<div class="description">
<dl><dd>"December 1979"</dd>
<dd>"This paper investigates the pattern of compensation arrangements between hospitals and physicans. Hospitals are assumed to choose a combination of salary and incentive or output-based compensation to maximize utility from profits and physicians' nonpatient care activities. Our theory suggests that medical care prices have implications for the choice of compensation method when risk and the costs of supervision are held constant."--p. [i]</dd>
<dd>The research for this paper was supported by Grant no. 95-P-97176/3-02 from the Health Care Financing Administration</dd></dl><br>Subjects: Physicians; Medical fees; Physicians</div>
<div class="fn value">
<dl><dd>Feldman, Roger D</dd>
<dd>Sloan, Frank A</dd>
<dd>Paringer, Lynn</dd>
<dd>Hadley, Jack</dd>
<dd>United States. Health Care Financing Administration</dd>
<dd>Urban Institute</dd></dl></div>
<dl><dd><a rel="nofollow" class="external free" href="https://archive.org/details/analysisofhospit00feld">https://archive.org/details/analysisofhospit00feld</a></dd>
<dd><a rel="nofollow" class="external free" href="https://archive.org/download/analysisofhospit00feld/analysisofhospit00feld.pdf">https://archive.org/download/analysisofhospit00feld/analysisofhospit00feld.pdf</a></dd></dl>