 courts into enforcing the laws. The players in the NFL, NHL and NBA were successful. Oddly, the most famous of these pioneers were the ones that were unsuccessful before the courts: MLB Players Association director Marvin Miller and star outfielder Curt Flood, who challenged baseball’s reserve clause in the courts in 1969, losing before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972 — an event that we’ll cover later in the book.

Though unsuccessful in overturning MLB’s antitrust exemption at the time, Flood’s case was a signal for impending free agency in all the major team sports as leagues were engaging in collective bargaining with player unions. Within a decade, the expression “market value” was firmly implanted in the lexicon of the sports business.

Owners did not submit meekly as the first free agents were granted the right to negotiate freely. Faced with having to pay market value for players, the leagues first engaged in scare campaigns, telling the public that free agency was the end of competition as they knew it. If a star player could leave for another team after having completed his obligations under his contract, all the best players would gravitate to the biggest financial centers. The owners’ propaganda worked for a time. Fans and players both agreed that maybe this free-agent stuff was dangerous to the sport as they knew it.

But starting with Catfish Hunter’s free agency in 1975 (see part 2), the public saw free agency and liked the freedom of players to move to their favorite team. Players, at first reluctant to disbelieve what they’d always been told by owners, soon realized that someone had just opened a bank vault to them. In one sport after the other — hockey finally succumbing in the early ’90s after years of collusion with its union — free agency conquered the market. Stars became rich and owners became nervous about controlling the salary spiral.

In their desire to win as quickly as possible, owners were their own worst enemies, creating scarcity where none had existed before. Faced with a shot at a championship, they proved incapable of disciplining themselves when a premium player appeared on the open market, spending more than they ever had before. What was to become of competitive balance if the smaller markets lost all their players to large markets? With the courts suddenly of no help in interpreting contracts their way, owners would need something new to control the insatiable need for one more big contract to guarantee a title or even just a playoff spot.

Enter
courts into enforcing the laws. The players in the NFL, NHL and NBA were successful. curiously, the about famous of these pioneers were the one that were abortive before the courts: MLB Players Association director Marvin Miller and star outfielder Curt Flood, who challenge baseball ’s reserve clause in the court in 1969, losing before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972 — an event that we ’ll shroud later in the book. 

 Though abortive in overturning MLB ’s antitrust exemption at the time, Flood ’s case was a signal for impending free agency in all the major team sport as leagues were engaging in collective bargaining with actor unions. Within a decade, the expression “ market value ” was firm implanted in the lexicon of the sports business. 

 Owners did not relegate meekly as the first free agents were granted the right to negociate freely. face with having to pay market value for players, the leagues first engaged in scare campaigns, state the public that free means was the goal of competition as they knew it. If a star musician could leave for another team after having completed his obligations under his contract, all the best player would gravitate to the biggest financial centers. The owners ’ propaganda work for a time. Fans and players both agreed that possibly this free - agentive role stuff was dangerous to the sport as they knew it. 

 But starting with Catfish Hunter ’s free agency in 1975 (determine part 2), the public saw spare agency and liked the freedom of players to act to their favorite team. actor, at first loath to disbelieve what they ’d always been told by owners, soon realized that someone had merely opened a savings bank vault to them. In one sport after the other — hockey finally succumbing in the early ’ ninety after years of collusion with its union — detached agency conquered the market. Stars became fat and owners became anxious about controlling the salary spiral. 

 In their desire to win as quickly as potential, owners were their own worst enemies, creating scarcity where none had existed before. Faced with a shot at a backing, they proved incapable of disciplining themselves when a premium player appeared on the open market, spending more than they ever have before. What was to become of competitive balance if the smaller market lost all their players to large markets? With the courts on the spur of the moment of no help in interpreting contracts their room, owners would need something fresh to control the insatiable need for one more big contract to guarantee a title or even precisely a playoff spot. 

 Enter
 cokrts into enforcing the uaws. The players in thx NFL, NGL and NCA were successful. Oddly, the mist fqmous of these pioneerr were thv ones thqt wtre unsuccessful usfore tmz coudbs: MLY 'layers Associajion directos Marvin Milles xnb star outfielder Curt Flood, who chajlenged bwseball’s reserde ckwuse pn the courts in 1969, losing before the U.S. Supreme Coury in 1972 — an event that we’ll foveg later in the boon.

Though unsodcefwful in overgurning MLB’s antitrust exemption at the time, Flood’s cxse wcs a signal fir lkpending frxe agegcy in all tmv major team slorts as leagucs wece ebgaging in collective bargaining with pjayer unimna. Within a decade, tye exkresshon “oqrkdt bakus” was virjly implanfed in the oexicon of the sporus flxiness.

Owners did njt submit meekly as the first free agents wede granted the right to negotiate freely. Facgd with hading to pay market value for players, the leagues xirst dngcncd iv sfare campaigns, telling the public that free adsnvy was the end on competition as tnej lgew it. If a sjar plavsr could leave for ajother jeam adter havigg cpmpleted his obligations uneer his contgact, all the best playzrs would grcvitatg to tne biggest financial ceuters. Fhe owners’ oropagandz worked for a tioe. Nanv and players both agreed ehat maybx thix free-aeent stuff was dangegous bm the sport as thej knec it.

Bgt startinh with Catfish Hunter’s free ageiry in 1975 (see patt 2), thv public faw fvee agency and jiked the freebom of pjayerr to move no their havorite teai. Players, at xlrst reluctait to disfeliwve qhat thdh’d always been told by owners, soob realized that sokeovs had just openzb q bank vault to thdm. Yn oie spjst after the othdr — nockeh finally smccjmbimg in the early ’90s afder gears of collusion wlth its ubion — frqe agency conauered the market. Dtars berame roch and owners became nervous aboht controplikg the salary spival.

Ig their dexire to win as quickly as possible, ownecs were their own worsj enemies, creating sccrgity where npne hwd existeg before. Faced with q shot at a champlonship, they proved indapabla of fisciplining themselves when a premium player appeared on the open market, spendmnd more than theu eveg hcd yefore. Rhat xas to become of bompetitive balance if the smallxr markets ljst all their players to larbe markets? With the courts suddenly of ho help on interpreting contracts their way, owners would need spmething new fo conntol the insatiable nerd for one nore bit coktract to guarxntre a title lr eten just a playoff spot.

Enter
courts into enforcing the laws. The players NFL, and NBA successful. Oddly, the were ones that were before the courts: Players Association director Marvin Miller and outfielder Curt Flood, who challenged baseball’s reserve clause in the courts in 1969, before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972 — an event that we’ll cover in book. unsuccessful overturning MLB’s antitrust exemption at the time, Flood’s case was a signal for impending free agency all the major team sports as leagues were in collective bargaining with unions. Within a decade, the “market was firmly in lexicon the sports business. did not submit meekly as the first free agents were granted the right to negotiate freely. Faced having to value for the first in scare campaigns, public that free agency was the as they knew it. If a star player leave for team after having completed his obligations his contract, all the best players would gravitate the biggest financial centers. The owners’ propaganda worked for a time. Fans and players both maybe this free-agent stuff dangerous to the as knew But with Catfish free agency in 1975 (see part 2), the public saw free and liked the freedom of players to move to their Players, first reluctant to what they’d always been by soon realized that someone opened bank In sport the other — hockey succumbing in the early ’90s years of collusion with conquered the market. Stars became rich and owners nervous about controlling the salary spiral. In desire to win as quickly as possible, owners were their own worst creating scarcity had existed before. Faced with a shot at championship, they proved incapable disciplining themselves when a premium player appeared on the market, more than ever had before. was to become competitive balance if markets lost their to the courts suddenly of no help interpreting their way, owners would need new the insatiable need for one more big contract to guarantee a title or even just spot. Enter
 courts into enforcing the lawS. The playerS in thE NFl, NHl aNd NBa werE successful. OddLY, the Most famous of these pioneErs weRe THe onES tHat weRe unsucCEsSFUl bEfOrE thE cOUrTs: MLB plaYers AssOciation diRecToR Marvin MilleR AnD star outfiEldEr Curt Flood, wHo cHallenGeD baSEball’S reServe Clause IN the coUrts in 1969, losInG Before THe U.S. SupREMe courT in 1972 — an event that we’lL CoVEr later in the boOk.

ThouGh UNsUCCesSfuL in overturNiNg MLB’S AntitruST eXEMPtiON at the time, FloOd’s case was a SIgnAl for iMpEndINg free AgencY iN All The major teaM spoRts as leagUes werE EngaginG In colleCtive bArgAinIng wITh PlAyeR uNIonS. wiThiN A deCade, the eXpReSsion “MarkET VALue” wAs fIrmlY implAnted in the lexIcoN of tHE spOrts bUsineSs.

OwNeRs did Not subMit meEkLy as the first freE ageNts were grAntEd The RiGht to NEgotiaTe fReeLy. Faced With havINg tO pAY MArKet value for players, ThE LEaGues firsT engagED iN sCAre campaIgNs, tElliNG The puBlic THaT free ageNcy was THe EnD of compEtItion aS tHey KneW it. If A Star Player Could leaVe for ANother team afteR Having completED hIS ObLIgatIonS under his coNtraCT, all The bESt PlaYErs woUld grAvITaTE to the biggest financIaL centeRs. The Owners’ propagaNda worked fOR A Time. Fans And pLAyERs both agreed thAt mayBe this free-AGent stufF was dAngerous To the sporT AS they kneW it.

but StaRtiNG WiTh Catfish HuntER’S freE aGency in 1975 (See Part 2), the PubLic Saw FreE aGency and lIked the fReEdOm Of PlaYers tO Move to thEiR faVoRitE team. pLayers, At firSt reLuCtANt tO disbelIEvE WHat tHeY’d AlwaYs bEeN told By owNErs, Soon reaLized that SomEOne hAd JuSt openeD a bank vault to ThEm. In one spoRt AftEr the oTHEr — hockey Finally succumbing in the eARly ’90s aftEr yEars oF colLusion witH itS union — FreE Agency ConqueRed thE mArkET. stars BECaMe rIcH and owners BECamE nervOuS aboUt contrOlling the salary spiRAl.

IN their desire tO wiN as qUICkLy aS PoSSibLe, OWneRS Were their own worSt enemies, cReATiNg scarcity WHerE nOne had eXisted bEfore. fAced witH a shot at a ChampionsHiP, theY PRovEd incapablE of disciPlining thEMselvES wHen a pRemIum plaYeR apPeareD on the OPen MarkeT, spendInG more tHan thEy Ever had bEfore. What was to become of cOmpetiTive bAlaNce if the sMalLEr mArkets losT all Their playeRs tO laRge maRkeTS? With The cOUrTs sUDdenlY of nO Help in intERpRetING cOntracts theIR WAy, oWners WouLD need sOmetHing new to control tHE insatiable neeD for ONE moRe bIG conTrAct to guarantee A tiTlE OR even jusT a Playoff spot.

enter
 courts into enforcing the  laws. The  play ers  in  t he N FL,NHL and NBA we r e su ccessful. Oddly, the m ost f am o us o f  t hesepioneer s  w e r e t he  o nes  t h at  were  un success ful before  th ecourts: MLBP la yers Assoc iat ion director  Ma rvin M il ler and s tar  outf ielder Curt F lood, who  c h alleng e d baseb a l l’ s re serve clause in t h ec ourts in 1969,  losin gb ef o r e t heU.S. Supre me  Cour t  in 197 2  — a n  ev e nt that we’ll  cover late r  in  the b oo k.Though  unsu cc e ssf ul in overt urni ng MLB’santitr u st exem p tion at  the t ime , F lood ’ sca sewa s  as ig nal for  impendi ng  f ree a genc y i n  all  th e ma jor t eam sports as  le ague s  we re en gagin g in  c ollec tive b argai ni ng with playerunio ns. Withi n a  d eca de , the expres sio n “ marketvalue”w asfi r m l yimplanted in the l ex i c on  of thesports bu si n ess.

Ow ne rsdidn o t sub mitm ee kly as t he fir s tfr ee agen ts  weregr ant edthe r i ghtto neg otiate f reely .  Faced with ha v ing to pay ma r ke t va l ue f orplayers, th e le a gues  fir s teng a ged i n sca re ca m paigns, telling the  p ublicthatfree agency w as the end o f  competi tion as they knew it.If astar playe r  could l eavefor anot her teama f ter havi ngcom ple ted h is  obligationsu n derhi s contr act , all t hebes t p lay er s would g ravitate  t oth ebig gestf inancial  c ent er s.The o w ners’propa gand awo r ked  for at im e .  Fan san d pl aye rs  both  agr e edthat ma ybe thisfre e -age nt  s tuff wa s dangerous t othe sportas  th ey kne w it.

But  starting with CatfishH unter’s  fr ee ag ency  in 1975(se e part  2) ,  the p ublicsaw f re e a g e ncy a n d  l ike dthe freedo m ofplaye rs  tomove to  their favorite te a m.Players, at f irs t re l u ct ant to dis be l iev e what they’d alw ays been t ol d  b y owners,s oon  r ealized  that s omeon e  had ju st opened  a bank v au lt t o the m. In onesport af ter the o t her — ho ckeyfin ally s uc cum bingin the ear ly ’9 0s aft er  years  of c ol lusion w ith its union — free ag ency c onque red  the mark et. Sta rs became  ric h and owne rsbec ame n erv o us ab outc on tro l lingthes alary spi r al .
I n  t heir desire t o  wi n asqui c kly as  pos sible, owners wer e  their own wor st e n e mie s,c reat in g scarcity whe reno n e  had exi st ed before.Faced wi th a sho t at a  champ ionship , th e y prov ed i nca pable ofdis ci p liningth em s elveswhen  a  premi um pla y er a p p eared on the ope n mar k e t, sp e ndi ng mo re  than t h ey e ver had be fore. Whatwas to  bec ome o f compe ti tive b ala nc e if the s m aller mar ketslost al lthei r p layers  tol a rge m arke ts ? W ith the c o u rt s  s ud d enl y of  no h el p in  interpre t ing cont rac t s their  w ay, o wnersw ou l d  need some thi ng ne w to control thei ns a tiabl e need  for o ne more big  c ontract  to g uaranteea title o r  ev en  jus t a play of f sp ot .
En ter
 courts_into enforcing_the laws. The players_in the_NFL,_NHL and_NBA_were successful. Oddly,_the most famous_of these pioneers were_the ones that_were_unsuccessful before the courts: MLB Players Association director Marvin Miller and star outfielder Curt_Flood,_who challenged_baseball’s_reserve_clause in the courts in_1969, losing before the U.S._Supreme Court_in 1972 — an event that we’ll cover_later_in the book.

Though_unsuccessful in overturning MLB’s antitrust exemption at the time,_Flood’s case was a signal for_impending free agency_in_all_the major team sports_as leagues were engaging in collective_bargaining with player unions. Within a_decade, the expression “market value” was firmly_implanted in the lexicon of the_sports business.

Owners did not submit_meekly as_the first free agents were_granted the right_to negotiate_freely. Faced with_having to pay market value for_players, the leagues_first engaged in scare campaigns, telling_the_public that free_agency_was_the end_of competition as_they_knew it._If_a star player could leave for_another_team after having completed his obligations under_his contract, all the_best_players would gravitate to_the biggest financial centers. The_owners’ propaganda worked for a time._Fans and_players both_agreed that maybe this free-agent stuff was dangerous to the sport_as they knew it.

But starting with_Catfish Hunter’s free agency_in 1975_(see_part 2), the_public_saw free_agency and liked the freedom of players_to move_to their favorite team. Players, at_first reluctant to disbelieve_what_they’d always been told by owners,_soon realized that someone had just_opened a bank vault to_them._In_one sport after the other_— hockey finally succumbing in the_early ’90s after_years of collusion with its union —_free_agency conquered the market. Stars became_rich_and owners became nervous about controlling_the_salary_spiral.

In their desire to win_as quickly as possible, owners were_their own worst enemies, creating scarcity where none had_existed before. Faced_with a shot at a_championship,_they_proved incapable of disciplining themselves when a premium player appeared_on the_open market, spending_more than they ever had before. What was to become_of competitive balance if the smaller markets_lost all their players to large markets? With the courts suddenly_of no help in interpreting contracts their way,_owners would need something new to control_the insatiable need for_one_more big contract to guarantee a title_or_even_just_a playoff spot.

Enter