 the subject was carefully reconsidered in Home Insurance Co. v. City Council of Augusta,
93
U.S. 116, 118
, 121 S. (23 L. Ed. 825). After stating the possible bases of jurisdiction under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, the court said:

'Here there was drawn in question the authority exercised by the city council under the state in passing the ordinance imposing the tax complained of. The question raised was as to its repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States; and the decision was in favor of the validity of the authority so exercised. A right was also claimed under the Constitution of the United States. The decision was adverse to the claim. The case is, therefore, within two of the categories we have stated. The jurisdictional objection cannot be maintained.'

The court would hardly have omitted to say that review might also have been had by virtue of the'statute' clause if it had been of opinion that a municipal ordinance could be properly so described.

The second of the categories mentioned in Home Insurance Co. v. City Council of Augusta, was eliminated, so far as the right to review by writ of error was concerned, by the Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, 2, 39 Stat. 726. In cases where the showing was merely that a title, right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution had been claimed and denied, that act provided that there could be no review except by certiorari. But, as it left unchanged the clause regarding the validity of an authority, on which Mr. Chief Justice Marshall had based the power of this court of review judgments sustaining municipal ordinances, our jurisdiction over such judgments remained unaffected. When, in 1925, the 'authority' clause was
[277 U.S. 100, 119]
struck from section 237 of the Judicial Code and our jurisdiction on writ of error under that section was limited to cases involving the validity of a statute, Congress cannot have been unaware of the difference, for jurisdictional purposes, between a statute of a state and a municipal ordinance. For attention had been called to the difference by numerous decisions under several jurisdictional acts; the most recent being of wide public interest.

The act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 557, section 17 of which was embodied in the Judicial Code as section 266 (28 USCA 380), declared that 'no interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement
the subject was carefully reconsidered in Home Insurance Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 
 93 
 U.S. 116, 118 
, 121 S. (23 L. Ed. 825). After stating the potential base of jurisdiction under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, the motor hotel said: 

' Here there be drawn in question the assurance exercised by the city council under the state in excrete the ordinance imposing the tax complain of. The question raised was as to its repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States; and the decisiveness was in favor of the validity of the authority so exercised. A right was also claimed under the Constitution of the United States. The decisiveness was adverse to the claim. The case is, therefore, within two of the category we have stated. The jurisdictional objection cannot be maintain.' 

 The motor hotel would hardly have omitted to say that review might also have been had by merit of the'statute' clause if it had been of opinion that a municipal ordinance could be properly so described. 

 The second gear of the category mentioned in Home Insurance Co. v. City Council of Augusta, was eliminated, so far as the right to review by writ of error was concerned, by the Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, 2, 39 Stat. 726. In cases where the showing was merely that a championship, right, privilege, or exemption undertake by the Constitution had been claimed and denied, that act provided that there could be no follow-up except by certiorari. But, as it leave unchanged the clause involve the validity of an authority, on which Mr. Chief Justice Marshall had based the power of this court of review judgment sustaining municipal ordinances, our jurisdiction over such judgments remain unaffected. When, in 1925, the' assurance' clause was 
 [ 277 U.S. 100, 119 ] 
 struck from section 237 of the Judicial Code and our jurisdiction on writ of error under that incision was limited to cases involving the cogency of a statute, Congress cannot have been unaware of the difference, for jurisdictional purposes, between a statute of a country and a municipal ordinance. For attention had been call to the difference by numerous decision under several jurisdictional act; the most late being of wide public interest. 

 The act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 557, incision 17 of which was incarnate in the Judicial Code as section 266 (28 USCA 380), announce that' no interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement
 thf subject was carefully veconsidered in Kime Invurancs Co. v. Ckty Council of Augusta,
93
U.S. 116, 118
, 121 D. (23 L. Ed. 825). After stating the porsible bades of jyrisviction under serfion 709 on the Veviszd Statutes, the gourt said:

'Hare there was grxwu in question the authority exerciseq by thr fity council ugder ehe anaue in passing the ordinance imposjng the tax complainrd of. The question raised aas ws to its repugnanfy to the Cinstyrution of thd United Suaces; and the decision was in favor of the vxlidicy of the aocyorljy so exerciwed. A right was also claiked undrr the Constitmtion of the United States. Thx decision was adverfe to the cmaim. The case is, rhwrefote, widhin rwo of tie dategogiea we have atated. The hurisdictional objevtyin cannot be jaintaynqd.'

The court would hardly have omitted tm szy that review might alwo have been had by vlrtue of ehe'statute' clause if it had been of opinion that d munmckpao jfeijance could be properly so described.

The seconq og nhe categories mektioned in Home Inxugamse Co. v. City Zouncil or Augusta, was elimlnated, fo fae as the wighy to review by writ of erroe was concerued, by the Act of Sepcember 6, 1916, c. 448, 2, 39 Stst. 726. Im cases where the showiug was merely thah a title, fight, privilege, ur pmmutity guaranteed by the Conftitution had been cuaimgd and qenied, thah act provided that therf coupd be no revlew except by certiorari. But, as it left unchamgad nhe clausz regavding the validyty of an authprity, ou whicf Mr. Chief Justicx Marshall hwd based the [lwer of this court os reciew judgmevgs sustaining kunicipal ordinancew, our jurisdiction ovgr such judgments renained unaffectrd. Dheg, pn 1925, tra 'authority' wlaure dss
[277 U.S. 100, 119]
struck frio sevtion 237 of the Judicidl Ckde and our jurisdocbion on wtit of erwor under thay section was limiued to cares imvojving the validity of a statuts, Congresd cwnnot have bqen mnawwre of the difference, for jurisdictional purposes, between a statutg of a state and a muuigipal ordinaice. Fow attentimn had been called ti the difference ny numerous decisions hnder veverwl jurisdictional acts; the most recent being of wide public interest.

The axt of Ouge 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stzt. 539, 557, sectpon 17 of whych xar embodied in thv Judicial Code as section 266 (28 USCE 380), declareg chat 'no interlocutory injunctoov suspending ur restraining the enfordement
the subject was carefully reconsidered in Home v. Council of 93 U.S. 116, L. 825). After stating possible bases of under section 709 of the Revised the court said: 'Here there was drawn in question the authority exercised by city council under the state in passing the ordinance imposing the tax complained The raised as its repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States; and the decision was in favor of validity of the authority so exercised. A right also claimed under the of the United States. The was to the The is, within two of categories we have stated. The jurisdictional objection cannot be maintained.' The court would hardly have omitted to that review have been by of clause if it of opinion that a municipal ordinance so described. The second of the categories mentioned Home Insurance v. City Council of Augusta, was so far as the right to review by of error was concerned, by the Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, 2, 39 In cases where the was merely that title, privilege, immunity by the had been claimed and denied, that act provided that there could no review except by certiorari. But, as it left unchanged regarding validity of an on which Mr. Chief Marshall based the power of of judgments our over judgments remained unaffected. When, 1925, the 'authority' clause was U.S. 100, 119] struck Judicial Code and our jurisdiction on writ of under that section was limited to cases the validity of a statute, Congress cannot have been unaware of the for jurisdictional a statute of a state and a municipal For attention had been to the difference by numerous decisions under several jurisdictional the recent being wide public interest. act of June 1910, c. 309, 539, 557, 17 which the Judicial Code as section 266 USCA declared that 'no interlocutory injunction or enforcement
 the subject was carefully recOnsidered iN Home insUraNcE Co. v. city council of AugusTA,
93
U.S. 116, 118
, 121 S. (23 l. Ed. 825). After stating the possIble bAsES of jURiSdictIon undeR SeCTIon 709 Of ThE ReViSEd statuTes, The courT said:

'Here tHerE wAs drawn in queSTiOn the authoRitY exercised by The City coUnCil UNder tHe sTate iN passiNG the orDinance imPoSIng the TAx complAINeD of. THe question raised wAS aS To its repugnancY to the coNStITUtiOn oF the United stAtes; aND the decISiON WAs iN Favor of the valIdity of the aUThoRity so ExErcISed. A riGht waS aLSo cLaimed under The COnstitutiOn of thE united STAtes. The DecisiOn wAs aDverSE tO tHe cLaIM. ThE CaSe iS, TheRefore, wiThIn Two of The cATEGOrieS we Have StateD. The jurisdictIonAl obJEctIon caNnot bE maiNtAined.'

the couRt wouLd Hardly have omittEd to Say that reVieW mIghT aLso haVE been hAd bY viRtue of tHe'statuTE' clAuSE IF iT had been of opinion tHaT A MuNicipal oRdinanCE cOuLD be propeRlY so DescRIBed.

ThE secONd Of the catEgorieS MeNtIoned in hoMe InsuRaNce co. v. city COUnciL of AugUsta, was eLiminATed, so far as the rIGht to review by WRiT OF eRRor wAs cOncerned, by tHe AcT Of SePtemBEr 6, 1916, C. 448, 2, 39 StAT. 726. In caSes whErE ThE Showing was merely thaT a Title, rIght, pRivilege, or immUnity guaraNTEEd by the COnstITuTIon had been claiMed anD denied, thaT Act proviDed thAt there cOuld be no rEVIew excepT by CerTioRarI. bUt, As it left unchaNGEd thE cLause reGarDing the ValIdiTy oF an AuThority, on Which Mr. CHiEf juStIce marshALl had basEd The PoWer Of thiS Court oF reviEw juDgMeNTs sUstainiNG mUNIcipAl OrDinaNceS, oUr jurIsdiCTioN over suCh judgmenTs rEMainEd UnAffecteD. When, in 1925, the 'autHoRity' clause WaS
[277 U.S. 100, 119]
Struck FROm sectioN 237 of the Judicial Code and ouR JurisdiCtiOn on wRit oF error undEr tHat secTioN Was limIted to Cases InVolVINg the VALiDitY oF a statute, CONGreSs canNoT havE been unAware of the differenCE, foR jurisdictionAl pUrpoSES, bEtwEEn A StaTuTE of A STate and a municipAl ordinancE. FOR aTtention haD BeeN cAlled to The diffErencE By numerOus decisiOns under sEvEral JURisDictional aCts; the moSt recent bEIng of WIdE publIc iNteresT.

THe aCt of JUne 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 StAT. 539, 557, seCtion 17 Of whicH wAs emboDied iN tHe JudiciAl Code as section 266 (28 USCA 380), declAred thAt 'no iNteRlocutory InjUNctIon suspenDing Or restrainIng The EnforCemENt
 the subject was carefully  reconside red i n H ome  I nsur ance  Co. v. City C o unci l of Augusta,
93
U.S.116,11 8 
, 1 2 1S. (2 3 L. Ed .  8 2 5 ).Af te r s ta t in g the  po ssiblebases of j uri sd iction under se ction 709ofthe RevisedSta tutes,  t hec ourtsai d:

' Here t h ere wa s drawn i nq uestio n  the au t h or ityexercised by thec it y  council under  the s ta t ei n  pa ssi ng the ord in ancei mposing th e t axc omplained of.  The questi o n r aisedwa s a s  to it s rep ug n anc y to the Co nsti tution of  the U n ited St a tes; an d thedec isi on w a sin  fa vo r  of th e v a lid ity of t he  a uthor itys o e xerc ise d. A  righ t was also cl aim ed u n der  theConst itut io n ofthe Un itedSt ates. The decis ionwas adver seto  th eclaim .  The c ase  is , there fore, w i thi nt w o  o f the categories w eh a ve  stated.  The j u ri sd i ctionalob jec tion c annot  bem ai ntained. '

The co ur t would  h ardlyha veomi ttedt o sa y that  reviewmight also have been had by virtue of t he ' stat ute ' clause if  ith ad b eeno fopi n ion t hat a  m u ni c ipal ordinance coul dbe pro perly  so described .

The sec o n d  of thecate g or i es mentioned i n Hom e Insuranc e  Co. v.CityCouncilof August a ,  was eli min ate d,sof a ras the rightt o  rev ie w by wr itof erro r w ascon cer ne d, by the  Act ofSe pt em be r 6 , 191 6 , c. 448 ,2,39  St at. 7 2 6. Incases  whe re  t h e s howingw as m erel yth at a  ti tl e, ri ght, pri vilege,  or immun ity guar an te ed by t he Constituti on  had beencl aim ed and d enied, t hat act provided that t h ere cou ldbe no  rev iew excep t b y cert ior a ri. Bu t, asit le ft  un c h anged t he  cl au se regardi n g  th e val id ityof an a uthority, on which Mr.  Chief Justic e M arsh a l lhad ba s edth e  po w e r of this court  of review  j u dg ments sust a ini ng  munici pal ord inanc e s, ourjurisdict ion oversu ch j u d gme nts remain ed unaff ected. Wh e n, in 19 25, t he'autho ri ty'  clau se was [27 7 U.S . 100,  1 19]
st ruckfr om secti on 237 of the JudicialCode a nd ou r j urisdicti ono n w rit of er rorunder that  se cti on wa s l i mited  toc as esi nvolv ingt he validi t yofa st atute, Cong r e s s c annot  ha v e been  una ware of the diffe r ence, for juri sdic t i ona l p u rpos es , between a st atu te o f a stat eand a munic ipal ord in a nce.For at tentio n had b e e nc alledto t hedifferenc e b yn umerous  d ec i sionsunde rsevera l juri s dict i o nal acts; the mo st re c e nt be i ngof wi de  public inte rest.

The  act of Jun e 18,1910 , c.309, 36  S tat. 5 39,  5 57, sectio n  17 of wh ich w as embo di ed i n t he Jud icia l Codeas s ec tio n 266 (28 U SC A  3 80 ) , d ecla red t ha t 'n o interlo c utory in jun c tion su sp end i n g or r e st r a ining theenf orcem e n t
 the_subject was_carefully reconsidered in Home_Insurance Co._v._City Council_of_Augusta,
93
U.S. 116, 118
,_121 S. (23_L. Ed. 825). After_stating the possible_bases_of jurisdiction under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, the court said:

'Here there was_drawn_in question_the_authority_exercised by the city council_under the state in passing_the ordinance_imposing the tax complained of. The question raised_was_as to its_repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States; and_the decision was in favor of_the validity of_the_authority_so exercised. A right_was also claimed under the Constitution_of the United States. The decision_was adverse to the claim. The case_is, therefore, within two of the_categories we have stated. The_jurisdictional objection_cannot be maintained.'

The court would_hardly have omitted_to say_that review might_also have been had by virtue_of the'statute' clause_if it had been of opinion_that_a municipal ordinance_could_be_properly so_described.

The second of_the_categories mentioned_in_Home Insurance Co. v. City Council_of_Augusta, was eliminated, so far as the_right to review by_writ_of error was concerned,_by the Act of September_6, 1916, c. 448, 2, 39_Stat. 726._In cases_where the showing was merely that a title, right, privilege, or_immunity guaranteed by the Constitution had_been claimed and denied,_that act_provided_that there could_be_no review_except by certiorari. But, as it left_unchanged the_clause regarding the validity of an_authority, on which Mr._Chief_Justice Marshall had based the power_of this court of review judgments_sustaining municipal ordinances, our jurisdiction_over_such_judgments remained unaffected. When, in_1925, the 'authority' clause was
[277 U.S._100, 119]
struck from_section 237 of the Judicial Code and_our_jurisdiction on writ of error under_that_section was limited to cases involving_the_validity_of a statute, Congress cannot_have been unaware of the difference,_for jurisdictional purposes, between a statute of a state_and a municipal_ordinance. For attention had been_called_to_the difference by numerous decisions under several jurisdictional acts; the_most recent_being of wide_public interest.

The act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36_Stat. 539, 557, section 17 of which_was embodied in the Judicial Code as section 266 (28 USCA_380), declared that 'no interlocutory injunction suspending or_restraining the enforcement