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<p>The enlisted personnel assignment process is a major part in the United States Navy's Personnel Distribution system. It ensures warfighters and supporting activities receive the right sailor with the right training to the right billet at the right time (R4) and is a critical element in meeting the challenges of Seapower 21 and Global CONOPS. In order to attain these optimal goals the ways-to-do-it need to be customer-centered and should optimize both, the Navy's needs and the sailor's interests. Recent studies and a detailing pilot in 2002 used a web-based marketplace with two-sided matching mechanisms to accomplish this vision. This research examines the introduction of an Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) as part of the U.S. Navy's enlisted personnel assignment process in a simulation environment. It uses a previously developed simulation tool, including the Deferred Acceptance (DA) and the Linear Programming (LP) matching algorithm to simulate the assignment process. The results of the sensitivity analysis suggested that the Navy should mainly emphasize sailor quality rather than saving AIP funds in order to maximize utility and the possible matches. When adopting such an introduction policy also the percentage of unstable matches under the LP as the matching algorithm was reduced.
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<br>Subjects: Algorithms; Simulation model; Distribution; Assignment; Two-sided matching; Detailing; Personnel policy analysis; Placement; Incentive pay</div>
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Logemann, Karsten</div>
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