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<p>On the modern battlefield communication is critical. Individual units require a steady flow of accurate information between
headquarters and field units to remain effective. Just as important, denying the enemy the same needs of communicating with the
help of electronic countermeasures (ECM), is essential to success. Communications jamming and surveillance are critical to
achieve information superiority.
</p>
<pre>This thesis evaluates the performance and capabilities of one of the most advanced devices that detects, analyzes and denies
</pre>
<p>enemy signals: the Rockwell Colins AN/USQ - 146 transportable communication jammer. The jammer’s best strategy varies
with respect to the modulation technique that the hostile communication system uses. As the theoretical analysis and the simulation
results indicated, the AN/USQ -146 jammer achieves its best performance over a FH/MFSK system when it selects the
repeat multitone jamming strategy. However, when the hostile communication system is the IEEE 802.11a wireless local area
network (WLAN) system, the AN/USQ - 146 (Rubicon II) jammer must select the partial-band jamming strategy with
ρ = 0.1.
</p>
<pre>The results of the theoretical analysis and the simulation modeling of the specific jammer for all types of jamming in manual
</pre>
<p>spot and repeat modes over FH/MFSK military communication systems and new advanced wireless standards such as the IEEE
802.11a can be used as guidelines to select the most effective jamming strategy for the specific type of hostile waveform encountered.
</p>
<br>Subjects: AN/USQ - 146 jammer; FH/MFSK; SINCGARS; probability of bit error; manual spot mode; repeat mode; barrage jamming; partial-band jamming; multitone jamming; Operational limitations; IEEE 802.11a; System View; Simulation Model</div>
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Dalakos, Aristeidis</div>
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