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"  The Good and the Bad A new Pentagon report details the progress and challenges in Afghanistan as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) stands on the verge of its 2014 withdrawal. The Congressionally mandated report, 2013 Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, covers October 2012 to March 2013, the first fighting season that saw Afghans take the lead on security against Taliban remnants, al-Qaida operatives, and the slew of criminal and insurgent groups that fight the government.  As always in Afghanistan, there is positive and negative news. The report&amp;#039;s basic takeaway is that the Afghans did not crumble under the responsibility of planning and executing security operations. Yet the overall weakness of the country&amp;#039;s central government may hinder the military&amp;#039;s ability to hold the insurgents at bay\u2014and to hold the nation together after the U.S.-led coalition leaves next year. Indeed, the report indicates the nation needs continuing money, training, and assistance. Here&amp;#039;s the good and the bad presented by the report. Afghan Military Improved\u2014But Not Enough ISAF&amp;#039;s long-standing goal in Afghanistan was to build a military and government that could stabilize the failed state at least enough to allow foreign troops to leave. This is a tall order in a place divided by deep ethnic and tribal tensions, with little infrastructure, a culture of corruption, and a populace that is amongst the poorest in the world. ISAF&amp;#039;s strategy was to build up the number of troops, conduct joint operations with them to improve their quality, teach them to plan operations, and then hand over the planning and execution of missions. PopMech observed this strategy firsthand in eastern Afghanistan in 2009. This new report covers an interesting period in the war&amp;#039;s history. &amp;quot;This is the first fighting season when the Afghan army and police were actually in lead,&amp;quot; says Peter Lavoy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia Pacific Security Affairs. &amp;quot;They&amp;#039;ve acquitted themselves quite well.&amp;quot; During the period covered by the report, the Afghan forces led almost 90 percent of operations. That&amp;#039;s the good news. The bad news is that they have a long way to go. &amp;quot;Although Afghan National Security Forces capabilities have greatly increased over the past two years, it has yet to demonstrate the ability to operate independently on a nationwide scale,&amp;quot; the report says. The Afghan National Army is plagued with a familiar problem: keeping soldiers. &amp;quot;The ANA attrition rate remained well above the 1.4 percent monthly goal, reaching 4.1 percent in one month during this reporting period,&amp;quot; the report says. (Translation: during just that month, four of every 100 Afghan soldiers left the service) The report notes that unresponsive commanders and ethnic divisions increase attrition rates. Supporting the Afghan troops may be banal, but it&amp;#039;s critical. Lavoy cited delivering paychecks, food, and fuel as areas that need improvement in the Afghan government. &amp;quot;These are functional skills and capability Afghans are still developing today,&amp;quot; he says.  The Afghan forces are also struggling to get necessary equipment to the troops doing the fighting. &amp;quot;Delivering equipment to the national and regional depots does not mean that this equipment has reached personnel in the field,&amp;quot; the report notes, wryly. &amp;quot;There is a shortfall in distribution between the regional depots and fielded units.&amp;quot; The report cites equipment shortages of medical equipment, mortars, night-vision goggles, and communications gear during this last fighting season. It doesn&amp;#039;t say what happens to the equipment, though. A cynic (or someone who has seen an Afghan market) would say it&amp;#039;s the kind of stuff that could fetch a nice price on the black market.  Gaining the Cities, Losing the Countryside The Pentagon&amp;#039;s report says that the Afghan government has won the cities and major towns, and credits a buildup of foreign troops for the achievement: &amp;quot;The progress made by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)\u2013led surge over the past three years has put the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan firmly in control of all of Afghanistan&amp;#039;s major cities and 34 provincial capitals and driven the insurgency into the countryside.&amp;quot; Well, that&amp;#039;s the good news. The bad news is that insurgents and other anti-government forces have taken root in rural areas where the central government can&amp;#039;t exert control. &amp;quot;The government has yet to reduce corruption or extend governance to many rural areas effectively,&amp;quot; the report states. Rural areas are where the poppy is grown, which is converted to heroin for the global black market. &amp;quot;Opium production remains a substantial portion of overall agriculture output and will continue to fuel corruption and fund the insurgency, undermining good governance and hindering efforts to improve security.&amp;quot;  The lack of military presence outside of Afghan cities may be an area of intense training and combat as ISAF begins to withdraw, the report hints. &amp;quot;To contend with the continuing Taliban threat, particularly in rural areas, the ANSF will require training and key combat support from ISAF, including in extremis close air support, through the end of 2014.&amp;quot; 2014: The Make-or-Break Year Next year ISAF&amp;#039;s mission will end, bringing big changes to the battlefield. It means the end of close air support, medevac, artillery support, and surveillance aircraft, &amp;quot;creating gaps which, if not addressed, will reduce Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ability to provide security for its populace and deter external threats.&amp;quot; Lavoy says the &amp;quot;key strategic event&amp;quot; of 2014 is the national election in April. He says there are more troops in place to guard the process than were there in 2009, and that security planning is further ahead at this time than it was for the last election. How the election plays out will be a key indicator on how the Afghans are handling their new responsibilities in 2014.  But however well things go in 2014, the report shoots down the idea that Afghan security forces can operate without international support\u2014what D.C. wonks call the zero option: &amp;quot;The ANSF will, however, need continued assistance and combat support through the end of the ISAF mandate in December 2014; beyond then it will still require substantial training, advising and assistance\u2014including financial support\u2014to address ongoing shortcomings.&amp;quot; "^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string>
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