After returning to Washington on 13 March, McNamara reported to Johnson that the situation had "unquestionably been growing worse": since his last visit in December 1963 with 40% of the countryside now under "Vietcong control or predominant influence", most of the South Vietnamese people were displaying "apathy and indifference", the desertion rate in the ARVN was "high and increasing" while the VC were "recruiting energetically". The "greatest weakness" accordingly to McNamara was the "uncertain viability" of Khánh's government, which could have been overthrown at any moment as the ARVN was ridden with factionalism.
After returning to Washington on 13 March McNamara reported to Johnson that the situation had "unquestionably been growing worse" since his last visit in December 1963 with 40% of the countryside now under "Vietcong control or predominant influence" most of the South Vietnamese people were displaying "apathy and indifference" the desertion rate in the ARVN was "high and increasing" while the VC were "recruiting energetically" The "greatest weakness" accordingly to McNamara was the "uncertain viability" of Khánh's government which could have been overthrown at any moment as the ARVN was ridden with factionalism