query: Strategic missile defense technology is substantially more advanced and discriminating in application than nuclear weapons, making potential future wars less potentially devastating  An operational national missile defense system renders nuclear weapons, and intercontinental ballistic missiles generally, obsolete. When a country can shoot down all enemy missiles, those weapons lose their power. The future of war, once countries have access to the technology to build missile shields, will no longer be marked by fingers held over the proverbial red button. Rather, the incentive for conflict between states armed with effective missile defenses will be to seek diplomatic solutions to problems. The technology will likely be in the hands of many nations very soon, as the United States has already provided the technology to Japan and Australia, and will be building defense batteries in Romania from 2015 (McMichael, 2009). Furthermore, even should war break out, they will necessarily be far less destructive, as they will not feature the city-leveling power of nuclear missiles. With missile defense, war will be less likely and, should it occur, less destructive.

positive: defence science science general house supports development missile defence Conventional war is a nasty thing, and can be just as destructive as nuclear war, if not as immediate. The threat of war is only increased with the breaking down of MAD, as countries will be able to engage one another without fear of the existential threat of nuclear holocaust. Furthermore, if many countries have access to missile defense systems they will likely be able to employ countermeasures against their enemies’ systems, bringing the chance of nuclear weapons deployment back to the fore.

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty harms US nuclear capabilities  As David Ganz, the president of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), argues: "This treaty would restrain the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and missile delivery systems." [1] The atrophying U.S. nuclear arsenal and weapons enterprise make reductions in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal even more dangerous. The new START treaty allows nuclear modernization but while the US capacity to modernize nuclear weapons is limited and either congress or the president is likely to prevent modernization on cost grounds. The Russians have a large, if unknown, advantage over the United States in terms of nonstrategic, particularly tactical, and nuclear weapons. The New START treaty however ignores these weapons entirely as it is focused on strategic arms. This therefore leaves the Russians with an advantage and potentially reduces the potential for deterrence in areas beyond the US. [2]  New START also restricts US missile defence options. The Obama Administration insists the treaty doesn’t affect it, but the Kremlin’s takes a different view: "[START] can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile-defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively." [3] New START imposes restrictions on U.S. missile defence options in at least four areas. First the preamble recognizes “the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” it seeks to make sure defensive arms “do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties” so defensive arms must be reduced to allow offensive arms to remain effective. [4] Russia also issued a unilateral statement on April 7, 2010, Russia reinforced this restriction by issuing a unilateral statement asserting that it considers the “extraordinary events” that give “the right to withdraw from this treaty” to include a buildup of missile defense. [5] Second, Article V states “Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors” and vice versa. [6] There are also restrictions on some types of missiles and launchers that are used in the testing of missile defense. And Finally, article X established the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), the treaty’s implementing body, with oversight over the implementation of the treaty which may impose additional restrictions on the U.S. missile defense program. [7]  [1] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.   [2] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [3] Brookes, Peter. “Not a new START, but a bad START”. The Hill. 13 September 2010.   [4] Obama, Barak, and Medvedev, Dmitri, ‘Treaty Between The United States of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, U.S. Department of State,   [5] Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, ‘New START Treaty Fact Sheet: Unilateral Statements’, U.S. Department of State, 13 May 2010,   [6] Obama, Barak, and Medvedev, Dmitri, ‘Treaty Between The United States of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, U.S. Department of State,   [7] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty maintains US nuclear and missile defence.  The US’ Nuclear armament will be modernized along with New START. “The Obama administration has agreed to provide for modernization of the infrastructure essential to maintaining our nuclear arsenal. Funding these efforts has become part of the negotiations in the ratification process. The administration has put forth a 10-year plan to spend $84 billion on the Energy Department's nuclear weapons complex. Much of the credit for getting the administration to add $14 billion to the originally proposed $70 billion for modernization goes to Sen. Jon Kyl, the Arizona Republican who has been vigilant in this effort. Implementing this modernization program in a timely fashion would be important in ensuring that our nuclear arsenal is maintained appropriately over the next decade and beyond.” [1]  Both US Military and civilian leaders insist that the new START treaty will still allow the US to deploy effective missile defenses, something which Russia was opposed to, and so will not affect US missile defense plans. The main limit on missile defense is that the treaty prevents the conversion of existing launchers for this purpose this would be more expensive than building new missiles specifically for defense purposes. [2]  Furthermore, as Joe Biden argues, New START is important to Russian cooperation on missile defense: "This [missile defense] system demonstrates America's enduring commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—that an attack on one is an attack on all. NATO missile defense also provides the opportunity for further improvements in both NATO-Russian and U.S.-Russian relations. NATO and Russia agreed at Lisbon to carry out a joint ballistic missile threat assessment, to resume theater missile-defense exercises, and to explore further cooperation on territorial missile defense—things that were nearly unimaginable two years ago. These agreements underscore the strategic importance the alliance attaches to improving its relationship with Russia. But trust and confidence in our relationship with Russia would be undermined without Senate approval of the New Start Treaty, which reduces strategic nuclear forces to levels not seen since the 1950s, and restores important verification mechanisms that ceased when the first Start Treaty expired last December." [3]  In many ways, in the 21st Century having an abundance of nuclear weapons, particularly having too many, is more of a liability than an advantage. The United States will be far safer with fewer nuclear weapons in the world and a stronger, more stable relationship with Russia under New START, and this is desirable. Therefore it is clear that New START maintains the important parts of US nuclear capabilities while removing the over-abundance which may become a liability due to security and medical concerns, and so New START should be supported.  [1] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.   [2] ibid  [3] Biden, Joseph. "The case for ratifying New START". Wall Street Journal. 25 November 2010.

negative: defence house believes all nations have right nuclear weapons The right of self-defence must be exercised in accordance with international law.  There can be no right to such terribly destructive weapons; their invention is one of the great tragedies of history, giving humanity the power to destroy itself. Even during the Cold War, most people viewed nuclear weapons at best as a necessary defence during that great ideological struggle, and at worst the scourge that would end all life on Earth. Nuclear war has never taken place, though it very nearly has on several occasions, such as during the Cuban Missile Crisis. And in 1983 a NATO war game, the Able Archer exercise simulating the full release of NATO nuclear forces, was interpreted by the Soviet Union as a prelude to a massive nuclear first-strike. Oleg Gordievsky, the KGB colonel who defected to the West, has stated that during Able Archer, without realising it, the world came ‘frighteningly close’ to the edge of the nuclear abyss, ‘certainly closer than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962’. [1] Soviet forces were put on immediate alert and an escalation was only avoided when NATO staff realised what was happening and scaled down the exercise. [2] Cooler heads might not prevail in future conflicts between nuclear powers; when there are more nuclear-armed states, the risk of someone doing something foolish increases. After all, it would take only one such incident to result in the loss of millions of lives. [3] Furthermore, in recent years positive steps have finally begun between the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia, in the strategic reduction of nuclear stockpiles. These countries, until recently the greatest perpetrators of nuclear proliferation, have now made commitments toward gradual reduction of weapon numbers until a tiny fraction of the warheads currently active will be usable. [4] All countries, both with and without nuclear weapons, should adopt this lesson. They should contribute toward non-proliferation, thus making the world safer from the threat of nuclear conflict and destruction. Clearly, the focus should be on the reduction of nuclear weapons, not their increase.  [1] Andrew, Christopher and Gordievsky, Oleg. 1991. “KGB: The Inside story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev”. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.  [2] Rogers, Paul. 2007. “From Evil Empire to Axis of Evil”. Oxford Research Group.  [3] Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  [4] Baker, Peter. 2010. “Twists and Turns on Way to Arms Pact With Russia”. The New York Times.

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty helps Russia more than the US  Not only does New START leave in place Russia’s extant tactical nuclear advantage but it has further loopholes for Russian weapons. As Mitt Romney argued in 2010: "Does the treaty provide gaping loopholes that Russia could use to escape nuclear weapon limits entirely? Yes. For example, multiple warhead missile bombers are counted under the treaty as only one warhead. While we currently have more bombers than the Russians, they have embarked on new programs for long-range bombers and for air-launched nuclear cruise missiles. Thus, it is no surprise that Russia is happy to undercount missiles on bombers." [1]  New START also fails to limit rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which Russia could potentially make use of. The definition of rail-mobile ICBM launchers was established in the expired START as “an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted.” [2] This and associated restrictions and limitations in START, are not in the New START. This makes it possible for Russia to claim that any new Rail Mobile ICBMs are not subject to New START limitations. [3] Mitt Romney worries that Russia is already working to take advantage of these omissions: “As drafted, it lets Russia escape the limit on its number of strategic nuclear warheads. Loopholes and lapses -- presumably carefully crafted by Moscow -- provide a path to entirely avoid the advertised warhead-reduction targets. …. These omissions would be consistent with Russia's plans for a new heavy bomber and reports of growing interest in rail-mobile ICBMs." [4]  This means that under the treaty limits, the United States is the only country that must reduce its launchers and strategic nuclear weapons. Russia has managed to negotiate the treaty limits so that they simply restrict it to reductions it was already planning to do. As a result the United States is making what are effectively unilateral reductions. [5] Therefore, New START is an unequal treaty as it offers more to Russia than to the US. This is bad for the balance of power and thus bad for world peace, and so New START should be opposed.  [1] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.   [2] ‘Terms and Definitions’, The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms And Associated Documents, 1991,   [3] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [4] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.   [5] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.

negative: onal asia politics defence house would ignore north korean provocations North Korea is an irrational regime that is a strategic threat to numerous great powers  North Korea is an irrational and irresponsible regime that can’t simply be ignored. As the United States National Security Council spokesman Tonny Vietor said in response to the 12th December 2012 missile test “This action is yet another example of North Korea's pattern of irresponsible behavior.” As a power that is willing to defy international sanctions and resolutions such as “Resolution 1874, which demands the DPRK not to conduct "any launch using ballistic missile technology" and urges it to "suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme"” [1] it is essential that there is engagement to prevent the regime breaking more international norms.  It is impossible simply to ignore a regime with such a propensity to engage in provocative actions when it borders you, as is the case with China and Russia, or when it has tested missiles that can potentially hit targets 6000km away, so most of Asia, including numerous US bases. [2]  [1] ‘North Korea rocket: International reaction’, BBC News, 12 December 2012,   [2] ‘North Korea’s missile programme’, BBC News, 12 December 2012,

negative: defence house believes all nations have right nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons serve to defuse international conflicts and force compromise  Nuclear weapons create stability, described in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Countries with nuclear weapons have no incentive to engage in open military conflict with one another; all recognize that they will suffer destruction if they choose the path of war. [1] If countries have nuclear weapons, fighting simply becomes too costly. This serves to defuse conflicts, and reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of war. For example, the conflict between India and Pakistan was defused by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both sides. Before they obtained nuclear weapons, they fought three wars that claimed millions of lives. Relations between the two states, while still far from cordial, have never descended into open war. The defusing of the immediate tension of war, has given the chance for potential dialogue. [2] A similar dynamic has been played out a number of times in the past, and as of yet there has never been a war between two nuclear powers. When states have nuclear weapons they cannot fight, making the world a more peaceful place.  [1] Waltz, Kenneth. 1981. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”. Adelphi Papers 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.  [2] Nizamani, Haider K. 2000. The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. Westport: Praeger.

negative: Trident is not an independent weapons system  Britain tries to maintain that it has an ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ but this is just a fiction. Britain has not had an independent nuclear deterrent for fifty years. The United Kingdom has used American missiles since the Polaris Sales Agreement of 6 April 1963 first with the United States supplying Polaris missiles and then Trident missiles. [1] The UK does not own its missiles, they are leased, and the UK is completely dependent on the US for the maintenance of the missiles and even for targeting data. [2] The United States certainly appears to consider Britain’s deterrent to be dependent on them; wikileaks revealed that the US handed over the serial numbers of the missiles it transfers to the UK over to Russia to help the Russians verify the number of UK missiles. [3]  [1] Jimmy Carter: "Sale of Trident I Missiles to the United Kingdom Exchange of Letters Between the President and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom. ," July 14, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  [2] ‘UK’s Trident system not truly independent’, Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence, 7 March 2006.  [3] ‘Geneva: Agreed statements meeting, 10Geneva135 26 February 2010’, The Telegraph, 4 February 2011.

negative: onal global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The verification requirements of New START have satisfied not only the Obama Administration but also a large number of foreign policy experts. A panel including Henry Kissinger argues that New START “emphasizes verification, providing a valuable window into Russia's nuclear arsenal." [1] Howard Baker argues that: "President Reagan was famous for his adage about dealing with the old Soviet Union: “Trust but verify.” Since the last START treaty expired in December 2009, we’ve had no right to conduct inspections of Russian nuclear bases, and thus no way to verify what the Russians are doing with their nuclear weapon systems. For us veterans of the Cold War, that’s an alarming fact and a compelling reason to ratify this New START treaty without further delay." [2]  When the allegations are gone through individually they do not stand up to scrutiny. On the telemetry issue the treaty does not limit throw-weight so the data is not needed; the number of warheads per missile can be verified by other means. There are less facilities being inspected, but more inspections and the decline in Russia’s nuclear forces means that not so many facilities need to be inspected. [3] There is no reason to be worried about the numbers of missiles as there will be a database detailing all the weapons both sides have and inspections to confirm this, [4] this will also mean that there are unique identifier tags on each missile, launcher and bombers so helping inspectors in their counting. [5] Mobile launchers are much less of a problem than they were as we already know the base number the Russia has whereas when START was originally negotiated the US did not know. Technology to track such mobile launchers has also become much more powerful. Finally if worried about the verification of the elimination of delivery vehicles both sides will have the right to inspect the debris and to demand demonstration of the procedures. [6] Neither side will be able to get around the new START’s verification regime.  [1] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.   [2] Baker, Howard. "Dangerous if we reject New START." USA Today.   [3] Blook, Oliver, ‘Nothing to Fear with New START Verification’, Center For Strategic & International Studies, 8 July 2010,   [4] Woolf, Amy F., ‘The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions’, Congressional Research Service, 24 October 2011, p.3,   [5] ‘Verification of New START’, Union of Concerned Scientists, 13 July 2010,   [6] Blook, Oliver, ‘Nothing to Fear with New START Verification’, Center For Strategic & International Studies, 8 July 2010,

negative: The war in Afghanistan is necessary for US and NATO security  The timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan means withdrawing by the end of 2012, regardless of the security situation, and handing over the conflict against the Taliban and Al Qaida (which will almost certainly still be going on) to a largely Afghan force which is ill-prepared to handle the war on its own. This means that proponents of the timetable withdrawal must support pulling NATO forces out of Afghanistan even if the war is going badly at the end of 2012 and it is clear that the withdrawal will benefit the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the battlefield. "Afghan forces simply do not currently have the capacity to do the protecting themselves at this point and, given the challenges of building up new institutions in Afghanistan after decades of war, will not necessarily have the ability until by the end of 2012.” US and NATO forces are needed to mentor and partner with Afghans as they build up an army and police force largely from scratch. Withdrawing before this task is completed adds up to a prescription for a drying up of intelligence and a Taliban victory. [1]  If the Taliban were thus to come to power in Afghanistan after the timetabled withdrawal, al-Qaeda would not be far behind. The USA's top nemesis would be able to salvage a victory in the very place from which it launched the 9/11 attacks eight years ago. Al-Qaeda would have its favourite bases and sanctuaries back, as well as a major propaganda win. [2]  This defeat for the West in Afghanistan would embolden its opponents not just in Pakistan, but all around the world, leaving it open to more attacks. [3]  The West has a security interest in preventing the region from slipping into a maelstrom of conflict. Pakistan, with 170m people and nuclear weapons, is vulnerable to the Taliban’s potent mixture of ethnic-Pushtun nationalism and extremist Islam, as its state power is tenuous. Anarchy in Afghanistan, or a Taliban restoration, would leave it prey to permanent cross-border instability. [4]  Therefore success in Afghanistan is key to the security in Pakistan. The US has even more reasons to care about the security of Pakistan when the India-Pakistan conflict is considered, especially as both sides of this have nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have come within a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. If Pakistan were to fall apart, it would potentially leave nuclear weapons and a large military in the hands of extremist Muslim groups, which could lead to a regional war with India. It is a compelling and vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia—which makes “fixing” Afghanistan in some way also a vital American interest, even if this means keeping the troops there past the timetabled withdrawal. [5]  The War on Terror cannot be won if the US and NATO pull out of Afghanistan and rely more simply on offshore military resources. During the 1990s, when the US tried to go after Osama bin Laden without access to nearby bases by using ships based in the Indian Ocean, the two- to four-hour flight times of drones and cruise missiles operating off such ships made prompt action to real-time intelligence impractical. [6]  Since 1979, the US has been involved in a long, complex conflict against Islamic extremism. It has fought this ideology in many ways in many places, and it is uncertain now how this conflict will evolve. However the US should understand that the conflict is unavoidable and that when extremism pushes, it is in the US and NATO'S long-term interests to push back — and that eventually, if they do so, extremism will wither. [7]  The timetabled withdrawal from Afghanistan could mean withdrawing before this struggle has been won, and handing a base for exporting terrorism to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Security comes before other state interests, largely because the rights of all citizens depend on their security first, and so the security dimension here is key. Therefore, in order to protect the security of the US and other NATO countries, the timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan should be abandoned, and the troops should remain there until the job is done.  [1] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009   [2] ibid  [3] The Economist. "Obama's War". 15 October 2009.   [4] ibid  [5] Foust, Joshua. "The Case for Afghanistan: Strategic Considerations". Registan. 27 August 2009.   [6] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009   [7] Brooks, David. "The Afghan Imperative". New York Times. 24 September 2009.

negative: ch debate media and good government politics defence government digital freedoms Transparency helps reduce international tension  Transparency is necessary in international relations. States need to know what each other are doing to assess their actions. Without any transparency the hole is filled by suspicion and threat inflation that can easily lead to miscalculation and even war.  The Cuban missile crisis is a clear example where a lack of transparency on either side about what they were willing to accept and what they were doing almost lead to nuclear war. [1] It is notable that one of the responses to prevent a similar crisis was to install a hotline between the White House and Kremlin. A very small, but vital, step in terms of openness.  Today this is still a problem; China currently worries about the US ‘pivot’ towards Asia complaining it “has aroused a great deal of suspicion in China.” “A huge deficit of strategic trust lies at the bottom of all problems between China and the United States.” The result would be an inevitable arms race and possible conflict. [2]  [1] Frohwein, Ashley, ‘Embassy Moscow: A Diplomatic Perspective of the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 7 May 2013  [2] Yafei, He, ‘The Trust Deficit’, Foreign Policy, 13 May 2013

negative: North Korea represents a clear danger to its neighbours and their allies and that is unlikely to change  [1] Tania Branigan The Guardian 23 November 2010  [2] Green, Shane, ‘North Korea  North Korea is virtually the definition of a rogue state. It remains technically at war with the South and frequently this manifests itself in acts of aggression. In any other situation the regime bombing of Yeonpyeong island would have been considered an act of war and met with a military response [1] . The regime’s relentless pursuit of nuclear weaponry poses a very real threat. The regime has tested missiles at least capable of reaching Tokyo and Seoul and has indicated a desire to be able to reach Washington, [2] James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is worried that they will be able to hit the west coast within a few years. [3] It seems reasonable to assume that, with the limited resources of the state being spent on these two goals, rather than feeding the people, the regime will ultimately succeed in their ambitions. Waiting until they can actually bomb North America or Europe would make Kim Jong-Un or his successor far too secure. Although it seems unlikely that he would ever mount an attack with conventional weapons, access to an appropriate delivery system and a nuclear warhead would make his removal by military means virtually impossible. Removing him from office before this happens is essential for the security of the region and the world.  [1] Tania Branigan The Guardian 23 November 2010  [2] Green, Shane, ‘North Korea threatens to attack US’, The Age, 8 March 2003  [3] Barnes, Julian E., ‘U.S. may be within N.Korea missile range in 3 years, official warns’, Los Angeles Times, 17 June 2009  threatens to attack US’, The Age, 8 March 2003  [3] Barnes, Julian E., ‘U.S. may be within N.Korea missile range in 3 years, official warns’, Los Angeles Times, 17 June 2009

negative: Further expansion of NATO will antagonise Russia  Russia considers NATO expansion to be very antagonistic towards it. Continued NATO expansion would only serve to manufacture the expansionist demon that NATO fears. The election of the ultranationalist Duma in 1996, the choice of the hardliner Yvegeny Primakov as foreign minister, and the failure of the reformist party ‘Russia’s Choice’ under Yegor Gaidar even to clear the 5% hurdle for Duma membership was in whole or in part, due to the Russian sense of isolation from Western Europe. President Putin has also made a lot out of his opposition to NATO expansion which he has opposed since he was first elected President. [1] This sense is dramatically emboldened by such provocative actions as threatening to station NATO troops on its borders. The Russian people are unlikely to consider that the forward deployment is not directed against them, as is shown by Russia’s worries about and threats in response to National Missile Defense which is not aimed at them, [2] but instead is only designed to maintain internal stability in the neighbouring republics. By inflaming Russian nationalism, NATO expansion is obstructs democratic development for Russia and undermines the security of its neighbouring republics.  [1] BBC News, ‘Putin warns against Nato expansion’, 26 January 2001,   [2] Quetteville, Harry de, and Pierce, Andrew, ‘Russia threatens nuclear attack on Poland over US missile shield deal’, The Telegraph, 17 January 2012,

negative: onal asia politics defence house would ignore north korean provocations North Korea is an unresolved conflict it can’t simply be ignored  Even if the provocations are sometimes relatively small and ineffective, such as the failed missile launch in April 2012, as a conflict zone they cant simply be ignored by anyone even if they themselves are unlikely to be drawn into any potential conflict. After Rwanda the United Nations promised never again would it allow genocide; [1] how much worse would it be to ignore something that could be a spark to a conflict that could cost millions of lives when we already know there is the potential. The United Nations was created “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace… to bring about … settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace” [2] therefore all nations should be attempting to resolve this frozen conflict that could so easily become a shooting war. Wars in Korea have in the past drawn in all the surrounding powers; the Imjin war involved China and Japan, China and Japan again fought over Korea in 1894-5, and the Korean War 1950-53 brought in both the USA and China while Russia and Japan were both involved as supply bases. Clearly the possibility of conflict is not something any power with a stake in Northeast Asia can simply ignore.  It is essential that there is a reaction to every incident just in case that is the incident that spins out of control.  [1] Power, Samantha, ‘Remember the Blood Frenzy of Rwanda’, Los Angeles Times, 4 April 2004,   [2] ‘Article 1 The Purposes of the United Nations are:’, United Nations, 26 June 1945,

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty sets a bad approach for a changing world  New START reduces US deterrence in world that is arming, not disarming. The United States has relied on deterrence for sixty years and as a result has prevented war between the great powers. A US drawdown, especially as other new powers are arming, will undermine deterrence. This will then encourage rivals to try to catch the United States while the reductions show that the United States is in decline. [1]  While proponents of reducing nuclear weapons, or reaching global zero, argue that possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapons states is the incentive behind proliferation, this is not true. The US has consistently taken leadership in the reduction of nuclear arms through treaties but this has so far had no effect in encouraging other nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals and indeed new powers have joined the club. Reducing nuclear arms through New START will therefore not encourage others to stop pursuing nukes. The U.S. should not be taking steps towards disarmament without all nuclear weapons states, including those not signed up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, also being involved. [2]  New START also fails to speak to the issue of protecting and defending the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. The treaty fails to recognize that deterrence is no longer simply between the U.S. and Russia and that the whole policy should no longer be based on just against strategic attacks on the United States or very close allies. Instead it is much more critical to deal with nuclear policy towards ‘rogue’ states and rising powers. [3]  Finally, the US should not set a precedent that it will sacrifice its own interests to bribe Russia over issues like Iran. As the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) argues: “we are told that the real purpose of New START is to create a stronger U.S.-Russia bond in a broader international effort to restrain Iran's nuclear weapons program. Such a justification is wrong. Iran's nuclear ambitions are no secret; neither are Russia’s past efforts in aiding that program. We seriously question whether Russia is serious about stopping Iran, with or without New START. There is no reason why the United States should be required to sacrifice its own defense capabilities to inspire Russia to a greater degree of diplomatic fortitude. If Russia is indeed concerned with a nuclear-armed Iran to its immediate south, it should need no extra incentive to take the action necessary to stop it." [4] If the U.S. bribes Russia over Iran China might expect to get similar treatment over North Korea. New START puts the US in a disadvantaged position in a changing world, and consequently should not be supported.  [1] Brookes, Peter. “Not a new START, but a bad START”. The Hill. 13 September 2010.   [2] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [3] Ibid.  [4] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.

negative: Existing international treaties that grant nuclear weapons to the US and other countries no longer reflect the changing global balance of power.  The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty is inherently unfair, in that it prevents countries that did not have nuclear weapons as of 1964 from developing them, but makes no effort to force those who already possess nuclear devices to disarm.  The result is that the list of countries with such weapons, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China, represents the balance of power as it existed at the time that the non-proliferation treaty was drafted. Countries that have entered the club subsequently, like India and Pakistan, did so in violation of the treaty and international law.  Any sort of treaty that seeks to limit access to nuclear arms has to provide opportunities for countries like Brazil to enter the “club” as they gain political or economic power. In the absence of any such mechanism the current treaty system is nothing more than a tool of Western dominance in order to keep the status quo which is favorable to the current nuclear powers something which is bound to build up resentment.  This would in effect offer not only to the pursuit of nuclear weapons by the targeted regimes, but to the rest of their policies. States like South Africa and Brazil already find it difficult to support a strong international line against Iran [1] due to seeing the inequality of allowing some countries nuclear weapons programmes but seeking to punish others, especially when the nuclear weapons states that are signatories to the NPT have not moved towards disarmament as the treaty stipulates. [2] This would in effect alienate them completely.  Second, even if the harm was justifiable by the ends, it would seem that in the long run, invading- or even censuring- every country that attempts to develop Nuclear Weapons in violation of the NPT is impractical as the United States and the rest of the world have de facto admitted by ending sanctions on Pakistan and India in 2001, two years after their nuclear tests. [3] As such, there needs to be a political means that can separate states like Brazil from states like Iran, lest the policy collapse under its own weight.  The West, rather than using force, should attempt to repair the existing non-proliferation treaty framework, such that the standards for possession of nuclear weapons are based on behaviour rather than history.  [1] Charbonneau, Louis, ‘Q+A: How likely are new U.S. sanctions against Iran?’, Reuters, 9 November 2011,   [2] Spektor, Matias, ‘How to Read Brazil’s Stance on iran’, YaleGlobal, 16 March 2010,   [3] BBC News, ‘US lifts India and Pakistan sanctions’, 23 September 2001,

negative: defence house believes all nations have right nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons give states valuable agenda-setting power on the international stage  The issues discussed in international forums are largely set by nuclear powers. The permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, for example, is composed only of nuclear powers, the same states that had nuclear weapons at the end of World War II. If all countries possess nuclear weapons, they redress the imbalance with regard to international clout, at least to the extent to which military capacity shapes states’ interactions with each other. [1] Furthermore, the current world order is grossly unfair, based on the historical anachronism of the post-World War II era. The nuclear powers, wanting to retain their position of dominance in the wake of the post-war chaos, sought to entrench their position, convincing smaller nations to sign up to non-proliferation agreements and trying to keep the nuclear club exclusive. It is only right, in terms of fairness that states not allow themselves the ability to possess certain arms while denying that right to others. Likewise, it is unfair in that it denies states, particularly those incapable of building large conventional militaries, the ability to defend themselves, relegating them to an inferior status on the world stage. [2] To finally level the international playing field and allow equal treatment to all members of the congress of nations, states must have the right to develop nuclear weapons.  [1] Fearon, James D. 1994. “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2).  [2] Betts, Richard K. 1987. Nuclear blackmail and nuclear balance. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

negative: His removal provides stability and security not only for Iraq but for the Middle East as a region  The Middle East is a tinder box at the best of times. Having an unpredictable megalomaniac sitting in the middle of it was dangerous, not only for Iraqis but for other peoples in the region. Hussain was a danger to the Middle East as he had proved many times, through his invasion of Iran [i] which was followed only a couple of years later in 1990 by an invasion of Kuwait which sparked the Gulf War [ii] and his use of scud missiles on Israel which was otherwise uninvolved in the conflict. [iii]  It was better to remove this threat than risk being drawn into a multi-player conflict when he next attacked a neighbor.  [i] Pipes, Daniel, ‘A Border Adrift: Origins of the Iraq-Iran War’, The Iraq-Iran War: Old Conflict, New Weapons, 1983  [ii] BBC on this day, ‘1990: Iraq invades Kuwait’.  [iii] CBC Digital Archives, ‘Scud vs. Patriot missiles’, 19 January 1991

negative: There is little evidence that the Ba’ath Party would have tolerated a handover of power to Saddam’s sons. Even in North Korea, the issue of Kim Il Sung’s succession became fraught, and hotly contested amongst the North Korean political elite.. However, the issue of who should run Iraq was and should remain a matter for the Iraqi people. The current puppet regime has little power outside Baghdad and, frankly, not that much inside, this lack of central control is as damaging as too much would be as is shown by the failure of Somalia and resulting civil war and piratical attacks. [i]  In many ways the war has encouraged the world’s rogue states to pursue nuclear weapons as, in an era of ‘pre-emptive defense, they are the only surety against invasion and overthrow [ii] . Iran is continuing to persue nuclear weapons even without the threat of Iraq on its borders, instead it is worried about Israel and the United States. One more threatening state would therefore have made little difference. [iii]  If the aim of the war was to insure against future threats then leaving a nation bitter and resentful, where barely a family has not lost someone to the conflict, a radicalized younger generation, emboldened militant clerics and a weak central government seems a very strange way to go about doing it. The West will almost certainly have to return to Iraq within a generation, if not a decade.  [i] Blair, David, ‘Somalia: Analysis of a failed state’, The Telegraph, 18 November 2008  [ii] Francis Fukuyama. “Iraq May Be Stable, But The War Was Still A Mistake”. Wall Street Journal. 15 August 2008.  [iii] BBC News, ‘Q&A: Iran nuclear issue’, 23 January 2012

negative: global middle east house believes israel should return its pre 1967 borders Israel has the right to claim minimal territory to ensure security  Israel has been the victim of multiple major illegal wars of aggression on the part of the Arab world, most notably in 1948 and 1967. These wars invalidate any special claim made by Arabs and Palestinians to pre-1967 territory, and justify Israel in keeping as much territory as is necessary to secure itself against these hostile states. Israel could have gone much further and taken more territory than it did in 1967 (as it was easily winning the war), but instead it restricted itself to only taking the territory that was necessary for it to create security buffer. [1] When peace deals have allowed Israel to improve its security through giving up land historically, it has done so, for example when it returned the Sinai peninsula to Egypt in 1982 in exchange for a peace treaty with Egypt, or when Israel returned the small swath of Jordanian territory it held when King Hussain of Jordan wanted to make peace. To date, Israel has withdrawn from approximately 93 percent of the territories it captured. In return for peace with Syria and an end to Palestinian terror, it is prepared to withdraw from most of the remaining 7% in dispute, although not all. Israel remains committed to trading land for peace, and never annexed the West Bank or Gaza Strip because it expected to return part of these territories in negotiations. When the Palestinians finally declared that they would recognize Israel and renounce terrorism, Israel agreed to begin to withdraw. Since 1993, Israel has turned over approximately 80% of the Gaza Strip and more than 40% of the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority. Thus, Israel's objection is not so much against returning any of the land captured in 1967, but against returning absolutely all of it and going back completely to the 1967 borders, as this would mean giving up territories vital for Israel's security. The minimal slivers of territory that Israel it seeks to maintain through a peace settlement (after returning 90% of the pre-1967 territory), is very important to its national security as it offers a buffer against future Arab wars of aggression. This why Ehud Olmert stressed that only most of the occupied territory could be returned. He still argued that some had to be kept for security reasons: “We can never totally return to the indefensible pre-1967 borders, ... We simply cannot afford to make Israel [9 miles] wide again at its center. We can't allow the Palestinians to be a couple [miles] from [Tel Aviv's] Ben Gurion Airport in the age of shoulder-fire missiles with the capacity to shoot down jumbo jets.” [2] Moreover, Israel is in an anomalous situation: It is an embattled democracy that historically has had to defend itself repeatedly against the armies of neighbouring Arab states whose declared goal was nothing less than Israel's eradication. The Israel Defense Forces could not afford to miscalculate. While other nations, like France or Kuwait, have been overrun, occupied, and nonetheless have survived to reconstitute themselves, Israel, in contrast, cannot depend on obtaining a second chance. Miscalculation on its part could have had devastating consequences and, thus, its situation is unique. [3] For this critical purpose of national survival, therefore, the annexed land serves a legally legitimate purpose, especially considering that the Arab wars of aggression were what caused the annexation of the land in the first place. In such circumstances, a nation that won a defensive war has a right to set terms to ensure against future wars of aggression.  [1] Johnson, Paul. “A History of the Jews”. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1987.  [2] Thinkexist.com. “Ehud Olmert Quotes”. Thinkexist.com   [3] Amidror, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov. “Israel's Requirement for Defensible Borders”. Defensible Borders for a Lasting Peace. 2005.

negative: defence house believes all nations have right nuclear weapons Government legitimacy is defined in its most limited form as the ability to provide security and stability within its jurisdiction. It seems fair to say that international institutions and states with a stake in international order, as most do, will have an interest in keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of failing and failed states, which do not retain the same legitimacy of states that can provide the baseline of security to their people. Furthermore, the openness created by the public recognition of the right to nuclear weapons will allow advanced countries to offer assistance in security and protection of nuclear stockpiles, making it less likely that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists.

negative: Democratic states have an obligation to not bolster repression abroad  It is common for Western democracies to make sweeping statements about the universality of certain rights, and that their system of government is the one that should be most sought after in the world, that democracy is the only legitimate form of government. As when Obama in Cairo proclaimed “These are not just American ideas; they are human rights. And that is why we will support them everywhere.” [1] They claim to work in the United Nations and other organizations toward the improvement of rights in other countries and clamour about the need for building governments accountability around the world, using their liberal-democratic paradigm as the model. Yet at the same time democratic governments and companies sell technologies to non-democratic allies that are used to systematically abuse the rights of citizens and to entrench the power of those avowedly illegitimate regimes. These hypocrisies read as a litany of shame. A telling example is the Blair government in the United Kingdom selling weapons to an oppressive regime in Indonesia for the sake of political expediency even after proclaiming an ‘ethical foreign policy’. [2]  Even if democracies do not feel it is a defensible position to actively seek to subvert all non-democratic states, and that non-democracies should be considered semi-legitimate on the basis of nations’ right to self-determination, they should still feel morally obliged not to abet those regimes by providing the very tools of oppression on which they rely. [3] To continue dealing in these technologies serves only to make democratic countries’ statements hollow, and the rights they claim to uphold seem less absolute, a risk in itself to freedoms within democracies. Respect for rights begins at home, and actively eroding them elsewhere reduces respect for them by home governments.  [1] Obama, Barack, “Remarks by the President on a new beginning”, Office of the Press Secretary, 4 June 2009,   [2] Burrows, G. “No-Nonsense Guide to the Arms Trade”. New Internationalist. 2002,   [3] Elgin, B. “House Bill May Ban US Surveillance Gear Sales”. Bloomberg. 9 December 2012.

negative: defence house believes all nations have right nuclear weapons While states do of course have the right to defend themselves, this does not extend to the possession and use of nuclear weapons. The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet. International humanitarian law prohibits the use of weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian objects and military targets. [1] Indeed, the use of nuclear weapons could well constitute a war crime or a crime against humanity. [2] Just as biological and chemical weapons are banned by international treaty, so too the international community generally acknowledges the dangers of nuclear proliferation, which is why so many treaties are dedicated to non-proliferation. [3] It is unfortunate that nuclear weapons exist, even more so that a few countries are still seeking to develop them. It is better to fight this movement and to prevent their use or acquisition by terrorists and the like. It is also essential for States to fulfil their obligation under Article VI of the NPT ‘to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects under strict and effective international control’. [4] Nuclear weapons cannot lawfully be employed or deployed and there is a legal obligation to negotiate in good faith for, and ensure, their elimination. [5]  [1] International Court of Justice. 1996. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p 226.  [2] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998.  [3] Shah, Anup. 2009. “Nuclear Weapons”. Global Issues.  [4] International Court of Justice. 1996. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p 226.  [5] Grief, Nicholas. 2011. “Nuclear Weapons: the Legal Status of Use, Threat and Possession”. Nuclear Abolition Forum, Issue No 1.

negative: global middle east house believes israel should return its pre 1967 borders Returning to the 1967 borders would make war more likely.  The Foreign Minister of Israel, Avigdor Lieberman, said in 2009: “A return to the pre-1967 lines, with a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria, would bring the conflict into Israel's borders. Establishing a Palestinian state will not bring an end to the conflict.” [1] This is why the American ambassador to the UN at the time of the 1967 war pointed out that “Israel's prior frontiers had proved to be notably insecure”, and American President Lyndon Johnson, shortly after the war, declared that Israel's return to its former lines would be “not a prescription for peace but for renewed hostilities.” Johnson advocated new 'recognized boundaries' that would provide "security against terror, destruction, and war.” [2] An Israel that withdrew completely to the 1967 borders would offer a very tempting target, since it would be a narrow country with no strategic depth whose main population centres and strategic infrastructure would be within tactical range of forces deployed along the commanding heights of the West Bank. This would hurt Israel's ability to deter future attacks and thus make conflict in the region even more likely. This ability of Israel to deter aggressors is particularly important not only due to the region's history of aggression against Israel, but also due to the unpredictable future events in the highly volatile Middle East. There is no way, for example, to guarantee that Iraq will not evolve into a radical Shi'ite state that is dependent on Iran and hostile to Israel (indeed, King Abdullah of Jordan has warned of a hostile Shi'ite axis that could include Iran, Iraq, and Syria), nor that a Jordan's Palestinian majority might seize power in the state (leaving Israel to defend itself against a Palestinian state that stretches from Iraq to Kalkilya), nor that in the future, militant Islamic elements will not succeed in gaining control of the Egyptian regime. [3]  Given its narrow geographical dimensions, a future attack launched from the pre-1967 borders against Israel's nine-mile-wide waist could easily split the country in two. Especially seeing as Islamic militants throughout the Middle East are unlikely to be reconciled to Israel even by a withdrawal to the 1967 borders, such a withdrawal therefore would actually make peace in the region less likely and encourage war against Israel. [4]  [1] Lazaroff, Tovah. “Lieberman warns against '67 borders”. Jerusalem Post. 27 November 2009.   [2] Levin, Kenneth. “Peace Now: A 30-Year Fraud”. FrontPageMag.com. 5 September 2008.   [3] Amidror, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov. “Israel's Requirement for Defensible Borders”. Defensible Borders for a Lasting Peace. 2005.   [4] El-Khodary, Taghreed and Bronner, Ethan. “Hamas Fights Over Gaza’s Islamist Identity”. New York Times. 5 September 2009.

negative: onal asia politics defence house would ignore north korean provocations North Korea is not an irrational regime, and is certainly not going to use its missiles to hit one of its neighbouring great powers. North Korea has shown time and time again that its number one objective is regime survival [1] and its provocations are one method it uses to try and ensure such survival through getting concessions and building deterrence against any possible pre-emptive attack either by the South or the United States. [2] North Korea will therefore never invite such retaliation from the surrounding great powers. All provocations it takes are just to the extent that it thinks it can get away with them. It is notable that since South Korea altered its stance from ‘controlled response’ to ‘manifold retaliation’ in the wake of the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island [3] the provocations from North Korea have been much less provocative i.e. missile testing rather than military actions.  [1] Lankov, Andrei, ‘Weep Not for Kim Jong Il’, Foreign Policy, 23 December 2011,   [2] ‘The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula’, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012,   [3] Mc Devitt, Michael, ‘Deterring North Korean Provocations’, Brookings, February 2011,

negative: Alternative renewables are inefficient for the cost  Nuclear power is the most practical renewable energy source as all the others face major difficulties either in scaling up to provide enough to be a major component of nations energy mix, don't provide energy all the time, the 'base load', or cause other environmental problems. Nuclear is a proven technology with large firms that can build large amounts of nuclear energy generation capacity.  The most efficient source of renewable energy has been hydroelectric power, however, this usually creates more problems than it solves. Building a large dam necessarily floods an enormous region behind the dam which in turn can displace thousands of people. There are also enormous ecological costs to dam building. A classical example is the Aswan dam in Egypt along the Nile. Not only did many thousands lose their homes but the yearly inundation of the Nile, which fertilised the surrounding land for thousands of year, was also stopped; the subsequent silting up of the river destroyed much wildlife1. A similar story of ecological destruction and human homelessness surrounded the more recent Three Gorges dam project in China2.  Wind, tidal, and solar power are all affected by issues of reliability. The tendency of wind power, in particular, to be a volatile source of energy, means that other power sources such as fossil fuel power stations have to make up the shortfall when wind levels drop. Tidal power technology is still in at an early stage and may take years to become profitable. It also has the potential to cause environmental problems in the marine environment. For a large area of the European Union, there is not the potential to exploit solar power as there are not enough hours of sunlight.  "Wind and solar power have their place, but because they are intermittent and unpredictable they simply can't replace big baseload plants such as coal, nuclear and hydroelectric. Natural gas, a fossil fuel, is too expensive already, and its price is too volatile to risk building big baseload plants. Given that hydroelectric resources are built pretty much to capacity, nuclear is, by elimination, the only viable substitute for coal. It's that simple."3  1 'Environmental Impact of the Aswan High Dam', 2 'Three Gorges Dam is a disaster in the making, China admits' by Jane Macartney, Times Online 27th September 2007, 3"Going Nuclear A Green Makes the Case", by Patrick Moore, Washington Post. April 16th, 2006:

negative: The use of drones creates a precedent that other states may use.  The United States is the first state with a large number of drones and other unmanned military vehicles. It is also the first country to use them. This inevitably means that the US is creating the precedent for how they will be used in future. The United States is aware of this potential and President Obama’s counterterrorism adviser John Brennan has stated “Other nations also possess this technology, and many more nations are seeking it, and more will succeed in acquiring it. President Obama and those of us on his national security team are very mindful that as our nation uses this technology, we are establishing precedents that other nations may follow, and not all of those nations may — and not all of them will be nations that share our interests or the premium we put on protecting human life, including innocent civilians.” [1] This is exactly the problem; do we really want to live in a world where any country can carry out targeted killings of people who are in another nation? Such a world would have the ever present risk of a covert conflict becoming a much more open shooting war.  [1] McNeal, Greg, ‘Is the U.S. Setting Precedents in its Drone Wars’, Forbes, 6 June 2012.

negative: The Pro’s perspective is backwards; as long as other nations do not move towards providing viable alternatives to US military dominance, the US cannot afford to reduce its own defenses. The US should not have to provide an incentive for other nations to improve their defense systems; their own self-preservation should be a sufficient incentive. In June 2011, then-US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that European NATO members’ reluctance to fund their share of NATO operations could be negative impacts for the alliance’s future. The New York Times related Gates’ words; “[Gates] warned of a ‘dim if not dismal future’ for the alliance unless its European members increased their participation, and he said that Washington would not forever pay for European security when the Europeans could do that for themselves.” [1] The US may be able to alter its role to be less unilateral, but it cannot do so until after other military entities improve their defense systems.  [1] Erlanger.

negative: global middle east house would arm syrian rebels Unforeseeable consequences  We do not know where arming the rebels will lead. The most obvious parallel has to be Afghanistan in the 1980s where the United States armed the mujahideen and succeeded in their objective of damaging the USSR through a war of attrition much as the US had suffered in Vietnam. Afghanistan became an albatross around the Soviet Union’s neck. [1] But the US did not win the peace, Afghanistan descended into civil conflict which had a Taliban victory that sheltered Osama bin Laden; US arms in Afghanistan unintentionally lead more than a decade later to September 11. In this case we would be arming a movement that has many jihadi elements that could end up with the weaponry. Other countries such as Turkey are also worried about where powerful weapons such as anti aircraft missiles could end up if provided to the rebels. They fear they could easily find their way across the border to militant Kurds. [2] Other paths that this could lead to are just as bad; for example helping the Libyan rebels lead to the conflict in Mali. [3] In this case the short term consequences could be just as bad. Arming the Sunnis could provoke retaliation from either Iran or Hezbollah who could feel undermined by the move, in the worst case scenario they could even attack western assets in the area. [4]  [1] Hoffman, David E., The Dead Hand: Reagan, Gorbachev and the Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race, Icon Books Ltd, 2011, p.211  [2] Hokayem, Emile, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013  [3] Jones, Owen, ‘The war in Libya was seen as a success, now here we are engaging with the blowback in Mali’, The Independent, 13 January 2013  [4] Yacoubian, Mona, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013

negative: NATO destabilizes peaceful relations with Russia  There are two issues keeping Russia cautious of NATO as a military alliance. The first is a proposal by the U.S. to put up a missile defence system in Poland, the Czech Republic and on warships in the Black Sea under the flag of NATO to protect against missiles from Iran or North Korea, which, according to Russia, would never fly over these countries in any attack. Russia concludes that the missile defence system therefore must be directed at them. The second issue is NATO’s plans to expand with Ukraine and Georgia, which Russia has traditionally regarded as part of their ‘sphere of influence’. As Russian president Medvedev stated in 2008: “No state can be pleased about having representatives of a military bloc to which it does not belong coming close to its borders.” [1]  [1] BBC News. Medvedev warns on Nato expansion. 2008

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty will make for a safer world.  Reducing US and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles makes for a safer world, as Dr. David Gushee states: "The issue on the table is a nuclear arms reduction and verification treaty between the United States and Russia. The treaty, called New START, would reduce Russian and American deployed nuclear weapons to 1,550 and delivery vehicles to 700 each. This would be a 33 percent reduction in the existing arsenals, which is worth achieving and celebrating even as we know that countless cities and millions of precious human beings could be destroyed by the use of even part of the remaining arsenals. Still, these reductions would be a great step on the way to a safer world, as would the re-establishment of bilateral, intrusive verification measures for both sides, also part of the treaty." [1]  The world is simply a much less secure place without New Start, and not just because New START means there are physically fewer nuclear weapons and thus a lesser chance of nuclear disasters (although this in itself is compelling). Rather, New START also has immense symbolic value, in demonstrating that the two greatest powers have enough in common and are interested enough in their mutual security that they can agree to deduce nuclear weapons together. It shows that these nations regard each other as partners for world peace, not as enemies.  The alternative world, without New START, would be one in which the mutual suspicion and animosity of the Cold War might continue. It is notable that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said in an interview released in early December 2010 that Russia might be forced to build up its nuclear forces against the West if the United States fails to ratify the New START treaty. [2] The threat of Russia, or even the US, resuming nuclear build-ups is a frightening thought for both nations, for the world and for peace.  On top of its other benefits, New START is key to opening Russian nuclear weapons up for verification, which contributes to trust and peace. As former Secretaries of State Kissinger, Shultz, Eagleburger, Baker and Powell argue “the agreement emphasizes verification, providing a valuable window into Russia's nuclear arsenal. Since the original START expired last December, Russia has not been required to provide notifications about changes in its strategic nuclear arsenal, and the United States has been unable to conduct on-site inspections. Each day, America's understanding of Russia's arsenal has been degraded, and resources have been diverted from national security tasks to try to fill the gaps. Our military planners increasingly lack the best possible insight into Russia's activity with its strategic nuclear arsenal, making it more difficult to carry out their nuclear deterrent mission.” [3] Therefore New START should be supported as it represents a positive step for peace and cooperation in the world.  [1] Gushee, Dr David P. "Security, Sin and Nuclear Weapons: A Christian Plea for the New START Treaty". Huffington Post. 4 December 2010.   [2] Abdullaev, Nabi. “Putin Issues Warning on New START”. The Moscow Times. 2 December 2010.   [3] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new Problems with Verification.  Verification is vital in any agreement to limit arms. Both sides need to trust each other a bit but a lot of this trust needs to come from comprehensive mechanisms to monitor and ensure that both sides are carrying out their commitments. If the verification system is not good enough then neither side will have faith in the agreement and will be more likely to try and bypass it.  Unfortunately the expired START’s verification regime was robust when compared to that for the New START. Baker Spring at the Heritage foundation lists some of the specific areas that are significantly less robust: A narrowing of the requirements for exchanging telemetry (electronic transmissions that give details of missile performance that helps give a good idea about whether Russia is complying with the treaty) , A reduction in the effectiveness of the inspections (the Russians feel that inspections are unfairly biased against them), Weaknesses in the ability to verify the number of deployed warheads on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), Abolition of the START verification regime governing mobile ICBMs, and A weakening of the verification standards governing the elimination of delivery vehicles. [1]  [1] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.

negative: The United States engaged in "hostilities" under War Powers  There are multiple arguments indicating why the U.S. might be engaged in hostilities under the War Powers Act, enough so that this single argument could make an entire two person case.  The U.S. has engaged in sustained hostilities in Libya which have resulted in regime change within the country. The President himself admits that causing regime change would be unjustifiable in his speech justifying the war by pledging that “broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake.”2 However, regime change was the result of the mission and NATO and U.S. played a significant role in facilitating that change.  Secondly, the War Powers act covers the U.S. fighting in a supportive role in wars. "For purposes of this chapter, the term 'introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.”3 Hence the U.S. is acting in violation of this condition.  Further, troops do not need to be on the ground to call the Libyan engagement hostilities. U.S. men and women have firstly died in the conflict, but secondly if troops were needed on the ground for a war, a U.S. president could potentially fire a thousand missiles at a country without the engagement being considered a war.  Further, even though the U.S. gave powers to NATO, it maintained a lead role in this coalition force. As such, the engagement should still be subject to U.S. laws and rules.  Finally, the sheer cost of the engagement to the U.S. taxpayer implies that it should be considered a war. The cost of the war has been more than $1 million per day.1  Greenwald, Glenn. “The illegal war in Libya.” Salon. 19/05/2011  BBC News, ‘Libya: Obama says US intervention will be limited’, 29 March 2011,  United States Congress, 50 USC CHAPTER 33 - WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, 7 January 2011,