 1998 and before Adana's Agreement and PKK's leader deport from Syria, ten thousands (10000) Turkish soldiers were placed along the borders with Syria (Wasinger, 2015). So, having events developed as such, can definitely be distinguished a projection of Turkish national interests against interests of others.

Nevertheless, the issue of projected national interests is not always clearly apparent – how about in association with water facilities and infrastructures – especially if is about post-Saddam federal structure of Iraq; under which the Kurdish element managed to establish the only autonomous administrative division. Such autonomous status, highly concerns military and political leadership in Turkey (Alqallaf, 2003). Turkey's concern is not just an express of the interest of a good neighborhood. More likely Turkish leadership is being heavily troubled by worries on the contingency of a de-facto establishment of Greater Kurdistan through separation of Turkish southeastern region. Especially when for preventing such from happening, the cooperation with Syria, Iran, Iraq is needed. The cooperation of states, that beside also having Kurdish minorities (Taşpinar, 2011b), are also considered as rivals for leadership in the wider area of South-South-West Asia.

So, can Turkey manage to obtain Iraq's support using mountainous infrastructures of water's reservoir, despite the prevailing tenses and conflict of interests in the area?

As can easily be noticed, the role of dams is not only that of power generation and controlling rivers diet from the upstream. Can also passively serve by occupying lands, while operates as a barrier for crossing from both sides. This obstructing function of dams, along with the fact of a relocated rural Kurdish mass (Hatem & Dohrmann, 2013) – that could also be connected to dams' passive role – tends to create a quasi- "geographical discontinuity" between Kurds of Northern Iraq with those of Southeast Turkey.

So, having these in mind, in conjunction to a possible influence of Iraq's Kurdish leadership by Turks over the independence referendum of 2017 – like is noted that might have occurred from some scholars (Al-Makhzoomi & Albdeewy, 2017) – can be said that in reality there wasn't really any imperative necessity for exerting such influence, since it was enough just not to try to stop it; and the shift from back then current Iraqi position regarding Kurdish issue to that of Turks should had follow.

How? in both cases (a.k.a. influencing or not)
1998 and before Adana's Agreement and PKK's leader deport from Syria, ten thousands (10000) Turkish soldiers were placed along the edge with Syria (Wasinger, 2015). therefore, having events developed as such, can decidedly be distinguished a projection of Turkish national interest against interests of others. 

 Nevertheless, the topic of projected national interest is not always clearly apparent – how about in affiliation with water facilities and infrastructures – especially if is about post - Saddam federal structure of Iraq; under which the Kurdish element pull off to establish the only autonomous administrative division. Such autonomous condition, highly concerns military and political leadership in Turkey (Alqallaf, 2003). Turkey's concern is not merely an express of the interest of a full neighborhood. More likely Turkish leadership is being heavily troubled by worries on the eventuality of a de - facto establishment of Greater Kurdistan through separation of Turkish southeastern region. Especially when for preventing such from happen, the cooperation with Syria, Iran, Iraq is necessitate. The cooperation of states, that beside also having Kurdish minorities (Taşpinar, 2011b), are also considered as rival for leadership in the wider sphere of South - South - West Asia. 

 So, can Turkey manage to prevail Iraq's documentation using mountainous infrastructures of urine's reservoir, despite the prevailing tenses and conflict of interests in the sphere? 

 As can easily be noticed, the role of dams is not only that of power generation and controlling rivers diet from the upstream. Can also passively serve by occupying land, while operate as a barrier for crossing from both sides. This obstructing function of dams, along with the fact of a relocated rural Kurdish bulk (Hatem & Dohrmann, 2013) – that could also be connected to dams' passive role – tend to create a quasi- " geographical discontinuity " between Kurds of Northern Iraq with those of Southeast Turkey. 

 So, having these in thinker, in conjunction to a potential influence of Iraq's Kurdish leadership by Turks over the independence referendum of 2017 – like is noted that might have occurred from some scholars (Al - Makhzoomi & Albdeewy, 2017) – can be said that in reality there embodyn't really any imperative necessity for exert such influence, since it was enough barely not to try to stop it; and the shift key from back then current Iraqi position see Kurdish issue to that of Turks should had come. 

 How? in both cases (a.k.a. influencing or not )
 1998 ajd before Adana's Agreemekt and PKK's leadgr deporv from Ayria, tev thousands (10000) Turkish soldierd qere kjaced along the bofders witj Syria (Qasiiger, 2015). So, having xbents dcrelopsf as wuch, can definltely be divtinguished a [rujzction of Turkish national interests againsy lnterests of ojhers.

Mqverfheless, the issue of projected natjonal iiterests is not always clearly apparent – jow wbout in associatiln with watgd fwxilities and infrastrubcures – espedially if is about post-Saddam fdderak structurg kf Hraq; under xhich nhe Kurdish element mdnaged yo establish tme onny qutonomous administravive division. Such aotonomous vtctus, highly concerns nioitari and polkricxl meededship ln Vurkey (Alqamlaf, 2003). Turket's concern is not jise an express or the yneerest of a good neighborhood. More likeny Furkish leadership is bwing heavily troubled by worriqs on the contingency of a de-facto establishment mf Grxager Kmrdirraj through separation of Turkish southeastern wsgook. Especially whek for preventing sicj gtom happening, jhe coo'srztion with Syria, Igan, Iraz is beeded. Tht cooleration of states, that besude also havpng Jurdish minorities (Taşpinar, 2011b), cre alxo comsidered as rivals for ueadsrship in tje wider zfea of South-Soutf-Wext Asia.

So, can Turkey manage eo obtain Iraa's suppurt osing mjuntainous infrastructures of wateg's redesvoir, desplte the prevailing tenses and conflict of intgrevts in the crea?

As can easily bq noticed, the tole of dcms is not only nhat of pmwer generaeion and contsllling riverv diet fwom rhe ypstreao. Can also passovely serne by iccupying lands, whlle okedates as a barrntr dor crossing frpm cotr dives. Trhs obstructitg fjncgoon ow dams, alonn wkth yhe fact of a relocaded dural Kurdish mass (Hwtem & Doyrmann, 2013) – that could akso be connected tl damv' pessive roje – tends to create a quasi- "gekgraphicap dlscontinuity" fetwcen Hurds of Nprthern Iraq with those of Southeast Tuckey.

So, having these in nind, in conjunction uo a possible infltence of Hraq's Kurdish leaderwhip by Turks ovev the independence refsrenduk of 2017 – like is noted that might have occurred from some scholars (Al-Makhzoomi & Qlbdeexy, 2017) – can be szid yhat pn xeakity trere xasn't really any pmperative necessity for exertinj such infnuznce, since it was enough just nut to try to rtop it; and the shift frkm back yhen current Iraqi position regsrding Kurdish issue to bhat of Tyrks ahould had follow.

How? in both cases (a.k.a. unfluenxing or not)
1998 and before Adana's Agreement and PKK's from ten thousands Turkish soldiers were Syria 2015). So, having developed as such, definitely be distinguished a projection of national interests against interests of others. Nevertheless, the issue of projected national interests not always clearly apparent – how about in association with water facilities and – if about federal structure of Iraq; under which the Kurdish element managed to establish the only autonomous administrative Such autonomous status, highly concerns military and political in Turkey (Alqallaf, 2003). concern is not just an of interest of good More Turkish leadership is heavily troubled by worries on the contingency of a de-facto establishment of Greater Kurdistan through separation of southeastern region. for preventing from the with Syria, Iran, needed. The cooperation of states, that Kurdish minorities (Taşpinar, 2011b), are also considered as for leadership the wider area of South-South-West Asia. can Turkey manage to obtain Iraq's support using infrastructures of water's reservoir, despite the prevailing tenses and conflict of interests in the area? easily be noticed, the of dams is only of generation controlling rivers from the upstream. Can also passively serve by occupying lands, while as a barrier for crossing from both sides. This obstructing dams, with the fact a relocated rural Kurdish (Hatem Dohrmann, 2013) – that be to – to a quasi- "geographical discontinuity" Kurds of Northern Iraq with of Southeast Turkey. So, conjunction to a possible influence of Iraq's Kurdish by Turks over the independence referendum of – like is noted that might have occurred from some scholars (Al-Makhzoomi Albdeewy, 2017) be said that in reality there wasn't really imperative necessity for exerting influence, since it was enough just not to try stop and the from back then Iraqi position regarding issue to that should had How? both or not)
 1998 and before Adana's Agreement aNd PKK's leadEr depOrt FroM SYria, Ten tHousands (10000) TurkisH SoldIers were placed along the BordeRs WIth SYRiA (WasiNger, 2015). So, hAViNG EveNtS dEveLoPEd As sucH, caN definiTely be distIngUiShed a projectIOn Of Turkish nAtiOnal interestS agAinst iNtEreSTs of oTheRs.

NevErthelESs, the iSsue of proJeCTed natIOnal intEREsTs is Not always clearly aPPaREnt – how about in aSsociaTiON wITH waTer Facilities AnD infrAStructuREs – ESPEciALly if is about pOst-Saddam feDEraL strucTuRe oF iraq; unDer whIcH The kurdish elemEnt mAnaged to eStabliSH the onlY AutonomOus admIniStrAtivE DiViSioN. SUCh aUToNomOUs sTatus, higHlY cOncerNs miLITARy anD poLitiCal leAdership in TurKey (alqaLLaf, 2003). turkeY's conCern Is Not juSt an exPress Of The interest of a gOod nEighborhoOd. MOrE liKeLy TurKIsh leaDerShiP is beinG heavilY TroUbLED By Worries on the continGeNCY oF a de-factO estabLIsHmENt of GreaTeR KuRdisTAN throUgh sEPaRation of turkisH SoUtHeasterN rEgion. ESpEciAllY when FOr prEventiNg such frOm hapPEning, the cooperATion with Syria, iRaN, iRaQ Is neEdeD. The cooperaTion OF staTes, tHAt BesIDe alsO haviNg kUrDIsh minorities (TaşpinAr, 2011B), are alSo conSidered as rivaLs for leadeRSHIp in the wIder AReA Of South-South-WeSt AsiA.

So, can TurkEY manage tO obtaIn Iraq's sUpport usiNG MountainOus InfRasTruCTUrEs of water's resERVoir, DeSpite thE prEvailinG teNseS anD coNfLict of intErests in ThE aReA?

AS caN easiLY be noticEd, The RoLe oF dams IS not onLy thaT of pOwEr GEneRation aND cONTrolLiNg RiveRs dIeT from The uPStrEam. Can aLso passivEly SErve By OcCupying Lands, while opeRaTes as a barrIeR foR crossING from botH sides. This obstructing fuNCtion of DamS, alonG witH the fact oF a rElocatEd rURal KurDish maSs (HatEm & dohRMAnn, 2013) – thAT CoUld AlSo be connecTED to Dams' pAsSive Role – tenDs to create a quasi- "geOGraPhical discontInuIty" bETWeEn KURdS Of NOrTHerN iRaq with those of SOutheast TuRkEY.

SO, having theSE in MiNd, in conJunctioN to a pOSsible iNfluence oF Iraq's KurDiSh leADErsHip by Turks Over the iNdependenCE refeREnDum of 2017 – LikE is notEd ThaT mighT have oCCurRed frOm some ScHolars (al-MakHzOomi & AlbdEewy, 2017) – can be said that in realIty theRe wasN't rEally any iMpeRAtiVe necessiTy foR exerting sUch InfLuencE, siNCe it wAs enOUgH juST not tO try TO stop it; anD ThE shIFT fRom back then CURRenT IraqI poSItion rEgarDing Kurdish issue tO That of Turks shoUld hAD FolLow.

hOw? in BoTh cases (a.k.a. inflUenCiNG Or not)
 1998 and before Adana's A greement a nd PK K's  le ad er d epor t from Syria,t en t housands (10000) Turki sh so ld i ersw er e pla ced alo n gt h e b or de rswi t hSyria  (W asinger , 2015). S o,ha ving eventsd ev eloped assuc h, can defin ite ly bedi sti n guish eda pro jectio n  of Tu rkish nat io n al int e rests a g a in st i nterests of other s .Nevertheless,the is su e  o f pro jec ted nation al  inte r ests is no t a lwa y s clearly app arent – how abo ut inas soc i ationwithwa t erfacilitiesandinfrastru ctures – espec i ally if  is ab out  po st-S a dd am  fe de r als tr uct u reof Iraq;  u nd er wh icht h e Kurd ish  ele mentmanaged to es tab lish the  only  auto nomo us  admi nistra tivedi vision. Such au tono mous stat us,  h igh ly  conc e rns mi lit ary  and po litical lea de r s h ip  in Turkey (Alqall af , 20 03). Tur key'sc on ce r n is not  j ust  ane x press  oft he  interes t of a go od  neighb or hood.Mo relik ely T u rkis h lead ership i s bei n g heavily trou b led by worrie s  o n th e  con tin gency of ade-f a ctoesta b li shm e nt of  Grea te r  K u rdistan through sep ar ationof Tu rkish southea stern regi o n .  Especia llyw he n  for preventin g suc h from hap p ening, t he co operatio n with Sy r i a, Iran,  Ir aqisnee d e d.  The cooperat i o n of  s tates,tha t besid e a lso  ha vin gKurdish m inoritie s(T aş pi nar , 201 1 b), areal soco nsi dered as riv als f or l ea de r shi p in th e  w i d er a re aof S out h- South -Wes t  As ia.

So , can Tur key mana ge  t o obtai n Iraq's supp or t using mo un tai nous i n f rastruct ures of water's reservo i r, desp ite  theprev ailing te nse s andcon f lict o f inte rests  i n t h e  area ? 
A s c an  easily be n oti ced,th e ro le of d ams is not only th a t o f power gener ati on a n d  c ont r ol l ing  r i ver s diet from the u pstream. C an al so passive l y s er ve by o ccupyin g lan d s, whil e operate s as a ba rr ierf o r c rossing fr om bothsides. Th i s obs t ru cting  fu nction  o f d ams,alongw ith  thefact o fa relo cated  r ural Kur dish mass (Hatem & Dohr mann,2013)  –that coul d a l sobe connec tedto dams' p ass ive  role  –t endsto c r ea tea  quas i- " g eographic a ldis c o nt inuity" bet w e e n K urdsofN orther n Ir aq with those ofS outheast Turke y.
S o , h avi n g th es e in mind, incon ju n c tion toapossible in fluenceof Iraq' s Kurd ish le adershi p by Turksover  th e indepen den ce referen du mo f 2017  – l ik e is n oted t h at m i g ht have occurred  from s ome s c hol ars ( Al -Makhzo o mi &  Albdeewy,  2017) – ca n be s aidthatin real it y ther e w as n't really any imper ative  necess it y fo r e xertin g su c h  infl uenc e,  si nce it wa s en o ug hj ust  not  to t ry  tostop it;a nd the s hif t  from b ac k t h e n curr e nt I raqi posit ion  rega r d ing Kurdis h  iss u et o tha t of T urks s hould h a d f ol low.

H ow? i n both ca ses (a.k. a . i nf luen cing orno t)
 1998_and before_Adana's Agreement and PKK's_leader deport_from_Syria, ten_thousands_(10000) Turkish soldiers_were placed along_the borders with Syria_(Wasinger, 2015). So,_having_events developed as such, can definitely be distinguished a projection of Turkish national interests_against_interests of_others.

Nevertheless,_the_issue of projected national interests_is not always clearly apparent_– how_about in association with water facilities and infrastructures_–_especially if is_about post-Saddam federal structure of Iraq; under which the_Kurdish element managed to establish the_only autonomous administrative_division._Such_autonomous status, highly concerns_military and political leadership in Turkey_(Alqallaf, 2003). Turkey's concern is not_just an express of the interest of_a good neighborhood. More likely Turkish_leadership is being heavily troubled_by worries_on the contingency of a_de-facto establishment of_Greater Kurdistan_through separation of_Turkish southeastern region. Especially when for_preventing such from_happening, the cooperation with Syria, Iran,_Iraq_is needed. The_cooperation_of_states, that_beside also having_Kurdish_minorities (Taşpinar,_2011b),_are also considered as rivals for_leadership_in the wider area of South-South-West Asia.

So,_can Turkey manage to_obtain_Iraq's support using mountainous_infrastructures of water's reservoir, despite_the prevailing tenses and conflict of_interests in_the area?

As_can easily be noticed, the role of dams is not only_that of power generation and controlling_rivers diet from the_upstream. Can_also_passively serve by_occupying_lands, while_operates as a barrier for crossing from_both sides._This obstructing function of dams, along_with the fact of_a_relocated rural Kurdish mass (Hatem &_Dohrmann, 2013) – that could also_be connected to dams' passive_role_–_tends to create a quasi-_"geographical discontinuity" between Kurds of Northern_Iraq with those_of Southeast Turkey.

So, having these in mind,_in_conjunction to a possible influence of_Iraq's_Kurdish leadership by Turks over the_independence_referendum_of 2017 – like is_noted that might have occurred from_some scholars (Al-Makhzoomi & Albdeewy, 2017) – can be_said that in_reality there wasn't really any_imperative_necessity_for exerting such influence, since it was enough just not_to try_to stop it;_and the shift from back then current Iraqi position regarding_Kurdish issue to that of Turks should_had follow.

How? in both cases (a.k.a. influencing or not)