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<p>Despite the volumes of material written on the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, little work has examined what intelligence is required to provide national policymakers with the information they need to make good decisions governing counterinsurgency. This thesis first reviews the problems experienced in Afghanistan with the collection and dissemination of intelligence from ground units to the national policymakers. It then takes a look at intelligence process doctrine encapsulated in service manuals of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, as well as joint service intelligence doctrine, and determines that priority intelligence requirements are not being properly articulated to obtain the answers policymakers require. After a review of counterinsurgency doctrine and theories, this thesis proposes three priority intelligence requirements for use in counterinsurgency operations. These three intelligence requirements focus on: 1) supporting operations that attack the insurgencys support infrastructure; 2) identify host-nation government personnel or institutions that are not effectively supporting counterinsurgency policy; and 3) revealing how the insurgency is undermining popular support for the government. This thesis identifies a way to get the answers to those priority intelligence requirements from the ground units to the policymakers in a usable form.
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<br>Subjects: Counterinsurgency; intelligence assessment; assessment; priority intelligence requirement; PIR; essential elements of information; EEI; insurgency; structured analytic techniques; intelligence requirement; legitimacy; corruption; Cuba; Egypt; Iranian Revolution; Baath Party; Iraq; ISR; HUMINT; SIGINT; Afghanistan</div>
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Swedlow, Andrew D.</div>
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