Right to form, to join or not join a trade union
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A. Freedom of association 25. Chapter 2, Article 1, of the Instrument of Government provides: "All citizens shall be guaranteed the following in theirrelations with the public authorities: 1. freedom of expression: the freedom to communicateinformation and to express ideas, opinions and emotions whether orally, in writing, in pictorial representations, or in anyother way; ... 5. freedom of association: the freedom to unite with othersfor public or private purposes; ..." 26. According to Chapter 2, Article 2: "All citizens shall be protected in their relations with the public authorities against all coercion designed to compel themto divulge an opinion in any political, religious, cultural orother similar connection. They shall furthermore be protectedin their relations with the public authorities against allcoercion designed to compel them to participate in any meetingfor the formation of opinion or in any demonstration or otherexpression of opinion or to belong to any politicalassociation, religious congregation or other association foropinions of the nature referred to in the first sentence." 27. Chapter 2, Article 12 paras. 1 and 2, reads: "The freedoms and rights referred to in Article 1 paras. 1 to5 ... may be restricted by law to the extent provided for inArticles 13-16 ... The restrictions referred to in the preceding subsection mayonly be imposed to achieve a purpose which is acceptable in ademocratic society. The restriction may never exceed what isnecessary having regard to the purpose which occasioned it, normay it be carried so far as to constitute a threat to the freeformation of opinion as one of the foundations of democracy.No restriction may be imposed solely on grounds of political,religious, cultural or other such opinions." 28. Chapter 2, Article 14 para. 2 provides: "Freedom of association may only be restricted in respect of organisations whose activities are of a military nature or the like or which involve the persecution of a population group of a particular race, skin colour or ethnic origin." 29. Pursuant to Chapter 2, Article 17: "Any trade union or employer or association of employers has a right to take industrial action unless otherwise provided by law or by agreement." B. Right of association 30. Section 7 of the 1976 Act on Co-Determination at Work reads: "Right of association means the right of employers andemployees to belong to an organisation of employers oremployees, to benefit from their membership as well as to workfor an organisation or for the founding of one." 31. Section 8 provides: "The right of association shall not be violated. A violation... will occur, if anyone from the employer’s side or the employee’s side takes any action to the detriment of anybodyon the other side by reason of that person having exercised hisright of association, or if anybody on either side takes anyaction against anybody on the other side with a view toinducing that person not to exercise his right of association.A violation will occur even if the action so taken is designedto fulfil an obligation towards another party. An employers’ or employees’ organisation shall not have to tolerate a violation of its right of association encroaching upon its activities. Where there is both a local and a central organisation, these provisions shall apply to the central organisation. If the right of association is violated by termination of anagreement or another legal measure or by a provision in acollective agreement or other contract, that measure orprovision shall be void." 32. According to section 10: "An employees’ organisation shall have the right to negotiatewith an employer regarding any matter relating to therelationship between the employer and any member of theorganisation who is or has been employed by that employer. Anemployer shall have a corresponding right to negotiate with anemployees’ organisation. A right of negotiation ... shall also be enjoyed by the employees’ organisation in relation to any organisation towhich an employer belongs, and by the employers’ organisationin relation to the employees’ organisation." C. Judicial remedies 33. Chapter 11, Article 3, of the Instrument of Government provides: "Legal disputes between private subjects shall only be settledby a court of law, unless otherwise provided by law ..." 34. In principle, it is possible for an employer against whom industrial action has been instituted to request a court injunction requiring that the action cease, and to claim damages. Such orders may be made by the relevant court if the industrial action is unlawful or in breach of an existing collective agreement. If the industrial action amounts to a criminal offence, a claim for compensation may be made under Chapter 2, section 4, of the 1972 Compensation Act (skadeståndslag 1972:207). 35. Pursuant to section 1 of the 1988 Act, a person who has been a party to administrative proceedings before the Government or another public authority may, in the absence of any other remedy, apply to the Supreme Administrative Court, as the first and only judicial instance, for review of any decisions in the case which involve the exercise of public authority vis-à-vis a private individual. The kind of administrative decision covered by the Act is further defined in Chapter 8, Articles 2 and 3, of the Instrument of Government, to which section 1 of the 1988 Act refers. According to these provisions the Act encompasses measures concerning, inter alia, personal and economic matters arising in relations between private persons and between such persons and the State. Section 2 of the Act specifies several types of decision which fall outside its scope, none of which are relevant in the instant case. In proceedings brought under the 1988 Act, the Supreme Administrative Court examines whether the contested decision "conflicts with any legal rule" (section 1 of the 1988 Act). If the court finds that the impugned decision is unlawful, it must quash it and, where necessary, refer the case back to the relevant administrative authority (section 5 of the 1988 Act). PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 36. In his application to the Commission of 1 July 1989 (no. 15573/89) Mr Gustafsson complained that the lack of State protection against the industrial action taken against his restaurant gave rise to a violation of his right to freedom of association as guaranteed by Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention and also of his right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), in conjunction with Article 17 (art. 17) of the Convention. He further alleged breaches of his rights under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) (right to a fair hearing) and Article 13 (art. 13) (right to an effective remedy), complaining that the court remedies to which he could have recourse in order to challenge the industrial action would have been ineffective since such action was lawful under Swedish law. 37. On 8 April 1994 the Commission declared the application admissible. In its report of 10 January 1995 (Article 31) (art. 31), the Commission expressed the opinion that (a) there had been a violation of Article 11 (art. 11) (by thirteen votes to four); (b) it was not necessary to examine the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in conjunction with Article 17 (art. 17) of the Convention (by eleven votes to six); (c) there had been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention (by sixteen votes to one); (d) there had been a violation of Article 13 (art. 13) of the Convention (by fourteen votes to three). The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the four separate opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment [2]. FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT 38. At the hearing on 22 November 1995 the Government, as they had done in their memorial, invited the Court to hold that there had been no violation of the Convention in the present case. 39. On the same occasion the applicant reiterated his request to the Court stated in his memorial to find that there had been violations of Articles 6, 11 and 13 (art. 6, art. 11, art. 13) of the Convention, and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in conjunction with Article 17 (art. 17) of the Convention. AS TO THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 (art. 11) OF THE CONVENTION 40. The applicant complained that the union action had infringed his right to freedom of association and that the failure of the respondent State to protect him against this action constituted a violation of Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention, which reads: "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly andto freedom of association with others, including the right toform and to join trade unions for the protection of hisinterests. "2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of theserights other than such as are prescribed by law and arenecessary in a democratic society in the interests of nationalsecurity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder orcrime, for the protection of health or morals or for theprotection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article(art. 11) shall not prevent the imposition of lawfulrestrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of thearmed forces, of the police or of the administration of theState." 41. The Government disputed this contention, whereas the Commission shared the applicant’s view that there had been a violation. A. Applicability of Article 11 (art. 11) 42. The Government contested the applicability of Article 11 (art. 11) to the matters complained of by the applicant. Unlike the applicants in previous cases where the Court had recognised a negative right to freedom of association (see the Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, pp. 21-22, paras. 55-58; and the Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A no. 264, pp. 15-16, para. 35), the applicant in the present case had not been compelled to join an association. The union action had primarily been aimed at making the applicant apply to his employees a certain agreement negotiated by the relevant labour organisations. This could have been achieved not only by the applicant joining one of the two employers’ associations in the trade - the Swedish Hotel and Restaurant Entrepreneurs’ Union ("HRAF") and the Employers’ Association of the Swedish Union of Restaurant Owners ("SRA") - but also by his signing with the Hotel and Restaurant Workers’ Union ("HRF") a substitute agreement to the existing collective agreements applied in the restaurant trade (see paragraph 10 above). He could have avoided the union action by availing himself of the possibility of entering into negotiations with the union with a view to reaching a solution based on a substitute agreement drafted in a way that was adapted to the special character of the business run by the applicant (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above). The conclusion of such an agreement might have affected the applicant’s freedom as an employer to conclude contracts with his employees, but this freedom was not as such guaranteed by the Convention. The Government in addition pointed out that in practice the union action had essentially had the effect of stopping deliveries of goods to his restaurant (see paragraph 14 above) and had not involved occupation or picketing of the applicant’s business premises. Nor had he substantiated his claim that he had had to sell the restaurant or had suffered any other form of pecuniary damage as a result of the industrial action. 43. The applicant and the Commission maintained that the unions’ boycott and blockade of his business had affected his right to negative freedom of association. Admittedly, had the applicant concluded a substitute agreement, the primary purpose of the action, namely to achieve the largest possible acceptance and the widest possible application of the collective agreement to which HRF was a party, could have been attained without the applicant becoming a member of HRAF or SRA. However, the applicant objected not only to formal membership but also to participation in the collective-bargaining system, since in both cases he would have become bound by a collective agreement with HRF. One of the most important effects of membership of an employers’ association in Sweden was the members’ participation, through the association, in collective bargaining and their undertaking to be bound by any collective agreement concluded by the association. Therefore, even though the applicant had had the possibility of accepting these obligations without formally joining HRAF or any other association, it would be artificial and formalistic to deny that his negative freedom of association had been affected. 44. The Court considers that although the extent of the inconvenience or damage caused by the union action to the applicant’s business may be open to question, the measures must have entailed considerable pressure on the applicant to meet the union’s demand that he be bound by a collective agreement. He had two alternative means of doing so: either by joining an employers’ association, which would have made him automatically bound by a collective agreement, or by signing a substitute agreement (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). The Court accepts that, to a degree, the enjoyment of his freedom of association was thereby affected. Article 11 (art. 11) is thus applicable in the present case. The Court will therefore examine whether there was an infringement of his right to freedom of association for which the respondent State was responsible. B. Compliance with Article 11 (art. 11) 1. General principles 45. The matters complained of by the applicant, although they were made possible by national law, did not involve a direct intervention by the State. The responsibility of Sweden would nevertheless be engaged if those matters resulted from a failure on its part to secure to him under domestic law the rights set forth in Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention (see, amongst others, the Sibson v. the United Kingdom judgment of 20 April 1993, Series A no. 258-A, p. 13, para. 27). Although the essential object of Article 11 (art. 11) is to protect the individual against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities with his or her exercise of the rights protected, there may in addition be positive obligations to secure the effective enjoyment of these rights. In the most recent judgment delivered in this connection, Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention has been interpreted to encompass not only a positive right to form and join an association, but also the negative aspect of that freedom, namely the right not to join or to withdraw from an association (see the above-mentioned Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson judgment, pp. 15-16, para. 35). Whilst leaving open whether the negative right is to be considered on an equal footing with the positive right, the Court has held that, although compulsion to join a particular trade union may not always be contrary to the Convention, a form of such compulsion which, in the circumstances of the case, strikes at the very substance of the freedom of association guaranteed by Article 11 (art. 11) will constitute an interference with that freedom (see, for instance, the above-mentioned Sibson judgment, p. 14, para. 29). It follows that national authorities may, in certain circumstances, be obliged to intervene in the relationships between private individuals by taking reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the effective enjoyment of the negative right to freedom of association (see, mutatis mutandis, the Plattform "Ärzte für das Leben" v. Austria judgment of 21 June 1988, Series A no. 139, p. 12, paras. 32-34). At the same time it should be recalled that, although Article 11 (art. 11) does not secure any particular treatment of the trade unions, or their members, by the State, such as a right to conclude any given collective agreement, the words "for the protection of [their] interests" in Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1) show that the Convention safeguards freedom to protect the occupational interests of trade-union members by trade-union action. In this respect the State has a choice as to the means to be used and the Court has recognised that the concluding of collective agreements may be one of these (see, for instance, the Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden judgment of 6 February 1976, Series A no. 20, pp. 15-16, paras. 39-40). In view of the sensitive character of the social and political issues involved in achieving a proper balance between the competing interests and, in particular, in assessing the appropriateness of State intervention to restrict union action aimed at extending a system of collective bargaining, and the wide degree of divergence between the domestic systems in the particular area under consideration, the Contracting States should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in their choice of the means to be employed. 2. Application of the foregoing principles 46. The applicant emphasised that he objected to becoming bound by a collective agreement mainly on grounds of political and philosophical conviction. Rather than subjecting himself and his employees to union corporatism, he wished to retain the personal character of the relationship between himself as employer and his employees. The applicant and the Commission were of the view that the pressure which was brought to bear upon him was such as to require the Swedish authorities to take positive measures of protection. Because of the blockade and boycott, he was largely prevented from obtaining deliveries of the necessary goods for the running of his restaurant (see paragraph 14 above). As a result, the applicant’s business suffered considerably and he had to sell the restaurant (see paragraph 23 above). These harsh measures had not been counterbalanced by any strong legitimate interests of HRF in forcing the applicant to sign a collective agreement. When taking action against the applicant, HRF had not represented any members employed by him. The only HRF member who was employed by the applicant had not asked for the union’s assistance but had expressly stated that she found the industrial action unnecessary, as the terms of employment offered by him were not open to criticism (see paragraph 15 above). On the contrary, they were more favourable than those which would have applied under the collective agreement in force. For these reasons HRF’s action was disproportionate to the interests which it sought to protect. In such circumstances, the applicant and the Commission underlined, it was incumbent on the respondent State to provide for effective legal redress, for instance by making available to the applicant legal procedures which would have made it possible for him to mitigate or terminate the action taken against him. Since no such legal protection existed in Swedish law, the facts giving rise to the applicant’s complaint constituted a violation of his rights under Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention. 47. The applicant further considered that the Government, having refrained from arguing before the Commission that the union action was justified, were estopped from changing their stance and adducing evidence in this respect in the proceedings before the Court. The Commission’s Delegate pointed out that the additional information and fresh arguments submitted by the Government on this point could and should have been adduced and invoked before the Commission. She invited the Court to consider very carefully what weight could be given to that information and to those arguments at this late stage of the proceedings. 48. The Government, in their memorial to the Court, stressed for the first time that the Commission’s finding that the terms of employment of the applicant’s employees were more favourable than those that would have applied under a collective agreement, was based on the applicant’s own submissions to the Commission and had never been confirmed or accepted by the Government. Before the Court, the Government, relying on information provided by HRF, disputed this finding. The collective agreement which the union sought to achieve with the applicant had had the aim of substantially improving the economic and social conditions for the applicant’s existing and future employees (see paragraph 15 above). In the absence of a collective agreement governing the relationship between the applicant and his employees, the latter could not benefit from the protection provided in important parts of the Swedish labour legislation. The working conditions applied by the applicant gave him a competitive advantage over other restaurant owners. 49. In the Government’s opinion, the applicant was in effect challenging a system that had been applied in Sweden for sixty years and which could be said to have formed one of the most important elements in what had become known as the "Swedish model" of industrial relations, believed by many to have contributed significantly to the Swedish Welfare State. The Government stated that in Sweden most major employers were affiliated to an employers’ organisation bound by a collective agreement and about 85% of employees were unionised. An essential and long-standing feature of the Swedish model was that industrial relations were determined primarily by the parties to the labour-market rather than by State intervention. Thus, wages, working hours, leave entitlements and various other kinds of terms of employment were governed by collective agreements, covering 90% of the labour-market, rather than by legislation. Another important feature was that employers should not be able to gain a competitive advantage over their competitors by offering less favourable working conditions than those provided for by collective agreements. Moreover, the Government pointed out that, as a result of the prohibition under Swedish law to resort to strikes, boycotts and other means in industrial relations governed by a collective agreement, such actions had been kept at a tolerable level for many years. On the other hand, unions not bound by a collective agreement with a particular employer had been left with a wide discretion in taking measures to make that employer sign a collective agreement. This reflected the importance the legislator had attached to the right of trade unions to promote their interests. 50. In these circumstances, the Government considered that Sweden was not under an obligation under Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention to take positive measures to protect the applicant against the union action. 51. As to the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court notes from the outset that the additional information concerning the terms and conditions of employment adduced by the Government before it supplement the facts underlying the application declared admissible by the Commission. The Court is not prevented from taking them into account in determining the merits of the applicant’s complaints under the Convention if it considers them relevant (see the Barthold v. Germany judgment of 25 March 1985, Series A no. 90, p. 20, paras. 41-42; and the McMichael v. the United Kingdom judgment of 24 February 1995, Series A no. 307-B, p. 51, para. 73). 52. As indicated earlier (see paragraph 44 above), the union action must have entailed a considerable pressure on the applicant to meet the union’s demand that he accept to be bound by a collective agreement, either by joining an employers’ association or by signing a substitute agreement. However, only the first alternative involved membership of an association. It is true that, had the applicant opted for the second alternative, he might have had less opportunity to influence the contents of future collective agreements than as a member of an employers’ association. On the other hand, a substitute agreement offered the advantage that it would have been possible to include in it individual clauses tailored to the special character of the applicant’s business. In any event, it does not appear, nor has it been contended, that the applicant was compelled to opt for membership of an employers’ association because of economic disadvantages attached to the substitute agreement. In reality the applicant’s principal objection to the second alternative was, as in relation to the first alternative, of a political nature, namely his disagreement with the collective-bargaining system in Sweden. However, Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention does not as such guarantee a right not to enter into a collective agreement (see the above-mentioned Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union judgment, pp. 15-16, paras. 40-41). The positive obligation incumbent on the State under Article 11 (art. 11), including the aspect of protection of personal opinion, may well extend to treatment connected with the operation of a collective-bargaining system, but only where such treatment impinges on freedom of association. Compulsion which, as here, does not significantly affect the enjoyment of that freedom, even if it causes economic damage, cannot give rise to any positive obligation under Article 11 (art. 11). 53. Furthermore, the applicant has not substantiated his submission to the effect that the terms of employment which he offered were more favourable than those required under a collective agreement. Bearing in mind the special role and importance of collective agreements in the regulation of labour relations in Sweden, the Court sees no reason to doubt that the union action pursued legitimate interests consistent with Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention (see, for instance, the above-mentioned Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union judgment, pp. 15-16, para. 40; and the Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden judgment of 6 February 1976, Series A no. 21, p. 16, para. 36). It should also be recalled in this context that the legitimate character of collective bargaining is recognised by a number of international instruments, in particular Article 6 of the European Social Charter, Article 8 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Conventions nos. 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organisation (the first concerning freedom of association and the right to organise and the second the application of the principles of the right to organise and to bargain collectively). 54. In the light of the foregoing, having regard to the margin of appreciation to be accorded to the respondent State in the area under consideration, the Court does not find that Sweden failed to secure the applicant’s rights under Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention. 55. In sum, the Court reaches the conclusion that the facts of the present case did not give rise to a violation of Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 (P1-1) 56. The applicant, referring to his allegations mentioned above (see paragraphs 39, 43, 46 and 47 above), submitted that the respondent State’s failure to provide protection against the industrial action had caused him pecuniary damage, in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), which reads: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peacefulenjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of hispossessions except in the public interest and subject to theconditions provided for by law and by the general principlesof international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impairthe right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessaryto control the use of property in accordance with the generalinterest or to secure the payment of taxes or othercontributions or penalties." The applicant contended that, as a consequence of the union action, he had had to sell his restaurant (see paragraph 23 above) at a loss of SEK 600,000. 57. The Government disputed the above allegation, whereas the Commission, having regard to its finding of a violation of Article 11 (art. 11), did not find it necessary to address the issue under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). 58. The Government conceded that the industrial action, having mainly the effect that the applicant’s suppliers could not deliver goods necessary for the running of his restaurant, must have led to difficulties in the running of the applicant’s business. However, the applicant had failed to substantiate any actual financial damage caused thereby and the Government had doubts as to how serious the consequences actually were for his business. The Government also denied that this matter, which essentially concerned the contractual relationships between the applicant and his suppliers, could engage the responsibility of the State under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). The State had not interfered with the applicant’s business but had only passively tolerated the trade unions’ activities in an open market. The situation was comparable to a consumer boycott instituted against a private company. Yet customers should be free to take such measures without the State incurring liability, even if the boycott led to bankruptcy of the company. 59. According to the Court’s case-law, Article 1 (P1-1), which guarantees in substance the right of property, comprises three distinct rules. The first, which is expressed in the first sentence of the first paragraph (P1-1) and is of a general nature, lays down the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, in the second sentence of the same paragraph (P1-1), covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions. The third, contained in the second paragraph (P1-2), recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The second and third rules, which are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, are to be construed in the light of the general principle laid down in the first rule (see, among other authorities, the Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium judgment of 20 November 1995, Series A no. 332, pp. 21-22, para. 33). It was not contended that the second and third rules above were applicable and the Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. On the other hand, the applicant alleged that there had been a violation of the first rule, namely the right "to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions". 60. Admittedly, the State may be responsible under Article 1 (P1-1) for interferences with peaceful enjoyment of possessions resulting from transactions between private individuals (see the James and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, pp. 28-29, paras. 35-36). In the present case, however, not only were the facts complained of not the product of an exercise of governmental authority, but they concerned exclusively relationships of a contractual nature between private individuals, namely the applicant and his suppliers or deliverers. In the Court’s opinion, such repercussions as the stop in deliveries had on the applicant’s restaurant were not such as to bring Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) into play. III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 PARA. 1 (art. 6-1) OF THE CONVENTION 61. The applicant alleged that there had been a breach of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention on the ground that the court remedies at his disposal in order to obtain protection against the industrial action would not have been effective. Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), in so far as is relevant, reads: "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by [a]... tribunal ..." 62. In the Government’s and the Commission’s opinion, Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) was inapplicable. 63. According to the principles in the Court’s case-law (see, for instance, the Kerojärvi v. Finland judgment of 19 July 1995, Series A no. 322, p. 12, para. 32), the Court has first to ascertain whether there was a dispute (contestation) over a "right" which could be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The dispute must be genuine and serious: it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise. Finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question. If the Court finds that there is a dispute over a right, it must examine whether the right in question was of a "civil" character. 64. The Government and the Commission observed that, although there were various possibilities for the applicant to have the merits of his case examined by a Swedish court (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above), it was clear that the union action against him was lawful and that Swedish law provided no basis for the national court to grant an order remedying the situation complained of by the applicant. In these circumstances, there was no dispute (contestation) over a right which could be said on arguable grounds to be recognised under Swedish law. Accordingly, Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) was inapplicable. 65. The applicant, citing Swedish case-law, argued that the negative right to freedom of association was recognised under Swedish law. However, in his submission, by virtue of Article 17 of the Instrument of Government which leaves it to the parties in the labour-market to solve industrial disputes (see paragraph 29 above), Sweden had abdicated its responsibilities as a Contracting Party to the Convention. The notion of an "arguable claim" in the Court’s case-law under Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention was not confined to the position under national law but referred also to the law of the Convention. 66. The Court observes that applicability of Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention depends on whether there is a dispute over a right recognised by national law. The applicant’s complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is not that he was denied an effective remedy enabling him to submit to a court a claim alleging a failure to comply with domestic law (as, for instance, in the Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, pp. 29-30, paras. 80-82). Rather his complaint is essentially directed against the fact that the union action was lawful under Swedish law. However, that provision (art. 6-1) does not in itself guarantee any particular content for (civil) "rights and obligations" in the Contracting States (see, for example, the Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, pp. 16-17, para. 36). In the instant case there was no right recognised under Swedish law to attract the application of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention. IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 (art. 13) OF THE CONVENTION 67. The applicant in addition submitted that the same facts as amounted to the alleged violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) (see paragraphs 62 and 66 above) also constituted a breach of Article 13 (art. 13), which provides: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy beforea national authority not withstanding that the violation hasbeen committed by persons acting in an official capacity." 68. The Government disputed this allegation. 69. The Commission, having regard to its considerations with respect to the applicant’s complaint under Article 11 (art. 11) (see paragraphs 43 and 46 above), was of the opinion that the applicant’s claim under this provision (art. 11) was arguable on its merits. Furthermore, it was undisputed that no effective court or other remedy was available to the applicant, given that the industrial action did not contravene Swedish law. For these reasons the Commission shared the applicant’s view that there had been a breach of Article 13 (art. 13). 70. According to the Court’s case-law, Article 13 (art. 13) requires that, where an individual has an arguable claim to be the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention, he or she should have a remedy before a national authority in order both to have his or her claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress. However, Article 13 (art. 13) does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State’s laws as such to be challenged before a national authority (see, for instance, the above-mentioned James and Others judgment, p. 47, para. 84; and the above-mentioned Powell and Rayner judgment, p. 16, para. 36). The applicant’s complaint under the Convention being essentially directed against the fact that the union action was lawful under Swedish law, Article 13 (art. 13) is not applicable.
No violation of Article 11 of the Convention: While the State had to take “reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the effective enjoyment of the negative right to freedom of association”, the restriction imposed on the applicant had not interfered significantly with the exercise of his right to freedom of association.