Public or political figures
II. RELEVANT FRENCH AND MONEGASQUE LAW AND EUROPEAN TEXTS A. Relevant domestic law 41. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are worded as follows : Article 9 “Everyone has the right to respect for his private life. Judges may, without prejudice to a right to compensation for the damage sustained, order any measures, such as seizure, attachment and others, capable of preventing or causing to cease an interference with a person ’ s privacy; in the event of urgency such measures may be ordered in urgent proceedings .” Article 1382 “Any act that causes damage to another shall render the person through whose fault the damage was caused liable to make reparation for it.” B. The Constitution of the Principality of Monaco 42. The relevant passages of Article 10 of the Constitution of 17 December 1962 of the Principality of Monaco ( amended by Law no. 1.249 of 2 April 2002) provide : “The succession to the Throne, opened by death or abdication, takes place by the direct and legitimate issue of the reigning prince, by order of primogeniture, with priority given to males within the same degree of kinship. In the absence of direct legitimate issue, the succession passes to the brothers and sisters of the reigning prince and their direct legitimate descendants, by order of primogeniture, with priority given to males within the same degree of kinship. If the heir who would have acceded by virtue of the preceding paragraphs is deceased or renounced the Throne before the succession became open, the succession passes to His own direct legitimate descendants by order of primogeniture, with priority given to males within the same degree of kinship. If the application of the preceding paragraphs does not fill the vacancy of the Throne, the succession passes to a collateral heir appointed by the Crown Council upon same advice of the Regency Council. The powers of the prince are temporarily held by the Regency Council. The Throne can only pass to a person holding Monegasque citizenship on the day the succession opens. ...” C. Relevant European texts 1. Resolution 1165 (1998) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 43. The relevant passages of Resolution 1165 (1998) on the right to privacy, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 26 June 1998, read as follows : “1. The Assembly recalls the current affairs debate it held on the right to privacy during its September 1997 session, a few weeks after the accident which cost the Princess of Wales her life. 2. On that occasion, some people called for the protection of privacy, and in particular that of public figures, to be reinforced at the European level by means of a convention, while others believed that privacy was sufficiently protected by national legislation and the European Convention on Human Rights, and that freedom of expression should not be jeopardised. 3. In order to explore the matter further, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights organised a hearing in Paris on 16 December 1997 with the participation of public figures or their representatives and the media. 4. The right to privacy, guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, has already been defined by the Assembly in the declaration on mass communication media and human rights, contained within Resolution 428 (1970), as ‘ the right to live one ’ s own life with a minimum of interference ’. 5. In view of the new communication technologies which make it possible to store and use personal data, the right to control one ’ s own data should be added to this definition. 6. The Assembly is aware that personal privacy is often invaded, even in countries with specific legislation to protect it, as people ’ s private lives have become a highly lucrative commodity for certain sectors of the media. The victims are essentially public figures, since details of their private lives serve as a stimulus to sales. At the same time, public figures must recognise that the position they occupy in society – in many cases by choice – automatically entails increased pressure on their privacy. 7. Public figures are persons holding public office and/or using public resources and, more broadly speaking, all those who play a role in public life, whether in politics, the economy, the arts, the social sphere, sport or in any other domain. 8. It is often in the name of a one-sided interpretation of the right to freedom of expression, which is guaranteed in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, that the media invade people ’ s privacy, claiming that their readers are entitled to know everything about public figures. 9. Certain facts relating to the private lives of public figures, particularly politicians, may indeed be of interest to citizens, and it may therefore be legitimate for readers, who are also voters, to be informed of those facts. 10. It is therefore necessary to find a way of balancing the exercise of two fundamental rights, both of which are guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights: the right to respect for one ’ s private life and the right to freedom of expression. 11. The Assembly reaffirms the importance of every person ’ s right to privacy, and of the right to freedom of expression, as fundamental to a democratic society. These rights are neither absolute nor in any hierarchical order, since they are of equal value. 12. However, the Assembly points out that the right to privacy afforded by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights should not only protect an individual against interference by public authorities, but also against interference by private persons or institutions, including the mass media. 13. The Assembly believes that, since all member states have now ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, and since many systems of national legislation comprise provisions guaranteeing this protection, there is no need to propose that a new convention guaranteeing the right to privacy should be adopted. 14. ...” 2. The Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Journalists 44. The Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Journalists, adopted in Munich on 24 and 25 November 1971 by the trade unions of journalists from the Member States of the European Community, was endorsed by the International Federation of Journalists at the Istanbul Congress in 1972. It reads, inter alia, as follows : “Preamble The right to information, to freedom of expression and criticism is one of the fundamental rights of man. All rights and duties of a journalist originate from this right of the public to be informed on events and opinions. The journalist ’ s responsibility towards the public excels any other responsibility, particularly towards employers and public authorities. The mission of information necessarily includes restrictions which journalists spontaneously impose on themselves. This is the object of the declaration of duties formulated below. A journalist however, can respect these duties while exercising his profession only if conditions of independence and professional dignity effectively exist. This is the object of the following declaration of rights. Declaration of duties The essential obligations of a journalist engaged in gathering, editing and commenting news are: 1. To respect truth whatever be the consequence to himself, because of the right of the public to know the truth; 2. To defend freedom of information, comment and criticism; 3. To report only on facts of which he knows the origin; not to suppress essential information nor alter texts and documents; 4. Not to use unfair methods to obtain news, photographs or documents; 5. To restrict himself to the respect of privacy; 6. To rectify any published information which is found to be inaccurate; 7. To observe professional secrecy and not to divulge the source of information obtained in confidence; 8. To regard as grave professional offences the following: plagiarism, calumny, slander, libel and unfounded accusations, the acceptance of bribe in any form in consideration of either publication or suppression of news; 9. Never to confuse the profession of a journalist with that of advertisements salesman or a propagandist and to refuse any direct or indirect orders from advertisers. 10. To resist every pressure and to accept editorial orders only from the responsible persons of the editorial staff. Every journalist worthy of that name deems it his duty faithfully to observe the principles stated above. Within the general law of each country, the journalist recognises, in professional matters, the jurisdiction of his colleagues only; he excludes every kind of interference by governments or others. Declaration of rights 1. Journalists claim free access to all information sources, and the right to freely inquire on all events conditioning public life. Therefore, secret of public or private affairs may be opposed only to journalists in exceptional cases and for clearly expressed motives; 2. The journalist has the right to refuse subordination to anything contrary to the general policy of the information organ to which he collaborates such as it has been laid down by writing and incorporated in his contract of employment, as well as any subordination not clearly implicated by this general policy; 3. A journalist cannot be compelled to perform a professional act or to express an opinion contrary to his convictions or his conscience; ... ” THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 45. The applicants alleged that the judgment against them amounted to unjustified interference in the exercise of their right to freedom of information. They relied on Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows : “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” A. The Chamber judgment 46. The Chamber noted that the judgment against the applicants made no distinction between information which formed part of a debate on a matter of public interest and that which merely concerned details of the Prince ’ s private life. Accordingly, in spite of the margin of appreciation left to States in this matter, it held that there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between, on the one hand, the restrictions imposed by the courts on the applicants ’ right to freedom of expression and, on the other, the legitimate aim pursued. It therefore concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention ( see the Chamber judgment, §§ 51 ‑ 75). B. The parties ’ submissions to the Grand Chamber 1. The applicants ’ submissions 47. The applicants submitted that the judgment against a news magazine for having published information that had already been disclosed in other media and for illustrating it with related photographs amounted to an interference in its freedom to impart information of public interest. They considered that this judgment was extremely serious and unprecedented, and that it had to be regarded as an excessive interference with its freedom of expression and information, with a clearly chilling effect. 48. The applicants did not dispute that the interference in question had had a lawful basis, namely Article 9 of the Civil Code, nor that it pursued a legitimate aim, namely “protection of the rights of others” with regard to the Prince ’ s right to private life and to his own image. Nonetheless, they expressed a reservation in this respect, and alleged that the domestic courts had interpreted in too broad a manner the concept of private life within the meaning of Article 9 of the Civil Code and Article 8 of the Convention. 49. The applicants considered that the right to respect for private life did admittedly have to be upheld, but that it was not absolute, especially when it clashed with the right to freedom of expression and information, and the rights of the other people concerned by the publication. They criticised the domestic courts for failing to balance the Prince ’ s rights against other rights which, they submitted, were of equal value: the rights of the mother, which they considered to be no less legitimate in a democratic society; the child ’ s right to be officially recognised; and the magazine ’ s right to impart information of public interest which was no longer confidential at the date of publication. 50. The applicants also considered that the impugned decisions had failed to make any distinction between ordinary citizens and public figures ( a fortiori politicians and Heads of State, who were inevitably exposed to media interest ), thus going against the Court ’ s case-law and current French case-law. In support of this argument, they submitted that the case-law developed by the domestic courts acknowledged the public ’ s right to information about facts relating to private life, and they cited by way of example several cases in which the domestic courts had reached their decisions on that basis. 51. The applicants further submitted, with regard to the necessity of the impugned interference, that any exception to a fundamental freedom must be interpreted restrictively, and that exceptions to freedom of expression could not therefore be punished disproportionately. They alleged that the right to respect for private life was not absolute, and argued that the decisions by the domestic courts in the present case did not correspond to a pressing social need, in that the courts had not carried out a thorough balancing exercise in respect of the conflicting rights in issue or taken account of the criteria established in the Court ’ s case-law. 52. In this connection they argued, inter alia, that, in a hereditary monarchy, information about the existence of an heir, born out of wedlock, who had not yet been officially recognised by his father, was a matter of public interest with regard both to the future of the monarchy and to the attitude of the Prince, a public figure. The question of his paternity concerned not only his own civil status – it was not without importance to know whether or not he had an illegitimate son and if so whether he had recognised him – but also the order of heirs or even possible successors to the throne, in view of the hereditary nature of the monarchy in Monaco and in the absence, at the relevant time, of any known heir. The applicants emphasised in this regard that the provisions of the Monegasque Constitution had been amended shortly before Prince Rainier ’ s death and that further amendments could not be ruled out. The information in question was also likely to enlighten the Prince ’ s subjects regarding his ethical conduct and his personal respect for the fundamental rights which he claimed for himself and which he advocated publicly and politically. 53. The applicants also argued that the Prince made use of public resources, some of which were allocated to providing for the future and the education of his son, which was a matter that directly affected Monegasque and French taxpayers. They also claimed that the German courts, called upon to examine a substantially similar dispute, had held that the information in question justified a debate on a matter of public interest. They further asserted that communication of the news to the public was all the more legitimate in that the Prince had ultimately recognised his son, in the context of a large-scale media operation. They added that by making a statement about the succession to the throne he had acknowledged that the news in issue was a matter of public concern. 54. The applicants further stated that the public profile of the Prince, head of the Monegasque State, was beyond doubt. As to the content of the report, they considered that it went beyond the sphere of the Prince ’ s private life, and extended to the private life of the child ’ s mother, who was free to express herself, and that of the child, who was entitled to official recognition. In this connection, they submitted that in a democratic society the wishes of one person, even a sovereign, could not confer privileges to the extent that they trespassed on the rights of others and, in particular acted as a “ bar to the claims of his son seeking to assert his existence and have his identity recognised”. 55. The applicants further emphasised that it was not contested that the article comprised information and photographs supplied by the child ’ s mother, who had herself contacted Paris Match with a view to obtaining official recognition for her son. They claimed that the impugned photographs had all been taken in a flat, with the full consent of the Prince, and they considered that they contained no intimate details or unflattering portrayals of any of the protagonists. The photographs showing the Prince in Ms Coste ’ s company had, they submitted, been taken in the context of official events, so the magazine could not be criticised for publishing them. Only photographs handed over by the child ’ s mother had been published, with a view to lending credence to her statements. Moreover, neither the veracity of the published information nor the conditions in which that information and the accompanying photographs had been given to the magazine had been challenged. The Nanterre TGI had therefore been wrong to describe the information as “mere rumours”. 56. The applicants also claimed that the principle of the free choice of the means of imparting information – the corollary of freedom to impart information – could not be contested without emptying that freedom of its substance. In that connection, they alleged that they had been free to illustrate the impugned article with relevant photographs. This had indeed been the case for the published photographs. With regard to the consequences of the article, the applicants denied that it could have disclosed anything that had not already been revealed to the public by the British, American, German and French press and audio - visual media and on the Internet. They therefore urged that the impact of the article be placed in perspective. They also argued that after the contested publication the Prince had officially acknowledged his paternity in a large-scale media operation, at the same time acknowledging the existence of another child. 57. The applicants thus argued that they had experienced an interference with their right to freedom of expression which, firstly, had not been “necessary”, in that it had not corresponded to a “pressing social need”, and which, secondly, had been disproportionate in its consequences to the legitimate aim pursued. They considered that only the Prince ’ s right to private life had been taken into account in assessing the alleged violation and the resulting damage. In addition, they considered that the penalties imposed had been very severe : in their view, a court-ordered publication was equivalent to expropriating a newspaper and eliminating a space used to exercise freedom of expression, and had the weight and effect of a public reprimand designed to discredit the magazine. 58. Lastly, the applicants argued that when the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation ruled on the case, the Prince had already confirmed the existence of a son born outside marriage, by means of an official statement and numerous press interviews. They criticised the domestic courts for failing to take account of that fact in assessing the extent of the alleged damage. They concluded that the publication in issue had been manifestly legitimate and that, in consequence, there had been no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the severe court judgments against them, together with the insertion of a court-ordered statement on the front cover of the magazine, and the aim pursued. 2. The Government ’ s submissions 59. After recapitulating the Court of Cassation ’ s case-law with regard to the protection of private life, the Government submitted, firstly, that an individual ’ s personal or family relations or their love life, pregnancy, illness, surgical operations, religious convictions, home and also right to control his or her own image had been considered as falling within the scope of private life. They also specified that only information relevant to the public ’ s right to be informed could be disclosed. Where the alleged interference concerned persons whose life or status as public figures made them well known, the case-law made a distinction on the basis of the type of information in question. 60. The Government emphasised in this respect that although the Court of Cassation had held that “ every person, whatever his rank, birth, fortune or present or future functions, [was] entitled to respect for his private life ”, it had nonetheless also validated the disclosure of information when this was necessary as a matter of public debate. 61. Having set out this domestic legal context, the Government did not dispute that the court judgment against the applicants amounted to interference in the exercise of their right to freedom of expression. They claimed, however, that this interference had been prescribed by law – a fact that the applicants, as professionals in the press field, could not, in the Government ’ s view, have failed to be aware of – and that it pursued a legitimate aim, namely protection of the Prince ’ s right to privacy and to protection of his image. 62. The Government also submitted that the domestic courts had complied with the Court ’ s case-law. In this connection, they argued that the impugned comments were to be examined in the light of the case as a whole and account taken of the content of the terms used and the context in which they were made. Referring to the margin of appreciation granted to the States in this area, they argued that in the area of freedom of expression, which implied a subjective approach, the national courts were best placed to classify the facts of a case, and that the Court ’ s supervision should not seek to substitute a new assessment of the facts for that of the national courts. In the present case, the domestic courts had carried out a careful analysis and sought to strike a balance between the protection of private life and that of freedom of expression. There was therefore nothing to justify a departure from the Court of Cassation ’ s assessment. 63. Before the Grand Chamber, the Government also submitted that in assessing the circumstances of the case it was unnecessary to take account of Ms Coste ’ s wish to publicise the identity of her child ’ s father in order to have the child recognised. In their opinion, if Paris Match wished to use Ms Coste ’ s interests in its defence, it ought to have summoned her to appear in the case before the domestic courts. The present case thus concerned solely a classic conflict between the rights and interests of an organ of the press relying on its right of expression and those of a person who had been the subject of a news article and who complained of a violation of his right to respect for his private life. 64. The Government considered that, in this case, there had been a pressing need to protect the Prince. They submitted that the impugned publication had not concerned a subject of public interest. They acknowledged that certain information concerning the Prince could be made public on account of his functions, but considered that the impugned disclosures, quite apart from the fact that they were particularly intimate, in no way affected the organisation of the Monegasque State. 65. The Government also considered that the Chamber had wrongly interpreted the concept of a contribution to a debate of public interest, and had opened the way for considerable legal uncertainty. In this regard, they argued that too wide an interpretation of this concept would reduce to almost nothing the scope of the Convention principle of protection of the private and family lives of public figures, and would open the way to repeated invasions of privacy and infringements of the right of public figures to control their own image, for exclusively commercial purposes. 66. Before the Grand Chamber, they submitted that the Court, in its judgment in Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) ([GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, ECHR 2012), had accepted a particularly wide definition of the concept of a debate of public interest. As legal commentators had also pointed out, that definition departed from the first Von Hannover judgment (cited above), and opened the way for publication of photographs and articles which breached the privacy of public figures, with a fleeting reference to a debate of public interest then appearing sufficient to justify such publications. In the Government ’ s opinion, were that interpretation to prevail, the concept of a debate of public interest, which, they argued, was intended to guarantee respect for the private life of public figures, would be reduced to an empty shell. 67. The Government considered that the fact that the Chamber had found that the article contained elements which related to the Prince ’ s private, or even intimate, life ought to lead the Grand Chamber to consider that the court judgment against the applicants had been justified. They claimed that the elements of private life set out in the article ought to take precedence and that the main, if not exclusive, purpose of the publication had been to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regarding details of the Prince ’ s private life. 68. Before the Grand Chamber, they also argued that the Chamber had wrongly held that the possible succession to the throne of the Principality of a son born outside marriage was “the core message of the article” : in fact, it had contained only two references to that matter, or eight lines out of the five hundred lines of text, covering four pages and accompanied by six pages of photographs, in addition to the photograph on the front cover. The Government reaffirmed that the fact that the Prince had a son born outside marriage, who had no official status, did not contribute to a debate of public interest. 69. Furthermore, while acknowledging that the German courts had dismissed the Prince ’ s claim when he brought proceedings against the weekly magazine Bunte for an article comparable to that published in Paris Match, the Government argued that the States Parties had different traditions in the area of respect by the media for private life, especially with regard to the private life of public figures. Thus, in France, the legislation and case-law were, they submitted, more protective of private life than in Germany or the United Kingdom. That being noted, the purpose of the Convention was not to harmonise national laws. The French courts had therefore been entitled to find, in contrast to the German courts, that the birth of the Prince ’ s son did not contribute to a debate of public interest: this was a reasonable position in reconciling the competing interests at stake. 70. The Government added that, even supposing that the Grand Chamber were to find that the birth in question involved a debate on a matter of public concern, the fact that the impugned article contained multiple intimate details of his life nonetheless justified that, in the instant case, protection of privacy took precedence over freedom of expression. 71. They considered that the publication of the article and of several photographs showing the Prince with his son had been particularly intrusive with regard to the Prince ’ s private life. Moreover, the article had contained disclosures concerning the most intimate details of the Prince ’ s life. Furthermore, the Prince had consented to photographs being taken of him with his son for private use, and not for publication. In this regard, the Government criticised the applicants for failing to filter the information provided by Ms Coste in order to exclude the intimate details concerning the Prince, choosing instead to publish those intimate details and thus failing in their duties and responsibilities. 72. The Government further stated that, in using the photographs and captions, the magazine had given this “scoop” a sensationalist spin. They added that the applicants could not rely on events which had occurred after publication, namely the Prince ’ s statement on the matter, in order to evade their responsibility. 73. Lastly, they explained that Paris Match was a profit-making newspaper which frequently exploited individuals ’ private lives in order to satisfy the curiosity of its readers, and that this commercial exploitation was linked to the more or less scandalous nature of its disclosures. In the present case, more than a million copies of the issue of Paris Match in question had been printed. In consequence, the Government considered that the interference in issue in the present case had been necessary and complied with the obligation of proportionality arising from the Court ’ s case-law, and that the amount of damages awarded ought, in their view, to be set against the magazine ’ s revenues. C. Third - party observations 1. Observations of the Government of Monaco 74. The Government of Monaco considered that the Chamber judgment raised a serious issue regarding the interpretation and application of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. In this connection, they submitted that, in practice, the criterion of “contribution to a debate of public interest”, however pertinent, guaranteed the requisite balance between freedom of expression and the protection of private life only when it was correctly applied and not subverted. In the present case, the considerations relating to the paternity of a child who was clearly excluded from succession to the throne could not fall within the scope of a debate of public interest. According to the Monegasque Government, the main – if not the sole – purpose of the article had been to satisfy the curiosity of a certain readership with regard to the private life of public figures. Moreover, it was to be feared that the approach taken in the Chamber judgment would result in future in too broad an interpretation of the justification of a contribution to a debate of public interest, which would seriously undermine the protection of private life which public figures were legitimately entitled to expect, particularly those exercising political functions. 75. The Government of Monaco also submitted that the category of “public figures” included a very particular sub - group of “political figures”, who were even more strongly exposed to media interest. They argued that it was important to ensure that press articles about “political figures” did not, in practice, come to enjoy the virtually irrebuttable presumption that they contributed per se to a debate of public interest. Yet the Chamber judgment created a grave risk in this regard, namely that the protection afforded to political figures ’ private lives would henceforth be severely restricted, or indeed reduced to nought. It was all the more important to address this problem in view of the fact that the interpretation proposed by the Court would be expected to serve as a reference for each High Contracting Party. 2. Observations of Media Legal Defence Initiative ( “ MLDI ” ) 76. The NGO MLDI considered that the issue of succession to the throne in a hereditary monarchy was a matter of public concern. It subscribed to the Chamber ’ s interpretation of this concept. Noting that a broad approach to the concept of a debate of public interest already existed in Germany and Belgium, it argued that a degree of latitude ought to be awarded to journalists and editors in exercising their professional judgment with regard to the details to be included in putting forward the essence of a message, especially where it was clear that it dealt with a matter of public interest. Indeed, such latitude was recognised in the United Kingdom and in other member States of the Council of Europe. 77. MLDI submitted that in a constitutional monarchy the Head of State carried out a fundamental representative role and exercised powers that could include making public comments or expressing views privately to politicians on a wide range of matters. Moreover, in a constitutional monarchy questions of succession were matters of legitimate public scrutiny, and this had implications for the latitude which must be afforded to the press to report on such matters and the right of the public to be informed, where appropriate, in respect of them. 78. MLDI also considered that the sanction imposed in the present case had been particularly severe. In the NGO ’ s view, the obligation to publish a statement had the potential not only to harm the reputation of the magazine, but also to impact substantially on its future sales. Furthermore, and in the light of the Court ’ s case-law, it considered that the amount of damages awarded had to be regarded as a form of censure. D. The Court ’ s assessment 79. The Court notes that it is common ground between the parties that the impugned court judgment constituted an interference with the applicants ’ exercise of their right to freedom of expression, protected by Article 10 of the Convention. Nor is it contested that the interference was prescribed by law, in that it was based on Articles 9 and 1382 of the Civil Code, and pursued a legitimate aim, namely, the protection of the rights of others within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention – in the present case the Prince ’ s right to private life and to protection of his own image. The Court agrees with this assessment. 80. However, the applicants expressed reservations concerning the lawfulness and legitimacy of the interference in question, considering that the national courts ’ interpretation of the concept of private life was too broad, and complained that there had been no thorough weighing up of the competing interests involved ( see paragraphs 48 - 50 above ). That being stated, the Court considers that these arguments concern the assessment of whether the interference was necessary, and are not such as to call into question its lawfulness or the legitimate aim. 81. The dispute in the instant case therefore relates to the question whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. 1. The general principles established in the Court ’ s case-law 82. Having been required on numerous occasions to consider disputes requiring an examination of the fair balance to be struck between the right to respect for private life and the right to freedom of expression, the Court has developed abundant case-law in this area. Having regard to the circumstances of the present case, it considers it useful to reiterate the general principles relating to each of the rights in question, and then to set out the criteria for balancing those rights. ( a ) General principles concerning the right to respect for private life 83. The Court reiterates that the notion of private life is a broad concept, not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It extends to aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person ’ s name, photograph, or physical and moral integrity. This concept also includes the right to live privately, away from unwanted attention (see Smirnova v. Russia, nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 95, ECHR 2003 ‑ IX). The guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the Convention in this regard is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his or her relations with other human beings. There is thus a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of private life. 84. Moreover, whilst a private individual unknown to the public may claim particular protection of his or her right to private life, the same is not true of public figures (see Minelli v. Switzerland ( dec. ), no. 14991/02, 14 June 2005). Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, even where a person is known to the general public, he or she may rely on a “legitimate expectation” of protection of and respect for his or her private life (see, inter alia, Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 97 ). 85. Publication of a photograph may thus interfere with a person ’ s private life even where that person is a public figure ( ibid., § 95). The Court has held on numerous occasions that a photograph may contain very personal or even intimate “information” about an individual or his or her family ( ibid., § 103). It has therefore recognised every person ’ s right to protection of his or her own image, emphasising that a person ’ s image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals the person ’ s unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The right to the protection of one ’ s image is thus one of the essential components of personal development. It mainly presupposes the individual ’ s right to control the use of that image, including the right to refuse publication thereof ( ibid., § 96). 86. In determining whether or not the publication of a photograph interferes with an applicant ’ s right to respect for his or her private life, the Court takes account of the manner in which the information or photograph was obtained. In particular, it stresses the importance of obtaining the consent of the persons concerned, and the more or less strong sense of intrusion caused by a photograph (see Von Hannover v. Germany, no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004 ‑ VI, § 5 9; Gurgenidze v. Georgia, no. 71678/01, §§ 55-60, 17 October 2006; and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, no. 71111/01, § 48, 14 June 2007). In this connection, the Court has had occasion to note that photographs appearing in the “sensationalist” press or in “romance” magazines, which generally aim to satisfy the public ’ s curiosity regarding the details of a person ’ s strictly private life (see Société Prisma Presse v. France ( dec. ), no. 66910/01, 1 July 2003; Société Prisma Presse v. France ( dec. ), no. 71612/01, 1 July 2003; and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France ( ICI PARIS ), no. 12268/03, § 40, 23 July 2009), are often obtained in a climate of continual harassment which may induce in the person concerned a very strong sense of intrusion into their private life or even of persecution (see Von Hannover, cited above, § 59). Another factor in the Court ’ s assessment is the purpose for which a photograph was used and how it could be used subsequently (see Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, no. 1234/05, § 42, 15 January 2009, and Hachette Filipacchi Associés ( ICI PARIS ), cited above, § 52). 87. However, these considerations are not exhaustive. Other criteria may be taken into account depending on the particular circumstances of a given case. Here, the Court emphasises the importance of assessing the seriousness of the intrusion into private life and the consequences of publication of the photograph for the person concerned (see Gurgenidze, cited above, § 41). ( b ) General principles concerning the right to freedom of expression 88. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual ’ s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to information or ideas that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “ democratic society ”. As enshrined in Article 10, freedom of expression is subject to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly (see Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 49, Series A no. 24, and, among other authorities, Lindon, Otchakovsky -Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 45, ECHR 2007 ‑ IV, and Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 101). 89. Although the press must not overstep certain bounds, regarding in particular protection of the reputation and rights of others, its task is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest. Thus, the task of imparting information necessarily includes “duties and responsibilities”, as well as limits which the press must impose on itself spontaneously (see Mater v. Turkey, no. 54997/08, § 55, 16 July 2013). Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of “public watchdog” (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, §§ 59 and 62, ECHR 1999 ‑ III; Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, § 71, ECHR 2004 ‑ XI; and Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 102). Furthermore, it is not for the Court, any more than it is for the national courts, to substitute its own views for those of the press as to what techniques of reporting should be adopted in a particular case (see Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 31, Series A no. 298, and Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, § 146, ECHR 2007 ‑ V). Freedom of expression includes the publication of photographs. This is nonetheless an area in which the protection of the rights and reputation of others takes on particular importance, as the photographs may contain very personal or even intimate information about an individual or his or her family ( see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 103). Lastly, although the publication of news about the private life of public figures is generally for the purposes of entertainment rather than education, it contributes to the variety of information available to the public and undoubtedly benefits from the protection of Article 10 of the Convention. However, such protection may cede to the requirements of Article 8 where the information at stake is of a private and intimate nature and there is no public interest in its dissemination (see Mosley v. the United Kingdom, no. 48009/08, § 131, 10 May 2011). ( c ) General principles concerning the margin of appreciation and balancing of rights 90. The choice of the means calculated to secure compliance with Article 8 of the Convention in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a matter that falls within the Contracting States ’ margin of appreciation, whether the obligations on the State are positive or negative (see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 104, with further references ). Likewise, under Article 10 of the Convention, the Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent an interference with the freedom of expression protected by this provision is necessary (ibid.). However, this margin goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those delivered by an independent court. In exercising its supervisory function, the Court ’ s task is not to take the place of the national courts, but rather to review, in the light of the case as a whole, whether the decisions they have taken pursuant to their power of appreciation are compatible with the provisions of the Convention relied on (ibid. , § 105, with further references ). 91. In cases which require the right to respect for private life to be balanced against the right to freedom of expression, the Court considers that the outcome of the application should not, in theory, vary according to whether it has been lodged with the Court under Article 8 of the Convention by the person who was the subject of the news report, or under Article 10 by the publisher. Indeed, as a matter of principle these rights deserve equal respect ( ibid., § 106). Accordingly, the margin of appreciation should in theory be the same in both cases. 92. According to the Court ’ s established case-law, the test of “necessity in a democratic society” requires the Court to determine whether the interference complained of corresponded to a “pressing social need”, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient (see The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 62, Series A no. 30). The margin of appreciation left to the national authorities in assessing whether such a “need” exists and what measures should be adopted to deal with it is not, however, unlimited but goes hand in hand with European supervision by the Court, whose task it is to give a final ruling on whether a restriction is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10. Where the balancing exercise has been undertaken by the national authorities in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court ’ s case-law, the Court would require strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts ( see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 107). 93. The Court has already had occasion to lay down the relevant principles which must guide its assessment in this area. It has thus identified a number of criteria in the context of balancing the competing rights (see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, §§ 109-13, and Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, §§ 90-95, 7 February 2012). The relevant criteria thus defined are: contribution to a debate of public interest, the degree of notoriety of the person affected, the subject of the news report, the prior conduct of the person concerned, the content, form and consequences of the publication, and, where appropriate, the circumstances in which the photographs were taken. Where it examines an application lodged under Article 10, the Court will also examine the way in which the information was obtained and its veracity, and the gravity of the penalty imposed on the journalists or publishers ( ibid.). The Court considers that the criteria thus defined may be transposed to the present case. 2. Application of these principles to the present case 94. The Court notes that the impugned article consisted of an interview with Ms Coste, who disclosed that the Prince was the father of her son. The article also provided details about the circumstances in which she had met the Prince, their intimate relationship, their mutual feelings, his reaction to the news of her pregnancy and the manner in which he behaved with the child. It was illustrated by photographs of the Prince holding the child or accompanied by Ms Coste, in both private and public contexts ( see paragraphs 14 ‑ 16 above ). 95. In this regard and in view of the parties ’ submissions ( see paragraphs 53 and 69 above ) concerning the conclusions reached by the German courts in respect of substantially similar articles that had been published in Bunte, the Court finds it appropriate to make the preliminary observation that its role in this case consists primarily in verifying whether the domestic courts whose decisions are contested by the applicants struck a fair balance between the rights at stake and ruled in accordance with the criteria established by it for that purpose ( criteria which have been reiterated in paragraph 93 above ). Thus, its assessment of the circumstances of the present case cannot be based on a comparative examination of the decisions reached by the French and German courts respectively with regard to the information disclosed. ( a ) The issue of the contribution to a debate of public interest 96. The Court reiterates that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on freedom of expression when a matter of public interest is at stake ( see, inter alia, Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, § 58, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ V). The margin of appreciation of States is reduced where a debate on a matter of public interest is concerned ( see Editions Plon v. France, no. 58148/00, § 44, ECHR 2004 ‑ IV). In the circumstances of the present case, it is therefore essential to determine at the outset whether the content of the interview disclosing the Prince ’ s fatherhood could be understood as constituting information such as to “contribute to a debate on a matter of public interest”. ( i ) The concept of “contribution to a debate of public interest” 97. The Government argued that too wide an interpretation of this concept would be liable to nullify any protection of the private life of public figures ( see paragraphs 65 - 66 above ). In this regard, the Court emphasises that the definition of what might constitute a subject of public interest will depend on the circumstances of each case ( see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 109, and Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 90). 98. It also reiterates that it has already had occasion to rule on different situations and has concluded that, although related to private life, they could legitimately be brought to the public ’ s attention. In those cases, it took into account a number of factors in ascertaining whether a publication disclosing elements of private life also concerned a question of public interest. Relevant factors include the importance of the question for the public and the nature of the information disclosed ( see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 109, and, in the context of the right to reputation, Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 90, with further references ). 99. In particular, it has accepted in the past that aspects of private life may be disclosed on account of the interest that the public may have in being informed about certain personality traits of the public figure concerned ( see Ojala and Etukeno Oy v. Finland, no. 69939/10, §§ 54 ‑ 55, 14 January 2014, and Ruusunen v. Finland, no. 73579/10, §§ 49 ‑ 50, 14 January 2014 in which the Court held that the date and the manner in which a former Finnish prime minister had entered a romantic relationship and the speed with which it had developed could be of public interest, in that it raised the question of whether he had been dishonest and lacked judgment in that regard ). It remains the case, however, that a person ’ s romantic relationships are, in principle, a strictly private matter. It follows that, in general, details concerning a couple ’ s sex life or intimate relations should only be permitted to be brought to the public ’ s knowledge without prior consent in exceptional circumstances. 100. The Court has also emphasised on numerous occasions that, although the public has a right to be informed, and this is an essential right in a democratic society which, in certain special circumstances, can even extend to aspects of the private life of public figures, articles aimed solely at satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership regarding the details of a person ’ s private life, however well known that person might be, cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate of general interest to society ( see Von Hannover, cited above, § 65; MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, no. 39401/04, § 143, 18 January 2011; and Alkaya v. Turkey, no. 42811/06, § 35, 9 October 2012). 101. Thus, an article about the alleged extramarital relationships of high-profile public figures who were senior State officials contributed only to the propagation of rumours, serving merely to satisfy the curiosity of a certain readership ( see Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 2), no. 21277/05, § 52, 4 June 2009). Equally, the publication of photographs showing scenes from the daily life of a princess who exercised no official functions was aimed merely at satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership ( see Von Hannover, cited above, § 65, with further references ). The Court reiterates in this connection that the public interest cannot be reduced to the public ’ s thirst for information about the private life of others, or to the reader ’ s wish for sensationalism or even voyeurism. 102. In order to ascertain whether a publication concerning an individual ’ s private life is not intended purely to satisfy the curiosity of a certain readership, but also relates to a subject of general importance, it is necessary to assess the publication as a whole and to examine whether, having regard to the context in which it appears (see Tønsbergs Blad A.S. and Haukom v. Norway, no. 510/04, § 87, 1 March 2007; Björk Eiðsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 46443/09, § 67, 10 July 2012; and Erla Hlynsdόttir v. Iceland, no. 43380/10, § 64, 10 July 2012), it relates to a question of public interest. 103. In this connection, the Court specifies that the public interest relates to matters which affect the public to such an extent that it may legitimately take an interest in them, which attract its attention or which concern it to a significant degree ( see The Sunday Times, cited above, § 66), especially in that they affect the well-being of citizens or the life of the community ( see Barthold v. Germany, 25 March 1985, § 58, Series A no. 90). This is also the case with regard to matters which are capable of giving rise to considerable controversy, which concern an important social issue ( see, for example, Erla Hlynsdόttir, cited above, § 64), or which involve a problem that the public would have an interest in being informed about ( see Tønsbergs Blad A.S. and Haukom, cited above, § 87). ( ii ) Contribution of the impugned article to a debate of public interest 104. In the present case, the domestic courts found a “lack of any topical news item” and “any debate on a matter of public interest” in the impugned publication, given that the child was barred from succession to the throne, a situation that “the company ’ s pleadings did not claim to be a subject of debate in French or Monegasque society or of examination in the article”. They thus held that the impugned article amounted to an invasion of the Prince ’ s private life, which could not in any way be justified by the “requirements of current - affairs reporting”, which they held to be “inexistent” ( see paragraphs 27 and 36 above ). 105. For its part, the Court considers that, in order to determine whether the content of the interview disclosing the Prince ’ s fatherhood could be understood as constituting information on a question of public interest, it is necessary to assess the article as a whole, as well as the substance of the information that is disclosed in it. In this connection and having regard to the observations of the domestic courts (see paragraphs 20, 27 and 36 above) and of the Government (see paragraph 70 above), the Court accepts that the interview with Ms Coste contained numerous details about the Prince ’ s private life and his real or supposed feelings which, in the circumstances of the case, are not directly related to a debate of public interest. 106. Nonetheless, the Court considers that the subject of the article cannot be regarded as disclosing only the relationship between Ms Coste and the Prince, unless the scope of the concept of public interest is greatly restricted. There is no doubt that the publication, taken as a whole and in context, and analysed in the light of the above-mentioned case-law precedents (see paragraphs 98 - 103 above), also concerned a matter of public interest. 107. In this regard, the Court considers it useful at the outset to point out that although a birth is an event of an intimate nature, it does not come solely within the private sphere of the persons concerned by it, but also falls within the public sphere, since it is in principle accompanied by a public statement (the civil-status document) and the establishment of a legal parent-child relationship. Thus, the purely private and family interest represented by a person ’ s descent is supplemented by a public aspect, related to the social and legal structure of kinship. A news report about a birth cannot therefore be considered, in itself, as a disclosure concerning exclusively the details of the private life of others, intended merely to satisfy the public ’ s curiosity. 108. Further, having regard to the specific features of the Principality of Monaco, in which “the links between the sovereign and the Monegasque Family are very close” and “the monarchy ... is based on the union between the Prince and the national community” [1], the Court considers that there is an undeniable public -interest value – at least for the subjects of the Principality – in the existence of a child (particularly a son) of the Prince, who was known at the relevant time as being single and childless. The fact that the Prince ’ s son was born out of wedlock is irrelevant in this regard. At the material time this child ’ s birth was not without possible dynastic and financial implications: the Prince was still unmarried and the question of legitimation by marriage could be raised, even if such an outcome was improbable. 109. Indeed, the consequences of the birth on the succession were mentioned in the article, which related the warning attributed to the Prince ’ s adviser, who allegedly said: “ Do you realise that, if it ’ s a boy, they ’ ll use that to prevent Albert acceding to the throne, and the child will be able to claim the throne. ” They were also evident in Ms Coste ’ s remarks when she stated: “ I didn ’ t want him to grow up like Mazarine ... I thought only about that, and not for a second about the fact that he represented a potential heir. ” Thus, reference was also made to the reasons which may have incited the Prince to refuse to recognise his paternity officially and to prefer to keep it secret. In addition, through Ms Coste ’ s comments stating that she was “afraid for [her] son ’ s psychological health” and wished him “to grow up normally, with a father”, the article also touched on the child ’ s best interests in having the father-child relationship, an important aspect of his personal identity, officially established. 110. At this stage, the Court reiterates, having regard to the Government ’ s argument that the article contained only a few lines on the issue of the child ’ s status as a potential heir ( see paragraph 68 above ), that the only decisive question is whether a news report is capable of contributing to a debate of public interest, and not whether it achieves this objective in full ( see Haldimann and Others v. Switzerland, no. 21830/09, § 57, ECHR 2015 ). It notes that, for an article to contribute to a debate of public interest, it is not necessary that it be devoted entirely to that; it may be enough for the article to be concerned with that debate and to contain one or several elements for that purpose ( see Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway, no. 13258/09, § 37, 16 January 2014; Ojala and Etukeno Oy, cited above, § 54; and Ruusunen, cited above, § 49). 111. In the present case, the impugned information was not without political import, and could arouse the interest of the public with regard to the rules of succession in force in the Principality (which prevented children born outside marriage from succeeding to the throne). Likewise, the attitude of the Prince, who wished to keep his paternity a secret and refused to acknowledge it publicly (see paragraphs 25 and 27 above), could, in a hereditary monarchy whose future is intrinsically linked to the existence of descendants, also be of concern to the public. This was equally true with regard to his behaviour in respect of the child ’ s mother – who was unable to obtain either the notarial deed of recognition of her son, or its transcription into the register of births, marriages and deaths ( see paragraph 17 above ) – and the child himself: this information could provide insights into the Prince ’ s personality, particularly with regard to the way in which he approached and assumed his responsibilities. 112. In this context, it is important to reiterate the symbolic role of a hereditary monarchy. In such a monarchy, the Prince embodies the unity of the nation. It follows that certain events affecting the members of the ruling family, while they are part of the latter ’ s private lives, are also part of contemporary history. This was the Court ’ s conclusion, in particular, with regard to the illness of Prince Rainier III (see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, §§ 38 and 117). In the Court ’ s opinion, this is also the case with regard to the birth of a child, even one born out of wedlock, especially since, at the date of the impugned events, the child in question appeared to be the Prince ’ s only descendant. In a constitutional hereditary monarchy, the person of the Prince and his direct line are also representative of the continuity of the State. 113. Consequently, the Court considers that, although the impugned article admittedly contained numerous details which concerned solely private or even intimate details of the Prince ’ s life, it was also intended to contribute to a debate on a matter of public interest ( see paragraphs 105 - 12 above ), as submitted by the applicants both before the domestic courts and before the Court ( see paragraphs 30 - 33 and 52 - 53 above ). 114. Having regard to the domestic courts ’ conclusions in this regard (see paragraph 104 above), the Court considers it useful to emphasise that the press ’ s contribution to a debate of public interest cannot be limited merely to current events or pre-existing debates. Admittedly, the press is a vector for disseminating debates on matters of public interest, but it also has the role of revealing and bringing to the public ’ s attention information capable of eliciting such interest and of giving rise to such a debate within society. Moreover, in view of the articles published in the Daily Mail and in Bunte ( see paragraphs 9 and 11 above ), the Court notes that the child ’ s status as a potential heir was already a matter of public discussion. 115. Accordingly, it considers that the national courts ought to have assessed the publication as a whole in order to determine its subject matter accurately, rather than examining the remarks concerning the Prince ’ s private life out of their context. In the event, however, they refused to take into consideration the interest that the article ’ s central message – namely the existence of a child who had been fathered by the Prince – could have for the public, and instead concentrated on the details provided by Ms Coste about the couple ’ s intimate relationship. In so doing, they deprived the public -interest justification relied upon by the applicants of any effectiveness. 116. In this case, however, having regard to the nature of the information in issue, the Court finds no reason to doubt that, in publishing Ms Coste ’ s account, the applicants could be understood as having contributed to the coverage of a subject of public interest. ( b ) How well known is the person concerned and what is the subject of the news report? ( i ) Consequences of the classification as a “public figure” 117. The Court reiterates that the role or function of the person concerned and the nature of the activities that are the subject of the news report and/or photograph constitute another important criterion to be taken into consideration ( see Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 110, and Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 91). The extent to which an individual has a public profile or is well known influences the protection that may be afforded to his or her private life. Thus, the Court has acknowledged on numerous occasions that the public was entitled to be informed about certain aspects of the private life of public figures (see, inter alia, Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, no. 53678/00, § 45, ECHR 2004 ‑ X). 118. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between private individuals and persons acting in a public context, as political figures or public figures. A fundamental distinction needs to be made between reporting details of the private life of an individual and reporting facts capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society, relating to politicians in the exercise of their official functions for example ( see Von Hannover, cited above, § 63, and Standard Verlags GmbH and Krawagna -Pfeifer v. Austria, no. 19710/02, § 47, 2 November 2006). 119. Thus, depending on whether or not he or she is vested with official functions, an individual will enjoy a more or less restricted right to his or her intimacy : in this regard, the right of public figures to keep their private life secret is, in principle, wider where they do not hold any official functions (even if, as members of a ruling family, they represent that family at certain events; see Von Hannover, cited above, §§ 76-77) and is more restricted where they do hold such a function ( see, for example, Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, § 42, Series A no. 103, and Ojala and Etukeno Oy, cited above, § 52). 120. The fact of exercising a public function or of aspiring to political office necessarily exposes an individual to the attention of his or her fellow citizens, including in areas that come within one ’ s private life. Accordingly, certain private actions by public figures cannot be regarded as such, given their potential impact in view of the role played by those persons on the political or social scene and the public ’ s resultant interest in being informed of them. The Court subscribes to the analysis of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, finding that “ public figures must recognise that the position they occupy in society – in many cases by choice – automatically entails increased pressure on their privacy” ( point 6 of Resolution 1165 (1998), see paragraph 43 above). 121. Thus, the Court has found in particular that politicians inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny of their every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large (see, inter alia, Lingens, cited above, § 42). Furthermore, this principle applies not only to politicians, but to every person who is part of the public sphere, whether through their actions (see, to this effect, Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG v. Austria, no. 34315/96, § 37, 26 February 2002, and News Verlags GmbH & Co.KG v. Austria, no. 31457/96, § 54, ECHR 2000 ‑ I) or their position (see Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria (no. 2), no. 10520/02, § 36, 14 December 2006). 122. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, even where a person is known to the general public, he or she may rely on a “legitimate expectation” of protection of and respect for his or her private life (see, inter alia, Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, § 97). Thus, the fact that an individual belongs to the category of public figures cannot in any way, even in the case of persons exercising official functions, authorise the media to violate the professional and ethical principles which must govern their actions, or legitimise intrusions into private life. 123. It follows that an individual ’ s celebrity or functions cannot under any circumstances justify hounding by the media or the publication of photographs obtained through fraudulent or clandestine operations (see, with regard to photographs taken using a telephoto lens and without the knowledge of the persons concerned, Von Hannover, cited above, § 68) or those portraying details of an individual ’ s private life and representing an intrusion into their intimacy (see, with regard to the publication of photographs relating to an alleged adulterous relationship, Campmany and Lopez Galiacho Perona v. Spain ( dec. ), no. 54224/00, ECHR 2000 ‑ XII). 124. In the present case, the Court notes that the Prince is a person who, through his birth as a member of a ruling family and his public functions, both political and representative, as Head of State, is undeniably a prominent public figure. The domestic courts ought therefore to have considered the extent to which this prominence and those public functions were capable of influencing the protection which could be afforded to his private life. Yet they refrained from including this circumstance in their assessment of the facts submitted for their examination. Thus, although it reiterated that an exception could be made to the principle of protection of private life whenever the facts disclosed could give rise to a debate on account of their impact given the status or function of the person concerned ( see paragraph 26 above ), the Versailles Court of Appeal drew no conclusion from that consideration in the present case. Equally, the Court of Cassation merely stated, in a general manner, that “every person, whatever his rank, birth, fortune or present or future functions, [was] entitled to respect for his private life” ( see paragraph 36 above ). 125. Indeed, given that the expectation of protection of private life may be reduced on account of the public functions exercised, the Court considers that, in order to ensure a fair balancing of the interests at stake, the domestic courts, in assessing the facts submitted for their examination, ought to have taken into account the potential impact of the Prince ’ s status as Head of State, and to have attempted, in that context, to determine the parts of the impugned article that belonged to the strictly private domain and what fell within the public sphere. ( ii ) The subject of the publication 126. The Court observes at the outset that the impugned publication admittedly concerned the sphere of the Prince ’ s private life, in that it described his love life and his relationship with his son. Nonetheless, referring to its previous findings ( see paragraphs 106 - 14 above ), it considers that the essential element of the information contained in the article – the child ’ s existence – went beyond the private sphere, given the hereditary nature of the Prince ’ s functions as the Monegasque Head of State. Further, given that the Prince had appeared on several occasions in public alongside Ms Coste (see paragraphs 14 and 16 above), the Court considers that the existence of his relationship with her was no longer purely a matter concerning his private life. 127. The Court would then emphasise that the Prince ’ s private life was not the sole subject of the article, but that it also concerned the private life of Ms Coste and her son, over whom Ms Coste alone had parental responsibility. Thus, it also contained details about the interviewee ’ s pregnancy, her own feelings, the birth of her son, a health problem suffered by the child and their life together ( see paragraph 14 above ). These were elements relating to Ms Coste ’ s private life, in respect of which she was certainly not bound to silence and was free to communicate. In this regard, the Court cannot ignore the fact that the disputed article was a means of expression for the interviewee and her son. 128. In addition, in securing the impugned publication, Ms Coste was motivated by a personal interest, namely obtaining official recognition for her son, as is clearly reflected in the article ( see paragraphs 14 and 15 above ). The interview thus raised a question of public interest, but also concerned competing private interests : that of Ms Coste in securing recognition for her son, which was why she had contacted the media ( see paragraph 17 above ), that of the child in having his paternity established and that of the Prince in keeping that paternity secret. 129. The Court nonetheless agrees that, as the Government have submitted ( see paragraph 63 above ), Ms Coste ’ s right to freedom of expression for herself and her son is not directly in issue in the present case, given that Ms Coste was not a party to the proceedings before the domestic courts and is not a party to the proceedings before the Court. It emphasises, however, that the combination of elements relating to Ms Coste ’ s private life and to that of the Prince had to be taken into account in assessing the protection due to him. ( c ) Prior conduct of the person concerned 130. The Court notes that neither the domestic courts nor the parties commented on the Prince ’ s prior conduct. In the circumstances of the case, it considers that, short of speculating, the material in the case file is not in itself sufficient to enable it to take cognisance of or examine the Prince ’ s previous conduct with regard to the media. Moreover, the mere fact of having cooperated with the press on previous occasions cannot serve as an argument for depriving a person discussed in an article of all protection (see Egeland and Hanseid v. Norway, no. 34438/04, § 62, 16 April 2009). An individual ’ s alleged or real previous tolerance or accommodation with regard to publications touching on his or her private life does not necessarily deprive the person concerned of the right to privacy. ( d ) Method of obtaining the information and its veracity 131. The Court emphasises at the outset the importance that it attaches to journalists ’ assumption of their duties and responsibilities, and to the ethical principles governing their profession. In this connection, it reiterates that Article 10 protects journalists ’ right to divulge information on issues of general interest subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and that they provide “reliable and precise” information in accordance with the ethics of journalism ( see Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 54, ECHR 1999 ‑ I). 132. The fairness of the means used to obtain information and reproduce it for the public and the respect shown for the person who is the subject of the news report ( see Egeland and Hanseid, cited above, § 61 ) are also essential criteria to be taken into account. The reductive and truncated nature of an article, where it is liable to mislead the reader, is therefore likely to detract considerably from the importance of the said article ’ s contribution to a debate of public interest ( see Stoll, cited above, § 152). 133. Further, the Court would point out the particular circumstances of the present case compared with other cases examined by it in which the press had exposed the private life of public figures, including members of the Monegasque ruling family: in a decision which appears to have been personal, deliberate and informed, Ms Coste herself contacted Paris Match ( see paragraph 17 above ). 134. The veracity of Ms Coste ’ s statements with regard to the Prince ’ s paternity has not been contested by him, and he himself publicly acknowledged it shortly after the impugned article was published. In this connection, the Court reiterates the essential nature of the veracity of the disseminated information: respect for this principle is fundamental to the protection of the reputation of others. 135. As to the photographs which illustrate the interview, they were handed over voluntarily – as noted by the Versailles Court of Appeal ( see paragraph 27 above ) – and without charge to Paris Match by Ms Coste ( see paragraph 17 above ). In addition, the photographs showing the Prince with his child were not taken without his knowledge (contrast Von Hannover, cited above, § 68), or in circumstances showing him in an unfavourable light (compare Von Hannover (no. 2), cited above, §§ 121 ‑ 23). Admittedly, and in common with the domestic courts, the Court notes that the photographs showed the Prince in a private context and were published without his consent. However, they certainly did not present him in a light which might undermine his public standing from the reader ’ s perspective. Nor did they present a distorted image of him, and above all they lent support to the content of the interview, illustrating the veracity of the information contained in it. 136. As to the photographs showing the Prince with Ms Coste, it is not disputed that these were taken in public places at events which were themselves public, so their publication raises no particular issues in the circumstances of the present case. ( e ) Content, form and consequences of the impugned article 137. The Government criticised the applicants for having given the published information a sensationalist spin and for failing to filter Ms Coste ’ s disclosures with a view to excluding those which concerned the intimate details of the Prince ’ s life ( see paragraphs 71 - 72 above ). For their part, the domestic courts noted that the impugned publication contained multiple digressions about the circumstances of Ms Coste ’ s meeting with the Prince, the Prince ’ s reaction to the announcement of Ms Coste ’ s pregnancy and his subsequent conduct towards the child ( see paragraphs 27 and 36 above ). 138. In this regard, the Court notes firstly that, in exercising their profession, journalists make decisions on a daily basis through which they determine the dividing line between the public ’ s right to information and the rights of others to respect for their private lives. They thus have primary responsibility for protecting individuals, including public figures, from any intrusion into their private life. The choices that they make in this regard must be based on their profession ’ s ethical rules and codes of conduct. 139. Secondly, the Court reiterates that the approach used to cover a subject is a matter of journalistic freedom. It is not for it, nor for the national courts, to substitute their own views for those of the press in this area (see Jersild, cited above, § 31). Article 10 of the Convention also leaves it for journalists to decide what details ought to be published to ensure an article ’ s credibility (see Fressoz and Roire, cited above, § 54). In addition, journalists enjoy the freedom to choose, from the news items that come to them, which they will deal with and how they will do so. This freedom, however, is not devoid of responsibilities (see paragraphs 131-32 above ). 140. Wherever information bringing into play the private life of another person is in issue, journalists are required to take into account, in so far as possible, the impact of the information and pictures to be published prior to their dissemination. In particular, certain events relating to private and family life enjoy particularly attentive protection under Article 8 of the Convention and must therefore lead journalists to show prudence and caution when covering them ( see Editions Plon, cited above, §§ 47 and 53, and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, §§ 46 ‑ 49). 141. In the present case, the impugned publication was presented as an interview made up of questions and answers, reproducing Ms Coste ’ s statements without any journalistic commentary. Moreover, the tone of the interview appeared to be measured and non-sensationalist. Ms Coste ’ s remarks are recognisable as quotations and her motives are also clearly set out for the readers. Equally, readers can easily distinguish between what is factual material and what concerns the interviewee ’ s perception of the events, her opinions or her personal feelings ( see paragraph 14 above ). 142. The Court has already had occasion to state that punishing a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another person in an interview would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so (see Jersild, cited above, § 35, and Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, no. 34147/06, §§ 47-48, 21 September 2010). It considers that the same approach should prevail in the circumstances of the present case, given that, over and above the Prince ’ s private life, the impugned publication concerned a matter of public interest, especially since the details provided by Ms Coste about her relationship with the Prince were not such as to undermine his reputation or arouse contempt towards him ( contrast Ojala and Etukeno Oy, cited above, § 56, and Ruusunen, cited above, § 51). Indeed, it is not disputed that Ms Coste ’ s account of her life and her personal relationship with the Prince was sincere and that it was faithfully reported by the applicants. In addition, there is no cause to doubt that, in publishing this account, the applicants ’ intention was to communicate to the public news that was of general interest ( see paragraph 116 above ). 143. Moreover, it was for the domestic courts to assess the impugned interview in such a way as to differentiate and weigh up what, in Ms Coste ’ s personal remarks, was likely to fall within the core area of the Prince ’ s private life (compare Ojala and Etukeno Oy, cited above, § 56, and Ruusunen, cited above, § 51 ) and what could be of legitimate interest to the public. Yet they failed to do so, denying that there was any “topical” value to the news about the existence of the Prince ’ s son and finding that it did not form part of “any debate on a matter of public interest which would have justified its being reported ... on the grounds of legitimate imparting of information to the public” ( see paragraph 36 above ). 144. Admittedly, the interview was placed in a narrative setting accompanied by graphic effects and headlines which were intended to attract the reader ’ s attention and provoke a reaction ( see paragraphs 15 ‑ 16 above ). Having regard to the Government ’ s criticisms on this point ( see paragraph 72 above ), the Court emphasises that the presentation of a press article and the style used in it are a matter of editorial decision, on which it is not in principle for it, or for the domestic courts, to pass judgment. Nonetheless, it also reiterates that journalistic freedom is not unlimited and that the press must not overstep certain bounds in this connection, in particular “the protection ... of the rights of others” ( see, inter alia, Mosley, cited above, § 113, and MGN Limited, cited above, § 141). In the present case, it considers that, viewed as a whole, this narrative presentation, created through the addition of headlines, photographs and captions, does not distort the content of the information and does not deform it, but must be considered as its transposition or illustration. 145. Moreover, the use of certain expressions ( see paragraphs 15 ‑ 16 above ) which, to all intents and purposes, were designed to attract the public ’ s attention cannot in itself raise an issue under the Court ’ s case-law (see Tănăsoaica v. Romania, no. 3490/03, § 41, 19 June 2012) : the magazine cannot be criticised for enhancing the article and striving to present it attractively, provided that this does not distort or deform the information published and is not such as to mislead the reader. 146. With regard to the photographs illustrating the article which show the Prince holding the child, the Court reiterates first of all that, in essence, Article 10 leaves it for journalists to decide whether or not it is necessary to reproduce such documents to ensure credibility (see, in particular, Fressoz and Roire, cited above, § 54, and Pinto Coelho v. Portugal, no. 28439/08, § 38, 28 June 2011 ). 147. It further notes that the Court of Cassation held that “ the publication of photographs of a person to illustrate subsequent content which amount [ ed ] to an invasion of his privacy necessarily infringe[d] his right to control of his own image” ( see paragraph 36 above ). 148. The Court considers that, while there is no doubt in the present case that these photographs fell within the realm of the Prince ’ s private life and that he had not consented to their publication, their link with the impugned article was not tenuous, artificial or arbitrary ( see Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 3), no. 8772/10, §§ 50 and 52, 19 September 2013). Their publication could be justified by the fact that they added credibility to the account of events. At the time of their publication, given that Ms Coste had been unable to obtain the notarial deed recognising her son ( see paragraphs 14 and 17 above ), she had at her disposal no other evidence which would have enabled her to substantiate her account and enable the applicants to forgo publication of the photographs. In consequence, although publication of these photographs had the effect of exposing the Prince ’ s private life to the public, the Court considers that they supported the account given in the article, which has already been found to have contributed to a debate of public interest ( see paragraph 113 above ). 149. Furthermore, taken alone or in conjunction with the accompanying text ( be this the headlines, subheadings and captions, or the interview itself ), these photographs were not defamatory, pejorative or derogatory for the Prince ’ s image (contrast Egeland and Hanseid, cited above, § 61); indeed, the latter did not allege that there had been damage to his reputation. 150. Lastly, with regard to the consequences of the disputed article, the Court notes that shortly after the article was published, the Prince publicly acknowledged his paternity. The Versailles Court of Appeal held in this connection that he had been “obliged” to provide a public explanation about a matter relating to his private life ( see paragraph 27 above ). For its part, the Court considers that the consequences of the publication must be put into perspective, in the light of the articles which had previously appeared in the Daily Mail and in Bunte. However, in the present case the domestic courts do not appear to have evaluated the consequences in the wider context of the international media coverage already given to the events described in the article. Thus, they attached no weight to the fact that the secrecy surrounding the Prince ’ s paternity had already been undermined by the previous articles in other media ( see paragraphs 9 and 11 above ). ( f ) The severity of the sanction 151. The Court reiterates that in the context of assessing proportionality, irrespective of whether or not the sanction imposed was a minor one, what matters is the very fact of judgment being given against the person concerned, including where such a ruling is solely civil in nature (see, mutatis mutandis, Roseiro Bento v. Portugal, no. 29288/02, § 45, 18 April 2006). Any undue restriction on freedom of expression effectively entails a risk of obstructing or paralysing future media coverage of similar questions. 152. In the present case, the applicant company was ordered to pay EUR 50, 000 in damages and to publish a statement detailing the judgment. The Court cannot consider those penalties to be insignificant. ( g ) Conclusion 153. In the light of all of the above-mentioned considerations, the Court considers that the arguments advanced by the Government with regard to the protection of the Prince ’ s private life and of his right to his own image, although relevant, cannot be regarded as sufficient to justify the interference in issue. In assessing the circumstances submitted for their appreciation, the domestic courts did not give due consideration to the principles and criteria as laid down by the Court ’ s case-law for balancing the right to respect for private life and the right to freedom of expression ( see paragraphs 142 - 43 above ). They thus exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded to them and failed to strike a reasonable balance of proportionality between the measures restricting the applicants ’ right to freedom of expression, imposed by them, and the legitimate aim pursued. The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 154. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 155. The applicants stated that they hoped to obtain just satisfaction which would compensate for the cost of the damages awarded and of the compulsory publication order imposed by the domestic courts. However, they did not quantify their claims under this head. 156. The Government did not comment on those claims before the Grand Chamber. 157. The Court reiterates that under Rule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Court itemised particulars of any claim made under Article 41 of the Convention must be submitted, together with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, failing which the claim may be rejected in whole or in part. In the present case, the applicants have not submitted particulars of their claims in respect of the damage sustained, nor provided the necessary supporting documents. It follows that the Court cannot allow their claim for compensation. B. Costs and expenses 158. The applicants claimed the sum of EUR 38, 463. 61 as reimbursement of the costs incurred by them in the proceedings before the national courts. They submitted fee notes and invoices in support of their claim. 159. The Government did not comment on those claims before the Grand Chamber. 160. The Court reiterates that costs and expenses will not be reimbursed under Article 41 unless it is established that they were actually incurred, were necessarily incurred and were also reasonable as to quantum. It also reiterates that it may award the applicant not only the costs and expenses incurred before it but also those incurred before the national courts for prevention and redress of the violation ( see Elsholz v. Germany [GC], no. 25735/94, § 7 3, ECHR 2000 ‑ VIII). 161. In the present case, taking account of the documents in its possession and the above-mentioned criteria, the Grand Chamber finds it reasonable to award the applicants jointly EUR 15,000 under this head. C. Default interest 162. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention, finding that the arguments advanced by the French Government with regard to the protection of Prince Albert’s private life and of his right to his own image could not be regarded as sufficient to justify interfering with the judgment in question, and that the domestic courts had not given due consideration to the principles and criteria for balancing the right to respect for private life and the right to freedom of expression. The Court considered in particular that, given the nature of the information in question, the applicants could be understood as having contributed to the coverage of a subject of public interest. It further observed that the disputed publication admittedly concerned the sphere of Prince Albert’s private life, but found that the essential element of the information contained in the article – the child’s existence – went beyond the private sphere, given the hereditary nature of the Prince’s functions as the Monegasque Head of State.