 even though Turkey side is not in favor of Iraq's Kurds independence – being afraid of area's destabilization and possible strengthening of similar tendencies inside its own territory – nevertheless, the prosecution of referendum would eventually had presented Iraq with a fait accompli; which Iraqi side alone would not be able to query or reverse it. Thus Iraq should find allies in persuading international community against a recognition of referendum's result. And so, pooling efforts should be attempted under mutual and balanced advantages; and obviously Iraq was the one that had to abate. The latter for Turkish side is being apprehended as a required adoption of their own logic from Iraq's; according to which different Kurdish groups should be treated differently.

Many more could be said on why could Turkey appeals friendly to Iraq's Kurds, even though is not in favor of an independent Kurdistan. Like cooperating in energy and economy issues (Van Heuvelen, 2013; Wasinger, 2015; Alaaldin, 2016; Idiz, 2017). Nevertheless, whether the latter could indeed create the idea of a Turkish implicit support of referendum – despite that such is not reflected in Turkish President speeches – or the connotation of direct influence (Al-Makhzoomi & Albdeewy, 2017), will not bother this study since could not provide any further assist on answering the question under investigation. And that's so, because of at least an underlying projection identification of Turkish national interests against those of others; based on the passive and functional role of dam.

Resuming on projection of national interests of one state to another, and in particular of Turkey's, through the provided examples of dams in South-Eastern Anatolia, the following can be said. In one hand water is being used as an instrument of power, while on the other hand projecting is not always clearly apparent but can also occur implicitly.

In conclusion, finally, is entirely comprehensible that Turkey can satisfy the properties of both stages in foreign policy as conceived by Morgenthau, while under circumstances and according to each case's conditions can support its foreign policy by exhibiting military capabilities. Such power capabilities, is the resultant of a significant population size and of economic development. As far as its population size is being concerned, can be said that in relevance to other countries in Europe and Middle East is generally considered true. As far as economic development is being concerned, Turkey invests in the areas of natural resources, energy and defense industry. Thus, not only an adoption of more neo-real
even though Turkey side is not in favor of Iraq's Kurds independence – being afraid of area's destabilization and possible strengthening of exchangeable tendency inside its own territory – nevertheless, the prosecution of referendum would finally had presented Iraq with a fait accompli; which Iraqi side alone would not be able to question or revoke it. Thus Iraq should recover allies in persuading external community against a recognition of referendum's result. And so, pool efforts should be attempted under mutual and balanced advantages; and obviously Iraq was the one that had to slake. The latter for Turkish side is being apprehended as a required borrowing of their own logic from Iraq's; according to which different Kurdish groups should be treated differently. 

 Many more could be said on why could Turkey appeal friendly to Iraq's Kurds, even though is not in favor of an independent Kurdistan. Like cooperating in energy and economy issues (Van Heuvelen, 2013; Wasinger, 2015; Alaaldin, 2016; Idiz, 2017). however, whether the latter could indeed create the idea of a Turkish implicit support of referendum – despite that such is not reflected in Turkish President speeches – or the connotation of lineal influence (Al - Makhzoomi & Albdeewy, 2017), will not trouble oneself this study since could not provide any further assist on answering the question under investigation. And that's so, because of at least an underlying projection designation of Turkish national interests against those of others; free-base on the passive and functional role of dam. 

 Resuming on expulsion of national interests of one state to another, and in particular of Turkey's, through the provide examples of dams in South - Eastern Anatolia, the following can be said. In one hand water is being use as an instrument of power, while on the other hand projecting is not constantly clearly apparent but can besides happen implicitly. 

 In decision, finally, is entirely comprehensible that Turkey can satisfy the properties of both stages in foreign policy as conceived by Morgenthau, while under context and according to each case's conditions can support its extraneous policy by exhibiting military capability. Such power capabilities, is the result of a significant population size and of economic growth. As far as its population size is being refer, can be said that in relevance to early countries in Europe and Middle East is generally considered on-key. As far as economic exploitation is being concerned, Turkey invests in the areas of natural resources, energy and defense industry. Thus, not merely an adoption of more neo - real
 evfn though Turkey side is not in favor oy Iraq's Kurds indepenaence – being afraid of area's dwstabulization and possible strengthvning of wimioqr tendencmss inside its lwn cecritory – nevertmeless, the [rosecution of rdfzrendum would eventually had presentqd Iraq wlth a fait accjmplp; rhicg Iraqi side alone would not be abme to qlery or reverse iy. Thus Iraq should find alpies in persuading intfrnational xommtbity against a recogniuimn of refetendum's result. And so, pooling efworts should be artelkted under mntual wnd balanced advantaces; and obviously Iraa wes tye one that had to abete. The latter for Torkish sida ns being apprehended qs a rexuirad aaiptkon oh tgeir oan mogic from Iraq's; accoeding to which difftregn Kurdish grohps shjujd be treated differently.

Many more coulg bs said on why could Turjey appeals friendly jo Iraq's Ktrds, even though is not in favor of an independend Kurvirtau. Like xolperating in energy and economy issues (Van Hetbekek, 2013; Wasinger, 2015; Alacldin, 2016; Idiz, 2017). Nevrrhhrjess, whether jhe latcsr could indeed creahe the ydea if a Turkysh omplicit support of refereneum – despite rhat such is not rzflected in Curkisn Prexident speeches – or the conhotation of direct ihwluence (Al-Makhzoumi & Dlbdeewy, 2017), will not bother ehis studb sinee could not proviqe any furhher assist on answering the euastion undfr investigation. And that's so, bxrause of at lgasd at underlving pvojection identyfication of Torkish nacional interests againsv those of oehers; based ot the passive and funstiobal eole of aam.

Resuming on projection of natiinal interests of pne atate to anothex, qnd in particulsr uf Eugkeb's, thwmugh the proeidea ebsmpler of dams ik Suuth-Rastern Anatolia, the folmowing can be said. Ik one hane water ys being used as an instrument lf poxer, whmle on thg other hand projecting is not zlways clfarjy apparent fut gan wlso occur implicitly.

In conclusion, finally, is entmrely comprehensible thqt Turkey can satisyy the propervies os both stdges in foreign polixy as conceived bn Morgenthau, while undsr cirwumstwnces and according to each case's conditions can support its foreign polixy by xxribiting mimitaty caiabnlicies. Sush plxer capabilities, ps the resultant of a significanv populatimn size and of economic develolmdnt. As far as its population size is geing comcerned, can be said that in relrvance to other countriex in Euripe ahd Middle Xast is generally comsiderzd truw. As fae as economic devdlolmcnt is beijg cpneerned, Turkey invests in the areaw of nqtkral resources, eiergy and denekse insustry. Thus, not only ah adkotion of more neo-rral
even though Turkey side is not in Iraq's independence – afraid of area's similar inside its own – nevertheless, the of referendum would eventually had presented with a fait accompli; which Iraqi side alone would not be able to or reverse it. Thus Iraq should find allies in persuading international community against recognition referendum's And pooling efforts should be attempted under mutual and balanced advantages; and obviously Iraq was the one had to abate. The latter for Turkish side being apprehended as a adoption of their own logic Iraq's; to which Kurdish should treated differently. Many could be said on why could Turkey appeals friendly to Iraq's Kurds, even though is not in of an Like cooperating energy economy (Van Heuvelen, 2013; Alaaldin, 2016; Idiz, 2017). Nevertheless, whether indeed create the idea of a Turkish implicit of referendum despite that such is not reflected Turkish President speeches – or the connotation of influence (Al-Makhzoomi & Albdeewy, 2017), will not bother this study since could not provide any on answering the question investigation. And that's because at an projection identification Turkish national interests against those of others; based on the passive functional role of dam. Resuming on projection of national interests state another, and in of Turkey's, through the examples dams in South-Eastern Anatolia, can said. water being as an instrument of while on the other hand is not always clearly implicitly. In conclusion, finally, is entirely comprehensible that can satisfy the properties of both stages foreign policy as conceived by Morgenthau, while under circumstances and according to case's conditions its foreign policy by exhibiting military capabilities. Such capabilities, is the resultant a significant population size and of economic development. As as population size being concerned, can said that in to other countries and Middle is considered as economic development is being concerned, invests the areas of natural resources, and Thus, not only an adoption of more neo-real
 even though Turkey side is not In favor of IRaq's KUrdS inDePendEnce – Being afraid of aREa's dEstabilization and possiBle stReNGtheNInG of siMilar teNDeNCIes InSiDe iTs OWn TerriTorY – nevertHeless, the pRosEcUtion of referENdUm would eveNtuAlly had preseNteD Iraq wItH a fAIt accOmpLi; whiCh IraqI Side alOne would nOt BE able tO Query or REVeRse iT. Thus Iraq should fiND aLLies in persuadiNg inteRnATiONAl cOmmUnity againSt A recoGNition oF ReFEREndUM's result. And so, Pooling effoRTs sHould bE aTteMPted unDer muTuAL anD balanced adVantAges; and obViouslY iraq was THe one thAt had tO abAte. the lATtEr For tuRKisH SiDe iS BeiNg apprehEnDeD as a rEquiRED ADoptIon Of thEir owN logic from IraQ's; aCcorDIng To whiCh difFereNt kurdiSh grouPs shoUlD be treated diffeRentLy.

Many morE coUlD be SaId on wHY could turKey Appeals FriendlY To IRaQ'S kUrDs, even though is not iN fAVOr Of an indePendenT kuRdIStan. Like CoOpeRatiNG In eneRgy aND eConomy isSues (VaN heUvElen, 2013; WasInGer, 2015; AlaAlDin, 2016; idiZ, 2017). NeveRThelEss, wheTher the lAtter COuld indeed creaTE the idea of a TuRKiSH ImPLiciT suPport of refeRendUM – desPite THaT suCH is noT reflEcTEd IN Turkish President spEeChes – or The coNnotation of diRect influeNCE (al-MakhzoOmi & ALBdEEwy, 2017), will not bothEr thiS study sincE Could not ProviDe any furTher assisT ON answeriNg tHe qUesTioN UNdEr investigatiON. and tHaT's so, becAusE of at leAst An uNdeRlyInG projectiOn identiFiCaTiOn Of TUrkisH National InTerEsTs aGainsT Those oF otheRs; baSeD oN The Passive ANd FUNctiOnAl Role Of dAm.

resumIng oN ProJection Of nationaL inTEresTs Of One statE to another, and In Particular Of turKey's, thROUgh the prOvided examples of dams in SOUth-EastErn anatoLia, tHe followiNg cAn be saId. IN One hanD water Is beiNg UseD AS an inSTRuMenT oF power, whilE ON thE otheR hAnd pRojectiNg is not always clearLY apParent but can aLso OccuR IMpLicITlY.

in cOnCLusION, finally, is entirEly comprehEnSIbLe that TurkEY caN sAtisfy tHe propeRties OF both stAges in forEign policY aS conCEIveD by MorgentHau, while Under circUMstanCEs And acCorDing to EaCh cAse's cOnditiONs cAn supPort itS fOreign PolicY bY exhibitIng military capabilities. such poWer caPabIlities, is The REsuLtant of a sIgniFicant popuLatIon Size aNd oF EconoMic dEVeLopMEnt. As Far aS Its populaTIoN siZE Is Being concerNED, Can Be saiD thAT in relEvanCe to other countrieS In Europe and MidDle EAST is GenERallY cOnsidered true. AS faR aS EConomic dEvElopment is bEing concErNEd, TurKey invEsts in The areaS OF nATural rEsouRceS, energy anD deFeNSe indusTrY. THUs, not oNly aN aDoptioN of morE Neo-rEAL
 even though Turkey side i s not in f avorofIra q' s Ku rdsindependence – bein g afraid of area's des tabil iz a tion an d pos sible s t re n g the ni ng  of  s i mi lar t end enciesinside its  ow nterritory –n ev ertheless,  th e prosecutio n o f refe re ndu m  woul d e ventu ally h a d pres ented Ira qw ith af ait acc o m pl i; w hich Iraqi side a l on e  would not beable t oq ue r y  or  re verse it.Th us Ir a q shoul d  f i n d  al l ies in persua ding intern a tio nal co mm uni t y agai nst a  r e cog nition of r efer endum's r esult. And so, pooling  effor tssho uldb eat tem pt e d u n de r m u tua l and ba la nc ed ad vant a g e s ; an d o bvio uslyIraq was theone  tha t  ha d toabate . Th elatte r forTurki sh  side is beingappr ehended a s a  r equ ir ed ad o ptionofthe ir ownlogic f r omIr a q ' s;  according to whic hd i ff erent Ku rdishg ro up s  shouldbe  tr eate d diffe rent l y. 

Many m ore co u ld  b e saidon  why c ou ldTur key a p peal s frie ndly toIraq' s  Kurds, even t h ough is not i n  f a v or of a n i ndependentKurd i stan . Li k ecoo p erati ng in  e n er g y and economy issue s(Van H euvel en, 2013; Was inger, 201 5 ; Alaaldin , 20 1 6; Idiz, 2017). N evert heless, wh e ther the  latt er could  indeed c r e ate theide a o f a  Tu r k is h implicit su p p ortof  refere ndu m – des pit e t hat  su ch  is not r eflected  i nTu rk ish  Pres i dent spe ec hes  –  or  thec onnota tionof d ir ec t  in fluence (A l - Makh zo om i &Alb de ewy,2017 ) , w ill not  bother t his stud ysi nce cou ld not provid eany furthe rass ist on a nswering  the question under inv e stigati on.  Andthat 's so, be cau se ofatl east a n unde rlyin gpro j e ction i de nti fi cation ofT u rki sh na ti onal  intere sts against thoseo f o thers; basedonthep a ss ive an d  fu nc t ion a l  role of dam.
Resuming o np ro jection of nat io nal int erestsof on e  stateto anothe r, and in  p arti c u lar  of Turkey 's, thro ugh the p r ovide d  e xampl esof dam sinSouth -Easte r n A natol ia, th efollow ing c an  be said . In one hand water isbeingusedasan instru men t  of  power, w hile  on the ot her  ha nd pr oje c tingis n o talw a ys cl earl y  apparent bu t c a n  a lso occur i m p l ici tly.
In conclu sion , finally, is ent i rely comprehen sibl e tha t T u rkey  c an satisfy the  pr op e r ties ofbo th stages i n foreig np olicy  as co nceive d by Mo r g en t hau, w hile  un der circu mst an c es andac co r ding t o ea ch  case' s cond i tion s can support itsforei g n  poli c y b y exh ib iting m i lita ry capabil ities. Such  power  cap abili ties, i sthe re sul ta nt of a si g nificantpopul ation s iz e an d o f econ omic d evelo pmen t.  As  far as i t s  p o pu la t ion  siz e isbe ingconcerned ,  can besai d  that i nrel e v ance t o  o t h er countri esin Eu r o pe and Mid d le E a st is ge nerall y cons ideredt rue .As farase c onomic de velopment isbe ingconcerne d,  Tur ke y i nv ests in the are as of na tural re s o urces,  en e rgya nd def en se industry.  Thus ,n ot only a n a doption ofmor e n eo-r eal 
 even_though Turkey_side is not in_favor of_Iraq's_Kurds independence_–_being afraid of_area's destabilization and_possible strengthening of similar_tendencies inside its_own_territory – nevertheless, the prosecution of referendum would eventually had presented Iraq with a_fait_accompli; which_Iraqi_side_alone would not be able_to query or reverse it._Thus Iraq_should find allies in persuading international community against_a_recognition of referendum's_result. And so, pooling efforts should be attempted under_mutual and balanced advantages; and obviously_Iraq was the_one_that_had to abate. The_latter for Turkish side is being_apprehended as a required adoption of_their own logic from Iraq's; according to_which different Kurdish groups should be_treated differently.

Many more could be_said on_why could Turkey appeals friendly_to Iraq's Kurds,_even though_is not in_favor of an independent Kurdistan. Like_cooperating in energy_and economy issues (Van Heuvelen, 2013;_Wasinger,_2015; Alaaldin, 2016;_Idiz,_2017)._Nevertheless, whether_the latter could_indeed_create the_idea_of a Turkish implicit support of_referendum_– despite that such is not reflected_in Turkish President speeches_–_or the connotation of_direct influence (Al-Makhzoomi & Albdeewy,_2017), will not bother this study_since could_not provide_any further assist on answering the question under investigation. And that's_so, because of at least an_underlying projection identification of_Turkish national_interests_against those of_others;_based on_the passive and functional role of dam.

Resuming_on projection_of national interests of one state_to another, and in_particular_of Turkey's, through the provided examples_of dams in South-Eastern Anatolia, the_following can be said. In_one_hand_water is being used as_an instrument of power, while on_the other hand_projecting is not always clearly apparent but_can_also occur implicitly.

In conclusion, finally, is_entirely_comprehensible that Turkey can satisfy the_properties_of_both stages in foreign policy_as conceived by Morgenthau, while under_circumstances and according to each case's conditions can support_its foreign policy_by exhibiting military capabilities. Such_power_capabilities,_is the resultant of a significant population size and of_economic development._As far as_its population size is being concerned, can be said that_in relevance to other countries in Europe_and Middle East is generally considered true. As far as economic_development is being concerned, Turkey invests in the_areas of natural resources, energy and defense_industry. Thus, not only_an_adoption of more neo-real