 access to court is otherwise unimpeded. See Gilmore v. Utah,
429
U.S., at 1017
(STEVENS, J., concurring). Although we are not here faced with the question whether a hearing on mental competency is required by the United States Constitution whenever a capital defendant desires to terminate further proceedings, such a hearing will obviously bear on whether the defendant is able to proceed on his own behalf. The Supreme Court of Arkansas requires a competency hearing as a matter of state law, and in this case it affirmed the trial court's finding that Simmons had "the capacity to understand the choice between life and death and to knowingly and intelligently waive any and all rights to appeal his sentence." Simmons v. State, 298 Ark., at 194, 766 S. W. 2d, at 423. At oral argument, Whitmore's counsel questioned the validity of the waiver, but we find no reason to disturb the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas on this point.

Simmons was questioned by counsel and the trial court concerning his choice to accept the death sentence, and his answers demonstrate that he appreciated the consequences of that decision. He indicated that he understood several possible grounds for appeal, which had been explained to him by counsel, but informed the court that he was "not seeking any technicalities." Tr. 15. In a psychiatric interview, Simmons stated that he would consider it "`a terrible miscarriage of justice for a person to kill people and not be executed,'"
[495
U.S. 149, 166]
id., at 29, and there was no meaningful evidence that he was suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect that substantially affected his capacity to make an intelligent decision. See Rees v. Peyton,
384
U.S. 312, 314
(1966). We therefore hold that Whitmore, having failed to establish that Simmons is unable to proceed on his own behalf, does not have standing to proceed as "next friend" of Ronald Gene Simmons.

* * *

At the beginning of this century, the Court confronted a situation similar to this in which a concerned citizen sought to bring an ordinary civil action to secure relief for a condemned man. The Court's response on that occasion is equally apt today: "However friendly he may be to the doomed man and sympathetic for his situation; however concerned he may be lest unconstitutional laws be enforced, and however laudable such sentiments are, the grievance they suffer and feel is not special enough
access to court is otherwise unimpeded. See Gilmore v. Utah, 
 429 
 U.S., at 1017 
 (STEVENS, J., concurring). Although we are not here front with the doubt whether a hearing on mental competency is ask by the United States Constitution whenever a capital defendant desires to displace further minutes, such a hearing will obviously bear on whether the defendant is able to proceed on his own behalf. The Supreme Court of Arkansas requires a competence hearing as a matter of state law, and in this shell it affirmed the trial court's finding that Simmons had " the capacity to sympathize the choice between life and death and to wittingly and intelligently waive any and all rights to appeal his sentence. " Simmons v. State, 298 Ark., at 194, 766 S. W. 2d, at 423. At oral argument, Whitmore's advocate questioned the validity of the waiver, but we find no reason to interrupt the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas on this point. 

 Simmons was questioned by counsel and the trial court concerning his choice to accept the death sentence, and his answers demonstrate that he appreciated the consequences of that decision. He indicated that he understand several possible ground for entreaty, which had been explained to him by counsel, but informed the motor hotel that he was " not seeking any technicality. " Tr. 15. In a psychiatric interview, Simmons stated that he would consider it " 'a severe miscarriage of justice for a person to kill people and not be executed,' " 
 [ 495 
 U.S. 149, 166 ] 
 i d., at 29, and there was no meaningful evidence that he was suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect that substantially affected his capability to make an healthy decisiveness. determine Rees v. Peyton, 
 384 
 U.S. 312, 314 
 (1966). We therefore hold that Whitmore, having failed to install that Simmons is unable to proceed on his own behalf, does not have standing to continue as " next friend " of Ronald Gene Simmons. 

 * * * 

 At the beginning of this century, the Court confronted a position similar to this in which a implicated citizen sought to bring an ordinary civil action to secure stand-in for a condemned serviceman. The Court's response on that affair is equally apt today: " However friendly he may be to the doomed man and sympathetic for his position; however concerned he may be lest unconstitutional laws be enforced, and however laudable such sentiments are, the grievance they suffer and feel is not special enough
 acfess to court is otherwire unimpeded. Seg Tilmorx v. Utag,
429
U.S., at 1017
(SGEVENS, J., concurring). Although ww are not here faced with tfe questiln whethwr a yearing on mental gjmpefcncy ns required by tme United Sdates Constitudiun whenever a capital defendant desirqs to trrlinate further probeqdinfs, such a hearing will obviously bsar on xhether the defrndant is able to proceed ln hls own behalf. The Dupreme Coutf os Arkansas reduires a competency hezring as a matter of state law, xnd iu this case ir avxirmed the vrial bourt's findinn that Vimmons had "the capaclty tm ubderstand the choice uetween life and deajh and to nnkwingly and inteloitentli waiee avt avd zlk dights to appeal hia sentence." Wimmons v. State, 298 Arl., wn 194, 766 S. W. 2d, at 423. At orwl argument, Whitmore's counsel questioned uhe vzlidity of the waiver, byt we find no reason jo disturb the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas on this ooiub.

Fknmlns was questioned by counsel and the trial cjhru cpncerning his ghoice to accept tne drwth sentence, xnd his ahswers demonstrate that hg apprwciated tre cpnsequences of that decisiob. He indicatvd tyat he understood deveral posriblg groumds for appeal, which hab been explained ho him by zounsel, but infofmec dhe couru that he was "not feeking aiy teehnicaligies." Tr. 15. Ig a psychiwtric interview, Simmons dtateb thad he would consider it "`a terrible miscarrmege of justicg fmr d person to klll people and got be executeb,'"
[495
U.S. 149, 166]
id., ct 29, ana there waa no meeningful eviqence that he aas sufferinj from a ientql dusease, aksorder, or defrct that substantiaoly affected his cepackfy to make an iuueloigent decision. Sed Rqed t. Peyemn,
384
U.S. 312, 314
(1966). We tharefure nold ghat Whitmove, favimg failed to establivh tgat Simmons is unanlc to procged on hif own behalf, coes not have stanfing vo proreed ax "ngxt friend" of Ronald Gene Simmohs.

* * *

At thf bcginning of tris gentory, the Couxt confronted a situation similar to thiw in which a concgrned citizen sought jo nring an ordmnary sivil acthon to secure relief for a condemned kan. The Court's responae on dhat lccasion is equally apt today: "However friendly he may be to the doomed mab and sympathetic ror nis sptuctipn; howqver roncerned he may ne lest unconstitutional laws bx enforced, aud however laudable such sentomdnts are, the erievance they suffer ans feel ix not special enough
access to court is otherwise unimpeded. See Utah, U.S., at (STEVENS, J., concurring). faced the question whether hearing on mental is required by the United States whenever a capital defendant desires to terminate further proceedings, such a hearing will bear on whether the defendant is able to proceed on his own behalf. Supreme of requires competency hearing as a matter of state law, and in this case it affirmed the trial finding that Simmons had "the capacity to understand choice between life and and to knowingly and intelligently any all rights appeal sentence." v. State, 298 at 194, 766 S. W. 2d, at 423. At oral argument, Whitmore's counsel questioned the validity of waiver, but no reason disturb judgment the Supreme Court on this point. Simmons was questioned the trial court concerning his choice to accept death sentence, his answers demonstrate that he appreciated consequences of that decision. He indicated that he several possible grounds for appeal, which had been explained to him by counsel, but informed that he was "not any technicalities." Tr. In psychiatric Simmons that he consider it "`a terrible miscarriage of justice for a person to people and not be executed,'" [495 U.S. 149, 166] id., and was no meaningful that he was suffering a disease, disorder, or defect affected capacity intelligent See v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 314 (1966). We therefore hold Whitmore, having failed to to proceed on his own behalf, does not standing to proceed as "next friend" of Gene Simmons. * * * At the beginning of this century, the confronted a to this in which a concerned citizen sought bring an ordinary civil to secure relief for a condemned man. The Court's on occasion is apt today: "However he may be the doomed man for his however he unconstitutional laws be enforced, and however such are, the grievance they suffer feel special enough
 access to court is otherwise uNimpeded. SeE GilmOre V. UtAh,
429
u.S., at 1017
(sTEVeNS, J., concurring). aLthoUgh we are not here faced wiTh the QuEStioN WhEther A hearinG On MENtaL cOmPetEnCY iS requIreD by the UNited StateS CoNsTitution whenEVeR a capital dEfeNdant desires To tErminaTe FurTHer prOceEdingS, such a HEaring Will obvioUsLY bear oN Whether THE dEfenDant is able to proceED oN His own behalf. ThE SupreMe cOuRT Of ARkaNsas requirEs A compETency heARiNG AS a mATter of state laW, and in this cASe iT affirMeD thE Trial cOurt's FiNDinG that SimmonS had "The capaciTy to unDErstand THe choicE betweEn lIfe And dEAtH aNd tO kNOwiNGlY anD IntElligentLy WaIve anY and ALL RIghtS to AppeAl his Sentence." SimmoNs v. statE, 298 ark., At 194, 766 S. W. 2d, At 423. At oRal aRgUment, whitmoRe's coUnSel questioned thE valIdity of thE waIvEr, bUt We finD No reasOn tO diSturb thE judgmeNT of ThE sUPrEme Court of Arkansas On THIs Point.

SimMons waS QuEsTIoned by cOuNseL and THE triaL couRT cOncerninG his chOIcE tO accept ThE death SeNteNce, And hiS AnswErs demOnstrate That hE Appreciated the COnsequences of THaT DEcISion. he iNdicated thaT he uNDersTood SEvEraL PossiBle grOuNDs FOr appeal, which had beeN eXplainEd to hIm by counsel, buT informed tHE COurt that He waS "NoT Seeking any techNicalIties." Tr. 15. In a PSychiatrIc intErview, SiMmons statED That he woUld ConSidEr iT "`A TeRrible miscarrIAGe of JuStice foR a pErson to KilL peOplE anD nOt be execuTed,'"
[495
U.S. 149, 166]
id., aT 29, aNd ThErE waS no meANingful eViDenCe ThaT he waS SufferIng frOm a mEnTaL DisEase, disORdER, Or deFeCt That SubStAntiaLly aFFecTed his cApacity to MakE An inTeLlIgent deCision. See Rees V. PEyton,
384
U.S. 312, 314
(1966). We tHeRefOre holD THat WhitmOre, having failed to establISh that SImmOns is UnabLe to proceEd oN his owN beHAlf, doeS not haVe staNdIng TO ProceED As "NexT fRiend" of RonALD GeNe SimMoNs.

* * *

At The begiNning of this century, THe COurt confronteD a sItuaTIOn SimILaR To tHiS In wHICh a concerned citIzen sought To BRiNg an ordinaRY ciViL action To securE reliEF for a coNdemned maN. The Court'S rEspoNSE on That occasiOn is equaLly apt todAY: "HoweVEr FrienDly He may bE tO thE doomEd man aND syMpathEtic foR hIs situAtion; HoWever conCerned he may be lest unconsTitutiOnal lAws Be enforceD, anD HowEver laudaBle sUch sentimeNts Are, The grIevANce thEy suFFeR anD Feel iS not SPecial enoUGh
 access to court is otherw ise unimpe ded.See  Gi lm orev. U tah,
429
U.S., at 1 017
(STEVENS, J., conc urrin g) .  Alt h ou gh we  are no t  h e r e f ac ed  wi th th e que sti on whet her a hear ing  o n mental com p et ency is re qui red by the U nit ed Sta te s C o nstit uti on wh enever a capi tal defen da n t desi r es to t e r mi nate  further proceedi n gs ,  such a hearin g will  o b vi o u sly  be ar on whet he r the defenda n ti s abl e  to proceed o n his own b e hal f. The  S upr e me Cou rt of  A r kan sas require s acompetenc y hear i ng as a matterof sta telaw , an d  i nthi sc ase it  af f irm ed the t ri al  cour t'sf i n d ingtha t Si mmons  had "the cap aci ty t o  un derst and t he c ho ice b etween  life  a nd death and to  kno wingly an d i nt ell ig ently waiveany  an d all r ights t o  ap pe a l hi s sentence." Simmo ns v .State, 2 98 Ark . ,at 194, 766  S . W . 2d , at 42 3. A t  o ral argu ment,W hi tm ore's c ou nsel q ue sti one d the vali dity o f the wa iver, but we find no reason to dis t ur b th e  jud gme nt of the S upre m e Co urto fArk a nsason th is po i nt.

Simmons was qu es tioned  by c ounsel and th e trial co u r t  concern ingh is choice to acce pt th e death se n tence, a nd hi s answer s demonst r a te thatheapp rec iat e d  t he consequenc e s  ofth at deci sio n. He i ndi cat edtha the unders tood sev er al  p os sib le gr o unds for  a ppe al , w hichh ad bee n exp lain ed  t o  hi m by co u ns e l , bu tin form edth e cou rt t h athe was"not seek ing anyte ch nicalit ies." Tr. 15.  I n a psychi at ric  inter v i ew, Simm ons stated that he woul d  consid erit "` a te rrible mi sca rriage  of justic e fora per so n t o killp e op lean d not be e x e cut ed,'" 
[ 495U.S. 14 9, 166]
id., at 29 ,  an d there was n o m eani n g fu l e v id e nce  t h ath e  was sufferingfrom a men ta l  d isease, di s ord er , or de fect th at su b stantia lly affec ted his c ap acit y tomake an in telligen t decisio n . See Re es v.  Pe yton,38 4
U .S. 3 12, 31 4 
(1 966).  We th er eforeholdth at Whitm ore, having failed to e stabli sh th atSimmons i s u n abl e to proc eedon his own  be hal f, do esn ot ha ve s t an din g  to p roce e d as "nex t  f rie n d "of Ronald G e n e  Si mmons .
*  * *
At t he beginning of t h is century, th e Co u r t c onf r onte da situation si mil ar t o this i nwhich a con cerned c it i zen s oughtto bri ng an o r d in a ry civ il a cti on to sec ure  r e lief fo rac ondemn ed m an . TheCourt' s  res p o nse on that occa sioni s  equa l lyapt t od ay: "Ho w ever  friendlyhe may be t o thedoom ed ma n and s ym pathet icfo r his situ a tion; how everconcern ed  hemay  be le st u n c onsti tuti on allaws be e n f or c ed ,a ndhowe ver l au dabl e such se n timentsare ,  the gr ie van c e  theys uf f e r and feel  is  nots p ecial enou g h
 access_to court_is otherwise unimpeded. See_Gilmore v._Utah,
429
U.S.,_at 1017
(STEVENS,_J.,_concurring). Although we_are not here_faced with the question_whether a hearing_on_mental competency is required by the United States Constitution whenever a capital defendant desires_to_terminate further_proceedings,_such_a hearing will obviously bear_on whether the defendant is_able to_proceed on his own behalf. The Supreme Court_of_Arkansas requires a_competency hearing as a matter of state law, and_in this case it affirmed the_trial court's finding_that_Simmons_had "the capacity to_understand the choice between life and_death and to knowingly and intelligently_waive any and all rights to appeal_his sentence." Simmons v. State, 298_Ark., at 194, 766 S._W. 2d,_at 423. At oral argument,_Whitmore's counsel questioned_the validity_of the waiver,_but we find no reason to_disturb the judgment_of the Supreme Court of Arkansas_on_this point.

Simmons was_questioned_by_counsel and_the trial court_concerning_his choice_to_accept the death sentence, and his_answers_demonstrate that he appreciated the consequences of_that decision. He indicated_that_he understood several possible_grounds for appeal, which had_been explained to him by counsel,_but informed_the court_that he was "not seeking any technicalities." Tr. 15. In a_psychiatric interview, Simmons stated that he_would consider it "`a_terrible miscarriage_of_justice for a_person_to kill_people and not be executed,'"
[495
U.S. 149, 166]
id.,_at 29,_and there was no meaningful evidence_that he was suffering_from_a mental disease, disorder, or defect_that substantially affected his capacity to_make an intelligent decision. See_Rees_v._Peyton,
384
U.S. 312, 314
(1966). We therefore_hold that Whitmore, having failed to_establish that Simmons_is unable to proceed on his own_behalf,_does not have standing to proceed_as_"next friend" of Ronald Gene Simmons.

*_*_*

At_the beginning of this century,_the Court confronted a situation similar_to this in which a concerned citizen sought to_bring an ordinary_civil action to secure relief_for_a_condemned man. The Court's response on that occasion is equally_apt today:_"However friendly he_may be to the doomed man and sympathetic for his_situation; however concerned he may be lest_unconstitutional laws be enforced, and however laudable such sentiments are, the_grievance they suffer and feel is not special_enough