The only British success of the battle was the delayed attack on the right bank of the Mississippi River, where Thornton's brigade of the 85th Regiment of Foot and detachments from the Royal Navy and Royal MarinesPatterson, Benton Rain, p. 230. attacked and overwhelmed the American line. The 700 militiamen were routed. Reilly felt the fault lay with Morgan, who had dispersed his troops, rather than concentrating most of them around his main defence, whilst deploying a picket, to give advance warning once the British arrived. The decision by General Morgan to deploy his troops in two positions a mile apart, neither defensible, was favorable for the British. Morgan's mismanagement of his Kentucky and Louisiana militiamen was an open invitation to defeat. Whilst the retreat of the militia has been criticized, such a move was no less than prudent. An inquiry, overseen by Major General William Carroll of the Tennessee Militia, found that the conduct was 'not reprehensible'.Court martial of inquiry, relative to the retreat on January 8, reproduced in Latour (1816), appendix LXII, p.cxxxii Major Paul Arnaud, commanding officer of the 2nd Louisiana militia brigade, was targeted as a scapegoat for the retreat on the Right Bank. His fellow Louisiana Militia officers Dejean, Cavallier and Declouet were admonished, as was Colonel John Davis of the Kentucky Militia.
The only British success of the battle was the delayed attack on the right bank of the Mississippi River, where Thornton's brigade of the 85th Regiment of Foot and detachments from the Royal Navy and Royal MarinesPatterson, Benton Rain, p. 230. attacked and overwhelmed the American line. The 700 militiamen were routed. Reilly felt the fault lay with Morgan, who had dispersed his troops, rather than concentrating most of them around his main defence, whilst deploying a picket, to give advance warning once the British arrived. The decision by General Morgan to deploy his troops in two positions a mile apart, neither defensible, was favorable for the British. Morgan's mismanagement of his Kentucky and Louisiana militiamen was an open invitation to defeat. Whilst the retreat of the militia has been criticized, such a move was no less than prudent. An inquiry, overseen by Major General William Carroll of the Tennessee Militia, found that the conduct was 'not reprehensible'.Court martial of inquiry, relative to the retreat on January 8, reproduced in Latour (1816), appendix LXII, p.cxxxii Major Paul Arnaud, commanding officer of the 2nd Louisiana militia brigade, was targeted as a scapegoat for the retreat on the Right Bank. His fellow Louisiana Militia officers Dejean, Cavallier and Declouet were admonished, as was Colonel John Davis of the Kentucky Militia.