<div class="description">
<dl><dd>Title from cover</dd>
<dd>"NPS-NS-92-010."</dd>
<dd>"May 12, 1992."</dd>
<dd>AD A252 808</dd>
<dd>Includes bibliographical references (p. 41-43)</dd>
<dd>The three basic elements where we traditionally commence strategic planning have changed dramatically in the past two years. A new national security strategy recasts the roles and missions of the armed forces in new terms. The submarine force needs to be justified under the new grammar for warfare as a part of the four new mission areas under the new national military strategy. The submarine force alone can perform the strategic deterrence and defense missions. The submarine's role in presence involves a high/low mix choice. There should be increased emphasis on the submarine force for crisis response: (1) rapid response (2) shore bombardment and strike (3) as the initial leading maritime component for second major regional contingencies, and (4) initial and limited sea control. A European regional war evolving out of a major regional contingency is not the same thing as the old European-centered global war with the USSR. Decreased emphasis should be placed on strategic anti- submarine warfare. Reconstitution goals could be met with at-sea nuclear weapons. Navy, Strategy, Missions. Submarine, Roles</dd>
<dd>aq/aq cc:9116 06/08/98</dd></dl><br>Subjects: DETERRENCE.; MILITARY STRATEGY.; NATIONAL SECURITY.; SUBMARINES.</div>
<div class="fn value">
Tritten, James John.</div>
Internet Archive identifier