Domestic violence
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE ... 55. In its report entitled “Violence towards women” (2014) the National Statistics Institute (ISTAT) provided statistical data concerning violence towards women. “ Istat carried out the survey in 2014, on a sample of 24,000 women aged 16 ‑ 70.The results are to be widely disseminated also among migrant women. Istat carried out the survey in 2014, on a sample of 24,000 women aged 16-70. Estimates indicate the most affected foreign women for citizenship: Romania, Ukraine, Albania, Morocco, Moldavia, China. More specifically, according to the second Istat survey, 6,788,000 women have been victims of some forms of violence, either physical or sexual, during their life, that is 31.5% of women aged 16-70. 20.2% has been victim of physical violence; 21% of sexual violence and 5.4% of the most serious forms of sexual violence such as rape and attempted rape: 652,000 women have been victims of rape; and 746,000 have been victims of attempted rape. Further, foreign women are victims of sexual or physical violence on a scale similar to Italian women ’ s: 31.3% and 31.5%, respectively. However, physical violence is more frequent among the foreign women (25.7% vs. 19.6%), while sexual violence is more common among Italian women (21.5% vs. 16.2%). Specifically, foreign women are more exposed to rape and attempted rape (7.7% vs. 5.1%) with Moldavians (37,3%), Romanians (33,9%) and Ukrainians (33,2%) who are the most affected ones. As for the author, current and former partners are those who commit the most serious crimes. 62.7% of rapes is committed by the current or the former partner while the authors of sexual assault in the majority of cases are unknown (76.8%). As for the age of the victim, 10.6% of women have been victims of sexual violence prior to the age of 16. Considering VAW-cases against women with children who have been witnessed violence, the rate of children witnessing VAW cases rises to 65.2% compared to the 2006 figure (= 60.3%). As for women ’ s status, women separated or divorced are those far more exposes to physical or sexual violence (51.4% vs. 31.5% relating to all other cases). It remains of great concern the situation of women with disabilities or diseases. 36% of the women with bad health conditions and 36.6% of those with serious limitations have been victims of physical or sexual violence. The risk to be exposed to rape or attempted rape doubles compared to women without any health problems (10% vs. 4.7%). On a positive note, compared to the previous edition-2006, sexual and physical violence cases result to be reduced from 13.3% to 11.3%. This is the result of an increased awareness of existing protection tools by women in the first place and the public opinion at large, in addition to an overall social climate of condemnation and no mercy for such crimes. More specifically, physical or sexual violence cases committed by a partner or a former partner is reduced (as for the former, from 5.1% to 4%; as for the latter, from 2.8% to 2%) as well as for cases of VAW perpetrated by non-partners (from 9% to 7.7%). The decline is meaningful when considering cases among female students: it reduced from 17.1% to 11.9% in the event of former partners; from 5.3% to 2.4% in the event of current partner; and from 26.5% to 22%, in the event of a non-partner. Significantly reduced are those cases of psychological violence committed by the current partner (from 42.3% to 26.4%), especially when they are not coupled with physical and sexual violence. Women are far more aware that they have survived a crime (from 14.3% to 29.6% in case of violence by the partner) and it is reported far more often to the police (from 6.7% to 11.8%). More often, they talk about that with someone (from 67.8% to 75.9%) and look for professional help (from 2.4% to 4.9%). The same applies in the event of violence by a non-partner. Compared to the 2006 edition, survivors are far more satisfied with the relevant work carried out by the police. In the event of violence from the current or the former partner, data show an increase from 9.9% to 28.5%. Conversely, negative results emerge when considering cases of rape or attempted rape (1.2% in both editions). The forms of violence are far more serious with an increase of those also victims of injuries (from 26.3% to 40.2% when the partner is the author); and an increased number of women that were fearing that their life was in danger (from 18.8% in 2006 to 34.5% in 2014). Also the forms of violence by a non-partner are more serious. 3, 466,000 women (=16.1%) have been victims of stalking during lifetime, of whom 1, 524,000 have been victims of their former partner; and 2,229,000 from other person that the former partner.” III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW 56. The relevant international law is partly described in the case of Opuz v. Turkey (no. 33401/02, §§ 72-82, ECHR 2009) and partly in the case of Rumor v. Italy ( no. 72964/10, §§ 31-35, 27 May 2014). 57. At its 49 th session, which was held from 11 to 29 July 201 1, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ( “ the CEDAW Committee ” ) adopted its concluding comments on Italy, of which the passages relevant to the present case read as follows :- “26. The Committee welcomes the adoption of the Act No. 11/2009 which introduced a crime of stalking and mandatory detention for perpetrator of acts of sexual violence, the National Action Plan to Combat Violence against Women and Stalking as well as the first comprehensive research on physical, sexual and psychological violence against women developed by the National Statistics Institute. However, it remains concerned about the high prevalence of violence against women and girls and the persistence of socio-cultural attitudes condoning domestic violence, as well as lack of data on violence against immigrant, Roma and Sinti women and girls. The Committee is further concerned about the high number of women murdered by their partner or ex-partner (femicide), which may indicate a failure of the State party ’ s authorities to adequately protect the women victims from their partners or ex-partners. In accordance with its general recommendation No. 19 on violence against women and the views adopted by the Committee under the Optional Protocol procedures, the Committee urges the State party to: (a) put emphasis on comprehensive measures to address violence against women in the family and in society, including through addressing the specific needs of women made vulnerable by particular circumstances, such as Roma and Sinti, migrant and older women and women with disabilities; (b) ensure that female victims of violence have immediate protection, including expulsion of perpetrator from the home, guarantee that they can stay in secure and well funded shelters, in all parts of the country, and that they have access to free legal aid, psycho-social counselling and adequate redress, including compensation; (d) enhance the system of appropriate data collection on all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence, protection measures, prosecutions and sentences imposed on perpetrators and conduct appropriate surveys to assess the prevalence of violence experienced by women belonging to disadvantaged groups, such as Roma and Sinti, migrant and older women and women with disabilities; (e) further pursue, in collaboration with a broad range of stakeholders, including women ’ s and other civil society organizations, awareness-raising campaigns through the media and public education programmes to make violence against women socially unacceptable and disseminate information on available measures to prevent acts of violence against women among the general public; (f) ratify the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, in a timely manner. ” 58. On 27 September 2012 the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) was signed. It was ratified by Italy on 10 September 2013 and came into force in that country on 1 August 2014. The passages of that Convention relevant to the present case are partly set out in the case of Y. v. Slovenia (no. 41107/10, § § 72, ECHR 2015 (extracts) ). Furthermore, Article 3 of that Convention provides : Article 3 – Definitions “For the purpose of this Convention: a “violence against women” is understood as a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women and shall mean all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life; b “domestic violence” shall mean all acts of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence that occur within the family or domestic unit or between former or current spouses or partners, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the victim; ... ” 59. The conclusions of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, drawn up following his official visit to Italy (from 15 to 26 January 2012), read as follows:- “ VII. Conclusions and recommendations 91. Efforts have been made by the Government to address the issue of violence against women, including through the adoption of laws and policies and the establishment and merger of governmental bodies responsible for the promotion and protection of women ’ s rights. Yet these achievements have not led to a decrease in the femicide rate or translated into real improvements in the lives of many women and girls, particularly Roma and Sinti women, migrant women and women with disabilities. 92. Despite the challenges of the current political and economic situation, targeted and coordinated efforts in addressing violence against women, through practical and innovative use of limited resources, need to remain a priority. The high levels of domestic violence, which are contributing to rising levels of femicide, demand serious attention. 93. The Special Rapporteur would like to offer the Government the following recommendations. A. Law and policy reforms 94. The Government should: (a) Put in place a single dedicated governmental structure to deal exclusively with the issue of substantive gender equality broadly and violence against women in particular, to overcome duplication and lack of coordination; (b) Expedite the creation of an independent national human rights institution with a section dedicated to women ’ s rights; (c) Adopt a specific law on violence against women to address the current fragmentation which is occurring in practice due to the interpretation and implementation of the civil, criminal and procedures codes; (d) Address the legal gap in the areas of child custody and include relevant provisions relating to protection of women who are the victims of domestic violence; (e) Provide education and training to strengthen the skills of judges to effectively address cases of violence against women; (f) Ensure the provision of quality, State-sponsored legal aid to women victims of violence as envisaged in the constitution and Law No. 154/200 on measures against violence in family relations; (g) Promote existing alternative forms of detention, including house arrest and low-security establishments for women with children, having due regard to the largely non-violent nature of the crimes for which they are incarcerated and the best interest of children; (h) Adopt a long-term, gender-sensitive and sustainable policy for social inclusion and empowerment of marginalized communities, with a particular focus on women ’ s health, education, labour and security; (i) Ensure the involvement of representatives of these communities, particularly women, in the design, development and implementation of policies which impact them; (j) Ensure continued provision of quality education for all, including through a flexible application of the 30 per cent ceiling of non-Italian pupils per classroom, to allow for inclusive schools particularly in places where the population of non-Italians is high. (k) Amend the “Security Package” laws generally, and the crime of irregular migration in particular, to ensure access of migrant women in irregular situations to the judiciary and law enforcement agencies, without fear of detention and deportation; (l) Address the existing gender disparities in the public and private sectors by effectively implementing the measures provided by the Constitution and other legislation and policies to increase the number of women, including from marginalized groups, in the political, economic, social, cultural and judicial spheres; (m) Continue to remove legal hurdles affecting the employment of women, which is exacerbated through the practice of signing blank resignations, and the lower positions and salary scale for women. Strengthen the social welfare system by removing impediments to the integration of women into the labour market; (n) Ratify and implement the Convention on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and cooperation in respect of parental responsibility and measures for the protection of children; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, International Labour Organization Convention No. 189 (2011) concerning decent work for domestic workers; the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes and the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. B. Societal changes and awareness-raising initiatives 95. The Government should also: (a) Continue to conduct awareness-raising campaigns aimed at eliminating; (b) Strengthen the capacity of the National Racial Discrimination Office to put in place programmes to bring about change in society ’ s perception of women who belong to marginalized communities and groups; (c) Continue to conduct targeted sensitization campaigns, including with CSOs, to increase awareness on violence against women generally, and women from marginalized groups in particular; (d) Train and sensitize the media on women ’ s rights including on violence against women, in order to achieve a non-stereotyped representation of women and men in the national media. C. Support services 96. The Government should further: (a) Continue to take the necessary measures, including financial, to maintain existing and/or set-up new anti-violence shelters for the assistance and protection of women victims of violence; (b) Ensure that shelters operate according to international and national human rights standards and that accountability mechanisms are put in place to monitor the support provided to women victims of violence; (c) Enhance coordination and exchange of information among the judiciary, police and psychosocial and health operators who deal with violence against women; (d) Recognize, encourage and support public-private partnerships with CSOs and higher learning institutions, to provide research and responses to addressing violence against women.” 60. A report by the non-governmental organisation WAVE (Women Against Violence Europe) on Italy was published in 2015. The part relevant to the present case reads as follows: “ In 2014, 681 women and 721 children were accommodated at 45 women ’ s shelters that are part of the national network Associazione Nazionale Donne in Rete contro la violenza - D.i.R.e. In addition, there are three shelters for Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) women, migrant and asylum seeking women in the cities of Reggio Emilia, Imola and Modena, one shelter for girls and young women victims of forced marriage, and 12 shelters for victims of trafficking. Women ’ s Centres There are 140 women ’ s centres providing non-residential support to women survivors of any kind of violence in Italy; 113 of these centres are run by NGOs, 19 are run by the state, and 8 are run by faith-based organisations. While the exact number of such services is not known, there are several women ’ s centres for Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) women, as well as centres for women victims of trafficking. All the women ’ s centres provide information and advice, counselling, advocacy and practical support with access to social rights (i.e. housing, income, health care) and legal advice. Some only provide specialist support for children and family support, and cooperate with programmes for perpetrators of violence against women. Women ’ s Networks There is one national women ’ s network in Italy, called Associazione Nazionale Donne in Rete contro la violenza - D.i.R.e. The network includes 73 members, all women ’ s organisations running women ’ s shelters and anti-violence centres in Italy. Formed in 2008 and based in Rome, the network conduct activities in the areas of public awareness, lobbying and advocacy, training, research and networking. In 2014, the network received EUR 66,747 in funding from various private donors and foundations for specific projects, and EUR 20,000 in membership fees. Policy & Funding The Extraordinary Action Plan against gender and sexual violence in accordance with art.5 par. 1 Law Decree 14 August 2013 n.93 converted with amendments into Law 15 October 2013 n.119 ( Piano di Azione Straordinario contro la violenza sessuale e di genere ai sensi dell ’ art 5 comma 1 D.L. 14 Agosto 2013 n. 93 convertito con modifiche nella legge del 15 Ottobre 2013 n 119 ) was launched in 2015 and covers a three-year period [voir paragraphe 53 ci-dessus]. The Plan addresses rape and sexual assault only marginally, and it does not provide for adequate financing of existing services or to create new services in the many regions where these are inexistent. While forced and early marriage is mentioned in the Plan, no particular measures are included. Conceived as an extraordinary measure provided for in a law decree addressing other subjects, the Plan generally fails to address the structural characteristics of violence against women and gender-based violence. Measures and interventions included in the Plan do not consider women ’ s shelters and anti-violence centres as key actors in providing specialist support to survivors of violence, with a gender perspective. The Department for Equal Opportunities – Presidency of the Council of Ministers – acts as coordinating body for the implementation of policies on VAW. This body has in practice little effectiveness, largely due to the failure of the President of the Council of Ministers to appoint a Minister with decision-making. There is currently no national monitoring body entrusted with the evaluation of national strategies on VAW in Italy, and women ’ s organisations are rarely invited to conduct such evaluation. Nonetheless, in 2014, a coalition of Italian women ’ s NGOs (among which D.i.R.e.) submitted a Shadow Report on the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action covering 2009-2014, and including review of national strategies on VAW. In 2014, funding for governmental activities to combat VAW equalled EUR 7 million, while very little funding was provided for NGOs activities through local regional governments; detailed information on funding for NGOs activities is not available, due to the budget being decentralized. State funding for women ’ s organisations providing support is exclusively project-based. Prevention, Awareness-raising, Campaigning The national women ’ s network, along with most of the women ’ s shelters and centres, and the national women ’ s helpline conduct activities in the field of prevention, awareness-raising and campaigning; besides the national women ’ s helpline (1522), none of them received funding to carry out these activities in 2014. Training Most of the women ’ s shelters and centres conduct trainings with a number of target groups: police, judiciary, civil servants, health professionals, psychologists, social workers, education professionals, media, and others.” THE LAW ... II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION 76. Relying on Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that, owing to their complacency and indifference, the Italian authorities, despite having been alerted several times to her husband ’ s violence, had not taken the necessary measures to protect her and her son ’ s life from the – in her view real and known – risk represented by her husband, and had not prevented the commission of other domestic violence. She alleged that the authorities had thus failed to comply with their positive obligation under the Convention. 77. The Court reiterates that since it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, it does not consider itself bound by the characterisation given by an applicant or a government. By virtue of the jura novit curia principle, it has, for example, considered of its own motion complaints under Articles or paragraphs not relied on by the parties. In other words, a complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on ( see Aksu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 4149/04 and 41029/04, § 43, ECHR 2012 ). Having regard to the circumstances complained of by the applicant and the manner in which her complaints were formulated, the Court will examine them under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( for a similar approach, see E.M. v. Romania, no. 43994/05, § 51, 30 October 201 2; Valiulienė v. Lithuania, no. 33234/07, § 87, 26 March 2013; and M.G. v. Turkey, no. 646/10, § 62, 22 March 2016 ). Those Articles provide : Article 2 “1. Everyone ’ s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. Article 3 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 78. The Government disputed that argument. A. The applicant ’ s submissions 79. The applicant alleged that the failure by the authorities to comply with their obligation to protect her life and that of her son, who was killed by her husband, had resulted in a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. She submitted in that regard that the Italian authorities had failed to protect her son ’ s right to life and that they had been negligent before the repeated violence, threats and injuries which she herself had endured. 80. She argued that the Italian authorities had tolerated de facto her husband ’ s violence. In her submission, the police had known since June 2012 that she had been a victim of violence and should have known that there was a real and serious risk that A.T. would be violent towards her. According to the applicant, there had been clear signs of a continuing threat of danger to her, but the authorities had not taken the necessary measures immediately after she had lodged her complaint and had thus left her alone and defenceless. 81. The applicant alleged, further, that, despite the hospital certificate of 19 August 2012 establishing that she had been beaten and threatened with a knife, that fact had not been taken seriously. 82. In the applicant ’ s view, the only remedy available had been a criminal complaint and this had not been effective. She stated that she had lodged a complaint on 5 September 2012 and made a statement to the police in April 2013. She added that, during the seven months between lodging the complaint and giving her statement, no investigative steps had been taken and no witnesses heard. In March 2013 the public prosecutor had again had to ask the police to investigate (see paragraph 29 above). 83. The applicant complained of the authorities ’ complacency and stated that she had changed her version of the facts once she had been questioned by the police seven months after lodging her complaint. In her view, it was clear that the State had not protected her and that she had been abandoned by the authorities, who had not taken any measures to protect her despite her request. The applicant also stated that the Udine District Council, while aware of the difficult situation in which she found herself, had refused to help her and had stopped funding her accommodation at the shelter run by the association for the protection of battered women. In her submission, the authorities should have intervened of their own motion given the circumstances of the case and her vulnerability. 84. The applicant argued that, according to the Court ’ s case-law, the positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention imposed a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person and backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions. She submitted that this could also imply in certain circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life was at risk from the criminal acts of another individual (she referred to Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, § 115, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ VIII, cited in Kontrová v. Slovakia, no. 7510/04, § 49, 31 May 200 7). She concluded that in the present case the Italian State had not taken the necessary measures to protect her life and that of her son. 85. Referring to the Court ’ s case-law ( Opuz, cited above, § 159), the applicant complained that she had also been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. She reiterated that she had lodged a complaint, supported by her medical case notes, in September 2012 and that, for seven months, the authorities had done nothing to protect her. She added that her husband had meanwhile succeeded in convincing her to come back and live with him. 86. In conclusion, the applicant submitted that the State had failed to comply with its positive obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. B. The Government ’ s submissions 87. After stating the principles established in the Court ’ s case-law, the Government submitted that not every claimed risk to life could entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising ( they referred to Opuz, cited above, § 129). In their submission, it also had to be established that the authorities had known or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they had failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. 88. Furthermore, the Government considered that the present case had to be distinguished from the case of Opuz (cited above). In their submission, in the present case the authorities had not known and could not have known that the applicant and her son ’ s lives were at risk, as there had been no tangible evidence that their lives were in imminent danger. They pointed out that, after the two episodes of violence in June and August 2012 the applicant had found refuge in a victim support shelter and that she had subsequently found employment providing her with financial independence. In the Government ’ s submission, the two episodes reported in June and August 2012 had appeared to be mere family rows. The Government submitted that the authorities had done everything in their power by fining A.T. for unauthorised possession of a lethal weapon, and that an investigation in respect of ill-treatment and bodily injury required that a complaint be lodged. 89. The Government also stated that the applicant had left the shelter where she had taken refuge and that when she had been questioned by the police in April 2013 she had changed her earlier statements. They observed that the authorities, before discontinuing the complaint of ill-treatment, had checked whether her version of the facts was accurate, whether there had been other events of that type and whether the applicant had been in a vulnerable situation capable of inducing her to change her statements. According to the Government, the applicant had then stated that there had been no further incident and that A.T. had calmed down. 90. In those circumstances the Government considered that an intervention by the authorities could have breached Article 8 of the Convention. 91. In their view, the time that elapsed between lodging the complaint and hearing the applicant had not had the effect of leaving the applicant exposed to violence from A.T. The Government pointed out, further, that as no other request for intervention had been made, there had been no specific sign of real and immediate violence. They added that on the basis of the aforementioned factors the authorities had decided not to prosecute A.T. for ill-treatment of family members. 92. The Government submitted that the applicant had never shown that she had suffered continual abuse or violence or that she had lived in fear of being attacked. They observed, however, that during her interview with the police in April 2013 she had asserted that she was no longer being abused. 93. Consequently, the Government considered that the acts of violence allegedly suffered by the applicant could not be classified as inhuman or degrading treatment. 94. From a procedural point of view, the Government submitted that they had complied with their positive obligations under the Convention. They stated that, following the investigation, as the applicant had changed her statements, the prosecution had to request that the case be discontinued. They added that the proceedings relating to the offence of causing bodily injury had continued and that A.T. had been sentenced on 1 October 2015 to pay a fine of EUR 2, 000. C. The Court ’ s assessment 1. Applicable principles 95. The Court will examine the complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in the light of the converging principles deriving from both those provisions, principles which are well-established and have been summarised, inter alia, in the judgments Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria ([GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, §§ 110 and 112-113, ECHR 2005 ‑ VII), and Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands ([GC], no. 52391/99, §§ 324- 25, ECHR 2007 ‑ II ). 96. The Court has already stated that, in interpreting Articles 2 and 3, it must be guided by the knowledge that the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective. 97. It reiterates that Article 3, like Article 2, must be regarded as one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention and as enshrining one of the core values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 88, Series A no. 161). In contrast to the other provisions in the Convention, it is cast in absolute terms, without exception or proviso, or the possibility of derogation under Article 15 of the Convention ( see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 49, ECHR 2002 ‑ III ). 98. The Court also reiterates the general principles established in its case-law concerning domestic violence as laid down in Opuz ( cited above, § 159, with the case-law references mentioned therein ). 99. In that connection it reiterates that children and other vulnerable individuals – into which category fall victims of domestic violence – in particular are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, against such serious breaches of personal integrity ( see Opuz, cited above, § 159). It also observes that the positive obligations laid down in the first sentence of Article 2 of the Convention also require by implication that the State should set in place an efficient and independent judicial system by which the cause of a death can be established and the guilty parties punished. The essential purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in that context ( ibid., §§ 150- 51). 100. The Court has also previously held that the authorities ’ positive obligations – in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in combination with Article 3 of the Convention – may include a duty to put in place and apply an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals (see, among other authorities, Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, no. 71127/01, § 65, 12 June 2008; Sandra Janković v. Croatia, no. 38478/05, § 45, 5 March 2009; A. v. Croatia, no. 55164/08, § 60, 14 October 2010; Đorđević v. Croatia, no. 41526/10, §§ 141-143, ECHR 2012; and M. and M. v. Croatia, no. 10161/13, § 136, ECHR 2015 (extracts) ). 101. Article 2 of the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual ( see Osman, cited above, § 115; Branko Tomašić and Others v. Croatia, no. 46598/06, § 50, 15 January 2009; Opuz, cited above, § 128; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, no. 22535/93, § 85, ECHR 2000 ‑ III; and Kılıç v. Turkey, no. 22492/93, § 62, ECHR 2000 ‑ III ). Bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the scope of the positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk ( see Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, §§ 89-90, ECHR 2001 ‑ III; Gongadze v. Ukraine, no. 34056/02, § 165, ECHR 2005 ‑ XI; and Opuz, cited above, §§ 129- 30). Another relevant consideration is the need to ensure that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice, including the guarantees contained in Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention ( see Osman, cited above, § 116, and Opuz, cited above, § 129). 102. The Court reiterates that the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, even administered by private individuals. 103. Nevertheless, it is not the Court ’ s role to replace the national authorities and to choose in their stead from among the wide range of possible measures that could be taken to secure compliance with their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention ( see Opuz, cited above, § 165 ). Moreover, under Article 19 of the Convention and under the principle that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective rights, the Court has to ensure that a State ’ s obligation to protect the rights of those under its jurisdiction is adequately discharged ( see Sandra Janković, cited above, § 46, and Hajduová v. Slovakia, no. 2660/03, § 47, 30 November 2010 ). The question of the appropriateness of the authorites ’ response may raise a problem under the Convention ( see Bevacqua and S ., cited above, § 79). 104. The positive obligation to protect a person ’ s physical integrity extends to matters concerning the effectiveness of a criminal investigation, which cannot be considered to be limited solely to cases of ill-treatment by State agents ( see M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, § 151, ECHR 2003 ‑ XII ). 105. This aspect of the positive obligation does not necessarily require a conviction, but effective implementation of the law, particularly criminal, in order to secure the protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of the Convention ( see M.G. v. Turkey, cited above, § 80). 106. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in the obligation to carry out an investigation. The protection machinery provided for in domestic law must operate in practice within a reasonable time such as to conclude the examination on the merits of specific cases submitted to them ( see Opuz, cited above, §§ 150- 51). The State ’ s obligation under Article 3 of the Convention will not be deemed to be satisfied if the protection afforded by domestic law exists only in theory: above all, it must also operate effectively in practice, and that requires a prompt examination of the case without unnecessary delays. 2. Application of the above-mentioned principles to the present case a) Article 2 107. The Court observes first of all that there is no doubt that Article 2 of the Convention applies to the situation arising as a result of the death of the applicant ’ s son. 108. It notes subsequently that in the instant case the force used against the applicant was not in the event lethal. This does not, however, exclude in principle an examination of the complaints under Article 2, the text of which, read as a whole, demonstrates that it covers not only intentional killing but also situations where it is permitted to use force which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life ( see Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no. 50385/99, §§ 49-55, ECHR 2004 ‑ XI ). The first sentence of Article 2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction ( see L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, § 36, Reports 1998 ‑ III ). 109. It is also necessary to bear in mind that, where the State ’ s positive obligations to protect the right to life are concerned, it may be a question of recourse to lethal force by the police or of failure by the authorities to take protective measures to avoid a risk from the acts of third party ( see, for example, Osman, cited above, §§ 115- 22 ). 110. The Court considers that the applicant was the victim of inherently life-endangering conduct even though she ultimately survived her injuries ( see Camekan v. Turkey, no. 54241/08, § 38, 28 January 2014 ). Article 2 of the Convention therefore applies in the present case in respect of the applicant herself as well. 111. Turning to the circumstances of the instant case, the Court notes that, following the violent acts perpetrated against her in June and August 2012, the applicant lodged a criminal complaint in respect of the abuse inflicted by A.T. ( see paragraph 21 above). It observes that the applicant appended to her complaint a medical report drawn up after the assault and describing the physical injuries visible on her body ( see paragraph 16 above ). At that time she expressed her fears for her life and that of her daughter and requested the benefit of protective measures. Accordingly, the conduct of the domestic authorities must be assessed from that date onwards. 112. The Court notes that a judicial investigation was instituted against A.T. for ill-treatment of family members, inflicting grievous bodily harm and making threats. The police sent the applicant ’ s complaint to the prosecution on 9 October 2012. On 15 October 2012 the prosecuting authorities, having regard to the applicant ’ s request for protective measures, ordered urgent investigative measures to be carried out. In particular, they requested the police to check whether there had been witnesses, including the applicant ’ s daughter. It notes that in the meantime the applicant had found refuge, through an association, in a shelter for victims of violence, where she stayed for three months. 113. The Court notes that no protection order was issued, that the prosecution reiterated its request to the police in March 2013, emphasising the urgency of the situation, and that the applicant was not heard until April 2013. 114. Whilst, in the context of domestic violence, protection measures are in principle intended to avoid a dangerous situation as quickly as possible, the Court notes that seven months elapsed before the applicant was heard. Such a delay could only serve to deprive the applicant of the immediate protection required by the situation. Admittedly, as submitted by the Government, during the period in question the applicant was not subjected to further physical acts of violence by A.T. However, the Court cannot disregard the fact that the applicant, who was being harassed by telephone, was living in fear while staying at the shelter. 115. In the view, the national authorities had a duty to take account of the unusual psychological, physical and material situation in which the applicant found herself and to assess the situation accordingly, providing her with appropriate support. That was not done in this case. 116. While it is true that, seven months later, in April 2013, the applicant changed some of her statements, which led the authorities to discontinue the case in part, the Court notes that proceedings for grievous bodily harm were still pending on that date. Yet, the authorities failed to conduct any assessment of the risks facing the applicant, including the risk of renewed assaults. 117. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that, by failing to act rapidly after the applicant had lodged her complaint, the national authorities deprived the complaint of any effectiveness, creating a situation of impunity conducive to the recurrence of A.T. ’ s acts of violence against his wife and family ( see Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, no. 63034/11, § 99, 28 June 2016 ). 118. Although the Government submitted that there had been no tangible evidence of an imminent danger to the applicant ’ s life or that of her son, the Court considers that the authorities do not appear to have assessed the risks involved for the applicant as a result of A.T. ’ s behaviour. 119. It notes that the context of impunity referred to above ( see paragraph 117) reached its peak during the tragic night of 25 November 2013. The Court observes in that connection that the police intervened twice that night. Having been called out by the applicant, the police first found the bedroom door broken and the floor strewn with bottles of alcohol. The applicant had informed them that her husband had been drinking and that she had decided to call them because she thought he needed a doctor. She had told them that she had lodged a complaint against her husband in the past, but that she had subsequently changed her statements. The couple ’ s son had stated that his father was not violent towards him. Lastly, neither the applicant not her son presented any traces of violence. A.T. had been taken to hospital in a state of intoxication but had subsequently checked himself out to go to an amusement arcade. The police intervened a second time the same night when they stopped and fined A.T. during an identity check in the street. According to the police report, A.T. had been in a state of intoxication, had difficulty maintaining his balance and the police had let him go after fining him. 120. The Court notes that on neither occasion did the authorities take any specific measures to provide the applicant with adequate protection consonant with the seriousness of the situation, even though the violence inflicted on her by A.T. was known to the police as proceedings for inflicting grievous bodily harm on the applicant were still pending at the time ( see paragraph 35 above ). 121. The Court cannot speculate as to how events would have turned out if the authorities had adopted a different approach. It reiterates, however, that a failure to take reasonable measures which might realistically have altered the outcome or mitigated the harm is sufficient to engage the State ’ s responsibility ( see E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 33218/96, § 99, 26 November 2002; Opuz, cited above § 136; and Bljakaj and Others v. Croatia, no. 74448/12, § 124, 18 September 2014 ). 122. In the Court ’ s view, the risk of a real and immediate threat ( see paragraph 99 above ) must be assessed taking due account of the particular context of domestic violence. In such a situation it is not only a question of an obligation to afford general protection to society ( see Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], no. 37703/97, § 69, ECHR 2002 ‑ VIII; Maiorano and Others v. Italy, no. 28634/06, § 111, 15 December 2009; Choreftakis and Choreftaki v. Greece, no. 46846/08, § 50, 17 January 2012; and Bljakaj, cited above, § 121), but above all to take account of the recurrence of successive episodes of violence within the family unit. In that context the Court reiterates that the police had to intervene twice during the night of 25 November 2013: firstly when they inspected the damaged flat, and secondly when they stopped and fined A.T., who was in a state of intoxication. Having regard also to the fact that the police had been in a position to check, in real time, A.T. ’ s police record, the Court considers that they should have known that the applicant ’ s husband constituted a real risk to her, the imminent materialisation of which could not be excluded. It therefore concludes that the authorities failed to use their powers to take measures which could reasonably have prevented, or at least mitigated, the materialisation of a real risk to the lives of the applicant and her son. 123. The Court reiterates that in domestic violence cases perpetrators ’ rights cannot supersede victims ’ human rights to life and to physical and psychological integrity ( see Opuz, cited above, § 147). Furthermore, the State has a positive obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk. 124. In those circumstances the Court concludes that the authorities cannot be considered to have displayed due diligence. They therefore failed in their positive obligation to protect the right to life of the applicant and her son within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention. 125. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the shortcomings observed above rendered the applicant ’ s criminal complaint ineffective in the circumstances of the instant case. Accordingly, it rejects the preliminary objection raised by the Government on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies ( see paragraph 68 above ) and concludes that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. b) Article 3 126. The Court considers that the applicant can be regarded as belonging to the category of “vulnerable persons” entitled to State protection ( see A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, § 22, Reports 1998 ‑ VI ). In that connection it takes note of the acts of violence suffered by the applicant in the past. It also notes that the violent acts perpetrated against the applicant, manifesting themselves in physical injuries and psychological pressure, are sufficiently serious to be classified as ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. It must therefore be determined whether the domestic authorities acted in a manner such as to satisfy the requirements of that Article. 127. The Court has found, under Article 2 of the Convention ( see paragraph 117 above ) that, by failing to act rapidly after the applicant had lodged her complaint, the national authorities deprived the complaint of any effectiveness, creating a situation of impunity conducive to the recurrence of A.T. ’ s acts of violence against his wife and family. It also notes that A. T. was convicted on 1 October 2015 of causing grievous bodily harm following the incident in August 2012, while in the meantime he had killed his son and attempted to murder the applicant and had also been sentenced on 8 January 2015, by the Udine preliminary hearings judge to life imprisonment for the murder of his son and the attempted murder of his wife, and for the offences of ill-treatment of the applicant and her daughter. It was established that the applicant and her children had been living in a climate of violence ( see paragraph 47 above ). 128. The Court reiterates on this point that the mere passing of time can work to the detriment of the investigation, and even fatally jeopardise its chances of success ( see M.B. v. Romania, no. 43982/06, § 64, 3 November 2011 ). It also observes that the passing of time will inevitably erode the amount and quality of the evidence available and that the appearance of a lack of diligence will cast doubt on the good faith of the investigative efforts, as well as drag out the ordeal for the complainants ( see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 86, ECHR 2002 ‑ II ). 129. The Court again emphasises that special diligence is required in dealing with domestic violence cases and considers that the specific nature of domestic violence as recognised in the Preamble to the Istanbul Convention ( see paragraph 58 above ) must be taken into account in the context of domestic proceedings. It stresses in this regard that the Istanbul Convention imposes a duty on the States Parties to take “the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention are carried out without undue delay while taking into consideration the rights of the victim during all stages of the criminal proceedings ”. 130. In that connection the Court also considers that, in judicial cases involving disputes relating to violence against women, the national authorities have a duty to examine the victim ’ s situation of extreme psychological, physical and material insecurity and vulnerability and, with the utmost expedition, to assess the situation accordingly. In the instant case there is no explanation for the authorities ’ complacency for such a long period – seven months – before the instigation of criminal proceedings. Likewise, there is no explanation for why the criminal proceedings for grievous bodily harm, instituted after the applicant had lodged her complaint, lasted three years, ending on 1 October 2015. 131. Having regard to the findings in the present case, the Court considers that the manner in which the domestic authorities prosecuted the case is also a manifestation of that judicial complacency and cannot be deemed to satisfy the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. ... III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 2 AND 3 133. Relying on Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3, the applicant submitted that the omissions by the Italian authorities proved that she had been discriminated against as a woman and that the Italian legislation on domestic violence was inadequate. Article 14 of the Convention provides : “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” A. The parties ’ submissions 134. Referring to all the domestic and international legislation she considered relevant in the instant case, the applicant relied on the conclusions of the United Nations Special Rapporteur, who urged Italy to eliminate stereotypical attitudes about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family, society and workplace. 135. The applicant alleged that she had not had the benefit of adequate legislative protection and that the authorities had failed to respond appropriately to her allegations of domestic violence. In her submission, that amounted to discriminatory treatment on grounds of sex. 136. Referring to the Court ’ s conclusion regarding Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 in the case of T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova ( no. 26608/11, § § 49 and 62, 28 January 2014 ), the applicant requested the Court to conclude that there had been a violation of Article 14. 137. The Government submitted that there had not been discrimination on grounds of sex in the present case. Moreover, in their submission, the claim that discrimination was institutionalised by the criminal law or administrative or judicial practice did not stand up to close analysis. 138. They pointed out that the National Council of the Judiciary had adopted two resolutions – on 11 February 2009 and 18 March 2014 – requesting the heads of the judicial offices to organise their departments and specialise in this area in such a way as to be able to deal effectively with cases of domestic violence. 139. They added that the domestic law provided for a firm response to such acts of violence : the law on stalking ... contained provisions for combating violence against women. B. The Court ’ s assessment 1. Admissibility 140. The Court, while observing that this complaint was never examined as such by the domestic courts, considers, in the light of the circumstances of the case, that it is so closely linked to the complaints examined above that the outcome must be the same and the complaint accordingly declared admissible. 2. Merits 141. The Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, a State ’ s failure to protect women against domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection before the law and that this failure does not need to be intentional ( see Opuz, cited above, § 191). The Court has previously held that “ the general and discriminatory judicial passivity [of the police] creating a climate that was conducive to domestic violence” amounted to a violation of Article 14 of the Convention ( ibid., §§ 191 et seq .). It also found that such discriminatory treatment occurred where it could be established that the authorities ’ actions were not a simple failure or delay in dealing with the violence in question, but amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the complainant as a woman ( see Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 3564/11, § 89, 28 May 2013 ). 142. In the instant case the Court notes that the applicant was assaulted by A.T. on several occasions ( see paragraphs 10, 16, 21 and 47 above ) and that the authorities had been aware of this. 143. It observes that the authorities did not carry out any investigation in the seven months following the applicant ’ s lodging of her complaint and that no measure of protection was implemented. Whilst, admittedly, the proceedings in respect of the applicant ’ s complaint were discontinued approximately one year later, on account of her having changed her statements, the Court also notes that A.T. was convicted of grievous bodily harm three years later, on 1 October 2015, after killing his son and attempting to murder the applicant. 144. The authorities ’ complacency in the present case is particularly striking in that the prosecution had asked the police, who had remained inactive for six months, to take immediate action having regard to the applicant ’ s request for protective measures. The Court reiterates in this connection the findings it has reached regarding the domestic authorities ’ failure to provide the applicant with effective protection and the impunity enjoyed by A.T. ( see paragraph 117 above ). 145. According to the Court, the combined effect of the above-mentioned factors shows that, by underestimating, through their complacency, the seriousness of the violent acts in question, the Italian authorities in effect condoned them. The applicant was therefore a victim of discrimination, as a woman, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention ( see T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, cited above, § 62; Eremia, cited above, § 98; and Mudric v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 74839/10, § 63, 16 July 2013 ). Furthermore, the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, following his official visit to Italy ( see 59 paragraph above ), those of the CEDAW ( see paragraph 57 above ) and those of the National Statistics Institute ( see paragraph 55 above ) demonstrate the extent of the problem of domestic violence in Italy and the discrimination suffered by women in this regard. The Court considers that the applicant provided prima facie evidence, backed up by undisputed statistical data, that domestic violence primarily affects women and that, despite the reforms implemented, a large number of women are murdered by their partners or former partners (femicide) and, secondly, that the socio - cultural attitudes of tolerance of domestic violence persist ( see paragraph 57 and 59 above ). 146. That prima facie evidence, which is undisputed by the Government, distinguishes the present case from that of Rumor ( cited above, § 76), the circumstances of which were very different, and in which the Court had held that the legislative framework in Italy governing domestic violence had been effective in that case in punishing the perpetrator of the crime of which the applicant had been a victim and preventing the recurrence of violent attacks on her physical integrity and had accordingly held that there had been no violation of Article 3, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14. 147. The Court reiterates that, having found that the criminal - law system in the present case had not had an adequate deterrent effect capable of effectively preventing the unlawful acts by A.T against the personal integrity of the applicant and of her son, it held that there had been a violation of the applicant ’ s rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. 148. Having regard to its conclusions reached above ( see paragraph 145 ), the Court considers that the violence perpetrated against the applicant must be regarded as based on her sex and accordingly as a form of discrimination against women. 149. Consequently, in the circumstances of the instant case, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. ...
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 2 (right to life) of the Convention on account of the murder of the applicant’s son and her own attempted murder. It also held that there had been a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention on account of the failure of the authorities in their obligation to protect the applicant against acts of domestic violence. Lastly, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3, finding that the violence inflicted on the applicant should be considered as being grounded on sex and that it consequently amounted to a form of discrimination against women. In this respect, the Court noted in particular that the applicant had been the victim of discrimination as a woman on account of the inaction of the authorities, which had underestimated the violence in question and thus essentially endorsed it.