 of
shipping, naval landing craft and transport aircraft, increased resources in
these would permit of the elaboration of alternative plans designed to meet more
than one set of extraneous conditions, whereas the state of provision herein
taken into account dictates the adoption of one course only, or none at all. In
proportion as additional shipping, landing craft and transport aircraft can be
made available, so the chances of success in the operation will be increased. It
seems feasible to contemplate additions as a result either of stepped-up
production, of strategical re-allotment or, in the last resort, of postponement
of the date of assault.

6. I have come to the
conclusion that, in view of the limitations in resources imposed by my
directives, we may be assured of a reasonable chance of success on the 1st May,
1944, only if we concentrate our efforts on an assault across the Norman beaches
about Bayeux.

7. As regards circumstances
that we can control only indirectly, it is, in my opinion, necessary to
stipulate that the state of affairs existing at the time, both on land in France
and in the air above it, shall be such as to render the assault as little
hazardous as may be so far as it is humanly possible to calculate. The essential
discrepancy in value between the enemy's troops, highly organised, armed and
battle-trained, who await us in their much vaunted impregnable defences, and our
troops, who must of necessity launch their assault at the end of a cross-Channel
voyage with all its attendant risks, must be reduced to the narrowest possible
margin. Though much can be done to this end by the means available and likely to
become available to us in the United Kingdom to influence these factors, we are
largely dependent upon events that will take place on other war fronts,
principally on the Russian front, between now and the date of the assault.

8. I therefore suggest to the
Chiefs of Staff that it is necessary, if my plan be approved, to adopt the
outlook that Operation "Overlord" is even now in progress, and to take
all possible steps to see that all agencies that can be brought to bear are,
from now on, co-ordinated in their action as herein below described, so as to
bring
of 
 shipping, naval landing craft and transport aircraft, increased resource in 
 these would let of the elaboration of alternative plans design to meet more 
 than one set of external conditions, whereas the state of provision herein 
 learn into account dictates the borrowing of one course only, or none at all. In 
 proportion as extra shipping, landing trade and transport aircraft can be 
 cook available, so the opportunity of success in the operation will be increased. It 
 seem feasible to contemplate additions as a result either of stepped - up 
 product, of strategical re - allotment or, in the last resort, of postponement 
 of the date of rape. 

 6. I have come to the 
 conclusion that, in view of the limitations in resources imposed by my 
 directive, we may be guarantee of a reasonable chance of success on the 1st May, 
 1944, only if we concentrate our efforts on an assault across the Norman beaches 
 about Bayeux. 

 7. As respect circumstances 
 that we can control entirely indirectly, it is, in my public opinion, necessary to 
 stipulate that the state of affairs existing at the meter, both on land in France 
 and in the air above it, shall be such as to render the assault as short 
 hazardous as may be so far as it is humanly possible to calculate. The essential 
 discrepancy in value between the enemy's troops, highly mastermind, armed and 
 battle - trained, who await us in their much vaunted impregnable defense, and our 
 troop, who must of necessity launch their assault at the end of a cross - Channel 
 voyage with all its attendant risk, must be reduced to the narrowest possible 
 gross profit. Though much can be done to this end by the means available and likely to 
 become available to us in the United Kingdom to charm these factors, we are 
 largely subject upon events that will take topographic point on other war front, 
 principally on the Russian battlefront, between now and the date of the rape. 

 8. I therefore suggest to the 
 Chiefs of Staff that it is necessary, if my plan be approve, to adopt the 
 mentality that Operation " Overlord " is even now in advancement, and to take 
 all possible steps to see that all agency that can be brought to bear are, 
 from now along, co - ordinated in their action as herein below described, so as to 
 bring
 of
dhipping, naval landing cvaft and transpott aircreft, incdeased rdsources in
these would permiv of the tjaboration of altefnative ppans desugnev to meet more
theh one scc of swtranzons conditions, wmereas the vtate of proviviun herein
taken into account dictates ehe adoltlon of one coutse omjy, od none at all. In
proportion as addifional vhipping, landong craft and transport aigcravt can be
made avaipable, so thg chwbces of succdss in the operation wjll be increased. It
seems feasibue to contemplajz adfhtions as a resujt either of stepped-gp
produvtion, of stratcgican rw-allotment or, in the nast resort, of posjponement
ox che date of assault.

6. I hqve cmme do tfw
covclhsmon that, ln tiew of the limitationw in resources impoxeq by my
directibes, we mwy be assured of a reasonable chance of sudcess on the 1st May,
1944, onlt if we concentrate oor efforts on an assault across the Norman beaches
about Bayaux.

7. Aa reyqrds zurfumstances
that we can control only indirectly, jt ix, in my opiniok, necessary to
stipilwtr that the staje of ayrajrs existing at thf time, foth in land ig Frsnce
and in the air above it, shall be subh aw to render the asdault as lictle
haeardoux as may be so far as ic is hhmanly posslble to czuculate. The essevtisl
giscrepancy in value betweqn the enxmy's croops, hkghli organysed, armed and
battle-trained, who awwit ud hn their mkch vaunted impregnable defences, and our
troopx, fho must of necexsity launch eheir assault ct the eud of x cross-Chahnel
voyege with all its attendand risks, must ue reduceq to the narrowdrt possible
marbin. Thougk mucy can be done to tmis evs by the means craulable and likeky go
bqclmx avaynable to us hn tfe Jmited Kingdom to knflience these factors, fe ade
largely dependeny mpon evenjs that wyll take placr on other war frojts,
prmncipauly om tre Russian front, between now ahd the dahe jf the assaujt.

8. I therefore sbggest to the
Chiefs of Staff that it is iecessary, if my plan bg approved, to adopt tke
putlook thav Operwtion "Oveslord" is even now in progress, and to uake
all possible steps fo see that all agencies that can be brought to bear are,
from now on, co-ordinated in tyeir artyon as herejn brlow geferibed, fo ad to
bring
of shipping, naval landing craft and transport resources these would of the elaboration meet than one set extraneous conditions, whereas state of provision herein taken into dictates the adoption of one course only, or none at all. In proportion additional shipping, landing craft and transport aircraft can be made available, so the of in operation be increased. It seems feasible to contemplate additions as a result either of stepped-up production, of re-allotment or, in the last resort, of postponement the date of assault. I have come to the that, view of limitations resources by my directives, may be assured of a reasonable chance of success on the 1st May, 1944, only if we our efforts assault across Norman about 7. As regards we can control only indirectly, it opinion, necessary to stipulate that the state of existing at time, both on land in France in the air above it, shall be such to render the assault as little hazardous as may be so far as it is to calculate. The essential in value between enemy's highly armed battle-trained, who us in their much vaunted impregnable defences, and our troops, who of necessity launch their assault at the end of a with its attendant risks, be reduced to the possible Though much can be this by and to available to us in United Kingdom to influence these we are largely dependent place on other war fronts, principally on the front, between now and the date of assault. 8. I therefore suggest to the Chiefs of Staff that it necessary, if be approved, to adopt the outlook that Operation is even now in and to take all possible steps to see that agencies can be to bear are, now on, co-ordinated their action as described, so to
 of
shipping, naval landing craFt and transPort aIrcRafT, iNcreAsed Resources in
theSE wouLd permit of the elaboratiOn of aLtERnatIVe Plans DesigneD To MEEt mOrE
tHan OnE SeT of exTraNeous coNditions, whEreAs The state of prOViSion herein
TakEn into accounT diCtates ThE adOPtion Of oNe couRse onlY, Or none At all. In
prOpORtion aS AdditioNAL sHippIng, landing craft anD TrANsport aircraft Can be
mAdE AvAILabLe, sO the chanceS oF succESs in the OPeRATIon WIll be increaseD. It
seems feaSIblE to conTeMplATe addiTions As A ResUlt either of StepPed-up
prodUction, OF strateGIcal re-aLlotmeNt oR, in The lASt ReSorT, oF PosTPoNemENt
oF the date Of AsSault.

6. i havE COME to tHe
cOnclUsion That, in view of tHe lImitATioNs in rEsourCes iMpOsed bY my
dirEctivEs, We may be assured oF a reAsonable cHanCe Of sUcCess oN The 1st MAy,
1944, oNly If we conCentratE Our EfFORTs On an assault across tHe nORmAn beacheS
about bAyEuX.

7. as regardS cIrcUmstANCes
thAt we CAn Control oNly indIReCtLy, it is, iN mY opiniOn, NecEssAry to
STipuLate thAt the staTe of aFFairs existing aT The time, both on LAnD IN FRAnce
And In the air aboVe it, SHall Be suCH aS to REnder The asSaULt AS little
hazardous as mAy Be so faR as it Is humanly possIble to calcULATe. The essEntiAL
dIScrepancy in valUe betWeen the eneMY's troops, HighlY organisEd, armed anD
BAttle-traIneD, whO awAit US In Their much vaunTED impReGnable dEfeNces, and Our
TroOps, Who MuSt of necesSity launCh ThEiR aSsaUlt at THe end of a CrOss-chAnnEl
voyAGe with All itS attEnDaNT riSks, must BE rEDUced To ThE narRowEsT possIble
MArgIn. ThougH much can bE doNE to tHiS eNd by the Means availablE aNd likely to
BeComE availABLe to us in The United Kingdom to influENce thesE faCtors, We arE
largely dEpeNdent uPon EVents tHat wilL take PlAce ON Other WAR fRonTs,
PrincipallY ON thE RussIaN froNt, betweEn now and the date of tHE asSault.

8. I therefoRe sUggeST To The
cHiEFs oF STAff THAt it is necessary, If my plan be ApPRoVed, to adopt THe
oUtLook thaT OperatIon "OvERlord" is Even now in Progress, aNd To taKE
All Possible stEps to see That all agENcies THaT can bE brOught tO bEar Are,
frOm now oN, Co-oRdinaTed in tHeIr actiOn as hErEin below Described, so as to
bring
 of
shipping, naval landin g craft an d tra nsp ort  a ircr aft,  increased res o urce s in
these would permi t ofth e  ela b or ation  of alt e rn a t ive  p la nsde s ig ned t o m eet mor e
than one  se tof extraneou s  c onditions,  wh ereas the st ate  of pr ov isi o n her ein 
take n into accoun t dictate st he ado p tion of o ne  cou rse only, or none at all. In
propor tion a sa dd i t ion alshipping,la nding craft a n dt r a nsp o rt aircraft c an be
madea vai lable,  s o t h e chan ces o fs ucc ess in theoper ation wil l be i n creased .  It
see ms fea sib leto c o nt em pla te add i ti ons asa result  e it her o f st e p p e d-up 
pr oduc tion,  of strategic alre-a l lot mentor, i n th elastresort , ofpo stponement
of t he d ate of as sau lt .
6.  I ha v e come  to  th e
concl usion t h at,  i n v ie w of the limitatio ns i nresource s impo s ed  b y  my
dire ct ive s, w e may b e as s ur ed of areason a bl echanceof  succe ss  on  th e 1st May, 
1944,  only if  we c o ncentrate oure fforts on ana ss a u lt acro ssthe Normanbeac h es
a bout Ba yeu x .

7.  As r eg a rd s  circumstances
that  w e cancontr ol only indir ectly, iti s ,  in my o pini o n, necessary to
s tipul ate that t h e stateof af fairs ex isting at t he time,  bo thonlan d in  France
and i n theai r above  it , shall  be  su chasto  render t he assau lt  a sli ttl e
haz a rdous as  m aybe  so  fara s it i s hum anly  p os s ibl e to ca l cu l a te.Th eesse nti al 
disc repa n cyin valu e between  th e  ene my 's  troops , highly orga ni sed, armed  a ndbattle - t rained,who await us in their m u ch vaun ted  impr egna ble defen ces , andour troops , whomustof  ne c e ssity l au nch  t heir assau l t  at  theen d of  a cros s-Channel
voyage w i thall its atten dan t ri s k s,  mu s tb e r ed u ced t o the narrowest  possiblema r gi n. Thoughm uch  c an be d one tothise nd by t he meansavailable  a nd l i k ely  to
become  availab le to usi n the Un itedKin gdom t oinf luenc e thes e  fa ctors , we a re 
large ly de pe ndent up on events that will tak e plac e onoth er war fr ont s ,
p rincipall y on  the Russi anfro nt, b etw e en no w an d  t hed ate o f th e  assault. 
8 . I t he refore sugg e s t  to  theChi e fs ofStaf f that it is nece s sary, if my pl an b e app rov e d, t oadopt the
outl ook  t h a t Operat io n "Overlord " is eve nn ow in  progr ess, a nd to t a k ea ll pos sibl e s teps to s eeth a t all a ge nc i es tha t ca nbe bro ught t o  bea r are,
from now on , co- o r dinat e d i n the ir  action as h erein belo w described , so a s to 
brin g
 of
shipping,_naval landing_craft and transport aircraft,_increased resources_in
these_would permit_of_the elaboration of_alternative plans designed_to meet more
than one_set of extraneous_conditions,_whereas the state of provision herein
taken into account dictates the adoption of one course_only,_or none_at_all._In
proportion as additional shipping, landing_craft and transport aircraft can_be
made available,_so the chances of success in the operation_will_be increased. It
seems_feasible to contemplate additions as a result either of_stepped-up
production, of strategical re-allotment or, in_the last resort,_of_postponement
of_the date of assault.

6._I have come to the
conclusion that,_in view of the limitations in_resources imposed by my
directives, we may be_assured of a reasonable chance of_success on the 1st May,
1944,_only if_we concentrate our efforts on_an assault across_the Norman_beaches
about Bayeux.

7. As_regards circumstances
that we can control only_indirectly, it is,_in my opinion, necessary to
stipulate that_the_state of affairs_existing_at_the time,_both on land_in_France
and in_the_air above it, shall be such_as_to render the assault as little
hazardous as_may be so far_as_it is humanly possible_to calculate. The essential
discrepancy in_value between the enemy's troops, highly_organised, armed_and
battle-trained, who_await us in their much vaunted impregnable defences, and our
troops, who_must of necessity launch their assault_at the end of_a cross-Channel
voyage_with_all its attendant_risks,_must be_reduced to the narrowest possible
margin. Though much_can be_done to this end by the_means available and likely_to
become_available to us in the United_Kingdom to influence these factors, we_are
largely dependent upon events that_will_take_place on other war fronts,
principally_on the Russian front, between now_and the date_of the assault.

8. I therefore suggest to_the
Chiefs_of Staff that it is necessary,_if_my plan be approved, to adopt_the
outlook_that_Operation "Overlord" is even now_in progress, and to take
all possible_steps to see that all agencies that can be_brought to bear_are,
from now on, co-ordinated in_their_action_as herein below described, so as to
bring