In the context of terrorism and national security considerations
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK and practice Legal frameworkRussian Citizenship Act (no. 62-FZ of 31 May 2002 Russian Citizenship Act (no. 62-FZ of 31 May 2002 Russian Citizenship Act (no. 62-FZ of 31 May 2002 33. Section 22 of the Act in its relevant part reads as follows: “1. A decision granting Russian citizenship ... shall be annulled if it is established that it has been taken on the basis of falsified documents or false information knowingly submitted by the applicant, or if the applicant refuses to take the oath. 2. The submission of falsified documents or knowingly false information must be established by a court...” Regulation on the Examination of Issues Related to Citizenship of the Russian Federation (adopted by Presidential Decree no. 1325 of 14 November 2002) 34. Section 54 of the Regulation, as in force at the material time, specified the procedure for annulment of a decision on Russian citizenship. The relevant part it reads as follows: “... The form of the annulment decision ( заключение об отмене решения по вопросам гражданства Российской Федерации ) shall comply with the form approved by the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. It must contain information about the legal basis for the [impugned decision on Russian citizenship]; information about the court ’ s decision establishing a legal fact of the use of falsified documents or false information knowingly submitted by the applicant to acquire or terminate his or her Russian citizenship; a description of the circumstances established by a court; and reference to the relevant section of the Russian Citizenship Act which serves as a legal basis for the annulment of a previously taken decision on Russian citizenship.” 35. Presidential Decree no. 398 of 17 June 2020 amended section 54 of the Regulation. It provided that a decision to annul citizenship had to be reasoned and had to describe the circumstances which had been taken into consideration by the competent authority. The relevant part of the amended provision in its relevant part reads as follows: “... [The annulment decision] ... shall be reasoned. It must contain information about the legal basis for the [impugned decision on Russian citizenship], as well as information about a legal basis for the annulment of the decision on Russian citizenship accompanied by a description of the circumstances which led to its adoption.” Other material 36. For a summary of domestic provisions concerning residence permits for foreign nationals, administrative removal of foreign nationals and refusal of entry into Russian Federation see Liu v. Russia (no. 2) ( no. 29157/09, §§ 45-52, 26 July 2011 ). For a summary of domestic provisions regarding Russian citizenship, Russian passports, the Federal Migration Service and administrative liability for certain offences see Alpeyeva and Dzhalagoniya v. Russia (nos. 7549/09 and 33330/11, §§ 56, 59, 62-64 and 70-72, 12 June 2018 ). Practice by the Russian Constitutional Court 37. In its inadmissibility decision of 21 April 2011 (no. 554-O-O) the Constitutional Court dismissed a complaint lodged by a person, who claimed that section 22 of the Russian Citizenship Act was incompatible with the Russian Constitution. The court concluded that the impugned provision was not arbitrary because it was only applicable in cases where individuals did not satisfy the conditions required for obtaining Russian citizenship. 38. On 25 October 2016 the Constitutional Court by other inadmissibility decision dismissed a similar complaint lodged by a person, who was stripped of Russian citizenship for failing to mention his two minor children in his application for Russian citizenship. The court repeated the arguments used in its decision of 21 April 2011. 39. On 15 January, 12 and 28 February 2019 the Constitutional Court in the same manner dismissed several more similar complaints, including that of the applicant (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). In addition to its previous reasoning, the court stated that the competent authorities should take into account surrounding circumstances, such as the time elapsed since the decision granting Russian citizenship for their decision to comply with the requirements of necessary and proportionate interference with human rights. Council of Europe documentsThe European Convention on Nationality The European Convention on Nationality The European Convention on Nationality 40. The principal Council of Europe document concerning nationality is the European Convention on Nationality (ETS No. 166), which was adopted on 6 November 1997 and came into force on 1 March 2000. It has been ratified by twenty-one member States of the Council of Europe. Russia signed this Convention on 6 November 1997 but has not ratified it. 41. Article 7 of that Convention (“Loss of nationality ex lege or at the initiative of a State Party”) in the relevant part read as follows: “1. A State Party may not provide in its internal law for the loss of its nationality ex lege or at the initiative of the State Party except in the following cases: ... b) acquisition of the nationality of the State Party by means of fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact attributable to the applicant; ...” Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Nationality 42. The Explanatory report to the European Convention on Nationality in the relevant part reads as follows: “58. Article 7 consists of an exhaustive list of cases where nationality may be lost automatically by operation of law ( ex lege ) or at the initiative of a State Party. In these limited cases, and subject to certain conditions, a State Party may withdraw its nationality. The provision is formulated in a negative way in order to emphasise that the automatic loss of nationality or a loss of nationality at the initiative of a State Party cannot take place unless it concerns one of the cases provided for under this article. However, a State Party may allow persons to retain its nationality even in such cases. Article 7 does not refer to cases in which there have been administrative errors which are not considered in the country in question to constitute cases of loss of nationality. ... 61. Fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact has to be the result of a deliberate act or omission by the applicant which was a significant factor in the acquisition of nationality. For example, if a person acquires the nationality of the State Party on condition that the nationality of origin would subsequently be renounced and the person voluntarily did not do so, the State Party would be entitled to provide for the loss of its nationality. Moreover, for the purpose of this Convention, “concealment of any relevant fact” means concealment of a relevant condition which would prevent the acquisition of nationality by the person concerned (such as bigamy). “Relevant” in this context refers to facts (such as concealment of another nationality, or concealment of a conviction for a serious offence) which, had they been known before the nationality was granted, would have resulted in a decision refusing to grant such nationality. 62. The wording of this sub-paragraph is also intended to cover the acquisition of nationality by false pretences (false or incomplete information or other deceitful action, notably by means of non-authentic or untrue certificates), threats, bribery and other similar dishonest actions. 63 In cases where the acquisition of nationality has been the result of the improper conduct specified in sub-paragraph b, States are free either to revoke the nationality (loss) or to consider that the person never acquired their nationality (void ab initio).” THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 43. The applicant complained that the decisions to annul his Russian citizenship and remove him from Russian territory had amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Admissibility 44. The parties did not comment on the admissibility of the complaint. 45. The Court notes that it is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits The parties ’ submissions (a) The Applicant 46. The applicant stated that the domestic law was unforeseeable in its application, because it did not provide for the annulment of a decision on citizenship for submitting incomplete information. That measure could only be applied if the information submitted was knowingly false. 47. He also stated that the interference with his rights had not been necessary in a democratic society owing to the authorities ’ failure to duly take into account his family situation or explain their finding that he posed a threat to national security. (b) The Government 48. The Government submitted that there had been an interference with the applicant ’ s rights under Article 8 of the Convention, which had fully satisfied the requirements of its second paragraph. It had pursued the legitimate aim of guaranteeing national security; it had been lawful and proportionate to that aim. 49. According to the Government, the “quality of law” requirement had not been breached in the present case. The applicable domestic law stipulated a person ’ s duty to provide exhaustive information related to his application for Russian citizenship in a clear and foreseeable manner. The legislative rules did not provide the authorities with any discretion prescribing that in such a situation citizenship had to be annulled in any event. 50. Furthermore, the Government stated that the applicant ’ s refusal to leave Russia of his own initiative had shown his lack of respect for Russian law. That fact, together with the threat which he posed to national security, warranted the necessity for his removal from Russia. The reasons underlying the applicant ’ s entry ban had been carefully examined by the domestic courts in adversarial proceedings. 51. Lastly, the Government submitted that applicant ’ s family situation and his ties with Russia and Tajikistan had been duly taken into account and assessed by the domestic courts in the proceedings concerning his administrative removal. The Court ’ s assessmentGeneral principles General principles General principles 52. The Court reiterates that the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad concept which encompasses, inter alia, the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings (see Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, § 29, Series A no. 251 ‑ B ), the right to “personal development” (see Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, no. 44599/98, § 47, ECHR 2001 ‑ I ) and the right to self ‑ determination (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 61, ECHR 2002 ‑ III ). 53. In the case of Ramadan v. Malta, (no. 76136/12, § 84, 21 June 2016) the Court held that although the right to citizenship is not as such guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols, it cannot be ruled out that an arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such a denial on the private life of the individual. To establish whether “an issue” arose under Article 8 of the Convention the Court assessed whether the revocation of the citizenship was “arbitrary” and the “consequences” of revocation for the applicant (see §§ 85, 90 and 91 ibid). In the case of K2 v. the United Kingdom (( dec. ), no. 42387/13, §§ 52-64 7 February 2017), which followed, the Court accepted that the revocation of citizenship amounted to an interference and applied the two-steps test to determine whether there has been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. Subsequently, in the case of Alpeyeva and Dzhalagoniya (cited above, §§ 110 ‑ 27) the Court firstly applied the “consequences” criteria to determine if there had been an interference with the applicant ’ s rights and then used the “arbitrariness” test to determine if there had been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. That approach was confirmed in the case of Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 32538/10, §§ 46-55, 30 January 2020). In the case of Ghoumid and Others v. France (no. 52273/16 and 4 others, §§ 43-44, 25 June 2020) the Court held that nationality is an element of a person ’ s identity. To establish whether there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention the Court examined as to whether the revocation of the applicant ’ s nationality had been arbitrary. Then, it assessed the consequences of that measure for the applicant. 54. In determining arbitrariness, the Court should examine whether the impugned measure was in accordance with the law; whether it was accompanied by the necessary procedural safeguards, including whether the person deprived of citizenship was allowed the opportunity to challenge the decision before courts affording the relevant guarantees; and whether the authorities acted diligently and swiftly (see Ramadan, cited above, §§ 86 ‑ 89; K2, cited above, § 50; Alpeyeva and Dzhalagoniya, cited above, § 109; and Ahmadov, cited above, § 44). 55. The Court also reiterates that the States are entitled to control the entry and residence of aliens on their territories (see, among many other authorities, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, § 67, 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, and Boujlifa v. France, 21 October 1997, § 42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI). The Convention does not guarantee the right of an alien to enter or to reside in a particular country and, in pursuance of their task of maintaining public order, Contracting States have the power to expel, for example, an alien convicted of criminal offences. However, their decisions in this field must, in so far as they may interfere with a right protected under paragraph 1 of Article 8, be in accordance with the law, pursue the legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society (see Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, § 113, ECHR 2003-X; Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, § 54, ECHR 2006‑XII; De Souza Ribeiro v. France [GC], no. 22689/07, § 77, ECHR 2012; Mehemi v. France, 26 September 1997, § 34, Reports 1997-VI; Dalia v. France, 19 February 1998, § 52, Reports 1998-I; and Boultif v. Switzerland, no. 54273/00, § 46, ECHR 2001 ‑ IX ). 56. Where immigration is concerned, Article 8 cannot be considered as imposing a general obligation on a State to respect the choice of married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to authorise family reunion on its territory (see Gül v. Switzerland, 19 February 1996, § 38, Reports 1996 ‑ I). However, the removal of a person from a country where close family members are living may amount to an infringement of the right to respect for family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 § 1 of the Convention (see Boultif, cited above, § 39). Where children are involved, their best interests must be taken into account and national decision-making bodies have a duty to assess evidence in respect of the practicality, feasibility and proportionality of any removal of a non-national parent in order to give effective protection and sufficient weight to the best interests of the children directly affected by it (see Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 12738/10, § 109, 3 October 2014, and Zezev v. Russia, no. 47781/10, § 34, 12 June 2018 ). Application of the general principles 57. Since the annulment of the applicant ’ s Russian citizenship did not automatically result in the decision to forcibly remove him from Russian territory, and since those issues were examined within separate sets of proceedings, the Court will examine those issues also separately. (a) Annulment of citizenship 58. Having noted the existence of various approaches to the examination of the issue (see paragraph 53 above), the Court will follow the consequence-based approach in determining whether the annulment of the applicant ’ s citizenship constituted an interference with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, §§ 107-09 and 118-34, 25 September 2018). It will examine: ( i ) what the consequences of the impugned measure were for the applicant and then (ii) whether the measure in question was arbitrary (the same methodology was used in the recent case of Ahmadov (cited above, § 43, 46 and 54)). (i) Consequences for the applicant 59. Firstly, the decision to annul the applicant ’ s Russian citizenship deprived him of any legal status in Russia. 60. Secondly, he was left without any valid identity documents. In Smirnova v. Russia (nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 97, ECHR 2003 ‑ IX (extracts)), the Court found that Russian citizens had to prove their identity unusually often in their everyday life, even when performing such mundane tasks as exchanging currency or buying train tickets, and that the internal passport was also required for more crucial needs, such as finding employment or receiving medical care. In Alpeyeva and Dzhalagoniya (cited above, §§ 70 and 114), the Court also noted that failure to possess a valid identity document was punishable by a fine under Article 19.15 of the CAO. The deprivation of passports in those cases had therefore amounted to interferences with the applicants ’ private lives. The annulment of the applicant ’ s passports in the instant case had the same effect. 61. Furthermore, the annulment of the applicant ’ s citizenship was a precondition for the imposition of the entry ban on him and the decision to remove him from Russian territory (see paragraphs 20 and 25 above) (contrast Ramadan v. Malta, cited above, §§ 20, 26, 87-89, 21 June 2016). 62. The annulment of the applicant ’ s Russian citizenship therefore amounted to an interference with the rights enshrined in Article 8. (ii) Whether the measure was arbitrary 63. In determining arbitrariness, the Court should examine whether the impugned measure was in accordance with the law; whether it was accompanied by the necessary procedural safeguards, including whether the person deprived of citizenship was allowed the opportunity to challenge the decision before courts affording the relevant guarantees; and whether the authorities acted diligently and swiftly (see Ramadan, cited above, §§ 86 ‑ 89; K2, cited above § 50; Alpeyeva and Dzhalagoniya, cited above, § 109; and Ahmadov, cited above, § 44; see paragraph 54 above). 64. The expression “in accordance with the law” requires that the measure should have some basis in domestic law; it also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see Slivenko, cited above, § 100, and Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 341, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). The law must indicate the scope of discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (see Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, ECHR 2000-II, §§ 55 and 56; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, ECHR 2000-V, §§ 55-63; Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, ECHR 2000-XI; and Al- Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, § 119, 20 June 2002). 65. Having regard to the above and to the general principles cited in paragraphs 53 - 54 above, the Court observes that the revocation or annulment of citizenship as such is not incompatible with the Convention. To assess whether Article 8 has been breached in the present case, the Court will examine the lawfulness of the impugned measure, accompanying procedural guarantees and the manner in which the domestic authorities acted. 66. The Court is ready to accept that the annulment of the applicant ’ s Russian citizenship had its basis in the provisions of the Russian Citizenship Act and the Regulation on the Examination of Issues Related to Citizenship of the Russian Federation (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above). The Court is not satisfied by the clarity of the relevant provisions, or by the procedural safeguards of the domestic law as in force at the material time. 67. The Court notes that to meet the requirements of the Convention, a law should be formulated in clear terms. If a person ’ s citizenship may be annulled or revoked for submitting false information or concealing information by that person, the law should specify the nature of that information (see the concept of “relevant facts” in the European Convention on Nationality and in the Explanatory Report to it cited in paragraphs 40 - 42 above; compare the Constitutional Court ’ s practice cited in paragraphs 37 ‑ 39 above). 68. Whilst conferring on the migration authorities the right to annul Russian citizenship, the Regulation on the Examination of Issues Related to Citizenship of the Russian Federation as in force at the material time (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above) did not require those authorities to give a reasoned decision specifying the factual grounds on which it had been taken, like the surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the missing information, the reason for not submitting it to the authorities, the time elapsed since obtaining citizenship, the strength of the ties which the person concerned had with a country, his or her family situation or other important factors. Especially, they were not required to explain why the failure by the applicant to indicate the full number of his siblings had been relevant for obtaining Russian citizenship. It was not explained whether the migration authorities could have refused to grant the applicant Russian citizenship if the facts about his siblings had been known by them (compare the European Convention on Nationality and the Explanatory Report cited in paragraphs 40 - 42 above as well as the case-law of the Constitutional Court in paragraphs 37 ‑ 39 above). The migration authority and the District Court dismissed the applicant ’ s argument that the missing information was not important for obtaining Russian citizenship as irrelevant. That finding was not overruled by the Regional or Supreme Courts (see paragraph 16 above). 69. According to the Government, after it had been established that the information submitted by the applicant was incomplete, the authorities had no other choice but to annul the decision granting him Russian citizenship, irrespective of the time elapsed since the obtaining of citizenship, the strength of the ties which the person concerned had with Russia, his or her family situation or other important factors (see paragraph 49 above). It has not been shown that the national courts had to consider the aforementioned factors either in the proceedings “regarding the establishment of a legal fact” or in the proceedings concerning the annulment of Russian citizenship. In the applicant ’ s case, the District Court considered that the argument about his strong ties with Russia was irrelevant. 70. It follows that the legal framework as in force at the material time fostered excessively formalistic approach to the annulment of Russian citizenship and failed to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference. The subsequent improvement of the applicable legislation cannot change that conclusion, because the amendments had no effect on the applicant ’ s situation. (iii) Conclusion 71. In the light of the above, the Court cannot accept that the annulment of the applicant ’ s Russian citizenship satisfied the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention. The Government did not demonstrate why the applicant ’ s failure to submit information about some of his siblings was of such gravity to justify deprivation of Russian citizenship several years after the applicant had obtained it. In the absence of balancing exercise which domestic authorities were expected to perform, the impugned measure appears to be grossly disproportionate to the applicant ’ s omission. The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the annulment of the applicant ’ s Russian citizenship. (b) Expulsion of the applicant from Russian territory 72. The decision to remove the applicant from the country amounted to an “interference” with his right to respect for his family life. 73. That interference was in accordance with the law, namely Article 18. 8 of the CAO. Administrative removal was a subsidiary penalty for breaching immigration rules. The applicant was found liable owing to his failure to comply with the DMI ’ s order to leave the country following the thirty-five-year entry ban imposed by the Federal Security Service on the grounds that he posed a threat to national security (see paragraphs 20, 23 and 25 above). 74. In these circumstances, and in the light of the parties ’ submissions, the Court has to take into account the proceedings concerning the imposition of the entry ban on the applicant, which were a prerequisite for the decision to remove him from Russia. 75. The Government argued that the applicant ’ s removal and the entry ban had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public safety or order. However, neither they nor the domestic courts outlined the basis for the security services ’ allegations against the applicant (contrast Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 35289/11, §§ 156 ‑ 57, 19 September 2017; Liu v. Russia (no. 2) ( no. 29157/09, § 75, 26 July 2011; Amie and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 58149/08, §§ 12-13 and 98, 12 February 2013; and Zezev, cited above, § 39). 76. Even if the aim pursued by the applicant ’ s exclusion from Russian territory was legitimate, the Court cannot conclude that the impugned interference was proportionate and therefore necessary in a democratic society. The domestic proceedings concerning the entry ban were focused on the issue of whether the Federal Security Service had issued it within its competence. No independent review of whether its conclusion had a reasonable basis in fact was carried out by the court. It does not appear that a critical aspect of the case – whether the Federal Security Service had been able to demonstrate the existence of specific facts serving as a basis for its assessment that the applicant presented a national security risk – was examined in a meaningful manner (see paragraph 21 above; contrast Regner, cited above, § 154). The national courts confined themselves to a purely formal examination of the decision concerning the applicant ’ s thirty ‑ five-year exclusion from Russia (see, for similar reasoning, Liu (no. 2), cited above, § 89, and Kamenov v. Russia, no. 17570/15, § 36, 7 March 2017). 77. Furthermore, neither in the proceedings concerning the ban on entering Russia nor in the proceedings concerning the applicant ’ s administrative removal did the domestic courts duly balance the interests at stake, taking into account the general principles established by the Court (see references in paragraph 52 above). In particular, the courts did not take into account: ( i ) the length of the applicant ’ s stay in Russia, (ii) the solidity of his professional, social, cultural and family ties with the country, (iii) the difficulties which he and his family were likely to encounter after the applicant ’ s removal from Russia and the best interests and (iv) well-being of his children (see Jeunesse, cited above, §§ 118 and 120 ). The mere reference to the applicant ’ s family ’ s ability to follow him or stay in Russia and receive financial support from him abroad (see paragraphs 21 and 28 above) is clearly insufficient justification for the serious issue which was at stake. 78. Overall, in those two sets of the proceedings it was not convincingly established that the threat which the applicant allegedly posed to national security outweighed the fact that he had been living in Russia for a considerable period of time in a household with a Russian national, with whom he had four children, two of whom had been born in Russia. This is particularly relevant given that during his stay in Russia the applicant had not committed any offences. 79. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the decision to remove the applicant from the country. 80. In the light of the above conclusion, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine as to whether the imposition of the entry ban on the applicant satisfied the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention. other alleged violations of the convention 81. On 23 September 2019 the applicant submitted additional complaint under Article 6 of the Convention. Having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as this complaint falls within the Court ’ s competence, the Court finds that it does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. This part of the application must therefore be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT 82. The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if referral of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention. 83. It considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 29 above) should remain in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court takes a further decision in this connection (see, mutatis mutandis, Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, § 10, ECHR 2010, and Nunez v. Norway, no. 55597/09, § 4, 28 June 2011 ). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 84. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” DamagePecuniary damage Pecuniary damage Pecuniary damage 85. The applicant submitted that following the proceedings concerning the administrative offence under Article 18.8 of the CAO he had paid the fine in the amount of EUR 29 (see paragraph 25 above). He also stated that on 26 September 2019 the Regional Court had ordered him to pay EUR 133 for the costs and expenses of the proceedings in which he had challenged the entry ban. Lastly, he claimed EUR 148 for the travel expenses incurred by his wife to visit him in detention and EUR 190 for his medical expenses. In total, he claimed EUR 500 in respect of pecuniary damage. 86. The Government contested the applicant ’ s claim. They stated that his obligation to pay the fine and cover the costs and expenses incurred by the national authorities in the domestic proceedings was not directly linked to the alleged violation. A similar argument was used against his claim for medical expenses, which, according to the Government, related to chronic illnesses he had developed before his detention. 87. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the claim for travel and medical expenses. It therefore dismisses that part of the claim. On the other hand, it decides to grant the remainder of the claim, awarding the applicant EUR 162 in respect of pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable (compare Bogomolova v. Russia, no. 13812/09, §§ 60-62, 20 June 2017, and Elvira Dmitriyeva v. Russia, nos. 60921/17 and 7202/18, §§ 107-10, 30 April 2019). Non-pecuniary damage 88. The applicant also claimed EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 89. The Government argued that the claim was excessive and inconsistent with the Court ’ s awards in similar cases. 90. Taking into account the parties ’ submissions, the violations found, the Court grants the applicant ’ s claim in full. It awards him EUR 10,000 in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him. Costs and expenses 91. Lastly, the applicant claimed EUR 960 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. 92. The Government contested the claim. 93. According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 850 covering costs for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. Default interest 94. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention as concerned both the revocation of the applicant’s Russian citizenship and the decision to expel him from Russian territory, finding that, overall, it had not been convincingly established that the threat which the applicant had allegedly posed to national security had outweighed the fact that he had been living in Russia for a considerable period of time in a household with a Russian national, with whom he had four children, two of whom had been born in Russia. That was particularly relevant given that during his stay in Russia the applicant had not committed any offences. The Court noted in particular that the authorities’ decisions in the applicant’s case had been overly formalistic, failing to duly balance the interests at stake. In particular, they had not shown why the applicant’s failure to submit information about some of his siblings had been so grave that it was justified to deprive him of his Russian citizenship so many years after he had obtained it. Indeed, revoking the applicant’s citizenship for such an omission, without the authorities carrying out any kind of balancing exercise, had been grossly disproportionate.