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<p>The United States is currently involved in stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and will likely continue this  involvement in the future. Currently, general-purpose forces, the majority of which are U.S. Army soldiers, conduct  these operations. As of this writing, the U.S. Army has resisted establishing a standing, dedicated, stability operations  force. Such a force would, at first glance, seem to be a logical progression of American military force structure, based  upon current Department of Defense directives and publicly stated policy. This thesis will explore the reasons behind  the lack of this force. It will analyze costs and benefits of a stability operations force with regards to military  readiness, domestic politics, and international politics. It will also consider the role of organization inertia. Finally, it  will recommend a workable framework for such a stability operations force, using the lessons learned from the  analysis within this thesis, making the most of the advantages described and mitigating the costs.
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<br>Subjects:</div>
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Gardner, Philip R.</div>
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