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<p>The Powell Doctrine for waging war was generally focused on the use of overwhelming physical force to defeat the enemy. Destroying enemy combatants and capabilities faster and more severely than the rate at which they can inflict losses has traditionally resulted in victory. Consequently, kinetic operations have always been at the forefront. Despite this predominance of kinetic operations, history has shown that technologically superior, militarily advanced, and numerically overwhelming forces are sometimes defeated by ragtag groups of a few hundred guerrillas with inferior combat capabilities. Rather than attempting to convince our enemies through the use of violent action which targets their physical well-being rather than their mental decision makingthere is a more effective way to wage war psychologically. By exploring case studies of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the neo-Taliban, this thesis examines whether resequencing psychological and kinetic operations, at various times throughout a conflict, will create stronger, more synchronized and believable messages, thus producing warfare waged in a more effective and efficient manner.
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<br>Subjects: Psychological Operations; PSYOP; Military Information Support Operations; MISO; Information Operations; IO; Strategic Communications; Warfare Waged Psychologically; Unconventional Warfare; UW; Special Operations Forces; Insurgency; Terrorism; Influence; Indirect Approach; Hamas; Hezbollah; Taliban; neo-Taliban; Israel; Kinetic; Non-kinetic</div>
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Schaad, Michael A.</div>
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