Alleged risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 if a deportation order was to be enforced
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. Constitution of Finland 21. According to Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of Finland ( Suomen perustuslaki, Finlands grundlag; Act no. 731/1999), the right of foreigners to enter Finland and to remain in the country is regulated by an Act. A foreigner shall not be deported, extradited or returned to another country, if in consequence he or she is in danger of a death sentence, torture or other treatment violating human dignity. B. Aliens Act 22. Section 37, subsection 1, of the Aliens Act ( ulkomaalaislaki, utlänningslagen; Act no. 301/2004 ), defines a family member for the purposes of the Act. The spouse and unmarried children under 18 years of age of the person living in Finland are regarded as his or her family members. If the person living in Finland is a minor, his or her guardian is considered a family member. 23. Under section 45, subsection 1(4), of the Act, a temporary residence permit may be issued to a foreigner before his or her arrival in Finland for special reasons. According to the travaux préparatoires to the Act (see Government Bill no. HE 28/2003), a permit under this provision could be granted to a relative other than a close family member, including grandparents, or to a foreigner who is willing to acquaint him or herself with Finnish culture or nature. In certain situations a permit could also be granted to an applicant who is sent to Finland by an international organisation to receive medical treatment. 24. Section 48 of the Act provides that a person from the former Soviet Union can be granted a continuous residence permit if he or she is of Finnish Ingrian descent and fulfils other criteria mentioned in the provision. 25. Section 49 of the Act contains provisions for granting a fixed-term residence permit to an alien who has entered Finland without a prior residence permit. According to subsection 1(1), a temporary or continuous residence permit may be issued if the applicant or at least one of his or her parents or grandparents is or was a Finnish citizen by birth. According to subsection 1(4), a residence permit shall be issued if its refusal would be manifestly unreasonable. A precondition for granting a residence permit under this section is that the applicant could have been granted a residence permit abroad before his or her arrival in Finland (see section 45 of the Act). 26. According to section 50, subsections 1 and 2, of the Act (as amended by Act no. 360/2007), “Family members of a Finnish citizen living in Finland and minor unmarried children of the family members are issued with a continuous residence permit on the basis of family ties upon application filed in Finland or abroad. Relatives other than family members of a Finnish citizen living in Finland are issued with a continuous residence permit if refusing a residence permit would be unreasonable because the persons concerned intend to resume their close family life in Finland or because the relative is fully dependent on the Finnish citizen living in Finland. Such other relatives must remain abroad while the application is processed.” 27. According to the travaux préparatoires to the previous Aliens Act (see the Government Bill no. HE 50/1998), “ full dependency ” on the Finnish citizen requires that the persons involved have previously lived in the same household and that compelling reasons have led to their separation, and that their interdependency has continued while the other person stayed in Finland. If the persons have not lived in the same household before, the circumstances of the applicant must have significantly changed, for which reason it can no longer be reasonably expected that he or she continue to live alone in the home country. The dependency could be either financial or mental. For example, weighty social and cultural reasons, serious illness or difficult handicap, attested by proper medical certificates, could contribute to full dependency. A relative as meant by this section could, for example, be the elderly parent of an adult person or, very exceptionally, an unmarried sibling. 28. Under section 51 of the Act, an alien residing in Finland is granted a temporary residence permit if he or she cannot be returned to his or her home country or country of permanent residence for temporary health reasons. 29. Section 52 of the Act contains provisions on the granting of residence permits on compassionate grounds. Under subsection 1, an alien is granted a continuous residence permit if its refusal would be manifestly unreasonable having regard to his or her health, ties to Finland or on other compassionate grounds, particularly in view of the circumstances he or she would face in his or her home country or of his or her vulnerable position. 30. According to section 148, subsection 2, of the Act, an alien who has entered the country without a residence permit and who is required to hold a visa or residence permit to stay in Finland but who has not applied for one or has not been granted one, may be refused entry. C. Domestic practice 31. The Supreme Administrative Court found in its decision of 9 October 2002 (no. T 2464) that the applicant A could not be refused a residence permit in the special circumstances of the case as A was considered to be completely dependent on her only daughter, now a Finnish citizen, who had lived in Finland since 1983. A was an elderly widow who suffered from serious heart disease and hypertension. 32. In its decision KHO 2006:8 of 3 March 2006, the Supreme Administrative Court found that the Russian mother of a citizen of Finland and the Russian Federation, and who needed medical treatment and help in her everyday life, could not be regarded as being fully dependent on her adult daughter who had been living in Finland since 1994. THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 33. The applicant complained that she risked being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if removed to Russia. 34. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 35. The Government contested that argument. A. Admissibility 36. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. The parties ’ submissions (a) The applicant 37. The applicant claimed that her daughter living in Finland was her closest relative. She further claimed that she needed help with daily activities and that she also suffered from medium to severe depression. The applicant claimed that she did not receive proper care in Russia. When she had come to Finland she had been undernourished and was suffering from a malignant melanoma. Furthermore, her flat in Vyborg had been sold and she no longer had anywhere to live in Russia. The applicant claimed that she was therefore totally dependent on her daughter ’ s help, both physically and mentally. 38. The applicant claimed that it had been impossible to obtain medical treatment in Russia and therefore her daughter had taken her to Finland. After the stroke in November 2006, the applicant had spent three weeks in hospital, after which she had been sent home. She had been dependent on outside help. At the time her husband, who suffered from dementia, still lived at home and the applicant had to take care of him. No care could be found for the husband in any institution as such services were not available. Two months after the applicant ’ s stroke, her husband died. The applicant ’ s daughter tried for two years to arrange care for her in Russia, but in vain. Hospital care was very expensive, even basic care, and it was not possible to hire any outside help. According to Russian law, children were responsible for taking care of their parents. 39. The applicant noted that since she came to Finland more than five years earlier, her daughter had acted as her caregiver. The applicant had problems in speaking and she claimed that her daughter was the only one to be able to interpret her communication. She was completely dependent on her daughter for daily activities and could not move without a wheelchair. (b) The Government 40. The Government noted that the applicant was born in 1942 and that she was 72 years old. She had suffered a stroke in 2006 and her right side was paralysed. She was also suffering from depression. The applicant had not presented any new medical certificates to the Court which had not previously been examined by the domestic courts. There were both private and public care institutions in Russia, and it was fairly common that elderly persons with health problems moved to them when they could no longer live at home. It was also possible to hire external help. The need for assistance and health care did not show as such that the applicant was dependent on her relative residing in Finland. There was nothing to prevent her relatives supporting her from Finland, in financial and other ways. The applicant ’ s home town, close to Vyborg, was located only some tens of kilometres from the Finnish border and could be reached by train from her daughter ’ s home town in a few hours. 41. The Government argued that the fact that the applicant ’ s flat had been sold did not constitute such a substantial change in her circumstances that it was unreasonable to expect the applicant to continue to live in her home country. Nor did the continuous, gradual weakening of health of a relative due to ageing constitute such a substantial change in that person ’ s circumstances to make it unreasonable to expect that the person continue to live in his or her home country. The applicant had not substantiated her allegation that she had no access to the necessary medical treatment in Russia in her own language. In the event of execution of the deportation order, the executing authority would examine whether the state of health of the deported person affected the deportation. In such cases the transportation could be, and had been, organised by ambulance, for example. Therefore, in the Government ’ s view, the applicant could receive the treatment she required in Russia. There was no violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 2. The Court ’ s assessment 42. The Court observes that Contracting States have the right as a matter of international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens (see Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, § 54, ECHR 2006 ‑ XII). However, expulsion by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if deported, faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. In such a case, Article 3 implies an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, § 125, ECHR 2008). 43. In order to determine whether there is a risk of ill-treatment, the Court must examine the foreseeable consequences of sending the applicant to Russia, bearing in mind the general situation there and her personal circumstances (see Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, § 108). 44. As to the general human rights situation in Russia, the situation is clearly not of such a nature that there would be a violation of the Convention if the applicant were to return to that country. The Court has therefore to establish whether the applicant ’ s personal situation is such that her return to Russia would contravene Article 3 of the Convention. 45. The Court acknowledges that, in principle, an applicant has to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he or she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565/05, §§ 50-51, ECHR 2008; Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, no. 10486/10, 20 December 2011; and S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60367/10, §§ 93-95, 29 January 2013). Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts about it. 46. The Court notes that, in the present case, the applicant has not even complained about any kind of torture or ill-treatment by the authorities but only about a lack of medical care and nursing. She claimed that it was impossible to obtain medical treatment in Russia and therefore her daughter had taken her to Finland. However, as the Government noted, the applicant has not adduced any evidence capable of proving her allegation that she has no access to the necessary medical treatment in Russia. The Court agrees with the Government that there are both private and public care institutions in Russia, and that it is also possible to hire external help. The applicant ’ s need for assistance and health care does not show as such that there are substantial grounds for believing that she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if returned to Russia (see, mutatis mutandis, Budina v. Russia ( dec. ), no. 45603/05, 18 June 2009). There are thus no such personal circumstances which would prevent her deportation to Russia. 47. Furthermore, regard must also be had to the concrete enforcement of the applicant ’ s removal. The Court notes that, according to information provided by the Government, the executing authority will examine, in the event of execution of the deportation order, whether the state of health of the deported person affects the deportation. In such cases the transportation can be, and has been, organised by ambulance, for example. The Court is therefore assured that the applicant ’ s health is taken into account at the time of her removal and that the mode of removal is chosen accordingly (see S.B. v. Finland ( dec. ), no. 17200/11, 24 June 2014). 48. Having regard to all of the above, the Court concludes that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if expelled to Russia in the current circumstances. Accordingly, there would be no violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicant were to be expelled to Russia. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 49. The applicant complained that her removal to Russia by the Finnish authorities would violate Article 8 of the Convention. 50. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 51. The Government contested that there existed such a close family tie or dependency between the applicant and her daughter that refusing the applicant ’ s residence permit or deporting her to Russia would constitute an interference within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant arrived in Finland only on 7 December 2008, prior to which she had lived in Russia. Her daughter had moved permanently to Finland in 1988. Thus the family life between the applicant and her daughter had been interrupted for more than 20 years. There was thus no interference and Article 8 did not apply to the case. 52. Were the Court of another opinion, the Government argued that, in any event, the impugned measure was in accordance with the law and pursued the legitimate aims of public safety, economic well-being of the country and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. As to the necessity in a democratic society, the Government noted that the applicant could not be considered a settled migrant. The impugned measure was thus necessary in a democratic society. There was thus no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 53. The applicant argued that during the previous five years she had had a close family relationship with her daughter and her family. In Russian culture the grandparents were considered as family members who needed protection. It was impossible to obtain a place in an elderly people ’ s home in Russia if a person had even one living child, as it was the child ’ s responsibility to take care of the parents. 54. The Court notes that, in the Convention case-law relating to expulsion and extradition measures, the main emphasis has consistently been placed on the “family life” aspect, which has been interpreted as encompassing the effective “family life” established in the territory of a Contracting State by aliens lawfully resident there, it being understood that “family life” in this sense is normally limited to the core family (see Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, § 94, ECHR 2003 ‑ X; and, mutatis mutandis, Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, § 45, Series A no. 311). The Court has, however, also held that the Convention includes no right, as such, to establish one ’ s family life in a particular country (see, inter alia, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 68, Series A no. 94; Gül v. Switzerland, 19 February 1996, § 38, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ I; and Boultif v. Switzerland, no. 54273/00, § 39, ECHR 2001 ‑ IX). 55. The Court also reiterates the principle that relationships between parents and adult children do not fall within the protective scope of Article 8 unless “additional factors of dependence, other than normal emotional ties, are shown to exist” (see Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, no. 39051/03, § 35, 13 December 2007; and, mutatis mutandis, Kwakye-Nti and Dufie v. the Netherlands ( dec. ), no. 31519/96, 7 November 2000). Therefore, the existence of “family life” cannot be relied on by applicants in relation to their elderly parents, adults who do not belong to the core family, unless the latter have been shown to be dependent on the members of their family (see Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], cited above, § 97). 56. The Court finds it established in the present case that the applicant came to Finland on 7 December 2008, before which she lived in Russia. Her daughter moved permanently to Finland in 1988. As the Government pointed out, the family life between the applicant and her daughter was thus interrupted for at least 20 years. The fact that the applicant has spent the last five years in Finland does not create a relationship between the applicant and her daughter which could amount to “family life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. This issue cannot be decisive as the applicant has not been lawfully resident in Finland during this time and she must have been aware of her insecure situation created by the fact that she was not regularised in Finland. 57. As to dependency, the Court notes that the applicant had a stroke in November 2006 in Russia after which she lived in Russia for two years before coming to Finland with a tourist visa in December 2008. After the expiry of her visa, her legal status in Finland was not regularised. Even assuming that the applicant is dependent on outside help in order to cope with her daily life, this does not mean that she is necessarily dependent on her daughter who lives in Finland, or that care in Finland is the only option. As mentioned earlier, there are both private and public care institutions in Russia, and it is also possible to hire external help. Moreover, as noted by the Government, the applicant ’ s daughter can support her financially and otherwise from Finland, in particular as her place of residence is not very far from the applicant ’ s place of residence in Russia. With a view to the Court ’ s case-law, the Court therefore considers that no such “additional factors of dependence other than normal ties of affection” exist between the applicant and her daughter, and that there is thus no “ family life” between them within the meaning of Article 8. This Article is therefore not applicable in the instant case due to the lack of family life. 58. Accordingly, the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention must be rejected as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. III. RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT 59. The Court points out that, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if referral of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention. 60. It considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see above § 4) must remain in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court takes a further decision in this connection (see operative part).
The Court held that there would be no violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention if the applicant were to be expelled to Russia. It found that neither the general situation in Russia nor the applicant’s personal circumstances would put her at real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment if she were expelled. In particular, she had failed to provide evidence to prove her allegation that she had no access to medical treatment in Russia, there being both private and public care institutions there or the possibility of hiring external help. The Court was also assured that her state of health at the time of her removal would be taken into account and appropriate transportation – by ambulance for example – would be organised. The Court further held that Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention was not applicable in the applicant’s case and this part of her complaint was declared inadmissible.