query: The threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of rogue states and terrorists increases as more countries possess them  There are many dangerous dictators and tyrants, many of who covet the possession of nuclear weapons not just for the purpose of defence, but also for that of intimidating their neighbours. [1] Such leaders should not possess nuclear weapons, nor should they ever be facilitated in their acquisition. For example, Iran has endeavoured for years on a clandestine nuclear weapons program that, were it recognized as a legitimate pursuit, could be increased in scale and completed with greater speed. The result of such an achievement could well destabilize the Middle East and would represent a major threat to the existence of a number of states within the region, particularly Israel. Furthermore, the risk of nuclear weapons, or at least weapons-grade material, falling into the hands of dissidents and terrorists increases substantially when there are more of them and larger numbers of countries possess them. Additionally, many countries in the developing world lack the capacity to safely secure weapons if they owned them, due to lack of technology, national instability, and government corruption. [2] Recognizing the rights of these countries to hold nuclear weapons vastly increases the risk of their loss or misuse.  [1] Slantchev, Branislav. 2005. “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises”. American Political Science Review 99(4).  [2] Sagan, Scott D. 1993. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

positive: defence house believes all nations have right nuclear weapons Government legitimacy is defined in its most limited form as the ability to provide security and stability within its jurisdiction. It seems fair to say that international institutions and states with a stake in international order, as most do, will have an interest in keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of failing and failed states, which do not retain the same legitimacy of states that can provide the baseline of security to their people. Furthermore, the openness created by the public recognition of the right to nuclear weapons will allow advanced countries to offer assistance in security and protection of nuclear stockpiles, making it less likely that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists.

negative: Existing international treaties that grant nuclear weapons to the US and other countries no longer reflect the changing global balance of power.  The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty is inherently unfair, in that it prevents countries that did not have nuclear weapons as of 1964 from developing them, but makes no effort to force those who already possess nuclear devices to disarm.  The result is that the list of countries with such weapons, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China, represents the balance of power as it existed at the time that the non-proliferation treaty was drafted. Countries that have entered the club subsequently, like India and Pakistan, did so in violation of the treaty and international law.  Any sort of treaty that seeks to limit access to nuclear arms has to provide opportunities for countries like Brazil to enter the “club” as they gain political or economic power. In the absence of any such mechanism the current treaty system is nothing more than a tool of Western dominance in order to keep the status quo which is favorable to the current nuclear powers something which is bound to build up resentment.  This would in effect offer not only to the pursuit of nuclear weapons by the targeted regimes, but to the rest of their policies. States like South Africa and Brazil already find it difficult to support a strong international line against Iran [1] due to seeing the inequality of allowing some countries nuclear weapons programmes but seeking to punish others, especially when the nuclear weapons states that are signatories to the NPT have not moved towards disarmament as the treaty stipulates. [2] This would in effect alienate them completely.  Second, even if the harm was justifiable by the ends, it would seem that in the long run, invading- or even censuring- every country that attempts to develop Nuclear Weapons in violation of the NPT is impractical as the United States and the rest of the world have de facto admitted by ending sanctions on Pakistan and India in 2001, two years after their nuclear tests. [3] As such, there needs to be a political means that can separate states like Brazil from states like Iran, lest the policy collapse under its own weight.  The West, rather than using force, should attempt to repair the existing non-proliferation treaty framework, such that the standards for possession of nuclear weapons are based on behaviour rather than history.  [1] Charbonneau, Louis, ‘Q+A: How likely are new U.S. sanctions against Iran?’, Reuters, 9 November 2011,   [2] Spektor, Matias, ‘How to Read Brazil’s Stance on iran’, YaleGlobal, 16 March 2010,   [3] BBC News, ‘US lifts India and Pakistan sanctions’, 23 September 2001,

negative: defence house believes all nations have right nuclear weapons The right of self-defence must be exercised in accordance with international law.  There can be no right to such terribly destructive weapons; their invention is one of the great tragedies of history, giving humanity the power to destroy itself. Even during the Cold War, most people viewed nuclear weapons at best as a necessary defence during that great ideological struggle, and at worst the scourge that would end all life on Earth. Nuclear war has never taken place, though it very nearly has on several occasions, such as during the Cuban Missile Crisis. And in 1983 a NATO war game, the Able Archer exercise simulating the full release of NATO nuclear forces, was interpreted by the Soviet Union as a prelude to a massive nuclear first-strike. Oleg Gordievsky, the KGB colonel who defected to the West, has stated that during Able Archer, without realising it, the world came ‘frighteningly close’ to the edge of the nuclear abyss, ‘certainly closer than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962’. [1] Soviet forces were put on immediate alert and an escalation was only avoided when NATO staff realised what was happening and scaled down the exercise. [2] Cooler heads might not prevail in future conflicts between nuclear powers; when there are more nuclear-armed states, the risk of someone doing something foolish increases. After all, it would take only one such incident to result in the loss of millions of lives. [3] Furthermore, in recent years positive steps have finally begun between the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia, in the strategic reduction of nuclear stockpiles. These countries, until recently the greatest perpetrators of nuclear proliferation, have now made commitments toward gradual reduction of weapon numbers until a tiny fraction of the warheads currently active will be usable. [4] All countries, both with and without nuclear weapons, should adopt this lesson. They should contribute toward non-proliferation, thus making the world safer from the threat of nuclear conflict and destruction. Clearly, the focus should be on the reduction of nuclear weapons, not their increase.  [1] Andrew, Christopher and Gordievsky, Oleg. 1991. “KGB: The Inside story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev”. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.  [2] Rogers, Paul. 2007. “From Evil Empire to Axis of Evil”. Oxford Research Group.  [3] Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  [4] Baker, Peter. 2010. “Twists and Turns on Way to Arms Pact With Russia”. The New York Times.

negative: The reality is that it makes far more sense for the United States to legitimatise actions it might take to prevent a state like Iran from developing nuclear by making reference to the uses that might find for a nuclear device, rather than the fact that they are have breached the terms of highly tenuous body of law.  While it may be true that the development of nuclear weapons is banned by international treaty, and that this treaty is recognised as a valid international legal instrument, it is far from clear whether it is in the United State’s interests to embrace either this specific version of International Law, or whether it should be the enforcer even if it does. For one thing, the current international legal system bans Iran from developing Nuclear weapons, but also bans Brazil from developing them. Consistency would obligate the US to actively prevent Brazil from developing a nuclear deterrent, by using threats and sanctions similar to those that have deployed against Iran. However,– common sense would argue that this would be both futile and counter-productive, since it would not only be difficult but result in enormous costs, both militarily and in terms of the reputation of the US. The alternative- granting an exception to Brazil, comparable to those previously granted to India, Pakistan and Israel-, India in particular now wishes to not just be an exception by join the NPT as a weapons state, would undermine those very legal standards that the government argues in favour of.1  After all, Brazil is unlikely to use such weapons aggressively, and the acquisition of such weapons by a regional hegemon(like Brazil) is unlikely to change the balance of power. It should be noted that most of the rising “responsible” regional hegemon like Brazil and South Africa opposed sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, [2] out of risk of enshrining a legal precedent.  Furthermore, even if the US chooses to cleave to the premise that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should be enforced as a matter of law rather than of policy, it is unclear why the US alone should take on the burden of its enforcement. As Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, even disarming and politically reforming countries that lack a nuclear deterrent is a financially and politically ruinous process – one that cannot be achieved without the support of allies and intergovernmental organisations. Furthermore, given the reaction against the US in international opinion, [3] it’s worth asking whether or not the cure is worse than the cold when it comes to American influence around the world.  [1] Fidler, David P., and Ganguly, Sumit, ‘India Wants to Join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a Weapons State’, YaleGlobal, 27 January 2010,   [2] Charbonneau, Louis, ‘Q+A: How likely are new U.S. sanctions against Iran?’, Reuters, 9 November 2011,   [3] Pew Global Attitudes Project, ‘Opinion of the United States’, Pew Research Center, 2011,

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty will help against Iran’s nuclear program.  New START will help bolster US-Russian cooperation, which is necessary for solving the problem of Iran’s nuclear proliferation. On Nov. 19, 2010, the Anti-Defamation League released a statement, which came from Robert G. Sugarman, ADL National Chair, and Abraham H. Foxman, ADL National Director: "The severe damage that could be inflicted on that relationship by failing to ratify the treaty would inevitably hamper effective American international leadership to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The Iranian nuclear threat is the most serious national security issue facing the United States, Israel, and other allies in the Middle East. While some Senators may have legitimate reservations about the New START treaty or its protocol, we believe the interest of our greater and common goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons must take precedence." [1] New START is crucial in getting Russian support against Iran and other rogue nuclear states.  Although the United States needs a strong and reliable nuclear force, the chief nuclear danger today comes not from Russia but from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea and the potential for nuclear material to fall into the hands of terrorists. Given those pressing dangers, some question why an arms control treaty with Russia matters. It matters because it is in both parties' interest that there be transparency and stability in their strategic nuclear relationship. It also matters because Russia's cooperation will be needed if we are to make progress in rolling back the Iranian and North Korean programs. Russian help will be needed to continue our work to secure "loose nukes" in Russia and elsewhere. And Russian assistance is needed to improve the situation in Afghanistan, a breeding ground for international terrorism.  Obviously, the United States does not sign arms control agreements just to make friends. Any treaty must be considered on its merits. But the New START agreement is clearly in the US’ national interest, and the ramifications of not ratifying it could be significantly negative. [2] As US Vice President Joe Biden argued in 2010: "New Start is also a cornerstone of our efforts to reset relations with Russia, which have improved significantly in the last two years. This has led to real benefits for U.S. and global security. Russian cooperation made it possible to secure strong sanctions against Iran over its nuclear ambitions, and Russia canceled a sale to Iran of an advanced anti-aircraft missile system that would have been dangerously destabilizing. Russia has permitted the flow of materiel through its territory for our troops in Afghanistan. And—as the NATO-Russia Council in Lisbon demonstrated—European security has been advanced by the pursuit of a more cooperative relationship with Russia. We should not jeopardize this progress." [3] Therefore, because New START will have significant positive consequences in terms of aiding relations with Russia, and thus in dealing with rogue nuclear states like Iran, it should be supported.  [1] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.   [2] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.   [3] Biden, Joseph. "The case for ratifying New START". Wall Street Journal. 25 November 2010.

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty sets a bad approach for a changing world  New START reduces US deterrence in world that is arming, not disarming. The United States has relied on deterrence for sixty years and as a result has prevented war between the great powers. A US drawdown, especially as other new powers are arming, will undermine deterrence. This will then encourage rivals to try to catch the United States while the reductions show that the United States is in decline. [1]  While proponents of reducing nuclear weapons, or reaching global zero, argue that possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapons states is the incentive behind proliferation, this is not true. The US has consistently taken leadership in the reduction of nuclear arms through treaties but this has so far had no effect in encouraging other nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals and indeed new powers have joined the club. Reducing nuclear arms through New START will therefore not encourage others to stop pursuing nukes. The U.S. should not be taking steps towards disarmament without all nuclear weapons states, including those not signed up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, also being involved. [2]  New START also fails to speak to the issue of protecting and defending the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. The treaty fails to recognize that deterrence is no longer simply between the U.S. and Russia and that the whole policy should no longer be based on just against strategic attacks on the United States or very close allies. Instead it is much more critical to deal with nuclear policy towards ‘rogue’ states and rising powers. [3]  Finally, the US should not set a precedent that it will sacrifice its own interests to bribe Russia over issues like Iran. As the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) argues: “we are told that the real purpose of New START is to create a stronger U.S.-Russia bond in a broader international effort to restrain Iran's nuclear weapons program. Such a justification is wrong. Iran's nuclear ambitions are no secret; neither are Russia’s past efforts in aiding that program. We seriously question whether Russia is serious about stopping Iran, with or without New START. There is no reason why the United States should be required to sacrifice its own defense capabilities to inspire Russia to a greater degree of diplomatic fortitude. If Russia is indeed concerned with a nuclear-armed Iran to its immediate south, it should need no extra incentive to take the action necessary to stop it." [4] If the U.S. bribes Russia over Iran China might expect to get similar treatment over North Korea. New START puts the US in a disadvantaged position in a changing world, and consequently should not be supported.  [1] Brookes, Peter. “Not a new START, but a bad START”. The Hill. 13 September 2010.   [2] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [3] Ibid.  [4] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.

negative: defence science science general house supports development missile defence A strategic missile defense shield will be an effective defense against ballistic missile attacks targeted at the United States and its allies  The missile defense shield the United States intends to build is the most effective and complete ballistic missile shield ever devised. When fully armed with a complement of anti-ballistic missiles both within the United States itself, and in allied nations in Europe, the shield will be virtually impregnable to external missile attack. This means the chance of a nuclear attack succeeding against it will be very unlikely, reducing the chance not only of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and another nuclear power, but also against missiles fired by rogue states or terrorists, the biggest threats in terms of actual use of nuclear weapons (The Economist, 2009). Technologically speaking, anti-ballistic missile missiles have developed by leaps and bounds in recent years. The current system being put into operation by the United States is the Aegis combat system, designed for deployment on US Naval vessels. This new development has served to sidestep the problems associated with ground and space-based missile defense arrays, due to the slow response time of ground missiles, and the still unfeasible orbital deployment. The sea-based defense array, furthermore, lacks the problem of the land-based system in that it does not need to be placed in countries other than the United States in order to be effective (thus avoiding the political problems of the past). Technology and diplomacy have clearly made a national missile defense system highly desirable.

negative: Russian and the US have many areas where they can cooperate.  In 2009 President Obama stated “I believe that on the fundamental issues that will shape this century, Americans and Russians share common interests that form a basis for cooperation.” [1] This makes the real question ‘how to cooperate’ rather that whether there should be cooperation. Military transparency, particularly on nuclear weapons is necessary. “Russia and the United States matter to one another, and how well or how poorly we manage our interactions matters to the rest of the world. The two of us control more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, and our leadership can do more than anyone else’s to help secure nuclear material globally and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.” [2] This continued cooperation on nuclear issues in particular has been demonstrated with the signing of the ‘New START’ treaty on 8th April 2010.  There are many other areas where cooperation between the America and Russia is vital as well. As is demonstrated by the geopolitical situation “Russia sits astride Europe, Asia and the broader Middle East – three regions whose future will shape American interests for many years to come. And in an era in which common challenges” so cooperation is necessary for the United States, but also for Russia as it would not want the US acting without its cooperation. According to Undersecretary of State Burns there are also many issues “non-proliferation, climate change, energy security, the struggle against terrorism, and many more – demand common action more than at any other period in human history, the United States and Russia have a lot more to gain by working together than by working apart.” [3]  [1] Barak Obama, Obama’s Speech in Moscow, President addresses New Economic School graduation, 7/7/09,  accessed 20/4/11  [2] William J. Burns, The United States and Russia in a New Era: One Year After "Reset", Remarks to the Center for American Progress, Washington DC, 14th April 2010,  accessed 10/4/11  [3] William J. Burns, The United States and Russia in a New Era: One Year After "Reset", Remarks to the Center for American Progress, Washington DC, 14th April 2010,  accessed 10/4/11

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty will make for a safer world.  Reducing US and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles makes for a safer world, as Dr. David Gushee states: "The issue on the table is a nuclear arms reduction and verification treaty between the United States and Russia. The treaty, called New START, would reduce Russian and American deployed nuclear weapons to 1,550 and delivery vehicles to 700 each. This would be a 33 percent reduction in the existing arsenals, which is worth achieving and celebrating even as we know that countless cities and millions of precious human beings could be destroyed by the use of even part of the remaining arsenals. Still, these reductions would be a great step on the way to a safer world, as would the re-establishment of bilateral, intrusive verification measures for both sides, also part of the treaty." [1]  The world is simply a much less secure place without New Start, and not just because New START means there are physically fewer nuclear weapons and thus a lesser chance of nuclear disasters (although this in itself is compelling). Rather, New START also has immense symbolic value, in demonstrating that the two greatest powers have enough in common and are interested enough in their mutual security that they can agree to deduce nuclear weapons together. It shows that these nations regard each other as partners for world peace, not as enemies.  The alternative world, without New START, would be one in which the mutual suspicion and animosity of the Cold War might continue. It is notable that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said in an interview released in early December 2010 that Russia might be forced to build up its nuclear forces against the West if the United States fails to ratify the New START treaty. [2] The threat of Russia, or even the US, resuming nuclear build-ups is a frightening thought for both nations, for the world and for peace.  On top of its other benefits, New START is key to opening Russian nuclear weapons up for verification, which contributes to trust and peace. As former Secretaries of State Kissinger, Shultz, Eagleburger, Baker and Powell argue “the agreement emphasizes verification, providing a valuable window into Russia's nuclear arsenal. Since the original START expired last December, Russia has not been required to provide notifications about changes in its strategic nuclear arsenal, and the United States has been unable to conduct on-site inspections. Each day, America's understanding of Russia's arsenal has been degraded, and resources have been diverted from national security tasks to try to fill the gaps. Our military planners increasingly lack the best possible insight into Russia's activity with its strategic nuclear arsenal, making it more difficult to carry out their nuclear deterrent mission.” [3] Therefore New START should be supported as it represents a positive step for peace and cooperation in the world.  [1] Gushee, Dr David P. "Security, Sin and Nuclear Weapons: A Christian Plea for the New START Treaty". Huffington Post. 4 December 2010.   [2] Abdullaev, Nabi. “Putin Issues Warning on New START”. The Moscow Times. 2 December 2010.   [3] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.

negative: The war in Afghanistan is necessary for US and NATO security  The timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan means withdrawing by the end of 2012, regardless of the security situation, and handing over the conflict against the Taliban and Al Qaida (which will almost certainly still be going on) to a largely Afghan force which is ill-prepared to handle the war on its own. This means that proponents of the timetable withdrawal must support pulling NATO forces out of Afghanistan even if the war is going badly at the end of 2012 and it is clear that the withdrawal will benefit the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the battlefield. "Afghan forces simply do not currently have the capacity to do the protecting themselves at this point and, given the challenges of building up new institutions in Afghanistan after decades of war, will not necessarily have the ability until by the end of 2012.” US and NATO forces are needed to mentor and partner with Afghans as they build up an army and police force largely from scratch. Withdrawing before this task is completed adds up to a prescription for a drying up of intelligence and a Taliban victory. [1]  If the Taliban were thus to come to power in Afghanistan after the timetabled withdrawal, al-Qaeda would not be far behind. The USA's top nemesis would be able to salvage a victory in the very place from which it launched the 9/11 attacks eight years ago. Al-Qaeda would have its favourite bases and sanctuaries back, as well as a major propaganda win. [2]  This defeat for the West in Afghanistan would embolden its opponents not just in Pakistan, but all around the world, leaving it open to more attacks. [3]  The West has a security interest in preventing the region from slipping into a maelstrom of conflict. Pakistan, with 170m people and nuclear weapons, is vulnerable to the Taliban’s potent mixture of ethnic-Pushtun nationalism and extremist Islam, as its state power is tenuous. Anarchy in Afghanistan, or a Taliban restoration, would leave it prey to permanent cross-border instability. [4]  Therefore success in Afghanistan is key to the security in Pakistan. The US has even more reasons to care about the security of Pakistan when the India-Pakistan conflict is considered, especially as both sides of this have nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have come within a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. If Pakistan were to fall apart, it would potentially leave nuclear weapons and a large military in the hands of extremist Muslim groups, which could lead to a regional war with India. It is a compelling and vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia—which makes “fixing” Afghanistan in some way also a vital American interest, even if this means keeping the troops there past the timetabled withdrawal. [5]  The War on Terror cannot be won if the US and NATO pull out of Afghanistan and rely more simply on offshore military resources. During the 1990s, when the US tried to go after Osama bin Laden without access to nearby bases by using ships based in the Indian Ocean, the two- to four-hour flight times of drones and cruise missiles operating off such ships made prompt action to real-time intelligence impractical. [6]  Since 1979, the US has been involved in a long, complex conflict against Islamic extremism. It has fought this ideology in many ways in many places, and it is uncertain now how this conflict will evolve. However the US should understand that the conflict is unavoidable and that when extremism pushes, it is in the US and NATO'S long-term interests to push back — and that eventually, if they do so, extremism will wither. [7]  The timetabled withdrawal from Afghanistan could mean withdrawing before this struggle has been won, and handing a base for exporting terrorism to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Security comes before other state interests, largely because the rights of all citizens depend on their security first, and so the security dimension here is key. Therefore, in order to protect the security of the US and other NATO countries, the timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan should be abandoned, and the troops should remain there until the job is done.  [1] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009   [2] ibid  [3] The Economist. "Obama's War". 15 October 2009.   [4] ibid  [5] Foust, Joshua. "The Case for Afghanistan: Strategic Considerations". Registan. 27 August 2009.   [6] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009   [7] Brooks, David. "The Afghan Imperative". New York Times. 24 September 2009.

negative: Banning assault weapons increases liberty and security  Many who are pro guns argue that it would be illegitimate for assault weapons to be banned while the police have them. Police forces, however, are going to be much more likely, and able to give them up when a ban is in place. The police don’t want to be involved in an arms race with criminals to have the biggest guns; just look at the British police force where there is little gun crime and few shootings of police officers it is not felt that there is the need to have police armed with more than a taser or even truncheon. [1] Put simply a ban on assault weapons can help reverse the arms race between police and criminals.  Civil liberties would also be enhanced as law enforcement agencies would not need to devote so many resources into monitoring assault weapons purchases and those who have done the purchasing. Instead they would be able to simply target all assault weapons purchases as needing immediate attention. [2]  Finally we must remember that this ban enhances the highest liberty at all; life. Today as Justice Breyer says “gun possession presents a greater risk of taking innocent lives” than not having a gun. [3]  [1] Keating, Ruth, ‘This House would arm the police’, Peter Squires ed., Debatabase, 2011,   [2] Matthews, Jake, ‘For Lives and Liberty: Banning Assault Weapons in America’, Harvard University Institute of Politics, 2012,   [3] Masters, Brian, ‘America’s deadly obsession with guns’, The Telegraph, 16 December 2012,

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty harms US nuclear capabilities  As David Ganz, the president of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), argues: "This treaty would restrain the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and missile delivery systems." [1] The atrophying U.S. nuclear arsenal and weapons enterprise make reductions in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal even more dangerous. The new START treaty allows nuclear modernization but while the US capacity to modernize nuclear weapons is limited and either congress or the president is likely to prevent modernization on cost grounds. The Russians have a large, if unknown, advantage over the United States in terms of nonstrategic, particularly tactical, and nuclear weapons. The New START treaty however ignores these weapons entirely as it is focused on strategic arms. This therefore leaves the Russians with an advantage and potentially reduces the potential for deterrence in areas beyond the US. [2]  New START also restricts US missile defence options. The Obama Administration insists the treaty doesn’t affect it, but the Kremlin’s takes a different view: "[START] can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile-defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively." [3] New START imposes restrictions on U.S. missile defence options in at least four areas. First the preamble recognizes “the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” it seeks to make sure defensive arms “do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties” so defensive arms must be reduced to allow offensive arms to remain effective. [4] Russia also issued a unilateral statement on April 7, 2010, Russia reinforced this restriction by issuing a unilateral statement asserting that it considers the “extraordinary events” that give “the right to withdraw from this treaty” to include a buildup of missile defense. [5] Second, Article V states “Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors” and vice versa. [6] There are also restrictions on some types of missiles and launchers that are used in the testing of missile defense. And Finally, article X established the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), the treaty’s implementing body, with oversight over the implementation of the treaty which may impose additional restrictions on the U.S. missile defense program. [7]  [1] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.   [2] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [3] Brookes, Peter. “Not a new START, but a bad START”. The Hill. 13 September 2010.   [4] Obama, Barak, and Medvedev, Dmitri, ‘Treaty Between The United States of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, U.S. Department of State,   [5] Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, ‘New START Treaty Fact Sheet: Unilateral Statements’, U.S. Department of State, 13 May 2010,   [6] Obama, Barak, and Medvedev, Dmitri, ‘Treaty Between The United States of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, U.S. Department of State,   [7] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.

negative: defence science science general house supports development missile defence While missile defense technology still has problems that need to be worked out, its future is very promising. The most recent technology, Aegis, is far more effective in testing than its predecessors and has been deployed on a number of Navy warships and in Japan and Australia (McMichael, 2009). The technology will with time become extremely effective at stopping enemy missiles. In a world with more and more countries developing nuclear weapons, many who oppose the United States and its allies, it is imperative that the United States has an effective defense against them. A missile defense system is the most promising such defense.

negative: The Count was only asked to provide an advisory opinion; their adjudication had no subsequent basis in law. Anyhow, the very same jury voted unanimously that ‘there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such’ (International Court of Justice, 1996). Unlike biological and chemical weapons, for which specific treaties have been developed to regulate and prevent their use, the absence of regulation for nuclear weapons implicitly recognizes wide-held appreciation for their deterrent effects

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty maintains US nuclear and missile defence.  The US’ Nuclear armament will be modernized along with New START. “The Obama administration has agreed to provide for modernization of the infrastructure essential to maintaining our nuclear arsenal. Funding these efforts has become part of the negotiations in the ratification process. The administration has put forth a 10-year plan to spend $84 billion on the Energy Department's nuclear weapons complex. Much of the credit for getting the administration to add $14 billion to the originally proposed $70 billion for modernization goes to Sen. Jon Kyl, the Arizona Republican who has been vigilant in this effort. Implementing this modernization program in a timely fashion would be important in ensuring that our nuclear arsenal is maintained appropriately over the next decade and beyond.” [1]  Both US Military and civilian leaders insist that the new START treaty will still allow the US to deploy effective missile defenses, something which Russia was opposed to, and so will not affect US missile defense plans. The main limit on missile defense is that the treaty prevents the conversion of existing launchers for this purpose this would be more expensive than building new missiles specifically for defense purposes. [2]  Furthermore, as Joe Biden argues, New START is important to Russian cooperation on missile defense: "This [missile defense] system demonstrates America's enduring commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—that an attack on one is an attack on all. NATO missile defense also provides the opportunity for further improvements in both NATO-Russian and U.S.-Russian relations. NATO and Russia agreed at Lisbon to carry out a joint ballistic missile threat assessment, to resume theater missile-defense exercises, and to explore further cooperation on territorial missile defense—things that were nearly unimaginable two years ago. These agreements underscore the strategic importance the alliance attaches to improving its relationship with Russia. But trust and confidence in our relationship with Russia would be undermined without Senate approval of the New Start Treaty, which reduces strategic nuclear forces to levels not seen since the 1950s, and restores important verification mechanisms that ceased when the first Start Treaty expired last December." [3]  In many ways, in the 21st Century having an abundance of nuclear weapons, particularly having too many, is more of a liability than an advantage. The United States will be far safer with fewer nuclear weapons in the world and a stronger, more stable relationship with Russia under New START, and this is desirable. Therefore it is clear that New START maintains the important parts of US nuclear capabilities while removing the over-abundance which may become a liability due to security and medical concerns, and so New START should be supported.  [1] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.   [2] ibid  [3] Biden, Joseph. "The case for ratifying New START". Wall Street Journal. 25 November 2010.

negative: In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The treaty, which calls for an end to all nuclear testing, includes provisions for extensive and independent mechanisms for the monitoring of nuclear activities. Such mechanisms could easily be co-opted for use in implementing, monitoring and verifying any future nuclear disarmament process.  "The de facto global nuclear test moratorium and CTBT’s entry into force are crucial barriers to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states and are essential to the future viability of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). They are the first two of the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament that were unanimously adopted in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference (Kimball, 2005).” Even if countries could rapidly produce a bomb without any testing they would not be able to see if it works and any state engaged in breakout would take time to make their bomb deployable on delivery vehicles.

negative: Assault weapons are not used in most crimes  There is little point in banning a type of weapon that is not used in most violence; assault rifles are used in fewer than 1 percent of all violent crimes in the united states at a time when gun violence is falling. [1] If assault weapons are not used in most crime then there is no rational basis for banning them. When the previous assault weapons ban expired in 2004 far from there being an increase in crime as predicted the number of murders declined by 3.6%. [2]  [1] La Jeunesse, William, ‘Debate answer on assault weapons ban could cause problems for Obama’, Fox News, 1 November 2012,   [2] Lott, John R., ‘The Big Lie of the Assault Weapons Ban’, Los Angeles Times, 28 June 2005,

negative: Palestinian support for two-state solution declined around 2008, and is waning even among the 'moderate' Palestinian camp, as well as among additional Arab elements.(8) It is also naïve to think that a two-state solution would gain the favour or even support of Iran. Iran wants to be the dominant power in the Middle East, and it wants nuclear weapons so that it can threaten not only Israel but other states in the region.(9) To this end, Iran has an incentive to keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict big and bloody so as to distract the West from its own regional agenda. Furthermore, an independent Palestinian state would probably be perceived as a security threat to some of its neighbours, particularly Jordan, and thus might actually prompt further tensions.(9)

negative: The bombing was immoral and illegal  The use of the Atomic bomb raised immediate moral questions as to its use.  Albert Einstein argued “The American decision [to use the bomb] may have been a fatal error, for men accustom themselves to thinking a weapon which has been used once can be used again... [on the other hand] Our renunciation of this weapon as too terrible to use would have carried great weight” [1] So far Einstein has been proved wrong and the precedent thus set has not been followed. That the bombs are ‘to terrible to use’ does seem to have sunk in.  The use of the bombs was also illegal as it would have breached the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, signed by the US. Of Hague IV The Laws and Customs of War on Land it probably breached articles 23, forbidding the use of weapons that cause ‘unnecessary suffering’, and article 25 forbidding the attack of undefended towns. It would certainly by its indiscriminate nature have breached article 27 “In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes” [2] as well as the attendant declaration forbidding attack from aircraft!  Clearly such sections forbidding attack from aircraft, or balloons in the 1899 version make the Hague convention seem antiquated but the laws of war in general remain even now as they were codified in 1907. [3] The International Court of Justice has referred back to these precedents “In the view of the vast majority of states as well as the writers there can be no doubt as to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons. The Court shares that view.” [4] That humanitarian law included the Hague conventions. The court reconfirmed the view that “States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets” [5] It is noteworthy that dissensions from a position of banning the use of nuclear weapons entirely focus on the possible use with minimal civilian casualties. [6] Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings did not attempt to minimize civilian casualties the implication is that their use was illegal based upon the Hague conventions that were already in force.  [1] Albert Einstein, quoted by Rudolph A. Winnacker, ‘The Debate About Hiroshima’, Military Affairs, vol.11, no.1, Spring 1947, p.25.  [2] Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907   [3] Malcom H. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge, 1997), p.807.  [4] International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, paragraphs 85-6.   [5] ibid. para. 78.  [6] ibid. para. 91.

negative: The intervention backfired.  NATO’S action increased the conflict’s duration about a six fold and the death toll at least sevenfold, but also increasing human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, and weapon proliferation in Libya and neighbouring countries [1]. The UN security council approved the resolution for protecting civilians in Libya [2] but NATO just did the opposite. Their operation came at the expense of increasing harm to Libyans. NATO attacked Libyan forces indiscriminately including those in Sirte who posed no threat to civilians as Sirte remained in government hands right to near the end of the conflict and continued to support the rebels offering them weapons, military training, intelligence and troops on ground [1], even when they rejected cease fire offers from the government that would have helped end the crisis and spare civilians.  [1] Alan, Kuperman, ‘Lessons from Libya; How not to intervene’, harvard.edu September 2013  [2] Robert, winnet and Richard Spencer, ‘UN approves no fly zone as British troops prepare for action’, telegraph.co.uk, 17 March 2011

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty helps Russia more than the US  Not only does New START leave in place Russia’s extant tactical nuclear advantage but it has further loopholes for Russian weapons. As Mitt Romney argued in 2010: "Does the treaty provide gaping loopholes that Russia could use to escape nuclear weapon limits entirely? Yes. For example, multiple warhead missile bombers are counted under the treaty as only one warhead. While we currently have more bombers than the Russians, they have embarked on new programs for long-range bombers and for air-launched nuclear cruise missiles. Thus, it is no surprise that Russia is happy to undercount missiles on bombers." [1]  New START also fails to limit rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which Russia could potentially make use of. The definition of rail-mobile ICBM launchers was established in the expired START as “an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted.” [2] This and associated restrictions and limitations in START, are not in the New START. This makes it possible for Russia to claim that any new Rail Mobile ICBMs are not subject to New START limitations. [3] Mitt Romney worries that Russia is already working to take advantage of these omissions: “As drafted, it lets Russia escape the limit on its number of strategic nuclear warheads. Loopholes and lapses -- presumably carefully crafted by Moscow -- provide a path to entirely avoid the advertised warhead-reduction targets. …. These omissions would be consistent with Russia's plans for a new heavy bomber and reports of growing interest in rail-mobile ICBMs." [4]  This means that under the treaty limits, the United States is the only country that must reduce its launchers and strategic nuclear weapons. Russia has managed to negotiate the treaty limits so that they simply restrict it to reductions it was already planning to do. As a result the United States is making what are effectively unilateral reductions. [5] Therefore, New START is an unequal treaty as it offers more to Russia than to the US. This is bad for the balance of power and thus bad for world peace, and so New START should be opposed.  [1] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.   [2] ‘Terms and Definitions’, The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms And Associated Documents, 1991,   [3] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [4] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.   [5] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.

negative: energy house would store nuclear waste underground Underground Nuclear Storage is Necessary  Even states without nuclear waste programs tend to generate radioactive waste. For example, research and medicine both use nuclear material and nuclear technology. Technologies such as Medical imaging equipment are dependent and the use of radioactive elements. This means that all states produce levels of nuclear waste that need to be dealt with.  Moreover, many non-nuclear states are accelerating their programmes of research and investment into nuclear technologies. With the exception of Germany, there is an increasing consensus among developed nations that nuclear power is the only viable method of meeting rising domestic demand for energy in the absence of reliable and efficient renewable forms of power generation.  The alternatives to putting nuclear waste in underground storage tend to be based around the reuse of nuclear waste in nuclear power stations. Whilst this is viable in some areas, in countries which lack the technology to be able to do this and in countries which don’t need to rely on nuclear power, this option becomes irrelevant. Further, even this process results in the creation of some nuclear waste, so in countries with the technology to implement such a solution, the disposal of the remaining nuclear waste is still an issue.  As such, underground nuclear storage is a necessary method that should be used to dispose of nuclear waste. [1]  [1] “The EU’s deep underground storage plan.” 03/11/2010. World Nuclear News.

negative: UAVs are the best possible weapon for the job.  We need to eliminate terrorists somehow and UAVs are the best possible equipment with which to carry out this mission. All the other options either would result in significantly more casualties or would have other problems that would likely allow terrorists to escape.  First there is the collateral damage that would be caused by using other alternatives to striking terrorists. Professor Plaw of the University of Massachusetts says that when terrorists were being confronted by the Pakistani Army, who were attacking at the behest of the United States, 46% of casualties were collateral damage. A similar number of 41% was the figure when Israel was targeting Hamas. [1] When compared to the 16 or 28% collateral damage figures for UAVs the choice should be easy.  Moreover other options have other disadvantages. Sending a hit squad in to eliminate terrorists may mean little collateral damage but would cause a diplomatic crisis as it would be tantamount to invading another country. Using a missile or local support on the other hand significantly increases the chances of the target escaping. Pakistan’s ISI, military intelligence, has for example been accused of helping the Taliban – they could hardly be trusted to kill them. [2]  [1] Shane, Scott, ‘The Moral Case for Drones’, The New York Times, 14 July 2012.  [2] Perlez, Jane, ‘Pakistan Scorns U.S. Scolding on Terrorism’, The New York Times, 23 September 2011.