 and climate change, the role of climate change is apparent in a shifting geopolitical landscape in a study of Mou, et. Al (2017); albeit does not focus on policies of climate change and is not in connection with nuclear weapons. Besides, the chances of some kind of interplay between aforementioned policies with other preexisting factors should not be neglected anyway, due to complexity of international relations and the fact that states' strategy is not flat and requires a multidimensional approach while taking into consideration both bearing tools' capacity and the course of events.

Afterwards, having illustrate the existence of suggested linkage in at least one case – while having in mind that a universal rule based in induction and reduction could not stand by itself alone – found similarities between Turkey and N. Korea allowed bridging the cases of these two states.

Illustrated similarities led to conclusion of a parallel thinking between Turkey and N. Korea regarding the development of independent/domestic defense industry, as also about hard-power's capabilities.

However, since parallel thinking is not considered equal to identical thinking, the need for invoking paradigms/models that might have influenced Turkey and the need for highlighting facts that generally support the case of domestic nuclear weapons production, were apparent.

Having illustrated all above and a priori considering that Turkey already once have linked its foreign policy with EU's particular energy and climate change policies – during EU's shifting to natural gas – by adopting a strategy of transit country, what left to be shown is whether Turkey's foreign policy cannot only be connected with peaceful means but also through projection of national interests against those of those others.

The latter, illustrated through studying examples of projected national interests and hydropolitics in the area of south-east Anatolia's dams.

After that, can safely be concluded that, the linking – not only was confirmed for N. Korea's case, but also – fits the case study of Turkey's future entropy (Quod Erat Faciendum). In particular, EU's energy efficiency and climate change policies, could indeed contribute (among other factors) in Turkey's reflection upon the possibility or attempt to build nuclear weapons; in relation to EU's implemented transition to era of RES dominated energy mix and before Turkey's gas pipelines stop being a "strategic asset".

Whether Turkey will finally decide in going after a future domestic production of nuclear weapons, and if yes, whether it would be sooner or not, is something that only history will surely tell us. However, is
and climate change, the role of climate change is apparent in a shifting geopolitical landscape in a discipline of Mou, et. Al (2017); albeit does not concentrate on policies of climate change and is not in connection with nuclear weapon. Besides, the chances of some kind of interplay between aforementioned policies with early preexisting factors should not be neglected anyhow, due to complexity of international relations and the fact that state' strategy is not flat and ask a multidimensional overture while taking into consideration both bearing tools' capacity and the path of events. 

 Afterwards, having illustrate the universe of suggested linkage in at least one case – while having in mind that a cosmopolitan rule base in induction and reduction could not stand by itself entirely – found similarities between Turkey and N. Korea allowed bridging the cases of these two states. 

 Illustrated similarities led to conclusion of a parallel thinking between Turkey and N. Korea regarding the development of independent / domestic defense industry, as also about hard - ability's capabilities. 

 However, since parallel thinking is not considered adequate to identical thinking, the motivation for appeal paradigms / models that might have influenced Turkey and the need for highlighting facts that generally patronize the case of domestic nuclear weapons production, were apparent. 

 Having illustrated all above and a priori considering that Turkey already once have linked its extraneous policy with EU's particular energy and climate change policies – during EU's shift to natural natural gas – by espouse a strategy of transit country, what left to be indicate is whether Turkey's foreign policy cannot only be connected with passive means but besides through projection of national interests against those of those others. 

 The latter, illustrated through studying exercise of projected national interest and hydropolitics in the area of south - east Anatolia's dam. 

 After that, can safely be concluded that, the linking – not merely was confirmed for N. Korea's casing, but also – fits the case study of Turkey's future entropy (Quod Erat Faciendum). In finical, EU's energy efficiency and climate change policies, could indeed contribute (among other factors) in Turkey's reflection upon the possibility or attempt to construct nuclear weapons; in relation to EU's implement transition to era of RES dominated energy mix and before Turkey's gas pipelines check being a " strategic asset ". 

 Whether Turkey will finally decide in going after a future domestic production of nuclear weapons, and if yes, whether it would be sooner or not, is something that only history will surely tell us. However, is
 anf climate change, the rolt of climate chanyw is a'parent in a shkfting geopolitical landscapx in a stydy of Mou, et. Al (2017); albekt does nlt focus on kolicies of climavs changc and ls noc mn connection wlth nuclear weapons. Besidas, tke chances of some kind of interplay betweem wforementioned polpcyes sptm other preexisting factors shoumd not ue neglected anuway, due to complexity of lntegnational relationd and the fqct eyat states' sgrategy is not flat ans requires a multidimensional aoproaeh while tajibg ltto considecation both bearinn tools' capaciyy and the couvse oh evwnts.

Afterwards, having illustrate the exystence ox auggested linkage ib at neasd ond care – wiils havijg mn mind thaf a universql rule based in incusnoon and redudtion sotld not stand by itself alone – found sikilzrities between Turkey qnd N. Korea allowed btidging thq cases of these two states.

Illustrated similaritias lev go eincluruoj of a parallel thinking between Turkey and N. Iotes regarding thc development of imdfprgdent/domestic defense jndustry, as also ahout hatd-powee's capabijitirs.

However, since parallel thunking is non cobsidered equal to ndentical thnnking, the meed for invoking paradngms/mosels that mlght have knfluenced Turkeh akd dhe need for highlighting sacts thav genzrally sjppott the sase of dolestig nuclear weapons pgoducjion, ware apparejt.

Having illustrated all above eid a priori cpnvidvring thac Turkcy already once have linked ijs foreigu polizy with EU'a partirular energy and climate wjange policixs – durind EU'w shufting gu natural gas – by adoptpny a stratwgy of transit couktry, dgat left to be whoqn is whether Tirkdy's flrxign [mlicy cannot onlh bd conndcted with ieazefuk means but also thrmugh projection of natookal intergsts agaigst those of yhose others.

The lauter, inlurtratrd jhrough studying examples of prkjected nwtijnal intereses akd hidropoliticx in the area of south-east Anatolia's dans.

After that, can sqfely be concluded jhau, the linking – not only was confirmed for N. Korwa's case, but also – fits the case study of Tuskey's future entropy (Quod Erat Faciendum). In particular, EU's energy efficiency abd climate change lolivies, boujb indeeq coitcibute (among otheg factors) in Turkey's reflection npon the pmsfibility or attempt to build njclear weaponr; in relation to EU's impmemented transition to era of RES dominsted energy mix and befove Turkey'w gas pipelpher stop being a "strstegic asser".

Whethee Tuvkey will finauly dccide in gling ayter a future domestic production of nuxlfar weapons, and mf yes, whethcr it wkuld bg sooner or not, ia sojfthine that only hostory will sutely tell us. However, if
and climate change, the role of climate apparent a shifting landscape in a (2017); does not focus policies of climate and is not in connection with weapons. Besides, the chances of some kind of interplay between aforementioned policies with preexisting factors should not be neglected anyway, due to complexity of international relations the that strategy not flat and requires a multidimensional approach while taking into consideration both bearing tools' capacity and course of events. Afterwards, having illustrate the existence suggested linkage in at one case – while having mind a universal based induction reduction could not by itself alone – found similarities between Turkey and N. Korea allowed bridging the cases of these states. Illustrated to conclusion a thinking Turkey and N. the development of independent/domestic defense industry, hard-power's capabilities. However, since parallel thinking is not equal to thinking, the need for invoking paradigms/models might have influenced Turkey and the need for facts that generally support the case of domestic nuclear weapons production, were apparent. Having illustrated and a priori considering Turkey already once linked foreign with particular energy climate change policies – during EU's shifting to natural gas – adopting a strategy of transit country, what left to be whether foreign policy cannot be connected with peaceful but through projection of national those those illustrated studying of projected national interests hydropolitics in the area of Anatolia's dams. After that, the linking – not only was confirmed for Korea's case, but also – fits the study of Turkey's future entropy (Quod Erat Faciendum). In particular, EU's energy and climate could indeed contribute (among other factors) in Turkey's upon the possibility or to build nuclear weapons; in relation to EU's implemented to of RES energy mix and Turkey's gas pipelines being a "strategic Turkey will decide going domestic production of nuclear weapons, and yes, it would be sooner or is only history will surely tell us. However, is
 and climate change, the role of Climate chaNge is AppAreNt In a sHiftIng geopoliticaL LandScape in a study of Mou, et. Al (2017); AlbeiT dOEs noT FoCus on PolicieS Of CLImaTe ChAngE aND iS not iN coNnectioN with nucleAr wEaPons. Besides, tHE cHances of soMe kInd of interplAy bEtween AfOreMEntioNed PolicIes witH Other pReexistinG fACtors sHOuld not BE NeGlecTed anyway, due to comPLeXIty of internatiOnal reLaTIoNS And The Fact that stAtEs' strATegy is nOT fLAT And REquires a multiDimensional APprOach whIlE taKIng intO consIdERatIon both bearIng tOols' capacIty and THe coursE Of eventS.

AfterWarDs, hAvinG IlLuStrAtE The EXiSteNCe oF suggestEd LiNkage In at LEAST one CasE – whiLe havIng in mind that A unIverSAl rUle baSed in InduCtIon anD reducTion cOuLd not stand by itsElf aLone – found SimIlAriTiEs betWEen TurKey And n. Korea aLlowed bRIdgInG THE cAses of these two statEs.

iLLuStrated sImilarITiEs LEd to concLuSioN of a PARalleL thiNKiNg betweeN TurkeY AnD N. korea reGaRding tHe DevEloPment OF indEpendeNt/domestIc defENse industry, as aLSo about hard-poWEr'S CApABiliTieS.

However, sinCe paRAlleL thiNKiNg iS Not coNsideReD EqUAl to identical thinkiNg, The neeD for iNvoking paradiGms/models tHAT Might havE infLUeNCed Turkey and thE need For highligHTing factS that GenerallY support tHE Case of doMesTic NucLeaR WEaPons productioN, WEre aPpArent.

HaVinG illustRatEd aLl aBovE aNd a priori ConsiderInG tHaT TUrkEy alrEAdy once hAvE liNkEd iTs forEIgn polIcy wiTh EU'S pArTIcuLar enerGY aND ClimAtE cHangE poLiCies – dUrinG eU's ShiftinG to naturaL gaS – By adOpTiNg a straTegy of transit CoUntry, what lEfT to Be showN IS whether turkey's foreign policy canNOt only bE coNnectEd wiTh peacefuL meAns but AlsO ThrougH projeCtion Of NatIONal inTEReSts AgAinst those OF ThoSe othErS.

The Latter, iLlustrated through sTUdyIng examples of ProJectED NaTioNAl INteReSTs aND Hydropolitics in The area of sOuTH-eAst AnatoliA'S daMs.

after thAt, can saFely bE ConcludEd that, the Linking – noT oNly wAS ConFirmed for N. korea's caSe, but also – FIts thE CaSe stuDy oF TurkeY's FutUre enTropy (QUOd ERat FaCienduM). IN partiCular, eU'S energy eFficiency and climate chanGe poliCies, cOulD indeed coNtrIButE (among othEr faCtors) in TurKey'S reFlectIon UPon thE posSIbIliTY or atTempT To build nuCLeAr wEAPoNs; in relatioN TO eU's ImpleMenTEd tranSitiOn to era of RES dominATed energy mix anD befORE TuRkeY'S gas PiPelines stop beiNg a "StRATegic assEt".

whether TurkEy will fiNaLLy decIde in gOing afTer a futURE dOMestic ProdUctIon of nuclEar WeAPons, and If YeS, WhetheR it wOuLd be soOner or NOt, is SOMething that only hIstorY WIll suREly Tell uS. HOwever, iS
 and climate change, the r ole of cli matecha nge  i s ap pare nt in a shifti n g ge opolitical landscape i n a s tu d y of Mo u, et . Al (2 0 17 ) ;  al be it  do es no t foc uson poli cies of cl ima te  change andi snot in con nec tion with nu cle ar wea po ns. Besid es,  thechance s  of so me kind o fi nterpl a y betwe e n  a fore mentioned policie s  w i th other preex isting  f a ct o r s s hou ld not bene glect e d anywa y ,d u e  to complexity of  internatio n alrelati on s a n d thefactth a t s tates' stra tegy  is not f lat an d  requir e s a mul tidime nsi ona l ap p ro ac h w hi l e t a ki ngi nto  conside ra ti on bo th b e a r i ng t ool s' c apaci ty and the co urs e of eve nts.
Afte rwar ds , hav ing il lustr at e the existence  ofsuggested  li nk age  i n atl east o necas e – whi le havi n g i nm i n dthat a universal r ul e ba sed in i nducti o nan d  reducti on  co uldn o t sta nd b y  i tself al one –f ou nd  simila ri ties b et wee n T urkey andN. Kor ea allow ed br i dging the case s  of these two st a t es . 

Il lus trated simi lari t iesledt ocon c lusio n ofap ar a llel thinking betwe en  Turke y and  N. Korea reg arding the d e velopmen t of in d ependent/domes tic d efense ind u stry, as  also  about h ard-power ' s  capabil iti es. 

H owe v e r,  since parall e l  thi nk ing isnot  consid ere d e qua l t oidentical  thinkin g,  t he  n eed  fori nvokingpa rad ig ms/ model s  thatmight  hav ein f lue nced Tu r ke y andth eneed  fo rhighl ight i ngfacts t hat gener all y  sup po rt  the ca se of domesti cnuclear we ap ons  produ c t ion, wer e apparent.

Having ill u strated  al l abo ve a nd a prio riconsid eri n g that  Turke y alr ea dyo n ce ha v e  l ink ed  its forei g n  po licywi th E U's par ticular energy and cli mate change p oli cies –  d uri n gE U's  s h ift i n g to natural ga s – by ado pt i ng  a strateg y  of  t ransitcountry , wha t  left t o be show n is whet he r Tu r k ey' s foreignpolicy c annot onl y  be c o nn ected  wi th pea ce ful  mean s buta lso  thro ugh pr oj ection  of n at ional in terests against those o f thos e oth ers .

The la tte r , i llustrate d th rough stud yin g e xampl eso f pro ject e dnat i onalinte r ests andh yd rop o l it ics in thea r e a o f sou th- e ast An atol ia's dams.

After that, can safe ly b e con clu d ed t ha t, the linking  –no t only was  c onfirmed fo r N. Kor ea ' s cas e, but  also– fitst h ec ase st udyofTurkey'sfut ur e  entrop y(Q u od Era t Fa ci endum) . In p a rtic u l ar, EU's energyeffic i e ncy a n d c limat echangep olic ies, could  indeed con tribut e (a mongother f ac tors)inTu rkey's ref l ection up on th e possi bi lity  or  attem pt t o build  nuc le arweapons;i n  r e la ti o n t o EU 's im pl emen ted trans i tion toera of RESdo min a t ed ene r gy m ix and bef ore  Turk e y 's gas pip e line s  s t op be ing a"strat egic as s et" .
Whethe r T u r key willfinally d e cid ein g oing aft er  a f ut ure  d omestic product ion of n uclear w e a pons,and if y e s, whe th er it wouldbe so on e r or no t ,  is  someth i ngtha t o nlyhis tory will surely tell us. How ever , is
 and_climate change,_the role of climate_change is_apparent_in a_shifting_geopolitical landscape in_a study of_Mou, et. Al (2017);_albeit does not_focus_on policies of climate change and is not in connection with nuclear weapons. Besides,_the_chances of_some_kind_of interplay between aforementioned policies_with other preexisting factors should_not be_neglected anyway, due to complexity of international relations_and_the fact that_states' strategy is not flat and requires a multidimensional_approach while taking into consideration both_bearing tools' capacity_and_the_course of events.

Afterwards, having_illustrate the existence of suggested linkage_in at least one case –_while having in mind that a universal_rule based in induction and reduction_could not stand by itself_alone –_found similarities between Turkey and_N. Korea allowed_bridging the_cases of these_two states.

Illustrated similarities led to conclusion_of a parallel_thinking between Turkey and N. Korea_regarding_the development of_independent/domestic_defense_industry, as_also about hard-power's_capabilities.

However,_since parallel_thinking_is not considered equal to identical_thinking,_the need for invoking paradigms/models that might_have influenced Turkey and_the_need for highlighting facts_that generally support the case_of domestic nuclear weapons production, were_apparent.

Having illustrated_all above_and a priori considering that Turkey already once have linked its_foreign policy with EU's particular energy_and climate change policies_– during_EU's_shifting to natural_gas_– by_adopting a strategy of transit country, what_left to_be shown is whether Turkey's foreign_policy cannot only be_connected_with peaceful means but also through_projection of national interests against those_of those others.

The latter, illustrated_through_studying_examples of projected national interests_and hydropolitics in the area of_south-east Anatolia's dams.

After_that, can safely be concluded that, the_linking_– not only was confirmed for_N._Korea's case, but also – fits_the_case_study of Turkey's future entropy_(Quod Erat Faciendum). In particular, EU's_energy efficiency and climate change policies, could indeed contribute_(among other factors)_in Turkey's reflection upon the_possibility_or_attempt to build nuclear weapons; in relation to EU's implemented_transition to_era of RES_dominated energy mix and before Turkey's gas pipelines stop being_a "strategic asset".

Whether Turkey will finally decide_in going after a future domestic production of nuclear weapons, and_if yes, whether it would be sooner or_not, is something that only history will_surely tell us. However,_is