The placement of the car's fuel tank was the result of both conservative industry practice of the time as well as the uncertain regulatory environment during the development and early sales periods of the car. Ford was accused of knowing the car had an unsafe tank placement and then forgoing design changes based on an internal cost-benefit analysis. Two landmark legal cases, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. and Indiana v. Ford Motor Co., resulted from fatal accidents involving Pintos.: Conventional wisdom holds that Ford Motor Company decided to rush the Pinto into production in 1970 to compete with compact foreign imports, despite internal pre-production tests that showed gas tank ruptures in low-speed rear-end collisions would produce deadly fires. This decision purportedly derived from an infamous seven-page cost-benefit analysis (the "Grush/Saunby Report" [1973]) that valued human lives at $200,000. Settling burn victims' lawsuits would have cost $49.5 million, far less than the $137 million needed to make minor corrections. According to this account, the company made an informed, cynical, and impressively coordinated decision that "payouts" (Kelman and Hamilton 1989:311) to families of burn victims were more cost-effective than improving fuel tank integrity. This description provides the unambiguous foundation on which the media and academics have built a Pinto gas tank decision-making narrative.
The placement of the car's fuel tank was the result of both conservative industry practice of the time as well as the uncertain regulatory environment during the development and early sales periods of the car Ford was accused of knowing the car had an unsafe tank placement and then forgoing design changes based on an internal cost-benefit analysis Two landmark legal cases Grimshaw v Ford Motor Co and Indiana v Ford Motor Co resulted from fatal accidents involving Pintos Conventional wisdom holds that Ford Motor Company decided to rush the Pinto into production in 1970 to compete with compact foreign imports despite internal pre-production tests that showed gas tank ruptures in low-speed rear-end collisions would produce deadly fires This decision purportedly derived from an infamous seven-page cost-benefit analysis (the "Grush/Saunby Report" [1973]) that valued human lives at $200000 Settling burn victims' lawsuits would have cost $495 million far less than the $137 million needed to make minor corrections According to this account the company made an informed cynical and impressively coordinated decision that "payouts" (Kelman and Hamilton 1989311) to families of burn victims were more cost-effective than improving fuel tank integrity This description provides the unambiguous foundation on which the media and academics have built a Pinto gas tank decision-making narrative