Protection of property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention)
II. THE RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A. Town-planning law 31. The 1947 Act is the main legal instrument of town-planning policy in Sweden. For this purpose, it provides for the drawing up of master plans and city plans. 32. A master plan (generalplan) will be drawn up by the municipality concerned in so far as this may be required in order to establish a framework for more detailed plans. Its adoption is a matter for the municipal council (kommunfullmäktige), which may refer the plan to the County Administrative Board - before 1 January 1973, to the Government - for approval (Article 10). 33. City plans are prepared for those urban areas in which this is deemed necessary (Article 24). A city plan is more detailed than a master plan: it will indicate the purposes for which the various areas may be utilised - housing, roads, squares, parks, etc. - and may also include more specific provisions on their use (Article 25). After adoption by the municipal council, it must be approved by the County Administrative Board. In the course of this procedure, property owners have various opportunities to submit their views to several agencies and they may, in the last resort, challenge the decision adopting the plan. 34. In some cases master plans and city plans will be submitted to the Government for a decision. 35. In conjunction with - or independently of - these plans, the Swedish authorities may resort to expropriations and to prohibitions on construction, measures between which there is not necessarily any legal connection. 1. Expropriations 36. As regards expropriation, the law applicable in the present case was mainly that contained in the 1917 Act, which was replaced with effect from 1 January 1973 by the Expropriation Act 1972 ("the 1972 Act"). Some additional matters were dealt with in the 1947 Act. 37. It is for the Government to decide whether expropriation should be authorised. Their decision takes the form of an expropriation permit and is based on the various conditions laid down in the Act. Issue of the permit does not automatically lead to an expropriation; it simply entitles a given public authority (or, in exceptional cases, a private individual or a company) to effect the expropriation if necessary. It leaves intact the owner ’ s right to sell, let or mortgage his property, and is subject to a time-limit within which the expropriating authority must initiate judicial proceedings for the fixing of compensation, failing which the permit will lapse. The 1917 Act was silent as to the length of this time-limit and as to the extension of the validity of permits. The official statement of reasons accompanying the Bill in which the 1972 Act originated drew attention to the disadvantages which expropriation permits occasion for property owners - uncertainly, restriction of the possibility of disposing of their property, difficulty in deciding whether to incur expenditure -, disadvantages which become more serious with the passage of time. For this reason Article 6 par. 1 of Chapter 3 of the 1972 Act provides (translation from the Swedish): "Expropriation permits shall set a time-limit for service of a summons to appear for the purposes of judicial proceedings. The time-limit may be extended if there are special reasons. Requests for extension shall be submitted before the time-limit expires. If the owner establishes that the fact that the question of expropriation remains pending has occasioned significantly more serious prejudice, the time-limit may, at his request, be reduced. No decision to reduce the time-limit can be taken until one year has elapsed since the issue of the expropriation permit." The expropriation is not completed until compensation has been fixed and paid. The Real Estate Court has jurisdiction in the matter; its decisions may be challenged in the Court of Appeal and, in the final instance, the Supreme Court. 38. Before 1 July 1953, expropriation related only to individual properties; each request for an expropriation permit described in detail the use to which the expropriating authority intended to put the premises concerned. The present applications involve another kind of expropriation, known as zonal expropriation. The relevant provision was introduced in 1953, by means of an amendment to Article 44 of the 1947 Act, and was repealed in 1971 with effect from 1 January 1972. It was as follows (translation from the Swedish): "If it is deemed necessary, for the purposes of public transport or town planning, to carry out a complete redevelopment of a densely-populated district and if such redevelopment can be effected only by means of rebuilding the entire district, the King may - where the redevelopment measures involve the adoption or modification of a city plan for the district concerned - grant the municipality the right to buy up the land needed for the redevelopment and also any land which is situated in the same district or in the immediate vicinity and whose value is likely to increase considerably as a result of the implementation of the plan ..." Between 1 January and 31 December 1972, provisions corresponding to this Article 44 were incorporated in the 1917 Act; they now appear in the 1972 Act (Chapter 2, Article 1). Zonal expropriations were thus designed as an instrument for major town-planning schemes. The permits which they entail may be issued as soon as a new city plan is under consideration, that is to say even before detailed arrangements for its implementation have been worked out. 39. Under Article 11 of the transitional provisions of the 1972 Act, requests for expropriation permits submitted before this new Act came into force continue to be subject to the old Act. 40. Like the 1917 Act, the 1972 Act does not provide for any possibility of compensation for prejudice resulting from the length of the validity of, or failure to utilise, an expropriation permit. It does, however, contain one exception (Chapter, 5, Article 16): compensation is payable for prejudice occasioned by the issue of an expropriation permit if the authority or person to whom it was granted has instituted, but subsequently abandoned, proceedings for the fixing of compensation. 2. Prohibitions on construction 1 41. The 1947 Act prohibits any new construction that is not in conformity with the city plan (Article 34). It permits, even before, and until, such a plan has been adopted by the municipal authorities and approved by the regional authorities, the prohibition as an interim measure of any construction work (Article 35 combined with Articles 14 and 15 of the 1947 Act). Article 15 of the Act provides as follows (translation from the Swedish): "If a question is raised concerning a request for the adoption of a master plan for a certain zone or for the amendment of a master plan that has already been approved, the County Administrative Board may, at the request of the municipality, prohibit all new construction (nybyggnad) in that zone. The prohibition shall remain in force until a decision in the matter has been taken by the municipal council, but not for more than one year. Where necessary, the County Administrative Board may, at the request of the municipality, extend the validity of the prohibition on contruction by a maximum of two years at a time. Exemptions form the prohibition on construction referred to in the preceding paragraph may be granted by the County Administrative Board or, in accordance with rules laid down by the Government, by the building Board (byggnadsnämnd)." The same principle applies where the authorities contemplate adopting a new city plan or amending an existing one (Article 35 of the 1947 Act). The principle concerns only new constructions, but Article 158 of the 1947 Act states that the provisions on new constructions shall extend "to such alterations to existing premises as may be classified as new construction under rules laid down by the Government". A rule to this effect appears in Article 75 of the 1959 Building Ordinance (byggnadsstadgan), which reads as follows (translation from the Swedish): "The expression ‘ new construction ’ shall mean: (a) the erection of entirely new premises; (b) the horizontal or vertical extension of existing premises; (c) any rebuilding of the exterior or interior of premises or any alteration thereto which, on account of its scale, may be equated to rebuilding; (d) the complete or partial conversion of premises for a use substantially different from their previous one; (e) such alteration to premises as results in their no longer being in conformity with the adopted master plan, city plan or building plan (byggnadsplan) or the regulations on building activities in zones situated outside the areas covered by city plans or building plans: and (f) any other alteration to premises which, in their present state, are not in conformity with the above-mentioned plans or regulations, except in the case of residential premises comprising not more than two dwellings or of outbuildings belonging to such premises. However, for the purposes of the present Article, the expression "new construction" shall not include the installation of central heating, water closets or other sanitary amenities in premises which, even if such installation has not been authorised, are expected to remain in their present state for a considerable length of time." 42. In his report of 1967, the Parliamentary Ombudsman (Justitieombudsmannen) referred to the consequences of long-term prohibitions on construction and envisaged certain solutions (translation from the Swedish): "As for as can be ascertained from the facts, the property owners in the Borås and Östersund cases cannot have expected to reap any advantages from the town-planning scheme. This means that the scheme could not provide them with any compensation for the prejudicial effects that were clearly occasioned by the long-term prohibitions. If in such cases one does not institute some means of protecting property owners against the prejudicial effect of long-term prohibitions, then - in order to render the implementation of town-planning schemes less expensive for municipalities - one or more property owners will themselves have to bear the prejudicial effects of a prohibition which has been imposed mainly in the interests of the community to settle questions of town planning within a reasonable time. Such a system is irreconcilable with the position that should obtain in a State governed by the rule of law. What arrangements should be made to protect a property owner against the prejudicial effects of temporary prohibitions on construction that remain in force for a lengthy period can hardly be stated without a thorough study of the problem. However, one possibility would be to set a maximum time-limit for the validity of temporary prohibitions. Nevertheless, such a solution could hardly be regarded as compatible with current requirements, for difficulties over determining what form future development should take mean that long delays cannot always be avoided. A preferable method would be to introduce a right for the property owner to seek compensation from the municipality for any loss he may establish or to require that it purchase the land once the prohibition has been in force for more than a certain period. There should, however, be a condition that the prohibition has been in force for quite a long time and has occasioned significant prejudicial effects that cannot be compensated by the advantages which the owners could be expected to gain through the town-planning scheme. In view of the foregoing, my opinion is that there should be a study of the question of introducing protection for private landowners against the prejudicial effects of unreasonably long temporary prohibitions on construction." (Justitieombudsmannens ämbetsberättelse 1967, pp. 478-479). B. Remedies against the public authorities 1. Appeals against municipal councils ’ decisions 43. At the time when the applicants referred the matter to the Commission, the Municipal Act 1953 and, in the case of the capital, the City of Stockholm Act 1957 provided for and regulated a right of appeal (kommunalbesvär) against decisions by municipalities. These Acts enabled any local resident - with certain exceptions - to challenge a municipal council ’ s decisions before the County Administrative Board. Such an appeal could be based on the following grounds only: failure to observe the statutory procedures, infringement of the law, ultra vires conduct, violation of the appellant ’ s own rights or application of powers for an improper purpose. The appeal had to reach the County Administrative Board within three weeks of the date on which approval of the minutes of the decision had been announced on the municipal notice-board; the place where the minutes might be consulted was also indicated on the notice-board. Unless otherwise provided, the County Administrative Board ’ s decision could, within three weeks from its notification to the appellant, be the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten). Almost identical provisions now appear in Chapter 7 of the Municipal Act 1977 (kommunallagen). They were slightly amended in 1980, with effect from 1 January 1981, in that the appeal now has to be made to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) and not to the County Administrative Board. 44. The above-mentioned rules apply to a municipal council ’ s decision to request the Government to issue or extend an expropriation permit. On the other hand, they do not apply to a decision to request the County Administrative Board to issue or extend a prohibition on construction: such a decision is, in fact, not open to any appeal to an administrative court. 2. Remedies against acts of the administration (a) Administrative appeals 45. In Sweden, administrative functions devolve largely on administrative authorities whose decision-making machinery is independent of the Government: such authorities do not come under any Ministry, and neither the Government nor the various Ministries may give them orders or instructions on how they should apply the law in this or that case. 46. It is often possible, however, to appeal to the Government against administrative authorities ’ decisions. Thus, a decision by the County Administrative Board to issue or extend a prohibition on construction may be challenged by means of an appeal to the Government (Article 150 par. 2 of the 1947 Act). (b) Judicial appeals 47. Generally speaking, the Swedish administration is not subject to supervision by the ordinary courts. Those courts hear appeals against the State only in contractual matters, on questions of extra contractual liability and, under some statutes, in respect of administrative decisions. 48. Judicial review of the administration ’ s acts is, therefore, primarily a matter for administrative courts. These courts, which had their origin within the administration itself, comprise three levels: the County Administrative Court (länsrätterna); the Administrative Courts of Appeal; and the Supreme Administrative Court, which was set up in 1909 on the pattern of certain foreign institutions, such as the French Conseil d ’ État, but differs therefrom in certain fundamental respects. These courts are composed of independent judges appointed for life and, as a rule, they enjoy wide powers which enable them not only to set aside administrative acts but also to modify or replace them. In practice, it is very common for the lawfulness of such acts to be challenged. There is, however, an important exception to this principle, in that no appeal may be made against decisions of the Government. 3. Appeals against acts of the Government 49. Certain administrative cases - those with the most important political or financial implications - are reserved for decision by the Government as the first and last instance. Expropriation permits fall within this category (see paragraph 37 above). Although the Public Administration Act 1971 (förvaltningslagen) is not formally applicable to proceedings before the Government, they must be conducted in compliance with a number of principles: the right of the person concerned to have access to all the documents in the case; an obligation on the authority to inform him of any document added to the file and to give him an opportunity of stating his opinion thereon; the right of the person concerned to express his views orally if he so wishes. Before the Government take a decision on a request for an expropriation permit, the request will be submitted to the County Administrative Board which will prepare the file. The Board must, notably, give the property owner an opportunity to present his views on the request; it will also hear such public authorities as may have an interest in the matter. After collecting the necessary data, the Board will transmit them to the Government which will then be in a position to arrive at their decision. 50. Cases examined by the Government give rise to decisions which, as a rule, are not open to appeal. However, in special cases it is possible to lodge an extraordinary appeal, of limited scope, known as an application for re-opening of the proceedings (resningsansökan). Prior to 1 January 1975 such applications - which may also relate to a decision taken by the Government in an appellate capacity - were made to the Supreme Court. Since that date they are made to the Supreme Administrative Court (Chapter 11, Article 11, of the Constitution). The grounds for re-opening proceedings are to be found - although the provision is not formally binding on the Supreme Administrative Court - in Chapter 58, Article 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure (rättegångsbalken), which reads (translation from the Swedish): "Once a judgment in a civil case has acquired the authority of res judicata, the re-opening of the proceedings in the interests of any of the parties may be ordered: 1. if a member or an official of the court has been guilty of a criminal offence or of misconduct in connection with the litigation or if an offence in connection with the litigation has been committed by a lawyer or legal representative, and if such offence or misconduct can be assumed to have affected the outcome of the case; 2. if a document submitted in evidence was forged or if a party examined on oath, a witness, an expert or an interpreter made false statements, and if such document or statements can be assumed to have affected the outcome of the case; 3. if there have come to light facts or evidence which, had they been put before the court previously, would probably have led to a different outcome; or 4. if the application of the law underlying the judgment is manifestly inconsistent with the law itself. Re-opening of the proceedings on the ground referred to in paragraph 3 above may not be ordered unless the party concerned establishes that in all probability he was unable to put the facts or evidence before the first instance or a superior court or that he had some other valid reason for not doing so." If, in a case like the present one, the Supreme Administrative Court accepts that the proceedings should be re-opened, it may either re-examine the whole case itself or refer it back to the Government. The very numerous decisions taken by the Government each year in fact give rise to very few applications for re-opening of the proceedings. C. Liability of public authorities 51. In the past, State and municipal bodies incurred no liability in respect of decisions which they took in the exercise of public authority, and no compensation could therefore be awarded for damage resulting from such decisions, although there were some doubts about the scope of this immunity. Swedish law on this subject was derived from case-law, specific statutes and unwritten principles. 52. The same law still applies on many points, but on 1 July 1972 the Civil Liability Act (skadeståndslagen) entered into force. This Act consolidates and develops a branch of the law governing compensation for damage in extra-contractual matters. It provides that the State and the municipalities are not civilly liable for damage caused by their acts. It does, however, make one radical change: the acts of the public authorities may now give rise to an entitlement to compensation in the event of fault or negligence (Chapter 3, Article 2). However, the legislature imposed an important restriction on this new principle, in that, save where the decisions in question have been set aside or modified, an action for damages "may not lie" in respect of decisions taken by Parliament, the Government, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court and the National Social Security Court (Chapter 3, Article 7). According to authoritative commentaries, the court must, of its own motion, declare the action inadmissible in such case. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 53. The applicants referred the matter to the Commission on 15 August 1975. They complained of unjustifiable interference with their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). They also alleged a violation of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention on the ground that the questions of expropriation and compensation had not been determined within a reasonable time by the Swedish courts, as well as a breach of Article 13 (art. 13) on the ground that they had had no effective remedy before a national authority against the infringements of their rights, which resulted from the expropriation permits and the prohibitions on construction. Lastly, they alleged a violation of Article 14 (art. 14) and relied on Articles 17 and 18 (art. 17, art. 18). 54. The Commission joined the two applications on 12 October 1977 in accordance with Rule 29 of its Rules of Procedure, and declared them admissible on 5 March 1979. 55. In its report of 8 October 1980 (Article 31 of the Convention) (art. 31), the Commission expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of Article 13 (art. 13) of the Convention (ten votes to two, with four abstentions). On the other hand, it concluded that there had been no breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) (ten votes to three), of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) (eleven votes to five) or of Articles 14, 17 and 18 (art. 14, art. 17, art. 18) (unanimously) of the Convention. The report contains three separate opinions. AS TO THE LAW I. THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 (P1-1) 56. The applicants complained of the length of the period during which the expropriation permits, accompanied by prohibitions on construction, affecting their properties had been in force. It amounted, in their view, to an unlawful infringement of their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), which reads as follows: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties." 57. In its Marckx judgment of 13 June 1979, the Court described as follows the object of this Article (P1-1): "By recognising that everyone has the right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, Article 1 (P1-1) is in substance guaranteeing the right of property. This is the clear impression left by the words ‘ possessions ’ and ‘ use of property ’ (in French: ‘ biens ’, ‘ propriété ’, ‘ usage des biens ’ ); the ‘ travaux préparatoires ’, for their part, confirm this unequivocally: the drafters continually spoke of" ‘ right of property ’ or ‘ right to property ’ to describe the subject-matter of the successive drafts which were the forerunners of the present Article 1 (P1-1)." (Series A no. 31, p. 27, par. 63) It has to be determined whether the applicants can complain of an interference with this right and, if so, whether the interference was justified. 1. The existence of an interference with the applicants ’ right of property 58. The applicants did not dispute that the expropriation permits and prohibitions on construction in question were lawful in themselves. On the other hand, they complained of the length of the time-limits granted to the City of Stockholm for the institution of the judicial proceedings for the fixing of compensation for expropriation (five years, extended for three, then for five and finally for ten years, in the case of the Sporrong Estate; ten years in the case of Mrs. Lönnroth; see paragraphs 11-14 and 20 above). They also complained of the fact that the expropriation permits and the prohibitions on construction had been maintained in force for a lengthy period (twenty-three and eight years for the permits; twenty-five and twelve years for the prohibitions; see paragraphs 18 and 25 above). They pointed to the adverse effects on their right of property allegedly occasioned by these measures when they were combined in such a way. They contended that they had lost the possibility of selling their properties at normal market prices. They added that they would have run too great a risk had they incurred expenditure on their properties and that if all the same they had had work carried out after obtaining a building permit, they would have been obliged to undertake not to claim - in the event of expropriation - any indemnity for the resultant capital appreciation. They also alleged that they would have encountered difficulties in obtaining mortgages had they sought them. Finally, they recalled that any "new construction" on their own land was prohibited. Though not claiming that they had been formally and definitively deprived of their possessions, the Sporrong Estate and Mrs. Lönnroth alleged that the permits and prohibitions at issue subjected the enjoyment and power to dispose of their properties to limitations that were excessive and did not give rise to any compensation. Their right of property had accordingly, so they contended, been deprived of its substance whilst the measures in question were in force. 59. The Government accepted that market forces might render it more difficult to sell or let a property that was subject to an expropriation permit and that the longer the permit remained in force the more serious this problem would become. They also recognised that prohibitions on construction restricted the normal exercise of the right of property. However, they asserted that such permits and prohibitions were an intrinsic feature of town planning and did not impair the right of owners to "the peaceful enjoyment of (their) possessions", within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). 60. The Court is unable to accept this argument. Although the expropriation permits left intact in law the owners ’ right to use and dispose of their possessions, they nevertheless in practice significantly reduced the possibility of its exercise. They also affected the very substance of ownership in that they recognised before the event that any expropriation would be lawful and authorised the City of Stockholm to expropriate whenever it found it expedient to do so. The applicants ’ right of property thus became precarious and defeasible. The prohibitions on construction, for their part, undoubtedly restricted the applicants ’ right to use their possessions. The Court also considers that the permits and prohibitions should in principle be examined together, except to the extent that analysis of the case may require a distinction to be drawn between them. This is because, even though there was not necessarily a legal connection between the measures (see paragraph 35 above) and even though they had different periods of validity, they were complementary and had the single objective of facilitating the development of the city in accordance with the successive plans prepared for this purpose. There was therefore an interference with the applicants ’ right of property and, as the Commission rightly pointed out, the consequences of that interference were undoubtedly rendered more serious by the combined use, over a long period of time, of expropriation permits and prohibitions on construction. 2. The justification for the interference with the applicants ’ right of property 61. It remains to be ascertained whether or not the interference found by the Court violated Article 1 (P1-1). That Article (P1-1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, which is of a general nature, enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in the second sentence of the same paragraph. The third rule recognises that the States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose; it is contained in the second paragraph. The Court must determine, before considering whether the first rule was complied with, whether the last two are applicable. (a) The applicability of the second sentence of the first paragraph 62. It should be recalled first of all that the Swedish authorities did not proceed to an expropriation of the applicants ’ properties. The applicants were therefore not formally "deprived of their possessions" at any time: they were entitled to use, sell, devise, donate or mortgage their properties. 63. In the absence of a formal expropriation, that is to say a transfer of ownership, the Court considers that it must look behind the appearances and investigate the realities of the situation complained of (see, mutatis mutandis, the Van Droogenbroeck judgment of 24 June 1982, Series A no. 50, p. 20, par. 38). Since the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are "practical and effective" (see the Airey judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 12, par. 24), it has to be ascertained whether that situation amounted to a de facto expropriation, as was argued by the applicants. In the Court ’ s opinion, all the effects complained of (see paragraph 58 above) stemmed from the reduction of the possibility of disposing of the properties concerned. Those effects were occasioned by limitations imposed on the right of property, which right had become precarious, and from the consequences of those limitations on the value of the premises. However, although the right in question lost some of its substance, it did not disappear. The effects of the measures involved are not such that they can be assimilated to a deprivation of possessions. The Court observes in this connection that the applicants could continue to utilise their possessions and that, although it became more difficult to sell properties in Stockholm affected by expropriation permits and prohibitions on construction, the possibility of selling subsisted; according to information supplied by the Government, several dozen sales were carried out (see paragraph 30 above). There was therefore no room for the application of the second sentence of the first paragraph in the present case. (b) The applicability of the second paragraph 64. The prohibitions on construction clearly amounted to a control of "the use of [the applicants ’ ] property", within the meaning of the second paragraph. 65. On the other hand, the expropriation permits were not intended to limit or control such use. Since they were an initial step in a procedure leading to deprivation of possessions, they did not fall within the ambit of the second paragraph. They must be examined under the first sentence of the first paragraph. (c) Compliance with the first sentence of the first paragraph as regards the expropriation permits 66. The applicants ’ complaints concerned in the first place the length of the time-limits granted to the City of Stockholm, which they regarded as contrary to both Swedish law and the Convention. 67. The 1917 Act did not contain any provisions either on the length of the time-limit during which the expropriating authority had to institute judicial proceedings for the fixing of compensation for expropriation, or on the extension of the validity of permits. According to the Sporrong Estate and Mrs. Lönnroth, it had been the established practice since the entry into force of the Act for the normal time-limit for service of a summons to appear before the Real Estate Court to be one year. Since the time-limits in the present case were as long as five and ten years respectively, it was alleged that there was no legal basis for the original permits; the same was said to apply to the three extensions of the permit affecting the property of the Sporrong Estate. The respondent State replied that the issue and the extension of the permits were in conformity with Swedish law: it argued that since the Government were entitled to fix the period of validity of the original permit, they were also empowered, in the absence of any provision to the contrary, to extend it. 68. The Court does not consider that it has to resolve this difference of opinion over the interpretation of Swedish law. Even if the permits complained of were not contrary to that law, their conformity therewith would not establish that they were compatible with the right guaranteed by Article 1 (P1-1). 69. The fact that the permits fell within the ambit neither of the second sentence of the first paragraph nor of the second paragraph does not mean that the interference with the said right violated the rule contained in the first sentence of the first paragraph. For the purposes of the latter provision, the Court must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual ’ s fundamental rights (see, mutatis mutandis, the judgment of 23 July 1968 in the "Belgian Linguistic" case, Series A no. 6, p. 32, par. 5). The search for this balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention and is also reflected in the structure of Article 1 (P1-1). The Agent of the Government recognised the need for such a balance. At the hearing on the morning of 23 February 1982, he pointed out that, under the Expropriation Act, an expropriation permit must not be issued if the public purpose in question can be achieved in a different way; when this is being assessed, full weight must be given both to the interests of the individual and to the public interest. The Court has not overlooked this concern on the part of the legislature. Moreover, it finds it natural that, in an area as complex and difficult as that of the development of large cities, the Contracting States should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in order to implement their town-planning policy. Nevertheless, the Court cannot fail to exercise its power of review and must determine whether the requisite balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the applicants ’ right to "the peaceful enjoyment of [their] possessions", within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 (P1-1). 70. A feature of the law in force at the relevant time was its inflexibility. With the exception of the total withdrawal of the expropriation permits, which required the agreement of the municipality, the law provided no means by which the situation of the property owners involved could be modified at a later date. The Court notes in this connection that the permits granted to the City of Stockholm were granted for five years in the case of the Sporrong Estate - with an extension for three, then for five and finally for ten years - and for ten years in the case of Mrs. Lönnroth. In the events that happened, they remained in force for twenty-three years and eight years respectively. During the whole of this period, the applicants were left in complete uncertainty as to the fate of their properties and were not entitled to have any difficulties which they might have encountered taken into account by the Swedish Government. The Commission ’ s report furnishes an example of such difficulties. Mrs. Lönnroth had requested the Government to withdraw the expropriation permit. The City Council replied that the existing plans did not authorise any derogation; the Government, for their part, refused the request on the ground that they could not revoke the permit without the Council ’ s express consent (see paragraph 21 above). The Courts has not overlooked the interest of the City of Stockholm in having the option of expropriating properties in order to implement its plans. However, it does not see why the Swedish legislation should have excluded the possibility of re-assessing, at reasonable intervals during the lengthy periods for which each of the permits was granted and maintained in force, the interests of the City and the interests of the owners. In the instant case, the absence of such a possibility was all the less satisfactory in that the town-planning schemes underlying the expropriation permits and, at the same time, the intended use prescribed for the applicants ’ properties were modified on several occasions. 71. As is shown by the official statement of reasons accompanying the Bill in which the 1972 Act originated, the Swedish Government conceded that "in certain respects, the existing system is a source of disadvantages for the property owner": "Naturally, the mere issue of an expropriation permit often places him in a state of uncertainty. In practice, his opportunities for disposing of his property by selling it, assigning the use thereof or having premises erected thereon are considerably restricted. He may also have difficulty in deciding whether to incur expenditure on upkeep or modernisation. The disadvantages resulting from an expropriation permit are, of course, increased if the judicial proceedings are not set in motion for a long time." (Kungl. Maj:ts proposition nr. 109, 1972, p. 227) The 1972 Act takes partial account of these problems. Admittedly, it does not provide for compensation to be granted to property owners who may have been prejudiced by reason of the length of the validity of the permit; however, it does enable them to obtain a reduction of the time-limit for service of the summons to appear before the Real Estate Court if they establish that the fact that the question of expropriation remains pending has caused significantly more serious prejudice (see paragraph 37 above). Since the Act was not applicable in the present case (see paragraph 39 above), it could not have been of assistance to the applicants in overcoming any difficulties which they might have encountered. 72. The Court also finds that the existence throughout this period of prohibitions on construction accentuated even further the prejudicial effects of the length of the validity of the permits. Full enjoyment of the applicants ’ right of property was impeded for a total period of twenty-five years in the case of the Sporrong Estate and of twelve years in the case of Mrs. Lönnroth. In this connection, the Court notes that in 1967 the Parliamentary Ombudsman considered that the adverse effects on property owners that could result from extended prohibitions were irreconcilable with the position that should obtain in a State governed by the rule of law (see paragraph 42 above). 73. Being combined in this way, the two series of measures created a situation which upset the fair balance which should be struck between the protection of the right of property and the requirements of the general interest: the Sporrong Estate and Mrs. Lönnroth bore an individual and excessive burden which could have been rendered legitimate only if they had had the possibility of seeking a reduction of the time-limits or of claiming compensation. Yet at the relevant time Swedish law excluded these possibilities and it still excludes the second of them. In the Court ’ s view, it is not appropriate at this stage to determine whether the applicants were in fact prejudiced (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Marckx judgment, Series A no. 31, p. 13, par. 27): it was in their legal situation itself that the requisite balance was no longer to be found. 74. The permits in question, whose consequences were aggravated by the prohibitions on construction, therefore violated Article 1 (P1-1), as regards both applicants. (d) Compliance with Article 1 (P1-1) as regards the prohibitions on construction 75. In view of the foregoing, the Court does not consider it necessary to determine whether the prohibitions on construction, taken alone, also infringed Article 1 (P1-1). II. THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 17 AND 18, OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 (art. 17+P1-1, art. 18+P1-1). 76. The applicants also relied on Articles 17 and 18 (art. 17, art. 18) of the Convention. They claimed that the exercise of their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions was subjected to "restrictions that were more far-reaching than those contemplated" by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and had a "purpose" that is not mentioned in that Article. The Commission concluded unanimously that there had been no violation. Having found that there was a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No 1. (P1-1), the Court does not consider it necessary also to examine the case under Articles 17 and 18 (art. 17, art. 18) of the Convention. III. THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 (art. 14+P1-1) 77. The applicants invoked Article 14 of the Convention, taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (art. 14+P1-1), and maintained that they had been victims of discrimination as compared with two categories of owners, namely those whose properties were not expropriated of owners, namely those whose properties were expropriated in an manner consistent with Swedish law and the Convention. The Court does not accept this argument, which is not supported by any evidence in the material before it. IV. THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 PAR. 1 (art. 6-1) OF THE CONVENTION 78. According to the applicants, their complaints concerning the expropriation permits affecting their properties were not, and could not have been, heard by the Swedish courts; in this respect they alleged a violation of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention which reads as follows: "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law ..." A. The applicability of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) 79. The applicants ’ right of property is without doubt a "civil right" and there was in fact no dispute on this point. It remains to be ascertained whether that right was the subject of a "contestation" (dispute) between the applicants and the Swedish authorities. 80. The Commission, whilst recognising that expropriation proceedings concerned a civil right, took the view that the expropriation permits issued under the 1917 Act did not amount to a determination of civil rights and obligations of the owners. It concluded that the administrative proceedings whereby the permits affecting the applicants ’ properties were issued and subsequently extended did not fall within the ambit of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1). The Court is unable to share this view. In its Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981, it pointed out that Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) "is not applicable solely to proceedings which are already in progress: it may also be relied on by anyone who considers that an interference with the exercise of one of his (civil) rights is unlawful and complains that he has not had the possibility of submitting that claim to a tribunal meeting the requirements of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1)" (Series A no. 43, p. 20, par. 44, with a reference to the Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18). It is of little consequence that the contestation (dispute) concerned an administrative measure taken by the competent body in the exercise of public authority (see, mutatis mutandis, the Ringeisen judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A no. 13, p. 39, par. 94, and the König judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A no. 27, p. 32, par. 94). In the present case, the applicants emphasised that they had not had the possibility of applying to a tribunal having jurisdiction to examine the situation created by the issue or extension of the expropriation permits. 81. As regards the actual lawfulness of such issue or extension, the Sporrong Estate and Mrs. Lönnroth cited the practice whereby the time-limit for service of a summons to appear before the Real Estate Court was normally one year (see paragraph 67 above); they maintained that the long time-limits granted in their cases were not in accordance with Swedish law. The Government, for their part, disputed this interpretation. The Court recalls that it does not consider that it has to resolve this difference of opinion (see paragraph 68 above). However, the existence and the serious nature of that difference demonstrate that an issue did arise under Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1). Given that the applicants regarded as unlawful the adoption or extension of measures which affected their right of property and had been in force for periods of the kind encountered in their cases, they were entitled to have this question of domestic law determined by a tribunal. 82. The applicants also complained of the fact that they were unable to take legal proceedings to seek redress for the loss occasioned both by the expropriation permits and by the prohibitions on construction. The Court, having just found that there was a contestation (dispute), does not deem it necessary to examine this argument. 83. To sum up, the expropriation permits affecting the applicants ’ properties related to a "civil" right and, as regards their period of validity, gave rise to a "contestation" (dispute), within the meaning of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1). B. Compliance with Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) 84. The Court has to establish Swedish law conferred on the applicants the "right to a court", one aspect of which is the right to access, that is the right to institute proceedings before a court having competence in civil matters (see the above-mentioned Golder judgment, Series A no. 18, p. 18, par. 36). It therefore has to be ascertained whether the Sporrong Estate and Mrs Lönnroth could have instituted legal proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of the decisions of the City Council and of the Government concerning the issue or extension of the long-term expropriation permits. 1. Review of the lawfulness of the City Council ’ s decisions 85. The Government stated it would have been open to the applicants to challenge the lawfulness of the decisions of the City of Stockholm to request the Government to issue or extend the said permits. It is true that, in so far as those decisions had come to the applicants ’ knowledge - despite the absence, according to them, of any individual notification -, they could have referred the matter to the County Administrative Board and then, if necessary, to the Supreme Administrative Court (see paragraph 43 above). However, the requests were only preparatory steps which, in themselves, did not at that stage interfere with a civil right. Furthermore, their lawfulness did not necessarily depend on the same criteria as the lawfulness of the final decisions taken by the Government in this respect. 2. Review of the lawfulness of the Government ’ s decisions 86. The Government ’ s decisions on the issue and extension of the permits are not open to appeal before the administrative courts. Admittedly, owners can challenge the lawfulness of such decisions by requesting the Supreme Administrative Court to re-open the proceedings. However, they must in practice rely on grounds identical or similar to those set out in Chapter 58, Article 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure (see paragraph 50 above). Furthermore, this is an extraordinary remedy - as the Government admitted - and is exercised but rarely. When considering the admissibility of such an application, the Supreme Administrative Court does not examine the merits of the case; at that stage, it therefore does not undertake a full review of measures affecting a civil right (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment, Series A no. 43, pp. 23, 24 and 26, par. 51, 54 and 60). It is only where the Supreme Administrative Court has declared the application admissible that such a review can be effected, either by that court itself or, if it has referred the case back to a court or authority previously dealing with the matter, by the latter court or authority. In short, the said remedy did not meet the requirements of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1). 87. To sum up, the case (in French: cause) of the Sporrong Estate and Mrs. Lönnroth could not be heard by a tribunal competent to determine all the aspects of the matter. As regards both applicants, there has therefore been a violation of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1). V. THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 (art. 13) OF THE CONVENTION 88. The applicants maintained that they were deprived of any effective remedy before a national "authority" in respect of the violations of which they complained; they relied on Article 13 (art. 13) which provides: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity." In its report, the Commission expressed the opinion that there had been a breach of this Article (art. 13). The Government contested this opinion, especially in their memorial of 31 July 1981, which was exclusively devoted to this issue. Having regard to its decision on Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine the case under Article 13 (art. 13); this is because its requirements are less strict than, and are here absorbed by, those of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) (see the above-mentioned Airey judgment, Series A no. 32, p. 18, par. 35, and, mutatis mutandis, the De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12, pl. 46, par. 95, and the above-mentioned Golder judgment Series A no. 18, pp. 15-16, par. 33). VI. THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 (art. 50) OF THE CONVENTION 89. At the hearings of 23 February 1982, the applicants ’ counsel stated that should the Court find a violation, his clients would seek under Article 50 (art. 50) just satisfaction for pecuniary loss and for legal and related expenses. He considered that their claims would to a large extent depend on the tenor of the judgment to be given and therefore suggested that examination of this issue be adjourned. The Government confined themselves to indicating that they reserved their position on the application of Article 50 (art. 50). Accordingly, although it was raised under Rule 47 bis of the Rules of Court, this question is not ready for decision. The Court is therefore obliged to reserve it and fix the further procedure, taking due account of the possibility of an agreement between the respondent State and the applicants.
The European Court of Human Rights held that there had been a violation of Article 1 (protection of property) of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, finding that the applicants bore an individual and excessive burden which could have been rendered legitimate only if they had had the possibility of seeking a reduction of the time-limits or of claiming compensation. It also held that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention, finding that the applicants’ case could not be heard by a tribunal competent to determine all the aspects of the matter.  In its judgment on just satisfaction of 18 December 1984, the Court further decided that Sweden was to pay, for damage, 800,000 Swedish crowns to the first and 200,000 crowns to the second applicant.