In the context of Japan's reliance on US extended deterrence, former Japanese diplomat, director of JIIA's Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation (2008–2014) and commissioner of the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (2014–2017) Nobuyasu Abe in 2018 called for re-examining the role of nuclear weapons alongside the non-nuclear military situation in the regional security environment to bridge the "great divide between idealists and realists" on adopting a no-first-use policy. He described the political divide in Japan as the skepticism of the Japanese government, the ruling LDP, and "center/right conservatives" on the one hand, and the support of the ruling coalition's junior partner Komeito, opposition parties, and "left/center anti-nuclear idealists" on the other. In its analysis of South Korea's reliance on US extended deterrence, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in January 2022 wrote that, were the US to adopt an NFU position, the credibility of its extended deterrence would be diminished. The institute's public attitudes survey findings, published in May 2023, include naming North Korea as the most pressing security concern, followed by China. In its November 2017 policy brief, the European Council on Foreign Relations concluded that North Korea's posture is one of "nuclear pre-emption" and its government "concerned that a first strike could destroy it"; in contrast, China pursues "what Beijing calls 'nuclear counterstrike campaigns, having declared its NFU doctrine out of the belief "that neither its government nor its nuclear arsenal could be eliminated in a first strike by a hostile power". And in the foreground of strained relations between South Korea and Japan, stemming from Japan's 1910–1945 occupation of Korea, the June 2023 trilateral meeting of the countries' military chiefs signaled closer nuclear strategy consultation at the urging of their US counterpart.
In the context of Japan's reliance on US extended deterrence, former Japanese diplomat, director of JIIA's Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation (2008–2014) and commissioner of the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (2014–2017) Nobuyasu Abe in 2018 called for re-examining the role of nuclear weapons alongside the non-nuclear military situation in the regional security environment to bridge the "great divide between idealists and realists" on adopting a no-first-use policy. He described the political divide in Japan as the skepticism of the Japanese government, the ruling LDP, and "center/right conservatives" on the one hand, and the support of the ruling coalition's junior partner Komeito, opposition parties, and "left/center anti-nuclear idealists" on the other. In its analysis of South Korea's reliance on US extended deterrence, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in January 2022 wrote that, were the US to adopt an NFU position, the credibility of its extended deterrence would be diminished. The institute's public attitudes survey findings, published in May 2023, include naming North Korea as the most pressing security concern, followed by China In its November 2017 policy brief, the European Council on Foreign Relations concluded that North Korea's posture is one of "nuclear pre-emption" and its gove.rnment "concerned that a first strike could destroy it"; in contrast, China pursues "what Beijing calls 'nuclear counterstrike campaigns, having declared its NFU doctrine out of the belief "that neither its government nor its nuclear arsenal could be eliminated in a first strike by a hostile power". And in the foreground of strained relations between South Korea and Japan, stemming from Japan's 1910–1945 occupation of Korea, the June 2023 trilateral meeting of the countries' military chiefs signaled closer nuclear strategy consultation at the urging of their US counterpart.