Access to a lawyer
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. Cautions B. Safety interviews 1. The Terrorism Act 2000 2. The relevant provisions of Code C C. The admissibility of evidence D. The reopening of criminal proceedings III. RELEVANT EUROPEAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS A. European Union law 1. The right to be informed 2. The right of access to a lawyer 3. Privilege against self-incrimination and right to silence B. International law 1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) 2. International criminal tribunals IV. RELEVANT COMPARATIVE LEGAL MATERIALS A. Council of Europe States B. The United States C. Canada THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND 3 (c) OF THE CONVENTION A. The Chamber ’ s conclusions B. The parties ’ submissions to the Grand Chamber 1. The applicants 2. The Government 3. The third party intervener C. The Court ’ s assessment 1. General principles 2. The application of the general principles to the facts of the case II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION A. Damage B. Costs and expenses C. Default interest
The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) (right to a fair trial and right to legal assistance) of the Convention in respect of the three first applicants and that there had been a breach of those provisions in respect of the fourth applicant. In respect of the three first applicants the Court was convinced that, at the time of their initial police questioning, there had been an urgent need to avert serious adverse consequences for the life and physical integrity of the public, namely further suicide attacks. There had therefore been compelling reasons for the temporary restrictions on their right to legal advice. The Court was also satisfied that the proceedings as a whole in respect of each of the first three applicants had been fair. The position with regard to the fourth applicant, who also complained about the delay in access to a lawyer, was different. He was initially interviewed as a witness, and therefore without legal advice. However, it emerged during questioning that he had assisted a fourth bomber following the failed attack. At that point, according to the applicable code of practice, he should have been cautioned and offered legal advice. However, this was not done. After he had made a written witness statement, he was arrested, charged with, and subsequently convicted of, assisting the fourth bomber and failing to disclose information after the attacks. In his case, the Court was not convinced that there had been compelling reasons for restricting his access to legal advice and for failing to inform him of his right to remain silent. It was significant that there was no basis in domestic law for the police to choose not to caution him at the point at which he had started to incriminate himself. The consequence was that he had been misled as to his procedural rights. Further, the police decision could not subsequently be reviewed as it had not been recorded and no evidence had been heard as to the reasons behind it. As there were no compelling reasons, it fell to the UK Government to show that the proceedings were nonetheless fair. In the Court’s view they were unable to do this and it accordingly concluded that the overall fairness of the fourth applicant’s trial had been prejudiced by the decision not to caution him and to restrict his access to legal advice.