Demonstrators
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE A. International legal documents 1. United Nations legal sources 190. The United Nations Committee against Torture issued General Comment No. 3 (2012) on the Implementation by States parties of Article 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the relevant parts of which read as follows: “ Obstacles to the Right to Redress 37. A crucial component of the right to redress is the clear acknowledgement by the responsible State party that the reparative measures provided or awarded to a victim are for violations of the Convention, by action or omission. The Committee is therefore of the view that a State party may not implement development measures or provide humanitarian assistance as a substitute for redress for victims of torture or ill-treatment. The failure of a State party to provide the individual victim of torture with redress may not be justified by invoking a State ’ s level of development. The Committee reminds that change of government as well as successor states still have the obligations to guarantee access to the right of redress. 38. States parties to the Convention have an obligation to ensure that the right to redress is effective. Specific obstacles that impede the enjoyment of the right to redress and prevent effective implementation of article 14 include, but are not limited to: inadequate national legislation, discrimination in accessing complaints and investigation mechanisms and procedures for remedy and redress; inadequate measures to secure the custody of alleged perpetrators, state secrecy laws, evidential burdens and procedural requirements that interfere with the determination of the right to redress; statutes of limitations, amnesties and immunities; the failure to provide sufficient legal aid and protection measures for victims and witnesses; as well associated stigma, and the physical, psychological and other related effects of torture and ill-treatment. In addition, the failure of a State party to execute judgments providing reparative measures for a victim of torture, handed down by either national, international or regional courts, constitute a significant impediment to the right to redress. States parties should develop coordinated mechanisms to enable victims to execute judgments across State lines, including recognizing the validity of court orders from other States parties and assisting in locating the assets of perpetrators. 39. With regard to the obligations in article 14, States parties shall ensure both de jure and de facto access to timely and effective redress mechanisms for members of groups marginalized and/or made vulnerable, avoid measures that impede the ability of members of such groups to seek and obtain redress, and address formal or informal obstacles that they may face in obtaining redress. These may include, for example, inadequate judicial or other procedures for quantifying damages which may have a negative disparate impact on such individuals in accessing or keeping money. As the Committee has emphasized in its General Comment No. 2, “gender is a key factor. Being female intersects with other identifying characteristics or status of the person ... to determine the ways that women and girls are subject to or at risk of torture or ill-treatment”. States parties shall ensure due attention to gender in providing all the elements cited above in the process of ensuring that everybody, in particular members of groups made vulnerable, including LGBT must be treated fairly and equally and obtain fair and adequate compensation, rehabilitation and other reparative measures which respond to their specific needs 40. On account of the continuous nature of the effects of torture, statutes of limitations should not be applicable as these deprive victims of the redress, compensation, and rehabilitation due to them. For many victims, passage of time does not attenuate the harm and in some cases the harm may increase as a result of post-traumatic stress that requires medical, psychological and social support, which is often inaccessible to those whom have not received redress. States parties shall ensure that all victims of torture or ill-treatment, regardless of when the violation occurred or whether it was carried out by or with the acquiescence of a former regime, are able to access their rights to remedy and to obtain redress ... ” 2. Case-law of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 191. International case-law provides examples of cases where the alleged victims of mass violations of fundamental rights, such as the right to life and the right not to be subjected to ill-treatment, have been authorised to wait many years before bringing proceedings at national level and subsequently applying to the international courts, although the admissibility criteria for their applications, with regard to exhaustion of domestic remedies and time-limits for submitting complaints, were similar to those provided for by the Convention (see, inter alia, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Community of Rio Negro of the Maya Indigenous People and its Members v. Guatemala, report no. 13/2008 of 5 March 2008, application no. 844/05; Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“ IACtHR ”), “ Las Dos Erres ” Massacre v. Guatemala, 24 November 2009 and IACtHR, and García Lucero et al. v. Chile, 28 August 2013 ). 192. The relevant parts of the first case cited above ( Community of Rio Negro of the Maya Indigenous People and its Members, §§ 88-89) read as follows: “The rule of a reasonable time for filing petitions with the inter-American human rights system must be analyzed in each case, mindful of the activity of the victims ’ next-of-kin to seek justice, the conduct of the state, and the situation and context in which the alleged violation occurred. Therefore, in view of the context and characteristics of the instant case, as well as of the fact that several investigations and judicial proceedings are still pending, the Commission considers that the petition was presented within a reasonable time, and that the admissibility requirement referring to the time for submission has been met.” B. Provisions concerning the statutory limitation of criminal liability 193. Article 121 of the Criminal Code, in force at the material time, is worded as follows: “ The statutory limitation of criminal liability does not apply to crimes against peace and humanity. ” 194. Article 122, in force at the material time, governs the statutory limitation periods in respect of criminal liability. The relevant parts are worded as follows: “ Criminal liability shall be statute-barred after : ( a) fifteen years, where the law provides for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or fifteen years ’ imprisonment for the offence committed; ( b) ten years, where the law provides for a maximum sentence of more than ten years ’ and less than fifteen years ’ imprisonment for the offence committed; ( c) eight years, where the law provides for a maximum sentence of more than five years ’ and less than ten years ’ imprisonment; ( d) five years, where the law provides for a maximum sentence of more than one year ’ s and less than five years ’ imprisonment for the offence committed; ( e) three years, where the law provides for a maximum sentence not exceeding one year ’ s imprisonment or a fine for the offence committed. These limitation periods shall start to run from the date on which the offence was committed ...” 195. Article 123 lays down a ground for interrupting the limitation period, namely the carrying out of any act that, under the law, must be notified to the accused. 196. Article 124, as in force at the material time, governs the special limitation period. The relevant parts are worded as follows : “ Criminal liability shall be time-barred regardless of how many interruptions have occurred, if the time-limit provided for in Article 122 is exceeded by half of the period in question.” C. Article 358 of the Criminal Code and case-law concerning its application 197. Article 358 of the Criminal Code read as follows: Inhuman treatment ( Tratamentele neomenoase ) “ 1. The fact of inflicting inhuman treatment on wounded or ill persons, on civilian health personnel or members of the Red Cross or other similar organisations, on the shipwrecked, on prisoners of war and, in general, on any other person who has fallen into enemy hands ( şi în general a oricărei persoane căzute sub puterea adversarului ), or of subjecting them to medical or scientific experiments which are not justified by medical treatment administered for their benefit, shall be punishable by a prison sentence of between five and twenty years and the deprivation of certain rights. 2. The fact of committing the following acts against the persons mentioned in the previous paragraph shall be punishable by the same penalty: (a) forcible conscription in the enemy ’ s armed forces; (b) hostage-taking; (c) deportation; (d) forcible transfer ( dislocarea ) or deprivation of liberty without a legal basis; (e) conviction or execution, without prior judgment by a court established by law in compliance with the basic requirements of due process as provided for by law. 3. The torture, mutilation or extermination of the persons mentioned in the first paragraph shall be punishable by life imprisonment or a prison sentence of between fifteen and twenty-five years and the deprivation of certain rights. 4. Where the offences punishable under this Article are committed in wartime, the applicable penalty shall be life imprisonment.” 198. By judgment no. 2579, delivered on 7 July 2009, the High Court of Cassation and Justice upheld a decision on the applicability of Article 358 of the Criminal Code – a provision which penalises inhuman treatment – adopted by the military court of appeal in a case concerning the arrest and death in prison in 1948 of an opponent of the totalitarian regime which had then just been established in Romania. The relevant passages of that judgment read as follows : “ By a judgment of 28 January 2009, the Military Court of Appeal decided ... to allow the appeal by the appellant ... against the decision ... not to bring a prosecution, issued in respect of D. Z. and the staff of the Medical Service of the Ministry of the Interior ( in 1948) with regard to the crime of inhuman treatment, penalised by Article 358 of the Criminal Code ... ... the case was sent to the Military Prosecutor ’ s Office at the Military Court of Appeal with a view to the opening of criminal proceedings ( în vederea începerii urmăririi penale ) for the reasons, facts and circumstances established by means of the evidence set out in the judgment ... In so ruling, the Court of Appeal noted that : ... Relying on the definition of inhuman treatment given by the European Court [of Human Rights], the High Court notes in the instant case that, in 1948, the period in which the events coming under Article 358 of the Criminal Code were committed, there existed a situation of conflict – a precondition [for this crime to be established] – between the authorities of the Communist State, who not only tolerated but even authorised “State agents” to behave like genuine torturers, and the victims of this regime of physical and psychological repression. In those circumstances, there is nothing to prevent the accused from being the subject of an investigation in relation to this offence. The actus reus of the offence of inhuman treatment as applicable in this case consists in subjecting injured or ill persons to inhuman treatment, that is, treatment which is difficult to endure physically and is humiliating. In consequence, the Military Court of Appeal was correct in ordering that the case be sent back to the prosecutor ’ s office so that proceedings could be brought, including in respect of this crime, the respondents Z. and D. having ordered the arrest of D.A. on 21 April 1948 on the charge of undermining State security, based on an anonymous denunciation and in the absence of any evidence that that offence had been committed. ” THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION 199. Mrs Anca Mocanu and Mr Marin Stoica alleged that the respondent State had failed in its obligations under the procedural aspect of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. They alleged that those provisions required the State to conduct an effective, impartial and thorough investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the armed repression of the demonstrations of 13 and 14 June 1990, in the course of which Mr Mocanu, the first applicant ’ s husband, was killed by gunfire and the second applicant was subjected to ill ‑ treatment. The relevant part of Article 2 provides : “1. Everyone ’ s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally ... ” Article 3 provides : “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A. The Court ’ s jurisdiction ratione temporis 200. The Court notes that the respondent Government made no plea before the Grand Chamber as to the Court ’ s lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis. However, they submitted that the Court could examine the complaints brought before it only in so far as they related to the period after 20 June 1994, the date on which the Convention came into force in respect of Romania. 201. The Court reiterates that it has to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it, and is therefore obliged to examine the question of its jurisdiction at every stage of the proceedings even where no objection has been raised in this respect ( see Blečić v. Croatia [GC], no. 59532/00, § 67, ECHR 2006 ‑ III). 1. The Chamber judgment 202. The Chamber held that the procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation arising out of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention had evolved into a separate and autonomous duty which could be considered capable of binding the State even when the infringement of life or of personal integrity occurred before the entry into force of the Convention with regard to that State. In so ruling, it reiterated the principles outlined in the Šilih v. Slovenia judgment ([GC], no. 71463/01, §§ 159-63, 9 April 2009) and subsequently applied in cases brought against Romania in which the events of December 1989 were in issue ( see Agache and Others v. Romania, no. 2712/02, §§ 70-73, 20 October 2009; Şandru and Others v. Romania, no. 22465/03, § 59, 8 December 2009; and Association “ 21 December 1989 ” and Others v. Romania, nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 114-18, 24 May 2011 ). 203. It also considered that, in order for this procedural obligation to be applicable, it must be established that a significant proportion of the procedural steps were or ought to have been implemented following ratification of the Convention by the country concerned. Applying those principles in this case, the Chamber noted that the criminal proceedings concerning the violent suppression of the demonstrations of June 1990 had been instituted in 1990, that they had continued after 20 June 1994 and that a significant proportion of the procedural measures had been carried out after that date. 204. The Chamber therefore declared that it had jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine the allegation of a procedural violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, dismissing the objection which had been raised by the Government in this connection with regard to Mr Stoica ’ s application alone. 2. The Court ’ s assessment 205. In Janowiec and Others v. Russia ([GC], nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, §§ 128-51, ECHR 2013), the Court provided additional clarifications on the temporal limitations of its jurisdiction – previously defined in the Šilih judgment ( cited above, §§ 162-63) – with regard to the procedural obligation to investigate deaths or ill-treatment which occurred prior to the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State ( the “critical date ” ). 206. It found, in essence, that this temporal jurisdiction was strictly limited to procedural acts which were or ought to have been implemented after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State, and that it was subject to the existence of a genuine connection between the event giving rise to the procedural obligation under Articles 2 and 3 and the entry into force of the Convention. It added that such a connection was primarily defined by the temporal proximity between the triggering event and the critical date, which could be separated only by a reasonably short lapse of time that should not normally exceed ten years ( see Janowiec and Others, cited above, § 146); at the same time, the Court specified that this time period was not in itself decisive. In this regard, it indicated that this connection could be established only if much of the investigation – that is, the undertaking of a significant proportion of the procedural steps to determine the cause of death and hold those responsible to account – took place or ought to have taken place in the period following the entry into force of the Convention ( see Janowiec and Others, cited above, § 147). 207. In the instant case, the Court reiterates that the complaints in respect of the procedural aspect of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention concern the investigation into the armed repression conducted on 13 and 14 June 1990 against the anti-government demonstrations, and that this repression cost the life of the first applicant ’ s husband and interfered with the second applicant ’ s physical integrity. That investigation began in 1990, shortly after those events, giving rise, inter alia, to investigative measures, the primary aim of which was to identify the victims who had been killed by gunfire, including the first applicant ’ s husband. 208. It should thus be noted that four years passed between the triggering event and the Convention ’ s entry into force in respect of Romania, on 20 June 1994. This lapse of time is relatively short. It is less than ten years and less than the time periods in issue in similar cases examined by the Court ( see Şandru and Others, cited above, §§ 55-59; Paçacı and Others v. Turkey, no. 3064/07, §§ 63-66, 8 November 2011; and Jularić v. Croatia, no. 20106/06, §§ 45-51, 20 January 2011). 209. Prior to the critical date, few procedural acts were carried out in the context of the investigation. It was after that date, and especially from 1997 onwards, that the investigation took shape through the joinder of dozens of cases which had previously been dispersed and the bringing of charges against senior military and civilian figures. Equally, the prosecutors ’ decisions to commit for trial and judicial decisions concerning this case were all issued after the critical date ( see, inter alia, the decision to commit for trial of 18 May 2000, the Supreme Court of Justice ’ s judgment of 30 June 2003, the decision to commit for trial of 27 July 2007 and the High Court of Cassation and Justice ’ s judgments of 17 December 2007 and 9 March 2011). 210. In other words, the majority of the proceedings and the most important procedural measures were carried out after the critical date. 211. Consequently, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine the complaints raised by Mrs Mocanu and Mr Stoica under the procedural aspect of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, in so far as those complaints relate to the criminal investigation conducted in the present case after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Romania. B. Objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies 212. The Government, alleging that the applicants had not brought an action in tort against the State, repeated the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies submitted by them to the Chamber in respect both of the complaint lodged by Mrs Anca Mocanu under Article 2 and that lodged by Mr Marin Stoica under Article 3. 1. The Chamber judgment 213. After pointing out that the Court had already dismissed a similar objection in its Association “ 21 December 1989 ” and Others judgment ( cited above, §§ 119-125) and that the State ’ s obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention could not be satisfied merely by an award of damages, the Chamber also dismissed the objection raised by the Government in this case. In addition, it considered that a single final judgment by a first-instance court did not demonstrate with sufficient certainty the existence of effective and accessible domestic remedies for complaints similar to those of the applicants. 2. The Government ’ s submissions 214. According to the Government, an action for damages based on the provisions of Articles 998 and 999 of the former Civil Code, and seeking to establish the State ’ s civil liability in tort on account of the lack of an effective investigation into the events of June 1990, would have enabled the two applicants to obtain fair compensation for the alleged damage and acknowledgement of a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. 215. In support of that argument, the Government indicated that the domestic courts had found in favour of other persons who were in similar situations to the applicants. In this connection, they referred to the decision which they had already mentioned in their observations before the Chamber. 216. The decision in question, which the Government had cited in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of this remedy, was a judgment of 12 June 2008 by which the Bucharest Fifth District Court had ordered the Ministry of Finance to pay compensation to a claimant for the shortcomings in an investigation opened following the repression of the demonstrations held in Bucharest in December 1989. The Government had indicated before the Chamber that the fact that they were submitting only one example of a judicial decision of this type could be explained by the absence of other proceedings for the same purpose. 217. The Government further referred to the judgment in Floarea Pop v. Romania (no. 63101/00, 6 April 2010 ), while distinguishing the present case from those of Branko Tomašić and Others v. Croatia (no. 46598/06, 15 January 2009 ) and Kats and Others v. Ukraine (no. 29971/04, 18 December 2008). They alleged that, contrary to the remedies in issue in these two cases, the remedy in issue here would have provided satisfaction to the applicants in respect of the procedural aspect of Articles 2 and 3 also, since the domestic courts had jurisdiction to examine possible breaches in that regard. 3. The applicants ’ submissions 218. In his submissions to the Grand Chamber, Mr Marin Stoica alleged that an action in tort did not constitute an adequate remedy in that it could not oblige those responsible for the investigation to establish what had happened, and that the prospects of success for such an action were purely hypothetical. In consequence, the exhaustion of this remedy had not been necessary. 219. Mrs Anca Mocanu made no comment on this point before the Grand Chamber. In her observations before the Chamber, she had submitted that the decision cited by the Government did not warrant the conclusion that this was an effective remedy, since the court concerned had not obliged the relevant authorities to expedite the criminal proceedings in question. In addition, she alleged that the case had been generated by the Government for the purposes in hand, namely the proceedings before the Court. She had added that nothing could dispense the State from its obligation to conduct an effective investigation as required by Article 2 of the Convention. 4. The Court ’ s assessment ( a) General principles 220. It is a fundamental feature of the machinery of protection established by the Convention that it is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. This Court is concerned with the supervision of the implementation by Contracting States of their obligations under the Convention. It should not take on the role of Contracting States, whose responsibility it is to ensure that the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined therein are respected and protected on a domestic level. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is based on the assumption – reflected in Article 13 of the Convention, with which it has close affinity – that there is an effective remedy available in respect of the alleged violation. The rule is therefore an indispensable part of the functioning of this system of protection ( Vučković and Others v. Serbia [GC], no. 17153/11, § 69, 25 March 2014). 221. States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system, and those who wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system (see, among many authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 65, Reports 1996 ‑ IV; and Vučković and Others, cited above, § 70). 222. The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies therefore requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 66; and Vučković and Others, cited above, § 71). To be effective, a remedy must be capable of directly redressing the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Balogh v. Hungary, no. 47940/99, § 30, 20 July 2004; and Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 46, ECHR 2006 ‑ II). 223. On the contrary, there is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 67, and Vučković and Others, cited above, § 73 ). However, the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust that avenue of redress (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 71; Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 70, 17 September 2009; and Vučković and Others, cited above, § 74). 224. The Court has, however, also frequently underlined the need to apply the exhaustion rule with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see Ringeisen v. Austria, 16 July 1971, § 89, Series A no. 13; Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 69; and Vučković and Others, cited above, § 76). The Court has therefore specified that the application of the rule must make due allowance for the fact that it is being applied in the context of machinery for the protection of human rights that the Contracting Parties have agreed to set up and without excessive formalism. It has therefore recognised that the rule of exhaustion is not capable of being applied automatically (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 69; and Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 286, ECHR 2012 (extracts) ). 225. As regards the burden of proof, it is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time. Once this burden has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted, or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from this requirement (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 68; Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey ( dec. ) [GC], nos. 46113/99 et al, § 69, ECHR 2010; McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, § 107, 10 September 2010; and Vučković and Others, cited above, § 77). 226. In those circumstances, in ruling on the issue of whether an applicant has met this admissibility criterion having regard to the specific circumstances of his or her case, the Court must first identify the act of the respondent State ’ s authorities complained of by the applicant ( see Haralambie v. Romania, no. 21737/03, § 70, 27 October 2009). 227. In this connection, the Court has held that, in the area of unlawful use of force by State agents – and not mere fault, omission or negligence –, civil or administrative proceedings aimed solely at awarding damages, rather than ensuring the identification and punishment of those responsible, were not adequate and effective remedies capable of providing redress for complaints based on the substantive aspect of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( see, inter alia, Yaşa v. Turkey, 2 September 1998, § 74, Reports 1998 ‑ VI). 228. Lastly, in several cases lodged against Romania, the Court has dismissed similar objections raised by the Government based on the same final judgment dating from 2008 that they rely upon in the present case ( see Association “ 21 December 1989 ” and Others, cited above, §§ 119-125; Lăpuşan and Others v. Romania, nos. 29007/06, 30552/06, 31323/06, 31920/06, 34485/06, 38960/06, 38996/06, 39027/06 and 39067/06, § 69, 8 March 2011; and Pastor and Ţiclete v. Romania, nos. 30911/06 and 40967/06, § 58, 19 April 2011 ). 229. In the judgments in question, the Court dismissed the objections of non-exhaustion on the ground that the availability of the remedy referred to by the Government was not certain in practice. Indeed, the Government had been able to submit only one example of a final judgment allowing an action engaging the State ’ s civil liability on account of the failure to conduct an effective investigation into the deaths by shooting committed in December 1989. ( b) Application of the above principles to the present case 230. In the present case, the Court notes that Mrs Anca Mocanu and Mr Marin Stoica alleged that the State had failed to comply with the obligations imposed on it under the procedural aspect of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to conduct an effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the armed repression of the demonstrations of 13 and 14 June 1990, in the course of which Mr Velicu ‑ Valentin Mocanu, the first applicant ’ s husband, was killed by gunfire and the second applicant was subjected to ill-treatment. 231. In this connection, it notes that the investigation concerning the first applicant has been pending before the domestic authorities and courts for more than twenty-three years, while the branch of the investigation concerning the second applicant was terminated by a judgment delivered on 9 March 2011. 232. However, the Government have not specified in what way an action in tort against the State in respect of the failure to conduct an effective investigation into the events of June 1990, the subject matter of the present applications, could have provided redress for the applicants, by ensuring the effectiveness of that investigation, closing the alleged gaps in it, or, at the very least, expediting it. 233. The Court notes that the only judicial decision produced by the Government merely awarded damages to an injured party concerned by the investigation into the events of December 1989 which was uncompleted at the time that that decision was delivered ( see Association “ 21 December 1989 ” and Others, cited above, §§ 119 and 136). 234. The Contracting Parties ’ obligation under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to conduct an investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible in cases of assault could be rendered illusory if, in respect of complaints under those Articles, an applicant were required to bring an action leading only to an award of damages ( see Isayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, § 149, 24 February 2005). 235. For the reasons set out above, the Court considers that the remedy put forward by the Government is not sufficient, in that it is not capable of providing redress for the situation complained of by the applicants. 236. It follows that the preliminary objection is unfounded and must therefore be dismissed. C. The allegation that Mr Stoica ’ s complaint was lodged out of time 237. Without explicitly reiterating the preliminary objection that they had raised before the Chamber, the Government alleged, with regard to the complaint lodged under Article 3 by Mr Stoica, that he ought to have displayed diligence, firstly in submitting his criminal complaint to the domestic authorities, and secondly in introducing his application before the Court. 1. The Chamber judgment 238. The Chamber considered that this second objection – alleging that Mr Stoica had lodged his criminal complaint with the relevant authorities out of time – should be joined to the examination of the merits of the complaint alleging a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, and declared the complaint admissible. 2. The Government ’ s submissions 239. The Government indicated that the criminal investigation into the violent acts committed on 13 and 14 June 1990 had been opened in 1990 and observed that, in spite of the opening of this investigation and the difficulties encountered by the authorities in identifying all the victims, the applicant did not join the proceedings until 2001. 240. In this regard, the Government considered that it was unacceptable for a presumed victim to benefit from steps taken by other persons to obtain the opening of an investigation without calling into question the fundamental principle of the Convention mechanism, namely exhaustion of domestic remedies, focused on the individual dimension of the right of petition. 241. Referring to the cases of Toma v. Romania ( ( dec. ), no. 34403/05, 18 September 2012) and Petyo Popov v. Bulgaria (no. 75022/01, 22 January 2009), the Government pointed out that the Court had criticised the conduct of applicants who had failed to bring their complaints concerning violations of Article 3 of the Convention before the domestic prosecuting authorities in due form. 242. In so far as the applicant sought to justify his passivity by an alleged vulnerability which prevented him from joining the investigation proceedings, the Government observed that the violence to which the applicant claimed to have been subjected in June 1990 had required only three to five days of medical care, that he had not been hospitalised for long and that he had not submitted medical certificates attesting to a physical or psychological impairment having a causal link with the events complained of. 243. The Government added that, after 1990, the social and political climate had been favourable to the victims and that the fears referred to by the applicant were accordingly unfounded. In this connection, they submitted that the Court had taken victims ’ vulnerability into account only in extremely critical situations, where the applicants had expressed well-founded fears in the light of the national context. 244. Referring to the cases of Narin v. Turkey (no. 18907/02, 15 December 2009) and Frandes v. Romania ( ( dec. ), no. 35802/05, 17 May 2011), the Government submitted that the Court, called on to assess the diligence shown by parties in applying to it, had considered that applications could be rejected as out of time even in cases concerning continuing situations. The Government considered that this rule applied to the situation of applicants who, like Mr Stoica in the instant case, had delayed excessively or without apparent reason before applying to the Court after realising that the investigation conducted by the authorities was losing effectiveness, or after the point that they ought to have realised this. In their opinion, Mr Stoica ’ s situation was very different from that of the applicants in Er and Others v. Turkey (no. 23016/04, 31 July 2012), as the applicant in the present case had been able at any moment to contact the authorities, who had not attempted to hide the facts or deny the circumstances. 3. The applicant ’ s submissions 245. The applicant explained that he had waited until 18 June 2001 before lodging a criminal complaint with regard to his experiences during the night of 13 to 14 June 1990 on account of the scale of the repression conducted by the authorities at that time, of which he among more than a thousand others had been a victim. He considered that the investigation in issue here did not concern ordinary incidents of unlawful use of force by State agents, but rather mass violations of human rights, orchestrated by the highest State authorities. In this connection, he alleged that, following the events of June 1990, he was in such a state of distress that he had hardly been able to leave his house for three months, for fear of the oppressive authorities, and that his mental and physical health had subsequently deteriorated to such an extent that he had sustained permanent psychological problems. 246. He pleaded that, in such circumstances, only a prompt reaction by the judicial authorities could have reassured him and encouraged him to lodge a complaint. He alleged that no such reaction had been forthcoming until 2000 and submitted that he had lodged a complaint at that point on learning that, for the first time, high-ranking State officials had been charged and committed for trial. 247. He observed that his complaint had not been dismissed as out of time by the national authorities, that it had been joined immediately to the wider investigation file opened into the impugned events, and that it had given rise to investigative acts in his respect without any allegations of passivity being made. 248. He considered that his failure to lodge a complaint before 2001 had not compromised the effectiveness of the investigation in any way. In this respect, he submitted that the authorities could have identified him from the video recordings that the State television service had made of the events which occurred in its own headquarters, or from the medical records drawn up, inter alia, during the night of 13 to 14 June 1990 by the emergency ward in which he was hospitalised. In addition, he noted that the fourth point of the operative provisions in the decision to commit for trial of 18 May 2000 ordered that the investigation be continued into the deprivation of liberty inflicted on 1, 300 persons by servicemen and miners from the morning of 13 June 1990 onwards, and also into the assaults sustained by hundreds of persons during the same period. 249. He claimed to have played a very active part in the investigation from 2001 onwards and to have regularly requested information on progress in the proceedings, submitting as evidence the entries made in the register of the military section of the prosecutor ’ s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 250. Lastly, he considered that lodging a complaint more rapidly would have had no impact on the outcome of that investigation, since the decision not to bring a prosecution, issued on 17 June 2009, also concerned those victims who had had the courage to lodge a complaint prior to 2001. 4. The third party ’ s observations 251. According to the non-governmental organisation Redress, the third-party intervener, the adverse psychological effects of ill-treatment on victims ’ capacity to complain represented a significant obstacle to redress. The reality of this phenomenon had been recognised, inter alia, by the United Nations Committee against Torture ( General Comment No. 3 ( 2012 ), § 38, cited above ). 252. Moreover, the Court had admitted that where abuses were perpetrated by State agents, their psychological effects could be even greater ( Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, § 33, Series A no. 26). 253. Scientific research showed that the experience of ill-treatment at the hands of social and political institutions charged with responsibility for ensuring individuals ’ safety and well-being could have particular psychological consequences which could explain a delay in making a complaint, or not making a complaint at all ( they referred, among other sources, to L. Piwowarczyk, A. Moreno, M. Grodin, “ Health Care of Torture Survivors ”, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 284 (2000), pp. 539-41). From a psychological perspective, the cause of this attitude was to be found in the shattering of the victims ’ ability to trust others, especially State agents. The victims of State agents felt more vulnerable than those of ordinary criminals, since they had little or no hope that the authorities would investigate their case, a fortiori where the State continued to repress peaceful demonstrations or showed no signs of pursuing an effective investigation ( A. Burnett, M. Peel, “ The Health of Survivors of Torture and Organised Violence ”, British Medical Journal, vol. 322 (2001), pp. 606-09). 254. This research also indicated that victims who did not identify themselves as activists or demonstrators suffered from ill-treatment more greatly, and could even be disproportionally impacted by the violence inflicted. 255. Given the difficult situation of victims, both in terms of their vulnerability and the obstacles to obtaining access to evidence, there was an increased tendency on the part of national courts to take these realities into account and to block limitation periods when agreeing to rule on complaints lodged many years after the events complained of by persons who had been tortured ( District Court of The Hague, Wisah Binti Silan and Others v. the Netherlands, 14 September 2011, §§ 4.15-4.18, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2012, no. 578; High Court (England and Wales), Mutua and Others v. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 5 October 2012, [2012] EWHC 2678 (QB); and the House of Lords (United Kingdom), A. v. Hoare, 30 January 2008, [2008] UKHL 6, §§ 44-49 ). 5. The Court ’ s assessment 256. The Court notes that the Government referred to the applicant ’ s tardiness in lodging a complaint with the domestic authorities concerning the events at the origin of this application. In this context, they also referred to the duty of diligence on persons wishing to apply to the Court. 257. The Court considers that the issue of the diligence incumbent on the applicant is closely linked to that of any tardiness in lodging a criminal complaint within the domestic legal system. Taken together, these arguments may be regarded as an objection alleging a failure to comply with the six-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. This objection must therefore now be examined ( see Micu v. Romania, no. 29883/06, § 108, 8 February 2011). ( a) General principles 258. The Court reiterates that the six-month time-limit provided for by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention has a number of aims. Its primary purpose is to maintain legal certainty by ensuring that cases raising issues under the Convention are examined within a reasonable time, and to prevent the authorities and other persons concerned from being kept in a state of uncertainty for a long period of time ( see Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, § 39, 29 June 2012; El - Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09, § 135, ECHR 2012; and Bayram and Yıldırım v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 38587/97, ECHR 2002-III ). That rule marks out the temporal limit of the supervision exercised by the Court and signals, both to individuals and State authorities, the period beyond which such supervision is no longer possible (see Walker v. the United Kingdom ( dec. ), no. 34979/97, ECHR 2000 ‑ I; Sabri Güneş, cited above, § 40; and El - Masri, cited above, § 135). 259. As a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where it is clear from the outset, however, that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of knowledge of that act or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant, and, where the situation is a continuing one, once that situation ends ( see, among other authorities, Dennis and Others v. the United Kingdom ( dec. ), no. 76573/01, 2 July 2002; Sabri Güneş, cited above, § 54; and El- Masri, cited above, § 136 ). 260. Article 35 § 1 cannot be interpreted in a manner which would require an applicant to seise the Court of his complaint before his position in connection with the matter has been finally settled at the domestic level, otherwise the principle of subsidiarity would be breached. Where an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 to take the start of the six-month period from the date when the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances ( see Edwards v. the United Kingdom ( dec. ), no. 46477/99, 7 June 2001, and El ‑ Masri, cited above, § 136 ). 261. In cases of a continuing situation, the period starts to run afresh each day and it is in general only when that situation ends that the six - month period actually starts to run (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, § 159, ECHR - 2009, and Sabri Güneş, cited above, § 54 ). 262. However, not all continuing situations are the same. Where time is of the essence in resolving the issues in a case, there is a burden on the applicant to ensure that his or her claims are raised before the Court with the necessary expedition to ensure that they may be properly, and fairly, resolved ( see Varnava and Others, cited above, § 160). This is particularly true with respect to complaints relating to any obligation under the Convention to investigate certain events. As the passage of time leads to the deterioration of evidence, time has an effect not only on the fulfilment of the State ’ s obligation to investigate but also on the meaningfulness and effectiveness of the Court ’ s own examination of the case. An applicant has to become active once it is clear that no effective investigation will be provided, in other words once it becomes apparent that the respondent State will not fulfil its obligation under the Convention ( see Chiragov and Others v. Armenia ( dec. ) [GC], no. 13216/05, § 136, 14 December 2011, and Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan ( dec. ) [GC], no. 40167/06, § 135, 14 December 2011, both referring to Varnava and Others, cited above, § 161). 263. The Court has already held that, in cases concerning an investigation into ill-treatment, as in those concerning an investigation into the suspicious death of a relative, applicants are expected to take steps to keep track of the investigation ’ s progress, or lack thereof, and to lodge their applications with due expedition once they are, or should have become, aware of the lack of any effective criminal investigation ( see the decisions in Bulut and Yavuz v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 73065/01, 28 May 2002; Bayram and Yıldırım, cited above; Frandes, cited above, §§ 18-23; and Atallah v. France ( dec. ), no. 51987/07, 30 August 2011). 264. It follows that the obligation of diligence incumbent on applicants contains two distinct but closely linked aspects: on the one hand, the applicants must contact the domestic authorities promptly concerning progress in the investigation – which implies the need to apply to them with diligence, since any delay risks compromising the effectiveness of the investigation – and, on the other, they must lodge their application promptly with the Court as soon as they become aware or should have become aware that the investigation is not effective ( see Nasirkhayeva v. Russia ( dec. ), no. 1721/07, 31 May 2011; Akhvlediani and Others v. Georgia ( dec. ), nos. 22026/10, 22043/10, 22078/10, 22097/10, 22128/10, 27480/10, 27534/10, 27551/10, 27572/10 and 27583/10, §§ 23-29, 9 April 2013; and Gusar v. the Republic of Moldova and Romania ( dec. ), no. 37204/02, §§ 14-17, 30 April 2013). 265. That being so, the Court reiterates that the first aspect of the duty of diligence – that is, the obligation to apply promptly to the domestic authorities – must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case. In this regard, it has held that applicants ’ delay in lodging a complaint is not decisive where the authorities ought to have been aware that an individual could have been subjected to ill-treatment – particularly in the case of assault which occurs in the presence of police officers – as the authorities ’ duty to investigate arises even in the absence of an express complaint ( see Velev v. Bulgaria, no. 43531/08, §§ 59-60, 16 April 2013). Nor does such a delay affect the admissibility of the application where the applicant was in a particularly vulnerable situation, having regard to the complexity of the case and the nature of the alleged human rights violations at stake, and where it was reasonable for the applicant to wait for developments that could have resolved crucial factual or legal issues ( see El - Masri, cited above, § 142 ). 266. With regard to the second aspect of this duty of diligence – that is, the duty on the applicant to lodge an application with the Court as soon as he realises, or ought to have realised, that the investigation is not effective – the Court has stated that the issue of identifying the exact point in time that this stage occurs necessarily depends on the circumstances of the case and that it is difficult to determine it with precision ( see the decision in Nasirkhayeva, cited above ). 267. In establishing the extent of this duty of diligence on applicants who wish to complain about the lack of an effective investigation into deaths or ill-treatment, the Court has been largely guided in recent years by the case-law on the duty of diligence imposed on applicants who complain about the disappearance of individuals in a context of international conflict or state of emergency within a country ( see Varnava and Others, cited above, § 16 5; Yetişen and Others v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 21099/06, §§ 72-85, 10 July 2012; and Er and Others, cited above, § 52), despite the differences between those two types of situation. 268. Thus, the Court has rejected as out of time applications where there had been excessive or unexplained delay on the part of applicants once they had, or ought to have, become aware that no investigation had been instigated or that the investigation had lapsed into inaction or become ineffective and, in any of those eventualities, there was no immediate, realistic prospect of an effective investigation being provided in the future ( see, inter alia, Narin, cited above, § 51; Aydınlar and Others v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 3575/05, 9 March 2010; and the decision in Frandes, cited above, §§ 18-23 ). In other words, the Court has considered it indispensable that persons who wish to bring a complaint about the ineffectiveness or lack of such investigation before the Court do not delay unduly in lodging their application. Where there has been a considerable lapse of time, and there have been significant delays and lulls in investigative activity, there will come a time when the relatives must realise that no effective investigation has been, or will be, provided. 269. The Court has held, however, that so long as there is some meaningful contact between relatives and authorities concerning complaints and requests for information, or some indication, or realistic possibility, of progress in investigative measures, considerations of undue delay by the applicants will not generally arise ( see Varnava and Others, cited above, § 165 ). ( b) Application of the above principles to the present case 270. The Court notes that the alleged attack on the applicant at the State television headquarters, in the presence of police officers and servicemen, took place on the night of 13 to 14 June 1990. A criminal investigation was opened shortly afterwards. On 18 June 2001, more than eleven years after the events, the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with a prosecutor at the military section of the prosecutor ’ s office at the Supreme Court of Justice (see paragraph 170 above). On 25 June 2008, more than eighteen years after the events, the applicant lodged his application with the Strasbourg Court. On 17 June 2009 the prosecutor ’ s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice decided to discontinue the proceedings against the surviving defendants either on the ground that the offences had become statute -barred or that there was no case to answer (see paragraphs 156-62 above). On 9 March 2011 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal against that decision (see paragraph 166 above). 271. The Court further notes that, in their objection, the Government criticises the applicant ’ s inactivity from 1990 to 2001. 272. From the point of view of the six-month rule, the Court has to ascertain whether the applicant, at the time of lodging his application with the Court, had been aware, or should have been aware, for more than six months, of the lack of any effective criminal investigation. His inactivity before lodging a criminal complaint at the domestic level is not as such relevant for the assessment of the fulfilment of the six-month requirement. However, if the Court were to conclude that before the applicant petitioned the competent domestic authorities he was already aware, or ought to have been aware, of the lack of any effective criminal investigation, it is obvious that his subsequent application with the Court has a fortiori been lodged out of time (see the decisions in Bayram and Yıldırım, and Bulut and Yavuz, both cited above), unless new evidence or information arose in the meantime which would have given rise to a fresh obligation on the authorities to take further investigative measures (see Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no. 32457/04, § 71, 27 November 2007, and Gürtekin and Others v. Cyprus ( dec. ), nos. 60441/13, 68206/13 and 68667/13, 11 March 2014 ). 273. Given that he formally lodged his complaint while being interviewed by a prosecutor in the military section of the prosecutor ’ s office at the Supreme Court of Justice, there is evidence that the applicant was keeping track of developments in the criminal investigation prior to 18 June 2001. He justified his reluctance to lodge a complaint by his vulnerability, which was explained not only by the deterioration in his health following the ill-treatment allegedly sustained in June 1990, but also by the feeling of powerlessness which he experienced on account of the large number of victims of the repression conducted by the security forces and the judicial authorities ’ failure to react in a prompt manner, capable of reassuring him and encouraging him to come forward. 274. Like the United Nations Committee against Torture, quoted by the third-party intervener, the Court acknowledges that the psychological effects of ill-treatment inflicted by State agents may also undermine victims ’ capacity to complain about treatment inflicted on them, and may thus constitute a significant impediment to the right to redress of victims of torture and other ill-treatment ( see General Comment No. 3 ( 2012 ), § 38, at paragraph 190 above ). Such factors may have the effect of rendering the victim incapable of taking the necessary steps to bring proceedings against the perpetrator without delay. Accordingly, as the third-party intervener pointed out, these factors are increasingly taken into account at national level, leading to a certain flexibility with regard to the limitation periods applicable to claims for reparation in respect of claims for compensation for personal injury (see paragraph 25 5 above). 275. The Court observes that very few victims of the events of 13 to 15 June 1990 lodged a complaint in the first few years (see paragraph 99 above). It does indeed appear that the majority of them found the courage to lodge a complaint only after the developments in the investigation arising from the decision of 16 September 1998 and the decision to commit for trial of 18 May 2000. The Court can only conclude, having regard to the exceptional circumstances in issue, that the applicant was in a situation in which it was not unreasonable for him to wait for developments that could have resolved crucial factual or legal issues ( see, by contrast, the decision in Akhvlediani and Others, cited above, § 27). Regard being had to the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant ’ s vulnerability and his feeling of powerlessness, which he shared with numerous other victims who, like him, waited for many years before lodging a complaint, amount to a plausible and acceptable explanation for his inactivity from 1990 to 200 1. 276. The Court also notes that certain other elements – particularly the video recording made by the State television service and the confiscation of identity documents belonging to the applicant and other persons who were held and filmed at the television station – indicate that the authorities knew or could have discovered without any real difficulties at least some of the names of the victims of the abuses committed on 13 June 1990 on the premises of the State television service and the surrounding area, and those committed over the following night, in the presence of the numerous servicemen who were gradually deployed there ( see Velev, cited above, §§ 59-60). Furthermore, the decision of 14 October 1999 and the decision to commit for trial of 18 May 2000 had ordered the investigators to identify all of those victims. 277. Moreover, the Court notes that the decision of 17 June 2009 not to bring a prosecution, upheld by the judgment of the High Court of Cassation and Justice of 9 March 2011, applied to all of the victims. The conclusion adopted with regard to the statutory limitation of criminal liability applied equally to those victims who had lodged complaints in the days following their assault and to those who, like the applicant, had complained at a later date. 278. In those circumstances, it cannot be concluded that Mr Stoica ’ s delay in lodging his complaint was capable of undermining the effectiveness of the investigation ( see, by contrast, the decision in Nasirkhayeva, cited above ). In any event, the applicant ’ s complaint was added to investigation case file no. 75/P/1998, which concerned a large number of victims of the events of 13 to 15 June 1990. The Court also notes that the decision of 29 April 2008, by which the military section of the prosecutor ’ s office stated that it did not have jurisdiction and referred the case to the ordinary criminal section for examination – inter alia – of the charges of inhuman treatment made against the highest-ranking army officers and the State leaders of the time, included the names of more than a thousand victims (see paragraph 14 2 above). Thus, the investigation was undertaken in entirely exceptional circumstances. 279. Moreover, the Court notes that from 2001 onwards, there was meaningful contact between the applicant and the authorities with regard to the former ’ s complaint and his requests for information, which he submitted annually by going to the prosecutor ’ s office in person to enquire about progress in the investigation. In addition, there were tangible indications that the investigation was progressing, particularly the successive decisions to bring charges against high-ranking civilian and military figures and the investigative measures in respect of the applicant, including the two forensic medical examinations which were carried out. 280. Having regard to the developments in the investigation subsequent to 2001, its scope and its complexity, all of which are accepted by the Government, the Court considers that after having lodged his complaint with the competent domestic authorities, the applicant could legitimately have believed that the investigation was effective and could reasonably have awaited its outcome, so long as there was a realistic possibility that the investigative measures were moving forward ( see, mutatis mutandis, Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 4704/04, § 52, 15 February 2011 ). 281. The applicant lodged his application with the Court on 25 June 2008, more than seven years after he had lodged his criminal complaint with the prosecuting authorities. The investigation was still pending at that time, and investigative steps had been taken. For the reasons indicated above ( see paragraph 27 9 ), which remained valid at least until the time when the applicant lodged his application before the Court, he cannot be criticised for having waited too long. 282. Moreover, the Court notes that the final domestic decision in the applicant ’ s case is the above - mentioned judgment of 9 March 2011. 283. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the application has not been lodged out of time. The Government ’ s objection must therefore be dismissed. D. Alleged violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention 1. The Chamber judgment 284. The Chamber examined separately the merits of the complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. It concluded that there had been a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2 in respect of Mrs Mocanu and that there had been no violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of Mr Stoica. ( a ) The part of the judgment concerning Mrs Mocanu 285. With regard to Mrs Mocanu, the Chamber noted that the criminal investigation into the unlawful killing of the applicant ’ s husband had been opened in 1990 and that it was still pending more than twenty years later. It concluded that the investigation had not complied with the requirement of promptness. 286. It also noted that in 1994 the case was pending before the military prosecuting authorities, which was not an independent investigative body, and that the shortcomings in the investigation, acknowledged by the national courts themselves, had not subsequently been remedied. 287. It also observed that Mrs Mocanu had been given access to the investigation belatedly, and that she had not been correctly informed about its progress. 288. Further, the Chamber considered that what was at stake in this case – that is, the right of the numerous victims to know what had happened and, by implication, the right to an effective judicial investigation and, where appropriate, compensation – were of such importance for Romanian society that they ought to have prompted the domestic authorities to deal with the case speedily and without unnecessary delay, in order to prevent any appearance of impunity for certain acts. 289. In view of these considerations, the Chamber concluded that there had been a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention. ( b) The part of the judgment concerning Mr Marin Stoica 290. With regard to Mr Stoica, the Chamber considered that, just as it was imperative that the relevant domestic authorities launch an investigation and take measures as soon as allegations of ill-treatment were brought to their attention, it was also incumbent on the persons concerned to display diligence and initiative. Thus, the Chamber attached particular importance to the fact that the applicant had not brought his complaint concerning the violence to which he was subjected on 13 June 1990 to the authorities ’ attention until eleven years after those events. 291. It noted that the complaint in question had been joined to case file no. 75/P/1998, which concerned, inter alia, the investigation into the charges of inhuman treatment, and that, in the context of that case, several investigative acts, including two forensic medical examinations, were carried out in respect of the applicant. 292. However, it noted that the case file indicated that, when the applicant lodged his complaint, certain offences – notably assault and wrongful conduct – had already become statute -barred, in application of domestic law. 293. Although the Chamber could accept that in situations of mass violations of fundamental rights it was appropriate to take account of victims ’ vulnerability, especially a possible inability to lodge complaints for fear of reprisals, it found no convincing argument that would justify the applicant ’ s passivity and decision to wait eleven years before submitting his complaint to the relevant authorities. 294. Accordingly, the Chamber concluded that there had been no violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention. 2. The applicants ’ submissions 295. The applicants alleged that the procedural aspect of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention had been breached in this case. They considered that the duty to investigate of their own motion contained in those Convention provisions was incumbent on the authorities under both domestic and international law. That duty was all the stronger in that the present case did not concern ordinary incidents of unlawful use of force by State agents, but a conflict which was fuelled by the authorities then in power and which set various groups of the population – including ethnic groups – against one another. 296. In this connection, they emphasised that, having regard to the high number of victims of the impugned events, the investigations which concerned them as victims related to crimes that were not subject to statutory limitation, such as genocide or inhuman treatment. They argued that this imposed on the authorities an even greater duty to investigate, which they had not fulfilled. Mrs Mocanu indicated also that she had not been informed of progress in the investigation after 2009. 297. Mr Stoica considered that the Court ought to examine the entirety of the investigation in the present case, in which senior State officials had been charged, and that it should not limit itself to examining that part of the investigation concerning the violence inflicted on him. He submitted that, for the purpose of evaluating the case under the procedural aspect of Article 3, the investigation ought not to be broken up and that the acts of violence to which he had been subjected could not be viewed in isolation. 298. Mr Stoica submitted that those events – on which the investigation ought to have shed light – were particularly significant in Romania ’ s recent history, since they had occurred in the context of the transition towards a democratic society and were part of a process which dated back to the dictator ’ s fall in December 1989. Adding that those events had affected very many people, the applicant considered that the investigation in question had been the only means for Romanian society to discover the truth about this episode in the country ’ s recent history, a factor which ought to have prompted the competent authorities to take appropriate action, something they had failed to do. 299. In this connection, he submitted in particular that, by closing the investigation into inhuman treatment on the ground that the constituent elements of the offence had not been made out, the prosecutor in his decision not to bring a prosecution of 17 June 2009 had incorrectly interpreted the law, since his conclusion was not consistent with the High Court of Cassation and Justice ’ s relevant case-law. 300. In addition, with regard to the offences under investigation which had become time-barred, he considered that the limitation period ought to have been suspended as long as the accused leaders held high-ranking public office. 301. Lastly, the applicant submitted that, having regard to the special features of the case, his lateness in bringing a complaint was irrelevant in examining the complaint alleging a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3 and that it had not been such as to obstruct the investigation. In this connection, he noted that the decision of 14 October 1999 and the fourth point of the decision to commit for trial of 18 May 2000 placed an obligation on the investigators to identify all the victims of the repression. He also alleged that the authorities had been informed directly about his case. 3. The Government ’ s submissions ( a) With regard to Mrs Mocanu 302. Referring to certain investigative measures in the domestic proceedings, the Government alleged that the national authorities had complied with their obligation to conduct an effective investigation into the circumstances of the death of Mrs Mocanu ’ s husband, all necessary procedural acts to establish the truth about that death – and particularly the factual circumstances in which it occurred – having been carried out in the context of that investigation. 303. They specified that the judicial authorities had been obliged to separate the investigation into several cases, depending on the accused, the offences or the civil parties concerned, given the complexity of the events which took place in June 1990 in Bucharest, and that for the same reason they had had to bring together a complex body of evidence, including more than 5, 700 witness statements. 304. In this connection, they invited the Court to take into consideration the unusual nature of the investigation, which was due not only to the large number of persons involved, but also to the fact that it concerned a sensitive historical event for Romania. They emphasised that the applicants ’ particular situations represented only one part of the vast nexus of events which occurred at the time of the large-scale demonstrations held in Bucharest and which had led to acts of violence, and that those situations could not therefore be analysed in isolation from the general context of the case file. 305. They submitted that there had not been any period of inactivity imputable to the authorities from 2000 to the present date. 306. They also specified that they did not challenge the Chamber ’ s findings with regard to the length of the investigations, but added that this was explained by the need to remedy the initial shortcomings in the investigation and the wish to ensure that the applicant was involved in the proceedings. ( b) With regard to Mr Marin Stoica 307. With regard to Mr Stoica, the Government indicated that the authorities had encountered difficulties in identifying all of the victims and involving them in the proceedings, given that they had not all lodged a complaint promptly. 308. They alleged that the criminal investigation had correctly concluded that criminal liability had become statute -barred, as the ill-treatment inflicted on the applicant did not fall within the category of crimes against humanity. They stressed that that conclusion was not intended to introduce a climate of impunity for the tragic events of 1990, but to apply the procedural rules of domestic law, particularly the reasonable limitation periods, which ranged from three to fifteen years. 309. There were no particular circumstances in this case which would justify imposing on the authorities an enhanced duty to investigate. 310. Furthermore, in the case of multiple violations of fundamental rights, the overall truth was not necessarily established by clarifying each individual situation. In those circumstances, an investigation could attain its objective – establishing the overall truth – even where it was obstructed in a particular individual case by the failure of the victim concerned to take any action. 4. The third party ’ s comments 311. The third-party intervener indicated that, over the past ten years, European and international law had attached increasing importance to the fight against impunity in respect of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or sentences, and to the recognition of the right of victims to an effective remedy and to redress. In this regard, it referred to several international texts, in particular the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations (adopted on 30 March 2011). According to those Guidelines, “the fact that the victim wishes not to lodge an official complaint, later withdraws such a complaint or decides to discontinue the proceedings does not absolve the authorities from their obligation to carry out an effective investigation, if there are reasons to believe that a serious human rights violation has occurred”. 312. The third-party intervener emphasised that Article 3 of the Convention required States to put in place criminal laws which effectively punished serious human rights violations by appropriate sanctions (it referred to the judgments in M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, § 150, ECHR 2003 ‑ XII; Çamdereli v. Turkey, no. 28433/02, § 38, 17 July 2008; and Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 117, ECHR 2010). It concluded that the statutory limitation periods should be adapted to the special features of such cases, which were characterised, inter alia, by the victims ’ vulnerability, particularly in the event of ill-treatment inflicted by State agents. 313. Relying on a case brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ( Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, case no. IT-95-17/1-T, judgment of 1 0 December 1998), it submitted that the inapplicability of statutory limitation of criminal liability with regard to war crimes and crimes against humanity was a unanimously recognised principle, but that it was not, however, limited to this type of crimes. It added that the United Nations Human Rights Committee shared this position in so far as it concerned flagrant violations of fundamental rights, and that the Committee had also stated that statutes of limitations should not be applicable to other forms of ill-treatment ( General Comment No. 3 ( 2012 ), § 40, see paragraph 190 above ). 5. The Court ’ s assessment ( a) General principles 314. The Court will examine together the complaints submitted by Mrs Mocanu and by Mr Stoica under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, in the light of the converging principles deriving from both those provisions, principles which are well-established and have been summarised, inter alia, in the judgments in Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria ([GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, §§ 110 and 112-13, ECHR 2005-VII ); Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands ([GC], no. 52391/99, §§ 324-25, ECHR 2007 ‑ II ); Al ‑ Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 55721/07, §§ 162 ‑ 67, ECHR 2011); and El- Masri ( cited above, §§ 182-85). 315. The Court has already stated that, in interpreting Articles 2 and 3, it must be guided by the knowledge that the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective. It reiterates that Article 3, like Article 2, must be regarded as one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention and as enshrining core values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe ( see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 88, Series A no. 161). In contrast to the other provisions in the Convention, it is cast in absolute terms, without exception or proviso, or the possibility of derogation under Article 15 of the Convention ( see Al- Skeini and Others, cited above, § 162 ). 316. The general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing and torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by agents of the State would be ineffective in practice if there existed no procedure either for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by State authorities, or for investigating arbitrary killings and allegations of ill-treatment of persons held by them ( see Al- Skeini and Others, cited above, § 163, and El- Masri, cited above, § 182). 317. Thus, having regard to the general duty on the State under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, the provisions of Articles 2 and 3 require by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation, both when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alia, agents of the State ( see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, § 161, Series A no. 324), and where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 of the Convention at the hands, inter alia, of the police or other similar authorities ( see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, § 102, Reports 1998 ‑ VIII). 318. The essential purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws safeguarding the right to life and prohibiting torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment in cases involving State agents or bodies, and to ensure their accountability for deaths and ill-treatment occurring under their responsibility ( see Nachova and Others, cited above, § 110, and Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey, no. 21689/93, §§ 310 and 358, 6 April 2004 ). 319. The Court has already held that the procedural obligation under Articles 2 and 3 continues to apply in difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed conflict. Even where the events leading to the duty to investigate occur in a context of generalised violence and investigators are confronted with obstacles and constraints which compel the use of less effective measures of investigation or cause an investigation to be delayed, the fact remains that Articles 2 and 3 entail that all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that an effective and independent investigation is conducted ( see Al- Skeini and Others, cited above, § 164). 320. Generally speaking, for an investigation to be effective, the persons responsible for carrying it out must be independent from those targeted by it. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence ( see Nachova and Others, cited above, § 110, and Halat v. Turkey, no. 23607/08, § 51, 8 November 2011). 321. Whatever mode is employed, the authorities must act of their own motion. In addition, in order to be effective, the investigation must be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. It should also be broad enough to permit the investigating authorities to take into consideration not only the actions of the State agents who directly and unlawfully used lethal force, but also all the surrounding circumstances ( see Al- Skeini and Others, cited above, § 163). 322. Although this is not an obligation of result, but of means, any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the circumstances of the case or the person responsible will risk falling foul of the required standard of effectiveness ( see El- Masri, cited above, § 18 3 ). 323. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. While there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by the authorities in investigating a use of lethal force or allegations of ill-treatment may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts ( see McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, § 114, ECHR 2001-III). 324. In all cases, with regard to the obligations arising under Article 2 of the Convention, the next of kin of the victim must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests. Equally, with regard to Article 3 of the Convention, the victim should be able to participate effectively in the investigation ( see McKerr, cited above, § 115). 325. Lastly, the investigation must be thorough, which means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation ( see El- Masri, cited above, § 183). 326. The Court has also held that in cases concerning torture or ill-treatment inflicted by State agents, criminal proceedings ought not to be discontinued on account of a limitation period, and also that amnesties and pardons should not be tolerated in such cases ( see Abdülsamet Yaman v. Turkey, no. 32446/96, § 55, 2 November 2004; Yeter v. Turkey, no. 33750/03, § 70, 13 January 2009; and Association “ 21 December 1989 ” and Others, cited above, § 144). Furthermore, the manner in which the limitation period is applied must be compatible with the requirements of the Convention. It is therefore difficult to accept inflexible limitation periods admitting of no exceptions ( see, mutatis mutandis, Röman v. Finland, no. 13072/05, § 50, 29 January 2013). ( b) Application of the above principles to the present case 327. In the present case, the Court notes that a criminal investigation was opened of the authorities ’ own motion shortly after the events of June 1990. From the outset, that investigation concerned the death by gunfire of Mrs Mocanu ’ s husband and other persons, and also the ill-treatment inflicted on other individuals in the same circumstances. The Court also notes that this investigation was initially divided up into several hundred separate case files (see paragraphs 82-87 above), and that it was subsequently brought together before being again split on several occasions into four, two and then three branches. 328. It appears from the decision issued on 14 October 1999 by the military section of the prosecutor ’ s office at the Supreme Court of Justice that that investigation was also tasked with identifying all of the victims of the repression carried out from 13 to 15 June 1990. It therefore concerned Mr Stoica, at least with effect from 18 June 2001, the date on which he officially lodged a complaint. The Court notes that a very high number of case files were opened at national level. However, given that all of these cases originated in the same events – which indeed resulted in their being regrouped by a decision of the prosecutor ’ s office at the Supreme Court of Justice into one single case in 1997 – the Court considers that it is essentially dealing with one and the same investigation. Even if the Court considered that the case concerns two distinct investigations, one in respect of Mrs Mocanu and the other in respect of Mr Stoica, its findings as to their effectiveness would be the same, for the reasons set out below. 329. The Court notes that this investigation is still pending in respect of Mrs Anca Mocanu. The judgment adopted by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 17 December 2007, returning to the prosecutor ’ s office the file on the charges initially brought against five army officers, is the most recent judicial decision delivered in respect of the first applicant. 330. The Court notes that the part of the investigation concerning Mr Stoica and implicating thirty-seven high-ranking civilian and military officials – including a former Head of State and two former Ministers of the Interior and of Defence – was terminated by a judgment delivered on 9 March 2011 by the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 331. It reiterates that its competence ratione temporis permits it to consider only that part of the investigation which occurred after 20 June 1994, the date on which the Convention came into force in respect of Romania (see paragraph 2 11 above). Accordingly, it will examine whether, after that date, the investigation conducted in the present case met the criteria of effectiveness set out above. ( i ) Independence of the investigation 332. The Court notes that from 1997, a few years after the date on which the Convention came into force in respect of Romania, until early 2008 the case was pending before the military section of the prosecutor ’ s office at the Supreme Court of Justice (from 2003, the High Court of Cassation and Justice ). It also notes that, with regard to Mrs Mocanu, the investigation is still pending before the military prosecutor ’ s office, after the ordinary prosecutor ’ s office declined jurisdiction on 6 June 2013 (see paragraph 123 above). 333. In this connection, the Grand Chamber endorses the Chamber ’ s finding that the investigation was entrusted to military prosecutors who, like the accused ( two of whom were generals), were officers in a relationship of subordination within the military hierarchy, a finding which has already led the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2 and Article 3 of the Convention in previous cases against Romania ( see Barbu Anghelescu v. Romania, no. 46430/99, § 67, 5 October 2004; Bursuc v. Romania, no. 42066/98, § 107, 12 October 2004; and, more recently, Şandru and Others, cited above, § 74; Association “ 21 December 1989 ” and Others, cited above, § 137; and Crăiniceanu and Frumuşanu v. Romania, no. 12442/04, § 92, 24 April 2012). 334. The number of violations found in cases similar to the present case is a matter of particular concern and casts serious doubt on the objectivity and impartiality of the investigations that the military prosecutors are called upon to conduct ( see, mutatis mutandis, Nachova and Others, cited above, § 117). The Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading the Court to conclude otherwise in the present case. ( ii ) Expedition and adequacy of the investigation 335. The Court notes that the investigation concerning Mrs Mocanu has been pending for more than twenty-three years, and for more than nineteen years since the Convention was ratified by Romania. Over this period, three of the five high-ranking army officers implicated in the killing of the applicant ’ s husband have died. 336. It also notes, in respect of Mr Stoica, that the relevant investigation was terminated by a judgment delivered on 9 March 2011, twenty-one years after the opening of the investigation and ten years after the official lodging of the applicant ’ s complaint and its joinder to the investigation case file. 337. Yet the very passage of time is liable not only to undermine an investigation, but also to compromise definitively its chances of being completed ( see M.B. v. Romania, no. 43982/06, § 64, 3 November 2011). 338. While acknowledging that the case is indisputably complex, as the Government have themselves emphasised, the Court considers that the political and societal stakes referred to by the latter cannot justify such a long period. On the contrary, the importance of those stakes for Romanian society should have led the authorities to deal with the case promptly and without delay in order to avoid any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts ( see, inter alia, Lăpuşan and Others, cited above, § 94, concerning a lapse of more than sixteen years since the opening of an investigation intended to lead to the identification and punishment of those responsible for repression of the anti-communist demonstrations of 1989, and more than eleven years since the entry into force of the Convention ). 339. The Court observes, however, that lengthy periods of inactivity occurred in the investigation in the present case, both at the initial stages and in recent years. It notes, in particular, that no significant progress was made in the investigation from 20 June 1994, date of the Convention ’ s entry into force, to 22 October 1997, the date on which joinder began of the numerous files which had been opened separately but which were part of the same factual context as that in which the present applications originated. It was only after that date that the prosecutor ’ s office began to conduct a wider investigation into all of the circumstances surrounding the concerted use of force by State agents against the civilian population ( see Al- Skeini and Others, cited above, § 163). 340. Furthermore, the Court notes that the decision of 16 September 1998 mentions that no investigative measure into the complaints of the persons assaulted at the State television headquarters had been conducted prior to that date (see paragraph 100 above). 341. In addition, the only procedural acts carried out in the case concerning Mrs Mocanu since the last referral to the prosecutor ’ s office, ordered on 17 December 2007, are the decision to discontinue proceedings, issued on 6 June 2013 in respect of two co-defendants who had died in the meantime, and two statements declining jurisdiction, issued on 30 April 2009 and 6 June 2013 respectively. 342. The Court also notes that the national authorities themselves found numerous shortcomings in the investigation. Thus, the decision adopted on 16 September 1998 by the prosecutor ’ s office at the Supreme Court of Justice indicated that none of the individuals who had held high office at the relevant time – in particular, the Head of State, the Prime Minister and his deputy, the Minister of the Interior and the Head of Police – had yet been questioned. 343. Further, the subsequent investigation did not enable all the defects to be remedied, as the Supreme Court of Justice and the High Court of Cassation and Justice noted in their respective decisions of 30 June 2003 and 17 December 2007, referring to the shortcomings in the previous proceedings. 344. Moreover, the Court notes that the investigation – severed since 1998 from the rest of the case – into the violence inflicted on numerous demonstrators and other persons who had been present by chance at the scene of the crackdown was terminated by the decision not to bring a prosecution, issued on 17 June 2009 and upheld by the judgment of 9 March 2011. Those persons included Mr Stoica, who, having lodged a complaint in 2001, had to wait ten years for the investigation to be completed. However, in spite of the length of time involved and the investigative acts carried out in respect of the applicant and listed by the Government, none of the above-cited decisions succeeded in establishing the circumstances of the ill-treatment which the applicant and other persons claimed to have sustained at the State television headquarters. 345. The decision adopted by the prosecutor ’ s office on 17 June 2009 indicated in substance that it had been impossible to establish the assailants ’ identity and the security forces ’ degree of involvement at the close of the investigations carried out by the civilian and then the military prosecution services. However, the authorities did not indicate what evidence had been used with a view to establishing the facts and for what tangible reasons their actions had not produced results. Moreover, at domestic level they had never called into question the applicant ’ s conduct in respect of the investigation, and had failed to make any comment concerning the date on which the applicant lodged his complaint. 346. The Court notes that this branch of the investigation was terminated essentially on account of the statutory limitation of criminal liability. In this connection, it reiterates that the procedural obligations arising under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention can hardly be considered to have been met where an investigation is terminated, as in the present case, through statutory limitation of criminal liability resulting from the authorities ’ inactivity ( see Association “ 21 December 1989 ” and Others, cited above, § 14 4 ). 347. With regard to the other major finding of the investigation, namely the conclusion that the constituent elements of inhuman treatment, punishable under Article 35 8 of the Romanian Criminal Code, had not been made out in respect of Mr Stoica, the Court considers that the conformity of the prosecutor ’ s interpretation with the relevant domestic case-law is open to doubt, in view of the judgment delivered by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 7 July 2009. Moreover, the Government have not adduced other examples of case-law in support of the decision given in this case. The Court also considers that the conclusion to the effect that the miners no longer had an enemy against whom to fight on 14 June 1990 ( see paragraph 16 1 above ) appears doubtful, since it manifestly disregards the violence which occurred on 13 June 1990 in the presence of large numbers of servicemen, equipped with heavy ammunition and tanks, as attested to in the above-cited decision itself. Furthermore, this conclusion is contrary to the facts established by the same decision, which describes in detail the acts of violence perpetrated on 14 June 1990 by the miners, who targeted, without distinction, the demonstrators, students who were present on the university premises and passers-by. In addition, in its judgment of 9 March 2011 dismissing Mr Stoica ’ s appeal against the decision not to bring a prosecution, the High Court of Cassation and Justice made no assessment whatsoever of the question of the applicability of Article 35 8 of the Criminal Code, and merely verified how the rules on statutory limitation had been applied in this case. 348. Accordingly, it appears that the authorities responsible for the investigation in this case did not take all the measures reasonably capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. ( iii ) The first applicant ’ s involvement in the investigation 349. With regard to the obligation to involve victims ’ relatives in the proceedings, the Court observes that Mrs Mocanu was not informed of progress in the investigation prior to the decision of 18 May 2000 committing for trial the persons accused of killing her husband. 350. Moreover, the Court notes that the applicant was questioned by the prosecutor for the first time on 14 February 2007, almost seventeen years after the events, and that, following the High Court of Cassation and Justice ’ s judgment of 17 December 2007, she was no longer informed about developments in the investigation. 351. The Court is not therefore persuaded that Mrs Mocanu ’ s interests in participating in the investigation were sufficiently protected ( see Association “ 21 December 1989 ” and Others, cited above, § 141). ( iv ) Conclusion 352. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that Mrs Mocanu did not have the benefit of an effective investigation as required by Article 2 of the Convention, and that Mr Stoica was also deprived of an effective investigation for the purposes of Article 3. 353. There has, accordingly, been a breach of the procedural aspect of those provisions. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 354. The applicant association complained of the length of the criminal proceedings which it had joined as a civil party in order to claim reparation for the damage caused by the ransacking of its headquarters on 14 June 1990, the destruction of its property and the assaults on its members. 355. It alleged on that account a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides : “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...” A. The Chamber judgment 356. The Chamber considered that the length of the impugned proceedings had been excessive and found a violation of Article 6 § 1. B. The parties ’ submissions 357. The applicant association stated that it had welcomed the Chamber judgment. 358. The Government stated that they did not contest, in principle, the Chamber ’ s conclusions as to the length of the criminal proceedings which the applicant association had joined as a civil party. C. The Court ’ s assessment 359. The Grand Chamber sees no reason to depart from the Chamber ’ s finding. Like the Chamber, it observes that on 26 July 1990 the association had lodged an official complaint with a request to join the proceedings as a civil party, referring to the damage sustained by it during the events of 13 to 15 June 1990. That criminal complaint was examined as part of the investigation which was closed by the decision of 17 June 2009 not to bring a prosecution. The proceedings with regard to the applicant association thus lasted almost nineteen years. 360. The Court ’ s competence ratione temporis being limited, the Chamber had been able to examine the complaint about the length of proceedings only in so far as it concerned the period after 20 June 1994, the date on which the Convention entered into force in respect of Romania. The length of the proceedings to be taken into account was therefore fifteen years. 361. The Court reiterates that it has found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on numerous occasions in cases raising similar issues to those in the instant case ( see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 46, ECHR 2000 ‑ VII, and, in particular, Gheorghe and Maria Mihaela Dumitrescu v. Romania, no. 6373, §§ 26-28, 29 July 2008, also concerning the length of criminal proceedings to which a civil party had been joined ). 362. After examining all the evidence submitted to it, the Court considers that there are no reasons justifying a different conclusion in the present case. 363. In the light of the criteria established in its case-law and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the length of the impugned proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. 364. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 365. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage alleged by Mrs Anca Mocanu 1. The parties ’ submissions 366. Before the Chamber the applicant had claimed 200,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the non-pecuniary damage allegedly sustained on account of the excessive length of the investigation into the killing of her husband, then aged 22. She submitted that she herself had been aged 20 at the time, and had found herself alone with their two children, one aged two years and the other a few months old. She indicated that over the following twenty years, during which she had waited for the investigation to be terminated and those responsible for her husband ’ s death to be identified, she had been obliged to provide for her own needs and those of her children, working as a cleaner and enduring wretched living conditions. She had also claimed EUR 100,000 in respect of pecuniary damage, without explaining its exact nature. 367. Considering those claims for just satisfaction to be excessive and unsubstantiated, the Government had invited the Court to dismiss them. 2. The Chamber judgment 368. With regard to the sum claimed in respect of pecuniary damage, the Chamber found no causal link between the violation found and the alleged pecuniary damage. Accordingly, it rejected that claim. 369. In contrast, it considered that just satisfaction should be awarded on account of the fact that the domestic authorities had failed to investigate the killing of the applicant ’ s husband with the degree of diligence required by Article 2 of the Convention. It awarded the applicant EUR 30, 000 under this head. 370. In addition, the Chamber reiterated that the application of the principle of restitutio in integrum implied that the applicants were put, as far as possible, in the same situation as that in which they would have found themselves had there not been a breach of the requirements of the Convention and concluded that the respondent State was to take the necessary measures to expedite the investigation into the killing of Mr Velicu -Valentin Mocanu, so that a decision which met the requirements of the Convention could be given. 3. The Court ’ s assessment 371. Having regard to the foregoing, to the reasons set out by the Chamber and to the fact that the applicant did not change the claim initially submitted to the Chamber, the Court considers that the applicant sustained significant non-pecuniary damage arising from the violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2. It awards her the sum of EUR 30, 000 in this respect. B. Damage alleged by Mr Marin Stoica 372. The applicant had claimed EUR 200,000 before the Chamber in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 373. Considering this claim excessive, the Government had submitted that the finding of a violation would constitute in itself sufficient just satisfaction in respect of the alleged non-pecuniary damage. 374. The Chamber having held that there had been no violation of the Convention in respect of Mr Stoica, it had not examined the claim for just satisfaction submitted by him. 375. The Court considers that Mr Stoica undeniably sustained non-pecuniary damage. Taking into account the violation of Article 3 found in respect of the applicant and ruling on an equitable basis as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards him EUR 1 5, 000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. C. The applicant association ’ s claim 376. The Chamber concluded that the applicant association had not submitted a claim for just satisfaction within the time allowed. 377. During the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, the association resubmitted to the Court a fax which it had sent on 22 December 2009, stating that this constituted a claim for just satisfaction. 378. The Court notes that, through this unsigned request, the applicant association claimed compensation amounting to EUR 42, 519, allegedly corresponding to the amount, adjusted for inflation, of the pecuniary damage which it had sustained on account of the ransacking of its headquarters, and stated that it wished to use this sum, inter alia, for “the restoration of [his] health [ sic ]”. As this claim is confused, it cannot be taken into consideration. Even supposing that it could be considered as a properly submitted claim for just satisfaction, it relates solely to pecuniary damage that is unconnected to the finding of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention arising from the excessive length of the proceedings. 379. The Court therefore rejects the applicant association ’ s claim. D. Costs and expenses 1. Costs and expenses in respect of the applications by Mrs Anca Mocanu and the applicant association ( nos. 10865/09 and 4 5 886/07 ) 380. The applicants claimed the sum of EUR 18, 050 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court, of which EUR 2, 800 related to the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, including the fees for their three lawyers. 381. The Government considered, with regard to the proceedings before the Chamber, that this claim was out of time, as it had not been submitted within the time allowed. 382. They also considered that, with regard to the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, this claim was excessive, and pointed out that it was not accompanied by any supporting documentation. 383. The Chamber concluded that the applicants had not submitted a claim for just satisfaction within the time allowed. 384. According to the Court ’ s established case-law, an award can be made in respect of costs and expenses only in so far as they have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum ( see Iatridis v. Greece ( just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § 54, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI). 385. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,800 claimed for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, this being the only claim submitted in a timely manner. From that amount must be deducted the sum of EUR 600 already paid jointly to two of the applicants ’ three lawyers by the Council of Europe by way of legal aid. 2. Costs and expenses in respect of the application by Mr Marin Stoica ( no. 32431/08 ) 386. The applicant claimed EUR 11, 507. 39 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, namely EUR 10, 394 in lawyer ’ s fees, EUR 300 in postal charges and EUR 813. 39 for the travel costs incurred by the applicant and his lawyer in attending the hearing before the Grand Chamber. 387. The Government considered that the time spent by the applicant ’ s lawyer in preparing the request for referral to the Grand Chamber, namely 15 hours, was unreasonable. They made the same comments in respect of the time spent in preparing the applicant ’ s additional observations – 20 hours – and the 15 hours spent in preparing counsel ’ s address. 388. In addition, the Government submitted that the costs incurred by the applicant to attend the hearing had not been necessary, given that only his lawyer ’ s presence had been justified. They opposed the claim for reimbursement of the applicant ’ s travel costs. 389. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 11,507.39 claimed for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before it, to be paid directly to Ms Hatneanu. From that amount must be deducted the sum of EUR 1, 638. 47 already paid by the Council of Europe by way of legal aid, and covering the travel costs incurred by the applicant and his lawyer. E. Default interest 390. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect (investigation) in respect of the first applicant and a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention in respect of the second applicant, finding that the authorities responsible for the investigation had not taken all the measures which could have led to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the violent events and that the applicants had not had the benefit of an effective investigation for the purposes of the Convention. The Court accepted in particular that, in exceptional circumstances, the psychological consequences of ill treatment inflicted by State agents could undermine victims’ capacity to complain about treatment inflicted on them and could constitute a significant impediment to their right to redress. In the present case, the Court noted that the second applicant, like the majority of the victims, had found the courage to lodge a complaint only several years after the events, when the investigation which had already been opened of the authorities’ own motion seemed to be making progress. It therefore considered that, in the exceptional circumstances of this case, the applicant’s vulnerability and his feeling of powerlessness amounted to a plausible and acceptable explanation for the fact that he had not lodged a complaint until 2001, more than ten years after the events.