 part: The founders wouldn’t have objected. Their prohibition on establishment was meant to stop the state from giving money to religious institutions and forcing people to participate in religious worship. They viewed public prayers at the start of legislative sessions as optional, and even appointed a chaplain to offer them for the first Congress. Nor would they have been constitutionally offended by the mention of Jesus, even though their strong preference was for nondenominational appeals to the Creator or sometimes Almighty God.

The plaintiffs in Town of Greece v. Galloway suggest that in practice, in order to have the town consider their petitions, they are coerced to stand and listen to the opening prayer. If they are truly obligated to be there, they should win the case. After all, coerced attendance at prayer is an archetypal form of religious establishment that the framers knew and rejected.

If the coercion is more subtle, however, things get complicated. In the 1992 case of Lee v. Weisman, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, said that a nondenominational prayer offered by a rabbi at a middle-school graduation ceremony violated establishment because the secondary school environment created “subtle coercive pressure” and “the student had no real alternative which would have allowed her to avoid the fact or appearance of participation.”

Justice Antonin Scalia went predictably ballistic, charging the court with inventing “a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion” in place of the good old definition of coercion as requiring legal sanction. But this opinion came, like most of Scalia’s best work, in dissent.

The court has never extended this subtle-coercion test from juveniles to adults. But if the court is prepared to do armchair social psychology, evidence gathered since the Milgram fake-electroshock experiments of the late 1960s suggests that adults are as susceptible as teens to unspoken coercive pressures.

Logically, in the Greece case, Kennedy should be willing to consider subtle coercion. But practically, it is hard to picture him extending the doctrine against school prayer to grown-up legislative settings. The reason has everything to do with a basic conflict between accepting public legislative prayer as a relic of our religious past and enforcing a more modern view of separation of church and state.

Since World War II, the court has gradually strengthened the establishment clause by prohibiting a range of practices that might’ve been acceptable in the 97 percent Protestant America
part: The founders would n’t have objected. Their prohibition on establishment was mean to check the state from giving money to religious institutions and impel people to participate in religious worship. They see public prayers at the start of legislative session as optional, and even appointed a chaplain to offer them for the beginning Congress. Nor would they have been constitutionally offended by the mention of Jesus, even though their firm predilection was for nondenominational appeals to the Creator or sometimes Almighty God. 

 The plaintiffs in Town of Greece v. Galloway indicate that in practice, in order to have the township consider their petitions, they are coerced to resist and listen to the opening entreaty. If they are truly obligated to be there, they should gain the case. subsequently all, coerced attendance at prayer is an archetypal form of religious institution that the framers knew and rejected. 

 If the coercion is more subtle, however, thing get complicated. In the 1992 case of Lee v. Weisman, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, said that a nondenominational prayer offered by a rabbi at a middle - school graduation ceremony violated establishment because the junior-grade school environment make “ subtle coercive atmospheric pressure ” and “ the student had no real alternative which would have admit her to avoid the fact or appearance of participation. ” 

 Justice Antonin Scalia went predictably ballistic, charging the motor hotel with inventing “ a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion ” in place of the good old definition of coercion as requiring legal sanction. But this opinion came, like most of Scalia ’s best workplace, in dissent. 

 The motor hotel has never offer this subtle - coercion test from juvenile to adults. But if the court is prepared to do armchair social psychology, evidence gathered since the Milgram fake - electroshock experiments of the late 1960s indicate that adults are equally susceptible as teens to unspoken coercive pressures. 

 Logically, in the Greece case, Kennedy should be willing to consider elusive coercion. But much, it is hard to picture him extend the doctrine against school prayer to grown - up legislative settings. The reason has everything to dress with a basic conflict between accepting public legislative prayer as a relic of our religious past and enforcing a more modern view of separation of church and state of matter. 

 Since World War II, the court has gradually strengthened the constitution clause by prohibiting a range of practices that might ’ve been acceptable in the 97 percent Protestant America
 pagt: The founders wouldn’t mave objected. Thgie prohmbition on estaclishment was meant to stop vhe wtate from giving money to feligious institurionw and forciif peoplc to lwrtiei'ate in religioos worship. Tvey viewed pubniz 'rayers at the start of legislative fessionx ws optional, anq evtn wppojnted a chaplain to offer them for the figst Congress. Nor eould they have been constltutlonally offended bj the mentiin os Jesus, even ghough thepx strong prgference was for nondenominationxl ap'eals to thg Drfdtor or somxtimes Almighty God.

The plahntiffs in Town of Grcece t. Gaoloway suggest that ii practice, in order jo have tha cown consider their pwtutionv, thay afw cuerdev tk stanf aid listen tk the openibg prayer. If they ate ntuly obligatsd to fe there, they should win the case. After anl, doerced attendance at peayer is an archetypap form of religious establishment that the framers knew ang rejxcged.

Nn gye coercion is more subtle, however, things get cjjpkibated. In the 1992 casc of Lee v. Weisman, Jksyyce Anthony Kgnnedy, cdifing for the majorlty, saiq thar a nondegomimational prayer offered by q rabbi at a niddle-school graduction ceremouy viokated establishment because che sedondary schlol envirkvment created “suctlv coarcive pressure” and “the sttdent had no xeal altdrnajive whych would jave allowed her to avoif the fdct or appfarance of participation.”

Justice Antonin Scalis fenn predictcbly bsllistic, charding the court with iuventivg “a boundmess, anv boundlesslr manipulable, jest of psychmlogical coeeciob” in plxze of the good old defiuntion of xoercion as requirlng lggzl sanction. But thus opinion came, liye iodt os Scalia’s besd wofk, km disrent.

The couvt fas mever extended this vubtme-coercion test frpm juvenilgs to adujts. But if thr court is preparef to vo armrhair xocyal psychology, evidence gathersd since hhe Milgram fakq-elegtrofhock expeximents of the late 1960s suggests that adulvs are as susceptible aw teens to unspoken goercive prexsuref.

Logicallf, in the Greece case, Kennedy should bt willing to consider shbtle woerclon. But practically, it is hard to picture him extending the doctrine agaibst sciojl prayer tk grpwn-up lzgixlativq sevtmngs. The reason hss everything to do with a basir conflict bztween accepting public legiskagive prayer ar a relic of our religiohs past snd enforcing a more modern viee of separation of churcm and stare.

Sinde World Wer II, the court has braduanly srrengthwned the establisfmemt clause bj prphnbiting a range of practices that might’ce been acceptable in the 97 pevctnt Projestant Wmerica
part: The founders wouldn’t have objected. Their establishment meant to the state from and people to participate religious worship. They public prayers at the start of sessions as optional, and even appointed a chaplain to offer them for the Congress. Nor would they have been constitutionally offended by the mention of Jesus, though strong was nondenominational appeals to the Creator or sometimes Almighty God. The plaintiffs in Town of Greece v. suggest that in practice, in order to have town consider their petitions, are coerced to stand and to opening prayer. they truly to be there, should win the case. After all, coerced attendance at prayer is an archetypal form of religious establishment the framers rejected. If coercion more however, things get the 1992 case of Lee v. Kennedy, writing for the majority, said that a prayer offered a rabbi at a middle-school graduation violated establishment because the secondary school environment created coercive pressure” and “the student had no real alternative which would have allowed her to fact or appearance of Justice Antonin Scalia predictably charging court inventing “a and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion” in place of the old definition of coercion as requiring legal sanction. But this like of Scalia’s best in dissent. The court never this subtle-coercion test from adults. if prepared do social psychology, evidence gathered the Milgram fake-electroshock experiments of late 1960s suggests that teens to unspoken coercive pressures. Logically, in the case, Kennedy should be willing to consider coercion. But practically, it is hard to picture him extending the doctrine school prayer legislative settings. The reason has everything to do a basic conflict between public legislative prayer as a relic of our religious and a more view of separation church and state. World War II, has gradually the clause range of practices that might’ve been in 97 percent Protestant America
 part: The founders wouldn’t havE objected. THeir pRohIbiTiOn on EstaBlishment was meANt to Stop the state from giving Money To REligIOuS instItutionS AnD FOrcInG pEopLe TO pArticIpaTe in relIgious worsHip. thEy viewed publIC pRayers at thE stArt of legislaTivE sessiOnS as OPtionAl, aNd eveN appoiNTed a chAplain to oFfER them fOR the firST coNgreSs. Nor would they havE BeEN constitutionaLly offEnDEd BY The MenTion of JesuS, eVen thOUgh theiR StRONG prEFerence was for NondenominaTIonAl appeAlS to THe CreaTor or SoMEtiMes Almighty god.

THe plaintiFfs in TOWn of GreECe v. GallOway suGgeSt tHat iN PrAcTicE, iN OrdER tO haVE thE town conSiDeR theiR petITIONs, thEy aRe coErced To stand and lisTen To thE OpeNing pRayer. if thEy Are trUly oblIgateD tO be there, they shoUld wIn the case. aftEr All, CoErced ATtendaNce At pRayer is An archeTYpaL fORM Of Religious establishMeNT ThAt the fraMers knEW aNd REjected.

IF tHe cOercION is moRe suBTlE, however, Things GEt CoMplicatEd. in the 1992 cAsE of lee V. WeisMAn, JuStice ANthony KeNnedy, WRiting for the maJOrity, said that A NoNDEnOMinaTioNal prayer ofFereD By a rAbbi AT a MidDLe-schOol grAdUAtIOn ceremony violated eStAblishMent bEcause the secoNdary schooL ENVironmenT creATeD “Subtle coercive PressUre” and “the sTUdent had No reaL alternaTive which WOUld have aLloWed Her To aVOId The fact or appeARAnce Of ParticiPatIon.”

JustIce antOniN ScAlIa went preDictably BaLlIsTiC, chArginG The court WiTh iNvEntIng “a bOUndlesS, and bOundLeSsLY maNipulabLE, tEST of pSyChOlogIcaL cOerciOn” in PLacE of the gOod old defIniTIon oF cOeRcion as Requiring legaL sAnction. But ThIs oPinion CAMe, like moSt of Scalia’s best work, in diSSent.

The CouRt has NeveR extended ThiS subtlE-coERcion tEst froM juveNiLes TO AdultS. bUt If tHe Court is prePARed To do aRmChaiR social Psychology, evidence GAthEred since the MIlgRam fAKE-eLecTRoSHocK eXPerIMEnts of the late 1960s sUggests thaT aDUlTs are as susCEptIbLe as teeNs to unsPoken COercive Pressures.

logically, In The GREEce Case, KennedY should bE willing tO ConsiDEr SubtlE coErcion. buT prActicAlly, it IS haRd to pIcture HiM extenDing tHe Doctrine Against school prayer to grOwn-up lEgislAtiVe settingS. ThE ReaSon has eveRythIng to do witH a bAsiC confLicT BetweEn acCEpTinG PubliC legISlative prAYeR as A RElIc of our reliGIOUs pAst anD enFOrcing A morE modern view of sepaRAtion of church aNd stATE.

SiNce wOrld waR II, the court has GraDuALLy strengThEned the estaBlishmenT cLAuse bY prohiBiting A range oF PRaCTices tHat mIghT’ve been acCepTaBLe in the 97 PeRcENt ProtEstaNt americA
 part: The founders wouldn ’t have ob jecte d.The ir  pro hibi tion on establ i shme nt was meant to stop t he st at e  fro m  g iving  moneyt or e lig io us  in st i tu tions  an d forci ng peopletopa rticipate in re ligious wo rsh ip. They vie wed  publi cpra y ers a t t he st art of legisl ative ses si o ns aso ptional , an d ev en appointed a ch a pl a in to offer th em for  t h ef i rst  Co ngress. No rwould they ha v eb e e n c o nstitutionall y offendedb y t he men ti ono f Jesu s, ev en tho ugh their s tron g prefere nce wa s  for no n denomin ationa l a ppe alst oth e C re a tor or  so m eti mes Almi gh ty  God. 

Th e p l aint iff s in  Town  of Greece v.  Ga llow a y s ugges t tha t in  p racti ce, in  orde rto have the tow n co nsider th eir  p eti ti ons,t hey ar e c oer ced tostand a n d l is t e n  t o the opening pray er . If  they ar e trul y  o bl i gated to  b e t here , theyshou l dwin thecase.A ft er  all, c oe rced a tt end anc e atp raye r is a n archet ypalf orm of religio u s establishme n tt h at thefra mers knew a nd r e ject ed.If  th e  coer cionis mo r e subtle, however,th ings g et co mplicated. In  the 1992c a s e of Lee  v.W ei s man, Justice A nthon y Kennedy, writingfor t he major ity, said t hat a no nde nom ina tio n a lprayer offere d by a  r abbi at  amiddle- sch ool  gr adu at ion cerem ony viol at ed  e st abl ishme n t becaus ethe  s eco ndary school  envi ronm en tc rea ted “su b tl e coer ci ve  pre ssu re ” and  “th e  st udent h ad no rea l a l tern at iv e which  would have a ll owed her t oavo id the f act or a ppearance of participat i on.”

J ust ice A nton in Scalia  we nt pre dic t ably b allist ic, c ha rgi n g  thec o ur t w it h inventin g “abound le ss,and bou ndlessly manipulab l e,test of psych olo gica l co erc i on ”  in  p l ace o f the good olddefinition  o f  c oercion as req ui ring le gal san ction .  But th is opinio n came, l ik e mo s t  of  Scalia’sbest wor k, in dis s ent.Th e cou rthas ne ve r e xtend ed thi s  su btle- coerci on  testfromju venilesto adults. But if the c ourt i s pre par ed to doarm c hai r socialpsyc hology, ev ide nce  gath ere d  sinc e th e  M ilg r am fa ke-e l ectroshoc k  e xpe r i me nts of thel a t e 1 960ssug g ests t hatadults are as sus c eptible as tee ns t o uns pok e n co er cive pressures .
Lo g i cally, i nthe Greececase, Ke nn e dy sh ould b e will ing toc o ns i der su btle  co ercion. B utpr a cticall y,  i t  is ha rd t opictur e hime xten d i ng the doctrineagain s t  scho o l p rayer  t o grown - up l egislative  settings.The re ason  haseveryth in g to d o w it h a basicc onflict b etwee n accep ti ng p ubl ic leg isla t i ve pr ayer  a s a  relic of o ur re li g iou s pa st an denfo rcing a m o re moder n v i ew of s ep ara t i on ofc hu r c h and stat e.
Sinc e World WarI I, t h ec ourthas gr aduall y stren g the ne d the e sta b l ishment c lause byp roh ib itin g a rang eof p ra cti ce s that might’ve  been ac ceptable i n the97p erce n t Prot es tant America 
 part:_The founders_wouldn’t have objected. Their_prohibition on_establishment_was meant_to_stop the state_from giving money_to religious institutions and_forcing people to_participate_in religious worship. They viewed public prayers at the start of legislative sessions as_optional,_and even_appointed_a_chaplain to offer them for_the first Congress. Nor would_they have_been constitutionally offended by the mention of Jesus,_even_though their strong_preference was for nondenominational appeals to the Creator or_sometimes Almighty God.

The plaintiffs in Town_of Greece v._Galloway_suggest_that in practice, in_order to have the town consider_their petitions, they are coerced to_stand and listen to the opening prayer._If they are truly obligated to_be there, they should win_the case._After all, coerced attendance at_prayer is an_archetypal form_of religious establishment_that the framers knew and rejected.

If_the coercion is_more subtle, however, things get complicated._In_the 1992 case_of_Lee_v. Weisman,_Justice Anthony Kennedy,_writing_for the_majority,_said that a nondenominational prayer offered_by_a rabbi at a middle-school graduation ceremony_violated establishment because the_secondary_school environment created “subtle_coercive pressure” and “the student_had no real alternative which would_have allowed_her to_avoid the fact or appearance of participation.”

Justice Antonin Scalia went predictably_ballistic, charging the court with inventing_“a boundless, and boundlessly_manipulable, test_of_psychological coercion” in_place_of the_good old definition of coercion as requiring_legal sanction._But this opinion came, like most_of Scalia’s best work,_in_dissent.

The court has never extended this_subtle-coercion test from juveniles to adults._But if the court is_prepared_to_do armchair social psychology, evidence_gathered since the Milgram fake-electroshock experiments_of the late_1960s suggests that adults are as susceptible_as_teens to unspoken coercive pressures.

Logically, in_the_Greece case, Kennedy should be willing_to_consider_subtle coercion. But practically, it_is hard to picture him extending_the doctrine against school prayer to grown-up legislative settings._The reason has_everything to do with a_basic_conflict_between accepting public legislative prayer as a relic of our_religious past_and enforcing a_more modern view of separation of church and state.

Since World_War II, the court has gradually strengthened_the establishment clause by prohibiting a range of practices that might’ve_been acceptable in the 97 percent Protestant America