 countries' nuclear answering readiness.

Going further, in order reader to get a clearer picture, is considered useful to highlight the fact that Turkey already is moving towards exploiting the benefits of nuclear power (WNN, 2016; Japan Times, 2017; WNA, 2017). As also useful to be stated, is that referencing nuclear energy harvesting for electricity is not targeting in portraying use for civil purposes as evil or to connect it with the earlier mentioned Iran's case. Rather is being referenced in order to exhibit the nuclear-friendly mentality in general. Albeit, Turkey's capabilities on using energy programme's multi-purposely "flourished" during past times; i.e. Ataturk dam (Jongerden, 2010; Stratfor, 2016). Also, in a sense of keeping equal distances from all sides, should be mentioned that there are expressed opinions on the ulterior origin of Turkey's motives for building nuclear plants; even though concurrently there are factual reasons connected to energy demand (Dombe, 2015). Such opinions, are in the same vein with ones concerning the extended ballistic range, as the result of its space programme (Stein, 2014; Dombe, 2015; Yanarocak, 2016).

Finally, based on Turkey's attitude on EU's immigration crisis – as the result of the illegal immigration flooding at eastern EU's borders with Turkey – can be said that some kind of "tit-for-tat" game is apparent (Robinson, 2015; Dinçer & Hecan, 2016, LSM, 2016); without judging whether or not is political correct to call it such, or justifying such tactics for such cases. Anyway, the aforementioned illegal immigration flows from Turkey to EU, resulted in reverse flow of money (Baczynska, 2016; Kingsley, 2016).

So similarities between followed tactics and results can be spotted in a side-by-side study of "tit-for-tat" for Turkey and N. Korea. Thus, the question that follows logically is the next. Whether today's observed use of same tactics for different reasons, could also be used for the same reasons by Turkey in the future; during equivalent shift to new energy-described era.

The weight of latter question gets heavier when considering the fact that Turkey's negotiations on entering EU, is frozen and there are no significant indicators exhibiting willingness to prioritize on entering from Turkey's side (Tocci, 2014; Nasr, 2017; Pitel, 2017; Rieg
countries' nuclear answering readiness. 

 Going further, in decree proofreader to get a clearer picture, is study useful to highlight the fact that Turkey already is move towards exploit the benefits of nuclear power (WNN, 2016; Japan Times, 2017; WNA, 2017). As also useful to be express, is that referencing nuclear energy harvest for electricity is not targeting in portraying habit for civil purposes as evil or to connect it with the sooner mentioned Iran's case. Rather is being reference in order to exhibit the nuclear - friendly brain in general. Albeit, Turkey's capability on using department of energy programme's multi - purposely " flourished " during past times; i.e. Ataturk decameter (Jongerden, 2010; Stratfor, 2016). Also, in a sense of keeping equal distances from all sides, should be mentioned that there are expressed opinions on the ulterior origin of Turkey's motives for building nuclear plants; even though concurrently there are factual reason connected to energy need (Dombe, 2015). Such public opinion, are in the same vein with ones concerning the extensive ballistic range, as the result of its space programme (Stein, 2014; Dombe, 2015; Yanarocak, 2016). 

 ultimately, based on Turkey's attitude on EU's immigration crisis – as the result of the illegal immigration flooding at eastern EU's borders with Turkey – can be said that some kind of " nipple - for - tat " game is apparent (Robinson, 2015; Dinçer & Hecan, 2016, LSM, 2016); without judging whether or not is political correct to call it such, or justify such tactic for such cases. Anyway, the aforementioned illegal immigration flows from Turkey to EU, resulted in reverse menstruation of money (Baczynska, 2016; Kingsley, 2016). 

 So similarities between followed tactic and results can be spotted in a side - by - side sketch of " tit - for - thematic apperception test " for Turkey and N. Korea. Thus, the question that follow logically is the next. Whether today's observed use of like tactics for different reason, could also be used for the like reasons by Turkey in the future; during equivalent shift to new energy - described era. 

 The weight of latter question gets heavier when considering the fact that Turkey's negotiations on enter EU, is frozen and there are no meaning indicators exhibiting willingness to prioritize on entering from Turkey's side (Tocci, 2014; Nasr, 2017; Pitel, 2017; Rieg
 cokntries' nuclear answerinn readiness.

Going furthec, in orser readdr to get a clearer picture, ms cinsidtged useful to highligft the fabt that Tyrkeb already is movmhg towavbs exlpoitnnj the benefits pf nuclear power (WNN, 2016; Ja[av Cimes, 2017; WNA, 2017). As also useful to be staeed, is yhwt referencing nuckqar snergy harvesting for electricity js not uargeting in portrsying use for civil purposfs ad evil or to conneft it with jge qqrlier mentiuned Iran's case. Rather is being referenced in order tu exhnbit the nuxlwar-vtiendly mentelity pn general. Alnvit, Turney's calabilities on msing enwrgy programme's multi-'urposely "flourished" during pdsc times; i.e. Ataturk dan (Hongetden, 2010; Strxrfof, 2016). Zlxo, in a denae of keepjng equal dustances from all sodqw, should be msntionqd that there are expressed opinions on tve hlterior origin of Turkwy's motives for buildlng nuclewr plants; even though concurrently there are factgal rxaronw gonndxtfd to energy demand (Dombe, 2015). Such opinions, are yh uhe same vein witm ones concerning yhf rvtended ballirtic rchgs, as the result of its spwce peogramme (Fteim, 2014; Dombe, 2015; Yanarocak, 2016).

Finally, based on Tugkey'w attitude on EU's nmmigration erisis – as yhe result of the illegcl immjgration flloding at dastern EU's borddrs whth Turkth – can be said thwt some kmnd oy "tit-for-gat" bame if apparent (Robikvon, 2015; Dinçer & Hecan, 2016, LSM, 2016); whthout judhing whether or not is political correct to csln in such, or justlfying such taceics for such eases. Anvway, tfe aforemehtioned illegal imiigration flofd from Turkeb to EU, rqsulred un revefre flow of monry (Baczynska, 2016; Kingsoey, 2016).

So similaritiex bgtseen followed tcetucs and results cav bq dpptead in a side-ty-siae ryudy uf "tit-for-tab" fur Tirkey and N. Korea. Thgs, tge question that fpljows logucally if the next. Whrther today's obserged uve uf sake jactics for different reasons, ckuld also be used for thq sane reasons bv Turkey in the future; during equivalent shift to new enetgy-described era.

The wgigmt of latter queseion gets heavier when considwring the fact thst Turkey's negotiatiohs on anterlng EU, is frozen and there are no significant indicators exhibiting willibgness to prioritiae om entvriug yrom Tuwkey'd side (Tocci, 2014; Nasg, 2017; Pitel, 2017; Rieg
countries' nuclear answering readiness. Going further, in to a clearer is considered useful Turkey is moving towards the benefits of power (WNN, 2016; Japan Times, 2017; 2017). As also useful to be stated, is that referencing nuclear energy harvesting electricity is not targeting in portraying use for civil purposes as evil or connect with earlier Iran's case. Rather is being referenced in order to exhibit the nuclear-friendly mentality in general. Albeit, capabilities on using energy programme's multi-purposely "flourished" during times; i.e. Ataturk dam 2010; Stratfor, 2016). Also, in sense keeping equal from sides, be mentioned that are expressed opinions on the ulterior origin of Turkey's motives for building nuclear plants; even though concurrently are factual to energy (Dombe, Such are in the with ones concerning the extended ballistic result of its space programme (Stein, 2014; Dombe, Yanarocak, 2016). based on Turkey's attitude on EU's crisis – as the result of the illegal flooding at eastern EU's borders with Turkey – can be said that some kind of is apparent (Robinson, 2015; & Hecan, 2016, 2016); judging or is political to call it such, or justifying such tactics for such cases. the aforementioned illegal immigration flows from Turkey to EU, resulted flow money (Baczynska, 2016; 2016). So similarities between tactics results can be spotted side-by-side of and Korea. the question that follows is the next. Whether today's use of same tactics be used for the same reasons by Turkey the future; during equivalent shift to new era. The weight of latter question gets heavier when considering the fact Turkey's negotiations EU, is frozen and there are no significant exhibiting willingness to prioritize entering from Turkey's side (Tocci, 2014; Nasr, 2017; Pitel, Rieg
 countries' nuclear answering Readiness.

GOing fUrtHer, In OrdeR reaDer to get a clearER picTure, is considered useful To higHlIGht tHE fAct thAt TurkeY AlREAdy Is MoVinG tOWaRds exPloIting thE benefits oF nuClEar power (WNN, 2016; JAPaN Times, 2017; WNA, 2017). AS alSo useful to be StaTed, is tHaT reFErencIng NucleAr enerGY harveSting for eLeCTricitY Is not taRGEtIng iN portraying use for CIvIL purposes as eviL or to cOnNEcT IT wiTh tHe earlier mEnTioneD iran's caSE. RATHEr iS Being referencEd in order to EXhiBit the NuCleAR-frienDly meNtALitY in general. ALbeiT, Turkey's cApabilITies on uSIng enerGy progRamMe's MultI-PuRpOseLy "FLouRIsHed" DUriNg past tiMeS; i.E. AtatUrk dAM (jONgerDen, 2010; straTfor, 2016). ALso, in a sense of KeePing EQuaL distAnces From AlL sideS, shoulD be meNtIoned that there aRe exPressed opIniOnS on ThE ulteRIor oriGin Of TUrkey's mOtives fOR buIlDING nUclear plants; even thOuGH CoNcurrentLy therE ArE fACtual reaSoNs cOnneCTEd to eNergY DeMand (DombE, 2015). Such oPInIoNs, are in ThE same vEiN wiTh oNes coNCernIng the Extended BalliSTic range, as the rESult of its spacE PrOGRaMMe (StEin, 2014; dombe, 2015; YanaroCak, 2016).

FINallY, basED oN TuRKey's aTtituDe ON Eu'S immigration crisis – aS tHe resuLt of tHe illegal immiGration floODINg at eastErn Eu'S bORders with TurkeY – can bE said that sOMe kind of "Tit-foR-tat" game Is apparenT (rObinson, 2015; DInçEr & HEcaN, 2016, LSm, 2016); WItHout judging whETHer oR nOt is polItiCal corrEct To cAll It sUcH, or justifYing such TaCtIcS fOr sUch caSEs. Anyway, ThE afOrEmeNtionED illegAl immIgraTiOn FLowS from TuRKeY TO EU, rEsUlTed iN reVeRse flOw of MOneY (BaczynSka, 2016; KingslEy, 2016).

SO SimiLaRiTies betWeen followed tAcTics and resUlTs cAn be spOTTed in a siDe-by-side study of "tit-for-taT" For TurkEy aNd N. KoRea. THus, the queStiOn that FolLOws logIcally Is the NeXt. WHETher tODAy'S obSeRved use of sAME taCtics FoR difFerent rEasons, could also be uSEd fOr the same reasOns By TuRKEy In tHE fUTurE; dURinG EQuivalent shift tO new energy-DeSCrIbed era.

The WEigHt Of latteR questiOn getS Heavier When consiDering the FaCt thAT turKey's negotiAtions on Entering Eu, Is froZEn And thEre Are no sIgNifIcant IndicaTOrs ExhibIting wIlLingneSs to pRiOritize oN entering from Turkey's sidE (Tocci, 2014; nasr, 2017; PIteL, 2017; Rieg
 countries' nuclear answer ing readin ess.
Go ing  f urth er,in order reade r  toget a clearer picture,  is c on s ider e dusefu l to hi g hl i g htth efac tt ha t Tur key  alread y is movin g t ow ards exploit i ng  the benef its  of nuclearpow er (WN N,  20 1 6; Ja pan  Time s, 201 7 ; WNA,  2017). A sa lso us e ful tob e  s tate d, is that refere n ci n g nuclear ener gy har ve s ti n g  fo r e lectricity  i s not targeti n gi n por t raying use fo r civil pur p ose s as e vi l o r  to co nnect  i t  wi th the earl iermentioned  Iran' s  case.R ather i s bein g r efe renc e din  or de r  to ex hib i t t he nucle ar -f riend ly m e n t a lity  in  gen eral.  Albeit, Turk ey' s ca p abi litie s onusin generg y prog ramme 's  multi-purposel y "f lourished " d ur ing  p ast t i mes; i .e.  At aturk d am (Jon g erd en , 2 01 0; Stratfor, 2016) .A l so , in a s ense o f  k ee p ing equa ldis tanc e s  from  all si des, sho uld be me nt ioned t ha t ther eare  ex press e d op inions  on theulter i or origin of T u rkey's motive s  f o r  b u ildi ngnuclear pla nts; even  tho u gh  co n curre ntlyth e re are factual reasons  c onnect ed to  energy deman d (Dombe,2 0 1 5). Such  opi n io n s, are in thesamevein witho nes conc ernin g the ex tended ba l l istic ra nge , a s t her e su lt of its spa c e  pro gr amme (S tei n, 2014 ; D omb e,201 5;  Yanaroca k, 2016) .
F in al ly,  base d  on Turk ey 'sat tit ude o n  EU'simmig rati on  c r isi s – ast he r esul tof  the  il le gal i mmig r ati on floo ding at e ast e rn E U' sborders  with Turkey–can be sai dtha t some k ind of " tit-for-tat" game is ap p arent ( Rob inson , 20 15; Dinçe r &  Hecan , 2 0 16, LS M, 201 6); w it hou t judgi n g  w het he r or not i s pol itica lcorr ect tocall it such, or j u sti fying such ta cti cs f o r  s uch ca s es.  A n ywa y ,  the aforementi oned illeg al im migrationf low sfrom Tu rkey to  EU,r esulted  in rever se flow o fmone y (Ba czynska, 2 016; Kin gsley, 20 1 6).
S osimil ari ties b et wee n fol lowedt act ics a nd res ul ts can  be s po tted ina side-by-side study of  "tit- for-t at"  for Turk eya ndN. Korea.  Thu s, the que sti onthatfol l ows l ogic a ll y i s  thenext .  Whethert od ay' s ob served useo f sam e tac tic s  for d iffe rent reasons, cou l d also be used  for t hesam e  rea so ns by Turkey i n t he f uture; d ur ing equival ent shif tt o new  energ y-desc ribed e r a .The we ight  of  latter q ues ti o n getshe av i er whe n co ns iderin g thef actt h at Turkey's nego tiati o n s one nte ringEU , is fr o zenand thereare no sign ifican t in dicat ors exh ib itingwil li ngness top rioritize  on e ntering  f romTur key'sside ( Tocci , 20 14 ; N asr, 2017 ; Pi t el ,2 017 ; Ri eg
 countries'_nuclear answering_readiness.

Going further, in order_reader to_get_a clearer_picture,_is considered useful_to highlight the_fact that Turkey already_is moving towards_exploiting_the benefits of nuclear power (WNN, 2016; Japan Times, 2017; WNA, 2017). As also_useful_to be_stated,_is_that referencing nuclear energy harvesting_for electricity is not targeting_in portraying_use for civil purposes as evil or to_connect_it with the_earlier mentioned Iran's case. Rather is being referenced in_order to exhibit the nuclear-friendly mentality_in general. Albeit,_Turkey's_capabilities_on using energy programme's_multi-purposely "flourished" during past times; i.e._Ataturk dam (Jongerden, 2010; Stratfor, 2016)._Also, in a sense of keeping equal_distances from all sides, should be_mentioned that there are expressed_opinions on_the ulterior origin of Turkey's_motives for building_nuclear plants;_even though concurrently_there are factual reasons connected to_energy demand (Dombe,_2015). Such opinions, are in the_same_vein with ones_concerning_the_extended ballistic_range, as the_result_of its_space_programme (Stein, 2014; Dombe, 2015; Yanarocak,_2016).

Finally,_based on Turkey's attitude on EU's immigration_crisis – as the_result_of the illegal immigration_flooding at eastern EU's borders_with Turkey – can be said_that some_kind of_"tit-for-tat" game is apparent (Robinson, 2015; Dinçer & Hecan, 2016, LSM,_2016); without judging whether or not_is political correct to_call it_such,_or justifying such_tactics_for such_cases. Anyway, the aforementioned illegal immigration flows_from Turkey_to EU, resulted in reverse flow_of money (Baczynska, 2016;_Kingsley,_2016).

So similarities between followed tactics and_results can be spotted in a_side-by-side study of "tit-for-tat" for_Turkey_and_N. Korea. Thus, the question_that follows logically is the next._Whether today's observed_use of same tactics for different reasons,_could_also be used for the same_reasons_by Turkey in the future; during_equivalent_shift_to new energy-described era.

The weight_of latter question gets heavier when_considering the fact that Turkey's negotiations on entering EU,_is frozen and_there are no significant indicators_exhibiting_willingness_to prioritize on entering from Turkey's side (Tocci, 2014; Nasr,_2017; Pitel,_2017; Rieg