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<p>In this climate of declining budgets and resources, models and simulations (M&amp;S) have become very beneficial to the U.S. Navy. However, the U.S. Navy's investment in, and use of, M&amp;S for addressing critical operational issues (COIs) within a warship's operational test (OT) program would not be practical unless the particular M&amp;S was determined to be a credible representation of that which would be physically tested. Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR) is responsible for accrediting U.S. Navy M&amp;S that are required to support OT. COMOPTEVFOR has developed a VV and A process that is documented in COMOPTEVFORINST 5000.1A. This instruction requires all surface ship acquisition program managers (PMs) to develop a Validation and Verification (V and V) plan that would meet COMOPTEVFOR's expectations for likely accreditation. This thesis will identify the extent to which surface ship PMs are complying with COMOPTEVFORINST 5000.1A; why they are not in full compliance with the instruction; what incentives would help them comply with the instruction; and what improvements can be made to the instruction that would increase compliance by the PMs. Finally, this thesis will conclude with recommendations that would help increase compliance with the instruction by the PMs.
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<br>Subjects: Armored vessels; Weapons</div>
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Locke, W. Michael.</div>
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