Following a split in the Communist Party, the leader of the Khalq faction, Hafizullah Amin, overthrew President Nur Muhammad Taraki and had him murdered on 8 October 1979. Soviet diplomats in Kabul had a low opinion of Taraki's ability to handle the rebellion, and an even lower one of Amin, who was regarded as a fanatic, but incompetent leader who lost control of the situation. In the fall of 1979, the leaders who pressed the most strongly for an invasion of Afghanistan to replace the incompetent Amin with Karmal, who was the man better able to preserve the communist regime's existence, were the Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the Chairman of KGB, Yuri Andropov and the Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry Ustinov. The intervention was envisioned in Moscow was merely a short conflict to stabilize the situation and allow the Communist regime to regain power. Brezhnev was indecisive, fearing that an occupation of Afghanistan might not be the short war that Gromyko, Ustinov and Andropov kept insisting it would be, but was fearful of the possibility of an Islamic fundamentalist regime being established that would export Islam into Soviet Central Asia. As it was, the inability and unwillingness of much of the Soviet-controlled Afghan Army to fight led the Soviets to involve themselves in Afghanistan for almost 10 years. Ironically, despite what was being feared in Moscow, the United States was not supporting the Islamic fundamentalist rebellion in Afghanistan, and only started to support the mujahideen ("warriors of Allah") with weapons after the Soviet invasion, concentrating foreign policy matters in the form of linkage towards preventing Soviet expansion.
Following a split in the Communist Party the leader of the Khalq faction Hafizullah Amin overthrew President Nur Muhammad Taraki and had him murdered on 8 October 1979 Soviet diplomats in Kabul had a low opinion of Taraki's ability to handle the rebellion and an even lower one of Amin who was regarded as a fanatic but incompetent leader who lost control of the situation In the fall of 1979 the leaders who pressed the most strongly for an invasion of Afghanistan to replace the incompetent Amin with Karmal who was the man better able to preserve the communist regime's existence were the Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko the Chairman of KGB Yuri Andropov and the Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry Ustinov The intervention was envisioned in Moscow was merely a short conflict to stabilize the situation and allow the Communist regime to regain power Brezhnev was indecisive fearing that an occupation of Afghanistan might not be the short war that Gromyko Ustinov and Andropov kept insisting it would be but was fearful of the possibility of an Islamic fundamentalist regime being established that would export Islam into Soviet Central Asia As it was the inability and unwillingness of much of the Soviet-controlled Afghan Army to fight led the Soviets to involve themselves in Afghanistan for almost 10 years Ironically despite what was being feared in Moscow the United States was not supporting the Islamic fundamentalist rebellion in Afghanistan and only started to support the mujahideen ("warriors of Allah") with weapons after the Soviet invasion concentrating foreign policy matters in the form of linkage towards preventing Soviet expansion