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<p>Over the course of India's six decades of statehood, the central government granted and removed authority to  and from states resulting in a variety of development patterns among Indian states and across different periods of  India's history. The cases presented here illustrate that when sub-national groups with well-entrenched and capable  governing institutions successfully lobbied the center for more authority, several developmental outcomes-reducing  insurgent violence, promoting economic growth, and reducing poverty-of the groups strengthened. When the  central government failed to relinquish power and responsibility to such states, development slowed or stalled.  Conversely, development did not significantly improve in states with weak governing institutions even when they  requested and were granted more power from the center illustrating the importance of embedded and strong state  institutions in state development.  This thesis examines the effect of decentralization on three aspects of development and describes the  conditions under which decentralization and centralization promote or impede insurgency, economic growth, and  poverty reduction. Based on empirical data from Indian states and detailed analysis of India's shifting political  economy over time, it is shown that the decentralization of fiscal and political authority to capable sub-national  governments enhances development programs. Conversely, centralizing authority in the presence of a capable subnational  government, or ceding authority to incapable sub-national governments impedes development.
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<br>Subjects: Insurgency; India; History; Economic development; Poverty; Decentralization in government; Tamil Nadu; Punjab; India, Northeastern</div>
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Federal, Robert K.</div>
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