Barnett also argues that, in strategic terms, Germany was in fact in a superior position following the Treaty than she had been in 1914. Germany's eastern frontiers faced Russia and Austria, who had both in the past balanced German power. Barnett asserts that its post-war eastern borders were safer, because the former Austrian Empire fractured after the war into smaller, weaker states, Russia was wracked by revolution and civil war, and the newly restored Poland was no match for even a defeated Germany. In the West, Germany was balanced only by France and Belgium, both of which were smaller in population and less economically vibrant than Germany. Barnett concludes by saying that instead of weakening Germany, the treaty "much enhanced" German power. Britain and France should have (according to Barnett) "divided and permanently weakened" Germany by undoing Bismarck's work and partitioning Germany into smaller, weaker states so it could never have disrupted the peace of Europe again. By failing to do this and therefore not solving the problem of German power and restoring the equilibrium of Europe, Britain "had failed in her main purpose in taking part in the Great War". thumb|American political cartoon depicting the contemporary view of German reparations, 1921|upright The British historian of modern Germany Richard J. Evans wrote that during the war the German right was committed to an annexationist program which aimed at Germany annexing most of Europe and Africa. Consequently, any peace treaty that did not leave Germany as the conqueror would be unacceptable to them. Short of allowing Germany to keep all the conquests of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Evans argued that there was nothing that could have been done to persuade the German right to accept Versailles. Evans further noted that the parties of the Weimar Coalition, namely the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the social liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) and the Christian democratic Centre Party, were all equally opposed to Versailles, and it is false to say as some historians have that opposition to Versailles also equalled opposition to the Weimar Republic. Finally, Evans argued that it is untrue that Versailles caused the premature end of the Republic, instead contending that it was the Great Depression of the early 1930s that put an end to German democracy. He also argued that Versailles was not the "main cause" of National Socialism and the German economy was "only marginally influenced by the impact of reparations".
barnett also argues that in strategic terms germany was in fact in a superior position following the treaty than she had been in 1914 germany's eastern frontiers faced russia and austria who had both in the past balanced german power barnett asserts that its post-war eastern borders were safer because the former austrian empire fractured after the war into smaller weaker states russia was wracked by revolution and civil war and the newly restored poland was no match for even a defeated germany in the west germany was balanced only by france and belgium both of which were smaller in population and less economically vibrant than germany barnett concludes by saying that instead of weakening germany the treaty "much enhanced" german power britain and france should have (according to barnett) "divided and permanently weakened" germany by undoing bismarck's work and partitioning germany into smaller weaker states so it could never have disrupted the peace of europe again by failing to do this and therefore not solving the problem of german power and restoring the equilibrium of europe britain "had failed in her main purpose in taking part in the great war" thumb|american political cartoon depicting the contemporary view of german reparations 1921|upright the british historian of modern germany richard j evans wrote that during the war the german right was committed to an annexationist program which aimed at germany annexing most of europe and africa consequently any peace treaty that did not leave germany as the conqueror would be unacceptable to them short of allowing germany to keep all the conquests of the treaty of brest-litovsk evans argued that there was nothing that could have been done to persuade the german right to accept versailles evans further noted that the parties of the weimar coalition namely the social democratic party of germany (spd) the social liberal german democratic party (ddp) and the christian democratic centre party were all equally opposed to versailles and it is false to say as some historians have that opposition to versailles also equalled opposition to the weimar republic finally evans argued that it is untrue that versailles caused the premature end of the republic instead contending that it was the great depression of the early 1930s that put an end to german democracy he also argued that versailles was not the "main cause" of national socialism and the german economy was "only marginally influenced by the impact of reparations"