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<p>An experimental program was developed to test the impact of bidding behavior on  two matching mechanisms proposed by prior research for use in the U.S. Navy's  Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) program. AIP is one compensation program used by the  Navy to encourage sailors to volunteer for less desirable assignments. Unlike other  compensation programs, sailors negotiate AIP rates through an auction-like system.  Previous research has proposed new mechanisms to effectively match sailors to  assignments based on the sailors' bids and Navy valuations. However, the two  mechanisms provide different incentives for sailors to truthfully reveal their minimum  acceptable AIP through their bids. The experimental program has been developed to help  determine which matching mechanism gives better incentives for sailors to bid closer to  their true valuations and how bidding differently than these valuations impacts the  effectiveness and cost of the matching mechanisms. The proper operation of the  experimental program was verified through 60 simulated sessions of ten participants  bidding their true values. The program was further tested on a trial run with 20 volunteer  subjects completing 20 bidding rounds each.
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<br>Subjects: Wages; Recruiting and enlistment; Employees; Volunteers</div>
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Resare, Nils A.</div>
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