Freedom of expression (Article 10)
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. The Police Act 42. Under section 14 of the Police Act ( poliisilaki, polislagen; Law no. 493/1995, as in force at the relevant time), at the request of the occupant of domestic or public premises or his or her representative, police officers had the right to remove anyone who unlawfully intruded, entered in secret or by diversion, or concealed himself or herself therein or neglected an order to leave. Police officers had the right to remove anyone with permission to be in an area or place referred to above if he or she disturbed the domestic or public peace of other persons or caused considerable disturbance in other ways and there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the disturbance would recur. If it was likely that removal would not prevent the disturbance from recurring, police officers had the right to apprehend the person causing the disturbance and keep him or her in custody. The apprehended person could be kept in custody only for as long as the disturbance was likely to recur, but no longer than twelve hours after being apprehended. 43. Pursuant to section 18(1) of the Police Act, police officers had the right to cordon off, close or clear a place or area in public use, or to prohibit or restrict movement there, if this was necessary to maintain public order and security, to secure an investigation, or to protect measures taken at the scene of an accident, the privacy of persons subjected to those measures and any endangered property. 44. Section 19 of the Police Act provided that police officers had the right to order a crowd to disperse or move if the gathering threatened public order and security or obstructed traffic. If an order to disperse or move was not obeyed, police officers had the right to use force to disperse the crowd and to apprehend non-compliant persons. Apprehended persons had to be released as soon as the purpose of the measure had been served, but no later than twelve hours after being apprehended. 45. A new Police Act ( poliisilaki, polislagen; Law no. 872/2011) came into force on 1 January 2014. Chapter 2, sections 5, 8 and 9, of the new Act contain the same regulations, including that an apprehended person may be kept in custody only for as long as the disturbance is likely to recur, but no longer than twelve hours after being apprehended. B. The Coercive Measures Act 46. Chapter 1, section 2, second paragraph, of the Coercive Measures Act ( pakkokeinolaki, tvångsmedelslagen; Law no. 450/1987, as in force at the relevant time) provided that, if the prerequisites existed for arrest, a police officer could apprehend a person suspected of an offence even without an arrest warrant if the arrest could otherwise be endangered. The police officer had, without delay, to notify an official with the power of arrest of this apprehension. Said official had to decide, within twenty-four hours of the apprehension, whether the apprehended person was to be released or arrested. 47. A new Coercive Measures Act ( pakkokeinolaki, tvångsmedelslagen; Law no. 806/2011) came into force on 1 January 2014. Chapter 2, section 1, of the new Act provides as follows. “A police officer may, for the purpose of clarifying an offence, apprehend a person suspected of an offence who is caught in the act or trying to escape. A police officer may also apprehend a suspect whose arrest or remand has been ordered. In addition, a police officer may, during the main hearing of a court or during the consideration of the decision, apprehend a defendant whose remand has been requested in connection with the judgment, if the remand is necessary in order to prevent him or her from leaving. If the prerequisites exist for arrest, a police officer may apprehend a suspect even without an arrest warrant if the arrest may otherwise be endangered. The police officer shall notify without delay an official with the power of arrest of this apprehension. Said official with the power of arrest shall decide, within twenty-four hours of the apprehension, whether the apprehended person is to be released or arrested. Prolonging the apprehension for more than twelve hours requires the existence of the prerequisites for arrest.” C. The Criminal Investigation Act 48. According to section 21 of the Criminal Investigation Act ( esitutkintalaki, förundersökningslagen; Law no. 449/1987, as in force at the relevant time), a suspect who had not been arrested or remanded could not be detained as part of the criminal investigation for longer than twelve hours at a time or, if the prerequisites for arrest under the Coercive Measures Act were fulfilled, for longer than twenty-four hours. 49. Pursuant to section 24, second paragraph, of the same Act, questioning could be conducted between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. only if, “1. the person being questioned requests this; 2. the matter is under simplified investigation for which the person being questioned is required to stay or to arrive immediately; or 3. there is some other pressing reason for it.” 50. The same rules are included in Chapter 6, section 5, subsection 2 and Chapter 7, section 5, second paragraph, of the new Criminal Investigation Act ( esitutkintalaki, förundersökningslagen; Law no. 805/2011) which came into force on 1 January 2014. D. The Penal Code 51. Chapter 16, section 4 of the Penal Code ( rikoslaki, strafflagen; Law no. 39/1889, as amended by Law no. 563/1998) provides as follows. “A person who (1) fails to obey an order or prohibition issued by a police officer, within his or her competence, for the maintenance of public order or security or the performance of a duty; (2) refuses to provide a police officer with the identifying information referred to in section 10, subsection 1, of the Police Act; (3) fails to obey a police officer’s clearly visible signal or order for stopping or moving a vehicle, as referred to in section 21 of the Police Act; (4) neglects the duty to provide assistance, as referred to in section 45 of the Police Act; or (5) alerts the police without reason or, by providing false information, hinders police operations; shall be sentenced, unless a more severe penalty for the act has been provided elsewhere in the law, for contumacy towards the police to a fine or to imprisonment of at most three months.” 52. Chapter 6, section 12, of the same Code provides the following. “A court may waive punishment if (1) the offence, when assessed as a whole, taking into account its harmfulness or the culpability of the perpetrator, is to be deemed of minor significance; (2) the perpetrator was under the age of 18 when the offence was committed and the act is deemed to be the result of lack of understanding or of imprudence; (3) due to special reasons related to the act or the perpetrator the act is deemed to be an excusable act; (4) punishment is deemed to be unreasonable or pointless in particular taking into account the factors referred to above in section 6, paragraph 3, and section 7, or action taken by the social security and health authorities; or (5) the offence would not have an essential effect on the total sentence due to the provisions on sentencing to a joint punishment.” E. The Criminal Records Act 53. Section 2, first and second paragraphs, of the Criminal Records Act ( rikosrekisterilaki, straffregisterlagen; Law no. 770/1993) provide as follows. “On the basis of notices by courts of law, data shall be entered in the criminal records on decisions whereby a person in Finland has been sentenced to unsuspended imprisonment; community service; suspended imprisonment; suspended imprisonment supplemented with a fine, community service or supervision; juvenile punishment; a fine instead of juvenile punishment; dismissal from office; or whereby sentencing has been waived under Chapter 3, section 4, of the Penal Code (no. 39/1889). However, no entries shall be made in the criminal records on the conversion of fines into imprisonment, nor on imprisonment imposed under the Civilian Service Act (no. 1723/1991). Data on fines imposed on the basis of the provisions governing corporate criminal liability shall also be entered in the criminal records. Furthermore, entries shall be made in the criminal records, as provided by Decree, on court decisions whereby a Finnish citizen or a foreigner permanently resident in Finland has been sentenced abroad to a penalty equivalent to one mentioned in paragraph 1.” IV. COMPARATIVE LAW 57. From the information available to the Court, including a comparative-law survey of thirty-four Council of Europe member States (Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine and the United Kingdom), it appeared that all of the surveyed States applied general criminal-law provisions to journalists covering demonstrations. No special status regarding the arrest, detention and conviction of journalists emerged. Members of the media therefore remained liable for offences committed by them during demonstrations in the same way as participants in demonstrations. While case-law similar to the present case was found in five of the surveyed States – Austria, Hungary, Spain, Sweden and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – it did not allow for the drawing of any general conclusions. 58. Concerning police powers, the vast majority of surveyed States did not regulate the specific issue of news-gathering during violent demonstrations. General guidelines or regulations governing police and media relations were found in twelve member States ( Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) whereby, as a general rule, members of the media covering events were encouraged to identify themselves as such in order to be distinguished from participants. However, while this singling out of members of the media was aimed at enabling and facilitating journalistic activity, it did not have the effect of conferring any sort of immunity on journalists when they failed to comply with police orders to leave the scene of a demonstration. Only a limited number of member States ( Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Russia and Serbia) dealt with the issue of news-gathering during demonstrations by way of specific regulations. In these member States, journalists were either granted protected areas from which they could cover ongoing demonstrations or were informed of the safest area in which to carry out their activities. Nonetheless, the overall balance of interests appeared to be struck in favour of preserving public order and safety by following police instructions. 59. While a large majority of the surveyed member States had professional codes of conduct or codes of ethics for journalists, they did not contain specific provisions relating to the relationship between journalists and the police during demonstrations. These codes rather focused on investigative techniques and journalistic sources as well as protecting third-party privacy. THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 60. The applicant complained under Article 10 of the Convention that his freedom of expression had been violated. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” A. The Chamber judgment 61. The Chamber considered that, since the applicant’s apprehension and conviction had been the consequence of his conduct as a newspaper photographer and journalist when disobeying the police, the presumption was that there had been an interference with his right to freedom of expression. The Chamber further found that the parties agreed that the impugned measures had a basis in Finnish law, in particular in Chapter 16, section 4, of the Penal Code. The interference was thus “prescribed by law” and it pursued several legitimate aims, namely the protection of public safety as well as the prevention of disorder and crime. 62. As to its necessity in a democratic society, the Chamber noted that the applicant had waived his right to use the separate, secure area for the press when he had decided to stay with the demonstrators even after the orders to disperse. It was established that the applicant had been aware of the orders of the police to leave the scene but had decided to ignore them. The applicant could have left the scene and moved to the secure press area without any consequences at any time during the cordon. By not doing so, the applicant had knowingly taken the risk of being apprehended for contumacy. 63. For the Chamber it was not entirely clear at what stage the police had learned that the applicant was a journalist. It appeared that the applicant had failed to make clear efforts to identify himself as a journalist. Moreover, it did not appear that the applicant had in any way been prevented from taking photographs of the demonstration. Nor had his camera or other equipment been confiscated and he had been allowed to keep all the photographs he had taken and to use them unrestrictedly. 64. The Chamber considered that the demonstration had been a matter of legitimate public interest, having regard in particular to its nature. The District Court had analysed the matter from the Article 10 point of view, balancing the different interests against each other, and had found that there had been a pressing social need to take the impugned measures against the applicant. The Chamber also attached weight to the fact that no penalty was imposed on the applicant as his act had been considered “excusable” by the domestic courts. Having regard to all the factors, the Chamber considered that the domestic courts had struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant 65. The applicant submitted that there had been an interference with his right to freedom of expression because the police had asked him to leave the area where the demonstration was taking place, he had been apprehended and had been unable during his detention of seventeen and a half hours to transmit information, and because he had been suspected, charged and convicted of a crime which constituted a “chilling effect” on his rights and work. 66. As to whether the interference had been prescribed by law, the applicant claimed that the police had exceeded their statutory powers or abused their discretionary powers at several different stages. First of all, the disproportionality of the police’s categorical order for the crowd to disperse showed that it was not in accordance with Finnish law. The police decision to treat the demonstration as a riot was also questionable as the extent of aggressive behaviour was relatively limited, involving only a few individuals. Secondly, the applicant’s detention had been illegal as it had been overnight and had lasted for about seventeen and a half hours. Apprehended persons should be released as soon as possible but no later than twelve hours after being apprehended. The police would have been able to detain him for longer than twelve hours only if he had been suspected of rioting. The police had first apprehended the applicant for contumacy towards the police, but later, according to the applicant, the reason for his apprehension had been changed to rioting. As the applicant had clearly not even participated in the demonstration, his conduct could not fulfil the definition of rioting. The police had not therefore had sufficient reason to apprehend him and he should have been released immediately or at the latest within twelve hours. Moreover, the applicant should have been interrogated or interviewed without delay as interrogations could be conducted even between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. if the suspect so requested or if there was another pressing reason. 67. The applicant also considered that the actual criminal conviction was not based on the law as he had not been aware that he might be found guilty of an offence by continuing to take photographs in the cordoned-off area. As the domestic courts had failed to give reasons in their judgments, the legality issues were not assessed by them. Therefore, the applicant maintained that the interference by the police, the prosecutor and the domestic courts had had no basis in Finnish law. 68. The applicant was prepared to accept that the interference might have pursued a legitimate aim. 69. As to the necessity, the applicant pointed out that his task had been to impart information within a reasonable time about the demonstration. He had been working both on an in ‑ depth story on the conduct of each side during the demonstration and on publishing online information about the demonstration immediately after its termination. The applicant claimed that there had been no separate and secure press area for journalists at the site of the demonstration. He had contacted all the main media organisations and found out that none of the journalists present had been instructed to go to a secure area and no one had in fact seen such an area. The view from outside into the cordoned-off area had been blocked by a dense, several rows deep, line of police officers, police minibuses and police buses. At 7.15 p.m. the police had cordoned off an even larger area, which had made it even more difficult to follow the events. There could not have been a secured area for journalists because originally the demonstration was to be a march and therefore a static press area would not have served any purpose. Even if there were such an area, its use should have been optional as it was not up to the State authorities to decide from which angle journalists should cover the event. 70. The applicant further maintained that the allegation that he had not identified himself as a journalist was contrary to common sense. He had had a press badge around his neck, which fact had been testified by a witness before the District Court. He had been carrying two cameras of a sort which, in 2006, were only used by professional journalists, and a camera bag. From the pre-trial investigation report it appeared that the applicant had identified himself as a journalist to the apprehending officer. At the end of the demonstration the applicant had stood between the demonstrators and the police line, and had thus clearly been separated from the former. At this time the situation had been calm and under police control. After detaining the demonstrators, a police officer had shouted “Get the photographer!” and the applicant had been apprehended while taking photographs. While in the police custody cell, he had actively shouted to passing police officers that he was a journalist. 71. The applicant argued that his detention of seventeen and a half hours had been disproportionate. The police could have released him at the scene or at the latest within twelve hours. The footage the applicant had gathered during the demonstration was already “old” by the time he had been released. The police had released minors after a few hours of detention, and the applicant could also have been released then. The police could also have discontinued the pre-trial investigation in his case and the prosecutor could have dropped the charges against him. However, the State considered it important that the applicant be prosecuted and possibly convicted of contumacy. The State had convicted him for carrying out his work even though he had already suffered the consequences of the police’s concrete actions. The District Court judgment and the duration of his detention would have a clear “chilling effect” on the work of journalists. The domestic courts had not assessed whether the interference had had a “pressing social need”. The District Court had not balanced the competing interests properly but had merely stated that the termination of the demonstration by ordering the crowd to disperse had been necessary. It had not assessed the nature of the “pressing social need” to remove the applicant from the scene. It had also failed to take into account the case-law of the Court according to which such a judgment would have a “chilling effect” on journalists. 2. The Government 72. The Government agreed with the Chamber’s conclusion to the effect that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention in the present case. 73. In the Government’s view, there had not been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. They noted that the police had not prevented the applicant from covering the event. The reason for the applicant’s apprehension had not been the fact that he was a photographer but the fact that he had repeatedly failed to obey consistent and clear police orders to leave the site of the demonstration. The police orders had concerned everyone at the scene. Evidence also showed that the applicant had been ordered personally by a police officer to leave the scene, after which he had consulted his superior on whether he should stay despite the police orders or not. The applicant had not been ordered to stop taking photographs at any time, even at very close range, up to his apprehension. As soon as the police had found out that the applicant was a member of the press, his camera, memory cards and other equipment had been immediately treated as journalistic sources and were not confiscated. He had been able to keep the photographs and no restrictions on the use of the photographs had been imposed on him by any authority at any stage. The applicant had been the seventh detainee to be interrogated and the sixth to be released of the eighty-one detainees interrogated on the following day. After releasing the minors, the police had turned their attention to the applicant as soon as possible. 74. The Government further pointed out that none of the domestic proceedings concerning the applicant, nor the current proceedings before the Court, concerned the applicant’s actions as a photographer. The matter at stake rather concerned his actions as part of a crowd which had systematically – after being advised, urged and finally ordered to disperse – refused to obey the police. It was for this reason that the domestic courts had found the applicant guilty of contumacy towards the police. Furthermore, the District Court had decided not to impose any sanction on the applicant as, in its opinion, the applicant had found himself in a conflictual situation. He had to choose to abide, on the one hand, by the expectations imposed on him by the law and the police and, on the other hand, by the expectations imposed on him by his employer who had sent him to cover the event and who had advised him to stay at the scene after he had personally been ordered to leave. Given this understandable difficulty, the District Court had deemed the applicant’s refusal to obey the police to be comparable to “an excusable act”. 75. In the alternative, should the Court find that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, the Government argued that the interference was “prescribed by law”. The interference had also had several legitimate aims, namely the protection of public safety as well as the prevention of disorder and crime, as found by the Chamber. 76. As to the necessity of the interference in a democratic society, the Government agreed with the Chamber’s finding that the domestic courts had struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. They noted that members of the media had been able to report on and photograph the event freely until its end, even at extremely close range to the police. There had also been a separate area for media representatives. However, the escalation of violence at the site of the Smash ASEM demonstration had resulted in the police arriving in numerous vehicles, some of which may have blocked visibility from the secure area to parts of the site. It was uncontested that the applicant had personally heard the police orders to disperse by 8.30 p.m. and that he had seen people heading towards the exits. At around 9 p.m., when the police had given the final orders to disperse, there had been two other photographers at the demonstration site but they had left the scene at around 9.15 p.m. No measures had been imposed on them at any stage. The police orders had been given in order to calm the situation, to restore public order and, in particular, to ensure public safety. When at 9.15 p.m. the police had ordered the applicant to leave he had refused to do so, stating that, as a photographer, the order did not apply to him. At that time those members of the crowd who had shown resistance had been detained and the event had come to an end. Some minutes later the police had apprehended the applicant as it had been clear that he was determined to disobey the police. As the applicant had consulted his superior by telephone asking for advice on whether to stay or leave, he had clearly understood that the police orders applied to him as well. The District Court had also found it established that the police orders had clearly applied to everybody, thus the applicant’s apprehension could not have come as a surprise to him. 77. The Government noted that the purpose of the applicant’s apprehension had not been to hinder his freedom of expression but to investigate the offence he was suspected of having committed. He had been able to use all the photographs he had taken at the event. The applicant’s apprehension and detention had thus been justifiable, necessary and proportionate as the police had been reacting to a violent demonstration for which there had existed a risk of further violence and disruption. The alleged interference was thus necessary in a democratic society. 78. The Government stressed the importance of equal treatment and equality before the law, as guaranteed by the Constitution of Finland and Article 14 of the Convention. They maintained that the applicant was not entitled to preferential or different treatment in comparison to other members of the crowd present at the demonstration. The police orders had been given without discrimination as to status or profession and had not been aimed at preventing the applicant’s professional activity. The aim of the police had been to calm the situation and to restore public order. Moreover, the District Court had established that the applicant had not shown his press badge to the apprehending officer or the receiving police officer at the police station. He had only shown his badge on the bus taking him to the police station. The applicant himself had written in the article about the event that he had started to wear his badge visibly only after he had been detained. Therefore, the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in assessing the proportionality of measures allegedly infringing the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had not been affected as the applicant had failed to make clear efforts to identify himself as a journalist. 79. Finally, the Government argued that no “chilling effect” could be connected to the present case. The applicant had not been detained and convicted for his activities as a journalist but for systematically disobeying clear police orders. Several other journalists present at the event had chosen not to disobey the police. No sanctions had been imposed on the applicant as the District Court had deemed his actions to be comparable to “an excusable act”. Nor had he been ordered to pay any legal costs. C. The Court’s assessment 1. Scope of the case before the Grand Chamber 80. In his written submissions to the Grand Chamber, the applicant claimed that his detention had been illegal as it had lasted overnight and for about eighteen hours. He claimed that, as the police did not have sufficient prerequisites for his arrest, he should have been released at the latest within twelve hours after the apprehension. For this reason his detention exceeding twelve hours was not “prescribed by law” (see paragraph 66 above). The Government did not comment on this complaint. 81. According to the Court’s constant case-law, the “case” referred to the Grand Chamber is the application as it has been declared admissible by the Chamber (see, among other authorities, K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 141, ECHR 2001 ‑ VII). The applicant lodged the complaint that his detention had been illegal in so far as it exceeded twelve hours for the first time in his submissions to the Grand Chamber. The Chamber, when examining the necessity of the interference with the applicant’s right under Article 10, had regard to the Government’s argument that the duration of the applicant’s detention of about eighteen hours was explained by the fact that he was detained late at night and that domestic law prohibited interrogations between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. (see paragraph 48 of the Chamber judgment ). However, the applicant had not complained before the Chamber that his detention for a duration exceeding twelve hours was unlawful. This complaint did not form part of the application which was declared admissible by the Chamber, and therefore falls outside the scope of the examination by the Grand Chamber. The Court will therefore limit its examination to the applicant’s complaint as declared admissible by the Chamber, namely that his apprehension, detention and conviction entailed an unjustified interference with his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. 2. Whether there was an interference 82. The Government primarily claimed that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression in the instant case. 83. The applicant was apprehended by the police in the context of a demonstration, detained for about eighteen hours, and was later charged and found guilty by the domestic courts of disobeying the police. However, no penalty was imposed on him since the offence was considered as “an excusable act”. Even if the impugned measures were not aimed at the applicant as a journalist but were the consequence of his failure to comply with police orders to disperse, addressed to all those present in the cordoned-off area, the exercise of his journalistic functions had been adversely affected as he was present at the demonstration as a newspaper photographer in order to report on the events (see, mutatis mutandis, Gsell v. Switzerland, no. 12675/05, § 49, 8 October 2009). The Court therefore accepts that there was an interference with his right to freedom of expression. 3. Whether the interference was prescribed by law 84. The Court notes that the expression “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention not only requires that the impugned measure should have a legal basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, which should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see, among other authorities, Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 140, ECHR 2012, and Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 52, ECHR 2000-V). 85. The parties disagree as to whether or not the interference was “prescribed by law”. The Court notes that the applicant’s main argument concerns the alleged illegality of his detention as far as it exceeded twelve hours, which issue falls outside the scope of the case before the Grand Chamber (see paragraph 81 above). For the rest, it appears from the applicant’s submissions that he does not, as such, argue that his apprehension, detention and conviction had no legal basis in Finnish law but rather complains of how the relevant provisions of domestic law were applied by the national authorities and courts in his case. However, it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see Kopp v. Switzerland, 25 March 1998, § 59, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II, and Kruslin v. France, 24 April 1990, § 29, Series A no. 176-A). None of the applicant’s arguments discloses any indication that the domestic authorities applied the law in an arbitrary manner. The Court is therefore satisfied that the interference complained of, encompassing the applicant’s apprehension, detention and conviction, had a legal basis in Finnish law, namely in section 19 of the Police Act, in Chapter 1, section 2, second paragraph, of the Coercive Measures Act and in Chapter 16, section 4, of the Penal Code. The Court therefore concludes that the interference was “prescribed by law”. 4. Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim 86. It has not been disputed that the interference pursued several legitimate aims within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, namely the protection of public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime. 5. Whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society (a) General principles 87. The general principles concerning the necessity of an interference with freedom of expression were summarised in Stoll v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 69698/01, § 101, ECHR 2007 ‑ V) and were reiterated more recently in Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 48876/08, § 100, ECHR 2013) and Morice v. France ([GC], no. 29369/10, § 124, ECHR 2015): “(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which ... must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly ... (ii) The adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10. (iii) The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are ‘relevant and sufficient’... In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts ...” This protection of Article 10 extends not only to the substance of the ideas and information expressed but also to the form in which they are conveyed (see Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 31, Series A no. 298). 88. The Court further emphasises the essential function the media fulfil in a democratic society. Although they must not overstep certain bounds, their duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with their obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 59, ECHR 1999-III; De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 24 February 1997, § 37, Reports 1997 ‑ I; and Jersild, cited above, § 31). Not only do the media have the task of imparting such information and ideas, the public also has a right to receive them (see The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 65, Series A no. 30). 89. In this connection, and with reference to the facts of the instant case, the crucial role of the media in providing information on the authorities’ handling of public demonstrations and the containment of disorder must be emphasised. The “watchdog” role of the media assumes particular importance in such contexts since their presence is a guarantee that the authorities can be held to account for their conduct vis-à-vis the demonstrators and the public at large when it comes to the policing of large gatherings, including the methods used to control or disperse protesters or to preserve public order. Any attempt to remove journalists from the scene of demonstrations must therefore be subject to strict scrutiny. 90. The Court also reiterates that the protection afforded by Article 10 of the Convention to journalists is subject to the proviso that they act in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the tenets of responsible journalism (see, mutatis mutandis, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 65; Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 54, ECHR 1999 ‑ I; Kasabova v. Bulgaria, no. 22385/03, § § 61 and 63-68, 19 April 2011; and Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, § 42, ECHR 2009 ). In the Court’s case-law, the concept of responsible journalism has so far focused mainly on issues relating to the contents of a publication or an oral statement (see, for example, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, §§ 65-67; Fressoz and Roire, cited above, §§ 52-55; Krone Verlag GmbH v. Austria, no. 27306/07, §§ 46-47, 19 June 2012; Novaya Gazeta and Borodyanskiy v. Russia, no. 14087/08, § 37, 28 March 2013; Perna v. Italy [GC], no. 48898/99, § 47, ECHR 2003 ‑ V; Times Newspapers Ltd, cited above, § 45; Ungváry and Irodalom Kft v. Hungary, no. 64520/10, § 42, 3 December 2013; and Yordanova and Toshev v. Bulgaria, no. 5126/05, §§ 53 and 55, 2 October 2012 ) rather than on the public conduct of a journalist. However, the concept of responsible journalism, as a professional activity which enjoys the protection of Article 10 of the Convention, is not confined to the content of information which is collected and/or disseminated by journalistic means. That concept also embraces, inter alia, the lawfulness of the conduct of a journalist, including, and of relevance to the instant case, his or her public interaction with the authorities when exercising journalistic functions. The fact that a journalist has breached the law in that connection is a most relevant, albeit not decisive, consideration when determining whether he or she has acted responsibly. 91. The Court reiterates in this context that journalists who exercise their freedom of expression undertake “duties and responsibilities” (see Stoll, cited above, § 102, and Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 49 in fine, Series A no. 24). It is to be noted in this connection that paragraph 2 of Article 10 does not guarantee a wholly unrestricted freedom of expression even with respect to media coverage of matters of serious public concern. In particular, and notwithstanding the vital role played by the media in a democratic society, journalists cannot, in principle, be released from their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law on the basis that, as journalists, Article 10 affords them a cast-iron defence (see, among other authorities and mutatis mutandis, Stoll, cited above, § 102; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 65; and Monnat v. Switzerland, no. 73604/01, § 66, ECHR 2006-X). In other words, a journalist cannot claim an exclusive immunity from criminal liability for the sole reason that, unlike other individuals exercising the right to freedom of expression, the offence in question was committed during the performance of his or her journalistic functions. (b) Application of the general principles to the applicant’s case 92. The Court notes that the applicant was apprehended, detained, charged and found guilty of having disobeyed the police. His apprehension took place in the context of the Smash ASEM demonstration in which he had participated as a photographer and journalist for the weekly magazine Suomen Kuvalehti. It is not in dispute that the demonstration attracted considerable media attention. 93. In contrast to many other cases brought by journalists under Article 10 of the Convention, including Stoll and further cases referred to in paragraphs 87 to 91 above, the present case does not concern the prohibition of a publication (public disclosure of certain information) or any sanctions imposed in respect of a publication. What is at stake in the present case are measures taken against a journalist who failed to comply with police orders while taking photos in order to report on a demonstration that had turned violent. 94. When assessing whether the measures taken against the applicant by the Finnish authorities were necessary, the Court will bear in mind that the interests to be weighed in the instant case, namely, the interest of the police in maintaining public order in the context of a violent demonstration and the interest of the public to receive information on an issue of general interest, are both public in nature (see, mutatis mutandis, Stoll, cited above, §§ 115 ‑ 16). It will examine the applicant’s apprehension, detention and conviction in turn, in order to determine whether the impugned interference, seen as a whole, was supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. (i) Applicant’s apprehension 95. Regarding the applicant’s apprehension, the Court will have regard to whether the police orders were based on a reasonable assessment of the facts and whether the applicant was able to report on the demonstration. It will also have regard to the applicant’s conduct, including whether he identified himself as a journalist. 96. When the demonstration started, a core group of about fifty demonstrators, some 500 bystanders and some fifty journalists, including the applicant, had congregated at the starting-point of the march. As the demonstration turned violent, the police first prevented the crowd from marching but allowed a peaceful demonstration to be held on the spot. Later on the police sealed off the area around the demonstration and ordered the crowd to disperse. The police had made security preparations for the event by deploying 480 police and border-guard officers. The police had good reason to expect, on the basis of the risk assessment made by the Finnish Security Intelligence and their previous experience of riots which had taken place the same year, as well as in view of the tone of the posters inviting members of the public to “ bring even a little bit of mayhem to the streets of Helsinki” and the anonymity of the organiser of the demonstration (see paragraphs 12-16 above), that the demonstration might turn violent. Subsequently the District Court found that the police actions had been legal and that the police had had justifiable reasons to give the orders to disperse (see paragraph 37 above). The Court therefore sees no reason to doubt that the police orders were based on a reasonable assessment of the facts. Moreover, in the Court’s view, the preventive measures against the likelihood of the events turning violent, including police orders to leave the scene of the demonstration, were justified. The measures were directed not only at the “abstract” protection of public order – the protection of public safety as well as the prevention of disorder and crime – but also at the safety of individuals at or in the vicinity of the demonstration, including members of the media and thus also the applicant himself. 97. The Court will now examine whether the applicant was in any way prevented from doing his job as a journalist at any time during the Smash ASEM demonstration. The parties disagreed on whether a secure press area existed. It appears, however, that most journalists, about fifty of them at the beginning of the demonstration, remained in the area of the demonstration. They were not, as was the applicant not, asked by the authorities, at any point during the events, to use a separate area reserved for the press. Furthermore, the demonstration was of such a character – initially foreseen as a march along the route – that the violent events could and actually did take place in an “unpredicted” area. In such a situation there was no possibility whatsoever for the authorities to secure in advance an area close to such events. Consequently, for the Court it is not decisive whether such a secure area existed as all journalists seem to have been in the area of the demonstration and could work freely there. It cannot therefore be said that the applicant was as such prevented from reporting on the event. On the contrary, he was able to take photographs during the entire demonstration until the very moment he was apprehended. This is clearly seen, for example, from the DVD-recordings made of the demonstration as well as from the fact that the last photograph taken by the applicant was of his apprehending police officer. 98. Turning now to the applicant’s conduct, the Court notes that he was apprehended within the cordoned-off area where he was with the core group of demonstrators who were holding onto each other’s arms. It appears from the DVD-recordings that the applicant was dressed in dark clothing, which corresponded to the required “dress code” for the demonstrators. He was not wearing any distinctive clothing or other signs capable of identifying him as a journalist. He was not wearing, for example, a yellow waistcoat or jacket as were some of his journalist colleagues. Nor was there apparently any indication, for example on the camera the applicant used, that he worked for Suomen Kuvalehti. Nor was his press badge visible in the DVD-recordings or in any of the photographs in which the applicant appears. The applicant’s appearance did not therefore seem to allow him to be clearly distinguishable from the protesters. It is thus likely that, on the basis of his presence within the cordoned-off area, as well as of his appearance, he was not readily identifiable as a journalist prior to his apprehension. 99. It also remains unclear from the District Court’s judgment and the other material in the case file to which police officers the applicant identified himself as a journalist. It appears from the pre-trial investigation report that he did so to his apprehending officer, who stated during the pre-trial investigation that the applicant did not resist the apprehension and that he had asked to make a telephone call, which he had been allowed to do. When the apprehending police officer had asked for identification, the applicant had presented his press card (see paragraph 27 above). From this it can be deduced that the applicant was not wearing his press badge, or at least was not wearing it visibly so that he could be immediately identified as a journalist. Another police officer present during the applicant’s apprehension stated during the pre-trial investigation that the applicant did not resist the apprehension but that he did not hear the applicant identify himself as a journalist (ibid.). It has also not been established whether the applicant identified himself as a journalist when he was taken to the bus taking him to custody. Nevertheless, the Court considers that the police must have learned of his status as a journalist at the latest at the police station when the receiving police officer removed the applicant’s press card which, according to the applicant’s own submissions, he had “held up” and started to wear visibly on his chest only a while earlier (see paragraph 28 above). On the basis of this information, the Court considers that, had the applicant wished to be acknowledged as a journalist by the police, he should have made sufficiently clear efforts to identify himself as such either by wearing distinguishable clothing or keeping his press badge visible at all times, or by any other appropriate means. He failed to do so. The applicant’s situation was thus different from that of the journalist in Najafli v. Azerbaijan who was wearing a journalist’s badge on his chest and also had specifically told the police officers that he was a journalist (see Najafli v. Azerbaijan, no. 2594/07, § 67, 2 October 2012; see also, mutatis mutandis, Gsell, cited above, § 49 ). 100. Moreover, the applicant claimed that he was not aware of the police orders to disperse. The Court observes that the District Court found it established that the applicant had been aware of the orders of the police to leave the scene but had decided to ignore them (see paragraph 37 above). The applicant himself admitted before the District Court and in his submissions to this Court that he had heard the orders at around 8.30 p.m. (see paragraphs 24 and 37 above). This is also confirmed by the fact that the applicant then called his employer to discuss whether he should leave the area or not (see paragraph 24 above). For the Court, this fact shows that the applicant understood, or at least contemplated, that the order applied to him as well. In addition, the applicant conceded in his submissions to this Court that, about half an hour later, he was personally told to disperse by a police officer, but he replied to the police officer that he had decided to stay (see paragraph 25 above). This admission is in manifest contradiction with the applicant’s claim that he was not aware of the police orders to disperse. The applicant thus clearly knew what he was doing and it cannot therefore be accepted that he was unaware of the police orders. Moreover, as a journalist reporting on police actions, he had to be aware of the legal consequences disobeying police orders may entail. Therefore, the Court cannot but conclude that, by not obeying the orders given by the police, the applicant knowingly took the risk of being apprehended for contumacy towards the police. 101. The Court also finds it relevant that all other journalists except the applicant obeyed the police orders. Even the last one of them left the area after hearing the final warning which clearly indicated that if the persons present still did not disperse, they would be apprehended. As witnessed by this last remaining journalist during the District Court proceedings, he had taken his last photograph at 9.15 p.m. and left the area just two to three minutes before the applicant’s apprehension took place. No measures were imposed on these journalists at any point ( see paragraph 37 above). The applicant could also have left the scene and moved outside the police cordon without any consequences at any time during it. Moreover, nothing in the case file suggests that the applicant, had he obeyed the order given by the police to leave the cordoned-off area, could not have continued to exercise his professional assignment even in the immediate vicinity of the cordoned-off area where, as it later developed, the police broke up the crowd of demonstrators and apprehended the protesters. (ii) Applicant’s detention 102. The applicant was held in police detention for seventeen and a half hours. As already found by the Court, the issue of the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention exceeding twelve hours falls outside the scope of examination by the Grand Chamber (see paragraph 81 above). In addition, the applicant claimed that he should have been interrogated and released expeditiously. 103. The Government maintained that the length of the applicant’s detention was mainly explained by the fact that he had been detained late at night and that the domestic law prohibited interrogations between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. The domestic law provided exceptions to this rule in section 24, second paragraph, of the Criminal Investigations Act (see paragraph 49 above). The Court observes that there is no information in the case file as to whether the applicant asked to be interrogated promptly during the night. The applicant has not even alleged that he did so. In addition, 128 persons altogether were apprehended and detained due to the demonstration and this fact may also have delayed the applicant’s release. However, the next day the applicant was one of the first to be interrogated and released due to his status as a journalist: he was the seventh detainee to be interrogated and the sixth to be released after the release of the minors (see paragraph 32 above). This fact clearly demonstrates that the police authorities displayed a rather favourable attitude towards the applicant as a representative of the media. 104. The Court notes that it is uncertain whether the applicant’s mobile telephone, camera equipment and memory cards were inspected by the police. The applicant claimed that this was the case. According to the report of the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman (see paragraph 34 above), the police had checked the content of the detainees’ mobile telephones. On the basis of the case file it is not clear whether the applicant’s mobile telephone was also checked and whether his memory cards were inspected. The Government, however, claimed that as soon as the police had found out that the applicant was a member of the press, his camera, memory cards and other equipment had immediately been treated as journalistic sources and were not confiscated (see paragraph 29 above). The applicant did not object to this assertion of the Government. 105. Although it is not entirely clear how the applicant’s camera equipment and memory cards were treated after his apprehension, the Court notes that it has not been claimed by the applicant that his camera equipment or the photographic materials he had acquired were not returned to him in their entirety or unaltered. For the Court, it does not appear that the applicant’s equipment was confiscated at any point but rather only set aside for the duration of his apprehension, in accordance with normal practice. Moreover, the applicant was allowed to keep all the photographs he had taken. No restriction on the use of the photographs was imposed on him by any authority at any stage. (iii) Applicant’s conviction 106. Finally, regarding the applicant’s conviction, the Court notes that the District Court found the applicant guilty of contumacy towards the police but did not impose any penalty on him as the offence was regarded as “excusable”. This conviction was later upheld by the Court of Appeal which did not give any additional reasons in its judgment. Finally, the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. 107. The Court considers that the demonstration was a matter of legitimate public interest, having regard in particular to its nature. The media therefore had the task to impart information on the event and the public had the right to receive such information. This was also acknowledged by the authorities and therefore they had made preparations to accommodate the needs of the media. The event attracted a lot of media attention and was closely followed. The Court notes, however, that of the fifty or so journalists present at the demonstration, the applicant was the only one to claim that his freedom of expression was violated in the context of the demonstration. 108. Moreover, any interference with the exercise of his journalistic freedom was of limited extent, given the opportunities made available to him to cover the event adequately. The Court emphasises once more that the conduct sanctioned by the criminal conviction was not the applicant’s journalistic activity as such, that is, any publication made by him. While the phase prior to publication also falls within the scope of the Court’s review under Article 10 of the Convention (see The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2), 26 November 1991, § 51, Series A no. 217), the present case does not concern a sanction imposed on the applicant for carrying out journalistic research or for obtaining information as such (contrast Dammann v. Switzerland, no. 77551/01, § 52, 25 April 2006, concerning the imposition of a fine on a journalist for obtaining information which was subject to official secrecy). The applicant’s conviction concerns only his refusal to comply with a police order at the very end of the demonstration, which had been judged by the police to have become a riot. 109. The District Court subsequently found that the police had had justifiable reasons to give these orders (see paragraph 37 above). It considered that it had been necessary to disperse the crowd because of the riot and the threat to public safety, and to order people to leave. Since these lawful orders were not obeyed, the police were entitled to apprehend and detain the disobedient demonstrators. As the Government pointed out, the fact that the applicant was a journalist did not entitle him to preferential or different treatment in comparison to the other people left at the scene (see paragraph 78 above). This approach is also supported by the information available to the Court, according to which the legislation of the majority of the Council of Europe member States does not have the effect of conferring any special status on journalists when they fail to comply with police orders to leave the scene of a demonstration (see paragraph 57 above). 110. It appears from the case file that charges were brought against eighty-six defendants altogether who were accused of several types of offences. The applicant argued that the prosecutor could and should have dropped the charges against him as he was only carrying out his work as a journalist. According to the Court’s case-law, the principle of discretionary prosecution leaves States considerable room for manoeuvre in deciding whether or not to institute proceedings against someone thought to have committed an offence (see, mutatis mutandis, Stoll, cited above, § 159). Furthermore, the Court reiterates that journalists cannot be exempted from their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law solely on the basis that Article 10 affords them protection (ibid., § 102). Nonetheless, the Court accepts that journalists may sometimes face a conflict between the general duty to abide by ordinary criminal law, of which journalists are not absolved, and their professional duty to obtain and disseminate information thus enabling the media to carry out their essential role as a public watchdog. Against the background of this conflict of interests, it has to be emphasised that the concept of responsible journalism requires that whenever a journalist – as well as his or her employer – has to make a choice between the two duties and if he or she makes this choice to the detriment of the duty to abide by ordinary criminal law, such journalist has to be aware that he or she runs the risk of being subject to legal sanctions, including those of a criminal character, by not obeying the lawful orders of, inter alia, the police. 111. The District Court raised the question whether the applicant as a journalist had the right not to obey the orders given to him by the police. It found that, in the circumstances of the case, the conditions for restricting the applicant’s right to freedom of expression were fulfilled. In reaching that conclusion the District Court referred to the judgment in Dammann (cited above), arguing that the applicant’s case had to be distinguished from it. The reasons given by the District Court for the applicant’s conviction for contumacy towards the police are succinct. However, having regard to the particular nature of the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression at stake in the present case (see paragraph 108 above), the Court is satisfied that they are relevant and sufficient. Moreover, the District Court had regard to the conflict of interests faced by the applicant when it decided not to impose any penalty on him. 112. In that context the Court reiterates that the nature and severity of the penalty imposed are further factors to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of the interference (see Stoll, cited above, § 153, with further references). In the present case, the District Court refrained from imposing any penalty on the applicant as his act was considered “excusable”. In coming to that conclusion it took into account that the applicant, as a journalist, had been confronted with contradictory expectations, arising from obligations imposed on him by the police, on the one hand, and by his employer, on the other hand. 113. In some cases, the fact of a person’s conviction may be more important than the minor nature of the penalty imposed (see Stoll, cited above, § 154, with further references). In the present case, however, the Court attaches weight to the fact that the applicant’s conviction had no adverse material consequences for him: as no sanction was imposed, the conviction was not, in accordance with the domestic law, even entered in his criminal record (see paragraph 53 above). The applicant’s conviction amounted only to a formal finding of the offence committed by him and as such could hardly, if at all, have any “chilling effect” on persons taking part in protests (compare and contrast, mutatis mutandis, Taranenko v. Russia, no. 19554/05, § 95, 15 May 2014) or on the work of journalists at large (compare and contrast Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 116, ECHR 2004 ‑ XI). In sum, it can be said that the applicant’s conviction was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. 6. Overall conclusion 114. Having regard to all the foregoing factors and taking into account the margin of appreciation afforded to the State, the Court concludes that, in the present case, the domestic authorities based their decisions on relevant and sufficient reasons and struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. It clearly transpires from the case file that the authorities did not deliberately prevent or hinder the media from covering the demonstration in an attempt to conceal from the public gaze the actions of the police with respect to the demonstration in general or to individual protesters (see paragraph 89 in fine above). Indeed, the applicant was not prevented from carrying out his work as a journalist either during or after the demonstration. The Court therefore concludes that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression can be said to have been “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court would stress that this conclusion must be seen on the basis of the particular circumstances of the instant case, due regard being had to the need to avoid any impairment of the media’s “watchdog” role (see paragraph 89 above). 115. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention, finding that the applicant’s apprehension and conviction of disobeying the police while covering a demonstration, without a sanction, had been proportionate. It noted in particular that the Finnish authorities had based their decisions on relevant and sufficient reasons and had struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. They had not deliberately prevented or hindered the media from covering the demonstration. The applicant had not been prevented from carrying out his work as a journalist either during or after the demonstration. In particular, he had not been apprehended for his work as a journalist as such but for refusing to obey police orders to leave the scene of the demonstration. His equipment had not been confiscated and he had not been sanctioned.