<div class="description">
<p>The United States Army has struggled to institutionalize counterinsurgency operations in the Global War on Terror. The  Army's reward system, which drives individual motivation and reflects corporate values, plays a much overlooked role in this  struggle. Within the Army, indeed within most organizations, pay, promotion, and awards form the tripod of extrinsic motivation,  and represent tools the organization can use to reward specific behavior. Today and for the foreseeable future, both pay and  promotion will have limited effects promoting counterinsurgency behavior. The Army's award system, which proudly traces its  history to George Washington, was not developed as a complete system until World War I and, in many respects, ceased  development after World War II. The current 'Pyramid of Honor,' which focuses on valorous acts, is deeply engrained in Army  culture. At the same time significant work and thought have gone into revising the Army's 'capstone' manuals, FM-1 and FM-3.0.  These documents, along with a separate manual on counterinsurgency, all revised or created since 9/11, attempt to move the Army  in a new direction.This thesis explains the paradox that results. The Army has reached a point where it is telling its soldiers to do one type  of action: work by, with, and through the host nation. Yet, it disproportionally delivers awards to those who conduct a separate  type of action: engaging and killing the enemy.
</p>
<br>Subjects: Counterinsurgency</div>
<div class="fn value">
Clemmer, Brent Alan.</div>
Internet Archive identifier