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<p>There is an increasing use of contactless smart card technology for identification, access control, and financial transactions due to its numerous advantages. However, there is also an increasing number of attacks that exploit the insecure contactless communications in order to gain unauthorized access to personal and sensitive information for illegitimate use. Open Protocol for Access Control Identification and Ticketing with privacY (OPACITY) and Protocol for Lightweight Authentication of Identity (PLAID) are two privacy-enhanced protocols that enable secure contactless communications to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of contactless smart card information and transactions. This thesis will examine and analyze the principle mechanisms behind OPACITY and PLAID protocols to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the protocols, as well as to benchmark the performance of the protocols against each other.
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<br>Subjects: Open Protocol for Access Control Identification and Ticketing with Privacy; OPACITY; Protocol for Lightweight Authentication of Identity; PLAID; Wireless authentication; Contactless smart cards authentication; factors of authentication; granularity of identification; credential confidence; subject-token binding; non-repudiation; MITM resistance; protection of classified material; authorization support; key distribution; bit entropy; cipher performance</div>
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<dl><dd>Kiat, Koh Ho</dd>
<dd>Run, Lee Yong</dd></dl></div>
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