Cases in which the Court found no violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. Constitution of Ukraine 1996 94. Article 29, which is relevant to the case, reads as follows: “Every person has the right to freedom and personal inviolability. No one shall be arrested or held in custody other than pursuant to a reasoned court decision and only on the grounds of and in accordance with a procedure established by law. In the event of an urgent necessity to prevent or stop a crime, bodies authorised by law may hold a person in custody as a temporary preventive measure, the reasonable grounds for which shall be verified by a court within seventy-two hours. The detained person shall be released immediately if he or she has not been provided, within seventy-two hours of detention, with a reasoned court decision in respect of their being held in custody. ... Everyone who has been detained has the right to challenge his or her detention in court at any time. ...” B. Criminal Code 2001 95. The relevant provisions can be summarised as follows: - Article 157 § 3 provides that interference with work of an electoral officer coupled with coercion, violence or threats of violence, committed following a conspiracy by a group of persons or by a public official using his/her position is punishable by three to seven years ’ imprisonment, with no right to hold certain posts or carry out certain activities for two to three years; - Article 191 § 5 provides for seven to twelve years ’ imprisonment, with confiscation of property and no right to hold certain posts or carry out certain activities for up to three years, as penalty for embezzlement involving particularly large amounts or committed by an organised group; - Articles 255 § 1 provides for five to twelve years ’ imprisonment as penalty for creation of a criminal organisation; - under Article 289 § 2, car theft committed, in particular, following a conspiracy or coupled with violence or threats of violence, is punishable by imprisonment for five to eight years, with or without property confiscation; - Article 349 penalises taking hostage a public official by eight to fifteen years ’ imprisonment. C. Code of Criminal Procedure 2012 96. The relevant provisions provide: Article 176. General provisions on preventive measures “1. Preventive measures are: (1) a personal undertaking; (2) a personal warranty; (3) bail; (4) house arrest; and (5) pre-trial detention. 2. Arrest [without a court order] ( затримання ) is a provisional preventive measure which can be used on the grounds and under the procedure defined by this Code. 3. The investigating judge or the court shall reject an application for a preventive measure if the investigator or the prosecutor has not proven that there are sufficient grounds to believe that none of the more lenient preventive measures would be sufficient for the prevention of the established risk or risks. The most lenient preventive measure is a personal undertaking and the most severe one is pre-trial detention. 4. Preventive measures shall be applied: during the investigation – by the investigating judge at the request of a prosecutor, or at the request of an investigator, approved by a prosecutor; and during the trial – by the court at the request of a prosecutor.” Article 177. Purpose and grounds for the application of preventive measures “1. The purpose of a preventive measure is to ensure that a suspect or an accused complies with his or her procedural obligations, as well as to prevent attempts to: (1) abscond from the pre-trial investigation authorities and/or the court; (2) destroy, conceal or spoil any of the objects or documents that are essential for establishing the circumstances of the criminal offence; (3) exert an unlawful influence on the victim, the witnesses, or on other suspects, accused, the expert or specialist ...; (4) obstruct the criminal proceedings in any other way; (5) commit another criminal offence or continue the criminal offence of which he/she is suspected or accused. 2. A preventive measure shall be applied on the grounds of a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a criminal offence and provided there are risks giving sufficient grounds for the investigating judge or the court to believe that the suspect, the accused or the convict could commit actions specified in paragraph one of this Article ...” Article 181. House arrest “1. House arrest consists of prohibiting the suspect or the accused from leaving his or her place of residence twenty-four hours per day or during certain hours. 2. House arrest may be applied to a person suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment. ... 5. National police officers may visit the suspect or the accused under house arrest at his or her domicile, with a view to surveying his or her behaviour. They may demand verbal or written explanations as regards the compliance by the suspect or the accused with his or her obligations. Electronic tracking devices may be used. 6. The validity period of a ruling of the investigating judge on placing a person under house arrest shall not exceed two months. If required, the duration of house arrest may be extended at the prosecutor ’ s request within the limits of the pre-trial investigation .... The total duration of house arrest may not exceed six months. Thereafter the ruling on the application of that preventive measure shall be deemed to have expired and the house arrest measure shall be considered lifted.” Article 208. Arrest by a competent official [without a court order] “1. [In the absence of a court order a] competent official is entitled to arrest ( затримати ) a person suspected of having committed a crime for which a prison sentence may be imposed, only in the following cases: (1) if the person has been caught whilst committing a crime or attempting to commit one; or (2) if immediately after a criminal offence the statements of an eyewitness, including the victim, or the totality of obvious signs on the body, or clothes or at the scene of the event indicate that this person has just committed an offence ... 4. A competent official who has carried out the arrest shall immediately inform the arrested person, in a language which he/she understands, of the grounds for the arrest and of what crime he/she is suspected of having committed. The official shall also explain to the arrested person his/her rights: to be legally represented; to be provided with medical assistance; to make statements or to remain silent; to inform [third] persons ... of his/her arrest and whereabouts; to challenge the grounds for the arrest; as well as the other procedural rights set out in this Code. 5. A report shall be drawn up in respect of an individual ’ s arrest containing, [in particular,] the following information: the place, date and exact time (the hour and minute) of the arrest ...; the grounds for the arrest; the results of the search of the person; requests, statements or complaints of the arrested person, if any; and a comprehensive list of his/her procedural rights and duties. The arrest report shall be signed by the official who drew it up, and by the arrested person. A copy shall immediately be served on the arrested person after obtaining his/her signature ...” 97. Article 276 of the Code provides that when a person has been arrested, a formal notification of suspicion must be served on him or her. From that moment, the person acquires the procedural status of a suspect. The official serving the notification is required to explain the suspect ’ s procedural rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to legal assistance. 98. Article 278 of the Code provides that a person who has been arrested without a court order must be released unless a formal notification of suspicion has been served on him or her within twenty-four hours of arrest. D. Compensation Act 1994 99. Under the Law of Ukraine on the Procedure for Compensating Damage caused to Citizens by the Unlawful Actions of Bodies in charge of Operational Enquiries, Pre-trial Investigation, Prosecutors or Courts (also referred to as “the Compensation Act”), a person is entitled to compensation for damage on account of, in particular, unlawful detention (section 1). The preconditions for entitlement to compensation include “a finding of ... unlawfulness of arrest and detention in a guilty verdict or other judicial decision” or termination of criminal proceedings for want of evidence of the person ’ s guilt (section 2). E. Civil Code 2003 100. Article 1176 provides for the right to compensation for damage sustained as a result of unlawful decisions, actions or omissions by bodies of inquiry, pre-trial investigation authorities, prosecutor ’ s offices and courts. It specifies that damage caused to an individual, in particular, by unlawful criminal prosecution, unlawful application of a preventive measure, and/or unlawful arrest must be compensated in full, irrespective of the guilt of officials of bodies of inquiry, pre-trial investigation authorities, prosecutor ’ s offices and courts. The procedure for claiming compensation for damage as described above “shall be established by law”. THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 101. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention about the conditions in which he had been transported from Kyiv to Chernigiv on 2 November 2015. He also complained that he had been obliged to participate in lengthy court hearings immediately after the coronary angioplasty of 25 December 2015. Lastly, he complained under the same provision that he had been confined in a metal cage during the court hearings of 13, 22 and 25 January 2016. Article 3 of the Convention relied on reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A. Admissibility 1. As regards the applicant ’ s transfer from Kyiv to Chernigiv on 2 November 2015 102. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that on 2 November 2015, during his transfer from Kyiv to Chernigiv and thereafter, he had been kept in a minibus for about eight hours without any water, food or access to a toilet. 103. The Government observed that the trip in question had not lasted long, given that the distance to cover was 150 km. They further submitted that the applicant had received water and had been allowed to use the toilet at his requests. 104. The Court refers to its well-established case-law principles regarding the assessment of whether the treatment complained of attained the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention ( see paragraphs 118 and 119 below). The Court has found a violation of that provision where a detainee was kept in a police-station cell for twenty-two hours without food or drink or unrestricted access to a toilet ( see Fedotov v. Russia, no. 5140/02, §§ 66-70, 25 October 2005). The Court has also found unacceptable the conditions of transport in cases where the applicants had remained confined in cramped prison vans or train carriages, without proper ventilation, water or catering, for long periods sometimes exceeding forty hours, and where they had had to undergo such trips on many occasions (see, for example, Yakovenko v. Ukraine, no. 15825/06, §§ 105-33, 25 October 2007; Koktysh v. Ukraine, no. 43707/07, §§ 106-08, 10 December 2009; and Konovalchuk v. Ukraine, no. 31928/15, §§ 66-70, 13 October 2016). 105. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was transported in a regular minibus, which he did not allege to have found uncomfortable ( see paragraph 21 above). In the absence of any details from the Government as regards how long the applicant had had to wait in that vehicle upon arrival in Chernigiv or as regards any arrangements for catering, the Court considers plausible the applicant ’ s submission that he was made to stay in the minibus for eight hours without being provided with food. 106. The Court observes that the parties are in dispute as to whether the applicant was provided with drinking water and had access to a toilet. The Court has held in its case-law that in cases which concern conditions of detention, applicants are expected in principle to submit detailed and consistent accounts of the facts complained of and to provide, as far as possible, some evidence in support of their complaints ( see Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no. 32362/02, § 45, 20 May 2010). The applicant did not provide any details as to whether he had asked to go to the toilet and, if so, on how many occasions and what the guards ’ response had been: refusing his requests, making him wait or denying him privacy. 107. That being so and having regard to the fact that the applicant ’ s transfer in allegedly inadequate conditions took place only once and lasted for a maximum of eight hours, the Court considers that the applicant has not substantiated that the conditions of his transfer on 2 November 2015, even if as unpleasant as alleged, were such as to give rise to any appearance of a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. 108. It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 2. As regards the applicant ’ s participation in the court hearings after the coronary operation of 25 December 2015 109. The Government submitted that the investigating judge who had conducted the hearings on 26-28 December 2015 had duly taken into account the applicant ’ s state of health. They further observed that several medical officials had monitored the applicant ’ s condition on a permanent basis and had provided him with medical care whenever required. The Government therefore invited the Court to dismiss this complaint as being manifestly ill-founded. 110. The applicant disagreed. 111. Contrary to the Government ’ s submission, the Court considers this complaint to be neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It therefore declares it admissible. 3. As regards the applicant ’ s confinement in a metal cage during the court hearings of 13, 22 and 25 January 2016 112. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. As regards the applicant ’ s participation in the court hearings after the coronary operation of 25 December 2015 (a) The parties ’ submissions 113. The applicant submitted that, in spite of the fact that he had been extremely weak after the operation of 25 December 2015, he had been obliged to participate in long court hearings. He observed, in particular, that his forensic medical examination with a view to establishing whether he was fit enough to participate in court hearings had never in fact been carried out. As regards his examination on 27 December 2015, it was reported as a simple medical examination ( see paragraph 76 above). Moreover, it had taken place in the presence of and under pressure from the prosecution officials. 114. The applicant further submitted that the court hearings, in particular the one on 27 December 2015, had been unacceptably long. In addition, the hearing room had been too crowded, which had exhausted him physically and caused him considerable stress and anguish. 115. The Government contended that the applicant had been exaggerating his health-related concerns. In their opinion, he was a person with robust health. They observed, in particular, that during the entire period of his employment in the Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration ( see paragraph 7 above), he had not taken a single day ’ s sick leave. The Government also pointed out that he was a heavy smoker who had continued smoking even while in hospital. 116. The Government emphasised that the applicant had been under constant medical supervision during the court hearings on 26, 27 and 28 December 2015 and that he had been provided with all the required medical care. They pointed out that not all the hearings on the dates mentioned had been long. 117. The applicant contested the Government ’ s arguments. He drew the Court ’ s attention to the fact that he had continued his medical treatment long after the events in question, which proved the seriousness of his medical condition at the time. (b) The Court ’ s assessment (i) General principles laid down in the Court ’ s case-law 118. Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000 ‑ IV). Indeed, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a value of civilisation closely bound up with respect for human dignity ( see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, § 81, ECHR 2015). 119. Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. Further factors include the purpose for which the ill ‑ treatment was inflicted, together with the intention or motivation behind it, although the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3. Regard must also be had to the context in which the ill-treatment was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions. Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these aspects, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual ’ s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition set forth in Article 3. It should also be pointed out that it may well suffice that the victim is humiliated in his own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others ( see Bouyid, cited above, §§ 85-86, with numerous further references). 120. In the context of deprivation of liberty the Court has consistently stressed that, to fall under Article 3, the suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering and humiliation connected with detention. The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him or her to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his or her health and well-being are adequately secured ( see Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, § 99, 20 October 2016, with further references). (ii) Application of the above principles in the present case 121. It is an established fact that the applicant underwent a coronary angioplasty on 25 December 2015 ( see paragraph 62 above). The Court therefore dismisses the Government ’ s conjecture that the applicant “had been exaggerating his health-related concerns” ( see paragraph 115 above). Nor does it find of relevance their observation that he had not been on sick leave during his previous public service or that he was a heavy smoker (ibid.). 122. It is not the task of the Court to substitute its opinion for that of the domestic experts in assessing the seriousness of the applicant ’ s medical conditions and the possible risks of them deteriorating ( see Mikhaniv v. Ukraine, no. 75522/01, § 70, 6 November 2008). That being so, the Court does not question the doctors ’ statements that the applicant could be moved in a wheelchair under medical supervision without risking his life ( see paragraphs 70, 73 and 76 above). The Court notes, however, that, in spite of the judicial ruling to that effect, there was no forensic medical examination of the applicant giving a clear answer to the question whether he was fit enough to participate in court hearings. Although a forensic medical expert was present during the applicant ’ s examination on 27 December 2015, he abstained from answering that question ( see paragraph 76 above). In any event, even if the applicant had been found fit enough to participate in court hearings, that finding could not be interpreted as giving the green light to the unlimited duration of such hearings. 123. The Court accepts the applicant ’ s argument that he was weak after the surgery in question. Indeed, he must have required not only medical supervision and treatment, but also sufficient rest. 124. Although the hearing with the applicant ’ s participation on 26 December 2015 lasted for two hours, which did not appear excessively long, the Court considers it important to take into account its broader context. It observes, in particular, that the previous day, immediately after the applicant ’ s transfer from the intensive-care ward to an ordinary ward late in the evening, he had had a visit from the investigator, who had tried to serve him with a copy of the application for his detention ( see paragraphs 61 and 64 above). That must have put the applicant, who was particularly vulnerable after the surgery, in a state of anxiety and stress. It appears that in the afternoon of 26 December 2015 his health deteriorated, which is why the hearing was adjourned ( see paragraph 69 above). 125. The following day the applicant was obliged to participate in a court hearing for over twenty-one hours, including throughout the night from 27 to 28 December 2015 ( see paragraph 79 above). Furthermore, even the previous night he had not been allowed uninterrupted sleep, given that at about 1 .30 a.m. on 27 December 2015 the investigator had tried to reach him in the hospital ward ( see paragraph 71 above). 126. In the Court ’ s opinion, that would be an ordeal even for somebody in good health. For the applicant, who had not yet recovered after the surgery, staying in court for twenty-one hours must have caused not only emotional and psychological distress, but considerable physical fatigue. 127. The Court considers that conducting judicial hearings at night can be justified only in cases of particular urgency. No such urgency existed in the applicant ’ s case. The only issue before the investigating judge was whether or not to place the applicant in detention instead of the previously imposed house arrest. Its examination could have been postponed for the duration of the applicant ’ s post-operative hospital treatment (seven to ten days – see paragraph 65 above). 128. Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that the applicant was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 129. Accordingly, there has been a violation of that provision. 2. As regards the applicant ’ s confinement in a metal cage during the court hearings of 13, 22 and 25 January 2016 (a) The parties ’ submissions 130. The applicant submitted that his placement in a metal cage during the court hearings of 13, 22 and 25 January 2016 had been an unjustified and humiliating measure. He emphasised that even though he had been suspected of serious crimes, he had never manifested any violent behaviour, and that he had been feeling unwell. He pointed out that he was a well ‑ known politician and that the proceedings against him had received broad media coverage. Accordingly, he had been exposed in a metal cage not only to those present in the court room, but to a much wider audience. Lastly, the applicant contended that by having eventually replaced the metal cage by a glass cabin, the authorities had admitted the inadmissibility of that previous practice. 131. The Government admitted that during the court hearings on the mentioned dates the applicant had indeed been held in a metal cage. They observed that such a security measure had been in compliance with the legal rules applicable at the time. Metal cages had eventually been replaced by glass cabins and during the subsequent hearings the applicant had been confined in a glass cabin. Having regard to the insignificant duration of his confinement in a metal cage, the Government maintained that there had been no violation of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 132. The Court notes that the holding of defendants in metal cages during a court hearing was a standard procedure in Ukraine, which was also applied in the applicant ’ s case. No assessment was ever made of the existence of any actual and specific security risks in the courtroom requiring that he be held in a metal cage during the hearings. 133. Although the applicant was confined in a metal cage during only three hearings, he was exposed behind bars not only to the persons attending those hearings but, owing to the high profile of the criminal proceedings against him, to a much wider audience as members of the public were following the proceedings via both national and international media (compare Lutsenko v. Ukraine (no. 2), no. 29334/11, § 171, 11 June 2015). 134. The Court has held that holding a person in a metal cage during a trial – having regard to its objectively degrading nature, which is incompatible with the standards of civilised behaviour that are the hallmark of a democratic society – constitutes in itself an affront to human dignity in breach of Article 3 ( see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, § 138, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). 135. The above conclusion remains pertinent in the circumstances of the present case. 136. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on this account. II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION 137. The applicant also complained: under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his arrest on 31 October 2015 and his re-arrest on 3 November 2015 had been unlawful and arbitrary; under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention and house arrest had not been justified by “relevant and sufficient reasons”; under Article 5 § 4 that he had had no effective procedure at his disposal by which he could have challenged the lawfulness of his arrest on 31 October 2015 and his re-arrest on 3 November 2015; and under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention that he had no enforceable right to compensation in respect of the breach of his rights under other paragraphs of Article 5 of the Convention. The provisions relied on read as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ... (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ... 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” A. Admissibility 138. The Court observes that the Government did not dispute the applicability of Article 5 of the Convention to the applicant ’ s house arrest. According to its case-law, house arrest is considered, in view of its degree and intensity, to amount to deprivation of liberty within the meaning of this provision ( see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, § 104, 5 July 2016, with further references). 139. Having regard to the way in which the applicant ’ s house arrest was applied, as described in paragraphs 30 and 50 above, the Court accepts that it constituted deprivation of liberty in the sense of Article 5 (compare Kavkazskiy v. Russia, no. 19327/13, §§ 19 and 65, 28 November 2017). 140. Furthermore, the Court finds that the applicant ’ s complaints under Article 5 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. Alleged violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (a) The parties ’ submissions 141. The applicant contended that his arrest on 31 October 2015 had been unlawful and arbitrary. He drew the Court ’ s attention to the fact that more than a year had elapsed between the institution of the criminal proceedings against him on 15 August 2014 and his arrest. During that time he had not manifested any lack of cooperation with the investigating authorities. Furthermore, he had been actively involved in politics in Ukraine. 142. The applicant further submitted that Article 208 of the CCP, on which the PGO had relied as the legal basis for his arrest, had been inapplicable in his case, as it permitted arrest without a judicial warrant only in specific urgent cases, when a person had been caught whilst committing a crime or immediately thereafter. 143. The applicant alleged that his re-arrest on 3 November 2015, which was based on the same provision of the CCP, had been equally unlawful. In his opinion, that measure had merely served as a pretext for not releasing him within seventy-two hours of his arrest of 31 October 2015. 144. The Government submitted that the applicant ’ s arrest on 31 October 2015 and his re-arrest on 3 November 2015 had been in compliance with the applicable legal rules and based on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed criminal offences. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 145. Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness. One general principle established in the case-law is that detention will be “arbitrary” where, despite complying with the letter of national law, there has been an element of bad faith or deception on the part of the authorities or where the domestic authorities neglected to attempt to apply the relevant legislation correctly ( see S., V. and A. v. Denmark [GC], nos. 35553/12 and 2 others, §§ 74 and 76, 22 October 2018, with further references). 146. The Court notes that under Ukrainian legislation deprivation of liberty without a reasoned court decision was possible only in a limited number of situations defined with sufficient precision. Thus, Article 29 of the Constitution permitted such a measure for a maximum of three days only as a response to an urgent need to prevent or stop a crime ( see paragraph 94 above). Under Article 208 of the CCP, an investigator could arrest a person, in particular if the latter had been caught in flagrante delicto, had been pointed out as an offender by eyewitnesses or victims, or had clear traces of a crime on his person or clothing immediately after the offence ( see paragraph 96 above). 147. The respondent Government has not demonstrated that any of those conditions were met in the applicant ’ s case, and the investigator had no power to arrest him without a court decision. 148. Indeed, as pointed out by the applicant, on 31 October 2015 he was arrested in connection with events which had taken place more a year earlier. It could not therefore be claimed that the authorities faced an urgent situation. 149. As regards the applicant ’ s re-arrest on 3 November 2015, the Court notes that it took place within minutes of his formal release. The Court observes that the authorities relied formally on a charge different from those that had served as a basis for the previous arrest order ( see paragraph 24 above). Nonetheless, it was clear from the text of the investigator ’ s subsequent application to the court for the applicant ’ s remand in custody ( see paragraph 27 above) that, in reality, the prosecution were relying on the same charges against the applicant as before, and that only one new charge had been added (the applicant ’ s supposed interference with the work of an electoral officer – see paragraph 23 above). Like all the other charges, that new charge had been known to the prosecution authorities prior to the applicant ’ s arrest on 31 October 2015. However, like before, the general requirement of a judicial arrest warrant was disregarded. Accordingly, the applicant ’ s re-arrest on 3 November 2015 was manifestly deficient under domestic law. 150. The situation described above makes it clear for the Court that the authorities acted in bad faith, seeking a pretext to secure the applicant ’ s continued detention and to circumvent the effect of the court order for his release. Such conduct is incompatible with the principle of legal certainty and arbitrary, and runs counter to the principle of the rule of law (see, mutatis mutandis, Mikhaniv, cited above, §§ 87-88). 151. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the applicant ’ s arrest on 31 October 2015 and his re-arrest on 3 November 2015. 2. Alleged violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (a) The parties ’ submissions 152. The applicant complained that he had been held in pre-trial detention and under house arrest without relevant and sufficient reasons. 153. The Government contended that both impugned measures had been duly justified. They observed that eventually the applicant had been released subject to an undertaking not to abscond. (b) The Court ’ s assessment (i) General case-law principles 154. In accordance with the Court ’ s established case-law under Article 5 § 3, the persistence of a reasonable suspicion is a condition sine qua non for the validity of continued detention, but, after a certain lapse of time, it no longer suffices: the Court must then establish (1) whether other grounds cited by the judicial authorities continue to justify the deprivation of liberty and (2), where such grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”, whether the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings. The Court has also held that justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities. When deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are obliged to consider alternative means of ensuring his or her appearance at trial ( see Buzadji, cited above, § 87). 155. Justifications which have been deemed “relevant” and “sufficient” reasons (in addition to the existence of reasonable suspicion) in the Court ’ s case-law have included such grounds as the danger of absconding, the risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses or of evidence being tampered with, the risk of collusion, the risk of reoffending, the risk of causing public disorder and the need to protect the detainee ( see Buzadji, cited above, § 88). Those risks must be duly substantiated, and the authorities ’ reasoning on those points cannot be abstract, general or stereotyped (see, among other authorities, Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, § 222, 28 November 2017). 156. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons set out in the decisions of the national judicial authorities relating to the applicant ’ s pre-trial detention and of the arguments made by the applicant in his requests for release or appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention ( see Merabishvili, cited above, § 225, with further references). 157. The Court applies the same criteria in assessing the reasonableness of the entire period of deprivation of liberty, irrespective of the place where the applicant was detained (in a pre-trial detention facility or at home under house arrest). In the Court ’ s view, it would hardly be workable in practice were one to assess the justifications for pre-trial detention according to different criteria depending on differences in the conditions of detention and the level of (dis)comfort experienced by the detainee. Such justifications should, on the contrary, be assessed according to criteria that are practical and effective in maintaining an adequate level of protection under Article 5 without running a risk of diluting that protection ( see Buzadji, cited above, §§ 112-14). (ii) Application of the above principles in the present case (α) Overall period to be taken into consideration 158. The period of deprivation of liberty to be taken into consideration in the present case started on 31 October 2015, the date of the applicant ’ s arrest, and ended on 7 June 2016, when he was released subject to an undertaking not to abscond ( see paragraphs 17, 24, 54 and 139 above). Accordingly, it lasted for seven months and seven days. For two months and twenty-two days of that period, the applicant was under arrest and in pre-trial detention, whereas for the remaining four and a half months he was under house arrest ( see paragraphs 17, 30, 38, 50 and 54 above). (β) Relevance and sufficiency of reasons for the applicant ’ s continued deprivation of liberty - Continued arrest until 6 November 2015 159. The Court reiterates that it has found the applicant ’ s arrest on 31 October 2015 and his re-arrest on 3 November 2015, which formed the legal basis for his deprivation of liberty until 6 November 2015, to be in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( see paragraph 151 above). More specifically, the Court has concluded that the domestic authorities, firstly, did not adhere to the “procedure prescribed by law” and, secondly, manifested bad faith. The issue whether there was a “reasonable suspicion” that the applicant had committed a criminal offence was not among those analysed by the Court in the context of the complaint under Article 5 § 1. 160. While, having regard to the incriminating material against the applicant, the Court accepts that there was a reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, it reiterates that under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the existence of reasonable suspicion cannot on its own justify pre-trial detention, and must be supported by additional grounds ( see Buzadji, cited above, § 95, and Štvrtecký v. Slovakia, no. 55844/12, § 59, 5 June 2018). 161. The Court will therefore examine whether such additional grounds were given by the domestic authorities to justify the applicant ’ s continued deprivation of liberty during the period in question. 162. It is noteworthy that, like the initial arrest report, the report on the applicant ’ s re-arrest of 3 November 2015 contained no reference to any specific circumstances warranting his deprivation of liberty ( see paragraph 24 above). The grounds referred to by the investigators were confined to those pre-printed on the arrest report template. 163. The Court therefore concludes that no relevant and sufficient reasons were provided in justification of the applicant ’ s continued arrest until 6 November 2015. - House arrest from 6 November to 28 December 2015 164. It would appear from the reasoning given in the decision of 6 November 2015 that the investigating judge of the Pecherskyy Court took into account a number of considerations indicating that the applicant ’ s pre ‑ trial detention would be an unjustified and excessive preventive measure. Namely, it was observed in the ruling that the applicant had a permanent place of residence, elderly parents and three minor children, that he was the leader of a political party, that he had received numerous awards, including a presidential one, and that he had positive character references. Furthermore, the judge noted that numerous members of parliament had offered their personal surety as a guarantee that the applicant would comply with his procedural obligations ( see paragraph 30 above). 165. The court ruling of 6 November 2015 contained no explanation, however, of how the above-mentioned circumstances, which were clearly favourable for the applicant, could be interpreted as justifying placing him under house arrest. Although the investigating judge mentioned the personal surety given by members of parliament, without questioning its authenticity or expressing any reservations in that regard, she gave no consideration to applying a personal warranty as a possible preventive measure. Nor did she consider the possibility of ensuring the applicant ’ s attendance in court by the use of other less intrusive preventive measures expressly provided for in Ukrainian law to ensure the proper conduct of criminal proceedings, such as a personal undertaking or release on bail ( see paragraph 96 above). 166. The Court observes that the appellate court maintained the same approach, de facto equating the absence of any grounds for the applicant ’ s pre-trial detention to the justification for placing him under house arrest ( see paragraph 34 above). 167. It follows that the applicant ’ s deprivation of liberty during this period was not based on relevant and sufficient reasons. - Pre-trial detention from 28 December 2015 to 15 March 2016 168. The Court notes that the investigating judge of the Dniprovskyy Court justified the replacement of the applicant ’ s house arrest by pre-trial detention on 28 December 2015, having mainly reiterated the factors referred to by the investigator: the existence of a reasonable suspicion of the applicant ’ s involvement in a number of criminal offences; the gravity of those offences; and the applicant ’ s friendly relations with officials of law ‑ enforcement, judicial and other authorities. Furthermore, the judge found it established that the applicant had not complied with the obligations inherent in house arrest ( see paragraphs 38 and 40 above). 169. Given that the reference to a reasonable suspicion was not sufficient in itself, the Court will give closer consideration to the other grounds used to justify the applicant ’ s detention. 170. The Court considers neither relevant nor sufficient the investigating judge ’ s reference to the applicant ’ s “friendly relations with officials of law ‑ enforcement, judicial and other authorities”. Couched in broad terms as it was, it implied questioning the integrity of those unspecified officials rather than substantiating any risks inherent in the applicant ’ s release or the application of a less restrictive preventive measure than pre-trial detention. 171. The Court next observes that the judge accepted, without further reasoning, the investigator ’ s argument that the applicant had not fulfilled his house-arrest obligations ( see paragraph 40 above). 172. To substantiate that conclusion, the investigator referred, in particular, to the applicant ’ s “continuously staying in private medical institutions” including the one founded by his father, as an indication that he had been “abusing his right to medical assistance” with a view to evading “various procedural measures”. It is noteworthy, however, that on 25 December 2015, the date on which the investigator applied to the court for the applicant ’ s pre-trial detention, the latter underwent a coronary angioplasty in the Amosov Institute ( see paragraph 62 above). This proved that the applicant did require serious medical attention. Even if that operation had not taken place, alleging that the applicant had been “abusing his right to medical assistance” cannot be accepted as a relevant reason to justify placing him in pre-trial detention. The authorities had ample opportunity to have the applicant examined by medical specialists whose independence they did not question (and they eventually did so by having him taken to the Amosov Institute). 173. The investigator also referred to the fact that there had been thirty ‑ eight alerts from the applicant ’ s electronic tracking device, from which he concluded that the applicant might have tampered with it. That conclusion clearly ran counter to the documents the prosecution had in its possession. Thus, about two weeks earlier the police had informed the prosecutor ’ s office about those alerts and had stated that most of them could be explained by “the technical imperfection of the device, the architectural particularities of the building, as well as the presence of a lift in the suspect ’ s flat”. On two occasions the alerts were explained by the fact that the applicant ’ had been transferred to the court for participation in court hearings and on one occasion, by the fact that he had been admitted to hospital ( see paragraph 36 above). 174. Lastly, the investigator noted that the applicant, “through his lawyers”, had been threatening one of the witnesses to make him change his depositions in the applicant ’ s favour ( see paragraph 37 above). It was not explained how replacing the applicant ’ s house arrest by pre-trial detention was supposed to put an end to such misbehaviour on the part of his lawyers with whom he would retain contact even in detention. 175. Accordingly, no relevant and sufficient reasons were provided for remanding the applicant in custody on 28 December 2015. 176. The Court does not accept, either, the stereotyped and abstract reasons invoked by the Kyiv City Court of Appeal in its ruling of 10 February 2016 upholding the decision to detain the applicant ’ and by the Dniprovskyy Court in its decision of 17 February 2016 extending that preventive measure. Those courts mainly referred to the gravity of the charges against the applicant and the persistence of the risks already established. - House arrest from 15 March to 7 June 2016 177. The Court takes note of the fact that it was the applicant himself who had asked that his pre-trial detention be replaced with house arrest ( see paragraph 50 above). This cannot, however, be interpreted as a waiver of his rights under Article 5 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Buzadji, cited above, §§ 106-10). 178. The Court has held in its case-law that the right to liberty is too important in a democratic society for a person to lose the benefit of the protection of the Convention simply because he gave himself up to be taken into detention ( see Storck v. Germany, no. 61603/00, § 75, ECHR 2005 ‑ V). It appears clearly from the facts of the case that the idea behind the applicant ’ s seeking to be placed in house arrest was to avoid the continuation of his detention in custody (compare Buzadji, cited above, § 108). 179. Although house arrest implied fewer restrictions and a lesser degree of suffering and inconvenience for the applicant than ordinary detention in prison, it still amounted to a deprivation of his liberty in the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention ( see paragraph 139 above). Accordingly, regardless of the applicant ’ s attitude to that measure, the domestic authorities were under an obligation either to provide due grounds for it or to release him. This was not done: the Dniprovskyy Court did not explain why there was a need for such an intrusive preventive measure in the applicant ’ s case. (γ) Conclusion 180. The Court is aware of the fact that a majority of length-of-detention cases that have come before it concerned longer periods of deprivation of liberty and, against that background, seven months and seven days ( see paragraph 158 above) may appear to be relatively short (compare Zherebin v. Russia, no. 51445/09, § 61, 24 March 2016). Nonetheless, the Court has found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention on many occasions even in respect of such short periods of detention where those were not justified (the Court ’ s abundant case-law of relevance is quoted in Zherebin, cited above, ibid.). 181. Having regard to the absence of relevant and sufficient reasons for the applicant ’ s deprivation of liberty in the present case, be it in the form of pre-trial detention or house arrest, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. 3. Alleged violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (a) The parties ’ submissions 182. The applicant submitted that there had been no judicial review of the lawfulness of his arrest of 31 October 2015. As regards the lawfulness of his re-arrest of 3 November 2015, he maintained that the Pecherskyy Court had assessed it in a formalistic and superficial manner, without addressing any of his arguments. 183. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to challenge the lawfulness of his arrest of 31 October 2015 before the appropriate court. They further contended that by the ruling of 6 November 2015, the investigating judge of the Pecherskyy Court had provided an effective judicial review of the lawfulness of the applicant ’ s re-arrest on 3 November 2015. (b) The Court ’ s assessment (i) General case-law principles 184. The Court reiterates that the purpose of Article 5 § 4 is to assure to persons who are arrested and detained the right to judicial supervision of the lawfulness of the measure to which they are thereby subjected (see, mutatis mutandis, De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, § 76, Series A no. 12, and Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, no. 2947/06, § 145, 24 April 2008). A remedy must be made available during a person ’ s detention to allow that person to obtain a speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention, capable of leading, where appropriate, to his or her release. The accessibility of a remedy implies, inter alia, that the circumstances voluntarily created by the authorities must be such as to afford applicants a realistic possibility of using the remedy ( see Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, no. 42310/04, § 239, 21 April 2011). The question whether a person ’ s right under Article 5 § 4 has been respected has to be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case ( see Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29462/95, § 84, ECHR 2000 ‑ XII). (ii) Application of the above principles in the present case 185. The Court takes notes from the outset of the formal decision on the applicant ’ s release of 3 November 2015 ( see paragraph 24 above). 186. According to the Court ’ s case-law, Article 5 § 4 of the Convention is no longer applicable to any attempts to get a judicial review of the lawfulness of one ’ s deprivation of liberty after release (see, mutatis mutandis, Slyusar v. Ukraine, no. 34361/06, § 13, 8 March 2012, and the reference therein to Reinprecht v. Austria, no. 67175/01, § 51, ECHR 2005 ‑ XII). 187. In other words, Article 5 § 4 of the Convention provides a preventive remedy in respect of unlawful deprivation of liberty. As regards proceedings for a judicial review of the lawfulness of a person ’ s detention after his or her release, all they can achieve is an ex post facto judicial declaration that the detention had been unlawful. At that point, the preventive remedy under Article 5 § 4 ceases to apply and a compensatory remedy enshrined in Article 5 § 5 of the Convention comes into play (see, mutatis mutandis, Lelyuk v. Ukraine, no. 24037/08, § 35, 17 November 2016). 188. The Court has consistently held in its case-law that it must look behind appearances and investigate the realities of the situation complained of (for the application of this principle in the context of Article 5 of the Convention, see Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 37138/06, § 163, 9 November 2010). 189. In the present case the reality was that the applicant was not released in spite of the court order of 3 November 2015 to that effect ( see paragraph 24 above). Given that the investigator continued to refer to the same grounds as before ( see paragraph 27 above), it meant in practice that the applicant could seek a judicial review of the lawfulness of his deprivation of liberty in the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention only within the remand proceedings of 6 November 2015, which he did ( see paragraphs 26 and 30 above). As to the question whether or not he should have lodged a separate complaint concerning the lawfulness of his initial arrest, the Court will analyse it from the standpoint of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention ( see paragraph 187 above). 190. Accordingly, the only remaining issue raised by the applicant under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention is the alleged failure of the Pecherskyy Court to give sufficient and relevant reasons in its ruling of 6 November 2015 ( see paragraph 182 above). However, the Court has already examined that issue under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention ( see paragraphs 164, 165, 167 and 181 above). It does not therefore seem necessary to deal with the same point under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention as well ( see Merabishvili, cited above, § 240). 191. The Court therefore concludes that, under the circumstances, there is no need to examine the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. 4. Alleged violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention (a) The parties ’ submissions 192. The applicant contended that he had not had an enforceable right to compensation in respect of the alleged breaches of Article 5. 193. The Government contested that submission. They observed that on 11 September 2017 the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been discontinued for want of evidence of his guilt. In the Government ’ s opinion, that provided sufficient grounds for him to claim compensation under Article 1176 of the Civil Code or section 1 of the Compensation Act ( see paragraphs 99 and 100 above), which he had failed to do. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 194. The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 5 is deemed to have been complied with where it is possible to apply for compensation in respect of a deprivation of liberty effected in conditions contrary to paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4. The right to compensation set forth in paragraph 5 therefore presupposes that a violation of one of the other paragraphs has been established, either by a domestic authority or by the Court. In this connection, the effective enjoyment of the right to compensation guaranteed by Article 5 § 5 must be ensured with a sufficient degree of certainty ( see Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, § 182, ECHR 2012). 195. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that Ukrainian legislation provided anyone who became a victim of unlawful criminal prosecution and/or detention with the possibility to claim compensation. The applicable legal provisions specified that the right to such compensation arose when there was a judicial finding of unlawfulness, in particular, of detention, or when the criminal proceedings against the person had been terminated for lack of proof of his/her guilt ( see paragraphs 99 and 100 above). 196. As pointed out by the Government, the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued on 11 September 2017 for lack of proof of his guilt ( see paragraphs 58 and 193 above). However, the grounds for depriving him of his liberty, which he considered to be in breach of Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention, had not been confined to the charges against him within the above-mentioned proceedings. They also included the charge of R. ’ s kidnapping, in respect of which the applicant was eventually convicted (see, in particular, paragraph 51 above). Furthermore, the Government suggested that, as of April 2018, there remained some outstanding charges against the applicant ( see paragraph 59 above). Although, based on the facts of the case, it is unclear what those charges could be, this implied that there was another obstacle preventing the applicant from claiming compensation solely relying on the PGO ’ s ruling of 11 September 2017 discontinuing the criminal proceedings against him. 197. It cannot therefore be said that the applicant ’ s effective enjoyment of the right to compensation was ensured with a sufficient degree of certainty, as required by Article 5 § 5 of the Convention ( see paragraph 194 above). 198. The Court also notes that the Government reproached the applicant for not having pursued his complaint concerning the lawfulness of his initial arrest of 31 October 2015, and the Court decided to deal with that issue under Article 5 § 5 ( see paragraphs 183 and 189 above). Having regard to the nature and scope of the alleged breaches of the applicant ’ s rights under Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention, the Court does not consider that by challenging the lawfulness of his arrest of 31 October 2015, that being one grievance among many others, the applicant could have changed the state of affairs described above. 199. In sum, there was no finding by the domestic authorities of a violation of one of the other paragraphs of Article 5 of the Convention to enable the applicant to claim compensation under paragraph 5. Nor are there any reasons to hold the absence of such a finding against the applicant. 200. However, in the present judgment the Court has found violations of Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 ( see paragraphs 151 and 181 above). It follows that Article 5 § 5 of the Convention is applicable. The Court must therefore establish whether Ukrainian law afforded, or now affords, the applicant an enforceable right to compensation on the basis of the findings of violations of Article 5 by this Court. 201. The Court has examined this issue in numerous other Ukrainian cases. It has found that a right to compensation under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention is not ensured in the domestic legal system when the Court establishes a violation of any of the preceding paragraphs of that Article and when there was no domestic judicial decision establishing the unlawfulness of the detention (see, for example, Nechiporuk and Yonkalo, cited above, §§ 233-34; Taran v. Ukraine, no. 31898/06, §§ 89-90, 17 October 2013; and Sinkova v. Ukraine, no. 39496/11, §§ 82-84, 27 February 2018). The Court finds no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. 202. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention. III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 18 OF THE CONVENTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 5 203. The applicant complained that the deprivation of his liberty had been ordered for ulterior motives, in particular political motives. He relied on Article 18 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 5, which provides as follows: “The restrictions permitted under [the] Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.” A. Admissibility 204. The Court observes that the crux of the applicant ’ s complaint under this head, namely that his criminal prosecution and detention had been ordered for ulterior motives, has not been examined under Article 5 of the Convention. The Court therefore considers that Article 18 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 5 is applicable (for the general principles on the interpretation and application of Article 18 of the Convention, see Merabishvili, cited above, §§ 287-91). 205. The Court also notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. The parties ’ submissions 206. The applicant alleged that the real reasons for his criminal prosecution had been as follows. Firstly, he referred to a conflict between the then head of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration (in whose team the applicant had been working at the time – see paragraph 7 above) and the President of Ukraine, which had led to the former ’ s resignation in March 2015. Secondly, the applicant had been the main rival of the candidate from the President ’ s party, who was also a close friend of the President, in the mid-term parliamentary elections in Chernigiv ( see paragraph 10 above). The applicant had uncovered various violations by the above-mentioned candidate, such as the bribing of voters, abuse of administrative resources and vote rigging. The applicant therefore alleged that it was that candidate who had initiated the applicant ’ s criminal prosecution. Another reason, in the applicant ’ s opinion, was his sharp criticism of those in power in general and President Poroshenko in particular. In addition, the applicant ’ s party had had a high score in the local elections. He submitted that the purpose of depriving him of his liberty and subjecting him to criminal prosecution was to prevent him from engaging in political activity and to discredit his political party. 207. In support of his submissions, the applicant referred to various statements made to the press, which showed that his criminal prosecution had been ordered for political reasons ( see paragraphs 88-93 above). 208. The Government argued that the applicant ’ s allegations lacked any substantiation. In particular, his participation in the local and the mid-term parliamentary elections had in no way been impeded. The applicant had himself been one of “those in power” up until the end of March 2015 and had not been in opposition. Nor had he enjoyed, in the Government ’ s opinion, any strong public support. Lastly, they submitted that it was open to anybody to criticise the President of Ukraine or his team without any fear of criminal prosecution and that the applicant had not provided any evidence to the contrary. 2. The Court ’ s assessment (a) General case-law principles 209. The Court reiterates that Article 18 of the Convention does not serve merely to clarify the scope of the restriction clauses (such as, for example, the second sentence of Article 5 § 1 and the second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11, which permit restrictions to those rights and freedoms). It also expressly prohibits the High Contracting Parties from restricting the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention for purposes not prescribed by the Convention itself, and to this extent it is autonomous ( see Merabishvili, cited above, § § 287-88). 210. A right or freedom is sometimes restricted solely for a purpose which is not prescribed by the Convention. But it is equally possible that a restriction is applied both for an ulterior purpose and a purpose prescribed by the Convention; in other words, that it pursues a plurality of purposes. The question in such situations is whether the prescribed purpose invariably expunges the ulterior one, whether the mere presence of an ulterior purpose contravenes Article 18, or whether there is some intermediary answer (ibid., § 292). 211. There is a considerable difference between cases in which the prescribed purpose was the one that truly actuated the authorities, though they also wanted to gain some other advantage, and cases in which the prescribed purpose, while present, was in reality simply a cover enabling the authorities to attain an extraneous purpose, which was the overriding focus of their efforts. Holding that the presence of any other purpose by itself contravenes Article 18 would not do justice to that fundamental difference, and would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of Article 18, which is to prohibit the misuse of power. Indeed, it could mean that each time the Court excludes an aim or a ground pleaded by the Government under a substantive provision of the Convention, it must find a breach of Article 18, because the Government ’ s pleadings would be proof that the authorities pursued not only the purpose that the Court accepted as legitimate, but also another one (ibid., § 303). 212. For the same reason, a finding that the restriction pursues a purpose prescribed by the Convention does not necessarily rule out a breach of Article 18 either. Indeed, holding otherwise would strip that provision of its autonomous character (ibid., § 304). 213. The Court is therefore of the view that a restriction can be compatible with the substantive Convention provision which authorises it because it pursues an aim permissible under that provision, but still infringe Article 18 because it was chiefly meant for another purpose that is not prescribed by the Convention; in other words, if that other purpose was predominant. Conversely, if the prescribed purpose was the main one, the restriction does not run counter to Article 18 even if it also pursues another purpose (ibid., § 305). 214. Which purpose is predominant in a given case depends on all the circumstances. In assessing that point, the Court will have regard to the nature and degree of reprehensibility of the alleged ulterior purpose, and bear in mind that the Convention was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society governed by the rule of law. In continuing situations, it cannot be excluded that the assessment of which purpose was predominant may vary over time (ibid., §§ 307-08). 215. The Court applies its usual approach to proof when dealing with complaints under Article 18 of the Convention (ibid., 310). The first aspect of that approach is that, as a general rule, the burden of proof is not borne by one or the other party because the Court examines all material before it irrespective of its origin, and because it can, if necessary, obtain material of its own motion. The second aspect of the Court ’ s approach is that the standard of proof before it is “beyond reasonable doubt”. That standard, however, is not co-extensive with that of the national legal systems which employ it. First, such proof can follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Secondly, the level of persuasion required to reach a conclusion is intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made, and the Convention right at stake. The third aspect of the Court ’ s approach is that the Court is free to assess not only the admissibility and relevance but also the probative value of each item of evidence before it. There is no reason for the Court to restrict itself to direct proof in relation to complaints under Article 18 of the Convention or to apply a special standard of proof to such allegations. Circumstantial evidence in this context means information about the primary facts, or contextual facts or sequences of events which can form the basis for inferences about the primary facts. Reports or statements by international observers, non-governmental organisations or the media, or the decisions of other national or international courts, are often taken into account to, in particular, shed light on the facts, or to corroborate findings made by the Court (ibid., §§ 311 and 314-17). (b) Application of the above principles in the present case 216. In the present case, the Court has accepted that the applicant was arrested on “reasonable suspicion” of having committed a criminal offence ( see paragraph 160 above). In other words, even though the Court has found a number of violations of Article 5 of the Convention ( see paragraphs 151, 181 and 202 above), it can still be stated that the applicant was deprived of his liberty for a purpose prescribed by Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention. 217. In analysing the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 18 of the Convention, the Court must first of all examine whether the restriction in question additionally pursued any other purpose which was not prescribed by Article 5 § 1. Even in the event of an affirmative answer to that question, there will only be a breach of Article 18 if that other purpose was predominant. 218. The Court accepts that the timing of the applicant ’ s initial arrest and the manner in which it was carried out could be interpreted as possible indices of an ulterior purpose. The Court observes, in particular, that the institution of criminal proceedings against the applicant on 15 August 2014, immediately after R. had complained to the police of his kidnapping by the applicant, apparently caused no immediate inconvenience to the applicant. Moreover, on 15 September 2014 the President of Ukraine awarded him an Order for Courage “for his commitment, active civic stance and high professionalism in carrying out his official duties” ( see paragraph 8 above). Subsequently, on 25 February, 7 August and 1 October 2015 further sets of criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant ( see paragraphs 14 - 16 above). However, it was only on 31 October 2015 that the investigating authorities notified the applicant of their suspicions in that respect and arrested him ( see paragraph 17 above). His arrest took place with the involvement of a special forces unit, which broke through the entrance door to the applicant ’ s flat ( see paragraph 18 above). All of a sudden, without any apparent reason, the applicant ’ s arrest and criminal prosecution became a matter of particular urgency and zeal for the prosecuting authorities. In the absence of any convincing explanations from the authorities, it was broadly perceived by political parties, mass media and civil society as selective justice ( see paragraphs 88 - 93 above). 219. While bearing that in mind, the Court will turn now to the specific arguments raised by the applicant in support of his complaint. 220. The Court notes that the applicant linked his criminal prosecution and deprivation of liberty, in particular, with the alleged conflict between the then Head of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration and the President of Ukraine, which had led to the former ’ s resignation in March 2015 ( see paragraphs 7 and 206 above). In the absence of complaints of political persecution raised by the above-mentioned official or any member of his political team other than the applicant, the Court does not find this argument convincing. 221. Nor is the Court convinced by the applicant ’ s allegation that the real impetus for his criminal prosecution might have stemmed from his rivalry with the candidate from the President ’ s party during the mid-term parliamentary elections in Chernigiv of 26 July 2015 ( see paragraphs 10 and 206 above). The applicant suggested that the whole legal machinery had been misused at the whim of a friend and political ally of the President. The Court does not discern any evidence in the case-file materials in support of such a serious allegation. Furthermore, it appears unlikely that the candidate, who had won the elections with 35.90% of the vote, would post factum seek to take revenge on the applicant, who had obtained less than half of that percentage (14.76%). The Court also finds it relevant to note that although the applicant suggested that the election results had been rigged and were unfair ( see paragraph 206 above), he has not lodged a complaint under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections). 222. In so far as the applicant claimed that he had been sharply criticising the President of Ukraine and those in power, the Court accepts the Government ’ s observation that he was obviously not the only one to do so. The Court has no information, however, of any attempts to stifle voices critical of the then President of Ukraine or the Government. The plurality of publicly expressed opinions in Ukraine concerning the applicant ’ s criminal prosecution itself is rather an indication to the contrary: that anybody was free to criticise the President in particular and the authorities in general. 223. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court is also sceptical of the alleged link between the deprivation of the applicant ’ s liberty and the success of his party in the local elections. It should be noted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant were instituted about a year prior to the creation of the UKROP party. Furthermore, apart from the “Bloc of Petro Poroshenko”, which won the election, two other parties, “Batkivshchyna” and “Opposition Bloc”, had better results than UKROP ( see paragraph 11 above) but did not allege that they had been persecuted. 224. In the light of all the foregoing, the Court considers that the allegations the applicant has raised in the context of his complaint under Article 18 of the Convention are not sufficiently proven. Even if there might have been some ulterior motives for prosecuting the applicant and depriving him of his liberty, the Court is unable to identify them on the basis of the applicant ’ s submissions, let alone find that those ulterior motives were predominant. 225. That being so, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 18 of the Convention. IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 2 OF THE CONVENTION 226. The applicant complained of a violation of his right to the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” A. Admissibility 227. The Court declares this complaint admissible given that it is neither manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. B. Merits 228. The applicant complained that high-ranking public officials had asserted his guilt in the absence of his conviction by a court, thus influencing public opinion and prejudging the case against him. 229. The Government argued that the authorities had been merely informing society of progress in a high-profile criminal case. 230. The Court reiterates the well-established principle of its case-law that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention bars officials from declaring a person guilty before that person ’ s conviction by a court. Officials may tell the public about criminal investigations by, for example, reporting suspicions, arrests, and confessions, if they do so discreetly and circumspectly. The choice of words used by them matters ( see Turyev v. Russia, no. 20758/04, § 19, 11 October 2016, with further references). 231. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the impugned remarks were not made in the framework of the criminal proceedings themselves but as part of press statements intended for the public. The Court takes note of the Government ’ s submission that the purpose of the impugned statements was to inform the public about a high-profile criminal case. Indeed, given that the applicant was a politician, the authorities might have considered it necessary to keep the public informed of the criminal accusations against him (compare Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 15172/13, § 127, 22 May 2014). However, the Court considers that the statements made by high-ranking officials to the mass media in respect of the criminal proceedings against the applicant were far from discreet or circumspect. His identity was known to the public and he was labelled as a leader of a criminal organisation involved in a number of serious criminal offences ( see paragraphs 82-87 above). As such, those statements could not but have encouraged the public to believe the applicant guilty before he had been proved guilty according to the law. 232. The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 233. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 234. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the applicant’s arrest and re-arrest. It also found a violation of Article 5 § 3 due to the absence of relevant and sufficient reasons for the applicant’s deprivation of liberty, and a violation of Article 5 § 5, finding that the applicant’s effective enjoyment of the right to compensation had not been ensured with a sufficient degree of certainty. The Court held, however, that there had been no violation of Article 18 of the Convention in the applicant’s case, finding that the allegations he had raised had not been sufficiently proven. Even if there might have been some ulterior motives for prosecuting the applicant and depriving him of his liberty, the Court was unable to identify them on the basis of the applicant’s submissions, let alone find that those ulterior motives were predominant.