This view contrasts with moral universalism, which argues that, even though well-intentioned persons disagree, and some may even remain unpersuadable (e.g. someone who is closed-minded), there is still a meaningful sense in which an action could be more "moral" (morally preferable) than another; that is, they believe there are objective standards of evaluation that seem worth calling "moral facts"—regardless of whether they are universally accepted.
tHiS viEw coNTrasts WIth mOral uNivErsalIsM, wHicH arguEs thAt, evEN thouGh well-intEntioned persoNs dIsagreE, and SOmE may EVen rEmAin unpErsuadaBlE (E.G. soMEone wHo is closEd-mInded), theRE Is still a meaNInGfuL senSe iN WhIch an acTIon cOulD be mOre "moral" (morally prEferaBLe) than aNOther; THAt is, THey BElievE THere Are OBjecTiVe STanDaRds Of evalUaTioN that sEem worth Calling "moral facts"—regardLesS OF whethEr they Are univerSally aCceptEd.