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<p>In Thailand, post January 2004, the Islamic insurgency in the south has surged  constantly. During this time, the insurgency has not refrained from attacking and  intimidating innocent people; government officials are also targeted especially the  military, the police, and the local community leaders. The Thai government has  developed its policies and ad hoc organization to confront this problem, and improved  related laws in hopes of improving the situation, but so far, little the government has  done has been successful.  This thesis examines the Thai government's counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy  post-2004 to cope with the Muslim insurgency in that country, and focuses on the ad-hoc  organization of Thai officials charged with executing the COIN strategy, with emphasis  placed on the intelligence system, in particular, in order to recommend the appropriate  ways to reform the intelligence system.  The purpose of this case study is first to suggest improvements to the Thai  Intelligence Community that will enable it to become more effective in fighting the  insurgency. The second goal of this thesis is to suggest modifications to the Thai  government's strategy and its organization that could enable the government to pursue  more effective counter-insurgency activities.
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<br>Subjects: Intelligence service; Thailand; Evaluation; Counterinsurgency; History; Muslims; Thailand, Southern; Political activity; Islam and politics; Communism</div>
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Ampunan, Tibordee</div>
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