<P> The free speech and free press clauses have been interpreted as providing the same protection to speakers as to writers , except for wireless broadcasting which has been given less constitutional protection . The Free Press Clause protects the right of individuals to express themselves through publication and dissemination of information , ideas and opinions without interference , constraint or prosecution by the government . This right was described in Branzburg v. Hayes as `` a fundamental personal right '' that is not confined to newspapers and periodicals . In Lovell v. City of Griffin ( 1938 ) , Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes defined `` press '' as `` every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion '' . This right has been extended to media including newspapers , books , plays , movies , and video games . While it is an open question whether people who blog or use social media are journalists entitled to protection by media shield laws , they are protected equally by the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause , because both clauses do not distinguish between media businesses and nonprofessional speakers . This is further shown by the Supreme Court consistently refusing to recognize the First Amendment as providing greater protection to the institutional media than to other speakers . For example , in a case involving campaign finance laws the Court rejected the `` suggestion that communication by corporate members of the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the same communication by '' non-institutional - press businesses . </P>
<P> The free speech and free press clauses have been interpreted as providing the same protection to speakers as to writers , except for wireless broadcasting which has been given less constitutional protection . The Free Press Clause protects the right of individuals to express themselves through publication and dissemination of information , ideas and opinions without interference , constraint or prosecution by the government . This right was described in Branzburg v. Hayes as `` a fundamental personal right '' that is not confined to newspapers and periodicals . In Lovell v. City of Griffin ( 1938 ) , Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes defined `` press '' as `` every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion '' . This right has been extended to media including newspapers , books , plays , movies , and video games . While it is an open question whether people who blog or use social media are journalists entitled to protection by media shield laws , they are protected equally by the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause , because both clauses do not distinguish between media businesses and nonprofessional speakers . This is further shown by the Supreme Court consistently refusing to recognize the First Amendment as providing greater protection to the institutional media than to other speakers . For example , in a case involving campaign finance laws the Court rejected the `` suggestion that communication by corporate members of the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the same communication by '' non-institutional - press businesses . </P>
when did the supreme court rule that movies were a form of protected speech
when did the supreme court rule that movies were a form of protected speech
1938
1938