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<p>The Navy has several tools at its disposal to shape the force, including early separation incentives. This analysis looks at the issues surrounding the separation incentives including the discount rate for government use, the discount rate used by individuals to make a decision (personal discount rate), comparable civilian sector wages for separating personnel, promotion probabilities, and the costs to the government of maintaining personnel until retirement. Using the information provided from researching these topics, a model was created to identify the present value of retirement payments for officers given their current rank, age, and years of service. The model provided a maximum amount the government should be willing to offer to separate an officer early. This model was compared to a second model which determined the minimum amount an officer would be willing to accept to separate before retirement. Recommendations for future methods of shaping the force were provided to maximize savings to the Navy based on data generated from the model.
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<br>Subjects: Military pensions; United States; Cost effectiveness; Separation incentives; Annuities; Force reduction; Cost benefit analysis; Government discount rate; Civilian sector wages; Retirement compensation; Personal discount rate; Military compensation</div>
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Reppert, Joseph L.</div>
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