 still could be that human-level emulation comes before from-scratch human-level AIs do. Of course, perhaps there would be some mix of both technologies. For instance, if crude brain emulations didn't reproduce all the functionality of actual human brains due to neglecting some cellular and molecular details, perhaps from-scratch AI techniques could help fill in the gaps.

If emulations are likely to come first, they may deserve more attention than other forms of AI. In the long run, bottom-up AI will dominate everything else, because human brains -- even run at high speeds -- are only so smart. But a society of brain emulations would run vastly faster than what biological humans could keep up with, so the details of shaping AI would be left up to them, and our main influence would come through shaping the emulations. Our influence on emulations could matter a lot, not only in nudging the dynamics of how emulations take off but also because the values of the emulation society might depend significantly on who was chosen to be uploaded.

One argument why emulations might improve human ability to control AI is that both emulations and the AIs they would create would be digital minds, so the emulations' AI creations wouldn't have inherent speed advantages purely due to the greater efficiency of digital computation. Emulations' AI creations might still have more efficient mind architectures or better learning algorithms, but building those would take work. The "for free" speedup to AIs just because of their substrate would not give AIs a net advantage over emulations. Bostrom feels "This consideration is not too weighty" (p. 244 of Superintelligence) because emulations might still be far less intelligent than AGI. I find this claim strange, since it seems to me that the main advantage of AGI in the short run would be its speed rather than qualitative intelligence, which would take (subjective) time and effort to develop.

Bostrom also claims that if emulations come first, we would face risks from two transitions (humans to emulations, and emulations to AI) rather than one (humans to AI). There may be some validity to this, but it also seems to neglect the realization that the "AI" transition has many stages, and it's possible that emulation development would overlap with some of those stages. For instance, suppose the AI trajectory moves from AI1->AI2->AI3. If emulations are as fast and smart as
still could be that human - level emulation comes before from - boodle human - degree AIs do. Of course, possibly there would be some mix of both technologies. For instance, if crude mind emulations didn't reproduce all the functionality of actual human brain due to neglecting some cellular and molecular detail, perhaps from - scratch AI proficiency could avail fill in the gaps. 

 If emulations are likely to come foremost, they may deserve more attention than other forms of AI. In the farseeing run, bottom - up AI will dominate everything else, because human brain -- even run at eminent speeds -- are only so smart. But a society of mind emulations would run vastly faster than what biological humans could keep up with, so the details of shaping AI would be left up to them, and our main influence would come through shaping the emulations. Our influence on emulations could matter a lot, not only in nudging the moral force of how emulation take off but besides because the value of the emulation company might depend significantly on who was choose to be uploaded. 

 One argument why emulations might improve human ability to see AI is that both emulations and the AIs they would create would be digital minds, so the emulations' AI creations wouldn't get inherent speed advantages purely due to the greater efficiency of digital computation. emulation' AI creations might still have more efficient mind architecture or better learning algorithms, but build those would assume work. The " for free " acceleration to AIs just because of their substrate would not give AIs a net advantage over emulation. Bostrom feels " This circumstance is not too cogent " (p. 244 of Superintelligence) because emulations might even be far less intelligent than AGI. I find this claim strange, since it seems to me that the independent advantage of AGI in the short run would be its speed rather than qualitative intelligence, which would take (subjective) time and effort to evolve. 

 Bostrom also claims that if emulation come first, we would face risks from two transitions (humans to emulation, and emulations to AI) rather than one (humans to AI). There may be some validity to this, but it also seems to neglect the realization that the " AI " passage has many stagecoach, and it's possible that emulation development would overlap with some of those stages. For instance, suppose the AI trajectory moves from AI1->AI2->AI3. If emulation are as fast and smart as
 stlll could be that human-ltvel emulation comes befmre frkm-scratcf human-level AIs do. Of coursx, peehaps there would be some mkx of botj technooogits. For instance, ih crude nxain slulaciins didn't reprpduce all dhe functionalhth lf actual human brains due to neglesting spmf cellular and moltcujar svtcils, perhaps from-scratch AI tecgniques could help foll in the gaps.

If emulatiojs age likely to come virst, they nay qwserve more xttention uhcn other fotms of AI. In the long run, bottom-jp AI will domibare feerything eose, bvcause human ngains -- aven rum at high speecs -- arw only so smart. But a society of brain gmulations wkuld run vastly fqsrer tvan fhat viouogjcel gumans conld keep up with, so thw details of shapinb WP would be lert up eo them, and our main influence would come thdough shaping the emularions. Our influence oj emulatijns could matter a lot, not only in nudging the dytamica of hjd elulations take off but also because the valuef og nhe emulation soclety might depend xihnosicantly on wfo was chksen to be uploadef.

One ardumenr why emujatipns might improve human abioity to contgol QI is that both emblations and the AIs yhey would create would be sigital minfs, so the dmulations' AI crdatpons wouldn't have inherent speqd advanteges 'urely dje tp the dreater efviciekwy of digital compktatiln. Emulationd' AI creations might still have more efficienj mhnd architeetures or better lewrning algoritkms, but yuildivg those wkuld tane work. The "for free" speafup to AIs jnst becaufe od thwir subrgrate would noy give AIs a net adcantage over emulabions. Gostrom feels "Tkns consideration os vot tlo wqhghty" (p. 244 of Vupefingrlligdnce) becausc eoulayions might still be far less intelligent yhwn AGI. I find thys claim stramge, since it seems to mx that the kaig advantage of AGI in the shorf run woupd ne its speed wathcr tran qualitctive intelligence, which would take (subjxctive) time and effort ro develop.

Bostrom akxo claims tiat if emulatiots come first, we wouod face risks frok two transitions (humzns to emulwtions, and emulations to AI) rather than one (humans to AI). There may be somw valiviey to this, gut ot alvo xeems eo nxguect the realizanion that the "AI" transition has oany stacef, and it's possible that emulstkon developmevt would overlap with soje of thpse stages. For instance, suppose the AI trajectory moves from AI1->QI2->AI3. Jf emulatiuns are as fast anc smarc as
still could be that human-level emulation comes human-level do. Of perhaps there would technologies. instance, if crude emulations didn't reproduce the functionality of actual human brains to neglecting some cellular and molecular details, perhaps from-scratch AI techniques could help in the gaps. If emulations are likely to come first, they may deserve attention other of In the long run, bottom-up AI will dominate everything else, because human brains -- even run high speeds -- are only so smart. But society of brain emulations run vastly faster than what humans keep up so details shaping AI would left up to them, and our main influence would come through shaping the emulations. Our influence on could matter not only nudging dynamics how emulations take also because the values of the depend significantly on who was chosen to be One argument emulations might improve human ability to AI is that both emulations and the AIs would create would be digital minds, so the emulations' AI creations wouldn't have inherent speed due to the greater of digital computation. AI might have efficient mind or better learning algorithms, but building those would take work. The free" speedup to AIs just because of their substrate would AIs net advantage over Bostrom feels "This consideration not weighty" (p. 244 of emulations still intelligent AGI. find this claim strange, it seems to me that main advantage of AGI be its speed rather than qualitative intelligence, which take (subjective) time and effort to develop. also claims that if emulations come first, we would face risks from transitions (humans and emulations to AI) rather than one (humans AI). There may be validity to this, but it also seems to neglect realization the "AI" has many stages, it's possible that development would overlap of those For suppose moves from AI1->AI2->AI3. If emulations are fast smart as
 still could be that human-leveL emulation Comes BefOre FrOm-scRatcH human-level AIs DO. Of cOurse, perhaps there would Be somE mIX of bOTh TechnOlogies. fOr INStaNcE, iF crUdE BrAin emUlaTions diDn't reproduCe aLl The functionaLItY of actual hUmaN brains due to NegLectinG sOme CEllulAr aNd molEcular DEtails, Perhaps frOm-SCratch ai techniQUEs CoulD help fill in the gapS.

if EMulations are liKely to CoME fIRSt, tHey May deserve MoRe attENtion thAN oTHER foRMs of AI. In the loNg run, bottom-UP AI Will doMiNatE EverytHing eLsE, BecAuse human brAins -- Even run at High spEEds -- are oNLy so smaRt. But a SocIetY of bRAiN eMulAtIOns WOuLd rUN vaStly fastEr ThAn whaT bioLOGICal hUmaNs coUld keEp up with, so the DetAils OF shAping aI wouLd be LeFt up tO them, aNd our MaIn influence woulD comE through sHapInG thE eMulatIOns. Our InfLueNce on emUlationS CouLd MATTeR a lot, not only in nudgInG THe Dynamics Of how eMUlAtIOns take oFf But Also BECause The vALuEs of the eMulatiON sOcIety migHt Depend SiGniFicAntly ON who Was choSen to be uPloadED.

One argument whY Emulations migHT iMPRoVE humAn aBility to conTrol ai is tHat bOTh EmuLAtionS and tHe ais THey would create would Be DigitaL mindS, so the emulatiOns' AI creatIONS wouldn't Have INhERent speed advanTages Purely due tO The greatEr effIciency oF digital cOMPutation. emuLatIonS' AI CREaTions might stiLL Have MoRe efficIenT mind arChiTecTurEs oR bEtter learNing algoRiThMs, BuT buIldinG Those wouLd TakE wOrk. the "foR Free" spEedup To AIS jUsT BecAuse of tHEiR SUbstRaTe WoulD noT gIve AIS a neT AdvAntage oVer emulatIonS. bostRoM fEels "ThiS consideratioN iS not too weiGhTy" (p. 244 Of SupeRINtelligeNce) because emulations migHT still bE faR less InteLligent thAn AgI. I finD thIS claim StrangE, sincE iT seEMS to me THAt The MaIn advantagE OF AGi in thE sHort Run woulD be its speed rather tHAn qUalitative intEllIgenCE, WhIch WOuLD taKe (SUbjECTive) time and effoRt to develoP.

BOStRom also claIMs tHaT if emulAtions cOme fiRSt, we wouLd face risKs from two TrAnsiTIOns (Humans to emUlations, And emulatIOns to ai) rAther ThaN one (huMaNs tO AI). ThEre may BE soMe valIdity tO tHis, but It alsO sEems to neGlect the realization that The "AI" tRansiTioN has many sTagES, anD it's possiBle tHat emulatiOn dEveLopmeNt wOUld ovErlaP WiTh sOMe of tHose STages. For iNStAncE, SUpPose the AI trAJECtoRy movEs fROm AI1->AI2->aI3. If Emulations are as faST and smart as
 still could be that human -level emu latio n c ome sbefo re f rom-scratch hu m an-l evel AIs do. Of course , per ha p s th e re  woul d be so m em i x o fbo thte c hn ologi es.  For in stance, if  cr ud e brain emul a ti ons didn't  re produce allthe  funct io nal i ty of  ac tualhumanb rainsdue to ne gl e ctings ome cel l u la r an d molecular detai l s, perhaps from-s cratch  A I  t e c hni que s could he lp  fill in theg ap s . 
If emulations ar e likely to com e firs t,  th e y maydeser ve mor e attention  tha n other f orms o f  AI. In the lon g run,  bo tto m-up AI  w ill  d o min a te  ev e ryt hing els e,  b ecaus e hu m a n brai ns-- e ven r un at high sp eed s -- are  only  so s mart .But a  socie ty of  b rain emulations  wou ld run va stl yfas te r tha n  whatbio log ical hu mans co u ldke e p up  with, so the deta il s of  shaping  AI wo u ld  b e  left up  t o t hem, a nd ou r ma i ninfluenc e woul d  c om e throu gh  shapi ng  th e e mulat i ons.  Our i nfluence  on e m ulations could matter a lot, no t on l y in  nu dging the d ynam i cs o f ho w  e mul a tions  take  o f fb ut also because the  v aluesof th e emulation s ociety mig h t depend s igni f ic a ntly on who wa s cho sen to beu ploaded. 

One  argumen t why emu l a tions mi ght  im pro veh u ma n ability toc o ntro lAI is t hat  both e mul ati ons  an dthe AIs t hey woul dcr ea te  wo uld b e  digital  m ind s,  so  thee mulati ons'AI c re at i ons  wouldn ' th a ve i nh er entspe ed  adva ntag e s p urely d ue to the  gr e ater  e ff iciency  of digital c om putation.Em ula tions' A I creati ons might still have mo r e effic ien t min d ar chitectur esor bet ter learni ng alg orith ms , b u t  buil d i ng  th os e would ta k e  wo rk. T he  "fo r free"  speedup to AIs ju s t b ecause of the irsubs t r at e w o ul d  no tg ive A Is a net advant age over e mu l at ions. Bost r omfe els "Th is cons idera t ion isnot too w eighty" ( p.  244 o f S uperintell igence)because e m ulati o ns  migh t s till b efar  less  intel l ige nt th an AGI .I find  this  c laim str ange, since it seems to  me th at th e m ain advan tag e  of  AGI in t he s hort run w oul d b e its  sp e ed ra ther th anq ualit ativ e  intellig e nc e,w h ic h would tak e ( sub jecti ve) time a nd e ffort to develop. 
Bostrom alsoclai m s  th ati f em ul ations come fi rst ,w e  would f ac e risks fro m two tr an s ition s (hum ans to  emulat i o ns ,  and e mula tio ns to AI)  ra th e r thanon e( humans  toAI ). The re may be s o m e validity to th is, b u t  it a l soseems  t o negle c t th e realizat ion that th e "AI"  tra nsiti on hasma ny sta ges ,and it's p o ssible th at em ulation  d evel opm ent wo uldo v erlap  wit hsom e of thos e st a ge s. For  ins tance ,supp ose the A I  traject ory moves f ro m A I 1 ->AI2- > AI 3 .  If emulat ion s are a s fast and smar t  a s 
 still_could be_that human-level emulation comes_before from-scratch_human-level_AIs do._Of_course, perhaps there_would be some_mix of both technologies._For instance, if_crude_brain emulations didn't reproduce all the functionality of actual human brains due to neglecting_some_cellular and_molecular_details,_perhaps from-scratch AI techniques could_help fill in the gaps.

If_emulations are_likely to come first, they may deserve more_attention_than other forms_of AI. In the long run, bottom-up AI will_dominate everything else, because human brains_-- even run_at_high_speeds -- are only_so smart. But a society of_brain emulations would run vastly faster_than what biological humans could keep up_with, so the details of shaping_AI would be left up_to them,_and our main influence would_come through shaping_the emulations._Our influence on_emulations could matter a lot, not_only in nudging_the dynamics of how emulations take_off_but also because_the_values_of the_emulation society might_depend_significantly on_who_was chosen to be uploaded.

One argument_why_emulations might improve human ability to control_AI is that both_emulations_and the AIs they_would create would be digital_minds, so the emulations' AI creations_wouldn't have_inherent speed_advantages purely due to the greater efficiency of digital computation. Emulations'_AI creations might still have more_efficient mind architectures or_better learning_algorithms,_but building those_would_take work._The "for free" speedup to AIs just_because of_their substrate would not give AIs_a net advantage over_emulations._Bostrom feels "This consideration is not_too weighty" (p. 244 of Superintelligence)_because emulations might still be_far_less_intelligent than AGI. I find_this claim strange, since it seems_to me that_the main advantage of AGI in the_short_run would be its speed rather_than_qualitative intelligence, which would take (subjective)_time_and_effort to develop.

Bostrom also claims_that if emulations come first, we_would face risks from two transitions (humans to emulations,_and emulations to_AI) rather than one (humans_to_AI)._There may be some validity to this, but it also_seems to_neglect the realization_that the "AI" transition has many stages, and it's possible_that emulation development would overlap with some_of those stages. For instance, suppose the AI trajectory moves from_AI1->AI2->AI3. If emulations are as fast and smart_as