<div class="description">
<p>Possibilistic Security Properties are widely used in the development of high-assurance security models. However, while a model may possess a security property, an implementation of the model is not guaranteed to possess the property. We argue that the choice of a framework, and its associated definition of refinement, is critical to ensure that an implementation maintains the security property. We show how to use the Doubly Labeled Transition Systems to reason about possibilistic security properties and refinement. We compare this framework to three other process algebras frameworks and show how our framework and security model preserves the security of the largest class of systems. As a consequence of this framework, we show how our security property links confidentiality to availability.
</p>
<br>Subjects: Computer science; Security; Information Flow; Formal Methods; Refinement; High Assurance</div>
<div class="fn value">
Bibighaus, David L.</div>
Internet Archive identifier