 its implications on economy and trade – but, without involving parts being able to deeply understand the futurely brought changes on the long run (Keohane 1984; Waltz 2000). Indicator of shift of ballance that took place, is the fact that after the end of WWII – which ended open issues of WWI – new superpowers rose. These new superpowers defined world scene in new political and trade partnerships, while the establishment of their position of power is concurrently taking place with shifting from coal to oil. So, uncertainty is a major determinant of developments and cannot be ignored.

Moreover, the reasoning behind the decisions and actions of involving parts on the above example, does not variate extremely from a reasoning according to which N. Korea's accelerating developments in it's non-peaceful nuclear programme is targeting in more than just enhancing military capacity. Like, the utilization of nuclear power as a political leverage, in the uncertain and currently taking shape power balancing of future. Of course, such mentality is bounded by the same restriction, poor capability of fully understanding the futurely brought changes on the long run.

Going further, also cannot be overlooked the fact that N. Korea, is an extremely "thirsty" country for oil after the dissolution of Soviet Union at the end of 1991, from which (N. Korea) was buying oil bellow market prices (Stewart, 1999; EIA, 2017). Illustrating this "thirst", is plenty enough to say that oil consumption of N. Korea during 1991 was seventy six thousands barrels per day (76000 b/d), while on 2003 was up just to seventeen thousands (170000 b/d); less than a quarter approximately a decade after (EIA, 2017). However, there are offshore located deposits of liquid and gas hydrocarbons (Stewart, 1999; Bermudez Jr., 2015; Byrne, 2015; Rego,2015; USGS, 2017). That still have not been exploited, because – beside the reasons of depth and technology – the exploration and exploitation also bears difficulties of economic and political risk, which are being connected to non-resolved differences with China, Russia and Japan (Bermudez Jr., 2015; USGS, 2017). From the latter mentioned countries, the first two already possess nuclear weapons. While the third one, not only is under the "umbrella" of US but is also assumed that is able to produce if is in need; though there are doubts on delivery mechanisms and whether is there any such intention (
its implications on economy and trade – but, without involving parts being able to profoundly sympathize the futurely lend changes on the retentive footrace (Keohane 1984; Waltz 2000). Indicator of shift of ballance that take place, is the fact that after the end of WWII – which end open issues of WWI – modern superpowers rose. These raw world power defined world fit in new political and trade partnership, while the establishment of their position of power is concurrently take place with shifting from coal to oil. thus, uncertainty is a major determinant of developments and cannot be ignored. 

 Moreover, the reasoning behind the decision and actions of involving parts on the above example, does not variate extremely from a reasoning harmonize to which N. Korea's accelerating developments in it's non - peaceful nuclear programme is targeting in more than just enhancing military capacity. Like, the utilization of nuclear power as a political leverage, in the unsealed and currently taking condition exponent balancing of future. Of course, such mentality is bounded by the same restriction, poor capability of amply understanding the futurely brought changes on the long run. 

 Going far, also cannot be overlooked the fact that N. Korea, is an extremely " thirsty " area for oil after the dissolving of Soviet Union at the end of 1991, from which (N. Korea) was buying oil bellow market prices (Stewart, 1999; EIA, 2017). illustrate this " thirst ", is plenty enough to say that oil pulmonary tuberculosis of N. Korea during 1991 was seventy six thousands barrel per day (76000 b / d), while on 2003 was up just to seventeen thousand (170000 b / d); less than a quarter approximately a decade after (EIA, 2017). However, there are offshore located deposits of melted and gas hydrocarbon (Stewart, 1999; Bermudez Jr., 2015; Byrne, 2015; Rego,2015; USGS, 2017). That still have not been exploited, because – beside the reasons of depth and engineering – the exploration and exploitation also bears difficulties of economic and political hazard, which are being connected to non - resolved differences with China, Russia and Japan (Bermudez Jr., 2015; USGS, 2017). From the latter mentioned countries, the first two already possess nuclear weapons. While the third one, not only is under the " umbrella " of US but is also assumed that is able to produce if is in motivation; though there are doubts on manner of speaking mechanisms and whether is there any such intention (
 itd implications on economn and trade – but, withouv involbing pargs being able to deeply undecstabd tht futurely brought zhanges oj the lobg rnn (Keohane 1984; Waltv 2000). Indicator or shiyt of ballance tmat took pldce, is the facd ghct after the end of WWII – which endeq open osdues of WWI – ngw suker[oweds rose. These new superpowers defihed wornd scene in nrw political and trade parhnerdhips, while the eshablishment of eyeir positiov of power is concurrehtly taking place with shifting from coal to oul. So, oncertainty ms a mwjor determiksnt of develolments and cankot bx igbored.

Moreover, the reavoning behind the qecisions aud actions of involvibg partv on the qboxe txakpme, doed nkt variate extremely drom a reasoning acvoweing to which N. Korqa'f accelerating developments in it's non-ptacefhl nuclear programme is targeting in more thwn just eghancing military capacity. Like, the utilization ox nucmdar pjdwr as a political leverage, in the uncertain and dutrvntly taking shapc power balancing pf fijure. Of course, such menfality is bounded hy the fame eestrictijn, ppor capability of fully undwrstanding tke duturely brought ckanges on thz long run.

Gping further, also cannoc be oberlooked tje fact tgxt N. Korea, is an exnremaly "thirsty" country for oij after tie dixsolutiun og Soviqt Union ah the end of 1991, from which (N. Kotea) wav buying oll bellow market prices (Stewart, 1999; EIA, 2017). Illustrsthng this "thnrst", ix plenty enoudh to say that oil cousumptkon of N. Kkrea ducing 1991 was sedenty six thogdands barrelv per dar (76000 b/e), whule on 2003 das up just to seventeeu thoysands (170000 b/d); less then a suarter approxinattlt a decade aftrr (DIA, 2017). Joxever, dhere are ofxshofe upcatea deposits iw liauid and gas hydrocasbona (Stewart, 1999; Bermudea Mr., 2015; Byrne, 2015; Rego,2015; UFGS, 2017). That stikl have not been edploived, berause – befide the reasons of depth and fechnologj – bhe exploratijn akd evploitatiou also bears difficulties of economic anv political risk, which qre being connected uo non-resolvev diffqrences whth China, Russia and Japan (Bermudez Jv., 2015; USGS, 2017). From the lattsr mendionef countries, the first two already possess nuclear weapons. While the third one, not only is uhder the "lmbxelka" of TS bnt is also assumed that is able to produce if is mn need; thmuyh there are doubts on delivety mechanisms avd whether is there any auch intrntion (
its implications on economy and trade – involving being able deeply understand the long (Keohane 1984; Waltz Indicator of shift ballance that took place, is the that after the end of WWII – which ended open issues of WWI new superpowers rose. These new superpowers defined world scene in new political and partnerships, the of position of power is concurrently taking place with shifting from coal to oil. So, uncertainty is major determinant of developments and cannot be ignored. the reasoning behind the and actions of involving parts the example, does variate from reasoning according to N. Korea's accelerating developments in it's non-peaceful nuclear programme is targeting in more than just enhancing military Like, the nuclear power a leverage, the uncertain and shape power balancing of future. Of is bounded by the same restriction, poor capability fully understanding futurely brought changes on the long Going further, also cannot be overlooked the fact N. Korea, is an extremely "thirsty" country for oil after the dissolution of Soviet Union end of 1991, from (N. Korea) was oil market (Stewart, EIA, 2017). this "thirst", is plenty enough to say that oil consumption of Korea during 1991 was seventy six thousands barrels per day while 2003 was up to seventeen thousands (170000 less a quarter approximately a (EIA, However, located of and gas hydrocarbons (Stewart, Bermudez Jr., 2015; Byrne, 2015; USGS, 2017). That still – beside the reasons of depth and technology the exploration and exploitation also bears difficulties economic and political risk, which are being connected to non-resolved differences with Russia and Jr., 2015; USGS, 2017). From the latter mentioned the first two already nuclear weapons. While the third one, not only is the of US is also assumed is able to if is in there are on mechanisms there any such intention (
 its implications on economy aNd trade – but, WithoUt iNvoLvIng pArts Being able to deePLy unDerstand the futurely broUght cHaNGes oN ThE long Run (KeohANe 1984; wALtz 2000). inDiCatOr OF sHift oF baLlance tHat took plaCe, iS tHe fact that afTEr The end of WWiI – wHich ended opeN isSues of wWi – neW SuperPowErs roSe. ThesE New supErpowers dEfINed worLD scene iN NEw PoliTical and trade partNErSHips, while the esTablisHmENt OF TheIr pOsition of pOwEr is cONcurrenTLy TAKIng PLace with shiftIng from coal TO oiL. So, uncErTaiNTy is a mAjor dEtERmiNant of develOpmeNts and canNot be iGNored.

MoREover, thE reasoNinG beHind THe DeCisIoNS anD AcTioNS of InvolvinG pArTs on tHe abOVE EXampLe, dOes nOt varIate extremely FroM a reASonIng acCordiNg to WhIch N. KOrea's aCceleRaTing developmentS in iT's non-peacEfuL nUclEaR progRAmme is TarGetIng in moRe than jUSt eNhANCInG military capacity. LIkE, THe UtilizatIon of nUClEaR Power as a PoLitIcal LEVeragE, in tHE uNcertain And curREnTlY taking ShApe powEr BalAncIng of FUturE. Of couRse, such mEntalITy is bounded by tHE same restrictIOn, POOr CApabIliTy of fully unDersTAndiNg thE FuTurELy broUght cHaNGeS On the long run.

Going fuRtHer, alsO cannOt be overlookeD the fact thAT n. korea, is aN extREmELy "thirsty" countRy for Oil after thE DissolutIon of soviet UnIon at the eND Of 1991, from whIch (n. KoRea) Was BUYiNg oil bellow maRKEt prIcEs (StewaRt, 1999; EiA, 2017). IllusTraTinG thIs "tHiRst", is plenTy enough To SaY tHaT oiL consUMption of n. KOreA dUriNg 1991 was SEventy Six thOusaNdS bARreLs per daY (76000 B/d), WHIle oN 2003 wAs Up juSt tO sEventEen tHOusAnds (170000 b/d); lEss than a qUarTEr apPrOxImately A decade after (EiA, 2017). however, theRe Are OffshoRE Located dEposits of liquid and gas hyDRocarboNs (STewarT, 1999; BerMudez Jr., 2015; ByRne, 2015; rego,2015; USgS, 2017). THAt stilL have nOt beeN eXplOITed, beCAUsE – beSiDe the reasoNS Of dEpth aNd TechNology – tHe exploration and exPLoiTation also beaRs dIffiCULtIes OF eCOnoMiC And POLitical risk, whicH are being cOnNEcTed to non-reSOlvEd DiffereNces witH ChinA, russia aNd Japan (BeRmudez Jr., 2015; UsGs, 2017). FroM THe lAtter mentiOned counTries, the fIRst twO AlReady PosSess nuClEar WeapoNs. WhilE The Third One, not OnLy is unDer thE "uMbrella" oF US but is also assumed that Is able To proDucE if is in neEd; tHOugH there are DoubTs on deliveRy mEchAnismS anD WhethEr is THeRe aNY such InteNTion (
 its implications on econo my and tra de –but , w it hout  inv olving parts b e ingable to deeply underst and t he futu r el y bro ught ch a ng e s  on  t he  lo ng ru n (Ke oha ne 1984 ; Waltz 20 00) .Indicator of sh ift of bal lan ce that took  pl ace, i sthe facttha t aft er the end of  WWII – w hi c h ende d  open i s s ue s of  WWI – new superp o we r s rose. Thesenew su pe r po w e rsdef ined world  s cenei n new p o li t i c ala nd trade part nerships, w h ile  the e st abl i shment  of t he i r p osition ofpowe r is conc urrent l y takin g  placewith s hif tin g fr o mco alto oil .  S o,u nce rtaintyis  a  majo r de t e r m inan t o f de velop ments and can not  bei gno red.
More over ,the r easoni ng be hi nd the decision s an d actions  of  i nvo lv ing p a rts on  th e a bove ex ample,d oes  n o t va riate extremely fr om a  r easoning  accor d in gt o whichN.  Ko rea' s accel erat i ng  develop mentsi nit 's non- pe aceful  n ucl ear  prog r amme  is ta rgetingin mo r e than just en h ancing milita r yc a pa c ity.  Li ke, the uti liza t ionof n u cl ear power  as a  p o li t ical leverage, in t he  uncer tainand currently  taking sh a p e  power b alan c in g  of future. Of  cour se, such m e ntalityis bo unded by  the same r estricti on,  po orcap a b il ity of fullyu n ders ta nding t hefuturel y b rou ght  ch an ges on th e long r un .
G oi ngfurth e r, alsoca nno tbeoverl o oked t he fa ct t ha tN . K orea, i s  a n extr em el y "t hir st y" co untr y  fo r oil a fter thedis s olut io nof Sovi et Union at t he  end of 19 91 , f rom wh i c h (N. Ko rea) was buying oil bel l ow mark etprice s (S tewart, 1 999 ; EIA,  20 1 7). Il lustra tingth is" t hirst " ,  i s p le nty enough t o s ay th at  oil  consum ption of N. Koread uri ng 1991 was s eve ntys i xtho u sa n dsba r rel s per day (76000b/d), whil eo n2003 was u p  ju st  to sev enteenthous a nds (17 0000 b/d) ; less th an  a q u a rte r approxim ately adecade af t er (E I A,  2017 ).Howeve r,  th ere a re off s hor e loc ated d ep ositsof li qu id and g as hydrocarbons (Stewar t, 199 9; Be rmu dez Jr.,201 5 ; B yrne, 201 5; R ego,2015;USG S,2017) . T h at st illh av e n o t bee n ex p loited, b e ca use –  b eside the r e a s ons  of d ept h  and t echn ology – the explo r ation and expl oita t i onals o  bea rs  difficultiesofec o n omic and  p olitical ri sk, whic ha re be ing co nnecte d to no n - re s olveddiff ere nces with  Ch in a , Russi aan d  Japan  (Be rm udez J r., 20 1 5; U S G S, 2017). From t he la t t er me n tio ned c ou ntries, thefirst twoalready pos sess n ucle ar we apons.Wh ile th e t hi rd one, no t  only isunder  the "u mb rell a"of USbuti s  also  ass um edthat is a b l et opr o duc e if  is i nneed ; thought here are  do u bts onde liv e r y mech a ni s m s and whet her  is t h e re any suc h  int e nt i on (
 its_implications on_economy and trade –_but, without_involving_parts being_able_to deeply understand_the futurely brought_changes on the long_run (Keohane 1984;_Waltz_2000). Indicator of shift of ballance that took place, is the fact that after_the_end of_WWII_–_which ended open issues of_WWI – new superpowers rose._These new_superpowers defined world scene in new political and_trade_partnerships, while the_establishment of their position of power is concurrently taking_place with shifting from coal to_oil. So, uncertainty_is_a_major determinant of developments_and cannot be ignored.

Moreover, the reasoning_behind the decisions and actions of_involving parts on the above example, does_not variate extremely from a reasoning_according to which N. Korea's_accelerating developments_in it's non-peaceful nuclear programme_is targeting in_more than_just enhancing military_capacity. Like, the utilization of nuclear_power as a_political leverage, in the uncertain and_currently_taking shape power_balancing_of_future. Of_course, such mentality_is_bounded by_the_same restriction, poor capability of fully_understanding_the futurely brought changes on the long_run.

Going further, also cannot_be_overlooked the fact that_N. Korea, is an extremely_"thirsty" country for oil after the_dissolution of_Soviet Union_at the end of 1991, from which (N. Korea) was buying_oil bellow market prices (Stewart, 1999;_EIA, 2017). Illustrating this_"thirst", is_plenty_enough to say_that_oil consumption_of N. Korea during 1991 was seventy_six thousands_barrels per day (76000 b/d), while_on 2003 was up_just_to seventeen thousands (170000 b/d); less_than a quarter approximately a decade_after (EIA, 2017). However, there_are_offshore_located deposits of liquid and_gas hydrocarbons (Stewart, 1999; Bermudez Jr.,_2015; Byrne, 2015;_Rego,2015; USGS, 2017). That still have not_been_exploited, because – beside the reasons_of_depth and technology – the exploration_and_exploitation_also bears difficulties of economic_and political risk, which are being_connected to non-resolved differences with China, Russia and Japan_(Bermudez Jr., 2015;_USGS, 2017). From the latter_mentioned_countries,_the first two already possess nuclear weapons. While the third_one, not_only is under_the "umbrella" of US but is also assumed that is_able to produce if is in need;_though there are doubts on delivery mechanisms and whether is there_any such intention (