 into Manchuria.

Obviously, it would be reckless not to worry about North Korea’s missile and WMD technologies. In August, there were reports yet again that Kim Jong Il was preparing an underground nuclear test. And the North test fired seven missiles in July. According to U.S. data, three of the missiles were Scud-Cs, and three were No-dong-As with ranges of 300 to 1,000 miles; all were capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. (Whether North Korea has such warheads is not definitively known, but it is widely believed to have in the neighborhood of ten—and the KFR certainly has the materials and technological know-how to build them.) The third type of missile, a Taep’o-dong-2, has a range of 2,300 to 9,300 miles, which means it could conceivably hit the continental United States. Though the Taep’o-dong-2 failed after takeoff during the recent testing, it did so at the point of maximum dynamic pressure—the same point where the space shuttle Challenger exploded, and the moment when things are most likely to go wrong. So this is likely not an insoluble problem for the KFR.

The Seven Stages of Collapse

Kim Jong Il’s compulsion to demonstrate his missile prowess is a sign of his weakness. Contrary to popular perception in the United States, Kim doesn’t stay up at night worrying about what the Americans might do to him; it’s not North Korea’s weakness relative to the United States that preoccupies him. Rather, if he does stay up late worrying, it’s about China. He knows the Chinese have always had a greater interest in North Korea’s geography—with its additional outlets to the sea close to Russia—than they have in the long-term survival of his regime. (Like us, even as they want the regime to survive, the Chinese have plans for the northern half of the Korean peninsula that do not include the “Dear Leader.”) One of Kim’s main goals in so aggressively displaying North Korea’s missile capacity is to compel the United States to deal directly with him, thereby making his otherwise weakening state seem stronger. And the stronger Pyongyang appears to be, the better off it is in its crucial dealings with Beijing, which are what really matter to Kim.

To Kim’s sure dismay, the American response to his recent missile tests was a
into Manchuria. 

 Obviously, it would be reckless not to worry about North Korea ’s missile and WMD technologies. In August, there be report yet again that Kim Jong Il was preparing an underground nuclear examination. And the North test fired seven projectile in July. accord to U.S. data, three of the missile were Scud - Cs, and three were No - dong - As with range of 300 to 1,000 miles; all were capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. (Whether North Korea has such warheads is not definitively known, but it is wide believed to have in the neighborhood of ten — and the KFR surely has the materials and technological know - how to build them .) The third type of projectile, a Taep’o - dong-2, has a stove of 2,300 to 9,300 miles, which means it could conceivably hit the continental United States. Though the Taep’o - dong-2 fail after takeoff during the recent testing, it did so at the distributor point of maximum dynamic pressure — the same point where the space shuttle Challenger exploded, and the moment when things are about probable to go wrong. So this is probable not an insoluble trouble for the KFR. 

 The Seven Stages of Collapse 

 Kim Jong Il ’s compulsion to demonstrate his missile prowess is a sign of his weakness. Contrary to popular perception in the United States, Kim does n’t last out up at night worrying about what the Americans might do to him; it ’s not North Korea ’s weakness relative to the United States that preoccupies him. Rather, if he does persist up late worrying, it ’s about China. He knows the Chinese have always receive a greater sake in North Korea ’s geography — with its additional outlets to the sea close to Russia — than they have in the retentive - term survival of his regime. (Like us, even as they want the government to survive, the Chinese have plans for the northern one-half of the Korean peninsula that do not include the “ Dear Leader. ”) One of Kim ’s main goals in so aggressively displaying North Korea ’s projectile capacity is to compel the United States to deal directly with him, thereby making his differently weakening state look stronger. And the stronger Pyongyang appear to be, the better off it is in its all-important dealings with Beijing, which are what really matter to Kim. 

 To Kim ’s certain dismay, the American response to his recent missile tests was a
 inho Manchuria.

Obviously, it would be recklgsw not vo worrg about Vorth Korea’s missile and WMD twchnooogies. In August, there were replrts yet agamn that Kim Jong Il was ixeparjkg an nnderground nuckear test. Dnd the North dert fired seven missiles in July. Accorqing to U.D. data, three os tht myssimvs were Scud-Cs, and three were Nk-dong-As with ranges pf 300 to 1,000 miles; all were capwble of carrying a nucpear warheae. (Whqrher North Kurea has sleh warheads is not definitively known, but kt is widely beoiwvef to have in the geighborhood of ten—atd the LFR certainly mas tie mqterials and technolojical know-how to buijd them.) Tve third type of miwsule, a Tae[’o-dovt-2, hxs z canfe of 2,300 to 9,300 miles, whjch means ir could conceivably hyn the continehtal Ugieed States. Though the Taep’o-dong-2 failed dftsr takeoff during the rwcent testing, it did do at the point of maximum dynamic pressure—the same point fhere ghe siace whkttle Challenger exploded, and the moment when fhonns are most likejy to go wrpnh. Xj this is likgly not an insoluble problem for thg KFR.

Tye Seven Ftagrs of Collapse

Kim Jong Il’s xompulsion tj demonstrate his mnssile prowers ix a sogn of his weakness. Concrary fo popular oerceptioh in the United Sgatvs, Khm doesn’u stay up at night worrying abobt what ghe Smericwns might fo to him; it’s not North Norea’d feakness rflative to the United States thev preoccupies hhm. Gather, if he dpes stay up lwte worrying, ij’s about Ehina. Fe knows tge Chinxse have alwwys had a gredjer interest mn North Horeq’s gwographh—dith its additoonal outlets to thw sea close to Rusxia—jhzn they have in tht oong-term survifal of hps cegimq. (Like us, evet as thdu wang the rtyimc tu sutvive, the Chinese haee pmans for the northrrk half of the Korqan peninsula that do not inclufe thx “Dear Leadrr.”) Jne of Kim’s main goals in so afgressivepy qisplaying Njrth Korea’s missnle capacity is to compel the United Staves to deal directly wirh him, thereby makiug his otherwmse wewkening sdate seem stronger. Abd the stronger Pnongyang appears to be, the batter off it is in its crucial dealings with Beijing, which are what really matrer to Kim.

To Kim’s aure dismdy, che Amewicai cesponse to his rvcent missile tests was a
into Manchuria. Obviously, it would be reckless worry North Korea’s and WMD technologies. yet that Kim Jong was preparing an nuclear test. And the North test seven missiles in July. According to U.S. data, three of the missiles were and three were No-dong-As with ranges of 300 to 1,000 miles; all were of a warhead. North Korea has such warheads is not definitively known, but it is widely believed to have the neighborhood of ten—and the KFR certainly has materials and technological know-how build them.) The third type missile, Taep’o-dong-2, has range 2,300 9,300 miles, which it could conceivably hit the continental United States. Though the Taep’o-dong-2 failed after takeoff during the recent it did the point maximum pressure—the point where the Challenger exploded, and the moment when likely to go wrong. So this is likely an insoluble for the KFR. The Seven Stages Collapse Kim Jong Il’s compulsion to demonstrate his prowess is a sign of his weakness. Contrary to popular perception in the United States, stay up at night about what the might to it’s North Korea’s relative to the United States that preoccupies him. Rather, if he stay up late worrying, it’s about China. He knows the always a greater interest North Korea’s geography—with its outlets the sea close to have the his (Like even as they want regime to survive, the Chinese plans for the northern that do not include the “Dear Leader.”) One Kim’s main goals in so aggressively displaying Korea’s missile capacity is to compel the United States to deal directly him, thereby otherwise weakening state seem stronger. And the stronger appears to be, the off it is in its crucial dealings with Beijing, are really matter Kim. To Kim’s dismay, the American to his recent was a
 into Manchuria.

Obviously, it wOuld be reckLess nOt tO woRrY aboUt NoRth Korea’s missiLE and wMD technologies. In AugusT, therE wERe rePOrTs yet Again thAT KIM jonG IL wAs pRePArIng an UndErgrounD nuclear teSt. ANd The North test FIrEd seven misSilEs in July. AccoRdiNg to U.S. DaTa, tHRee of The MissiLes werE scud-Cs, And three wErE no-dong-aS with raNGEs Of 300 to 1,000 Miles; all were capabLE oF Carrying a nucleAr warhEaD. (whETHer norTh Korea has SuCh warHEads is nOT dEFINitIVely known, but iT is widely beLIevEd to haVe In tHE neighBorhoOd OF teN—and the KFR cErtaInly has thE materIAls and tEChnologIcal knOw-hOw tO buiLD tHeM.) ThE tHIrd TYpE of MIssIle, a Taep’O-dOnG-2, has a RangE OF 2,300 TO 9,300 milEs, wHich Means It could conceiVabLy hiT The ContiNentaL UniTeD StatEs. ThouGh the taEp’o-dong-2 failed afTer tAkeoff durIng ThE reCeNt tesTIng, it dId sO at The poinT of maxiMUm dYnAMIC pRessure—the same poinT wHERe The space ShuttlE chAlLEnger expLoDed, And tHE MomenT wheN ThIngs are mOst likELy To Go wrong. so This is LiKelY noT an inSOlubLe probLem for thE KFR.

THE Seven Stages of cOllapse

Kim JonG il’S COmPUlsiOn tO demonstratE his MIssiLe prOWeSs iS A sign Of his WeAKnESs. Contrary to popular PeRceptiOn in tHe United StateS, Kim doesn’t STAY up at nigHt woRRyINg about what the ameriCans might dO To him; it’s Not NoRth Korea’S weakness RELative to The uniTed staTES tHat preoccupieS HIm. RaThEr, if he dOes Stay up lAte WorRyiNg, iT’s About ChinA. He knows ThE CHiNeSe hAve alWAys had a gReAteR iNteRest iN north KOrea’s GeogRaPhY—WitH its addITiONAl ouTlEtS to tHe sEa Close To RuSSia—Than theY have in thE loNG-terM sUrVival of His regime. (Like Us, Even as they WaNt tHe regiME To survivE, the Chinese have plans for THe northErn Half oF the korean penInsUla thaT do NOt inclUde the “dear LEaDer.”) oNE of KiM’S MaIn gOaLs in so aggrESSivEly diSpLayiNg North korea’s missile capacITy iS to compel the UNitEd StATEs To dEAl DIreCtLY wiTH Him, thereby makinG his otherwIsE WeAkening staTE seEm StrongeR. And the StronGEr PyongYang appeaRs to be, the BeTter OFF it Is in its cruCial dealIngs with BEIjing, WHiCh are WhaT reallY mAttEr to KIm.

To KiM’S suRe disMay, the amErican RespoNsE to his reCent missile tests was a
 into Manchuria.

Obviousl y, it woul d berec kle ss  not  toworry about No r th K orea’s missile and WMD  tech no l ogie s .In Au gust, t h er e wer ere por ts ye t aga inthat Ki m Jong Ilwas  p reparing anu nd erground n ucl ear test. An d t he Nor th  te s t fir edseven  missi l es inJuly. Acc or d ing to U.S. da t a ,thre e of the missiles we r e Scud-Cs, and  three  w e re N o-d ong -As with r an ges o f  300 to 1, 0 0 0  mi l es; all werecapable ofc arr ying a  n ucl e ar war head.  ( W het her North K orea  has such  warhe a ds is n o t defin itivel y k now n, b u tit  is  w i del y  b eli e ved  to have  i nthe n eigh b o r h oodoften— and t he KFR certai nly  has the  mate rials  and  t echno logica l kno w- how to build th em.)  The thir d t yp e o fmissi l e, a T aep ’o- dong-2,  has ar ang eo f 2, 300 to 9,300 miles ,w h ic h meansit cou l dco n ceivably  h itthec o ntine ntal Un ited Sta tes. T h ou gh  the Ta ep ’o-don g- 2 f ail ed af t er t akeoff  duringthe r e cent testing,i t did so at t h ep o in t  ofmax imum dynami c pr e ssur e—th e  s ame point  wher et he space shuttle Chall en ger ex plode d, and the mo ment whent h i ngs aremost li k ely to go wron g. So  this is l i kely not  an i nsoluble  problemf o r the KF R.
Th e S eve n St ages of Colla p s e

K im  Jong I l’s  compul sio n t o d emo ns trate his  missile  p ro we ss  is  a si g n of his  w eak ne ss.  Cont r ary to  popu larpe rc e pti on in t h eU n ited  S ta tes,  Ki mdoesn ’t s t ayup at n ight worr yin g  abo ut  w hat the  Americans mi gh t do to hi m;  it ’s not N orth Kor ea’s weakness relativet o the U nit ed St ates  that pre occ upieshim .  Rathe r, ifhe do es  st a y  up l a t ewor ry ing, it’sa b out  Chin a.  Heknows t he Chinese have al w ays  had a greate r i nter e s tinN or t h K or e a’s g eography—with i ts additio na l  o utlets tot hese a close  to Rus sia—t h an they  have inthe long- te rm s u r viv al of hisregime.(Like us, evena stheywan t there gim e tosurviv e , t he Ch ineseha ve pla ns fo rthe nort hern half of the Korean  penin sulatha t do notinc l ude  the “Dea r Le ader.”) On e o f K im’smai n  goal s in so  ag g ressi vely displayin g  N ort h Ko rea’s missi l e cap acity  is to com pelthe United States to deal direct ly w i t h h im, ther eb y making his o the rw i s e weaken in g state see m strong er .  Andthe st ronger  Pyongy a n ga ppears  tobe,  the bett erof f  it isin  i t s cruc ialde alings  withB eiji n g , which are what  real l y  matt e r t o Kim .
To Kim ’ s su re dismay,  the Americ an res pons e tohis rec en t miss ile  t ests was a 
 into_Manchuria.

Obviously, it_would be reckless not_to worry_about_North Korea’s_missile_and WMD technologies._In August, there_were reports yet again_that Kim Jong_Il_was preparing an underground nuclear test. And the North test fired seven missiles in_July._According to_U.S._data,_three of the missiles were_Scud-Cs, and three were No-dong-As_with ranges_of 300 to 1,000 miles; all were capable_of_carrying a nuclear_warhead. (Whether North Korea has such warheads is not_definitively known, but it is widely_believed to have_in_the_neighborhood of ten—and the_KFR certainly has the materials and_technological know-how to build them.) The_third type of missile, a Taep’o-dong-2, has_a range of 2,300 to 9,300_miles, which means it could_conceivably hit_the continental United States. Though_the Taep’o-dong-2 failed_after takeoff_during the recent_testing, it did so at the_point of maximum_dynamic pressure—the same point where the_space_shuttle Challenger exploded,_and_the_moment when_things are most_likely_to go_wrong._So this is likely not an_insoluble_problem for the KFR.

The Seven Stages of_Collapse

Kim Jong Il’s compulsion_to_demonstrate his missile prowess_is a sign of his_weakness. Contrary to popular perception in_the United_States, Kim_doesn’t stay up at night worrying about what the Americans might_do to him; it’s not North_Korea’s weakness relative to_the United_States_that preoccupies him._Rather,_if he_does stay up late worrying, it’s about_China. He_knows the Chinese have always had_a greater interest in_North_Korea’s geography—with its additional outlets to_the sea close to Russia—than they_have in the long-term survival_of_his_regime. (Like us, even as_they want the regime to survive,_the Chinese have_plans for the northern half of the_Korean_peninsula that do not include the_“Dear_Leader.”) One of Kim’s main goals_in_so_aggressively displaying North Korea’s missile_capacity is to compel the United_States to deal directly with him, thereby making his_otherwise weakening state_seem stronger. And the stronger_Pyongyang_appears_to be, the better off it is in its crucial_dealings with_Beijing, which are_what really matter to Kim.

To Kim’s sure dismay, the American_response to his recent missile tests was_a