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THE LAW ... II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION 87. The applicants alleged that the proceedings before the CONSOB had not been fair, and complained that that body lacked impartiality and independence. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read: “1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ... ” 88. The Government contested the applicants ’ position. A. Admissibility 1. Whether Article 6 of the Convention applies in its criminal head (a) The parties ’ submissions i. The Government 89. The Government contended that the proceedings before the CONSOB did not relate to a “criminal charge” against the applicants. They noted that the offence prescribed by Article 187 ter of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998 was clearly classified as “administrative” under both domestic and European law; [the corresponding penalty] could be imposed by an administrative body at the close of administrative proceedings. 90. As to the nature of the offence, it included any conduct, even that of mere negligence, which was likely to provide erroneous signals or information to investors, without it being necessary that this be likely to trigger a significant change in the financial markets. It protected investors against any potential risk that might influence their choices and thus referred to interests other than those usually protected by criminal law. Finally, the sanctions that could be imposed affected only the assets of the person concerned and/or his ability to exercise managerial functions, and under no circumstances could they lead to a custodial sentence, even in the event of non-payment. They were not mentioned in an individual ’ s criminal record and usually concerned professional operators in the financial system rather than the population as a whole. 91. Moreover, the amount of the fines had been proportionate to the guilty party ’ s resources and financial strength; the present case concerned a financial operation which was aimed at gaining control of one of the largest vehicle manufactures in the world, and had cost more than EUR 500,000,000. In addition, the fines, the possible confiscation of the assets used to commit the office and the prohibition on exercising managerial functions were essentially intended to restore market confidence and reassure investors, by targeting the elements which had made it possible for the administrative offence to be committed (on this point, they also referred to the aims pursued by Directive 2003/6/EC). They were intended to make reparation and compensate for financial damage, and to prevent the guilty party from benefiting from the illegal activities. Furthermore, in the case of Spector Photo Group ( Spector Photo Group NV v Commissie voor het Bank, Financie -en Assurantiewezen, C-45/08., 23 December 2009), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had accepted the coexistence, in this sector, of administrative and criminal sanctions. ii. The applicants 92. The applicants considered that although they were classified as “administrative” in domestic law, the sanctions imposed by the CONSOB ought to be considered as “criminal”, in the autonomous meaning of this concept in the Court ’ s case-law. The ECJ ’ s judgment in the case of Spector Photo Group, cited by the Government, did not take the opposite line, but merely stated that if a Member State had introduced the possibility of a criminal financial sanction, it was not necessary, for the purposes of assessing whether the administrative sanction was effective, proportionate and dissuasive, to take account of the level of that sanction. Moreover, in its judgment of 26 February 2013 in case C-617/10 ( Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson ), the ECJ had confirmed the following principles: (a) the applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter; (b) Article 50 of the Charter (guaranteeing the ne bis in idem principle) presupposes that the measures which are adopted against a defendant are of a criminal nature; (c) for the purpose of assessing whether tax penalties are criminal in nature, it is necessary to consider the legal classification of the offence under national law, the very nature of the offence, and the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned is liable to incur. 93. In the present case, the seriousness of the sanctions was clear, since the maximum sum that could be imposed was EUR 5,000,000. This primary sanction was supplemented by secondary penalties, such as temporary loss of entitlement (of up to three years) to hold administrative, managerial or supervisory roles in listed companies, temporary suspension (of up to three years) from professional bodies, and confiscation of the proceeds of the office and the assets used to commit it. Referring to the Court ’ s case-law in this area (in particular Dubus S.A. v. France, no. 5242/04, 11 June 2009; Messier v. France, no. 25041/07, 30 June 2001; and Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, no. 43509/08, 27 September 2011), the applicants concluded that Article 6 was applicable in its criminal limb. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 94. The Court reiterates its established case-law that, in determining the existence of a “criminal charge”, it is necessary to have regard to three factors: the legal classification of the measure in question in national law, the very nature of the measure, and the nature and degree of severity of the “penalty” (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 82, Series A no. 22). Furthermore, these criteria are alternative and not cumulative ones: for Article 6 to apply in respect of the words “criminal charge”, it suffices that the offence in question should by its nature be “criminal” from the point of view of the Convention, or should have made the person concerned liable to a sanction which, by virtue of its nature and degree of severity, belongs in general to the “criminal” sphere. This, however, does not exclude a cumulative approach where separate analysis of each criterion does not make it possible to reach a clear conclusion as to the existence of a “criminal charge” ( see Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, §§ 30 and 31, ECHR 2006-XIII, and Zaicevs v. Latvia, no. 65022/01, § 31, ECHR 2007-IX (extracts)). 95. In the present case, the Court first observes that the market manipulations with which the applicants were accused did not constitute a criminal offence in Italian law. Such conduct was in effect punished by a penalty which was classified as “administrative” by Article 187 ter § 1 of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998 (see paragraph 20 above). However, this was not decisive for the purposes of the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention in its criminal head, as the indications furnished by the domestic law have only a relative value (see Öztürk v. Germany, 21 February 1984, § 52, Series A no. 73, and Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. , cited above, § 39). 96. As to the nature of the offence, it appears that the provisions which the applicants were accused of breaching were intended to guarantee the integrity of the financial markets and to maintain public confidence in the security of transactions. The Court reiterates that the CONSOB, an independent administrative body, has the task of protecting investors and ensuring the effectiveness, transparency and development of the stock markets (see paragraph 9 above). These are general interests of society, usually protected by criminal law (see, mutatis mutandis, Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. , cited above, § 40; see also Société Stenuit v. France, report of the European Commission of Human Rights, 30 May 1991, § 62, Series A no. 232 ‑ A). In addition, the Court considers that the fines imposed were essentially intended to punish, in order to prevent repeat offending. They had therefore been based on rules whose purpose was both deterrent, namely to dissuade the applicants from resuming the activity in question, and punitive, since they punished unlawful conduct (see, mutatis mutandis, Jussila, cited above, § 38). Thus, they were not solely intended, as the Government claimed (see paragraph 91 above), to repair damage of a financial nature. In this respect, it should be noted that the penalties were imposed by the CONSOB on the basis of the gravity of the impugned conduct, and not of the harm caused to investors. 97. As to the nature and severity of the penalty which was “likely to be imposed” on the applicants (see Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39665/98 and 40086/98, § 120, ECHR 2003-X), the Court, like the Government (see paragraph 90 above), notes that the fines in question could not be replaced by a custodial sentence in the event of non ‑ payment (see, a contrario, Anghel v. Romania, no. 28183/03, § 52, 4 October 2007). However, the fine which the CONSOB was entitled to impose could go up to EUR 5,000,000 (see paragraph 20 above), and this ordinary maximum amount could, in certain circumstances, be tripled or fixed at ten times the proceeds or profit obtained through the unlawful conduct (see paragraph 53 above). Imposition of the above-mentioned pecuniary administrative sanctions entails the temporary loss of their honour for the representatives of the companies involved, and, if the latter are listed on the stock exchange, their representatives are temporarily forbidden from administering, managing or supervising listed companies for periods ranging from two months to three years. The CONSOB may also prohibit listed companies, management companies and auditing companies from engaging the services of the offender, for a maximum period of three years, and request professional associations to suspend, on a temporary basis, the individual ’ s right to carry out his or her professional activity (see paragraph 54 above). Lastly, the imposition of financial administrative sanctions entails confiscation of the proceeds or profits of the unlawful conduct and of the assets which made it possible (see paragraph 56 above). 98. It is true that in the present case the maximum penalties were not imposed, the Turin Court of Appeal having reduced some of the fines imposed by the CONSOB (see paragraph 30 above), and no confiscations having been ordered. However, the criminal connotation of proceedings depends on the degree of severity of the penalty to which the person concerned is a priori liable (see Engel and Others, cited above, § 82), and not the severity of the penalty ultimately imposed (see Dubus S.A., cited above, § 37). Furthermore, in the present case the applicants had ultimately received fines ranging from EUR 500,000 to 3,000,000, and Mr Gabetti, Mr Grande Stevens and Mr Marrone had been prohibited from administering, managing or supervising listed companies for periods ranging from two to four months (see paragraphs 25 - 26 and 30 - 31 above). This last penalty was such as to compromise the integrity of the persons concerned (see, mutatis mutandis, Dubus S.A., loc. ult. cit. ), and, given their amount, the fines were of undeniable severity and had significant financial implications for the applicants. 99. In the light of the above, and taking account of the severity of the fines imposed and of those to which the applicants were liable, the Court considers that the penalties in question, though their severity, were criminal in nature (see, mutatis mutandis, Öztürk, cited above, § 54, and, a contrario, Inocêncio v. Portugal ( dec. ), no. 43862/98, ECHR 2001 ‑ I). 100. Moreover, the Court also reiterates that, with regard to certain French administrative authorities which have jurisdiction in economic and financial law and enjoy sentencing powers, it has held that the criminal limb of Article 6 applied, in particular, with regard to the Disciplinary Offences (Budget and Finance) Court ( Guisset v. France, no. 33933/96, § 59, ECHR 2000 ‑ IX), the Financial Markets Board ( Didier v. France ( dec. ), no. 58188/00, 27 August 2002), the Competition Commission ( Lilly France S.A. v. France ( dec. ), no. 53892/00, 3 December 2002), the sanctions committee of the financial market supervisory authorities ( Messier v. France ( dec. ), no. 25041/07, 19 May 2009), and the Banking Commission ( Dubus S.A., cited above, § 38). The same finding was made in respect of the Italian regulatory authority responsible for competition and the market (the AGCM – Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato; see Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. , cited above, § 44). 101. After noting and giving due weight to the various aspects of the case, the Court considers that the fines imposed on the applicants were criminal in nature, with the result that Article 6 § 1 is applicable in this case under its criminal head (see, mutatis mutandis, Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. , loc. ult. cit. ). ... B. Merits 1. Whether the proceedings before the CONSOB were fair (a) The parties ’ submissions i. The applicants 106. The applicants alleged that the proceedings before the CONSOB had been essentially in written form, that no public hearing had been scheduled and that the rights of the defence were not respected. The Court of Cassation itself had acknowledged that the guarantees of a fair trial and protection of the rights of the defence (Articles 111 and 24 of the Constitution) did not apply to administrative proceedings (see paragraph 38 above). 107. The applicants submitted that CONSOB Resolutions no. 12697 of 2 August 2000 and no. 15086 of 21 June 2005 had de facto eliminated the principle of adversarial proceedings, which was, however, a requirement under Article187 septies of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998 ... As in the present case, those resolutions permitted non-communication to the defendant of the Directorate ’ s conclusions, which then formed the basis of the decision taken by the Commission; in addition, the latter did not receive the pleadings submitted by the defendants during the investigation phase. Furthermore, the Commission ruled without hearing the defendants and without a public hearing, a fact which, in the present case, had prevented the applicants from addressing the Commission directly and from defending themselves in relation to the Directorate ’ s findings. Those findings had been important evidence, and familiarity with them would have enabled the applicants to detect inconsistencies in the investigation or to obtain relevant information for their defence. The Commission held only an internal meeting, in the course of which the sole individual questioned had been a civil servant from the IT Office (that is, from the body responsible for the “charge”). The applicants were not invited to the meeting and had not even been able to obtain a copy of its minutes. 108. The applicants also claimed that they had not been informed in good time of the new documents on which the IT Office ’ s supplementary note had been based (see paragraph 23 above) and had not had the time and facilities necessary to defend themselves in relation to it. Those documents were allegedly brought to their attention at a late stage. 109. The applicants considered that the proceedings before the CONSOB did not guarantee a real separation between the investigative and decision-making phases, which, they alleged, was in breach of the principle of equality of arms. The investigation was indeed entirely subject to the power to give instructions enjoyed by the CONSOB ’ s chairman, who had responsibility for a large number of investigative measures, including the wording of the accusation or accusations. 110. They submitted that, in the present case, the investigative activity had been unilateral and based on witness statements made in the absence of the accused or their counsel, who had not had an opportunity to question those witnesses or to be present when the various investigative measures were carried out. The applicants had been able to submit their respective pleadings only in writing. ii. The Government 111. The Government argued that the CONSOB ’ s IT Office had appended to its report all of the documents from the investigation, and thus also the defence pleadings submitted by the applicants. They also emphasised that the applicants had been given a thirty-day period in which to submit any observations on the IT Office ’ s supplementary note of 19 October 2006, and that the applicants had submitted those observations on 24 November 2006 without making any complaint as to the limited time available to them. Furthermore, the applicants had never requested that witnesses be summoned and questioned; in the normal course of events, their presence served no purpose in the proceedings before the CONSOB, these being based on the acquisition of technical information and data. The technical nature of the offences justified the decision to resort to essentially written proceedings. 112. Bearing in mind the “administrative” nature of the proceedings before the CONSOB, the Government argued that their fairness could not be challenged on the sole ground that they had been conducted entirely in writing. As administrative proceedings were not referred to in Article 6 of the Convention, the principles of a fair hearing could only be applied to them mutatis mutandis. The impugned proceedings had indeed been promoted by a concern to ensure respect for the rights of the defence, the adversarial principle and the principle that the accusation should correspond to the act that is punished. The applicants had had access to the investigation file, and the investigation and the decision-making process had been separated – the first stage had been under the jurisdiction of the IT Office and the Administrative Sanctions Directorate, while the second stage had been entrusted to the CONSOB ’ s Commission. 113. In this connection, the Government emphasised that the letter accusing the applicants of a violation of Article 187 ter § 1 of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998 had not been signed by the CONSOB ’ s chairman, but by the head of the markets and economic opinions division and by the director-general of institutional activities. 114. Once proceedings in respect of an offence had been opened, the persons concerned could exercise their defence rights by presenting written observations or by asking to be heard, first by the relevant office then by the Administrative Sanctions Directorate. Thus, as in the present case, such persons had an opportunity to submit observations concerning the elements constituting the offence and any other relevant circumstance, prior to examination of their case. The investigation took place in two stages (the first before the IT Office, the other before the Directorate), and the Office ’ s report was transmitted not only to the Directorate, but also to the defendants, who could then submit to the Directorate their defence in relation to its content. The fact that the latter ’ s conclusions had not been transmitted to the accused and that they were not heard in person by the Commission had no effect on the fairness of the proceedings. 115. The Government pointed out that even in judicial proceedings the accused was not entitled to discuss the penalty during the decision-making phase. Moreover, the maximum severity of those penalties was determined by the law, which also indicted the criteria to be respected in order to ensure that they were proportionate to the severity of the offences committed. Lastly, as the combined divisions of the Court of Cassation had acknowledged in judgment no. 20935 of 2009, Article 187 septies of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998 (governing the rights of the defence in the context of proceedings before the CONSOB) had been introduced into the Italian legal system specifically to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Convention. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 116. The Court is prepared to accept that, as the Government have emphasised, the proceedings before the CONSOB provided the accused with an opportunity to submit evidence in their defence. The accusation drawn up by the IT Office was indeed communicated to the applicants, who were invited to defend themselves (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above). The applicants were also informed of the IT Office ’ s report and supplementary note, and were given thirty days to submit any observations concerning the latter document (see paragraph 23 above). This deadline does not seem patently insufficient and the applicants did not ask for it to be extended. 117. Nonetheless, as the Government have acknowledged (see paragraph 114 above), the report containing the Directorate ’ s conclusions, which was then to be used as the basis for the Commission ’ s decision, was not communicated to the applicants, who were therefore unable to defend themselves in relation to the document ultimately submitted by the CONSOB ’ s investigative bodies to the body responsible for ruling on the merits of the accusations. Further, the applicants did not have an opportunity to question or have questioned those persons who may have been heard by the IT Office. 118. The Court also notes that the proceedings before the CONSOB were essentially written and that the applicants were unable to take part in the only meeting held by the commission, to which they were not invited. This is not disputed by the Government. In this connection, the Court reiterates that an oral, and public, hearing constitutes a fundamental principle enshrined in Article 6 § 1 (see Jussila, cited above, § 40). 119. However, the obligation to hold a hearing is admittedly not absolute (see Håkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden, 21 February 1990, § 66, Series A no. 171-A) and there may be proceedings in which an oral hearing may not be required, for example where there are no issues of credibility or contested facts which necessitate a hearing and the courts may fairly and reasonably decide the case on the basis of the parties ’ submissions and other written materials (see, for example, Döry v. Sweden, no. 28394/95, § 37, 12 November 2002; Pursiheimo v. Finland ( dec. ), no. 57795/00, 25 November 2003; Jussila, cited above, § 41; and Suhadolc v. Slovenia ( dec. ), no. 57655/08, 17 May 2011, in which the Court held that the lack of a public oral hearing created no appearance of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, in a case concerning driving in excess of the speed limit and driving under the influence of alcohol, where the evidence against the accused had been obtained using technical devices). 120. While the requirements of a fair hearing are the strictest in the sphere of criminal law, the Court would not exclude that in the criminal sphere the nature of the issues to be dealt with before the tribunal or court may not require an oral hearing. Notwithstanding the consideration that a certain gravity attaches to criminal proceedings, which are concerned with the allocation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of a punitive and deterrent sanction, it is self-evident that there are criminal cases which do not carry any significant degree of stigma. There are clearly “criminal charges” of differing weight (see Jussila, cited above, § 43). 121. It must also be said that the fact that proceedings are of considerable personal significance to the applicant is not decisive for the necessity of a hearing (see Pirinen v. Finland ( dec. ), no. 32447/02, 16 May 2006). Nevertheless, refusing to hold an oral hearing may be justified only in rare cases (see Miller v. Sweden, no. 55853/00, § 29, 8 February 2005, and Jussila, cited above, § 42). 122. As to the present case, the Court considers that a public hearing, open and accessible to the applicants, was necessary. In this connection, the Court notes that the facts were contested, especially with regard to the state of progress in the negotiations with Merrill Lynch International Ltd, and that, quite apart from their financial severity, the penalties which some of the applicants were liable to incur carried, as previously noted (see paragraphs ..., 97 and 98 above), a significant degree of stigma, and were likely to adversely affect the professional honour and reputation of the persons concerned. 123. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the proceedings before the CONSOB did not satisfy all of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, particularly with regard to equality of arms between the prosecution and the defence and the holding of a public hearing which would have allowed for an oral confrontation. 2. Whether the CONSOB was an independent and impartial tribunal (a) The parties ’ submissions i. The applicants 124. The applicants alleged that, on account of its structure and the powers enjoyed by its chairman, the CONSOB was not an “independent and impartial tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 125. They emphasised that the investigation phase in their case was carried out by the IT Office and by the Administrative Sanctions Directorate. Yet the CONSOB ’ s chairman was called upon to supervise that phase before chairing the Commission proper, in other words the body responsible for imposing the penalties. There was therefore no clear separation between the investigation and the decision-making stages, and this dual role fulfilled by the chairman could create objectively justified doubts as to his impartiality. The same was true with regard to the other members of the Commission, who had learned of the facts only through the chairman and solely on the basis of the version given by the Directorate, to which the defence pleadings submitted by the accused had not been joined. Lastly, the bodies responsible for the investigation had not been independent in relation to the CONSOB ’ s senior hierarchy. 126. Under CONSOB Resolution no. 15087 of 21 June 2005, the chairman was at the summit of the Commission: he applied penalties, supervised the preliminary investigation and authorised the use of investigative powers. He could order inspections or other investigative measures, and in consequence he could not be considered as a “neutral” and impartial judge. ii. The Government 127. The Government noted that the CONSOB was made up of a chairman and four members, selected from independent persons who had specific skills and appropriate moral qualities. At the relevant time its members were elected for a period of five years and their term of office could be renewed only once. During their term of office, those members were not permitted to exercise any other professional or business activities or to hold any other public office. 128. The CONSOB was independent from any other authority and, in particular, from the executive. It could use its budget autonomously and adopt resolutions concerning the career and conditions of employment of its staff. The decision-making body (the Commission) was separate from the investigative bodies (the Office and the Directorate). 129. Although he was responsible for supervising the various offices and had certain powers of initiative during the investigation (in particular he could authorise inspections and ask that various investigative measures be carried out, such as obtaining data on telephone communications and seizing property), the CONSOB ’ s chairman could never interfere in the investigations concerning a given case, which were carried out by the relevant office and by the Directorate. Nor, conversely, did the department and the Directorate play any role in adoption of the final decision. The CONSOB ’ s chairman was responsible for supervising the general criteria which the offices had to comply with in carrying out investigations. He could not take part in assessing the merits of a case on the basis of the evidence obtained, or influence the results of the investigation. His or her duties were comparable to that of the president of a court. 130. The power to open misconduct proceedings and to bring charges lay exclusively with the head of the relevant division, who acted in complete independence and with full discretion. As to the inspections, these were investigative measures intended to obtain information. They were assessed in turn by the relevant offices. Indeed, in the present case, the chairman of the CONSOB had neither authorised the inspections nor asked that investigative measures be taken. The final decision on a seizure of property – which had not been ordered in the present case – lay with the Commission, and required a favourable opinion from the prosecutor ’ s office, issued at the request of the CONSOB ’ s chairman. In any event, it was an interim measure aimed at guaranteeing the solvency of defendants or depriving them of assets used to commit offences. The decision on seizure of property in no way prejudged the decisions concerning the merits of the accusations or the penalties. Even in the context of judicial proceedings, it was accepted that a procedural decision which did not imply any judgment on a suspect ’ s guilt or innocence (such as, for example, an order to remand a person in custody) did not amount to a ground for subsequent doubts as to the impartiality of the court which had issued it. 131. Lastly, the Government noted that in the present case, there had been no conflict of interests between the CONSOB ’ s staff, the members of the Commission and the applicants. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 132. The Court reiterates its well-established case-law to the effect that, in order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered “independent”, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of safeguards against outside pressures and the question whether it presents an appearance of independence (see Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], nos. 39343/98, 39651/98, 43147/98 and 46664/99, § 190, ECHR 2003-VI). 133. Having regard to the manner and conditions of appointment of the members of the CONSOB, and in the absence of any indication of a lack of sufficient and adequate safeguards against possible extraneous pressure, Court considers that there is no reason to doubt the CONSOB ’ s independence with regard to any other power or authority, and especially with regard to the executive. In this respect, it endorses the Government ’ s observations regarding the CONSOB ’ s autonomy and the safeguards surrounding the appointment of its members (see paragraphs 127 and 128 above). 134. The Court further reiterates the general principles governing the steps to assess the impartiality of a “tribunal”, which are set out, inter alia, in the following judgments: Padovani v. Italy, 26 February 1993, § 20, Series A no. 257-B; Thomann v. Switzerland, 10 June 1996, § 30, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III; Ferrantelli and Santangelo v. Italy, 7 August 1996, § 58, Reports 1996-III; Castillo Algar v. Spain, 28 October 1998, § 45, Reports 1998-VIII; Wettstein v. Switzerland, no. 33958/96, § 44, ECHR 2000 ‑ XII; Morel v. France, no. 34130/96, § 42, ECHR 2000-VI; and Cianetti v. Italy, no. 55634/00, § 37, 22 April 2004. 135. As regards the subjective aspect of the CONSOB ’ s impartiality, the Court notes that nothing in the present case pointed to any prejudice or bias on the part of its members. The mere fact that they took decisions against the applicants cannot in itself cast doubt on their impartiality (see, mutatis mutandis, Previti v. Italy ( dec. ), no. 1845/08, § 53, 12 February 2013). It follows that the Court cannot but presume the personal impartiality of the CONSOB ’ s members, including its chairman. 136. As to the objective impartiality, the Court notes that the CONSOB ’ s regulations provide for a certain separation between the investigative entities and the entity with responsibility for determining whether an offence had been committed and imposing penalties. In particular, the accusation is drawn up by the IT Office, which also carries out the investigations; the results are then summarised in the Directorate ’ s report, which contains conclusions and proposed penalties. The final decision on imposing penalties lies solely with the Commission. 137. It is nevertheless the case that the IT Office, the Directorate and the Commission are merely branches of the same administrative body, acting under the authority and supervision of a single chairman. In the Court ’ s opinion, this amounts to the consecutive exercise of investigative and judicial functions within one body; in criminal matters such a combination of functions is not compatible with the requirements of impartiality set out in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, in particular and mutatis mutandis, Piersack v. Belgium, 1 October 1982, §§ 30-32, Series A no. 53, and De Cubber v. Belgium, 26 October 1984, §§ 24-30, Series A no. 86, in which the Court concluded that the “tribunal” had lacked objective impartiality, in the first case on the ground that an assize court had been presided over by a judge who had previously acted as head of the section of the Brussels public prosecutor ’ s department which had been responsible for dealing with the accused ’ s case; and, in the second, on account of the successive exercise of the functions of investigating judge and trial judge by one and the same person in one and the same case). 3. Whether the applicants had had access to a court with full jurisdiction 138. The above findings concerning the CONSOB ’ s lack of objective impartiality and the fact that the proceedings before it did not comply with the principles of a fair hearing are not, however, sufficient to warrant the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 6 in this case. In this connection, the Court observes that the penalties complained of by the applicants were not imposed by a court at the close of adversarial judicial proceedings, but by an administrative authority, namely the CONSOB. While entrusting the prosecution and punishment of similar minor offences to such authorities is not inconsistent with the Convention, the person concerned must have an opportunity to challenge any decision made against him or her before a tribunal which offers the guarantees of Article 6 (see Kadubec v. Slovakia, 2 September 1998, § 57, Reports 1998-VI; Čanády v. Slovakia, no. 53371/99, § 31, 16 November 2004; and Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. , cited above, § 58 ). 139. Therefore, in administrative proceedings, the obligation to comply with Article 6 of the Convention does not preclude a “penalty” being imposed by an administrative authority in the first instance. For this to be possible, however, decisions taken by administrative authorities which do not themselves satisfy the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction (see Schmautzer, Umlauft, Gradinger, Pramstaller, Palaoro and Pfarrmeier v. Austria, judgments of 23 October 1995, §§ 34, 37, 42 and 39, 41 and 38 respectively, Series A nos. 328 A-C and 329 A ‑ C). The characteristics of a judicial body with full jurisdiction include the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the decision of the body below. It must have jurisdiction to examine all questions of fact and law relevant to the dispute before it (see Chevrol v. France, no. 49636/99, § 77, ECHR 2003-III; Silvester ’ s Horeca Service v. Belgium, no. 47650/99, § 27, 4 March 2004; and Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. , cited above, § 59 ). 140. In the present case, the applicants had the possibility, which they used, of challenging the penalties imposed by the CONSOB before the Turin Court of Appeal and then to appeal on points of law against the judgments delivered by the latter court. It remains to be established whether those two courts were “judicial bodies with full jurisdiction” within the meaning of the Court ’ s case-law. (a) The parties ’ submissions i. The applicants 141. According to the applicants, the subsequent proceedings before the Turin Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation had not remedied the shortcomings in the proceedings before the CONSOB. Although the court of appeal could be considered a judicial body with full jurisdiction, the fact remained that its hearings had not been held in public. Yet a derogation from the principle that hearings should be held in public could be considered justifiable only in exceptional circumstances (they referred, in particular, to Vernes v. France, no. 30183/06, § 30, 20 January 2011). 142. The applicants contended, in particular, that the proceedings before the court of appeal had not been ordinary proceedings, but special proceedings in which the hearing had taken place in private. In support of their claims, they submitted declarations signed by the administrative director of the Registry of the First Civil Division of the Turin Court of Appeal, stating that the hearings in their case had been held in private. During those hearings, only the counsel for the accused had been present; the applicants had not been summoned, and the court of appeal had questioned neither the accused nor any witnesses. It had carried out no investigations, and had merely endorsed the evidence gathered by the CONSOB. Admittedly, the Government had submitted statements from the President of the First Section of the Court of Appeal, claiming that the hearings in question had in reality indeed been held in public (see paragraph 145 below). It was nonetheless the case that those statements could not contradict the content of public documents, such as the judgments delivered by the court of appeal, which indicated that the parties had been summoned to a private hearing and which attested the facts which they recorded until forgery was proved. Yet the Government had not brought proceedings for forgery and, in any event, the President of the First Section of the Court of Appeal had merely passed on the content of statements made by others, without recounting any event of which he had had direct knowledge. 143. It was true that a public hearing had been held before the Court of Cassation. However, the latter was not a body with full jurisdiction, since it did not deal with the merits of the case and was not called upon to express an opinion on the merits of the accusation or the relevance and cogency of the evidence. It had therefore dismissed all of the arguments submitted by the applicants in order to challenge the manner in which the CONSOB or the court of appeal had assessed the evidence. ii. The Government 144. The Government noted that the applicants had had access to oral and public proceedings before the Turin Court of Appeal, which had re-examined on the merits all of the evidence and information gathered by the CONSOB with regard to the particular circumstances of the impugned conduct, thus enabling it to assess the proportionality of the penalties. The court of appeal enjoyed very wide powers with regard to the taking of evidence, even of its own motion, and could have set aside or amended the CONSOB ’ s decision. The applicants could have requested that witnesses be questioned, or could have asked to be heard in person; yet they had submitted no requests to that effect. At the close of the judicial proceedings, the court of appeal had altered the CONSOB ’ s assessment, and had reduced the penalties imposed on three of the five applicants. 145. The Government submitted that the applicants ’ claim that their case had not been examined in a public hearing before the Turin Court of Appeal was false. Pursuant to section 23 of Law no. 689 of 1981, all of the hearings held before that court were open to the public. As to the statements signed by the Administrative Director of the Registry of the First Section of the Court of Appeal and submitted by the applicants (see paragraph 142 above), the Government argued that they did not reflect the reality of the situation. In counter-argument, they produced five statements signed by the President of the First Section of the Turin Court of Appeal and by the Administrative Director of the same Section, stating that, in the five sets of proceedings concerning the applicants and challenging the penalties imposed by the CONSOB, only the hearings concerning the urgent measures ( sub procedimento cautelare ) had been held in private, all of the other hearings having been public. In those statements, dated 6 September 2013, the President of the First Section of the Court of Appeal indicated that, at the relevant time, he had not been assigned to that body (he had taken up his duties on 1 March 2013), but that he had been able to reconstitute the sequence of events by examining the registers and case files, and on the basis of information provided directly by the staff of the registry and by the judges who had dealt with the cases in question. In particular, the applicants ’ cases had been added to the list of non-contentious cases ( registro volontaria giurisdizione ). Further, Law no. 62 of 18 April 2005 stated that proceedings in respect of Article 187 of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998 were to be held in accordance with the conditions laid down in section 23 of Law no. 689 of 1981 (which did not provide for the holding of a hearing in private). Although the applicants ’ cases had remained on the list of non-contentious cases, the procedure followed had been that required by Law no. 62 of 2005. 146. On the basis of those statements, the Government claimed that on 6 March 2007 the applicants had requested that execution of the CONSOB ’ s decision be stayed (Article 187 septies § 5 of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998). In the context of these sub-proceedings for the application of urgent measures, a hearing had been held on 28 March 2007; it had been held in private, as provided for by Articles 283 and 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A hearing on the merits had subsequently been held on 11 July 2007; in accordance with section 23 of Law no. 689 of 1981, that hearing was held in public. Furthermore, two of the judgments issued by the court of appeal (specifically those against Mr Marrone and the company Giovanni Agnelli S.a.s .) referred to “the public hearing” set for 11 July 2007. The following hearings on the merits of the cases (namely those of 7 November and 5 December 2007) were also public. 147. The Government also emphasised that the applicants had had the opportunity to appeal on points of law, and that the case was then referred to the combined divisions. Before those divisions, there was an oral and public procedure, which fully complied with the rights of the defence, and which concerned both the interpretation and application of the substantive and procedural law ( errores in iudicando and in procedendo ) and the coherence and adequacy of the reasons put forward by the court of appeal. The Government referred, in particular, to the case of Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. (judgment cited above), in which the Court concluded that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, noting that the review of the contested administrative penalty by the administrative court and the Consiglio di Stato had indeed been conducted by courts with full jurisdiction to examine all aspects of the case. In the Government ’ s opinion, there was all the more reason to reach the same conclusion in the present case, where the powers of the court of appeal had been wider than those of the administrative court and the Consiglio di Stato. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 148. The Court notes at the outset that there is nothing in the present case to cast doubt on the independence and impartiality of the Turin Court of Appeal. Indeed, the applicants do not contest it. 149. The Court further observes that the court of appeal had jurisdiction to rule, in respect of both law and fact, on whether the offence set out in Article 187 ter of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998 had been committed, and was authorised to set aside the decision taken by the CONSOB. It was also called upon to assess the proportionality of the imposed penalties to the seriousness of the alleged conduct. In fact, it reduced the amount of the fines and the length of the ban on exercising their profession imposed on certain of the applicants (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above) and examined their various factual or legal allegations (see paragraphs 32 ‑ 36 above). Thus, its jurisdiction was not merely confined to reviewing lawfulness. 150. It is true that the applicants complained about the fact that the court of appeal did not question witnesses (see paragraph 142 above). However, they did not indicate any procedural rule which would have prevented such questioning. In addition, the request for questioning of witnesses, made by Mr Grande Stevens in his pleadings of 25 September 2007, did not indicate either the names of the persons whom he wished to have summoned, or the events about which they were to provide evidence. In addition, that request was made on a purely hypothetical basis, for examination only if the court of appeal held that the documents already included in the case file were insufficient or unusable. This also holds in respect of the request made by Mr Marrone, who raised the possibility of questioning the witnesses from whose statements he quoted only “if necessary” (see paragraph 29 above). In any event, before the Court the applicants have not identified the witnesses whom the court of appeal allegedly refused to question and the reasons why their evidence would have been decisive for the outcome of the case. They have not therefore substantiated their complaint under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention. 151. In the light of the above considerations, the Court considers that the Turin Court of Appeal was indeed a “body with full jurisdiction” within the meaning of its case-law (see, mutatis mutandis, Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. , cited above, §§ 60-67). The applicants themselves do not seem to contest this (see paragraph 141 above). 152. It remains to be established whether the hearings on the merits held before the Turin Court of Appeal were public, a factual matter on which the parties ’ submissions differ (see paragraphs 142 and 145 - 146 above). In this connection, the Court cannot but reiterate its conclusions concerning the necessity, in the present case, of a public hearing (see paragraph 122 above). 153. The Court notes that the parties submitted contradictory documents with regard to the manner in which the disputed hearings were conducted; according to the written statements from the Administrative Director of the Registry of the Turin Court of Appeal, submitted by the applicants, those hearings were held in private, although – according to the written statements of the President of the Court of Appeal, submitted by the Government – only the hearings which concerned the urgent measures were held in private, all of the other hearings having been public. The Court is hardly in a position to state which of these two versions is correct. Whatever the case, faced with these two versions, both of which are plausible and which come from competent but opposing sources, the Court considers that it should not depart from the content of the official documents in the proceedings. As the applicants have righty emphasised (see paragraph 142 above), the judgments delivered by the court of appeal indicate that it met in private or that the parties had been summoned to deliberations held in private (see paragraph 30 in fine above). 154. On the basis of these references, the Court accordingly concludes that no public hearing was held before the Turin Court of Appeal. 155. It is true that a public hearing was held before the Court of Cassation. However, the latter did not have jurisdiction to examine the merits of the case, to establish the facts and to assess the evidence; indeed, the Government do no contest this. It could not therefore be considered as a court with full jurisdiction within the meaning of the Court ’ s case-law. 4. The applicants ’ other allegations 156. The applicants also claimed that the press releases of 24 August 2005 contained truthful information and that their conviction in spite of the defence evidence included in the file resulted from a “presumption of guilt” against them. In their opinion, they had been under no obligation in those press releases to describe mere plans or hypothetical agreements which had not yet been finalised. Moreover, the CONSOB ’ s published instructions specified that information for possible dissemination to the public ought to be tied to real circumstances or a specific event, and not to mere hypotheses as to future and possible actions, which were not of interest for the markets. Yet, at the date on which the press releases were disseminated, no tangible initiative had been undertaken by the applicant companies in relation to expiry of the convertible loan. At the relevant time the envisaged scenario was uncertain, since it was still subject to approval by Merrill Lynch International Ltd and the possibility that there would be no obligation to launch a takeover bid. A CONSOB official had participated in drawing up one of the press releases, and the text in question had received the CONSOB ’ s prior agreement. 157. Despite that, the applicants considered that the CONSOB had drawn up its accusations on the basis of the arbitrary presumption that the agreement amending the equity swap contract had been concluded prior to 24August 2005, in spite of the absence of any written or oral evidence to corroborate that presumption. According to the applicants, they had been convicted without any evidence to that effect. 158. The Court reiterates that it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see Khan v. the United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, § 34, ECHR 2000-V), and that, as a rule, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them (see Pacifico v. Italy ( dec. ), no. 17995/08, § 62, 20 November 2012). Yet the Court has examined the decisions of the national courts that are contested by the applicants without discerning any signs of arbitrariness that would reveal a denial of justice or a manifest abuse (see, a contrario, De Moor v. Belgium, 23 June 1994, § 55 in fine, Series A no. 292 ‑ A, and Barać and Others v. Montenegro, no. 47974/06, § 32, 13 December 2011). 159. The Court also reiterates that the principle of the presumption of innocence requires, inter alia, that when carrying out their duties, the members of a court should not start with the preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offence charged; the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and any doubt should benefit the accused. It also follows that it is for the prosecution to inform the accused of the case that will be made against him, so that he may prepare and present his defence accordingly, and to adduce evidence sufficient to convict him (see, inter alia, Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, 6 December 1988, § 77, Series A no. 146; John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996, § 54, Reports 1996 ‑ I; and Telfner v. Austria, no. 33501/96, § 15, 20 March 2001). 160. In the present case, the judgment convicting the applicants was delivered on the basis of inferences held to be strong, clear and concordant, submitted by the IT Office, and which indicated that at the time of issuing the press releases of 24 August 2005, the agreement amending the equity swap had been concluded or was about to be concluded. In these circumstances, no appearance of a violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence can be found (see, mutatis mutandis, Previti v. Italy ( dec. ), no. 45291/06, § 250, 8 December 2009). 6. Conclusion 161. In the light of the above considerations, the Court considers that, although the proceedings before the CONSOB did not met the requirements of fairness and objective impartiality set out in Article 6 of the Convention, the applicants ’ case was subsequently reviewed by an independent and impartial body with full powers, specifically the Turin Court of Appeal. However, the latter did not hold a public hearing, which, in the present case, amounted to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. ... V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF PROTOCOL NO. 7 202. The applicants submitted that there had been a violation of the ne bis in idem principle, as guaranteed by Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. That provision reads as follows: “1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State. 2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. 3. No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention.” 203. The Government contested that argument. A. Admissibility 1. Reservation by Italy in respect of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 204. The Government noted that Italy had made a declaration to the effect that Articles 2 to 4 of Protocol No. 7 applied only to offences, procedures and decisions classified as criminal under Italian law. Yet Italian law did not classify the offences penalised by the CONSOB as criminal in nature. Furthermore, Italy ’ s declaration was similar to those made by other States (in particular, Germany, France and Portugal). 205. The applicants responded that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, to which no derogation is permitted under Article 15 of the Convention, concerned a right falling within European public order. In their opinion, the declaration made by Italy when depositing the instrument of ratification of Protocol No. 7 did not have the scope of a reservation within the meaning of Article 57 of the Convention, which did not permit reservations of a general character. In addition, the declaration in question was not attached to “a law” in force at the time it was prepared and did not contain “a brief statement” of that law. The declaration did therefore have any impact on Italy ’ s obligations. 206. The Court observes that the Government have alleged that a reservation has been made regarding the application of Articles 2 to 4 of Protocol No. 7 (see paragraph 204 above). Apart from the applicability of the reservation, the Court has to examine its validity. In other words, it must determine whether the reservation satisfies the requirements of Article 57 of the Convention (see Eisenstecken v. Austria, no. 29477/95, § 28, ECHR 2000-X). That provision reads as follows: “1. Any State may, when signing [the] Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this article. 2. Any reservation made under this article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned.” 207. The Court reiterates that, in order to be valid, a reservation must satisfy the following conditions: (1) it must be made at the time the Convention is signed or ratified; (2) it must relate to specific laws in force at the time of ratification; (3) it must not be a reservation of a general character; (4) it must contain a brief statement of the law concerned (see Põder and Others v. Estonia ( dec. ), no. 67723/01, ECHR 2005 ‑ VIII, and Liepājnieks v. Latvia ( dec. ), no. 37586/06, § 45, 2 November 2010). 208. The Court has had occasion to specific that Article 57 § 1 of the Convention requires “precision and clarity” from the Contracting States, and that in requiring that a reservation is to contain a brief statement of the law concerned, this provision is not a “purely formal requirement” but sets out “a condition of substance which constitutes an evidential factor and contributes to legal certainty” (see Belilos v. Switzerland, 29 April 1988, §§ 55 and 59, Series A no. 132; Weber v. Switzerland, 22 May 1990, § 38, Series A no. 177; and Eisenstecken, cited above, § 24). 209. By “reservation of a general character” in Article 57 is meant, in particular, a reservation couched in terms that are too vague or broad for it to be possible to determine their exact meaning and scope. The wording of the declaration must enable the scope of the Contracting State ’ s undertaking to be ascertained, in particular as to which categories of dispute are included, and must not lend itself to different interpretations (see Belilos, cited above, § 55). 210. In the present case, the Court notes that the reservation in question does not contain a “brief statement” of the law or laws which were allegedly incompatible with Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. It can be inferred from the wording of the reservation that Italy intended to exclude from the scope of that provision all offences and proceedings which were not classified as “criminal” under Italian law. However, a reservation which does not refer to or mention those specific provision of the Italian legal order which exclude offences or proceedings from the scope of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 does not afford to a sufficient degree a guarantee that [it] does not go beyond the provision expressly excluded by the Contracting State (see, mutatis mutandis, Chorherr v. Austria, 25 August 1993, § 20, Series A no. 266 ‑ B; Gradinger v. Austria, 23 October 1995, § 51, Series A no. 328 ‑ C; and Eisenstecken, cited above, § 29; see also, in contrast, Kozlova and Smirnova v. Latvia ( dec. ), no. 57381/00, ECHR 2001 ‑ XI ). In this respect, the Court reiterates that even significant practical difficulties in indicating and describing all of the provisions concerned by the reservation cannot justify a failure to comply with the conditions set out in Article 57 of the Convention (see Liepājnieks, decision cited above, § 54 ). 211. Consequently, the reservation relied on by Italy does not meet the requirements of Article 57 § 2 of the Convention. This conclusion is a sufficient basis for finding the reservation invalid, without it being necessary to examine further whether there has been compliance with the other requirements of Article 57 (see, mutatis mutandis, Eisenstecken, cited above, § 30). ... B. Merits 1. The parties ’ submissions (a) The applicants 213. The applicants pointed out that they had been subjected to a criminal penalty following the proceedings before the CONSOB, and that they had been subjected to criminal proceedings for the same facts. 214. As to the issue of whether the proceedings before the CONSOB and the criminal proceedings concerned the same “offence”, the applicants pointed to the principles laid down by the Grand Chamber in the case of Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia ([GC], no. 14939/03, 10 February 2009), in which the Court concluded that it is prohibited to prosecute a person for a second “offence” in so far as it arose from identical facts or facts which were substantially the same. In their opinion, this had clearly been the case in their respect. In this connection, the applicants stated that although the ECJ had admittedly specified that Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights did not preclude a Member State from imposing successively, for the same acts of non-compliance with declaration obligations in the field of value ‑ added tax, a tax penalty and a criminal penalty, this was on condition that the first penalty was not criminal in nature (see Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, judgment cited above, point 1 of the operative provisions); in their opinion, however, this condition was absent in the present case, since, whatever their formal classification in Italian law, the penalties imposed by the CONSOB were indeed criminal in nature within the meaning of the Court ’ s case-law. (b) The Government 215. Referring to the arguments developed under Article 6 of the Convention, the Government submitted, firstly, that the proceedings before the CONSOB did not concern a “criminal charge” and that the CONSOB ’ s decision had not been “criminal” in nature. 216. Moreover, European Union law had explicitly authorised the use of a double penalty (administrative and criminal) in the context of the fight against illegal conduct on the financial markets. Such use was part of the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, particularly in areas such as taxation, environmental policies and public safety. In the light of this, and of the fact that some States had not ratified Protocol No. 7 or had made declarations in respect of it, it was possible to affirm that the Convention did not guarantee the principle of ne bis in idem in the same manner as was the case for other fundamental principles. Accordingly, it was not correct to consider that the imposition of a final administrative penalty prevented the bringing of a criminal prosecution. In this connection, the Government referred to the opinion expressed before the ECJ by the Advocate General in his conclusions of 12 June 2012 in the above-cited case of Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson. 217. In any event, the pending criminal proceedings against the applicants did not concern the same offence as that which had been punished by the CONSOB. There was a clear distinction between the offences set out in Articles 187 ter and 185 respectively of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998, since only the second required the existence of malicious intent (mere negligence not being sufficient) and of the possibility that the false or misleading information disseminated could trigger a significant shift in the financial markets. Moreover, only the criminal procedure could result in the imposition of punishments involving a custodial sentence. The Government referred to the case of R.T. v. Switzerland (( dec. ), no. 31982/96, 30 May 2000), in which the Court stated that the imposition of penalties by two different bodies (one administrative, the other criminal) had not been incompatible with Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. In this regard, the fact that one and the same conduct could breach both Article 187 ter and Article 185 of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998 was not relevant, since the case concerned a typical example of a single act constituting various offences, the characteristic feature of this notion being that a single criminal act was split up into two separate offences (they referred to Oliveira v. Switzerland, no. 25711/94, § 26, 30 July 1998; Goktan v. France, no. 33402/96, § 50, 2 July 2002; Gauthier v. France ( dec. ), no. 61178/00, 24 June 2003; and Ongun v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 15737/02, 10 October 2006). 218. Lastly, it was to be noted that, in order to ensure the proportionality of the penalty to the accusations, the criminal court was able to take into account the prior imposition of an administrative penalty and to reduce the criminal penalty. In particular, the amount of the administrative fine was deducted from the criminal financial penalty (Article 187 terdecies of Legislative Decree no. 58 of 1998) and assets already seized in the context of the administrative proceedings could not be confiscated. 2. The Court ’ s assessment 219. The Court reiterates that in the case of Sergey Zolotukhin (cited above, § 82), the Grand Chamber specified that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a second “offence” in so far as it arises from facts which are substantially the same. 220. The guarantee enshrined in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 becomes relevant on commencement of a new prosecution, where a prior acquittal or conviction has already acquired the force of res judicata. At this juncture the available material will necessarily comprise the decision by which the first “penal procedure” was concluded and the list of accusations levelled against the applicant in the new proceedings. Normally these documents would contain a statement of facts concerning both the offence for which the applicant has already been tried and the offence of which he or she stands accused. In the Court ’ s view, such statements of fact are an appropriate starting point for its determination of the issue whether the facts in both proceedings were identical or substantially the same. It is irrelevant which parts of the new accusations are eventually upheld or dismissed in the subsequent proceedings, because Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 contains a safeguard against being tried or being liable to be tried again in new proceedings rather than a prohibition on a second conviction or acquittal (see Sergey Zolotukhin, cited above, § 83 ). 221. The Court ’ s inquiry should therefore focus on those facts which constitute a set of concrete factual circumstances involving the same defendant and inextricably linked together in time and space, the existence of which must be demonstrated in order to secure a conviction or institute criminal proceedings (see Sergey Zolotukhin, cited above, § 84). 222. Applying those principles to the case at hand, the Court notes, firstly, that it has just concluded, under Article 6 of the Convention, that there existed valid grounds for considering that the procedure before the CONSOB involved a “criminal charge” against the applicants (see paragraph 101 above) and also observes that the sentences imposed by the CONSOB and partly reduced by the court of appeal constituted res judicata on 23 June 2009, when the judgments of the Court of Cassation were delivered (see paragraph 38 above). From that date, the applicants ought therefore to be considered as having been “already finally convicted of an offence” for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 223. Despite this, the new set of criminal proceedings which had been brought against them in the meantime (see paragraphs 39 - 40 above) were not closed and resulted in judgments being delivered at first and second instance. 224. It remains to be ascertained whether those new proceedings were based on facts which were substantially the same as those which had been the subject of the final conviction. In this regard, the Court notes that, contrary to what the Government seem to be asserting (see paragraph 217 above), it follows from the principles set out in the case of Sergey Zolotukhin, cited above, that the question to be answered is not whether or not the elements of the offences set out in Articles 187 ter and 185 § 1 of Legislative Decree No. 58 of 1998 are identical, but whether the offences with which the applicants were charged before the CONSOB and before the criminal courts concerned the same conduct. 225. Before the CONSOB, the applicants were essentially accused of having failed to mention in the press releases of 24 August 2005 the plan to renegotiate the equity swap contract with Merrill Lynch International Ltd, although that plan already existed and was at an advanced stage of preparation (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above). They were subsequently punished for this by the CONSOB and by the Turin Court of Appeal (see paragraphs 27 and 35 above). 226. Before the criminal courts, the applicants were accused of having stated, in those same press releases, that Exor had neither instituted nor examined initiatives concerning the expiry of the financing agreement, although the agreement amending the equity swap had already been examined and concluded, information that was kept secret in order to avoid a probable fall in the FIAT share price (see paragraph 40 above). 227. In the Court ’ s opinion, these proceedings clearly concerned the same conduct by the same persons on the same date. Moreover, the Turin Court of Appeal itself, in its judgments of 23 January 2008, admitted that Articles 187 ter and 185 § 1 of Legislative Decree No. 58 of 1998 concerned the same conduct, namely the dissemination of false information (see paragraph 34 above). It follows that the new set of proceedings concerned a second “offence” originating in identical acts to those which had been the subject-matter of the first, and final, conviction. 228. This finding is sufficient to conclude that there has been a breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 229. Moreover, in so far as the Government submit that European Union law has explicitly authorised the use of a double penalty (administrative and criminal) in the context of combatting unlawful conduct on the financial markets (see paragraph 216 above), the Court, while specifying that its task is not to interpret the case-law of the ECJ, notes that in its judgment of 23 December 2009 in the case of Spector Photo Group, the ECJ indicated that Article 14 of Directive no. 2003/6 does not oblige the Member States to provide for criminal sanctions against authors of insider dealing, but merely states that those States are required to ensure that administrative sanctions are imposed against the persons responsible where there has been a failure to comply with the provisions adopted in implementation of that directive. It also drew the States ’ attention to the fact that such administrative sanctions may, for the purposes of the application of the Convention, be qualified as criminal sanctions (see paragraph 61 above). Further, in its Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson judgment, on the subject of value-added tax, the ECJ stated that, under the ne bis in idem principle, a State can only impose a double penalty (fiscal and criminal) in respect of the same facts if the first penalty is not criminal in nature (see paragraph 92 above). VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 41 AND 46 OF THE CONVENTION 230. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 231. The relevant parts of Article 46 of the Convention read as follows: “1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution ... A. Indication of general and individual measures 1. General principles 232. Any judgment in which the Court finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention to put an end to the breach and to make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach. If, on the other hand, national law does not allow – or allows only partial – reparation to be made for the consequences of the breach, Article 41 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate. It follows, inter alia, that a judgment in which the Court finds a breach of the Convention or the Protocols thereto imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order (see Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 47, ECHR 2004 ‑ I; Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 198, ECHR 2004 ‑ II; and Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 487, ECHR 2004 ‑ VII). 233. The Court reiterates that its judgments are essentially declaratory in nature and that, in general, it is primarily for the State concerned to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used in its domestic legal order in order to discharge its obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court ’ s judgment (see, inter alia, Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000-VIII; Brumărescu v. Romania (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 28342/95, § 20, ECHR 2001-I; and Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 210, ECHR 2005-IV). This discretion as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attached to the primary obligation of the Contracting States under the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed (see Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Article 50), 31 October 1995, § 34, Series A no. 330 ‑ B). 234. However, exceptionally, with a view to helping the respondent State to fulfil its obligations under Article 46, the Court will seek to indicate the type of measure that might be taken in order to put an end to a systemic situation it has found to exist. In such circumstances, it may propose various options and leave the choice of measure and its implementation to the discretion of the State concerned (see, for example, Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 194, ECHR 2004-V). In certain cases, the nature of the violation found may be such as to leave no real choice as to the measures required to remedy it and the Court may decide to indicate a specific measure (see, for example, Assanidze, cited above, §§ 202 and 203; Alexanian v. Russia, no. 46468/06, § 240, 22 December 2008; Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, no. 40984/07, §§ 176 and 177, 22 April 2010; and Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 21722/11, § 208, 9 January 2013 ). 2. Application of these principles in the present case 235. In the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court does not consider it necessary to indicate general measures that the State ought to adopt for the execution of the present judgment. 236. In contrast, as regards individual measures, the Court considers that in the present case the nature of the violation found is such as to leave no real choice as to the measures required to remedy it. 237. In these conditions, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and the urgent need to put an end to the violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (see paragraph 228 above), the Court considers that the respondent State must ensure that the new set of criminal proceedings brought against the applicants in violation of that provision and which, according to the most recent information received, are still pending, are closed as rapidly as possible and without adverse consequences for the applicants (see, mutatis mutandis, Assanidze, cited above, § 203, and Oleksandr Volkov, cited above, § 208). ...
First the Court noted that the reservation made by Italy did not contain “a brief statement of the law concerned”, contrary to the requirements of Article 57 of the Convention. A reservation which did not refer to, or mention, those specific provisions of the domestic legal order which exclude offences or procedures from the scope of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 did not afford to a sufficient degree the guarantee that they did not go beyond the provision expressly excluded by the contracting State. Consequently, the Court found that the reservation relied upon by Italy did not meet the requirements of Article 57 and was accordingly invalid. As to the merits, the Court concluded, under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention, that there were indeed grounds for considering that the procedure before Consob concerned “a criminal charge”. Equally, the sentences imposed by Consob and partly reduced by the court of appeal had become final in June 2009, when the Court of Cassation had delivered its judgments. Accordingly, the applicants ought to have been considered as having already been convicted by a final judgment. In spite of that, the new criminal proceedings which had been brought against them in the meantime were maintained, and resulted in judgments at first and second instance. In addition, proceedings before Consob and the criminal courts concerned the same conduct by the same persons on the same date. It followed that the new proceedings concerning a second “offence” originated in identical events to those which had been the subject-matter of the first and final conviction, which in itself amounted to a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. It was therefore for Italy to ensure that the new criminal proceedings brought against the applicants in violation of this provision, and which were still pending, according to the most recent information received, against the third and fifth applicants, were closed as rapidly as possible and without adverse consequences for the applicants. Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 in the case of Häkkä, where it considered that the applicant had a real possibility to prevent double jeopardy by first seeking rectification and then appealing against the taxation decisions.