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<p>This thesis postulates that in today's media environment and, with adversaries skillfully using propaganda to  skirt nation's resolve, Perception Management is key to military success and should, therefore, be an Information  Operations (IO) Core Capability vis-aÌ -vis its current consideration in the U.S. doctrine as related IO capability.  The Kargil episode of 1999 was a political victory for India, while, from the Pakistani perspective, it was a  successful tactical operation - albeit one which was not accompanied by a coordinated politico-diplomatic plan - turned  into a politico-diplomatic setback. Pakistan's tactical successes in Kargil were not translated into strategic gains due to  the lack of clarity over policy and, hence, no real Perception Management offensive mounted. On the contrary, India  hyped the situation with the West using its media as a key element of Perception Management to win substantial  political support. Eventually, Pakistani forces had to withdraw in the face of immense international pressures.  As only the Indian disinformation of Kargil was publicized and myths were promoted, the real history of Kargil  became obscured. It is a central aim of this thesis to present the Pakistani case, to set the record, if not exactly  straight, then to provide a balancing viewpoint through Pakistani eyes.
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<br>Subjects: Mass media; Propaganda; International relations; History; Systems engineering; Information warfare; Psychology</div>
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Zaman, Khyber</div>
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