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<p>The United States government has utilized leadership decapitation strategies to counter illicit or insurgent organizations since the kingpin strategy was first developed in the late 20th century by the Drug Enforcement Administration. Most critical analysis of this strategy, however, deals with terrorist organizations rather than transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). This thesis looks to the findings in these critical studies that may also be relevant to countering TCOs and, based on them, asks: what are the main factors that determine the effectiveness of leadership decapitation in countering TCOs? This thesis applies the four factors found in the literature to impact vulnerability to leadership decapitation—institutionalization, popular support, history of violent rivalry, and law enforcement efforts—to four TCOs. It finds that Medellin and Cali cartels did not gain an advantage from any of the factors. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) received protection from leadership decapitation from three of the four factors but ultimately was defeated. In the final case, the Sinaloa cartel, all four factors were present to provide the organization with protection from decapitation. These results are important for governments and law enforcement organizations to understand as they work to defeat TCOs.
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<br>Subjects: Transnational Criminal Organizations; leadership removal; leadership change; leadership decapitation; measuring effectiveness; Cali Cartel; Medellin Cartel; Sinaloa Cartel; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; FARC; Colombia; Mexico; popular support; law enforcement; violent rivalry; institutionalization; kingpin strategy; cartel; counter-TCO; TCO</div>
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Ortiz, Leah</div>
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