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<p>As the United States exits Iraq and Afghanistan, it must begin the long process of preparing for future challenges. There is considerable pressure on policy makers within the Congress and DoD in making strategy and force structure decisions with costs in mind. A key question is what will future conflict look like and how much resources should be committed to large conventional forces. To effectively analyze the desired size and characteristics of tomorrows military, we must take a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies, one of which could be conflict with China. This thesis examines the strengths and weakness in both the U.S. and China, and uses Game Theory to model conflict between the two countries using the Correlates of War data to measure national power. Finally, the relative merits of diplomacy and irregular war are examined in order to determine the best method for the United States to achieve an advantage when interacting with China in the pursuit of national objectives.
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<br>Subjects: Irregular War; Irregular Warfare Capabilities; Irregular actions; Game Theory; Power Transition; Correlates of War; U.S.; China; Strategic; Conventional</div>
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Reynolds, Phil W.</div>
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