(Suspected) terrorists
THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 92. The applicant argued that his removal to the Russian Federation would expose him to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. That Article reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Admissibility 93. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible MeritsThe parties’ submissions The parties’ submissions The parties’ submissions (a) The applicant (i) General situation in the North Caucasus Region 94. The applicant referred to the November 2013 report by the non-governmental organisation Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT). According to that report, the Russian authorities had resorted to ill-treatment and torture of Chechen fighters. 95. The applicant further cited Amnesty International’s Global Report for 2017-2018 (“State of Human Rights in the World”, 2017 2018, published on 22 February 2018), which indicates a further deterioration of the situation in Chechnya and reports enforced disappearances, unlawful detentions, torture and other ill-treatment in custody, together with extrajudicial executions, in the North Caucasus region. 96. The applicant also relied on the report by the non-governmental organisation Memorial according to which fundamental rights were not respected in Russia in criminal proceedings. He also pointed to a report entitled “L’évolution de la politique russe en matière de lutte antiterroriste” (“The Evolution of Russian Counter-Terrorism Policy”) published in 2018 by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), which is a research and discussion centre for the analysis of international issues. According to this report, Russian law prescribes harsher sentences for persons convicted of terrorism and extremism. 97. The applicant referred to a report entitled “Security and Human Rights in Chechnya and the Situation of Chechens in Russia” published in January 2015 by the Danish Immigration Service. One part deals with fabricated criminal cases, confessions under torture and other ill-treatment. 98. The applicant further relied on a report by the Swiss Refugee Assistance Organisation (OSAR) according to which the Chechen police systematically tortured, first, persons who refused to cooperate with them as informers and, secondly, those who adhered to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam. On this latter point, the applicant also cited a report by Dr Mark Galeotti, entitled “License to kill? The risk to Chechens inside Russia” published in June 2019. The author of this report is a researcher in the field of Russian security services at the Institute of International Relations in Prague. (ii) The applicant’s personal situation 99. The applicant began by referring to the persecution to which he had been subjected before leaving Russia (see paragraphs 4 to 8 above). At that point the only thing that could be held against him by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and ORB agents was the fact that his father and paternal uncles had been fighters. He emphasised that the veracity of this situation had been established because the OFPRA had granted him refugee status (see paragraph 17 above). 100. The applicant stated that the threats made against him prior to his departure had not ceased after he fled to France. For example, several of his close relatives had allegedly been approached by the Russian police, who were still actively interested in him (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above). 101. According to the applicant, his current profile would be an aggravating factor if he were to be deported to his country of origin. He pointed out that the CNDA had not addressed the risk he incurred as a result of his criminal conviction (see paragraph 31 above). In this regard, he stated that the Russian authorities were aware of the judgment of 16 April 2015 (see paragraph 21 above) and that, moreover, they had resumed their pressure on his family members living in Russia after its publication (see paragraphs 23, 46 and 49 above). He argued that his refugee status had been wrongly revoked as he did not constitute a serious threat to French society. 102. The applicant submitted that, in view of the persecution to which he had been subjected prior to his departure from Russia (see paragraphs 4 to 8 above), his conviction for acts of terrorism in connection with his involvement in an armed group active in the Syrian conflict (see paragraph 21 above) and the treatment inflicted on terrorist suspects by the Russian authorities, he ran a real and serious risk of being exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment if returned to his country of origin. (b) The Government (i) The general situation in the North Caucasus Region 103. At the outset, the Government observed that most of the reports by governmental and non-governmental organisations produced by the applicant were not recent ones, having been published between 2009 and 2015. Reports published in 2018 had also been submitted by him in evidence but they did not indicate any widespread practice of ill-treatment of individuals suspected of belonging to a terrorist movement. 104. The Government were of the view that the situation in Chechnya was not such as to preclude removal to that region, as the Court had previously held (they referred to R.K. and Others v. France, no. 68264/14, §§ 49-50, 12 July 2016; R.M. and Others v. France, no. 33201/11, §§ 50-51, 12 July 2016; I.S. v. France, cited above, §§ 47-48; and M.I. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 47679/17, §§ 45-46, 29 January 2019). 105. The Government also asserted that, to their knowledge, there were no reports from governmental or non-governmental organisations for the years 2017 and 2018 showing systematic practices of arbitrary detention and systematic ill-treatment of Chechens suspected or convicted of having fought for the so-called “Islamic State” organisation in Syria. 106. Lastly, the Government maintained that several Russian nationals of Chechen origin with links to a terrorist movement who had been suspected or convicted of terrorist offences and returned to Russia had not challenged the choice of that destination country and had not alleged, after their return, that they had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. They explained that, at the time of their observations, 14 such individuals had been deported by France since 2012. 107. The Government concluded that no generalised risk of ill-treatment facing all terrorist suspects had been proven and, therefore, that the risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention had to be examined on a case-by-case basis. (ii) The applicant’s personal situation 108. The Government took the view that the applicant had not established the existence of a specific individual risk. 109. They first noted that, although the applicant had been granted refugee status, the OFPRA’s analysis following the applicant’s interview with a protection officer on 21 June 2012 (see paragraph 18 above) showed that he had been unable to explain why he had been instructed to contact rebels (see paragraph 5 above) or how his close relatives had obtained his Russian “external passport” from the authorities (see paragraph 6 above). 110. The Government further noted that the events that had led to the applicant’s departure from the Russian Federation and to the granting of his refugee status had occurred long ago and could not serve to substantiate the existence of any current fear of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention that the applicant might sustain if he were to be deported to his country of origin. 111. In that connection, the Government emphasised that the applicant’s statements during his interview with an OFPRA official on 19 May 2015 remained imprecise and inconsistent as to the surveillance to which he and his close relatives were allegedly still subject and as to the conditions in which his Russian “domestic passport” had been recovered from the authorities (see paragraph 24 above). The Government also disputed the probative value of the witness statements and the press article produced by the applicant (see paragraphs 23, 46, 49 and 51 above). 112. The Government submitted that the applicant had used his Russian “external passport” to travel to Turkey and then to Syria (see paragraph 22 above), even though it was well known that the authorities in both countries were co-operating with Russia, and Turkey had in fact sent back jihadists of Chechen origin. The Government further noted that, by using such a travel document, the applicant, who was then claiming to be a refugee, had demonstrated his allegiance to his country of origin. 113. The Government noted that the applicant’s accomplice with the same profile as him, who had also been convicted on 16 April 2015, had left Syria and returned to Chechnya (see paragraph 22 above). They emphasised that there was no allegation that he had been ill-treated. 114. Lastly, the Government noted that the Russian authorities had not requested the applicant’s extradition or carried out the threats they had allegedly made against his relatives (see paragraphs 23, 46 and 49 above). The Government also pointed out that the applicant had not explained how the Russian authorities had been informed of his criminal conviction on 16 April 2015. Lastly, the Government stated that, if the deportation order were to be enforced, the applicant would be sent to Moscow. The Court’s assessment (a) General principles (i) Preliminary observations on the nature of interim measures 115. As a preliminary matter, the Court considers it useful to clarify the purpose and nature of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as applied in the present case on 8 March 2019 for the duration of its examination of the application. It reiterates that where there is plausibly asserted to be a risk of irreparable damage to the enjoyment by the applicant of one of the core rights under the Convention, such as that provided for in Article 3, the object of an interim measure is to preserve and protect the rights and interests of the parties to a dispute before the Court, pending its final decision. The power to indicate to the respondent State the interim measure or measures that it should adopt is exercised only in limited spheres and, as indicated above, where there is an imminent risk of irreparable damage (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 104, ECHR 2005-I). The Court has previously emphasised the special importance and vital role of interim measures in the Convention system (see, among other authorities, Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806/05, § 86, 10 March 2009, and Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386/10, §§ 211-213, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). Where a respondent State has deported an applicant despite the application of an interim measure, the Court may conclude that the State has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention (see, for example, M.A. v. France, no. 9373/15, § 71, 1 February 2018). 116. However, it follows from the general scheme of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that a decision on whether it should be applied in a given case will generally be made within a very short lapse of time, in order to prevent an imminent risk of irreversible harm, and often on the basis of limited information. Consequently, the full facts of the case will often remain undetermined until the Court’s judgment on the merits of the complaint to which the measure is related. Where this is possible in view of the urgency of the matter, however, the Court may invite the respondent State to provide further information before taking a decision on the request for interim measures or decide to apply Article 39 temporarily pending the receipt of such information from both parties, as it has done in the present case (see paragraphs 36 and 42 above). In any event, it is precisely for the purpose of preserving the Court’s ability to render such a judgment after an effective examination of the complaint that such measures are indicated. Until that time, it may be unavoidable for the Court to indicate interim measures on the basis of facts which, despite making a prima facie case in favour of such measures, are subsequently added to or challenged to the point of calling into question the measures’ justification (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, §§ 104 and 125, and Paladi, cited above, § 89). (ii) Application of Article 3 in expulsion cases 117. In the present case the Court would reiterate that the Contracting States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the destination country. In these circumstances, Article 3 implies an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611/11, § 111, 23 March 2016, and A.M. v. France, no. 12148/18, § 113, 29 April 2019). (iii) Absolute nature of Article 3 obligations 118. The Court would emphasise that it is acutely conscious of the scale of the threat that terrorism represents for the community and it does not therefore underestimate the importance of the fight against terrorism. It is well aware of the immense difficulties currently faced by States in protecting their populations from terrorist violence (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 79, Reports 1996 ‑ V; Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, § 137, ECHR 2008; and A.M. v. France, cited above, § 112). Faced with such a threat, the Court has considered it legitimate for Contracting States to take a firm stand against those who contribute to terrorist acts, which it cannot condone in any circumstances (see Daoudi v. France, no. 19576/08, § 65, 3 December 2009; Boutagni v. France, no. 42360/08, § 45, 18 November 2010; Auad v. Bulgaria, no. 46390/10, § 95, 11 October 2011; A.M. c. France, cited above, § 112; and O.D. v. Bulgaria, no. 34016/18, § 46, 10 October 2019). 119. It must be observed, however, that the protection secured by Article 3 of the Convention is absolute in nature. For a planned forcible expulsion to be in breach of the Convention it is necessary – and sufficient – for substantial grounds to have been shown for believing that there is a real risk that the person concerned will be subjected in the receiving country to treatment prohibited by Article 3, even where the person is regarded as representing a threat to the Contracting State’s national security (see Saadi, cited above, §§ 140 ‑ 141; Auad, cited above, § 100; and O.D. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 46). In other words, it is not necessary for the Court to examine allegations about an applicant’s terrorist activities because they are not relevant for its analysis under Article 3, according to its current case-law (see Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, no. 2947/06, § 126, 24 April 2008, Auad, cited above, § 101; and O.D. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 46). Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999 ‑ V, and J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no. 59166/12, § 77, 23 August 2016). This is also true even where, as in the present case, the applicant has links with a terrorist organisation (see A.M. v. France, cited above). (iv) Principle of the ex nunc assessment of the risk 120. If the applicant has not already been deported, the material point in time for the assessment must be that of the Court’s consideration of the case. A full and ex nunc assessment is required where it is necessary to take into account information that has come to light after the final decision by the domestic authorities was taken (see Chahal, cited above, § 79; F.G. v. Sweden [GC], cited above, § 115; A.M. v. France, cited above, § 115; and D and Others v. Romania, no. 75953/16, § 62, 14 January 2020). (v) Principle of subsidiarity 121. Where domestic proceedings have taken place concerning the matter in dispute, it is not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and it will usually be for those courts to assess the evidence before them. In cases concerning the expulsion of asylum-seekers, the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum applications or verify how the States honour their obligations under the Refugee Convention (see F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, § 117). As a general principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned (see A.M. v. France, cited above, § 116). The Court must be satisfied, however, that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State concerned is adequate and sufficiently supported by domestic material as well as by material originating from other reliable and objective sources (see X. v. the Netherlands, no. 14319/17, § 72, 10 July 2018). (vi) Relationship between Convention law, EU law and the Geneva Convention 122. The Court notes that EU law enshrines in primary law the right to asylum and the right to international protection (Article 78 TFEU and Article 18 of the Charter, cited in paragraphs 71 and 72 above). Furthermore, under Article 14 §§ 4 and 5 of Directive 2011/95 (see paragraph 73 above) the principle of non-refoulement, and certain rights enshrined in EU law on the basis of the Geneva Convention (Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31, 32 and 33 of that convention) (see paragraphs 80 and 81 above) are applicable, unlike the other rights enumerated in those two instruments, to any person present in the territory of a member State who fulfils the material conditions to be considered a refugee, even if he or she has not formally obtained refugee status or has had it withdrawn (see N. D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], cited above, § 183, and see paragraphs 74-76 above). 123. The Court would emphasise, however, that under the terms of Article 19 and Article 32 § 1 of the Convention it is not competent to apply or examine alleged violations of EU rules unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Furthermore, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling, such as on the question whether a person remains a refugee following the withdrawal of refugee status, the CJEU, unlike the national courts and this Court, may be called upon to rule on the validity in abstracto of the possibilities offered by the provisions of EU law (see paragraph 79 above). More generally, it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, if necessary in conformity with EU law, the Court’s role being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the Convention (see N.H. and Others v. France, nos. 28820/13 and 2 others, § 166, 2 July 2020). More specifically, the Court has not, to date, ruled on the distinction made in EU and domestic law between refugee status and fact of being a refugee. The Court would emphasise that neither the Convention nor its Protocols protect, as such, the right to asylum. The protection they afford is confined to the rights enshrined therein, including particularly the rights under Article 3 of the Convention, as restated above. In that connection, Article 3 embraces the prohibition of refoulement under the Geneva Convention (see N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], cited above, § 188). (vii) The risk assessment 124. The assessment of whether there are substantial grounds for believing that an applicant faces a real risk requires the Court to examine the conditions in the destination country in the light of the standards of Article 3 of the Convention. These standards entail that the ill-treatment an applicant alleges he or she will face if returned must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this level is relative, depending on all the circumstances of the case ( F.G. v. Sweden [GC], cited above, § 112, and A.M. v. France, cited above, § 114). Although assessment of that risk is to some degree speculative, the Court has always been very cautious, especially where public security concerns are also at issue, and has examined carefully the material placed before it in the light of the requisite standard of proof, before indicating an interim measure under Rule 39 (see paragraphs 115 and 116 above) or finding that the enforcement of removal from the territory would be contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see Saadi, cited above, § 142). (viii) Distribution of the burden of proof 125. It is in principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he or she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see, as regards asylum-seekers, F.G. v. Sweden [GC], cited above, § 112, and J.K. and Others v. Sweden, cited above, § 91). In this connection it should be observed that a certain degree of speculation is inherent in the preventive purpose of Article 3 and that it is not a matter of requiring the persons concerned to provide clear proof of their claim that they would be exposed to proscribed treatment (see X. v. the Netherlands, cited above, § 74). Nevertheless, it is for such persons to prove that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if they were deported to the destination country, they would be exposed to a real risk. Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts that it may raise (see Saadi, cited above, § 129; M.A. v. France, cited above, § 51; and A.M. v. France, cited above, § 118). (b) Application of those principles to the present case (i) The general situation in the North Caucasus region 126. As regards the general situation in the North Caucasus region, the Court has previously found that, although there have been reports of serious human rights violations in Chechnya, the situation has not been such that any return to the Russian Federation would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see I v. Sweden, no. 61204/09, § 58, 5 September 2013; M.V. and M.T. v. France, cited above, §§ 39-40; R.K. and Others v. France, cited above, §§ 49-50; R.M. and Others v. France, no. 33201/11, §§ 50-51, 12 July 2016; I.S. v. France, cited above, §§ 47-48; and M.I. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited above, §§ 45-46). In the light of the above-mentioned international reports (see paragraphs 85 to 91 above), the Court sees no reason to revisit this conclusion and considers that the protection afforded by Article 3 of the Convention can only come into play if the applicant is able to establish that there are substantial grounds for believing that his return to the Russian Federation would, in the particular circumstances of the present case, give rise to a real risk of treatment that is prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. 127. In this connection the Court notes that, according to international reports, certain categories of the population of the North Caucasus, and more specifically of Chechnya, Ingushetia or Dagestan, may be particularly at risk, such as members of the armed Chechen resistance, individuals regarded by the authorities as such, their close relatives, those who have assisted them in any way, civilians forced by the authorities to collaborate with them and anyone suspected or convicted of acts of terrorism (see paragraphs 85 to 91 above). The Court therefore takes the view that the assessment of the risk to the applicant must be made on an individual basis, bearing in mind that persons with a profile corresponding to one of the above-mentioned categories may be more likely than others to attract the attention of the authorities. (ii) The applicant’s personal situation 128. As is clear from the general principles set out above, while it is primarily for the applicant to produce evidence capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the impugned deportation order were enforced, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, when such evidence is submitted it is for the respondent State to dispel any doubts that may be raised by it. In the present case, the Court notes the general nature of the arguments put forward by the applicant to challenge the enforcement of the deportation (see paragraphs 94-102 above) but observes that his fears appear to be based on two points. The first point made by the applicant related to allegations that he had been detained and tortured in Russia because of his family ties to individuals who had taken a stand in favour of the Chechen rebels and to his refusal to co-operate with the authorities; he claimed that he was still wanted in that connection. According to him, this was the justification for the OFPRA’s decision to grant him refugee status (see paragraph 17 above). The second point made by the applicant was that the Russian and Chechen authorities had become aware of his criminal conviction in France (see paragraph 21 above) and that they were interested in him because of his links with a jihadist group in Syria (see paragraphs 23, 46 and 49 above). 129. The Court observes that, in cases concerning removal to the Russian Federation, it is the first time that it has been called upon to consider the merits of a complaint under Article 3 of the Convention by a Russian applicant of Chechen origin who claims that he would be at risk of treatment contrary to that provision on account of his criminal conviction for acts of terrorism in the respondent State. In addition, the situation is one where the applicant’s refugee status in the respondent State has been revoked (see paragraph 27 above). 130. With regard to the first point made by the applicant (see paragraph 128 above), the Court would observe, at the outset, that its task is not to draw the appropriate conclusions from the Geneva Convention, EU law or French law concerning the revocation of the applicant’s refugee status under Article L. 711-6 2° of the Immigration and Asylum Code (see paragraph 56 above). However, it considers that, for the purposes of examining the present case, it must take into account the factors that led to the granting of refugee status to the applicant by the OFPRA and the information then available to the French authorities (see paragraph 17 above) (see, mutatis mutandis, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, no. 30471/08, §§ 8, 9 and 82, 22 September 2009, and M.G. v. Bulgaria, no. 59297/12, § 88, 25 March 2014). At the time he was granted this status, the French authorities considered that there was sufficient evidence that he would be at risk of persecution in his country of origin if returned there. The Court is of the view, however, that this is only a starting point for its analysis of the applicant’s current situation and that it must proceed therewith solely in the light of Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, M.G. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 88). 131. The Court first observes that a certain period of time has elapsed since the events which justified the granting of refugee status to the applicant (see paragraphs 5 to 9 above). The applicant himself has argued that only two of his close relatives still reside in Chechnya and that the male members of his family have died or are beneficiaries of international protection in Europe. Furthermore, as is apparent from the statement of facts, the applicant organised his departure from France to Syria, in March 2013 (see paragraph 21 above), shortly after his interview with the OFPRA officer on 21 June 2012 (see paragraph 16 above) and the granting of refugee status on 31 January 2013 (see paragraph 17 above). It is also clear from the facts that he travelled there in early August 2013 via Germany, Poland (where he collected his Russian “external passport”), Ukraine and Turkey (see paragraph 21 above). 132. The Court notes, moreover, that in order to prove the authorities’ continuing interest in him, the applicant produced a witness statement which was appended to his application form (see paragraph 11 above). The Court agrees with the Government that this testimony is undated and that the applicant has not established a family relationship with its author. Furthermore, although during the interview with an OFPRA official on 19 May 2015 the applicant stated that the Russian prosecutor’s office had tried to contact him (see paragraph 24 above), the Court notes that he was very evasive in this regard and that there is nothing in the file to indicate that the Russian or Chechen authorities are still interested in him in connection with the events that occurred in 2011. Throughout the proceedings before the asylum authorities and the French courts it was observed that the applicant’s statements remained vague and inconsistent. 133. The Court further notes that the applicant was issued with a Russian “external passport” which he used to leave Russia (see paragraph 6 above) and then to travel in 2013 from Poland to Turkey and Syria (see paragraph 21 above). In this connection, the Court observes that the applicant has provided no explanation for the inconsistencies in his account identified by the Government, failing to explain how, in his alleged situation in 2011, he managed to obtain a Russian “external passport”. The Court reiterates that the issuance of an international travel document to a person whose activities had already attracted the attention of the Russian authorities would appear highly unlikely (see K.Y. v. France (dec.), no. 14875/09, 3 May 2011, and R.K. and Others v. France, cited above, § 54). 134. The Court further notes that in the summer of 2013, i.e. after the OFPRA’s decision granting the applicant refugee status (see paragraph 17 above), his close relatives living in Chechnya collected the Russian “internal passport” in his name for which they had applied (see paragraph 24 above). The applicant has not alleged that his relatives had problems with the Russian authorities on account of applying for and obtaining this passport. 135. As to the second point put forward by the applicant (see paragraph 128 above), the Government submitted that several other individuals who had been convicted in France for their involvement in terrorist activities had been returned to Russia without having invoked any risk under Article 3 of the Convention before the domestic authorities or the Court. The Court cannot conclude from these facts alone (which are devoid of any details enabling their scope to be assessed) that the applicant would not personally be subject to a risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention if returned to Russia. It notes, however, that the applicant does not contest the Government’s finding that one of his accomplices who previously returned to Chechnya from Syria has not had any problems with the authorities (see paragraph 22 above). 136. The Court notes that the applicant’s main argument consists in the allegation that the Russian and Chechen authorities are aware of his criminal conviction in France (see paragraph 21 above) and are interested in him because of his involvement with a jihadist group in Syria. The Court certainly does not entirely rule out the assumption that the Russian authorities might have become aware of the judgment delivered on 16 April 2015 by the Paris Criminal Court (see paragraph 21 above). However, there is no evidence that the Russian authorities have shown any particular interest in the applicant in connection with an alleged investigation in his country of origin on account of his links with a jihadist network in Syria. The Court notes in particular that Russia has never requested the applicant’s extradition from France or sought a copy of the judgment convicting him of terrorism-related offences. Nor does the case file show that he would be liable to arrest in Russia for offences committed on Russian soil or elsewhere. In any event, in view of the nature of the applicant’s conviction in France together with the national and international contexts, profoundly and durably marked as they are by the fight against terrorism, it cannot be ruled out that he might be subject to checks and surveillance on his return to Russia, without these measures necessarily constituting treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention (see A.S. v. France, cited above, § 62). As the Court has previously found, the issue to be decided in a case such as the present one is not whether the applicant would be detained and questioned, or even subsequently convicted, by the authorities of the destination country, since this in itself would not contravene the Convention. Its concern is whether or not the applicant would be ill-treated or tortured, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, upon returning to that country (see X v. Sweden, no. 36417/16, § 55, 9 January 2018). 137. The Court further reiterates that the national authorities are best placed to assess the applicant’s credibility since they have had an opportunity to see and hear him and to assess his demeanour (see R.C. v. Sweden, no. 41827/07, § 52, 9 March 2010; M.E. v. Sweden, no. 71398/12, § 78, 26 June 2014; and F.G. v. Sweden [GC], cited above, § 118). 138. In the present case, the Court observes that on 16 May 2019 the Lille Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the prefect’s directions specifying the Russian Federation as the destination country (see paragraph 48 above) after analysing, in terms of Article 3 of the Convention, the risks that he would allegedly face if the deportation were enforced. However, the Court notes that it is still necessary to determine whether, in view of the facts that led the OFPRA to grant the applicant refugee status (see paragraph 17 above), the procedure before the French authorities was appropriate and allowed for a full examination of his personal situation. The Court observes that, as can be seen from paragraph 29 above, the Versailles Administrative Court, which had previously been asked to annul the directions specifying Russia as the country of destination, had considered that the first decision taken in that regard had not been sufficiently reasoned, particularly in view of the applicant’s refugee status at that time. 139. As to the principles governing the distribution of the burden of proof (see paragraph 125 above), the Court reiterates that they apply to all expulsion cases. The Court has previously indicated that for asylum-seekers it may be difficult, if not impossible, to supply evidence within a short time, especially if such evidence must be obtained from the country from which he or she claims to have fled. Owing to the special situation in which asylum-seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when assessing the credibility of their statements and any supporting documents (see, in particular, J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], cited above, §§ 92-93). 140. In the light of the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant’s situation is not that of an asylum-seeker who has just fled his or her country and who could therefore be considered vulnerable because of everything he or she might have been through during the migration (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 232, ECHR 2011; Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, [GC], no. 47287/15, § 192, 21 November 2019; and N.H. and Others v. France, cited above, § 162, 2 July 2020). The Court observes that the applicant arrived in France in 2011, that he was granted refugee status in January 2013 and that this status was revoked in 2016 following his criminal conviction in 2015 for acts committed in France, and also in Germany, Poland, Ukraine, Turkey and Syria, between 1 September 2012 and 19 November 2013, particularly for having spent almost two months in a combat zone in Syria very shortly after he was granted refugee status (see paragraph 17 above). Furthermore, as the CNDA held in its decision of 11 May 2019 rejecting the appeal against the OFPRA’s decision revoking his refugee status (see paragraph 31 above), the departure of the applicant and his accomplice for Syria had been “preceded by thorough and lengthy preparation” (see paragraphs 21 and 31 above). The Court therefore considers that it cannot be concluded from the facts of the case that the applicant should be characterised as “vulnerable” having regard to the meaning given thereto by the Court in apportioning the burden of proof in cases concerning Article 3 of the Convention, a characterisation which would have made it necessary to give him the benefit of the doubt. 141. Without prejudice to the burden of proof, the Court reiterates that a full and ex nunc assessment of the applicant’s complaint is required where account must be taken of factors which have arisen since the domestic authorities adopted the final decision (see paragraph 118 above). 142. In the present case the Court would observe, first, that on 14 May 2019, that is to say, two days before the Lille Administrative Court ruled on the risks which the applicant allegedly faced in the event of his return to Russia, the CJEU had held that the revocation of refugee status in the event of a threat to the security or society of the host member State did not mean that the person concerned was no longer a refugee (see paragraphs 74 and 76 above). Furthermore, in its judgment of 19 June 2020 (see paragraph 61 above), the Conseil d’État applied the case-law of the CJEU (see paragraph 76 above). The Court notes that although, in his appeal on points of law against the CNDA’s decision, the applicant pleaded that the CNDA had erred in law by holding that the revocation of his refugee status de facto entailed that he was no longer a refugee (see paragraph 53 above), it is clear from both the case-law of the CJEU and that of the Conseil d’État (see paragraphs 61 and 62 above), which in this case did not allow the applicant’s appeal (see paragraph 53 above), that despite the revocation of his status on the basis of Article L. 711-6 of the Immigration and Asylum Code, the applicant remained a refugee, as the CNDA had not accepted the OFPRA’s conclusion that the exclusion clause should be applied. 143. The Court further notes that the applicant has not appealed against the judgment of the Lille Administrative Court dismissing his application for annulment of the prefectoral order of 25 February 2019 (see paragraph 39 above) and that this judgment has become final. Without prejudice to the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the applicant could therefore be deported to the Russian Federation or to any country to which he could be legally admitted under the provisions of that order. 144. As is clear from the Court’s case-law, the fact that the person concerned is a refugee is an element which must be taken into particular account by the domestic authorities when examining the reality of the risk he or she would allegedly face in the event of expulsion (see, mutatis mutandis, Shiksaitov v. Slovakia, nos. 56751/16 and 33762/17, §§ 70-71, 10 December 2020, and Bivolaru and Moldovan v. France, nos. 40324/16 and 12623/17, § 141, 25 March 2021). In the light of what has been stated in paragraphs 142 to 143 above, the Court notes that the fact that the revocation of the applicant’s refugee status has no bearing on whether or not he remains a refugee was not taken into account by the French authorities in the context of the decision to deport him to the Russian Federation and the subsequent review of that order. The Court concludes that the French authorities and the domestic courts did not assess the risks that the applicant allegedly faced if the deportation order were to be enforced in the light of that situation and the fact that, at least when he arrived in France in 2011, the applicant had been identified as belonging to a group that was, at that time, considered to be targeted. 145. The Court does not rule out the possibility that, following a thorough and complete examination of the applicant’s personal situation and verification as to whether or not he was still a refugee, the French authorities might reach the same conclusion as the Lille Administrative Court, namely that there is no risk to him under Article 3 of the Convention if he is deported to Russia. However, the Court notes that the CNDA had issued a decision on the basis of Article L. 731-3 of the Immigration and Asylum Code (see paragraphs 63 and 64 above) and that it has in similar cases issued opinions advising against the removal of individuals to the country of their nationality on the grounds that, while they had lost refugee status they had remained refugees (see paragraphs 65 and 66 above), including in the case of the expulsion to Russia of a Russian national of Chechen origin with a profile similar (though not identical) to that of the applicant (see paragraph 65 above). The Court further notes that in both opinions the CNDA found that a decision specifying the country of destination had breached France’s obligations arising from the right of refugees to protection against refoulement, Articles 4 and 19 § 2 of the EU Charter and Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 65 and 66 above). 146. In conclusion, and in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its procedural aspect if the applicant were returned to Russia without an ex nunc assessment by the French authorities of the risk he claims to face if deported. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION 147. The applicant argued that his removal to the Russian Federation would expose him to treatment in breach of Article 2 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.” 148. The Court reiterates that it is the master of the legal characterisation of the facts in the case (see M.G. v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§ 59 ‑ 62; Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 114, 20 March 2018; and Ilias et Ahmed [GC], cited above, § 176) and that it may decide not to examine a particular complaint separately, considering that it is subsumed or otherwise closely linked to a complaint that has already been dealt with. 149. Having regard to the facts of the present case, to the parties’ arguments and to the conclusion reached by the Court under Article 3 of the Convention, it considers that it has examined the main legal question raised by the application. The Court concludes that it does not need to examine the admissibility or merits of the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, R.M. and Others v. France, cited above, § 58). RULE 39 OF THE Rules of Court 150. The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention. 151. It considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 44 above) must continue in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court takes a further decision in this connection (see operative part below). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 152. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” Damage 153. The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) for the non-pecuniary damage that he claimed to have sustained as a result of the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention. He added that his isolation in the administrative detention centre and periods spent under a compulsory residence order, away from his family, had exacerbated his feeling of anguish and worry about being deported to Russia. 154. The Government disputed those claims. 155. The Court observes that a violation of Article 3 of the Convention has not yet occurred in the present case. In this situation it takes the view that its finding to the effect that the deportation, if it were to be implemented without a prior ex nunc assessment of the reality of the risks faced by the applicant in the event of his return to Russia, would constitute a violation of that Article, represents sufficient just satisfaction. Costs and expenses 156. The applicant also claimed EUR 3,750 for the costs and expenses that he had incurred in the proceedings before the Court. He explained that he had already paid the sum of EUR 750 that he had been charged in respect of the interim measures and that he could not afford to pay the remaining EUR 3,000 for the proceedings on the merits of his application. 157. The Government considered that this sum was duly justified and that the applicant’s clam did not call for any particular observation on their part. 158. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 3,750, to be paid to the applicant, in respect of all costs and expenses. Default interest 162. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there would be a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention under its procedural aspect if, having had his refugee status withdrawn, the applicant were to be returned to his country of origin without any prior assessment by the French authorities of the actual and current risk that he claimed to be facing in the event of his deportation. It began by observing that both under the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and under that of the French Conseil d’État, the withdrawal of refugee status had no bearing on the fact of being a refugee. The question whether the applicant remained a refugee thus should have been given specific consideration by the national authorities when they examined, under Article 3 of the Convention, the reality of the risk that he faced in the event of deportation to his country of origin. The Court found that both when his deportation was ordered and when it was reviewed by a court, the French authorities, in assessing the risks that he faced on his return to Russia, had not specifically taken account of the fact that the applicant could be presumed to have remained a refugee in spite of the withdrawal of his status.