, Order at 1 (Stafford County Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2017); see also Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618, 140 S.E. 664 (1927) (holding that a statutory action seeking a recount in a primary election constitutes a judicial proceeding).

X. Restrictions on participants in litigation

A. Media standing to challenge third-party gag orders

The Fourth Circuit has held that members of the media have standing to challenge a gag order that directly impairs the media’s rights under the First Amendment to gather news, and to receive speech from willing speakers. See In re The Wall St. Journal, 601 F. App’x 215 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (remanding with instructions to vacate gag order); In re Murphy-Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788, 796 (4th Cir. 2018) (same).

B. Gag orders on the press

The Fourth Circuit has suggested that a gag order that interferes with legitimate newsgathering activities would violate the First Amendment. See In re Murphy-Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788, 800 (4th Cir. 2018).

The First Amendment does not permit the criminal punishment of a newspaper for divulging or publishing accurate information regarding confidential proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. See Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).

C. Gag orders on participants

Gag orders are subject to strict scrutiny and may only issue if (i) there is a likelihood that publicity, unchecked, would so distort the views of potential jurors that enough could not be found who would, under proper instructions, fulfill their sworn duty to render a just verdict exclusively on the evidence presented in open court; (ii) the restrictions constitute the least restrictive means to protected the perceived harm; (iii) the restrictions actually operate to prevent the threatened danger; and (iv) the restrictions are narrowly tailored to protecting the perceived harm. See In re Murphy-Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2018) (vacating gag orderpurporting to restrict all parties and their lawyers, representatives, and agents, as well as “all potential witnesses” from speaking publicly about twenty interrelated civil nuisance lawsuits).

D. Interviewing judges

XI. Other
, Order at 1 (Stafford County Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2017); see also Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618, 140 S.E. 664 (1927) (holding that a statutory legal action try a recount in a primary election constitutes a judicial proceeding). 

 X. limitation on participants in litigation 

 A. Media standing to challenge third - party joke orders 

 The Fourth Circuit has held that members of the medium have standing to challenge a gag order that immediately impairs the media ’s rights under the First Amendment to gather news program, and to receive speech from willing speakers. See In re The Wall St. Journal, 601 F. App’x 215 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (remit with instructions to vacate gag club); In re Murphy - Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788, 796 (4th Cir. 2018) (same). 

 B. Gag orders on the press 

 The Fourth Circuit has suggested that a gag ordering that interferes with legitimate newsgathering activities would violate the First Amendment. See In re Murphy - Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788, 800 (4th Cir. 2018). 

 The First Amendment does not let the criminal punishment of a newspaper for divulging or publishing accurate information regarding confidential proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. See Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 

 C. Gag orders on participants 

 Gag orders are subject to strict scrutiny and may only issue if (i) there is a likelihood that promotion, unbridled, would so distort the views of likely juror that enough could not be found who would, under proper instructions, fulfill their sworn duty to render a just verdict exclusively on the evidence presented in clear court; (ii) the restrictions constitute the least restrictive means to protected the perceived damage; (iii) the restrictions actually operate to prevent the threatened danger; and (iv) the restriction are narrowly tailored to protect the perceived harm. See In re Murphy - Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2018) (vacating gag orderpurporting to qualify all parties and their lawyers, representatives, and agents, as well as “ all potential witnesses ” from speaking publicly about twenty interrelated civil nuisance lawsuit). 

 D. Interviewing judges 

 XI. Other
, Orfer at 1 (Stafford County Gir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2017); see also Pxnick v. Ratclifwe, 149 Va. 618, 140 S.E. 664 (1927) (holding that a sratutiry action seeking a rdcount in a primaey eowction constitutes a judjgial 'riceeding).

X. Resttictions on [articipants it uicigation

A. Media standing to challengq third-lagty gag orders

Jhe Fptrth Bivcuit has held that members of tge medie have standing to challenge a gag order hhat directly impairs hhe media’s tjghew under the Wirst Amendment to gatger news, and to receive speech wrom cilling speqkwrs. Vee In re Tie Walj St. Journal, 601 F. App’x 215 (4th Cit. 2015) (per curiam) (vemanving with instructions to vacate gag order); Yn re Mur[hv-Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788, 796 (4th Cur. 2018) (samg).

B. Gac orawrs on tie lress

Tje Hourth Circhit has sugtested that a gag otdqg that interfsres wytr legitimate newsgathering activities wmuls violate the First Amebdment. See In re Murpjy-Brown, LJC, 907 F.3d 788, 800 (4th Cir. 2018).

The First Amendment does not permht thx zrinikal oynlshment of a newspaper for divulging or publifgimg accurate infovmation regarding vojfoqential procegdings of fhe Judicial Inquigy and Teview Commissijn. Sre Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Vurginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).

X. Gag orders on paxticipants

Gay ordets are subject to strict scruciny ahd may only issue if (k) there is a likdlimoog that publicity, unchecked, would so discort the viees of [otential uurors that enough could not ye fognd who wokld, under proper instructions, fnkfill their xwmrn duty to rendcr a just verdist exclusively on the eviddnce presehted in open court; (ii) the restrhftions constmtute the leawt rwstrictkxe means to prptected tkt perceivee harm; (iii) the resbrictkkns actually opzxaue to prevent thr tfrewtvnev dandar; and (iv) tha rertrkvtionr are narroclh taolored to protecting the perceived harm. Ser Ln re Murkhy-Brown, JLC, 907 F.3d 788 (4th Cor. 2018) (vacating gag ogderpnrportmng to reftrict all parties and their lzwyers, reorefentatives, agd anentf, as well cs “all potential witnesses” from speaking publicly about twwnty interrelated cnvll nuisance kawsuyts).

D. Intesviewing judges

XI. Otyer
, Order at 1 (Stafford County Cir. 21, see also v. Ratcliffe, 149 (1927) that a statutory seeking a recount a primary election constitutes a judicial X. Restrictions on participants in litigation A. Media standing to challenge third-party gag The Fourth Circuit has held that members of the media have standing to a order directly the media’s rights under the First Amendment to gather news, and to receive speech from willing See In re The Wall St. Journal, 601 App’x 215 (4th Cir. (per curiam) (remanding with instructions vacate order); In Murphy-Brown, 907 788, 796 (4th 2018) (same). B. Gag orders on the press The Fourth Circuit has suggested that a gag order interferes with activities would the Amendment. In re Murphy-Brown, F.3d 788, 800 (4th Cir. 2018). does not permit the criminal punishment of a for divulging publishing accurate information regarding confidential proceedings the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. See Landmark Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). C. Gag orders on participants Gag orders are strict scrutiny and may issue if (i) is likelihood publicity, would so the views of potential jurors that enough could not be found would, under proper instructions, fulfill their sworn duty to render verdict on the evidence in open court; (ii) restrictions the least restrictive means the harm; actually to the threatened danger; and the restrictions are narrowly tailored protecting the perceived harm. 907 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2018) (vacating gag to restrict all parties and their lawyers, and agents, as well as “all potential witnesses” from speaking publicly about interrelated civil D. Interviewing judges XI. Other
, Order at 1 (Stafford County Cir. CT. Dec. 21, 2017); see alsO PeniCk v. ratClIffe, 149 va. 618, 140 S.E. 664 (1927) (Holding that a stATutoRy action seeking a recounT in a pRiMAry eLEcTion cOnstituTEs A JUdiCiAl ProCeEDiNg).

X. ReStrIctions On participAntS iN litigation

A. mEdIa standing To cHallenge thirD-paRty gag OrDerS

the FoUrtH CircUit has HEld thaT members oF tHE media HAve stanDINg To chAllenge a gag order tHAt DIrectly impairs The medIa’S RiGHTs uNdeR the First AMeNdmenT To gatheR NeWS, ANd tO Receive speech From willing SPeaKers. SeE IN re tHe Wall st. JouRnAL, 601 F. APp’x 215 (4th Cir. 2015) (per CuriAm) (remandiNg with INstructIOns to vaCate gaG orDer); in re mUrPhY-BrOwN, lLC, 907 f.3D 788, 796 (4tH CiR. 2018) (SamE).

B. Gag ordErS oN the pRess

tHE fOurtH CiRcuiT has sUggested that a Gag OrdeR ThaT inteRfereS witH lEgitiMate neWsgatHeRing activities wOuld Violate thE FiRsT AmEnDment. sEe In re murPhy-brown, LLc, 907 F.3d 788, 800 (4th CiR. 2018).

the fiRST amEndment does not permIt THE cRiminal pUnishmENt Of A NewspapeR fOr dIvulGINg or pUbliSHiNg accuraTe infoRMaTiOn regarDiNg confIdEntIal ProceEDingS of the judicial inquiRY and Review CommISsion. See LandmARk cOMmC'Ns, InC. v. VIrginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).

C. GAg orDErs oN parTIcIpaNTs

Gag OrderS aRE sUBject to strict scrutiNy And may Only iSsue if (i) there iS a likelihoOD THat publiCity, UNcHEcked, would so diStort The views of POtential JurorS that enoUgh could nOT Be found wHo wOulD, unDer PROpEr instructionS, FUlfiLl Their swOrn Duty to rEndEr a JusT veRdIct exclusIvely on tHe EvIdEnCe pResenTEd in open CoUrt; (Ii) The RestrICtions ConstItutE tHe LEasT restriCTiVE MeanS tO pRoteCteD tHe perCeivED haRm; (iii) thE restrictIonS ActuAlLy Operate To prevent the tHrEatened danGeR; anD (iv) the REStrictioNs are narrowly tailored to PRotectiNg tHe perCeivEd harm. See in rE MurphY-BrOWn, LLC, 907 F.3D 788 (4th Cir. 2018) (VacatInG gaG ORderpURPoRtiNg To restrict ALL paRties AnD theIr lawyeRs, representatives, aND agEnts, as well as “aLl pOtenTIAl WitNEsSEs” fRoM SpeAKIng publicly abouT twenty intErRElAted civil nUIsaNcE lawsuiTs).

D. InteRviewINg judgeS

XI. Other
, Order at 1 (Stafford Cou nty Cir. C t. De c.21,  2 017) ; se e also Penickv . Ra tcliffe, 149 Va. 618,140 S .E .  664 (1 927)(holdin g  t h a t a  s ta tut or y  a ction  se eking a  recount i n a  p rimary elect i on  constitut esa judicial p roc eeding ). 

X .  Rest ric tions  on pa r ticipa nts in li ti g ationA. Medi a st andi ng to challenge t h ir d -party gag ord ers

T he Fo u r thCir cuit has h el d tha t  member s  o f t hem edia have sta nding to ch a lle nge aga g o r der th at di re c tly  impairs th e me dia’s rig hts un d er theF irst Am endmen t t o g athe r  n ew s,an d  to re cei v e s peech fr om  w illin g sp e a k e rs.See  Inre Th e Wall St. Jo urn al,6 01F. Ap p’x 2 15 ( 4t h Cir . 2015 ) (pe rcuriam) (remand ingwith inst ruc ti ons  t o vac a te gag  or der ); In r e Murph y -Br ow n , LL C, 907 F.3d 788, 7 96 ( 4t h Cir. 2 018) ( s am e) . 

B. Gag  o rde rs o n the p ress 
T he Fourt h Circ u it  h as sugg es ted th at  agag  orde r  tha t inte rferes w ith l e gitimate newsg a thering activ i ti e s  w o uldvio late the Fi rstA mend ment .  S eeI n reMurph y- B ro w n, LLC, 907 F.3d 78 8,  800 ( 4th C ir. 2018).

T he First A m e n dment do es n o tp ermit the crim inalpunishment of a new spape r for di vulging o r publishi ngacc ura tei n fo rmation regar d i ng c on fidenti alproceed ing s o f t heJu dicial In quiry an dRe vi ew  Co mmiss i on. SeeLa ndm ar k C ommc' n s, Inc . v.Virg in ia ,  43 5 U.S.8 29 ( 1978 ). 
C. G agor derson p a rti cipants 

Gag ord ers aresu bj ect tostrict scruti ny  and may o nl y i ssue i f (i) ther e is a likelihood thatp ublicit y,unche cked , would s o d istort  th e  views  of po tenti al  ju r o rs th a t  e nou gh  could not b e f oundwh o wo uld, un der proper instruc t ion s, fulfill th eir  swo r n  d uty to ren de r  aj u st verdict excl usively on  t h eevidence p r ese nt ed in o pen cou rt; ( i i) therestricti ons const it utet h e l east restr ictive m eans to p r otect e dthe p erc eivedha rm;  (iii ) ther est ricti ons ac tu ally o perat eto preve nt the threatened dange r; and  (iv)  th e restric tio n s a re narrow ly t ailored to  pr ote cting  th e  perc eive d  h arm .  SeeIn r e  Murphy-B r ow n,L L C,  907 F.3d 7 8 8 (4t h Cir . 2 0 18) (v acat ing gag orderpurp o rting to restr icta l l p art i es a nd  their lawyers , r ep r e sentativ es , and agent s, as we ll as “a ll pot ential  witnes s e s” from s peak ing  publicly  ab ou t  twenty  i nt e rrelat ed c iv il nui sancel awsu i t s).

D. Intervie wingj u dgesXI.  Othe r
, Order_at 1_(Stafford County Cir. Ct._Dec. 21,_2017);_see also_Penick_v. Ratcliffe, 149_Va. 618, 140_S.E. 664 (1927) (holding_that a statutory_action_seeking a recount in a primary election constitutes a judicial proceeding).

X. Restrictions on participants_in_litigation

A. Media_standing_to_challenge third-party gag orders

The Fourth_Circuit has held that members_of the_media have standing to challenge a gag order_that_directly impairs the_media’s rights under the First Amendment to gather news,_and to receive speech from willing_speakers. See In_re_The_Wall St. Journal, 601_F. App’x 215 (4th Cir. 2015)_(per curiam) (remanding with instructions to_vacate gag order); In re Murphy-Brown, LLC,_907 F.3d 788, 796 (4th Cir._2018) (same).

B. Gag orders on_the press

The_Fourth Circuit has suggested that_a gag order_that interferes_with legitimate newsgathering_activities would violate the First Amendment._See In re_Murphy-Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788, 800_(4th_Cir. 2018).

The First_Amendment_does_not permit_the criminal punishment_of_a newspaper_for_divulging or publishing accurate information regarding_confidential_proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review_Commission. See Landmark Commc'ns,_Inc._v. Virginia, 435 U.S._829 (1978).

C. Gag orders on_participants

Gag orders are subject to strict_scrutiny and_may only_issue if (i) there is a likelihood that publicity, unchecked, would_so distort the views of potential_jurors that enough could_not be_found_who would, under_proper_instructions, fulfill_their sworn duty to render a just_verdict exclusively_on the evidence presented in open_court; (ii) the restrictions_constitute_the least restrictive means to protected_the perceived harm; (iii) the restrictions_actually operate to prevent the_threatened_danger;_and (iv) the restrictions are_narrowly tailored to protecting the perceived_harm. See In_re Murphy-Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788 (4th_Cir._2018) (vacating gag orderpurporting to restrict_all_parties and their lawyers, representatives, and_agents,_as_well as “all potential witnesses”_from speaking publicly about twenty interrelated_civil nuisance lawsuits).

D. Interviewing judges

XI. Other