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<p>Since its origins in the years immediately following the Second World War, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) has evolved through the combined effects of external pressure from strategic planning for a global war with the Soviet Union and the internal bureaucratic and doctrinal infighting among the Joint Staff and the various services. This infighting was not merely over service' 'turf battles', but also touched the very heart of the individual services' philosophies on command in war. This thesis follows the history of that evolutionary process since World War II with an eye toward a future revision to the UCP. Given the fundamentally altered geo-strategic situation brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the author argues for a complete revision of the UCP based on distinct post-Cold War theater and regional missions. Instead of consolidating the bulk of U.S.-based forces into the U.S. Atlantic Command, the author proposes the retention of several separate (but joint) 'strategic' conventional forces commands based on mission, readiness, and deployability/sustainability criterion.
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<br>Subjects: Unified Command; Atlantic Command; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Strategic planning; World War Two</div>
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Quinn, John T., II</div>
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