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<p>After defeating the Iraqi military, Coalition Forces spread out across Iraq to stabilize and transition  control of the country back to Iraqis. This historical analysis of Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra studies  military operations intended to stabilize these three cities from April 2003 to September 2005. Prior to and  after the reestablishment of Iraqi sovereignty, Coalition Forces worked with Iraqi citizens at the local level  to reestablish control of the population. In order to achieve this, the counterinsurgent force must  understand that when consensus for non-violent political opposition does not exist within the governed  populace, coercive measures must be taken to enforce local security. This analysis evaluates the effects  of military operations over time and through frequent unit transitions with varying numbers of U.S. and Iraqi  security forces. The conclusions gleaned from this analysis are summarized as unit approaches that either  achieved control or failed to achieve control at the local level. This study suggests that a distributed lightto-  medium equipped ground force operating within urban centers and in continuous close proximity to the  population is best able to establish local control and partner with local police and military forces. This force  should be enabled with language and cultural skills. Necessary combat multipliers include human  intelligence collectors and social network analysts.
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<br>Subjects: Counterinsurgency; Insurgency; OIF; insurgency; counterinsurgency; COIN; Iraq; Samarra; Mosul; Ramadi; control; trust; security; population; Diamond Model; control of the population; protection of the population; intelligence; combat outposts; HUMINT; population control; consensus; coercion; expectation; behavior; influence; networks</div>
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<dl><dd>Clark, Terry L.</dd>
<dd>Nielsen, Shannon E.</dd>
<dd>Broemmel, Jarett D.</dd></dl></div>
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