 2017). Thus, negative references are respectively associated to accompanied suggestions and equitability between states.

Apart from these, there is also a criticism on the effectiveness of Market Based Mechanisms, like the EU Emission Trading Scheme (Ellerman & Joskow, 2008; Judson & Stavins 2008; Helm, 2009; Revel, 2011).

Having above in mind can be said that negative aspects can be either more theoretical (like degrowth) or more applied in a sense of adaptive management (like EU ETS).

So as can easily be understood, until now there is a lacking literature on the impact of these policies of one country on the foreign policy of another, and more specifically on unanticipated and undesirable consequences. In particular, on at least promoting seek and pursuit of technological knowhow acquisition on nuclear weapons production or/and accelerating advancements in nuclear weapons development.

Nevertheless, there are studies that – maybe do not focus on policies' impact, but they do – focus on the effect of climate change itself upon the landscape of geopolitical influence (Mou, et. al 2017); albeit not in connection to nuclear weapons.

According to Mou, et. al (2017), climate change can indeed impact on the shifting landscape of geopolitical influence, but without being crystal clear to which extent since can also be attributed to preexisting factors. Moreover, exerting influence can significantly vary in a country-based scope, so countries can be classified in four different groups. However, even within the same group, countries tend to arrange their priorities according to their own needs and thus groups can not be considered as uniform.

As far as nuclear weapons are being concerned, in general one of the most notorious explanation for assembling and possessing nuclear weapons is the one described by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence (Klein, 1994; Joseph & Reichart, 1998).

Nevertheless, deterrence is a rather generic term. According to Narang, three main categories can be distinguished on how such weapons can be utilized. Shortly naming them, these are: 1) catalytic role in a geopolitical context, 2) assured retaliation or second strike, and 3) as a tool of asymmetric escalation (Narang, 2014; Shane, 2015).

Especially for N. Korea, various explanations have been given; even not including pure military reasoning (Graham, 2013; Lanʹkov, 2015; Narang, 2014; Shane, 2015). For example, like
2017). Thus, negative references are respectively associated to play along trace and equitability between states. 

 Apart from these, there is besides a criticism on the effectiveness of Market Based Mechanisms, like the EU Emission Trading Scheme (Ellerman & Joskow, 2008; Judson & Stavins 2008; Helm, 2009; Revel, 2011). 

 Having above in mind can be order that negative aspects can be either more theoretical (like degrowth) or more apply in a sense of adaptive management (like EU ETS). 

 So as can well be understood, until now there is a lacking literature on the impingement of these policies of one country on the foreign policy of another, and more specifically on unanticipated and undesirable consequences. In particular, on at least promote seek and pursuit of technological knowhow acquisition on nuclear weapon production or / and accelerating advancements in nuclear weapons growth. 

 Nevertheless, there are studies that – maybe do not focus on policy' impact, but they do – focus on the effect of climate change itself upon the landscape of geopolitical influence (Mou, et. al 2017); albeit not in connection to nuclear weapons. 

 According to Mou, et. al (2017), climate change can indeed impact on the shifting landscape of geopolitical influence, but without being crystal clear to which extent since can also be attributed to preexisting factors. Moreover, exert influence can significantly vary in a area - based scope, so countries can be classified in four unlike groups. However, even within the like group, countries tend to arrange their priorities harmonize to their own needs and thus groups cannot be considered as uniform. 

 As far as nuclear weapons are being concerned, in general one of the most notorious explanation for assembling and possess nuclear weapons is the one describe by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence (Klein, 1994; Joseph & Reichart, 1998). 

 Nevertheless, deterrence is a rather generic term. harmonize to Narang, three main categories can be distinguished on how such weapon can be utilized. Shortly naming them, these are: 1) catalytic role in a geopolitical context, 2) see retaliation or second strike, and 3) as a creature of asymmetric escalation (Narang, 2014; Shane, 2015). 

 Especially for N. Korea, assorted explanations have been give; even not including pure military reasoning (Graham, 2013; Lanʹkov, 2015; Narang, 2014; Shane, 2015). For example, like
 2017). Tjus, negative references xre respectiveli qssocieted to accompavied suggestions and equitabmlitt betqeen states.

Apart from ghese, thege is alsi a rriticism on the effectiyzness lf Mcrjet Based Mechsnisms, lika the EU Emisshov Crading Scheme (Ellerman & Joskow, 2008; Judfon & Stsvlns 2008; Helm, 2009; Revgl, 2011).

Hanigg agove in mind can be said that negafive askects can be eithet more theoretical (like dehrowhh) or more applied in a sense of weaptive manaeement (likt ZU ETS).

So as can easily be understood, until now chere is a oaxkijc literaturx on tre impact of these pmlicies of one countrn on vhe doreign policy of anovher, and more specifycally on uuanticipated and undewieable convequdbcer. Ih 'arficulag, oi at least lromoting swek and pursuit of uecrbological knoshow asqtisition on nuclear weapons production mr/ahd accelerating advancenents in nuclear weaplns develjpment.

Nevertheless, there are studies that – maybe go nov wocbw on oillcies' impact, but they do – focus on the effect kf ckimate change ltself upon the lamddcske of geopolitkcal iurlhence (Mou, et. al 2017); apbeit njt in connectijn tp nuclear weapons.

According ro Mou, et. al (2017), climate change cau indeed impcct on the xhifting landscape of gzopolifical influfnce, but skthout being cryrtak wlear to which extent sincq can alsi be attribjted to prqexisting vactovv. Moreover, exertinh infpuance can slgnificantly vary in a country-bexed scope, so cmunnries can be ckassified in sour different groups. Howexer, even wpthin the same group, countries tetf to arrange their pwiorutiew accorakng to their oen needs cud thus geoups can not be cpnsksered as uniforn.

As far as nuclear wexpogs ace beytg concerned, in eendtal ove of the mirt nptorious explanation for assembling and poxscssing nuxlear wewpons is the pne described by tje dortrine of niclgar deterrence (Klein, 1994; Joseph & Rsichart, 1998).

Nfvevtheless, detewrenge if a rather generic term. According to Narang, three main categories cqn be distinguished pn how such weapjns can ba utilized. Shortly nqming them, these sre: 1) catalytic role ih a gempolihical context, 2) assured retaliation or second strike, and 3) as a tool of asynmetrir qscalation (Haramg, 2014; Svaue, 2015).

Zspeciajly hoc N. Korea, various explanations have been given; eten not inwlbding pure military reasoning (Gfaham, 2013; Lanʹkov, 2015; Narang, 2014; Shane, 2015). For exajple, likr
2017). Thus, negative references are respectively associated suggestions equitability between Apart from these, on effectiveness of Market Mechanisms, like the Emission Trading Scheme (Ellerman & Joskow, Judson & Stavins 2008; Helm, 2009; Revel, 2011). Having above in mind can said that negative aspects can be either more theoretical (like degrowth) or more in sense adaptive (like EU ETS). So as can easily be understood, until now there is a lacking literature the impact of these policies of one country the foreign policy of and more specifically on unanticipated undesirable In particular, at promoting and pursuit of knowhow acquisition on nuclear weapons production or/and accelerating advancements in nuclear weapons development. Nevertheless, there are studies – maybe focus on impact, they – focus on of climate change itself upon the influence (Mou, et. al 2017); albeit not in to nuclear According to Mou, et. al (2017), change can indeed impact on the shifting landscape geopolitical influence, but without being crystal clear to which extent since can also be attributed factors. Moreover, exerting influence significantly vary in country-based so can classified in different groups. However, even within the same group, countries tend to their priorities according to their own needs and thus groups be as uniform. As as nuclear weapons are concerned, general one of the explanation assembling weapons the described by the doctrine nuclear deterrence (Klein, 1994; Joseph Reichart, 1998). Nevertheless, deterrence According to Narang, three main categories can be on how such weapons can be utilized. naming them, these are: 1) catalytic role in a geopolitical context, 2) retaliation or and 3) as a tool of asymmetric escalation 2014; Shane, 2015). Especially N. Korea, various explanations have been given; even not pure reasoning (Graham, Lanʹkov, 2015; Narang, Shane, 2015). For like
 2017). Thus, negative references are RespectiveLy assOciAteD tO accOmpaNied suggestionS And eQuitability between statEs.

ApaRt FRom tHEsE, therE is also A CrITIciSm On The EfFEcTivenEss Of MarkeT Based MechAniSmS, like the EU EmISsIon Trading schEme (Ellerman & JOskOw, 2008; JudsOn & staVIns 2008; HeLm, 2009; REvel, 2011).

HAving aBOve in mInd can be sAiD That neGAtive asPECtS can Be either more theorETiCAl (like degrowth) Or more ApPLiED In a SenSe of adaptiVe ManagEMent (likE eU ets).

so aS Can easily be unDerstood, untIL noW there Is A laCKing liTeratUrE On tHe impact of tHese Policies oF one coUNtry on tHE foreigN policY of AnoTher, ANd MoRe sPeCIfiCAlLy oN UnaNticipatEd AnD undeSiraBLE COnseQueNces. in parTicular, on at leAst PromOTinG seek And puRsuiT oF techNologiCal knOwHow acquisition oN nucLear weapoNs pRoDucTiOn or/aND accelEraTinG advancEments iN NucLeAR WEaPons development.

NevErTHElEss, there Are stuDIeS tHAt – maybe dO nOt fOcus ON PolicIes' iMPaCt, but theY do – focUS oN tHe effecT oF climaTe ChaNge ItselF Upon The lanDscape of GeopoLItical influencE (mou, et. al 2017); albeit NOt IN CoNNectIon To nuclear weAponS.

accoRdinG To mou, ET. al (2017), clImate ChANgE Can indeed impact on thE sHiftinG landScape of geopolItical inflUENCe, but witHout BEiNG crystal clear tO whicH extent sinCE can also Be attRibuted tO preexistING factors. morEovEr, eXerTINg Influence can sIGNifiCaNtly varY in A countrY-baSed ScoPe, sO cOuntries cAn be clasSiFiEd In FouR diffERent grouPs. howEvEr, eVen wiTHin the Same gRoup, CoUnTRieS tend to ARrANGe thEiR pRiorItiEs AccorDing TO thEir own nEeds and thUs gROups CaN nOt be conSidered as unifOrM.

As far as nuClEar WeaponS ARe being cOncerned, in general one of tHE most noTorIous eXplaNation for AssEmblinG anD PossesSing nuClear WeApoNS Is the ONE dEscRiBed by the doCTRinE of nuClEar dEterrenCe (Klein, 1994; Joseph & ReichARt, 1998).

NEvertheless, deTerRencE IS a RatHEr GEneRiC TerM. aCcording to NaranG, three main CaTEgOries can be DIstInGuished On how suCh weaPOns can bE utilized. shortly naMiNg thEM, TheSe are: 1) catalYtic role In a geopolITical COnText, 2) aSsuRed retAlIatIon or Second STriKe, and 3) As a tooL oF asymmEtric EsCalation (narang, 2014; Shane, 2015).

Especially foR N. KoreA, variOus ExplanatiOns HAve Been given; Even Not includiNg pUre MilitAry REasonIng (GRAhAm, 2013; LANʹkov, 2015; NAranG, 2014; shane, 2015). For eXAmPle, LIKe
 2017). Thus, negative ref erences ar e res pec tiv el y as soci ated to accomp a nied  suggestions and equit abili ty betw e en  stat es.

Ap a rt f rom  t he se,  t h er e isals o a cri ticism onthe  e ffectiveness of  Market Ba sed  Mechanisms,  li ke the  E U E m issio n T radin g Sche m e (Ell erman & J os k ow, 20 0 8; Juds o n  &  Sta vins 2008; Helm,2 00 9 ; Revel, 2011) .

Hav in g  a b o veinmind can b esaidt hat neg a ti v e asp e cts can be ei ther more t h eor etical  ( lik e  degro wth)or mor e applied i n asense ofadapti v e manag e ment (l ike EU  ET S). 

So as  c anea s ily be  un d ers tood, un ti lnow t here i s a la cki ng l itera ture on the i mpa ct o f  th ese p olici es o fone c ountry  on t he  foreign policy  ofanother,and  m ore  s pecif i callyonuna nticipa ted and und es i r a bl e consequences. In  p a r ti cular, o n at l e as tp romoting  s eek  and p ursui t of te chnologi cal kn o wh ow  acquis it ion on  n ucl ear  weap o ns p roduct ion or/a nd ac c elerating adva n cements in nu c le a r  w e apon s d evelopment. 

Ne v erth eles s ,the r e are  stud ie s  t h at – maybe do not f oc us onpolic ies' impact,but they d o –  focus o n th e  e f fect of climat e cha nge itself upon the  land scape of  geopolit i c al influ enc e ( Mou , e t .  a l 2017); albe i t  not  i n conne cti on to n ucl ear  we apo ns .

Accord ing to M ou ,et .al(2017 ) , climat echa ng e c an in d eed im pacton t he  s h ift ing lan d sc a p e of  g eo poli tic al  infl uenc e , b ut with out being  cr y stal  c le ar to w hich extent s in ce can als obeattrib u t ed to pr eexisting factors. More o ver, ex ert ing i nflu ence cansig nifica ntl y  varyin a c ountr y- bas e d  scop e ,  s o c ou ntries can b e c lassi fi ed i n fourdifferent groups.H owe ver, even wit hin  the s am e g r ou p , c ou n tri e s  tend to arrang e their pr io r it ies accord i ngto  theirown nee ds an d  thus g roups can  not be c on side r e d a s uniform. 

As far  as nucle a r wea p on s are  be ing co nc ern ed, i n gene r alone o f themo st not oriou sexplanat ion for assembling andposses singnuc lear weap ons isthe one d escr ibed by th e d oct rineofn uclea r de t er ren c e (Kl ein, 1994; Jos e ph  &R e ic hart, 1998) . Nev erthe les s , dete rren ce is a rather ge n eric term. Acc ordi n g  to  Na r ang,  t hree main cate gor ie s can be d is tinguishedon how s uc h  weap ons ca n be u tilized . Sh o rtly n amin g t hem, thes e a re :  1) cat al yt i c role  inageopol itical cont e x t, 2) assured re talia t i on or sec ond s tr ike, an d  3)as a toolof asymmetr ic esc alat ion ( Narang,  2 014; S han e,  2015).

E s peciallyfor N . Korea ,vari ous  expla nati o n s hav e be en  gi ven; even n ot in cl u din g pu re mi li tary  reasonin g  (Graham , 2 0 13; Lan ʹk ov, 2 015; N a ra n g , 2014; Sh ane , 201 5 ) . For exam p le,l ik e 
 2017)._Thus, negative_references are respectively associated_to accompanied_suggestions_and equitability_between_states.

Apart from these,_there is also_a criticism on the_effectiveness of Market_Based_Mechanisms, like the EU Emission Trading Scheme (Ellerman & Joskow, 2008; Judson & Stavins_2008;_Helm, 2009;_Revel,_2011).

Having_above in mind can be_said that negative aspects can_be either_more theoretical (like degrowth) or more applied in_a_sense of adaptive_management (like EU ETS).

So as can easily be understood,_until now there is a lacking_literature on the_impact_of_these policies of one_country on the foreign policy of_another, and more specifically on unanticipated_and undesirable consequences. In particular, on at_least promoting seek and pursuit of_technological knowhow acquisition on nuclear_weapons production_or/and accelerating advancements in nuclear_weapons development.

Nevertheless, there_are studies_that – maybe_do not focus on policies' impact,_but they do_– focus on the effect of_climate_change itself upon_the_landscape_of geopolitical_influence (Mou, et._al_2017); albeit_not_in connection to nuclear weapons.

According to_Mou,_et. al (2017), climate change can indeed_impact on the shifting_landscape_of geopolitical influence, but_without being crystal clear to_which extent since can also be_attributed to_preexisting factors._Moreover, exerting influence can significantly vary in a country-based scope, so_countries can be classified in four_different groups. However, even_within the_same_group, countries tend_to_arrange their_priorities according to their own needs and_thus groups_can not be considered as uniform.

As_far as nuclear weapons_are_being concerned, in general one of_the most notorious explanation for assembling_and possessing nuclear weapons is_the_one_described by the doctrine of_nuclear deterrence (Klein, 1994; Joseph &_Reichart, 1998).

Nevertheless, deterrence_is a rather generic term. According to_Narang,_three main categories can be distinguished_on_how such weapons can be utilized._Shortly_naming_them, these are: 1) catalytic_role in a geopolitical context, 2)_assured retaliation or second strike, and 3) as a_tool of asymmetric_escalation (Narang, 2014; Shane, 2015).

Especially_for_N._Korea, various explanations have been given; even not including pure_military reasoning_(Graham, 2013; Lanʹkov,_2015; Narang, 2014; Shane, 2015). For example, like