query: A treaty would benefit larger powers over the small  Any treaty that seeks to ban cyber-attacks would simply be an attempt to cement the position of the most powerful countries at the expense of weaker ones. This is because cyber-attacks are, like terrorism, weapons that can be used by anyone to attack a much bigger target. To launch a cyber-attack there is little need for training, only a small amount of comparatively cheap equipment (to military hardware at any rate), and an internet connection. [1] And it is difficult to defend against. This makes it ideal for poor nations to maintain cyber warfare as a credible threat to their bigger neighbours while their neighbours threaten them conventionally with their bigger militaries. We have seen before arms treaties that are fundamentally biased in favour of a small group of powerful states. Most notable is the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty where there are five recognised nuclear weapons states who are allowed the horrific weapons and everyone else is banned from having them. This discrimination was accepted as a result of the agreement that the nuclear weapons states would eventually disarm. It has not happened so leaving a troubled treaty system that appears to be regularly flouted. [2]  [1] Phillips, Andrew T., ‘Now Hear This – The Asymmetric Nature of Cyber Warfare’, U.S. Naval Institute, Vol.138/10/1316, October 2012,   [2] Miller, Steven E., ‘Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2012,

positive: global house would create international treatyban cyber attacks Everyone would benefit from the potential closure of a zone of possible future conflict. While cyber warfare may give a smaller state a brief advantage due to some low cost methods of attack ultimately the superior resources, both in defence and attack in cyberspace of the richer state would be telling. In the United States the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) alone has a budget of $1.54billion for research into cyber offence from 2013-2017 [1] considering that there are numerous other agencies involved in cyber warfare or defence, or monitoring the internet it is clear that cyber-attacks are not some wonder weapon that can even the odds between states.  [1] Kallberg, Jan and Thuraisingham, Bhavani, ‘Cyber Operations: Bridging from Concept to Cyber Superiority’, Joint Force Quarterly, Vol.68, no.1, January 2013,

negative: Existing international treaties that grant nuclear weapons to the US and other countries no longer reflect the changing global balance of power.  The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty is inherently unfair, in that it prevents countries that did not have nuclear weapons as of 1964 from developing them, but makes no effort to force those who already possess nuclear devices to disarm.  The result is that the list of countries with such weapons, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China, represents the balance of power as it existed at the time that the non-proliferation treaty was drafted. Countries that have entered the club subsequently, like India and Pakistan, did so in violation of the treaty and international law.  Any sort of treaty that seeks to limit access to nuclear arms has to provide opportunities for countries like Brazil to enter the “club” as they gain political or economic power. In the absence of any such mechanism the current treaty system is nothing more than a tool of Western dominance in order to keep the status quo which is favorable to the current nuclear powers something which is bound to build up resentment.  This would in effect offer not only to the pursuit of nuclear weapons by the targeted regimes, but to the rest of their policies. States like South Africa and Brazil already find it difficult to support a strong international line against Iran [1] due to seeing the inequality of allowing some countries nuclear weapons programmes but seeking to punish others, especially when the nuclear weapons states that are signatories to the NPT have not moved towards disarmament as the treaty stipulates. [2] This would in effect alienate them completely.  Second, even if the harm was justifiable by the ends, it would seem that in the long run, invading- or even censuring- every country that attempts to develop Nuclear Weapons in violation of the NPT is impractical as the United States and the rest of the world have de facto admitted by ending sanctions on Pakistan and India in 2001, two years after their nuclear tests. [3] As such, there needs to be a political means that can separate states like Brazil from states like Iran, lest the policy collapse under its own weight.  The West, rather than using force, should attempt to repair the existing non-proliferation treaty framework, such that the standards for possession of nuclear weapons are based on behaviour rather than history.  [1] Charbonneau, Louis, ‘Q+A: How likely are new U.S. sanctions against Iran?’, Reuters, 9 November 2011,   [2] Spektor, Matias, ‘How to Read Brazil’s Stance on iran’, YaleGlobal, 16 March 2010,   [3] BBC News, ‘US lifts India and Pakistan sanctions’, 23 September 2001,

negative: The reality is that it makes far more sense for the United States to legitimatise actions it might take to prevent a state like Iran from developing nuclear by making reference to the uses that might find for a nuclear device, rather than the fact that they are have breached the terms of highly tenuous body of law.  While it may be true that the development of nuclear weapons is banned by international treaty, and that this treaty is recognised as a valid international legal instrument, it is far from clear whether it is in the United State’s interests to embrace either this specific version of International Law, or whether it should be the enforcer even if it does. For one thing, the current international legal system bans Iran from developing Nuclear weapons, but also bans Brazil from developing them. Consistency would obligate the US to actively prevent Brazil from developing a nuclear deterrent, by using threats and sanctions similar to those that have deployed against Iran. However,– common sense would argue that this would be both futile and counter-productive, since it would not only be difficult but result in enormous costs, both militarily and in terms of the reputation of the US. The alternative- granting an exception to Brazil, comparable to those previously granted to India, Pakistan and Israel-, India in particular now wishes to not just be an exception by join the NPT as a weapons state, would undermine those very legal standards that the government argues in favour of.1  After all, Brazil is unlikely to use such weapons aggressively, and the acquisition of such weapons by a regional hegemon(like Brazil) is unlikely to change the balance of power. It should be noted that most of the rising “responsible” regional hegemon like Brazil and South Africa opposed sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, [2] out of risk of enshrining a legal precedent.  Furthermore, even if the US chooses to cleave to the premise that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should be enforced as a matter of law rather than of policy, it is unclear why the US alone should take on the burden of its enforcement. As Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, even disarming and politically reforming countries that lack a nuclear deterrent is a financially and politically ruinous process – one that cannot be achieved without the support of allies and intergovernmental organisations. Furthermore, given the reaction against the US in international opinion, [3] it’s worth asking whether or not the cure is worse than the cold when it comes to American influence around the world.  [1] Fidler, David P., and Ganguly, Sumit, ‘India Wants to Join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a Weapons State’, YaleGlobal, 27 January 2010,   [2] Charbonneau, Louis, ‘Q+A: How likely are new U.S. sanctions against Iran?’, Reuters, 9 November 2011,   [3] Pew Global Attitudes Project, ‘Opinion of the United States’, Pew Research Center, 2011,

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty sets a bad approach for a changing world  New START reduces US deterrence in world that is arming, not disarming. The United States has relied on deterrence for sixty years and as a result has prevented war between the great powers. A US drawdown, especially as other new powers are arming, will undermine deterrence. This will then encourage rivals to try to catch the United States while the reductions show that the United States is in decline. [1]  While proponents of reducing nuclear weapons, or reaching global zero, argue that possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapons states is the incentive behind proliferation, this is not true. The US has consistently taken leadership in the reduction of nuclear arms through treaties but this has so far had no effect in encouraging other nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals and indeed new powers have joined the club. Reducing nuclear arms through New START will therefore not encourage others to stop pursuing nukes. The U.S. should not be taking steps towards disarmament without all nuclear weapons states, including those not signed up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, also being involved. [2]  New START also fails to speak to the issue of protecting and defending the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. The treaty fails to recognize that deterrence is no longer simply between the U.S. and Russia and that the whole policy should no longer be based on just against strategic attacks on the United States or very close allies. Instead it is much more critical to deal with nuclear policy towards ‘rogue’ states and rising powers. [3]  Finally, the US should not set a precedent that it will sacrifice its own interests to bribe Russia over issues like Iran. As the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) argues: “we are told that the real purpose of New START is to create a stronger U.S.-Russia bond in a broader international effort to restrain Iran's nuclear weapons program. Such a justification is wrong. Iran's nuclear ambitions are no secret; neither are Russia’s past efforts in aiding that program. We seriously question whether Russia is serious about stopping Iran, with or without New START. There is no reason why the United States should be required to sacrifice its own defense capabilities to inspire Russia to a greater degree of diplomatic fortitude. If Russia is indeed concerned with a nuclear-armed Iran to its immediate south, it should need no extra incentive to take the action necessary to stop it." [4] If the U.S. bribes Russia over Iran China might expect to get similar treatment over North Korea. New START puts the US in a disadvantaged position in a changing world, and consequently should not be supported.  [1] Brookes, Peter. “Not a new START, but a bad START”. The Hill. 13 September 2010.   [2] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [3] Ibid.  [4] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.

negative: defence house believes all nations have right nuclear weapons Possessing nuclear weapons will do little to help small and poor nations set the agendas on the international stage. In the present age, economic power is far more significant in international and diplomatic discourse than is military power, particularly nuclear weapon power. States will not be able to have their grievances more rapidly addressed in the United Nations or elsewhere, since they will be unable to use nuclear weapons in an aggressive context as that would seriously threaten their own survival. Possessing nuclear weapons may at best provide some security against neighbouring states, but it creates the greater threat of accidental or unintended use or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and rogue states.

negative: Disarming illegal weapons  A second possible justification for intervention is when the state that is intervening against is itself breaking international law such as the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The intervention would then be to force compliance of the treaty; this would mean forcible disarmament of illegal weapons. In the case of Syria the country could be deemed to have violated its own legal obligations due to its having broken the 1925 Geneva Protocol [1] that bans the use of chemical weapons. Since manufacturing and possession of these weapons is banned if it is considered that having such weapons is a ‘gross violation of international law’ then a limited use of force to destroy these weapons could be considered to be legal. [2] This could be considered to be analogous to the police stepping in to confiscate a banned weapon, with no police internationally other states have to be the ones to step in.  [1] 1925 Geneva Protocol, League of Nations, 17 June 1925,   [2] Dr Wolff Heintschel, ‘Viewpoints: Is there legal basis for military intervention in Syria?’, BBC News, 29 August 2013,

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty will make for a safer world.  Reducing US and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles makes for a safer world, as Dr. David Gushee states: "The issue on the table is a nuclear arms reduction and verification treaty between the United States and Russia. The treaty, called New START, would reduce Russian and American deployed nuclear weapons to 1,550 and delivery vehicles to 700 each. This would be a 33 percent reduction in the existing arsenals, which is worth achieving and celebrating even as we know that countless cities and millions of precious human beings could be destroyed by the use of even part of the remaining arsenals. Still, these reductions would be a great step on the way to a safer world, as would the re-establishment of bilateral, intrusive verification measures for both sides, also part of the treaty." [1]  The world is simply a much less secure place without New Start, and not just because New START means there are physically fewer nuclear weapons and thus a lesser chance of nuclear disasters (although this in itself is compelling). Rather, New START also has immense symbolic value, in demonstrating that the two greatest powers have enough in common and are interested enough in their mutual security that they can agree to deduce nuclear weapons together. It shows that these nations regard each other as partners for world peace, not as enemies.  The alternative world, without New START, would be one in which the mutual suspicion and animosity of the Cold War might continue. It is notable that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said in an interview released in early December 2010 that Russia might be forced to build up its nuclear forces against the West if the United States fails to ratify the New START treaty. [2] The threat of Russia, or even the US, resuming nuclear build-ups is a frightening thought for both nations, for the world and for peace.  On top of its other benefits, New START is key to opening Russian nuclear weapons up for verification, which contributes to trust and peace. As former Secretaries of State Kissinger, Shultz, Eagleburger, Baker and Powell argue “the agreement emphasizes verification, providing a valuable window into Russia's nuclear arsenal. Since the original START expired last December, Russia has not been required to provide notifications about changes in its strategic nuclear arsenal, and the United States has been unable to conduct on-site inspections. Each day, America's understanding of Russia's arsenal has been degraded, and resources have been diverted from national security tasks to try to fill the gaps. Our military planners increasingly lack the best possible insight into Russia's activity with its strategic nuclear arsenal, making it more difficult to carry out their nuclear deterrent mission.” [3] Therefore New START should be supported as it represents a positive step for peace and cooperation in the world.  [1] Gushee, Dr David P. "Security, Sin and Nuclear Weapons: A Christian Plea for the New START Treaty". Huffington Post. 4 December 2010.   [2] Abdullaev, Nabi. “Putin Issues Warning on New START”. The Moscow Times. 2 December 2010.   [3] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.

negative: Designing and constructing tactical nuclear weapons allow a state's scientists to maintain a competitive position in nuclear technology.  Research and development into tactical nuclear weapons are essential for countries to maintain their technological edge in the field of nuclear science. The United States has long enjoyed technological dominance in the field of nuclear weaponry. However, in recent years China and Russia have begun to pour effort into developing ever-smaller nuclear weapons for tactical deployment. If the United States and the other nuclear powers wish to maintain their position within the nuclear tech order, they must begin investing further in development of similar miniaturized nuclear devices. Research into the design and construction of mini-nukes provides a number of benefits beyond the tactical flexibility conferred by such weapons. First, developing mini-nukes puts designers and scientists in the West on the same intellectual page as those seeking to devise nuclear weapons suitable for use in terrorist attacks, such as so-called suitcase-nukes1. By learning how to build such weapons scientists will be able to devise means of counteracting them should an enemy attempt to employ them in an attack. Furthermore, the miniaturization of nuclear weapons has applications in other nuclear technologies such as in the design and manufacture of smaller nuclear power facilities. Military technology always finds an outlet in civilian use. Such was case with Cold War technological endeavors, such as the Space Race, which yielded everything from superior computer processors to ballpoint pens. Clearly, the public will in many ways reap the boons arising from the development of smaller tactical nuclear weapons. 1 Jervis, Robert. 2001. "Weapons Without Purpose? Nuclear Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era". Foreign Affairs.

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty maintains US nuclear and missile defence.  The US’ Nuclear armament will be modernized along with New START. “The Obama administration has agreed to provide for modernization of the infrastructure essential to maintaining our nuclear arsenal. Funding these efforts has become part of the negotiations in the ratification process. The administration has put forth a 10-year plan to spend $84 billion on the Energy Department's nuclear weapons complex. Much of the credit for getting the administration to add $14 billion to the originally proposed $70 billion for modernization goes to Sen. Jon Kyl, the Arizona Republican who has been vigilant in this effort. Implementing this modernization program in a timely fashion would be important in ensuring that our nuclear arsenal is maintained appropriately over the next decade and beyond.” [1]  Both US Military and civilian leaders insist that the new START treaty will still allow the US to deploy effective missile defenses, something which Russia was opposed to, and so will not affect US missile defense plans. The main limit on missile defense is that the treaty prevents the conversion of existing launchers for this purpose this would be more expensive than building new missiles specifically for defense purposes. [2]  Furthermore, as Joe Biden argues, New START is important to Russian cooperation on missile defense: "This [missile defense] system demonstrates America's enduring commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—that an attack on one is an attack on all. NATO missile defense also provides the opportunity for further improvements in both NATO-Russian and U.S.-Russian relations. NATO and Russia agreed at Lisbon to carry out a joint ballistic missile threat assessment, to resume theater missile-defense exercises, and to explore further cooperation on territorial missile defense—things that were nearly unimaginable two years ago. These agreements underscore the strategic importance the alliance attaches to improving its relationship with Russia. But trust and confidence in our relationship with Russia would be undermined without Senate approval of the New Start Treaty, which reduces strategic nuclear forces to levels not seen since the 1950s, and restores important verification mechanisms that ceased when the first Start Treaty expired last December." [3]  In many ways, in the 21st Century having an abundance of nuclear weapons, particularly having too many, is more of a liability than an advantage. The United States will be far safer with fewer nuclear weapons in the world and a stronger, more stable relationship with Russia under New START, and this is desirable. Therefore it is clear that New START maintains the important parts of US nuclear capabilities while removing the over-abundance which may become a liability due to security and medical concerns, and so New START should be supported.  [1] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.   [2] ibid  [3] Biden, Joseph. "The case for ratifying New START". Wall Street Journal. 25 November 2010.

negative: The UK should encourage others to reduce their own stocks of nuclear weapons.  Britain as a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty the United Kingdom is obliged to pursue “nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” [1] While complete disarmament by all states with nuclear weapons is a long way off the United Kingdom could make a good start by getting rid of its own weapons. A Nuclear Weapons state giving up its weapons after sixty years would show that nations can manage without nuclear weapons and so act as an encouragement to others to do the same.  [1] ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/140, 22 April 1970, Article VI.

negative: warpeace science internet house would consider large scale cyber attack act war Cyber attacks can do serious damage to the state  Large scale cyber attacks can result in substantial harms to the state equivalent to those of an armed attack. Many states are dependent on flawless functioning of government and financial services online, and attacking them would cause mass disruption. For example, massive cyber attacks can cause serious disruption to economy by targeting financial, banking and commercial services; they can target government websites and steal confidential information that would compromise country's security, as was the case with USA in 2007 [10]; they could target power grids and shut down infrastructure on a massive scale across the country. All these instances cause disruption and leave the targeted country vulnerable with the government unable to operate successfully. This way, for instance, a large scale cyber attack from Russia on Georgia 2008 caused massive disruption to government, banking services, and communication within and outside of the country [11]. For these reasons USA's Pentagon decided to consider a cyber attack that 'produces the death, damage, destruction or high-level disruption that a traditional military attack would cause' an act of war [12]. Given the damage of possible attacks to the state, large-scale cyber attacks should be considered an act of war.

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty harms US nuclear capabilities  As David Ganz, the president of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), argues: "This treaty would restrain the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and missile delivery systems." [1] The atrophying U.S. nuclear arsenal and weapons enterprise make reductions in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal even more dangerous. The new START treaty allows nuclear modernization but while the US capacity to modernize nuclear weapons is limited and either congress or the president is likely to prevent modernization on cost grounds. The Russians have a large, if unknown, advantage over the United States in terms of nonstrategic, particularly tactical, and nuclear weapons. The New START treaty however ignores these weapons entirely as it is focused on strategic arms. This therefore leaves the Russians with an advantage and potentially reduces the potential for deterrence in areas beyond the US. [2]  New START also restricts US missile defence options. The Obama Administration insists the treaty doesn’t affect it, but the Kremlin’s takes a different view: "[START] can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile-defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively." [3] New START imposes restrictions on U.S. missile defence options in at least four areas. First the preamble recognizes “the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” it seeks to make sure defensive arms “do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties” so defensive arms must be reduced to allow offensive arms to remain effective. [4] Russia also issued a unilateral statement on April 7, 2010, Russia reinforced this restriction by issuing a unilateral statement asserting that it considers the “extraordinary events” that give “the right to withdraw from this treaty” to include a buildup of missile defense. [5] Second, Article V states “Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors” and vice versa. [6] There are also restrictions on some types of missiles and launchers that are used in the testing of missile defense. And Finally, article X established the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), the treaty’s implementing body, with oversight over the implementation of the treaty which may impose additional restrictions on the U.S. missile defense program. [7]  [1] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.   [2] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [3] Brookes, Peter. “Not a new START, but a bad START”. The Hill. 13 September 2010.   [4] Obama, Barak, and Medvedev, Dmitri, ‘Treaty Between The United States of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, U.S. Department of State,   [5] Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, ‘New START Treaty Fact Sheet: Unilateral Statements’, U.S. Department of State, 13 May 2010,   [6] Obama, Barak, and Medvedev, Dmitri, ‘Treaty Between The United States of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, U.S. Department of State,   [7] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.

negative: In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The treaty, which calls for an end to all nuclear testing, includes provisions for extensive and independent mechanisms for the monitoring of nuclear activities. Such mechanisms could easily be co-opted for use in implementing, monitoring and verifying any future nuclear disarmament process.  "The de facto global nuclear test moratorium and CTBT’s entry into force are crucial barriers to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states and are essential to the future viability of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). They are the first two of the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament that were unanimously adopted in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference (Kimball, 2005).” Even if countries could rapidly produce a bomb without any testing they would not be able to see if it works and any state engaged in breakout would take time to make their bomb deployable on delivery vehicles.

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty will help against Iran’s nuclear program.  New START will help bolster US-Russian cooperation, which is necessary for solving the problem of Iran’s nuclear proliferation. On Nov. 19, 2010, the Anti-Defamation League released a statement, which came from Robert G. Sugarman, ADL National Chair, and Abraham H. Foxman, ADL National Director: "The severe damage that could be inflicted on that relationship by failing to ratify the treaty would inevitably hamper effective American international leadership to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The Iranian nuclear threat is the most serious national security issue facing the United States, Israel, and other allies in the Middle East. While some Senators may have legitimate reservations about the New START treaty or its protocol, we believe the interest of our greater and common goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons must take precedence." [1] New START is crucial in getting Russian support against Iran and other rogue nuclear states.  Although the United States needs a strong and reliable nuclear force, the chief nuclear danger today comes not from Russia but from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea and the potential for nuclear material to fall into the hands of terrorists. Given those pressing dangers, some question why an arms control treaty with Russia matters. It matters because it is in both parties' interest that there be transparency and stability in their strategic nuclear relationship. It also matters because Russia's cooperation will be needed if we are to make progress in rolling back the Iranian and North Korean programs. Russian help will be needed to continue our work to secure "loose nukes" in Russia and elsewhere. And Russian assistance is needed to improve the situation in Afghanistan, a breeding ground for international terrorism.  Obviously, the United States does not sign arms control agreements just to make friends. Any treaty must be considered on its merits. But the New START agreement is clearly in the US’ national interest, and the ramifications of not ratifying it could be significantly negative. [2] As US Vice President Joe Biden argued in 2010: "New Start is also a cornerstone of our efforts to reset relations with Russia, which have improved significantly in the last two years. This has led to real benefits for U.S. and global security. Russian cooperation made it possible to secure strong sanctions against Iran over its nuclear ambitions, and Russia canceled a sale to Iran of an advanced anti-aircraft missile system that would have been dangerously destabilizing. Russia has permitted the flow of materiel through its territory for our troops in Afghanistan. And—as the NATO-Russia Council in Lisbon demonstrated—European security has been advanced by the pursuit of a more cooperative relationship with Russia. We should not jeopardize this progress." [3] Therefore, because New START will have significant positive consequences in terms of aiding relations with Russia, and thus in dealing with rogue nuclear states like Iran, it should be supported.  [1] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.   [2] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.   [3] Biden, Joseph. "The case for ratifying New START". Wall Street Journal. 25 November 2010.

negative: Attacking chemical weapons stores prevents a threat in itself as it runs the risk of blowing up the weapons and therefore dispersing them into the air. [1] This risk would potentially be even higher with any biological weapons as they would not become harmless through dispersal as Chemical weapons would.  Quite apart from the risks of setting off the arsenals when attacking them such attacks would be very unlikely to be successful. While Syria’s chemical weapons may be held in a few large centers this would seem to be unlikely given the history of attacks on unconventional weapons programs. Syria itself has had a nuclear weapons program destroyed as a result of an Israeli air attack in 2007. [2] This would have been a powerful lesson in the need to disperse these weapons to prevent their destruction from the air.  [1] ‘Preventing Syrian Chemical Weapons Threat From Becoming Deadly Reality’, PBS Newshour, 5 December 2012,   [2] Harel, Amos, ‘Five years on, new details emerge about Israeli strike on Syrian reactor’, Haaretz, 10 September 2012,

negative: warpeace science internet house would consider large scale cyber attack act war Definition of a large scale cyber attack is extremely vague  Armed acts of aggression are a good method of judging if an action is an act of war because they result in actual destruction, violence and loss of human life. Cyber attacks, on the other hand, do not and thus there is no objective way to tell what scale of a cyber attack is enough to constitute an act of war. While Pentagon claims a cyber attack that is equivalent of damage caused by traditional warfare as a standard, how is it supposed to be applied if pretty much all of the cyber attacks have been bloodless [24]? For instance, stealing large amounts of confidential data from a country is a large scale cyber attack, and could have an immense economic impact, but it is bloodless and so how much damage does there need to be before it can be a casus belli? It is very difficult to measure the impact of even a very evident and intense cyber attack, as NATO found out when assessing a cyber attack on Georgia in 2008 [25]. While the Pentagon might have a nice theoretical framework, in reality there are too many unanswered (and possible impossible to answer) questions. This can lead to abuse of justifications for war and unnecessary violence.

negative: global law international law politics defence warpeace house supports new The New START treaty helps Russia more than the US  Not only does New START leave in place Russia’s extant tactical nuclear advantage but it has further loopholes for Russian weapons. As Mitt Romney argued in 2010: "Does the treaty provide gaping loopholes that Russia could use to escape nuclear weapon limits entirely? Yes. For example, multiple warhead missile bombers are counted under the treaty as only one warhead. While we currently have more bombers than the Russians, they have embarked on new programs for long-range bombers and for air-launched nuclear cruise missiles. Thus, it is no surprise that Russia is happy to undercount missiles on bombers." [1]  New START also fails to limit rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which Russia could potentially make use of. The definition of rail-mobile ICBM launchers was established in the expired START as “an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted.” [2] This and associated restrictions and limitations in START, are not in the New START. This makes it possible for Russia to claim that any new Rail Mobile ICBMs are not subject to New START limitations. [3] Mitt Romney worries that Russia is already working to take advantage of these omissions: “As drafted, it lets Russia escape the limit on its number of strategic nuclear warheads. Loopholes and lapses -- presumably carefully crafted by Moscow -- provide a path to entirely avoid the advertised warhead-reduction targets. …. These omissions would be consistent with Russia's plans for a new heavy bomber and reports of growing interest in rail-mobile ICBMs." [4]  This means that under the treaty limits, the United States is the only country that must reduce its launchers and strategic nuclear weapons. Russia has managed to negotiate the treaty limits so that they simply restrict it to reductions it was already planning to do. As a result the United States is making what are effectively unilateral reductions. [5] Therefore, New START is an unequal treaty as it offers more to Russia than to the US. This is bad for the balance of power and thus bad for world peace, and so New START should be opposed.  [1] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.   [2] ‘Terms and Definitions’, The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms And Associated Documents, 1991,   [3] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [4] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.   [5] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.

negative: Russian and the US have many areas where they can cooperate.  In 2009 President Obama stated “I believe that on the fundamental issues that will shape this century, Americans and Russians share common interests that form a basis for cooperation.” [1] This makes the real question ‘how to cooperate’ rather that whether there should be cooperation. Military transparency, particularly on nuclear weapons is necessary. “Russia and the United States matter to one another, and how well or how poorly we manage our interactions matters to the rest of the world. The two of us control more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, and our leadership can do more than anyone else’s to help secure nuclear material globally and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.” [2] This continued cooperation on nuclear issues in particular has been demonstrated with the signing of the ‘New START’ treaty on 8th April 2010.  There are many other areas where cooperation between the America and Russia is vital as well. As is demonstrated by the geopolitical situation “Russia sits astride Europe, Asia and the broader Middle East – three regions whose future will shape American interests for many years to come. And in an era in which common challenges” so cooperation is necessary for the United States, but also for Russia as it would not want the US acting without its cooperation. According to Undersecretary of State Burns there are also many issues “non-proliferation, climate change, energy security, the struggle against terrorism, and many more – demand common action more than at any other period in human history, the United States and Russia have a lot more to gain by working together than by working apart.” [3]  [1] Barak Obama, Obama’s Speech in Moscow, President addresses New Economic School graduation, 7/7/09,  accessed 20/4/11  [2] William J. Burns, The United States and Russia in a New Era: One Year After "Reset", Remarks to the Center for American Progress, Washington DC, 14th April 2010,  accessed 10/4/11  [3] William J. Burns, The United States and Russia in a New Era: One Year After "Reset", Remarks to the Center for American Progress, Washington DC, 14th April 2010,  accessed 10/4/11

negative: defence house believes all nations have right nuclear weapons The right of self-defence must be exercised in accordance with international law.  There can be no right to such terribly destructive weapons; their invention is one of the great tragedies of history, giving humanity the power to destroy itself. Even during the Cold War, most people viewed nuclear weapons at best as a necessary defence during that great ideological struggle, and at worst the scourge that would end all life on Earth. Nuclear war has never taken place, though it very nearly has on several occasions, such as during the Cuban Missile Crisis. And in 1983 a NATO war game, the Able Archer exercise simulating the full release of NATO nuclear forces, was interpreted by the Soviet Union as a prelude to a massive nuclear first-strike. Oleg Gordievsky, the KGB colonel who defected to the West, has stated that during Able Archer, without realising it, the world came ‘frighteningly close’ to the edge of the nuclear abyss, ‘certainly closer than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962’. [1] Soviet forces were put on immediate alert and an escalation was only avoided when NATO staff realised what was happening and scaled down the exercise. [2] Cooler heads might not prevail in future conflicts between nuclear powers; when there are more nuclear-armed states, the risk of someone doing something foolish increases. After all, it would take only one such incident to result in the loss of millions of lives. [3] Furthermore, in recent years positive steps have finally begun between the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia, in the strategic reduction of nuclear stockpiles. These countries, until recently the greatest perpetrators of nuclear proliferation, have now made commitments toward gradual reduction of weapon numbers until a tiny fraction of the warheads currently active will be usable. [4] All countries, both with and without nuclear weapons, should adopt this lesson. They should contribute toward non-proliferation, thus making the world safer from the threat of nuclear conflict and destruction. Clearly, the focus should be on the reduction of nuclear weapons, not their increase.  [1] Andrew, Christopher and Gordievsky, Oleg. 1991. “KGB: The Inside story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev”. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.  [2] Rogers, Paul. 2007. “From Evil Empire to Axis of Evil”. Oxford Research Group.  [3] Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  [4] Baker, Peter. 2010. “Twists and Turns on Way to Arms Pact With Russia”. The New York Times.

negative: The war in Afghanistan is necessary for US and NATO security  The timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan means withdrawing by the end of 2012, regardless of the security situation, and handing over the conflict against the Taliban and Al Qaida (which will almost certainly still be going on) to a largely Afghan force which is ill-prepared to handle the war on its own. This means that proponents of the timetable withdrawal must support pulling NATO forces out of Afghanistan even if the war is going badly at the end of 2012 and it is clear that the withdrawal will benefit the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the battlefield. "Afghan forces simply do not currently have the capacity to do the protecting themselves at this point and, given the challenges of building up new institutions in Afghanistan after decades of war, will not necessarily have the ability until by the end of 2012.” US and NATO forces are needed to mentor and partner with Afghans as they build up an army and police force largely from scratch. Withdrawing before this task is completed adds up to a prescription for a drying up of intelligence and a Taliban victory. [1]  If the Taliban were thus to come to power in Afghanistan after the timetabled withdrawal, al-Qaeda would not be far behind. The USA's top nemesis would be able to salvage a victory in the very place from which it launched the 9/11 attacks eight years ago. Al-Qaeda would have its favourite bases and sanctuaries back, as well as a major propaganda win. [2]  This defeat for the West in Afghanistan would embolden its opponents not just in Pakistan, but all around the world, leaving it open to more attacks. [3]  The West has a security interest in preventing the region from slipping into a maelstrom of conflict. Pakistan, with 170m people and nuclear weapons, is vulnerable to the Taliban’s potent mixture of ethnic-Pushtun nationalism and extremist Islam, as its state power is tenuous. Anarchy in Afghanistan, or a Taliban restoration, would leave it prey to permanent cross-border instability. [4]  Therefore success in Afghanistan is key to the security in Pakistan. The US has even more reasons to care about the security of Pakistan when the India-Pakistan conflict is considered, especially as both sides of this have nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have come within a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. If Pakistan were to fall apart, it would potentially leave nuclear weapons and a large military in the hands of extremist Muslim groups, which could lead to a regional war with India. It is a compelling and vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia—which makes “fixing” Afghanistan in some way also a vital American interest, even if this means keeping the troops there past the timetabled withdrawal. [5]  The War on Terror cannot be won if the US and NATO pull out of Afghanistan and rely more simply on offshore military resources. During the 1990s, when the US tried to go after Osama bin Laden without access to nearby bases by using ships based in the Indian Ocean, the two- to four-hour flight times of drones and cruise missiles operating off such ships made prompt action to real-time intelligence impractical. [6]  Since 1979, the US has been involved in a long, complex conflict against Islamic extremism. It has fought this ideology in many ways in many places, and it is uncertain now how this conflict will evolve. However the US should understand that the conflict is unavoidable and that when extremism pushes, it is in the US and NATO'S long-term interests to push back — and that eventually, if they do so, extremism will wither. [7]  The timetabled withdrawal from Afghanistan could mean withdrawing before this struggle has been won, and handing a base for exporting terrorism to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Security comes before other state interests, largely because the rights of all citizens depend on their security first, and so the security dimension here is key. Therefore, in order to protect the security of the US and other NATO countries, the timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan should be abandoned, and the troops should remain there until the job is done.  [1] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009   [2] ibid  [3] The Economist. "Obama's War". 15 October 2009.   [4] ibid  [5] Foust, Joshua. "The Case for Afghanistan: Strategic Considerations". Registan. 27 August 2009.   [6] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009   [7] Brooks, David. "The Afghan Imperative". New York Times. 24 September 2009.

negative: onal asia politics defence house would ignore north korean provocations The United States has its own interests in the North Korean question, not only does it have troops in South Korea and security guarantees to maintain with its ally but it is also concerned by nuclear proliferation. If there is a chance to get rid of North Korean nuclear weapons through negotiations, or even a peace treaty should the USA not take that when it is in the US national interest? [1]  [1] DiFilippo, Anthony, ‘Time for North Korea Peace Treaty’, The Diplomat, 11 April 2012,

negative: defence science science general house supports development missile defence A strategic missile defense shield will be an effective defense against ballistic missile attacks targeted at the United States and its allies  The missile defense shield the United States intends to build is the most effective and complete ballistic missile shield ever devised. When fully armed with a complement of anti-ballistic missiles both within the United States itself, and in allied nations in Europe, the shield will be virtually impregnable to external missile attack. This means the chance of a nuclear attack succeeding against it will be very unlikely, reducing the chance not only of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and another nuclear power, but also against missiles fired by rogue states or terrorists, the biggest threats in terms of actual use of nuclear weapons (The Economist, 2009). Technologically speaking, anti-ballistic missile missiles have developed by leaps and bounds in recent years. The current system being put into operation by the United States is the Aegis combat system, designed for deployment on US Naval vessels. This new development has served to sidestep the problems associated with ground and space-based missile defense arrays, due to the slow response time of ground missiles, and the still unfeasible orbital deployment. The sea-based defense array, furthermore, lacks the problem of the land-based system in that it does not need to be placed in countries other than the United States in order to be effective (thus avoiding the political problems of the past). Technology and diplomacy have clearly made a national missile defense system highly desirable.

negative: The bombing was immoral and illegal  The use of the Atomic bomb raised immediate moral questions as to its use.  Albert Einstein argued “The American decision [to use the bomb] may have been a fatal error, for men accustom themselves to thinking a weapon which has been used once can be used again... [on the other hand] Our renunciation of this weapon as too terrible to use would have carried great weight” [1] So far Einstein has been proved wrong and the precedent thus set has not been followed. That the bombs are ‘to terrible to use’ does seem to have sunk in.  The use of the bombs was also illegal as it would have breached the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, signed by the US. Of Hague IV The Laws and Customs of War on Land it probably breached articles 23, forbidding the use of weapons that cause ‘unnecessary suffering’, and article 25 forbidding the attack of undefended towns. It would certainly by its indiscriminate nature have breached article 27 “In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes” [2] as well as the attendant declaration forbidding attack from aircraft!  Clearly such sections forbidding attack from aircraft, or balloons in the 1899 version make the Hague convention seem antiquated but the laws of war in general remain even now as they were codified in 1907. [3] The International Court of Justice has referred back to these precedents “In the view of the vast majority of states as well as the writers there can be no doubt as to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons. The Court shares that view.” [4] That humanitarian law included the Hague conventions. The court reconfirmed the view that “States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets” [5] It is noteworthy that dissensions from a position of banning the use of nuclear weapons entirely focus on the possible use with minimal civilian casualties. [6] Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings did not attempt to minimize civilian casualties the implication is that their use was illegal based upon the Hague conventions that were already in force.  [1] Albert Einstein, quoted by Rudolph A. Winnacker, ‘The Debate About Hiroshima’, Military Affairs, vol.11, no.1, Spring 1947, p.25.  [2] Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907   [3] Malcom H. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge, 1997), p.807.  [4] International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, paragraphs 85-6.   [5] ibid. para. 78.  [6] ibid. para. 91.

negative: Countries need to design nuclear devices to adapt with changing defensive technology.  There are a number of technological developments that have made the use of conventional weapons ineffective in combating certain threats. For example, some bunkers are buried so deeply underground that conventional bombs cannot penetrate them. Weapons such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), currently in development in the United States, would be able to penetrate such bunkers, while leaving no more surface damage than a conventional bomb1. Deployment of a weapon such as the RNEP might prove necessary in order to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons in rogue states, as for example, Iran has built extremely tough bunkers for the purpose of nuclear testing and storage of weapons of mass destruction. Blocking the development of necessary tactical nuclear technologies actually raises the chances of these dangerous states obtaining nuclear weapons. Another instance of tactical nuclear devices proving useful is in the destruction of clandestine biological and chemical weapons factories. Were such facilities destroyed by conventional bombing, some of the materials being manufactured could easily leak into neighbouring population areas, leading to increased casualties. Clearly, in light of these defense innovations, tactical nuclear weapons are an essential addition to a nuclear power's arsenal. 1 Reynolds, Paul. 2003. "Mini-Nukes on US Agenda". BBC News.

negative: Nuclear weapons can be abolished through the co-operation of nuclear powers and the establishment of an independent verification system  The co-operation of the United States and Russia, demonstrated in their regularly-renewed START treaties, confer the ability of nuclear powers to work towards a reduction in nuclear stockpiles. A new campaigning body, Global Zero, has laid out the path to nuclear abolishment, concerning first bilateral accords to reduce stockpiles in the manner already occurring. From there, they advocate the ‘universal acceptance of a comprehensive verification and enforcement system accompanied by tighter controls on fissile materials produced by civil-nuclear programmes’ (The Economist, 2011). The process will not be swift, but it is plausible and not a stretch considering the success of previous START treaties and the example of the International Atomic Energy Agency as an independent body charged with verifying nuclear installations.

negative: defence house believes all nations have right nuclear weapons The threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of rogue states and terrorists increases as more countries possess them  There are many dangerous dictators and tyrants, many of who covet the possession of nuclear weapons not just for the purpose of defence, but also for that of intimidating their neighbours. [1] Such leaders should not possess nuclear weapons, nor should they ever be facilitated in their acquisition. For example, Iran has endeavoured for years on a clandestine nuclear weapons program that, were it recognized as a legitimate pursuit, could be increased in scale and completed with greater speed. The result of such an achievement could well destabilize the Middle East and would represent a major threat to the existence of a number of states within the region, particularly Israel. Furthermore, the risk of nuclear weapons, or at least weapons-grade material, falling into the hands of dissidents and terrorists increases substantially when there are more of them and larger numbers of countries possess them. Additionally, many countries in the developing world lack the capacity to safely secure weapons if they owned them, due to lack of technology, national instability, and government corruption. [2] Recognizing the rights of these countries to hold nuclear weapons vastly increases the risk of their loss or misuse.  [1] Slantchev, Branislav. 2005. “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises”. American Political Science Review 99(4).  [2] Sagan, Scott D. 1993. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

negative: A world government is not needed to prevent nuclear world war, because such a war would be so catastrophic that the common sense of humanity will prevent it from ever happening. From the earliest days of the nuclear arms race, and especially after intercontinental ballistic missiles were perfected in the 1960s as the principal means of delivery of nuclear bombs, a delivery system for which no plausible defense could be devised, it was recognized that all-out world war was no longer a viable option in the contemporary world, simply because such a war would almost inevitably entail Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Not only would the immediate death and destruction be overwhelming, but the long-term effects from radiation and possible nuclear winter could be even worse. In the MAD world, the populations of all nations, especially those of the major powers, are held hostage in a sort of perpetual “Mexican standoff.” As paradoxical as it may seem, the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic delivery systems has created the most effective deterrent to unrestricted warfare ever seen in the history of the human race. The inescapable horrors of a nuclear war guarantee that such a war will never happen.

negative: An assault weapons ban would stop the manufacture of many of the deadliest guns.  Yes a ban would not immediately take assault weapons off the streets but there would be significant long term benefits as highlighted by Connecticut Senator Joe Liberman "We ought to restore the assault weapons ban -- not to take anybody's guns away that they have now, but to stop the manufacturing of these weapons." [1] The ban would stop manufacturers from making the weapons and with the legislation improved from the 1994 version it would be possible to prevent the cosmetic changes that were made to keep guns on the market. [2] This would mean that prices both in the USA and globally would increase as there would be less supply. One positive result might also be help to change the United States’ position on the arms trade treaty which would further restrict global supply. [3] This would answer Mexican calls to cut off the supply of guns into the country that helps make the drugs violence in the country so deadly both by meaning less of the weapons are made and by helping to cut off the route through which weapons get into Mexico. [4] A ban on assault weapons would not fix Mexico but it would deprive arms smugglers of the closest, easiest and cheapest place to buy the arms used by the drugs cartels. [5]  [1] Jamieson, Dave, ‘Connecticut Gov. Dannel Malloy Calls For Tougher Gun Controls’, The Huffington Post, 16 December 2012,   [2] Epstein, Edward, ‘NRA clout is outgunning Feinstein / Assault weapons ban renewal in doubt’, SFGate, 28 June 2004,   [3] Urquhart, Conal, ‘Arms trade treaty failure is disappointing, says William Hague’, guardian.co.uk, 28 July 2012,   [4] ‘Mexico urges U.S. to review gun laws after Colorado shooting’, Reuters, 21 July 2012,   [5] Chertoff, Emily, ‘Regulating U.S.-Made Assault Weapons: The International Case’, The Atlantic, 19 December 2012,

negative: defence science science general house supports development missile defence As a matter of principle, every country, including the United States, has the right to defend itself to the best of its technological and economic ability  The nation-state is the fundamental building block of the international system, and is recognized as such in all international treaties and organizations (Mearsheimer, 1993). States are recognized as having the right to defend themselves, and this right must extend to the possession of a strategic national missile defense system. The United States has every right to develop such a system if it will furnish a greater measure of defense for its citizens and interests. US military technology is the most advanced and prodigiously financed in the world, which is why it is generally the United States that stands at the forefront of new defense and combat systems. The National Missile Defense program is simply the newest tool in the arsenal of the world’s greatest military, whose purpose is entirely defensive. To shield itself from potential ballistic missile, and even nuclear, attack the United States has the right to build a missile shield to defend itself and its allies under its aegis. There is no principled justification for a country to not pursue defense initiatives that benefit itself and that it wishes to pursue.

negative: Withdrawal from Article 98 agreements would hamper relations with the US  Many of the states in Europe that have signed up to BIA’s are applicant to NATO which leaves them in a difficult position when it comes to withdrawing from such a treaty. While NATO members are exempt from the punitive provisions aimed at states who do not have Article 98 agreements, in order to join NATO the state will need the support of the United States. Such support will be less forthcoming if that country has abandoned an agreement with the United States such as a BIA. Linking issues is not unusual in international relations whether it is linking multiple issues in a single larger negotiation or blocking progress in joining an organisation as a result of a single issue. Perhaps the best example of this occurring is Turkey and the EU where Turkey’s membership has been held up by its dispute with Cyprus over the northern half of the island. [1]  Even if the United States were to allow an application to NATO to proceed despite the abandonment of their bilateral treaty relations will surely be damaged. No state is going to welcome another state unilaterally withdrawing from a treaty they have signed. The Eastern European states value their relationship with the United States due to that country’s commitment to their independence and support during the early 1990s as the soviet bloc broke up. It would not make sense for these small independent countries to risk relations with the world’s most powerful statements over an agreement which is unlikely to ever have a practical relevance.  [1] Rinke, Andreas, and Solaker, Gulsen, “Cyprus remains stumbling block in Turkey’s EU ambition: Merkel”, Reuters, 25 February 2013,

negative: defence house believes all nations have right nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons serve to defuse international conflicts and force compromise  Nuclear weapons create stability, described in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Countries with nuclear weapons have no incentive to engage in open military conflict with one another; all recognize that they will suffer destruction if they choose the path of war. [1] If countries have nuclear weapons, fighting simply becomes too costly. This serves to defuse conflicts, and reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of war. For example, the conflict between India and Pakistan was defused by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both sides. Before they obtained nuclear weapons, they fought three wars that claimed millions of lives. Relations between the two states, while still far from cordial, have never descended into open war. The defusing of the immediate tension of war, has given the chance for potential dialogue. [2] A similar dynamic has been played out a number of times in the past, and as of yet there has never been a war between two nuclear powers. When states have nuclear weapons they cannot fight, making the world a more peaceful place.  [1] Waltz, Kenneth. 1981. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”. Adelphi Papers 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.  [2] Nizamani, Haider K. 2000. The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. Westport: Praeger.

negative: North Korea represents a clear danger to its neighbours and their allies and that is unlikely to change  [1] Tania Branigan The Guardian 23 November 2010  [2] Green, Shane, ‘North Korea  North Korea is virtually the definition of a rogue state. It remains technically at war with the South and frequently this manifests itself in acts of aggression. In any other situation the regime bombing of Yeonpyeong island would have been considered an act of war and met with a military response [1] . The regime’s relentless pursuit of nuclear weaponry poses a very real threat. The regime has tested missiles at least capable of reaching Tokyo and Seoul and has indicated a desire to be able to reach Washington, [2] James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is worried that they will be able to hit the west coast within a few years. [3] It seems reasonable to assume that, with the limited resources of the state being spent on these two goals, rather than feeding the people, the regime will ultimately succeed in their ambitions. Waiting until they can actually bomb North America or Europe would make Kim Jong-Un or his successor far too secure. Although it seems unlikely that he would ever mount an attack with conventional weapons, access to an appropriate delivery system and a nuclear warhead would make his removal by military means virtually impossible. Removing him from office before this happens is essential for the security of the region and the world.  [1] Tania Branigan The Guardian 23 November 2010  [2] Green, Shane, ‘North Korea threatens to attack US’, The Age, 8 March 2003  [3] Barnes, Julian E., ‘U.S. may be within N.Korea missile range in 3 years, official warns’, Los Angeles Times, 17 June 2009  threatens to attack US’, The Age, 8 March 2003  [3] Barnes, Julian E., ‘U.S. may be within N.Korea missile range in 3 years, official warns’, Los Angeles Times, 17 June 2009

negative: The development of tactical nuclear weapons by one state would lead to a new global arms race.  When one state develops a new military technology that could potentially tip the strategic balance in its favor, other countries are quick to take notice and to attempt to develop the technology themselves. During the Cold War, the nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union reached a fever pitch, with both states spending vast quantities of money and resources to build newer, deadlier, and ever more plentiful nuclear arsenals. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, the nuclear arms race has been at low ebb. Recent moves by the United States, as well as Russia and China, to develop newer, smaller nuclear weapons, as well as to open discussion of tactical application of such weapons outside the paradigm of MAD, however, threaten to bring the nuclear arms race into the 21st century1. If nuclear weapons begin to permeate the tactical decisions of states, from use in bunker-busting to destroying armor formations, they will cease to hold the special power of fear that has kept them from ever being employed in combat since World War II. A race to develop easier to use, less accountable weapons, while eroding the taboo against their use, spells a recipe for disaster. 1 Jervis, Robert. 2001. "Weapons Without Purpose? Nuclear Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era". Foreign Affairs.