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<dl><dd>AD-A327 103</dd>
<dd>Thesis (M.S. in Civil Engineering)--University of Maryland College Park, Summer 1997</dd>
<dd>Includes bibliographical references</dd>
<dd>With the passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, the U.S. Federal Government set in motion a process which is intended to reform the federal acquisition process with the aim of achieving greater efficiency and value. Although numerous initiatives have been adopted in pursuit of this goal, one area which has been neglected is performance bonds. In keeping with the Total Quality Management (TQM) objective of reaping benefits from the 'low hanging fruit' first, this paper examines the potential savings available as a result of relatively minor changes to the way requirements for performance bonds on Navy construction contracts are determined. The result is savings which appear to be 'hanging low' indeed. By shifting to a risk-based system of requiring performance bonds only on those contract with an appreciable default risk, savings of 0.5% to 1.0% of the gross cost of construction appear to be available with very little loss potential</dd></dl><br>Subjects: GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT; OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS; FEDERAL LAW</div>
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Tave, Gary A</div>
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