.

According to second pillar, states tend to pursue their national interest in terms of maximizing their power (Hanish, 2013). Thus, we assume that the rationale behind countries that are going for adding domestic produced nuclear weapons to their arsenal, is the determinant of maximizing their power. Such maximization, is not apprehended only as a mean of deterrence in a "balance of terror", but rather – in terms of law of force or simply called "might is the right" – as a leverage for serving their interests (e.g. economy, politics).

According to third pillar, the maximization of states power is accomplished through rational decisions (Hanish, 2013).

To be noticed, that in terms of political realism as defined above and for this study, the two latter pillars are inextricably linked; thus having found the requirements for supporting second pillar, then will almost inevitably found those for third.

Also to be noticed that, when comes to rationality and third pillar, along with the criteria for determining actions and decisions built upon realistic logic comes the likelihood of subjectively judging. For example, what assumed as rational for the analyst, might not be rational in culture of involved party (Penney et. al, 2013).

Albeit, N. Korea already exhibited that can "read" rational made choices of great powers and other sovereign states according to their culture, in a "tit-for-tat" tactic; which evolved by them. And can be said that actually did that quite well, when considering the accomplished money-flow with direction from international donors to N. Korea – in terms of financial aid, and – in exchange for made pledges on nuclear use.

Could that be the reason for the attempted re-introduce of "unpredictability doctrine" (Fuchs, 2017; Sullivan & Tumulty, 2017; Thrush & Landler, 2017) by the current president of US? Or is that, because was something that N. Korea might was expecting; based on Nixon's heritage (Burr & Kimball, 2015; Fuchs, 2017; Thrush & Landler, 2017). Nevertheless, this issue is presented over-simplified so that cannot capture the full rational behind. Thus, this example should only be considered as demonstration of culture's role in rational made choices and nothing more.

Having above in mind, can be said that "game" of rational choices, supports author's choice for selecting political realism as the vehicle for analysis.

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 According to second pillar, states tend to pursue their home sake in terms of maximizing their exponent (Hanish, 2013). therefore, we assume that the rationale behind countries that are going for total domestic produced nuclear weapons to their armory, is the antigenic determinant of maximizing their power. Such maximization, is not apprehend only as a mean of deterrence in a " balance wheel of terror ", but rather – in terms of law of force or merely called " might is the right " – as a leverage for serving their interest (e.g. economy, politics). 

 According to third pillar, the maximization of states power is carry through through rational decisions (Hanish, 2013). 

 To be noticed, that in terms of political realism as define above and for this study, the two latter pillars are inextricably linked; thus having found the prerequisite for supporting second pillar, then will almost inevitably found those for third. 

 Also to be noticed that, when comes to rationality and third pillar, along with the criteria for determine actions and decisions build upon naturalistic logic hail the likelihood of subjectively judging. For example, what simulate as rational for the analyst, might not be rational in culture of involved party (Penney et. al, 2013). 

 Albeit, N. Korea already show that can " read " rational made choices of great powers and early sovereign states according to their culture, in a " tit - for - tat " tactic; which evolved by them. And can be said that actually do that quite well, when considering the accomplished money - flow with direction from international donors to N. Korea – in term of financial aid, and – in exchange for reach pledges on nuclear use. 

 Could that be the reason for the undertake re - introduce of " volatility doctrine " (Fuchs, 2017; Sullivan & Tumulty, 2017; Thrush & Landler, 2017) by the current president of US? Or is that, because was something that N. Korea might was expecting; establish on Nixon's heritage (Burr & Kimball, 2015; Fuchs, 2017; Thrush & Landler, 2017). however, this issue is presented over - simplified so that cannot appropriate the full rational behind. Thus, this example should only be view as demonstration of culture's role in rational made choices and nothing more. 

 Having above in mind, can be state that " game " of rational choice, supports author's choice for selecting political realism as the vehicle for psychoanalysis.
.

Acclrding to second pillar, rtates tend to kuesue tieir nafional ivterest in terms of maximiziig tyeir kjwer (Hanish, 2013). Thus, de assume that thw rauionale behind conhtries bkat adc goiug for adding dokestic proguced nuclear fexplns to their arsenal, is the determigant of mwximizing theit powtr. Fuch maximization, is not apprehended ohly as e mean of detertence in a "balance of terrlr", bkt rather – in termd of law of forsw or simply zalled "might is the rifht" – as a leverage for serving gheir interests (e.t. efmnomy, politmcs).

Accjrding to thlgd pilldr, the kaximization on staves power is accomplished through rational qecisions (Hcnish, 2013).

To be noticed, tyar in jerms of oiligiczl rsalism as defined agove and foe this study, the twp jqtter pillars are igevtricably linked; thus having found the gequjrements for supporting second pillar, then wlll almose inevitably found those for third.

Also to be notiwed tiag, wkck coows to rationality and third pillar, along with trs vrpteria for determlning actions and cefixyons built upun realisfic logic comes thf likelyhood of subjestivrly judging. For example, whar assumed as eational for the aualyst, might not be rstional in culture of iuvolves party (Penjey et. al, 2013).

Xlbeit, N. Korea auresdf exhibiudd that can "read" wational nade choicer of great powers anf othcs sovereign states accotding do their cklture, in a "tit-for-tat" tactic; whmrh evolved by tvem. And can be ssid that actuwlly did that auite wzll, whdn consideging the eccomplished money-flow widj direction hrom intewnatuonao donorr to N. Korea – im terms oy finqncial aid, and – in exzgange for made 'utdtes on nuclear usd.

Cotlf vhat fa the reason for thd atteopted rt-nntvodjce pf "unpredictability goctdine" (Fuchs, 2017; Sullivsn & Tumulti, 2017; Thrush & Landler, 2017) by the current presifent mf NS? Or os jhat, because was something that N. Korea ligmt was expectyng; naseq on Nixon'x heritage (Burr & Kimball, 2015; Fuchs, 2017; Thrush & Landler, 2017). Neverthwless, this issue is kresented ovec-simplyfied so dhat cannot capture rhe full rational behind. Thus, this exajple svould only be considered as demonstration of culture's role in rational made chiices enq nothing mkre.

Hsving ayovz in migd, cen be said that "gake" of rational choices, supports author's ckoice for selecting political rdalism as the vehicle for analysis.

. According to second pillar, states tend their interest in of maximizing their assume the rationale behind that are going adding domestic produced nuclear weapons to arsenal, is the determinant of maximizing their power. Such maximization, is not apprehended as a mean of deterrence in a "balance of terror", but rather – terms law force simply called "might is the right" – as a leverage for serving their interests (e.g. economy, According to third pillar, the maximization of states is accomplished through rational (Hanish, 2013). To be noticed, in of political as above for this study, two latter pillars are inextricably linked; thus having found the requirements for supporting second pillar, then will inevitably found third. Also be that, comes to rationality pillar, along with the criteria for decisions built upon realistic logic comes the likelihood subjectively judging. example, what assumed as rational for analyst, might not be rational in culture of party (Penney et. al, 2013). Albeit, N. Korea already exhibited that can "read" rational made great powers and other states according to culture, a tactic; evolved by And can be said that actually did that quite well, when the accomplished money-flow with direction from international donors to N. in of financial aid, – in exchange for pledges nuclear use. Could that reason the "unpredictability (Fuchs, Sullivan & Tumulty, 2017; & Landler, 2017) by the president of US? Or that N. Korea might was expecting; based on heritage (Burr & Kimball, 2015; Fuchs, 2017; & Landler, 2017). Nevertheless, this issue is presented over-simplified so that cannot the full Thus, this example should only be considered as of culture's role in made choices and nothing more. Having above in mind, be that "game" rational choices, supports choice for selecting realism as the analysis.
.

According to second pillar, stAtes tend to PursuE thEir NaTionAl inTerest in terms oF MaxiMizing their power (Hanish, 2013). thus, wE aSSume THaT the rAtionalE BeHINd cOuNtRieS tHAt Are goIng For addiNg domestic ProDuCed nuclear weAPoNs to their aRseNal, is the deteRmiNant of MaXimIZing tHeiR poweR. Such mAXimizaTion, is not ApPRehendED only as A MEaN of dEterrence in a "balanCE oF Terror", but ratheR – in terMs OF lAW Of fOrcE or simply cAlLed "miGHt is the RIgHT" – AS a lEVerage for servIng their intEResTs (e.g. ecOnOmy, POliticS).

AccoRdINg tO third pillaR, the MaximizatIon of sTAtes powER is accoMplishEd tHroUgh rATiOnAl dEcISioNS (HAniSH, 2013).

To Be noticeD, tHaT in teRms oF POLIticAl rEaliSm as dEfined above anD foR thiS StuDy, the Two laTter PiLlars Are ineXtricAbLy linked; thus havIng fOund the reQuiReMenTs For suPPortinG seConD pillar, Then wilL AlmOsT INEvItably found those foR tHIRd.

also to be NoticeD ThAt, WHen comes To RatIonaLITy and ThirD PiLlar, alonG with tHE cRiTeria foR dEtermiNiNg aCtiOns anD DeciSions bUilt upon RealiSTic logic comes tHE likelihood of SUbJECtIVely JudGing. For examPle, wHAt asSumeD As RatIOnal fOr the AnALyST, might not be rational In CulturE of inVolved party (PeNney et. al, 2013).

AlBEIT, N. Korea aLreaDY eXHibited that can "Read" rAtional madE Choices oF greaT powers aNd other soVEReign staTes AccOrdIng TO ThEir culture, in a "TIT-for-TaT" tactic; WhiCh evolvEd bY thEm. ANd cAn Be said thaT actuallY dId ThAt QuiTe welL, When consIdEriNg The AccomPLished Money-Flow WiTh DIreCtion frOM iNTErnaTiOnAl doNorS tO N. KorEa – in TErmS of finaNcial aid, aNd – iN ExchAnGe For made Pledges on nuclEaR use.

Could tHaT be The reaSON for the aTtempted re-introduce of "unPRedictaBilIty doCtriNe" (Fuchs, 2017; SuLliVan & TumUltY, 2017; thrush & landleR, 2017) by thE cUrrENT presIDEnT of uS? or is that, beCAUse Was soMeThinG that N. KOrea might was expectINg; bAsed on Nixon's hEriTage (bURr & kimBAlL, 2015; fucHs, 2017; tHruSH & landler, 2017). NevertheLess, this isSuE Is Presented oVEr-sImPlified So that cAnnot CApture tHe full ratIonal behiNd. thus, THIs eXample shouLd only be ConsidereD As demONsTratiOn oF cultuRe'S roLe in rAtionaL MadE choiCes and NoThing mOre.

HaViNg above iN mind, can be said that "game" oF ratioNal chOicEs, supportS auTHor'S choice foR selEcting poliTicAl rEalisM as THe vehIcle FOr AnaLYsis.

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According to second pil lar, state s ten d t o p ur suethei r national int e rest  in terms of maximizin g the ir powe r  ( Hanis h, 2013 ) .T h us,  w eass um e  t hat t herationa le behindcou nt ries that ar e  g oing for a ddi ng domesticpro ducednu cle a r wea pon s totheira rsenal , is thede t ermina n t of ma x i mi zing  their power. Suc h  m a ximization, is  not a pp r eh e n ded  on ly as a me an  of d e terrenc e  i n a  "b a lance of terr or", but ra t her  – inte rms of law  of f or c e o r simply ca lled  "might i s ther ight" – as a le verage  fo r s ervi n gth eir  i n ter e st s ( e .g.  economy ,po litic s).A c c ordi ngto t hirdpillar, the m axi miza t ion  of s tates  pow er  is a ccompl ished  t hrough rational  dec isions (H ani sh , 2 01 3).
T o be n oti ced , thatin term s  of  p o l i ti cal realism as def in e d  a bove and  for t h is  s t udy, the  t wolatt e r  pill arsa re  inextri cablyl in ke d; thus  h avingfo und  th e req u irem ents f or suppo rting second pillar, then will alm o st i ne v itab lyfound those  for thir d.
A ls o t o  be n otice dt ha t , when comes to rat io nality  andthird pillar,  along wit h t he crite riaf or determining ac tions  and decis i ons buil t upo n realis tic logic c omes the  li kel iho odo f  s ubjectively j u d ging .For exa mpl e, what  as sum edasra tional fo r the an al ys t,  m igh t not be ratio na l i ncul tureo f invo lvedpart y(P e nne y et. a l ,2 0 13). 
Al beit , N .Korea  alr e ady  exhibi ted thatcan "rea d"  r ational  made choices  o f great po we rsand ot h e r sovere ign states according to their c ult ure,in a  "tit-for -ta t" tac tic ;  which  evolv ed by  t hem . And c a n  b e s ai d that act u a lly  didth at q uite we ll, when consideri n g t he accomplish edmone y - fl oww it h  di re c tio n from internatio nal donors  t o  N . Korea –i n t er ms of f inancia l aid ,  and –in exchan ge for ma de  ple d g eson nuclear  use.

C ould that be th e  r eason  fo r theat tem ptedre-int r odu ce of  "unpr ed ictabi litydo ctrine"(Fuchs, 2017; Sullivan& Tumu lty,201 7; Thrush  &L and ler, 2017 ) by  the curre ntpre siden t o f  US?Or i s  t hat ,  beca usew as someth i ng  th a t  N . Korea mig h t was  expe cti n g; bas ed o n Nixon's heritag e  (Burr & Kimba ll,2 0 15;  Fu c hs,20 17; Thrush & L and le r ,  2017).Ne vertheless,  this is su e  is p resent ed ove r-simpl i f ie d  so th at c ann ot captur e t he full ra ti on a l behi nd.Th us, th is exa m ples h ould only be con sider e d  as d e mon strat io n of cu l ture 's role in  rational m ade ch oice s and  nothin gmore.
Ha vi ng above i n  mind, ca n besaid th at  "ga me"  of ra tion a l  choi ces,  s upp orts auth o r 's ch oi c e f or s elect in g po litical r e alism as  th e  vehicl efor a nalysi s .
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According to_second pillar,_states tend to pursue_their national_interest_in terms_of_maximizing their power_(Hanish, 2013). Thus,_we assume that the_rationale behind countries_that_are going for adding domestic produced nuclear weapons to their arsenal, is the determinant_of_maximizing their_power._Such_maximization, is not apprehended only_as a mean of deterrence_in a_"balance of terror", but rather – in terms_of_law of force_or simply called "might is the right" – as_a leverage for serving their interests_(e.g. economy, politics).

According_to_third_pillar, the maximization of_states power is accomplished through rational_decisions (Hanish, 2013).

To be noticed, that_in terms of political realism as defined_above and for this study, the_two latter pillars are inextricably_linked; thus_having found the requirements for_supporting second pillar,_then will_almost inevitably found_those for third.

Also to be noticed_that, when comes_to rationality and third pillar, along_with_the criteria for_determining_actions_and decisions_built upon realistic_logic_comes the_likelihood_of subjectively judging. For example, what_assumed_as rational for the analyst, might not_be rational in culture_of_involved party (Penney et._al, 2013).

Albeit, N. Korea already_exhibited that can "read" rational made_choices of_great powers_and other sovereign states according to their culture, in a "tit-for-tat"_tactic; which evolved by them. And_can be said that_actually did_that_quite well, when_considering_the accomplished_money-flow with direction from international donors to_N. Korea_– in terms of financial aid,_and – in exchange_for_made pledges on nuclear use.

Could that_be the reason for the attempted_re-introduce of "unpredictability doctrine" (Fuchs,_2017;_Sullivan_& Tumulty, 2017; Thrush &_Landler, 2017) by the current president_of US? Or_is that, because was something that N._Korea_might was expecting; based on Nixon's_heritage_(Burr & Kimball, 2015; Fuchs, 2017;_Thrush_&_Landler, 2017). Nevertheless, this issue_is presented over-simplified so that cannot_capture the full rational behind. Thus, this example should_only be considered_as demonstration of culture's role_in_rational_made choices and nothing more.

Having above in mind, can be_said that_"game" of rational_choices, supports author's choice for selecting political realism as the_vehicle for analysis.
