Cases concerning NATO operations in Afghanistan
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE International MaterialUnited Nations Security Council Resolutions and international agreements concerning Afghanistan and ISAFAgreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions of 5 December 2001 (“the Bonn Agreement”) United Nations Security Council Resolutions and international agreements concerning Afghanistan and ISAFAgreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions of 5 December 2001 (“the Bonn Agreement”) Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions of 5 December 2001 (“the Bonn Agreement”) United Nations Security Council Resolutions and international agreements concerning Afghanistan and ISAFAgreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions of 5 December 2001 (“the Bonn Agreement”) Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions of 5 December 2001 (“the Bonn Agreement”) Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions of 5 December 2001 (“the Bonn Agreement”) 71. The relevant passages of the above agreement read as follows: “The participants in the UN talks on Afghanistan, ... Reaffirming the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice, ... Recognizing that some time may be required for a new Afghan security force to be fully constituted and functional and that therefore other security provisions detailed in Annex I to this agreement must meanwhile be put in place, ... Have agreed as follows: THE INTERIM AUTHORITY ... V. Final provisions ... 3) The Interim Authority shall cooperate with the international community in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime. It shall commit itself to respect international law and maintain peaceful and friendly relations with neighbouring countries and the rest of the international community. ... ANNEX I INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE 1. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan recognize that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves. To this end, they pledge their commitment to do all within their means and influence to ensure such security, including for all United Nations and other personnel of international governmental and non-governmental organizations deployed in Afghanistan. 2. With this objective in mind, the participants request the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces. 3. Conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and functioning, the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centres and other areas. 4. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan pledge to withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in which the UN mandated force is deployed. It would also be desirable if such a force were to assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan’s infrastructure.” United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001 72. The above resolution reads as follows: “The Security Council, Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1378 (2001) of 14 November 2001 and 1383 (2001) of 6 December 2001, Supporting international efforts to root out terrorism, in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirming also its resolutions 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 and 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, Welcoming developments in Afghanistan that will allow for all Afghans to enjoy inalienable rights and freedom unfettered by oppression and terror, Recognizing that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghan themselves, Reiterating its endorsement of the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001 (S/2001/1154) (the Bonn Agreement), Taking note of the request to the Security Council in Annex 1, paragraph 3, to the Bonn Agreement to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of an international security force, as well as the briefing on 14 December 2001 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on his contacts with the Afghan authorities in which they welcome the deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations-authorized international security force, Taking note of the letter dated 19 December 2001 from Dr. Abdullah Abdullah to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/1223), Welcoming the letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General of 19 December 2001 (S/2001/1217), and taking note of the United Kingdom offer contained therein to take the lead in organizing and commanding an International Security Assistance Force, Stressing that all Afghan forces must adhere strictly to their obligations under human rights law, including respect for the rights of women, and under international humanitarian law, Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force, in consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority established by the Bonn Agreement, Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Authorizes, as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment; 2. Calls upon Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to the International Security Assistance Force, and invites those Member States to inform the leadership of the Force and the Secretary-General; 3. Authorizes the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate; 4. Calls upon the International Security Assistance Force to work in close consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority in the implementation of the force mandate, as well as with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General; 5. Calls upon all Afghans to cooperate with the International Security Assistance Force and relevant international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and welcomes the commitment of the parties to the Bonn Agreement to do all within their means and influence to ensure security, including to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of all United Nations personnel and all other personnel of international governmental and non-governmental organizations deployed in Afghanistan; 6. Takes note of the pledge made by the Afghan parties to the Bonn Agreement in Annex 1 to that Agreement to withdraw all military units from Kabul, and calls upon them to implement this pledge in cooperation with the International Security Assistance Force; 7. Encourages neighbouring States and other Member States to provide to the International Security Assistance Force such necessary assistance as may be requested, including the provision of overflight clearances and transit; 8. Stresses that the expenses of the International Security Assistance Force will be borne by the participating Member States concerned, requests the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund through which contributions could be channelled to the Member States or operations concerned, and encourages Member States to contribute to such a fund; 9. Requests the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force to provide periodic reports on progress towards the implementation of its mandate through the Secretary-General; 10. Calls on Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to provide assistance to help the Afghan Interim Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces; 11. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.” Subsequent United Nations Security Council Resolutions 73. In its Resolution 1510 (2003) of 13 October 2003 the United Nations Security Council expanded the mandate of ISAF to areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs. 74. In addition, the United Nations Security Council continuously renewed the authorisation for ISAF given by Resolution 1386 (2001). For the relevant time, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1833 (2008) of 22 September 2008 extended the authorisation for a period of twelve months beyond 13 October 2008. The relevant parts read: “The Security Council, ... Recognizing that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghan Authorities, stressing the role of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in assisting the Afghan Government to improve the security situation and welcoming the cooperation of the Afghan Government with ISAF, ... Stressing the central and impartial role that the United Nations continues to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading the efforts of the international community, noting, in this context, the synergies in the objectives of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and of ISAF, and stressing the need for strengthened cooperation, coordination and mutual support, taking due account of their respective designated responsibilities, ... Expressing also its concern over the harmful consequences of violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups on the capacity of the Afghan Government to guarantee the rule of law, to provide security and basic services to the Afghan people, and to ensure the full enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, Reiterating its support for the continuing endeavours by the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition, to improve the security situation and to continue to address the threat posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups, and stressing in this context the need for sustained international efforts, including those of ISAF and the OEF coalition, ... Recognizing the efforts taken by ISAF and other international forces to minimize the risk of civilian casualties, and calling on them to take additional robust efforts in this regard, notably by the continuous review of tactics and procedures and the conduct of after-action reviews and investigations in cooperation with the Afghan Government in cases where civilian casualties have occurred and when the Afghan Government finds these joint investigations appropriate, ... Recalling the leading role that the Afghan Authorities will play for the organization of the next presidential elections, with the assistance of the United Nations, and stressing the importance of the assistance to be provided to the Afghan Authorities by ISAF in ensuring a secure environment conducive to the elections, ... Expressing its appreciation for the leadership provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and for the contributions of many nations to ISAF and to the OEF coalition, including its maritime interdiction component, which operates within the framework of the counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of ISAF, in coordination with the Afghan Government, Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides to extend the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force, as defined in resolution 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), for a period of twelve months beyond 13 October 2008; 2. Authorizes the Member States participating in ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate; ... 5. Calls upon ISAF to continue to work in close consultation with the Afghan Government and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the OEF coalition in the implementation of the force mandate; 6. Requests the leadership of ISAF to keep the Security Council regularly informed, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of its mandate, including through the provision of quarterly reports; 7. Decides to remain actively seized of this matter.” Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (“Interim Administration”) of 4 January 2002 75. The relevant part of the above-mentioned agreement reads as follows: “Article I: General Obligations ... 4. For the purpose of this Military Technical Agreement, the following expressions shall have the meaning described below: ... g. Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the area marked out on the map attached at Annex B. ... i. An ‘Offensive Action’ is any use of armed military force. ... Article II: Status of the International Security Force 1. The arrangements regarding the Status of the ISAF are at Annex A. Article III: Provision of Security and Law and Order 1. The Interim Administration recognises that the provision of security and law and order is their responsibility. This will include maintenance and support of a recognised Police Force operating in accordance with internationally recognised standards and Afghanistan law and with respect for internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking other measures as appropriate. 2. The Interim Administration will ensure that all Afghan Military Units come under its command and control in accordance with the Bonn Agreement. The Interim Administration agrees it will return all Military Units based in Kabul into designated barracks detailed at Annex C as soon as possible. Such units will not leave those Barracks without the prior approval of the Interim Administration and notification to the ISAF Commander by the Chairman of the Interim Administration. 3. The Interim Administration will refrain from All Offensive Action within the AOR. ... ANNEX A Arrangements Regarding the Status of the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF Status of Forces Agreement”) Section 1: Jurisdiction 1. The provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946 concerning experts on mission will apply mutatis mutandis to the ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel. ... 3. The ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, will under all circumstances and at all times be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national elements in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offences which may be committed by them on the territory of Afghanistan. The Interim Administration will assist the ISAF contributing nations in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions. 4. The ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, will be immune from personal arrest or detention. ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, mistakenly arrested or detained will be immediately handed over to ISAF authorities. The Interim Administration agree that ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, may not be surrendered to, or otherwise transferred to the custody of, an international tribunal or any other entity or State without the express consent of the contributing nation. ISAF Forces will respect the laws and culture of Afghanistan. ...” International law and practiceThe Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 76. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (“the Vienna Convention”) provides as follows: Article 31 General Rule of Interpretation “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” Case-law of the International Court of Justice 77. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (8 July 1996), the International Court of Justice stated as follows: “25. The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant for the Protection of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life, however, is not such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself. ... 41. The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law. As the Court stated in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) : there is a ‘specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law’ ( I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 94, para. 176). This dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the means of force employed.” 78. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (9 July 2004), the International Court of Justice rejected Israel’s argument that the human rights instruments to which it was a party were not applicable to occupied territory, and held: “106. ... the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.” 79. In its judgment concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) (19 December 2005), the International Court of Justice held as follows: “215. The Court, having established that the conduct of the UPDF [Uganda People’s Defence Force] and of the officers and soldiers of the UPDF is attributable to Uganda, must now examine whether this conduct constitutes a breach of Uganda’s international obligations. In this regard, the Court needs to determine the rules and principles of international human rights law and international humanitarian law which are relevant for this purpose. 216. The Court first recalls that it had occasion to address the issues of the relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law and of the applicability of international human rights law instruments outside national territory in its Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In this Advisory Opinion the Court found that ‘the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law.’ (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 178, para. 106.) It thus concluded that both branches of international law, namely international human rights law and international humanitarian law, would have to be taken into consideration. The Court further concluded that international human rights instruments are applicable ‘in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory’, particularly in occupied territories (ibid., pp. 178-181, paras. 107-113).” International humanitarian law 80. Article 50 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 (“Additional Protocol I”), which is applicable to international armed conflicts, defines civilians as persons who are not members of the armed forces. The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 8 June 1977 (“Additional Protocol II”), which is applicable to non-international armed conflicts, does not contain a definition of civilians. The definition of civilians in Additional Protocol I is a norm of customary international law which also applies to non-international armed conflicts (see Rule 5 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law study by the ICRC and the commentary thereon [2] ). Civilians are protected against attack in non-international armed conflict, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities (Article 13 (3) of Additional Protocol II and Rule 6 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law study). In respect of non-international armed conflicts, the Customary International Humanitarian Law study indicated that there was ambiguity whether members of armed opposition groups could be considered civilians and be attacked lawfully only for such time as they took a direct part in hostilities, or whether they were, due to their membership, either considered to be continuously taking a direct part in hostilities or considered not to be civilians (see commentary on Rules 5 and 6). In 2009, the ICRC published Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, [3] stating, inter alia, that in non-international armed conflict organised armed groups constituted the armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consisted only of individuals whose continuous function it was to take a direct part in hostilities (“continuous combat function”). Such members of organised armed groups belonging to a non-State party to an armed conflict ceased to be civilians, and lost protection against direct attack, for as long as they assumed their continuous combat function. 81. The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, set forth in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I, constitutes a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts (see Rules 11 to 13 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law study and the commentaries thereon). The principle of proportionality in attack, codified in Article 51(5)(b) and repeated in Article 57(2)(a)(iii) of Additional Protocol I, is recognised as a norm of customary international law which is applicable in both international and non-international armed conflict (see paragraph 77 above and Rule 14 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law study). It provides that launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited. State practice indicates that an ex ante perspective is decisive in this respect and Germany made a declaration to that effect upon ratification of Additional Protocol I. The principle of precautions in attack, codified in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, is a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts (see Rules 15 to 21 and the commentaries thereon). It provides that in the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects and that all feasible precautions must be taken, including in the choice of means and methods of warfare, to avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Everything feasible must be done to verify that targets are military objectives and to assess whether the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Each party to the conflict must give effective advance warning of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit, such as in cases where the element of surprise is essential to the success of an operation or to the security of the attacking forces. The obligation to take all “feasible” precautions has been interpreted by many States as being limited to those precautions which are practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances prevailing at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations. 82. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocol I, all of which are applicable to international armed conflict only (with the exception of the common Article 3 to the Conventions), place an obligation on each Contracting State to investigate and prosecute alleged grave breaches of the Conventions, including the wilful killing of protected persons. [4] Additional Protocol II does not contain a similar provision. Its Article 6 contains certain guarantees to be respected in the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences related to the armed conflict, including a court “offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality” and that the accused be informed “without delay” of the grounds against him. 83. It is an established norm of customary international humanitarian law which is also applicable in non-international armed conflicts, that States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects (see Rule 158 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law study and the commentary thereon). States engaging in multinational operations under the auspices of an international organisation are under the obligation to ensure respect for the entire body of international humanitarian law, including customary international humanitarian law, by their national contingent, including by the exercise of disciplinary and criminal powers retained by them. [5] 84. International humanitarian law assigns duties to commanders to ensure compliance with its rules, including in respect of initiating disciplinary or penal action against subordinates or other persons under their control (see Article 87 of Additional Protocol I and the ICRC commentary thereon [6] as well as Rule 153 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law study and commentary thereon in respect of the corresponding rule of command responsibility for failure to prevent, repress or report war crimes). 85. In 2019, the ICRC and the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights published the Guidelines on investigating violations of IHL: Law, policy and good practice (“Guidelines on investigating violations of IHL”). These Guidelines, while noting that international humanitarian law has few provisions on the specific way investigations should be carried out, draw on internationally recognised principles most commonly required for the effectiveness of an investigation (independence, impartiality, thoroughness and promptness, and in a modified form, transparency) and elucidate their practical application to investigations in armed conflict. United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (“UN Basic Principles and Guidelines”) 86. The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005 (A/RES/60/147), call for States to investigate violations of international humanitarian law “effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially” (under II., 3. lit. b). United Nations Human Rights Committee 87. In its General Comment No. 36 on the right to life under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on 30 October 2018, the Human Rights Committee stated: “63. ... In light of article 2 (1) of the Covenant, a State party has an obligation to respect and ensure the rights under article 6 of all persons who are within its territory and all persons subject to its jurisdiction, that is, all persons over whose enjoyment of the right to life it exercises power or effective control. This includes persons located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State whose right to life is nonetheless affected by its military or other activities in a direct and reasonably foreseeable manner ... 64. Like the rest of the Covenant, article 6 continues to apply also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable, including to the conduct of hostilities. While rules of international humanitarian law may be relevant for the interpretation and application of article 6 when the situation calls for their application, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive. Use of lethal force consistent with international humanitarian law and other applicable international law norms is, in general, not arbitrary. By contrast, practices inconsistent with international humanitarian law, entailing a risk to the lives of civilians and other persons protected by international humanitarian law, including the targeting of civilians, civilian objects and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, indiscriminate attacks, failure to apply the principles of precaution and proportionality, and the use of human shields would also violate article 6 of the Covenant. States parties should, in general, disclose the criteria for attacking with lethal force individuals or objects whose targeting is expected to result in deprivation of life, including the legal basis for specific attacks, the process of identification of military targets and combatants or persons taking a direct part in hostilities, the circumstances in which relevant means and methods of warfare have been used, and whether less harmful alternatives were considered. They must also investigate alleged or suspected violations of article 6 in situations of armed conflict in accordance with the relevant international standards ...” The Minnesota Protocol 88. In 2017, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights published a revised version of the Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death (“the Minnesota Protocol”), a set of international guidelines, which provides: “21. Where, during the conduct of hostilities, it appears that casualties have resulted from an attack, a post-operation assessment should be conducted to establish the facts, including the accuracy of the targeting. Where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a war crime was committed, the State must conduct a full investigation and prosecute those who are responsible. Where any death is suspected or alleged to have resulted from a violation of IHL that would not amount to a war crime, and where an investigation (‘official inquiry’) into the death is not specifically required under IHL, at a minimum further inquiry is necessary. In any event, where evidence of unlawful conduct is identified, a full investigation should be conducted.” Inter-American Court of Human Rights 89. In its judgment of 15 September 2005 on the merits, reparations and costs in Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, which concerned a massacre of civilians carried out by a paramilitary group with the alleged assistance of the State authorities, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognised the existence of a non-international armed conflict and stated that it would take international humanitarian law into account in interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights (paragraphs 114-15). The court went on to determine that the standard against which the investigations into the extra-legal executions had to be measured was one of a “serious, impartial and effective investigation that must not be undertaken as a mere formality destined beforehand to be fruitless” (paragraph 223). Such investigation must draw on all available means in order to discover the truth within a reasonable timeframe, bearing in mind the complexity of the events under investigation and their context (see, in particular, Afro-Descendant Communities Displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 20 November 2013, paragraphs 370-73). Comparative law MATERIAL 90. According to the information available to the Court, notably of the legislation and practice in thirteen member States of the Council of Europe which participate in military operations abroad (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom), all of these States empowered the competent domestic authorities to investigate alleged war crimes or wrongful deaths inflicted abroad by members of their armed forces. The investigation is mandatory in eight States; in three States it is in principle non-mandatory according to the broader meaning of discretionary prosecution ( opportunité des poursuites ). The duty to investigate is considered as essentially autonomous in seven States, while in two States it depends on the State jurisdiction to a larger extent, although it seems that attribution to the State of the impugned acts is not a necessary requirement. As regards the procedural guarantees during the investigation of criminal offences allegedly committed by members of the armed forces abroad, domestic law in ten States refers to the general procedural guarantees applicable in any criminal case, whereas in two States, specific legal provisions or principles apply, the extent and quality of which do, however, not seem to be substantially different from those applicable in ordinary criminal cases. Domestic law and practiceAuthorisation of the deployment of German troops as part of ISAF Authorisation of the deployment of German troops as part of ISAF Authorisation of the deployment of German troops as part of ISAF 91. On 22 December 2001 the German Parliament authorised the deployment of German troops to Afghanistan and their participation in ISAF. The authorisation referred to the Bonn Agreement and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) regarding the tasks and responsibilities of the troops. Moreover, the authorisation clarified the right to individual and collective self-defence: “The exercise of the right to individual and collective self-defence remains unaffected [by the participation in ISAF]. The troops deployed in this [ISAF] operation are further authorised to use military force for the defence of others.” 92. On 16 October 2008 the German Parliament prolonged the deployment of German troops in Afghanistan until 13 December 2009. Basic Law ( Grundgesetz ) 93. Article 25 of the German Basic Law reads as follows: “The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.” Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch) 94. In June 2002, the Code of Crimes against International Law was adopted and entered into force, amending domestic law with a view to the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“the Rome Statute”) on 1 July 2002, including in respect of Germany. Article 153f of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 96 below) was introduced at the same time. A key objective of the legislative amendments was to enable the investigation and prosecution of offences falling within the scope of the Rome Statute at the domestic level, not least in view of the principle of complementarity foreseen in the Rome Statute (see Publication of the Federal Parliament ( Bundestagsdrucksache ) no. 14/8524, at p. 12). 95. The relevant provisions of the Code of Crimes against International Law, as in force at the material time, read as follows: Article 1 “This Act shall apply to all criminal offences against international law designated under this Act and to serious criminal offences designated therein even when the offence was committed abroad and has no connection to Germany.” Article 2 “General criminal law shall apply to offences under this Act, except insofar as Articles 1 and 3 to 5 of this Act contain special provisions.” Article 11 War crimes consisting in the use of prohibited methods of warfare “(1) Whoever in connection with an international armed conflict or with an armed conflict not of an international character ... 3. carries out an attack by military means and anticipates with certainty that the attack will cause death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects on a scale out of proportion to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated, ... shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than three years. ... (2) Where the perpetrator causes the death or serious injury of a civilian (Article 226 of the Criminal Code) or of a person who is protected under international humanitarian law through an offence pursuant to paragraph (1), numbers 1 to 6, he shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than five years. Where the perpetrator intentionally causes death, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life or for not less than ten years. ...” Criminal investigations 96. The relevant provisions of the German Code of Criminal Procedure regulating criminal investigations read as follows: Article 152 “(1) The public prosecutor’s office shall have the authority to prefer public charges. (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, the public prosecutor’s office shall be obliged to take action in relation to all prosecutable criminal offences, provided there are sufficient factual indications.” Article 153c “(1) The public prosecutor’s office may dispense with prosecuting criminal offences 1. which have been committed outside the territorial scope of this statute ...; ... Offences for which there is criminal liability pursuant to the Code of Crimes against International Law shall be subject to Article 153f. ...” Article 153f “(1) The public prosecutor’s office may dispense with prosecuting a criminal offence for which there is criminal liability pursuant to Articles 6 to 14 of the Code of Crimes against International Law in the cases referred to in Article 153c § 1, numbers 1 and 2, if the suspect is not resident in Germany and is not expected to so reside. If, in the cases referred to in Article 153c § 1, number 1, the suspect is a German national, however, this shall only apply if the offence is being prosecuted before an international court of justice or by a State on whose territory the offence was committed or a citizen of which was injured by the offence. (2) The public prosecutor’s office may dispense with prosecuting an offence for which there is criminal liability under Articles 6 to 14 of the Code of Crimes against International Law in the cases referred to in Article 153c § 1, numbers 1 and 2, in particular if 1. no German national is suspected of having committed the crime; 2. the offence was not committed against a German national; 3. no suspect is, or is expected to be, resident in Germany; 4. the offence is being prosecuted by an international court of justice or by a country on whose territory the offence was committed, a citizen of which is either suspected of the offence, or suffered injury as a result of the offence. ...” Article 160 “(1) As soon as the public prosecutor’s office obtains knowledge of a suspected criminal offence either through a criminal information or by other means it shall investigate the facts to decide whether public charges are to be preferred. (2) The public prosecutor’s office shall ascertain not only incriminating but also exonerating circumstances and shall ensure that evidence, the loss of which is to be feared, is taken. ...” Article 170 “(1) If the investigations provide sufficient reason for preferring public charges, the public prosecutor’s office shall prefer them by submitting a bill of indictment to the competent court. (2) In all other cases the public prosecutor’s office shall terminate the proceedings. The public prosecutor shall notify the suspect thereof if he was examined as such or a warrant of arrest was issued against him; the same shall apply if he requested such notice or if there is a particular interest in the notification.” Article 171 “If the public prosecutor’s office does not grant an application for preferring public charges or after conclusion of the investigation it orders the proceedings to be terminated, it shall notify the applicant, indicating the reasons. The decision shall inform the applicant, if he is at the same time the aggrieved person, of the possibility of contesting the decision and of the time-limit provided therefor (Article 172 § 1).” 97. According to well-established domestic practice, indications that a person may have committed a criminal offence which fall below the threshold of “sufficient factual indications” as set out in Article 152 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are insufficient for the opening of a formal criminal investigation under Article 160 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In such a scenario, the public prosecutor’s office may conduct preliminary investigations in order to establish whether there are “initial grounds for suspicion” ( Anfangsverdacht ) justifying the opening of a formal criminal investigation. In such preliminary investigations, the person concerned does not have the status of an “accused” and no coercive investigatory measures may be undertaken. However, the public prosecutor’s office is authorised to examine witnesses and to procure a judicial examination of witnesses where appropriate (see Offenburg Regional Court, no. Qs 41/93, order of 25 May 1993). Possibilities to challenge a decision by the public prosecutor not to bring charges 98. Decisions made by the public prosecutor’s office not to bring charges are not final determinations in the sense of res judicata. Prosecution may be reopened if there is new evidence or the evidence presents itself in a different light (see Federal Court of Justice, no. 2 StR 524/10, judgment of 4 May 2011, at paragraph 9), for example in the form of subsequent submissions by an aggrieved party. 99. A decision to discontinue a criminal investigation may be challenged by any aggrieved party within one month of receipt of notification, by lodging a motion seeking to compel public charges (Articles 172 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The brief in support of such a motion must indicate the facts intended to substantiate the charges and the evidence as to the offence having been committed. This formal requirement is to enable the court to determine whether or not there is sufficient suspicion as to an offence having been committed exclusively based on the content of the brief, without having to study the files or annexes (see Hamm Court of Appeal, no. 3 Ws 209/09, order of 14 July 2009). The petitioner must present the essence of the public prosecutor’s discontinuation decision (Hamm Court of Appeal, no. 1 Ws 135/11, order of 28 April 2011; Federal Constitutional Court, no. 2 BvR 967/07, order 4 September 2008, at paragraph 17). If the petitioner seeks to rely on additional evidence contained in the investigation file, he must provide the essential content of the respective pieces of evidence in his brief, which may require him to elaborate on evidence that may exonerate the suspect (see Federal Constitutional Court, no. 2 BvR 2040/15, order 27 July 2016, at paragraph 15). In assessing whether there are sufficient grounds for suspicion, the court may consider whether the suspect would have to be acquitted in subsequent criminal proceedings based on the principle in dubio pro reo (see Federal Constitutional Court, no. 2 BvR 2318/07, order of 13 December 2007, at paragraph 2). 100. The Federal Constitutional Court is empowered to review and reverse decisions to discontinue proceedings made by public prosecutors and has made use of that power (see no. 2 BvR 878/05, order of 17 November 2005, at paragraph 23). It may find a violation of a person’s fundamental rights where a decision dismissing a motion to compel public charges was based on the excessively formalistic application of the requirements (see no. 2 BvR 912/15, order of 21 October 2015). In cases concerning killings for which State officials may possibly bear responsibility, it has aligned itself with the requirements of this Court’s case-law in respect of effective investigations under Article 2 of the Convention (see no. 2 BvR 2307/06, order of 4 February 2010; no. 2 BvR 2699/10, order of 26 June 2014). Courts Constitution Act ( Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz ) 101. The relevant provisions of the German Courts Constitution Act read as follows: Section 120 “(1) In criminal matters, the Court of Appeal for the district in which the Land government has its seat shall have jurisdiction for the territory of the given Land for hearing and deciding cases at first instance involving ... 8 criminal offences pursuant to the Code of Crimes against International Law. ...” Section 142a “(1) The Federal Prosecutor General shall discharge the duties of the public prosecutor’s office in respect of the criminal matters falling under the first instance jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal pursuant to section 120(1) and (2) at these courts as well. In order for the prosecution to be transferred to the Federal Prosecutor General it is sufficient if adequate factual indications exist to fulfil the preconditions for his jurisdiction. The public prosecutor’s office shall inform the Federal Prosecutor General without delay of any events that give cause to examine the transfer of prosecution to him or her. If, in the cases covered by section 120(1), the officials of the public prosecutor’s office of a Land and the Federal Prosecutor General cannot agree which of them should take over the prosecution, the Federal Prosecutor General shall decide.” Section 146 “The officials of the public prosecutor’s office must comply with the official instructions of their superiors.” Section 147 “The right of supervision and direction shall lie with: (1) the Federal Minister of Justice and Consumer Protection in respect of the Federal Prosecutor General and the federal prosecutors; ...” THE LAW AdmissibilityThe Court’s competence ratione personae and ratione lociThe parties’ submissions The Court’s competence ratione personae and ratione lociThe parties’ submissions The parties’ submissions The Court’s competence ratione personae and ratione lociThe parties’ submissions The parties’ submissions The parties’ submissions (a) The respondent Government 102. The respondent Government maintained that the application was incompatible ratione personae and ratione loci with the provisions of the Convention. (i) Compatibility ratione personae 103. As regards the Court’s competence ratione personae, the Government referred to Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway ((dec.) [GC], nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01, 2 May 2007 – hereinafter “ Behrami and Saramati ”) and submitted that military actions conducted under the ultimate authority and control of the United Nations Security Council, the latter acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, could not be attributed to the respective Contracting State. Therefore, the Court was not competent ratione personae to review the military action at issue. The Government further argued that the conclusion in Behrami and Saramati had been confirmed in multiple later decisions by the Court and had to be considered settled case-law. In so far as the Court had concluded that certain military actions in Iraq were attributable to the respective Contracting States in Jaloud v. the Netherlands ([GC], no. 47708/08, ECHR 2014), Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 27021/08, ECHR 2011), and Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 55721/07, ECHR 2011), this was founded on the exceptional circumstances of those cases. These special circumstances were, however, not present in the current case, which was comparable to Behrami and Saramati on a factual level: – ISAF was created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001); it had not existed previously. The Security Council delegated its powers by authorising States participating in ISAF to “take all necessary measures”. The mandate was sufficiently precise and defined the objects of the mission as well as the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved. In addition, a reporting requirement was provided for. – ISAF was commanded and controlled in a manner comparable to KFOR, as a unified command over troops from a large number of States forming a multinational force. The States involved in the military presence included States that were not party to the Convention. – The security presence of ISAF and its military activities in Afghanistan had been repeatedly endorsed by the Security Council and the UN bodies. This endorsement included the air strikes to combat the Taliban. – This assessment was not changed by the fact that what is termed “full command” over the contingent made available by Germany rested with German commanders. Concerning the troop-contributing States there was thus no difference between KFOR and ISAF. (ii) Compatibility ratione loci (α) No exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Afghanistan 104. In the Government’s submission, the Court was furthermore not competent ratione loci to examine the application. The deaths of the applicant’s sons had not occurred in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Germany. According to the Court’s well-established case-law, a Contracting State only exercised jurisdiction outside its own territory if the case involved either “effective control over an area” or the exercise of “State agent authority and control”. Neither of these two exceptions were applicable in the present case. 105. Germany had not had effective control over the Kunduz region and the bomb release area. In September 2009, German ISAF troops in the region were involved in the conduct of hostilities in an active combat zone, which was under the control of the insurgents. The number of insurgents in that area was nearly as high as the number of ISAF troops. The ISAF troops stationed in Kunduz were in danger of being attacked by the insurgents or of falling victim to their booby traps whenever they left the garrison. They were only able to take reactive measures and suffered serious losses in battles with the insurgents. ISAF’s troop strength was far too small, when measured against the approximately 8,000 square kilometres of territory concerned and the large number and high level of organisation of Taliban insurgents active in the region, for ISAF to have effective control over the Kunduz region. 106. As regards jurisdiction based on “State agent authority and control”, the case was not comparable to Al-Skeini and Others or Jaloud (both cited above). At no time during the ISAF deployment in Afghanistan was there ever a situation comparable to that in Iraq in 2003 and 2004. The ISAF mission focused solely on lending support to the Afghan civil government in the fight against armed insurgents and in building up Afghan security forces. The Afghan civil government had its own security forces, in particular in the Kunduz area. On the morning following the air strike at issue, it was the Afghan security forces who had cleared the sand bank of the residual weapons still lying there before the arrival of German and other reconnaissance units. The German reconnaissance unit was able to search the site only after a unit of the Afghan security forces afforded it protection against attacks by Taliban insurgents. ISAF did not exercise governmental powers or assume executive functions, for example by exercising police powers in order to maintain general security and order. 107. The air strike of 4 September 2009 did not establish a jurisdictional link between the persons affected by it and the respondent State, as it was an instantaneous extraterritorial act and the provisions of Article 1 did not admit a “cause and effect” notion of “jurisdiction” (the Government referred to Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, § 75, ECHR 2001 ‑ XII, and Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, § 64, ECHR 2010 ). This did not lead to an accountability gap, since Contracting States had to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law. (β) No competence ratione loci based on institution of criminal proceedings 108. In the Government’s submission, the investigative measures that the German authorities had instituted were, in the particular circumstances of the present case, not sufficient to make the complaints under the procedural limb of Article 2 compatible ratione loci with the Convention. Both Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey ([GC], no. 36925/07, 29 January 2019) and Romeo Castaño v. Belgium (no. 8351/17, 9 July 2019) concerned mutual obligations of cooperation, notably duties of cooperation under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention between two Contracting States in criminal matters within the legal space of the Convention. The jurisdictional link for such an obligation to cooperate resulted from the special nature of the Convention as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights. It aimed at preventing a vacuum in the system of human rights protection between two Contracting States within the legal space of the Convention and at ensuring that each Contracting State can fulfil its procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention. That rationale limited the principle that a jurisdictional link was established by the institution of investigations into deaths that occurred outside of the territory of a State to cases where two or more Contracting States must assume their respective responsibility for the collective enforcement of the Convention. 109. The present case did not concern a failure on the part of Germany to assume its responsibility for the collective enforcement of the Convention. No mutual obligations of cooperation between Contracting States in criminal matters within the legal space of the Convention were at stake. The deaths that were investigated had occurred in military action outside the territory of Council of Europe member States. The special character of the Convention as a collective enforcement treaty among the Contracting States did not come into play. 110. Referring to Güzelyurtlu and Others (cited above), Markovic and Others v. Italy ([GC], no. 1398/03, ECHR 2006 ‑ XIV) and Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 35622/04, 11 December 2012), the Government asserted that the institution of investigations or proceedings could establish jurisdiction only with regard to measures that the State could take exclusively within its territorial jurisdiction – thus limiting the subject matter of the Court’s review to acts which took place there – or, in the case of Turkey in Güzelyurtlu and Others, on the basis of jurisdiction otherwise established. Where extraterritorial investigations were conducted, jurisdiction was established in line with the exceptional nature of extraterritorial jurisdiction in military missions outside the territories of the Contracting States ( Al-Skeini and Others, § 149, and Jaloud, § 152, both cited above). The formal and instantaneous act of a Contracting State to decide to institute a criminal investigation could not, in itself, establish a jurisdictional link and trigger the procedural obligation under Article 2, irrespective of any other circumstance of a given case. It was decisive whether the impugned investigation itself was of an extraterritorial nature. The essence of the applicant’s objections concerned investigatory measures which were, or in his view should have been, taken outside German territory and otherwise outside its jurisdiction. The specific challenges for the investigation, which stemmed from the extraterritorial situation in an active combat zone during a non-international armed conflict, continued to decisively influence the ensuing domestic proceedings. 111. There was no need to expand the reach of the Convention in order to avoid an accountability gap, as Germany was already required by international humanitarian law and domestic criminal law to examine the death of civilians during the conduct of hostilities. Moreover, Germany was also obliged to investigate under international criminal law in the present case. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, however, concerned the jurisdiction of that court, not that of Germany for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. 112. If the scope of Güzelyurtlu and Others (cited above) were extended to investigations into extraterritorial military action in the conduct of hostilities not involving the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1, States would be obliged to perform impossible tasks in terms of establishing facts extraterritorially. Such an approach would also circumvent the existing case-law in respect of the exceptional nature of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the Court’s competence ratione personae. Moreover, the establishment of jurisdiction under Article 1 would become arbitrary. If the mere fact of instituting proceedings was sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link even where no other grounds for a jurisdictional link were shown to exist, this could create an incentive not to conduct such proceedings at all. In addition, such an approach could entail an inconsistent application of the Convention among the Contracting States participating in the same extraterritorial military mission. If one State instituted proceedings and another did not, the latter could evade responsibility under the Convention. 113. The special features that had exceptionally triggered a jurisdictional link in Güzelyurtlu and Others (cited above) were not present in this case. In particular, the retention of exclusive criminal jurisdiction over German ISAF personnel in respect of offences which might be committed by them on the territory of Afghanistan, under section I, subsection 3, of the ISAF Status of Forces Agreement (see paragraph 75 above) did not constitute a “special feature” for the purposes of establishing a jurisdictional link within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention (the Government referred to Güzelyurtlu and Others, cited above, § 190). That provision was a rule on immunity, which excluded ISAF personnel from prosecution by the Afghan authorities. This retention of criminal jurisdiction concerned the internal relationship between the soldier and the sending State. It did not open up any possibility for the civilian law-enforcement authorities of troop-contributing States to pursue criminal investigations of their own on Afghan territory, nor did the delegation of powers in the pertinent United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Such investigations might have interfered with the sovereignty of Afghanistan. The legal powers of the military police in connection with their authorisation to conduct internal investigations were limited. They were not allowed to summon Afghan witnesses, nor to adopt investigative or coercive measures in order to secure evidence. These restrictions on Germany’s legal powers to investigate in Afghanistan reinforced the argument that the United Nations was the entity responsible, not Germany. There was no basis for attribution or extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of the investigation. A rule similar to section I, subsection 3, of the ISAF Status of Forces Agreement had also been included in the status of forces agreement in Behrami and Saramati (cited above) and had not given rise to doubts there. (b) The applicant 114. The applicant submitted that the facts of which he complained had occurred within the jurisdiction of Germany for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. (i) Establishment of a jurisdictional link by instituting a criminal investigation 115. The applicant submitted that the criminal investigation concerning the death of his sons carried out by the German authorities was sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link for the purposes of Article 1 between Germany and the applicant. In Güzelyurtlu and Others (cited above), the deaths that were investigated had also occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the State in respect of which the institution of the criminal investigation established a jurisdictional link. That approach was in line with the nature of the procedural obligation under Article 2, which had evolved into a separate and autonomous obligation, which the Court had recognised as being “detachable” and capable of binding the State even if the death had occurred outside its jurisdiction. The approach also followed the same rationale as Markovic and Others (cited above), Aliyeva and Aliyev v. Azerbaijan (no. 35587/08, 31 July 2014) and Gray v. Germany (no. 49278/09, 22 May 2014). 116. Contrary to the Government’s submission, the obligation to seek cooperation, as a component of the procedural obligation under Article 2, was not confined to seeking mutual cooperation between Contracting States. The Court had made clear in Güzelyurtlu and Others (cited above) that there were two types of cases where the duty to cooperate might arise with respect to the procedural obligation under Article 2. First, there were cases where a State, as a part of its own obligation to investigate, might have an obligation to seek cooperation from other States. Second, there were cases where a State might have an obligation to assist another State that was conducting an investigation under its jurisdiction. It was only in relation to that latter scenario that the Court had spoken of the obligation of mutual cooperation among Contracting States in Güzelyurtlu and Others. The present case, however, concerned the former scenario, as it related to Germany’s obligation to seek cooperation for an investigation that it was conducting. There was nothing in the case-law or in logic that limited Germany to seeking cooperation only from other Contracting States. 117. Finding that the initiation of investigations was sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link would not render the establishment of jurisdiction arbitrary or act as a deterrent to the opening of investigations. Even where no investigation or proceedings were instituted, a jurisdictional link based on the procedural obligation imposed by Article 2 would be present where a case had “special features” (the applicant referred to Güzelyurtlu and Others, cited above, § 190). Those special features depended on the particular circumstances of the case and would, in the applicant’s submission, include whether the State had an obligation under domestic or international law to conduct an investigation. In the present case, such an obligation existed under both domestic and international law, as the Government had conceded, given that the criminal liability of Colonel K. for, inter alia, an alleged war crime was at issue. 118. The retention of criminal jurisdiction over its service personnel under section I, subsection 3, of the ISAF Status of Forces Agreement (see paragraph 75 above) was of significance in this respect. Contrary to the Government’s submission, this was not a rule on immunity, but one on jurisdiction. Germany had explicitly retained criminal jurisdiction over its service personnel vis-à-vis the Afghan authorities, the United Nations and ISAF. This supported the argument that the acts carried out by German actors in Afghanistan were attributable to Germany. Moreover, Germany had retained full control over that investigation, questioned the suspect, heard witnesses, collected evidence and taken investigative steps which had also, however insufficiently, involved the applicant. Germany’s jurisdiction had never been contested over the course of that investigation. All alleged violations, whether on German territory or abroad, were committed by German officials. 119. If the jurisdictional link were based merely on the initiation of proceedings in Germany, the Court’s review would not be confined to investigative measures within Germany’s territory. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the Court’s case-law, which saw the jurisdictional link in line with the nature of the procedural obligation to carry out an effective investigation. Some of the investigative flaws which he alleged had occurred in Afghanistan, others in Germany. It was not decisive that the facts that triggered the investigation had taken place outside the Council of Europe member States’ territory. The Convention was not only applicable in the legal space of the Contracting States. Weight had to be given to the fact that the incident which had to be investigated was, in the applicant’s submission, attributable to Germany and fell within its extraterritorial jurisdiction. (ii) Germany’s jurisdiction in respect of the impugned investigation was also established through other circumstances 120. The applicant submitted that, even in the absence of a criminal investigation, a jurisdictional link for the purposes of Article 1 would be established. The facts underlying the present application fell within Germany’s extraterritorial jurisdiction because Germany had exercised “control” over the victims of the air strike. Relying on General Comment No. 36 of the Human Rights Committee (see paragraph 87 above) and on Al-Skeini and Others (cited above, § 137), he argued that it was decisive that Germany was able to affect the relevant rights – in the present case the right to life – of the applicant’s sons, who were killed by the air strike. No logical distinction could be made between the exercise of power, so as to be able to affect the right to life, in the context of a patrol, a checkpoint or an air operation. The fact that Colonel K. had decided not to deploy ground troops but to resort to an air strike could not justify reaching a different conclusion with regard to jurisdiction to that reached in Al-Skeini and Others and Jaloud (both cited above). The air strike was a manifestation of Germany’s exercise of public powers in the region. The German troops had operated with the consent and at the invitation of the Afghan Government and exercised some of the public powers normally exercised by local or sovereign authorities. They were mandated by the United Nations Security Council to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security, including through the operation of checkpoints, regular patrols and security operations in the fight against the insurgency. A complete breakdown of the Afghan State order was not necessary for the establishment of a jurisdictional link on this ground. 121. Germany had also exercised effective control over the area in which the air strike that killed the applicant’s sons occurred. The German-commanded RC North comprised approximately 5,600 troops and the site of the air strike was only seven kilometres from the base of PRT Kunduz, where around 1,500 soldiers had been present at the time of the air strike. In this regard the applicant pointed to the fact that effective control could be limited to the specific area where the incident occurred, at that time, and did not require the State to be an occupying power (on the applicant referred to Jaloud, cited above, §§ 139 and 142, and Issa and Others v. Turkey, no. 31821/96, §§ 74 and 76, 16 November 2004). The proximity to the German base and the possibility of immediately deploying ground troops and obtaining close air support – which had arrived at the site of the hijacked tankers within minutes – confirmed that the area where the air strike occurred had been under effective German control. A situation of active hostilities did not per se exclude the possibility that a State exercised, at a certain moment, effective control over an area, particularly with regard to the right to life of the people in that area. The Court had previously found that violations of the Convention committed in the context of an armed conflict fell within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State for the purposes of Article 1, including during phases of active hostilities (the applicant referred to Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, ECHR 2014). 122. The facts that gave rise to the applicant’s complaint were also attributable to Germany. The applicant argued that the approach to the test of attribution as set out in Behrami and Saramati (cited above) had been refined in Al-Jedda (cited above), which introduced “effective control” as one of the prerequisites for the attribution of conduct. In that judgment, the Court also recognised that certain conduct could be attributed to more than one entity, namely the United Nations and the Contracting State. This concept of multiple attribution had long been recognised by the International Law Commission. While COMISAF had had operational command, Germany had retained full command over its troops (the applicant referred to Jaloud, cited above). Colonel K. and the German troops had not been placed “at the disposal” of any foreign power or international organisation and had not been under the “exclusive direction and control” of the United Nations Security Council, NATO, COMISAF or any other State. This was reflected in the sequence of binding orders, given by Colonel K. without involving his superiors, leading to the air strike that killed the applicant’s sons. This conduct differed significantly from that in Behrami and Saramati (cited above), as did the legal framework for the conduct of the German troops in Kunduz. Third-party interveners (a) The Governments of Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom 123. Relying on Behrami and Saramati (cited above), the intervening Governments submitted that the applicant’s complaints were not compatible ratione personae with the Convention. The United Nations Security Council exercised ultimate authority and control over ISAF. 124. The intervening Governments asserted that Germany had not exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1. Germany had neither exercised effective control over the area in question nor State agent authority and control. 125. There were fundamental differences between the present case and that of Güzelyurtlu and Others (cited above). Opening an investigation at the domestic level concerning facts occurring in the framework of a military operation abroad under the mandate of an international organisation could not in itself suffice to establish a jurisdictional link for the purposes of Article 1. To hold otherwise would put in question the Behrami and Saramati and Banković and Others jurisprudence and could risk resulting in a universal application of the Convention. This could affect States’ willingness and ability to engage in multilateral military operations abroad and could have a chilling effect on States instituting investigations. International humanitarian law was the lex specialis governing situations of armed conflict and Contracting States had to comply with its obligations even in the absence of the Convention being applicable. There was deliberately no general duty under international humanitarian law to investigate each and every death occurring in armed conflict; instead a duty to investigate arose only under certain circumstances. 126. More specifically, the Governments of France and the United Kingdom questioned where Germany’s investigative obligation derived from, given that the incident to be investigated was, in their submission, attributable to the United Nations rather than to Germany. Such a situation was different from that in Šilih v. Slovenia ([GC], no. 71463/01, § 159, 9 April 2009) and Janowiec and Others v. Russia ([GC], nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, § 132, ECHR 2013), which had concerned investigations into acts that occurred outside the respondent State’s temporal jurisdiction. The Government of the United Kingdom added that it would contradict the Monetary Gold principle ( Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Preliminary Question), Judgment of 15 June 1954, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 19) to impose investigative obligations which would inevitably require assessments to be made on the role of other, likely non-Contracting State, allies. 127. The Governments of France and the United Kingdom added that section I, subsection 3 of the ISAF Status of Forces Agreement dealt with disciplinary matters of service personnel and concerned investigative measures taking place in Germany. Neither ISAF nor the United Nations nor the Afghan authorities had such disciplinary powers. The provision had a limited nature, which did not allow for broader conclusions and which did not make the respective investigatory measures attributable to troop-contributing States. It did not constitute a “special feature” in respect of jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 in cases concerning the procedural limb of Article 2. When looking at the investigation in isolation, the legal constraints imposed by the legal framework of the United Nations and the ISAF mission, as well as Afghan law, had to be considered. Notably, the German prosecution authorities were not allowed to conduct investigations in Afghanistan. 128. The Governments of France and the United Kingdom pointed out that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court concerned the competence of that court and dealt with individual criminal responsibility. They emphasised that individual criminal responsibility should not be confused with a State’s responsibility under the Convention and concluded that the provisions of the Rome Statute could not have any bearing on the determination of a State’s jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. (b) The Human Rights Centre of the University of Essex, the Open Society Justice Initiative, the Institute of International Studies of the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano and Rights Watch (UK) 129. The Open Society Justice Initiative and the Institute of International Studies of the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano submitted that there was a trend in international law towards recognising States’ procedural obligations where they had direct control or authority over a victim’s rights, irrespective of where the incident took place and regardless of whether the State also had jurisdiction over the victim’s substantive right under Article 2. 130. Alternatively, if jurisdiction over a victim’s substantive right under Article 2 were required in order to establish whether a procedural obligation arose, the Open Society Justice Initiative and Rights Watch (UK) pointed to the growing recognition that international human rights law obligations arose where a State exercised power, control or authority over a person’s rights. The Human Rights Centre of the University of Essex asserted that extraterritorial jurisdiction existed in relation to the right to life on the basis of targeting or the use of force. Rights Watch (UK) and the Institute of International Studies of the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano advocated a functional approach to the analysis of jurisdiction, as envisaged by Judge Bonello in his concurring opinion in Al-Skeini and Others (cited above). 131. The Open Society Justice Initiative added that if international humanitarian law applied to the conflict and to the extraterritorial incident in question, then the State was bound by international humanitarian law obligations to conduct an investigation and no further question of jurisdiction would arise. The Court’s assessment (a) As to the applicable principles 132. The applicant complained exclusively under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention about the criminal investigation into the air strike which had killed his two sons. In Güzelyurtlu and Others (cited above), the Court recently set out the principles concerning the existence of a “jurisdictional link” for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention in cases where the death occurred outside the territory of the Contracting State in respect of which the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention was said to arise. After summarising the relevant case-law up to that point, the Court held: “ (b) The Court’s approach 188. In the light of the above-mentioned case-law it appears that if the investigative or judicial authorities of a Contracting State institute their own criminal investigation or proceedings concerning a death which has occurred outside the jurisdiction of that State, by virtue of their domestic law (e.g. under provisions on universal jurisdiction or on the basis of the active or passive personality principle), the institution of that investigation or those proceedings is sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link for the purposes of Article 1 between that State and the victim’s relatives who later bring proceedings before the Court (see, mutatis mutandis, Markovic and Others, cited above, §§ 54-55). 189. The Court would emphasise that this approach is also in line with the nature of the procedural obligation to carry out an effective investigation under Article 2, which has evolved into a separate and autonomous obligation, albeit triggered by acts in relation to the substantive aspects of that provision (see Šilih v. Slovenia [GC], no. 71463/01, § 159, 9 April 2009, and Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, § 132, ECHR 2013). In this sense it can be considered to be a detachable obligation arising out of Article 2 and capable of binding the State even when the death occurred outside its jurisdiction (see, mutatis mutandis, Šilih, § 159, in relation to the compatibility ratione temporis ). 190. Where no investigation or proceedings have been instituted in a Contracting State, according to its domestic law, in respect of a death which has occurred outside its jurisdiction, the Court will have to determine whether a jurisdictional link can, in any event, be established for the procedural obligation imposed by Article 2 to come into effect in respect of that State. Although the procedural obligation under Article 2 will in principle only be triggered for the Contracting State under whose jurisdiction the deceased was to be found at the time of death, ‘special features’ in a given case will justify departure from this approach, according to the principles developed in Rantsev [ v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04], §§ 243-44[, ECHR 2010]. However, the Court does not consider that it has to define in abstracto which ‘special features’ trigger the existence of a jurisdictional link in relation to the procedural obligation to investigate under Article 2, since these features will necessarily depend on the particular circumstances of each case and may vary considerably from one case to the other.” 133. Applying those principles to the case at hand, the Court went on to find that a “jurisdictional link” between the applicants – who had complained under the procedural limb of Article 2 in respect of their relatives’ deaths in the Cypriot government-controlled part of Cyprus – and Turkey was established on two grounds, each of which would have sufficed in itself to establish such a jurisdictional link within the scope of that case (see Güzelyurtlu and Others, cited above, §§ 191-96). A jurisdictional link was established, first, because the authorities of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the “TRNC”) had instituted their own criminal investigation into the murder of the applicants’ relatives, which gave the “TRNC” courts criminal jurisdiction over the individuals who had committed the crimes wherever they were to be found on the whole island of Cyprus, and which accordingly engaged Turkey’s responsibility under the Convention. A jurisdictional link was also established because there were two special features related to the situation in Cyprus: (i) the northern part of Cyprus was under effective control of Turkey for the purposes of the Convention, which justified a departure from the general approach established in Rantsev (cited above ) and therefore engaged Turkey’s procedural obligation under Article 2; and (ii) the presence of the murder suspects in the territory controlled by Turkey had been known to the Turkish and “TRNC” authorities and prevented Cyprus from fulfilling its Convention obligations. (b) Application of these principles to the present case 134. The German authorities instituted, under domestic law, a criminal investigation into the deaths of the applicant’s two sons and of other civilians in connection with the air strike on 4 September 2009 near Kunduz. 135. Without calling into question the principles set out in Güzelyurtlu and Others (cited above) and the application of those principles to the facts of that case, the Court considers that there are significant differences between that case and the present one. In its opinion, the principle that the institution of a domestic criminal investigation or proceedings concerning deaths which occurred outside the jurisdiction ratione loci of that State, not within the exercise of its extraterritorial jurisdiction, is in itself sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link between that State and the victim’s relatives who bring proceedings before the Court (ibid., §§ 188, 191 and 196), does not apply to the factual scenario at issue in the present case. The latter indeed differs from Güzelyurtlu and Others in that the deaths investigated by the German prosecution authorities had occurred in the context of an extraterritorial military operation within the framework of a mandate given by a resolution of the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, outside the territory of the Contracting States to the Convention. In taking this approach, the Court is also mindful of the concerns raised by the respondent Government and the intervening Governments that establishing a jurisdictional link merely on the basis of the institution of an investigation may have a chilling effect on instituting investigations at the domestic level into deaths occurring in extraterritorial military operations, and result in an inconsistent application of the Convention in respect of Contracting States participating in the same operation. If the mere fact of instituting a domestic criminal investigation into any death which has occurred anywhere in the world were sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link, without any additional requirements, this would excessively broaden the scope of application of the Convention. 136. However, in Güzelyurtlu and Others the Court found that a jurisdictional link had also been established in view of the “special features” of that case. It considered that such special features, which it did not define in abstracto, could establish a jurisdictional link bringing the procedural obligation imposed by Article 2 into effect, even in the absence of an investigation or proceedings having been instituted in a Contracting State in respect of a death which occurred outside its jurisdiction (ibid., § 190). This also applies in respect of extraterritorial situations outside the legal space of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Markovic and Others, cited above, §§ 54-55) as well as in respect of events occurring during the active hostilities phase of an armed conflict (see Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], no. 38263/08, §§ 329-32, 21 January 2021). 137. In the present case the Court considers, firstly, that Germany was obliged under customary international humanitarian law to investigate the air strike at issue, as it concerned the individual criminal responsibility of members of the German armed forces for a potential war crime (see, in particular, Rule 158 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law study by the ICRC, and the obligation of States engaging in multinational operations under the auspices of an international organisation to ensure respect for the entire body of international humanitarian law, including customary international humanitarian law, by their national contingent, including by the exercise of disciplinary and criminal powers retained by them, cited in paragraph 83 above; see also the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, cited in paragraph 86 above, and further guidance from international human rights bodies, cited in paragraphs 87-89 above). The existence of a duty to investigate under international law, with which the respondent Government agreed in the present case, reflects the gravity of the alleged offence (see also Georgia v. Russia (II), cited above, § 331). 138. The Court considers, secondly, that the Afghan authorities were prevented, for legal reasons, from themselves instituting a criminal investigation against Colonel K. and Staff Sergeant W. in respect of the alleged offence. Under section I, subsection 3, of the ISAF Status of Forces Agreement, the troop-contributing States had indeed retained exclusive jurisdiction over the personnel they contributed to ISAF in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offences which their troops might commit on the territory of Afghanistan (see paragraph 75 above), as is common practice for troop-contributing States in United Nations-authorised military missions. The respondent Government and third-party Governments submitted that that provision constituted a rule on immunity. In the Court’s opinion, this is true in so far as it shields the ISAF personnel of troop-contributing States from prosecution by the Afghan authorities. At the same time, however, it is also a rule regulating jurisdiction, as the applicant submitted: it clarifies who has jurisdiction over ISAF personnel in criminal matters and provides that only the troop-contributing States are entitled to institute a criminal investigation or proceedings against the personnel they contribute to ISAF, even in cases of alleged war crimes. If the troop-contributing States do not exercise the criminal jurisdiction to investigate allegations that the personnel they contribute to ISAF (or other multinational military missions) committed criminal offences, this may lead to situations of impunity, including in respect of offences entailing individual criminal responsibility under international law. 139. Thirdly, the German prosecution authorities were also obliged under domestic law to institute a criminal investigation, as the Government confirmed. The criminal investigation was conducted by the Federal Prosecutor General because it concerned the potential liability of Colonel K. and Staff Sergeant W., two German nationals, for, inter alia, a war crime as set forth in the Code of Crimes against International Law. The Federal Prosecutor General has exclusive competence to prosecute offences under that Code (see paragraph 101 above), which are subject to the principle of universal jurisdiction (see paragraph 95 above) and to the principle of mandatory prosecution. Under domestic law the German authorities could only have dispensed with such an investigation if the alleged offence had been investigated either before an international tribunal or by the authorities on whose territory the alleged offence occurred or whose nationals were victims (see paragraph 96 above). The latter two scenarios were precluded in the present case by Germany’s retention of exclusive jurisdiction over its troops, under the ISAF Status of Forces Agreement, in respect of any criminal offences which these might commit on the territory of Afghanistan. 140. In that connection the Court observes that the offences punishable under the German Code of Crimes against International Law are serious in nature. The Code and the related provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure were adopted against the background of Germany’s ratification of the Rome Statute in order to enable the investigation and prosecution of those offences at the domestic level and to avoid impunity (see paragraph 94 above). 141. The Court further observes that according to the information available to it, in the majority of those Contracting States which participate in military deployments overseas, the competent domestic authorities are obliged under domestic law to investigate alleged war crimes or wrongful deaths inflicted abroad by members of their armed forces, and the duty to investigate is considered essentially autonomous (see paragraph 90 above). 142. In the present case the fact that Germany retained exclusive jurisdiction over its troops in respect of serious crimes which, moreover, it was obliged to investigate under international and domestic law constitutes “special features” which in their combination trigger the existence of a jurisdictional link for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention in relation to the procedural obligation to investigate under Article 2. 143. The Court notes that the applicant did not complain about the substantive act which gave rise to the duty to investigate. It therefore does not have to examine whether, for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, there is also a jurisdictional link in relation to any substantive obligation under Article 2. It emphasises, however, that it does not follow from the mere establishment of a jurisdictional link in relation to the procedural obligation under Article 2 that the substantive act falls within the jurisdiction of the Contracting State or that the said act is attributable to that State. 144. Accordingly, the scope of the present case is limited to the investigative acts and omissions by German military personnel in Afghanistan that were undertaken in accordance with the retention of exclusive jurisdiction under the ISAF Status of Forces Agreement over German troops in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offences which these might commit on the territory of Afghanistan, as well as to acts and omissions of the prosecution and judicial authorities in Germany. These are capable of giving rise to the responsibility of Germany under the Convention (compare Jaloud, cited above, §§ 154-55). 145. The Court does not overlook the restrictions on Germany’s legal powers to investigate in Afghanistan, or the fact that the deaths to be investigated occurred in the context of active hostilities. However, such circumstances do not per se exclude the determination that further investigatory measures, including in Afghanistan, may have been necessary, including through the use of international legal assistance and modern technology. The specific challenges to the investigation relate to the scope and content of the procedural obligation under Article 2 incumbent on the German authorities and thus to the merits of the case (see Güzelyurtlu and Others, cited above, § 197). The Government’s further objectionThe parties’ submissions The parties’ submissions The parties’ submissions 146. The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted all domestic remedies concerning his objections of a lack of independence – both in Afghanistan (see paragraph 158 below) and in Germany (because of pressure allegedly exerted by the Federal Ministry of Defence on the Dresden Public Prosecutor General and because of the abstract possibility for the Federal Ministry of Justice to issue binding directives to the Federal Prosecutor General) – and a lack of reasonable expedition of the investigations (see paragraphs 164-66 below). He had not raised these complaints, not even in substance, either in his constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court, or in his motion to compel public charges before the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal. His unspecified references to the general obligation to conduct effective investigations under Article 2 of the Convention did not suffice in this respect. He had not mentioned the relevant criteria in respect of these specific complaints and had not advanced any arguments. He had not even elaborated on these aspects in his factual description of the investigation in his submissions. 147. The applicant asserted that he had exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. He had raised the complaints that he was now invoking before the Court at least in substance before the domestic courts. Both in his motion to compel public charges and in his constitutional complaint he had described in detail the course and duration of the investigation and alleged that it had suffered from several deficiencies, referring to the obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to conduct an effective investigation. The Federal Constitutional Court was in a position to rule on the complaints made by the applicant. The situation was similar to that in Hentschel and Stark v. Germany (no. 47274/15, 9 November 2017). The Court’s assessment 148. The Court reiterates that the purpose of the exhaustion rule is to afford a Contracting State the opportunity of addressing, and thereby preventing or putting right, the particular Convention violation alleged against it. It is true that under the Court’s case-law it is not always necessary for the Convention to be explicitly raised in domestic proceedings, provided that the complaint is raised “at least in substance”. This means that the applicant must raise legal arguments to the same or like effect on the basis of domestic law, in order to give the national courts the opportunity to redress the alleged breach. However, as the Court’s case-law bears out, to genuinely afford a Contracting State the opportunity of preventing or redressing the alleged violation requires taking into account not only the facts but also the applicant’s legal arguments for the purposes of determining whether the complaint submitted to the Court has indeed been raised beforehand, in substance, before the domestic authorities. That is because “it would be contrary to the subsidiary character of the Convention machinery if an applicant, ignoring a possible Convention argument, could rely on some other ground before the national authorities for challenging an impugned measure, but then lodge an application before the Court on the basis of the Convention argument” (see, among other authorities, Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 117, 20 March 2018, with further references). 149. Where the applicant complains of the lack of an effective criminal investigation under the procedural limb of Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, it is sufficient, in order to comply with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, including with regard to legal arguments not explicitly raised at the domestic level, if the applicant has challenged the effectiveness of that investigation before the competent domestic court and, by describing the course and duration of the investigation and subsequent court proceedings in detail, referred to the relevant factual elements for that court to assess the investigation’s effectiveness (compare Hentschel and Stark, cited above, §§ 64 and 66). In this respect, the Court reiterates that compliance with the procedural requirement of Article 2 is assessed on the basis of several essential parameters which are interrelated and which, taken jointly rather than separately, enable the degree of effectiveness of the investigation to be assessed (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, § 225, 14 April 2015). 150. In the present case it is not disputed that the applicant challenged the effectiveness of the investigation before the Federal Constitutional Court and that he made references to the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention. It is, by contrast, in dispute between the parties whether, in the factual description of the investigation and court proceedings in his submissions to the Federal Constitutional Court, he sufficiently elaborated on certain aspects which he later alleged, in his application before the Court, to be flaws in the investigation. 151. The Court observes that the applicant described in his constitutional complaint the on-site assessment performed by the team of PRT Kunduz in the aftermath of the air strike, the report of the German military police and the course of the investigations undertaken by the German prosecution authorities. He thus referred before the Federal Constitutional Court to the relevant factual elements in respect of his allegations about delays with the on-site assessment by the German military contingent in the aftermath of the air strike, the lack of independence of the persons involved in it, the delay in opening the formal criminal investigation and the ineffectiveness of the preliminary investigations. The Court finds that the applicant thus referred before the Federal Constitutional Court to the relevant factual elements regarding the above aspects, such as to enable that court to assess the effectiveness of the investigation. The Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must therefore be dismissed in respect of those aspects. 152. By contrast, the applicant’s constitutional complaint did not refer to the alleged lack of independence of the investigation in Germany. The Court considers that it can be left open whether the applicant exhausted domestic remedies in respect of this specific argument, because it is in any event inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. The Court considers that the interaction between the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Dresden Public Prosecutor General in the context of the preliminary investigation carried out by the latter (see paragraph 30 above) was from the outset incapable of affecting the independence of the investigation, given that the Federal Prosecutor General, who had commenced a preliminary investigation on 8 September 2009 (see paragraph 30 above), had exclusive competence for the investigation and prosecution of offences under the Code of Crimes against International Law and that the Dresden Public Prosecutor General was obliged by law to transfer the investigation concerning Colonel K.’s liability for offences under that Code to the Federal Prosecutor General without delay (see paragraph 101 above). There are no indications that the Federal Ministry of Defence tried to influence or interfere with the Federal Prosecutor General’s investigation. Moreover, a lack of independence cannot be deduced from the abstract possibility for the Federal Ministry of Justice to issue binding directives to the Federal Prosecutor General, it being undisputed that no such directives were issued in the present case (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç, cited above, § 222). Conclusion 153. With the exception of the submissions in respect of the alleged lack of independence of the investigation undertaken in Germany, the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It is also not inadmissible on any other grounds. The Court therefore declares it admissible. Merits 154. The applicant complained under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention that the investigation into the air strike that killed, inter alios, his two sons had not been effective. In addition to alleging flaws in the investigation, the applicant also complained, relying on Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 2, that he had had no effective domestic remedy to challenge the decision of the German Federal Prosecutor General to discontinue the investigation. 155. As the essence of the applicant’s complaint is that no individual was prosecuted for his sons’ deaths, the Court considers it appropriate to examine the complaints solely under the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention (see Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 5878/08, §§ 291-92, 30 March 2016, and Hentschel and Stark, cited above, § 45). The provision in question reads as follows: “1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” The parties’ submissionsThe applicant The applicant The applicant 156. The applicant submitted that the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life also applied in times of armed conflict, as did the obligation to effectively investigate under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention. International humanitarian law was already taken into account in Article 15 § 2 of the Convention and did not apply here. However, even if international humanitarian law had applied in the present case, the investigation still had to live up to the standards of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in terms of independence, impartiality, thoroughness, effectiveness, promptness and transparency. The normal Convention standards did not disappear even if the Convention was interpreted in the light of international humanitarian law. 157. The investigation in the present case had been ineffective because (i) it had not been conducted by sufficiently independent persons; (ii) the evidence gathered had been one-sided and insufficient investigative measures had been taken to establish the facts, with surrounding circumstances not investigated at all; (iii) the investigation had not been instituted promptly and had not been conducted with reasonable expedition; and (iv) the applicant as a next of kin had not been sufficiently involved. (a) Effectiveness of the investigation (i) Independence 158. In the applicant’s submission, the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigative steps in Afghanistan had lacked the necessary independence from those implicated in the air strike of 4 September 2009. The members of the team which conducted the initial on-site reconnaissance eleven hours after the air strike had been direct colleagues of the suspects. As they served under Colonel K.’s command, they had even stood in a hierarchical relationship to him. All investigators involved had been part of the German military contingent in Afghanistan and neither team had been focused on securing evidence or identifying responsibilities. The soldiers involved in the air strike had not been separated from each other, which entailed a risk of collusion. (ii) The evidence taken was insufficient 159. The applicant submitted that the German prosecutors had not carried out any investigatory steps in Afghanistan. The failure to visit the site of the air strike indicated a violation of Article 2. The Federal Prosecutor General had based his decision almost exclusively on fact-finding from external sources, in particular by military personnel, which had not been compiled with the aim of identifying criminal responsibility and had not been conducted under criminal procedural law. The Federal Prosecutor General had not made use of a list of possible civilian victims handed over by UNAMA and had failed to contact the relatives of the affected persons in Afghanistan, including the applicant. 160. The course of the investigation indicated that the result was pre-determined. The Federal Prosecutor General’s investigation had started with a rigid five to six-week schedule, which did not leave room for supplementary investigations. According to that schedule, only one further investigative measure was to be taken, namely the questioning of the two suspects and of two witnesses, both of whom were subordinates of Colonel K. and had been present at the command post at the time of the air strike. That questioning appeared to be a sheer formality. A thorough investigation with an open outcome would have allowed for further investigative measures to be taken. 161. The investigation did not fulfil its purpose of ascertaining the circumstances surrounding the events and of determining whether the force used had been lawful. Considerable uncertainty remained regarding the conformity of the air strike with international humanitarian law. The number of victims and their status as civilian or combatant was never determined, nor was the meaning of the terms “insurgent” or “Taliban” – which were broad and did not define legitimate military targets – clarified. Consequently, it was impossible to assess the expected military advantage in relation to the expected loss of civilian life, and hence whether the use of force had been excessive. The actual circumstances should have been investigated by questioning eyewitnesses. The fact that the surviving tanker driver, the interpreter and the pilots were questioned by the parliamentary commission of inquiry showed that it would also have been reasonable and possible for the Federal Prosecutor General to do so. Further clarification could also have been obtained by having independent military experts assess the surveillance images taken by the aircraft and by questioning the population in the villages surrounding the site of the air strike, including the applicant. The examination of these witnesses could have been carried out through modern technology. 162. Nor had the Federal Prosecutor General sufficiently investigated whether there had been an imminent threat which had rendered the air strike, and hence the use of force against the applicant’s sons, “absolutely necessary” within the meaning of Article 2 § 2 of the Convention. It had not been investigated whether sufficient precautionary measures had been taken in order to avoid civilian casualties, nor whether the assumption of the absence of civilians had indeed been reasonable. Objects seized by the Afghan security forces, such as remnants of arms said to have been carried by the persons attacked, should have been obtained. 163. The reasoning on which the Federal Prosecutor General relied to discontinue the investigation could not justify the gaps in the investigation. The alleged honest belief of the suspects that they were acting lawfully was only relevant as a defence to avoid the charge of a substantive violation of Article 2, but it had to be established whether or not the air strike was, objectively, in accordance with international humanitarian law. Criminal liability for negligent manslaughter, based on the negligence involved in arriving at the assumption that no civilians had been present at the bomb release area, would have been possible and should have been investigated further. (iii) The investigation was not conducted with reasonable expedition 164. The investigation had not been conducted with the necessary and reasonable expedition. The mandatory battle damage assessment had not been carried out until eleven hours after the air strike, in breach of ISAF Rules of Engagement. This had made it impossible to establish the precise circumstances and degree of damage caused by the air strike because the site had been significantly altered in the meantime. Germany could have sent a drone to take footage to document the scene. There had also been delays in questioning the soldiers involved in the air strike in Afghanistan. 165. The formal criminal investigation had been instituted only on 12 March 2010, more than six months after the air strike. This delay significantly undermined the probative value of the testimonies and allowed for collusion. What was decisive was not whether there had been actual foul play on part of the authorities, but whether effective precautions had been taken to prevent collusion from happening. Not requesting Colonel K. and the other soldiers involved in the incident to return to Germany after the incident for immediate questioning had caused extensive and unjustifiable delays. Many investigative measures, including taking suspects’ testimonies, could have been undertaken immediately after the air strike, including through the use of modern technology. 166. The preliminary investigation initiated right after the air strike could not be regarded as a proper criminal investigation. Its sole purpose was to establish the existence of “initial grounds for suspicion” required for the institution of a formal criminal investigation and it did not allow for investigative measures, such as the questioning of witnesses. The length of the preliminary investigation could not justify the brevity of the formal criminal investigation. (iv) Lack of sufficient involvement of the applicant 167. The applicant, as the next of kin of two victims, had not been involved in the investigations to the extent necessary to safeguard his legitimate interests. On 12 April 2010, and thus at a time when the formal investigation was still open, the applicant had filed a criminal complaint concerning the air strike and requested access to the investigation file. The Federal Prosecutor General closed the investigation on 16 April 2010 without having heard the applicant or permitting his lawyer access to the file. Access to the file was granted only on 3 September 2010, and the Federal Prosecutor General’s decision to discontinue the investigation was only made available to the applicant on 13 October 2010. The applicant should have been heard, as it could not be ruled out that he possessed relevant information, notably as to the identity of those present at the bomb site. (b) Judicial review of, and remedies against, the discontinuation decision 168. The applicant asserted that he did not have the possibility of seeking judicial review of the Federal Prosecutor General’s decision to discontinue the investigation, contrary to the requirements of Article 2. 169. The scope and nature of the motion to compel public charges, as well as the high admissibility threshold, rendered it ineffective as a remedy in the present case, which concerned violations of the right to life caused by the armed forces abroad. The mechanism did not enable victims and their relatives to challenge in an effective manner the discontinuation of an investigation in cases involving inaccessible or classified information, such as on military decision-making. It had been impossible for the applicant to prove that there were sufficient grounds for suspicion that the suspects were criminally liable, as the German prosecution authorities had not investigated the matter thoroughly and the applicant could not fill in all the gaps. It was impossible for the applicant to address each piece of evidence in detail in his brief. 170. Nor had the constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court constituted an effective remedy to have the discontinuation decision reviewed. The Federal Constitutional Court only reviewed specific violations of constitutional law and was primarily concerned with the question whether the decision to discontinue the investigation had been arbitrary. Unlike in Hentschel and Stark (cited above), the Federal Constitutional Court had not assessed the investigation in detail and had failed to examine the substance of the applicant’s claim under Article 2 of the Convention. 171. The flaws in the investigation had had a negative impact on the applicant’s other potential remedies, including on his compensation claim. The parliamentary commission of inquiry did not meet the requirements of an effective remedy. Its findings, which did not fully clarify the circumstances and lawfulness of the air strike, were not binding and did not address the applicant’s procedural rights under Article 2. The Government 172. At the outset, the Government emphasised that the German legal system had responded comprehensively to the air strike that killed the applicant’s sons. The Federal Prosecutor General had conducted an in-depth examination in order to determine whether the military personnel involved were criminally responsible. A parliamentary commission of inquiry had examined the political and factual dimensions of the events for over one and a half years. Court proceedings on compensation were still pending. 173. Turning to the criminal investigation against the military personnel involved in the air strike, the Government submitted that Germany had complied with its duty to investigate. At the time of the air strike, the situation in the Kunduz region amounted to a non-international armed conflict for the purposes of international humanitarian law, to which the common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the rules of customary international humanitarian law applied. The general principle established in Hassan (cited above) to interpret the Convention in the light of international humanitarian law equally applied to non-international armed conflicts. Consequently, international humanitarian law provided the appropriate yardstick for determining what was required from the respondent State. The situation in the present case differed from that in Jaloud (cited above), as the incident at issue had occurred in the course of the conduct of hostilities. The nature and degree of scrutiny required to satisfy the minimum threshold of the investigation’s effectiveness had to be interpreted in a way which took into account the specifics of the situation and the legal framework for the conduct of hostilities. The Government emphasised the special role assigned to commanders in the conduct of investigations under international humanitarian law. (a) Effectiveness of the investigation 174. None of the defects in the investigation which the applicant alleged existed. Even supposing that they did, the investigation had still succeeded in bringing to light all relevant facts about the incident and had enabled the identification of the persons responsible. The essence of the present application was not concerned with the effectiveness of the investigation and did not aim at a more in-depth clarification of the relevant facts. Rather, it was directed against the legal assessment by the Federal Prosecutor General. However, Article 2 of the Convention did not cover the review of individual prosecutorial decisions in relation to their legal correctness (the Government referred to Armani Da Silva, cited above, § 259). (i) Reasonable expedition of the investigation 175. In the Government’s submission, the investigation had been conducted with reasonable expedition. As regards measures taken in Afghanistan, it sufficed to perform the initial post-attack reconnaissance of the bomb release area in the aftermath of the air strike by flyover. As soon as it became known that there may have been civilian casualties, ISAF had established an investigation team which travelled to Kunduz that same day, and performed reconnaissance of the bomb release area and questioned Colonel K. as well as further German soldiers. Its report led to the appointment of the Joint Investigation Board, which had submitted an extensive report on 26 October 2009. Also on the day of the air strike, an investigation team from the German military police had been deployed to Kunduz and prepared a report. The measures for post-attack reconnaissance suggested in that report were later performed by ISAF and Afghan officials. Moreover, on the day of the air strike, the relevant bodies of the German armed forces had initiated inquiries with a view to potentially opening formal disciplinary investigations. 176. The German law-enforcement agencies had been informed of the air strike on the day it occurred and took action immediately. The decision to open a formal criminal investigation was not delayed and had been prepared for effectively in the preceding preliminary investigations. Contrary to the applicant’s submission, the prosecution authorities were authorised under domestic law to examine and to procure a judicial examination of witnesses in these preliminary investigations. 177. The persons responsible for the investigations had taken appropriate steps to reduce the risk of collusion. Both German and ISAF authorities had questioned Colonel K. and further soldiers involved, on 4 September 2009 and several times thereafter. The prosecution authorities had received access to the documents relating to the examination of all important witnesses which had been carried out by the national and international bodies, such as ISAF, soon after the incident. All important evidence, such as the audio recordings of the radio communications with the USAF F-15 aircraft or the thermal images from their infrared cameras, had been immediately secured. The records of the interviews with the suspects were available to the Federal Prosecutor General, who had also interviewed them in person. 178. The order of events concerning the air strike had been established right at the outset of the investigations. There was nothing that could have been covered up by any collusive arrangements. Ordering Colonel K. or other officers potentially responsible for the incident to return to Germany for questioning would, in fact, have impaired the investigation. An effective interview of the suspects and of the witnesses required highly specialist knowledge about the military situation and the circumstances on the ground. The ISAF investigators possessed this specialist knowledge. (ii) Independence 179. The persons responsible for conducting the investigation had been sufficiently independent from those implicated in the air strike. At the outset, it had to be noted that responsibility for investigations of criminal offences potentially committed by German soldiers lay, in all cases and exclusively, with civilian law-enforcement agencies and civilian criminal-law courts, irrespective of whether the potential offences were committed within Germany or abroad. For historical reasons, Germany had deliberately refrained from reintroducing a separate military justice system after 1949. The responsibility of civilian law-enforcement agencies and courts was an element which served to guarantee the independence of the proceedings. 180. In his assessment, the Federal Prosecutor General had relied, inter alia, on the independent investigations performed by ISAF, the Afghan civil government, the ICRC and UNAMA. Article 2 of the Convention did not require that the law-enforcement agencies needed to obtain all evidence and make all necessary determinations by themselves. The duty to investigate could be fulfilled by having the results of parliamentary and international investigations of an incident made available to the public prosecution authorities, and a criminal investigation could be based on the results of these investigations (the Government referred to Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, §§ 309-10, ECHR 2011; Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 26562/07 and 6 others, §§ 628-31, 13 April 2017; and Mustafić-Mujić and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 49037/15, §§ 102 ‑ 06, 30 August 2016 ). This was appropriate, in particular, in view of the multilevel nature of the military deployment in Afghanistan under the delegation of United Nations Security Council powers, which did not entail legal powers for the civilian law-enforcement authorities of the troop-contributing States to pursue criminal investigations of their own on Afghan territory (other than through international legal assistance), and also served to achieve a high level of public scrutiny. 181. The German military police had not acted on behalf of the Federal Prosecutor General and their factual findings served only as one source amongst other independent sources. The military police had been subordinated to the Commander of the German ISAF contingent and had presented its final report to him. It was hierarchically and functionally independent from the Commander of PRT Kunduz. Even assuming that the military police had lacked independence, this could not render the investigations as such ineffective. Their report was only one among many sources relied on by the Federal Prosecutor General, and in view of their limited investigatory powers they could only play a minor role. Moreover, in view of the legal restrictions on Germany’s powers to investigate in Afghanistan, there had been no feasible alternatives to the investigations conducted by the military police. In addition, the security situation at the material time would not have allowed sending civilian prosecutors or police officers to the place of the incident in order to conduct independent investigations. It would be unrealistic and potentially counterproductive to require that investigations into alleged unlawful killings in armed conflicts always had to be investigated by civilian authorities. (iii) Sufficiency of evidence 182. The measures taken by the investigatory teams which formed the basis for the Federal Prosecutor General’s determination had been conducted along the lines described in the 2019 Guidelines on investigating violations of IHL in respect of how to carry out criminal investigations at the height of an armed conflict. 183. There was no requirement to conduct further investigations to establish the exact number of victims. The Federal Prosecutor General had taken all reports prepared for the purpose of other investigations into account, and after evaluating the evidence had made comprehensive determinations in this respect. He had taken sufficient account, for the purposes of evaluating the criminal responsibility of the suspects, of the fact that the damage ascertained after the incident may have been an indication of whether the attacker had been able to anticipate the likelihood of civilian casualties before the attack. The Federal Prosecutor General’s determination that the number of people present at the time of the bomb release did not give rise to doubts that this group of people were Taliban insurgents could not have been called into question by investigating the number of victims further. 184. The Federal Prosecutor General was not required to consult military experts in order to determine whether all “reasonable and feasible precautions” had been taken. This was a question of applying the standards of international humanitarian law and he could base his assessment on the report prepared by the ISAF investigation team, which was composed of military experts from different countries. He had legitimately determined that Colonel K. had not had any further feasible reconnaissance and precautionary measures available to him. It had been confirmed to him on seven separate occasions that the informant had identified the persons present at the location as “insurgents”, and the images provided by the infrared cameras from the USAF F-15 aircraft, on which the persons next to the fuel tankers were visible as dots of a heat source, were consistent with the statements by the informant. It had not been required to simulate the situation in the command centre or to examine further witnesses who had not had any contact with the suspects at the material time, as this would not have been able to provide any insights capable of incriminating the suspects. 185. The applicant’s plea that international humanitarian law had been applied incorrectly concerned the question of the application and interpretation of domestic law, as well as of the assessment of the existing evidence, to which the Court – by reason of the subsidiary nature of its role – could only object in the event of arbitrariness or some other cogent reason. No such cogent reason could be identified in the case at hand. The Federal Prosecutor General had proceeded on the assumption that the lawfulness of the order of the air strike had to be assessed according to the standard of a “reasonable commander”. That assessment was based on the likely consequences as they presented themselves at the time of decision-making, not the effects of the air strike as they had become known in hindsight. This legal view was in line with established doctrines of public international law. 186. It was generally recognised that military action in armed conflict which was in compliance with international humanitarian law did not lead to criminal responsibility on the part of the participating soldiers and that compliance with international humanitarian law rather constituted an exculpatory defence, including in respect of offences under general criminal law. The interpretation that the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law determined what was “absolutely necessary” for the purposes of Article 2 § 2 of the Convention in a situation of armed conflict was in accordance with the Court’s approach in Hassan (cited above). Lastly, the Federal Prosecutor General had provided extensive reasoning why any potential violation of the Rules of Engagement was irrelevant for the determination of criminal responsibility. The preliminary investigation performed to determine whether or not formal disciplinary proceedings should be launched had led to the result that Colonel K. could not even be reproached from a disciplinary perspective. (iv) Involvement of the applicant 187. The applicant had been involved in the investigation to the extent necessary to safeguard his legitimate interests. It had not been necessary to hear him as a witness in order to ensure a reliable investigation of the circumstances. It was established that his two sons had been killed by the air strike. The applicant, whose statements about, inter alia, his presence at the place of the incident had remained vague, had no knowledge relevant for the determination as to whether the suspects ought to have anticipated the presence of civilians at the sand bank, and hence their criminal liability. 188. The applicant had been given sufficient opportunity to make statements in the investigation. Decisions made by the prosecution authorities not to bring charges were not final determinations in the sense of res judicata and prosecution could be reopened subsequently. The applicant had not been deprived of an opportunity to influence the investigation by the Federal Prosecutor General’s discontinuation decision. The Federal Prosecutor General had reviewed the applicant’s evidence and written submissions and rejected the latter as ill-founded. 189. There had been no undue delay in recognising the applicant as an injured party and in granting him access to the investigation file. Following his request of 12 April 2010, the Federal Prosecutor General was obliged to give the suspects the opportunity to make submissions. As the request by the applicant’s legal representative had been made on behalf of a large number of persons who claimed to have been affected, a certain amount of time was required to verify their respective status. In response to the applicant’s letter of 7 July 2010, the Federal Prosecutor General had confirmed, by letter of 16 July 2010, that proof of the applicant’s status as an injured party had been established with respect to his younger son, but that the necessary evidence in respect of a number of other persons, on whose behalf the request had been made, was still missing. After the applicant’s legal representative, by letter of 1 September 2010, had limited the scope of the request for access to the files to the applicant, the Federal Prosecutor General had promptly granted access by letter of 3 September 2010. (b) Remedy to complain about the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation 190. It was not required that the applicant be provided with an effective judicial remedy for reviewing the Federal Prosecutor General’s decision not to bring charges (the Government referred to Armani Da Silva, cited above, §§ 278-79). Nonetheless, the applicant did, in fact, have at his disposal two effective judicial remedies to challenge the effectiveness of the investigation and had used both: (i) his motion to compel public charges before the Court of Appeal and (ii) his constitutional complaint. 191. The motion to compel public charges did, as such, entail a sufficient scope of review in the event of flagrant or particularly grave violations of the duty to investigate by the prosecution authorities. There was no indication that the Court of Appeal would not have ordered the investigations to be resumed, had the applicant’s motion complied with the admissibility requirements and had the Court of Appeal found the investigations performed thus far to be deficient. The admissibility requirements applied by the Court of Appeal were not excessive, particularly in view of the fact that the applicant had been represented by a lawyer. In accordance with the case-law of the domestic courts, the Court of Appeal had not demanded a summary of the entire content of the evidence compiled in the investigation files, but rather a presentation of the content of those pieces of evidence on which the Federal Prosecutor General had relied. 192. Moreover, the Federal Constitutional Court had reviewed the effectiveness of the investigation via the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It had expressly emphasised that the Federal Prosecutor General’s decision not to bring charges was not only in line with the standards of the Federal Constitutional Court, but also with the requirements established by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. It explained why the Federal Prosecutor General had not been required to examine eyewitnesses or to take further evidence, since further investigations concerning the number and identity of the victims of the air strike would not have concerned any aspects relevant for the assessment of the criminal liability of the suspects. The Federal Constitutional Court had furthermore emphasised that the Court of Appeal’s decision on the motion to compel public charges had discussed the reasons given by the Federal Prosecutor General in depth. Third-party intervenersThe Governments of France, Norway and the United Kingdom The Governments of France, Norway and the United Kingdom The Governments of France, Norway and the United Kingdom 193. The intervening Governments asserted that the procedural obligation under Article 2 as applied to situations of armed conflict outside national territory had to be interpreted in a manner consistent with international humanitarian law, which constituted lex specialis. This concerned not only the threshold issue when the duty to investigate arose, but also the content of such a duty. As to the latter, the Government of the United Kingdom emphasised that Article 6 of Additional Protocol II was essentially limited to prosecutorial obligations of independence and did not contain a broader reference to transparency requirements or the involvement of next of kin. With respect to the requirement of independence, the Governments of France and the United Kingdom further elaborated on the special role assigned to commanders in the conduct of investigations under international humanitarian law and submitted that the lex specialis obligations as regards the specific investigative duties of commanders would be disavowed if the procedural obligations under Article 2 were to be interpreted so as to require the exclusion from investigations of military commanders. 194. The intervening Governments submitted that the practical realities of military deployments had to be considered. These could include the housing of those investigating, such as military police, jointly with other members of the military contingent; the investigators having a certain hierarchical or institutional link with the military leadership responsible for the operation; and the impact of limited resources on the promptness and number of investigatory steps, especially in respect of smaller Contracting States and contingents. The Governments of France and the United Kingdom pointed to the legal constraints imposed by the legal framework of the United Nations and the ISAF mission, as well as Afghan law, notably that German prosecution authorities were not allowed to conduct investigations in Afghanistan. 195. The Governments of France and the United Kingdom added that it followed from State practice that States considered that “lawful acts of war”, referred to in Article 15 of the Convention, derogated from Article 2, even in the absence of prior notification of derogation. The Human Rights Centre of the University of Essex, the Open Society Justice Initiative, the Institute of International Studies of the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano and Rights Watch (UK) 196. The Human Rights Centre of the University of Essex asserted that international humanitarian law became applicable on the basis of objective criteria. Where it was applicable and a State chose to invoke international humanitarian law, the concurrent application of international humanitarian law and human rights law might result in a significant modification of the content of human rights law obligations of the State. Where a State chose not to invoke international humanitarian law, the Court should acknowledge that it was applicable, while noting that the State had chosen to be examined exclusively on the basis of human rights law. For the State to invoke international humanitarian law, it was sufficient that it was applicable and that the respondent State invoked it before the Court; a derogation was unlikely to be required in international armed conflict and might not be required in extraterritorial non-international armed conflict. Where the concurrent application of international humanitarian law did not result in a modification of a relevant human rights law rule, a human rights body could draw upon international humanitarian law to confirm a human rights analysis, without a need for the State to invoke international humanitarian law. The Institute of International Studies of the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano emphasised that reliance on international humanitarian law required very careful consideration in order not to contradict Article 15 of the Convention, in particular. 197. The Human Rights Centre of the University of Essex submitted that international humanitarian law required, in respect of the use of force, that everything feasible be done to verify that the objectives to be attacked were military objectives. There was an obligation under international humanitarian law to investigate suspected violations, with the Guidelines on investigating violations of IHL elaborating on the respective standards. The Open Society Justice Initiative, the Institute of International Studies of the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano and Rights Watch (UK) argued that the standards developed in international human rights law regarding the duty to investigate into civilian deaths during armed conflict should not be lowered by reference to international humanitarian law. The Court’s assessmentThe relevant general principles The relevant general principles The relevant general principles 198. In the domestic proceedings the situation in which the air strike that killed the applicant’s two sons occurred was characterised as a non-international armed conflict for the purposes of international humanitarian law. While acknowledging that Germany had not availed itself of its right of derogation under Article 15 of the Convention, the Government submitted that international humanitarian law provided the appropriate yardstick for determining what was required from the respondent State in the circumstances, in line with the Court’s approach in Hassan (cited above). 199. The Court notes that there is no substantive normative conflict in respect of the requirements of an effective investigation between the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to the present case (see paragraphs 82 and 84-85 above) and those under the Convention. The Court can therefore confine itself to examining the facts of the present case based on its case-law under Article 2, without having to address whether in the present case the requirements allowing it to take account of the context and rules of international humanitarian law when interpreting and applying the Convention in the absence of a formal derogation under Article 15 of the Convention are met (see Hassan, cited above, §§ 98 et seq .). 200. Reiterating that the procedural duty under Article 2 must be applied realistically (see Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 168), the Court considers that the challenges and constraints for the investigation authorities stemming from the fact that the deaths occurred in active hostilities in an (extraterritorial) armed conflict pertained to the investigation as a whole and continued to influence the feasibility of the investigative measures that could be undertaken throughout the investigation, including by the civilian prosecution authorities in Germany. Accordingly, the standards applied to the investigation conducted by the civilian prosecution authorities in Germany should be guided by those established in respect of investigations into deaths in extraterritorial armed conflict, as set out in Al ‑ Skeini and Others (cited above, §§ 163-67) and restated in Jaloud (cited above, § 186). 201. What form of investigation will achieve the purposes of Article 2 may vary depending on the circumstances. However, whatever mode is employed, the authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention (see Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 165). 202. In order to be “effective”, as this expression is to be understood in the context of Article 2 of the Convention, an investigation must firstly be adequate (see Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, § 324, ECHR 2007 ‑ II, and Armani Da Silva, cited above, § 233). This means that it must be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts, a determination of whether the force used was justified in the circumstances and of identifying and – if appropriate – punishing those responsible (see Armani Da Silva, § 233; Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç, § 172; and Al ‑ Skeini and Others, § 166, all cited above). This is not an obligation of result, but of means (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 160, ECHR 2005 ‑ VII; Al ‑ Skeini and Others, cited above, § 166; and Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç, cited above, § 173). The authorities must take whatever reasonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of the clinical findings, including the cause of death. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Armani Da Silva, § 233, and Al-Skeini and Others, § 166, both cited above). 203. In particular, the investigation’s conclusions must be based on a thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements, failing which the investigation’s ability to establish the circumstances of the case and the identity of those responsible will be undermined to a decisive extent (see Kolevi v. Bulgaria, no. 1108/02, § 201, 5 November 2009, and Armani Da Silva, cited above, § 234). Nevertheless, the nature and degree of scrutiny which satisfy the minimum threshold of the investigation’s effectiveness depend on the circumstances of the particular case. The nature and degree of scrutiny must be assessed on the basis of all relevant facts and with regard to the practical realities of investigation work (see Velcea and Mazăre v. Romania, no. 64301/01, § 105, 1 December 2009, and Armani Da Silva, cited above, § 234). It is not possible to reduce the variety of situations which might occur to a bare checklist of acts of investigation or other simplified criteria (see Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94, §§ 101-10, ECHR 1999-IV; Velikova v. Bulgaria, no. 41488/98, § 80, ECHR 2000 ‑ VI; and Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç, cited above, § 176). 204. It is clear that where the death to be investigated under Article 2 occurs in circumstances of generalised violence, armed conflict or insurgency, obstacles may be placed in the way of investigators and, as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions has also observed, concrete constraints may compel the use of less effective measures of investigation or may cause an investigation to be delayed (see Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 164; see also Bazorkina v. Russia, no. 69481/01, § 121, 27 July 2006 ). Nonetheless, the obligation under Article 2 entails that, even in difficult security conditions, all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into alleged breaches of the right to life (see Al ‑ Skeini and Others, cited above, § 164). 205. The investigation should also be broad enough to permit the investigating authorities to take into consideration not only the actions of the State agents who directly used lethal force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the operations in question, where this is necessary in order to determine whether the State complied with its obligation under Article 2 to protect life (ibid., § 163). This will require adequate questioning of the members of the armed forces prima facie involved in the incident ( see Aktaş v. Turkey, no. 24351/94, § 306, 24 April 2003). 206. For an investigation into alleged unlawful killing by State agents to be effective, it may generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence (see Armani Da Silva, § 232, and Al-Skeini and Others, § 167, both cited above). 207. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. It must, however, be accepted that there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation. That said, a prompt response by the authorities in investigating a use of lethal force may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see Armani Da Silva, § 237, and Al-Skeini and Others, § 167, both cited above). 208. There must also be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation, the degree of which may vary from case to case. The investigation must be accessible to the victim’s family to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests (see Armani Da Silva, § 235, and Al-Skeini and Others, § 167, both cited above). However, the investigative materials may involve sensitive issues and disclosure cannot be regarded as an automatic requirement under Article 2 (see Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, § 304; McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, § 129, ECHR 2001-III; and Armani Da Silva, cited above, § 236). Moreover, Article 2 does not impose a duty on the investigating authorities to satisfy every request for a particular investigative measure made by a relative in the course of the investigation (see Velcea and Mazăre, § 113; Ramsahai and Others, § 348; and Armani Da Silva, § 236, all cited above). The outcome of the investigation must be duly brought to the attention of the next of kin (see Damayev v. Russia, no. 36150/04, § 87, 29 May 2012). 209. The adequacy of the investigative measures, the promptness of the investigation, the involvement of the deceased person’s family and the independence of the investigation are interrelated and each of them, taken separately, does not amount to an end in itself. They are criteria which, taken jointly, enable the degree of effectiveness of the investigation to be assessed. It is in relation to this purpose of an effective investigation that any issues must be assessed (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç, cited above, § 225). 210. Article 2 does not entail the right to have third parties prosecuted or convicted for a criminal offence (see Mustafić-Mujić and Others, § 117, and Armani Da Silva, § 238, both cited above). To date, the Court has not faulted a prosecutorial decision which flowed from an investigation which was in all other respects Article 2 compliant (see Armani Da Silva, cited above, § 259), or required the competent domestic court to order a prosecution if that court had taken the considered view that application of the appropriate criminal legislation to the known facts would not result in a conviction (see Mustafić-Mujić and Others, cited above, § 123). Application to the present case (a) Adequacy 211. At the outset the Court notes that the criminal investigation established that the applicant’s two sons were killed by the air strike which had been ordered by Colonel K. on 4 September 2009. It was undisputed that the fuel tankers, which the air strike targeted, had been hijacked and remained under the control of insurgents and that there had been civilian casualties. The cause of death of the applicant’s sons, and the person(s) responsible for it, were known from the start of the investigation (compare and contrast Jaloud, cited above). 212. The Federal Prosecutor General determined that Colonel K. had not incurred criminal liability mainly because he had been convinced, at the time of ordering the air strike, that no civilians were present at the sand bank (see paragraphs 33-49 above). Thus he had not acted with the intent to cause excessive civilian casualties which would have been required for him to be liable under the relevant provision of the Code of Crimes against International Law. His liability under general criminal law was ruled out owing to the lawfulness of the air strike under international humanitarian law. In respect of the latter, the Federal Prosecutor General elaborated on the meaning of the terms “insurgents” and “Taliban”, as employed in his decision, and on the status under international humanitarian law of the victims of the air strike. He considered that the armed Taliban fighters who had hijacked the two fuel tankers were members of an organised armed group that was party to the armed conflict and were thus legitimate military targets. They included those persons who had become functionally integrated into and exercised a continuous combat function within the organised armed group. All those air strike victims who were not Taliban fighters were civilians protected under international humanitarian law, including those who were helping the Taliban to free the fuel tankers from the sand bank and those who were trying to obtain fuel for their own benefit (see paragraphs 42 and 44-45 above). 213. For the purposes of answering the relevant questions of law regarding Colonel K.’s criminal liability, the Federal Prosecutor General’s investigation focused, in essence, on clarifying two questions of fact: Colonel K.’s subjective assessment of the situation when he ordered the air strike, which was crucial as regards both his liability under the Code of Crimes against International Law and the lawfulness of the air strike under international humanitarian law; and the number of victims (see paragraph 36 above). 214. The Court notes that the German civilian prosecution authorities, including the Federal Prosecutor General, did not have legal powers to undertake investigative measures in Afghanistan under the ISAF Status of Forces Agreement, but would have been required to resort to international legal assistance to that end. However, the Federal Prosecutor General could rely on a considerable amount of material from different sources concerning the circumstances and the impact of the air strike. The reports from on-site investigations conducted in the aftermath of the air strike, including by the German military police, ISAF, UNAMA and the Afghan civil authorities, were available to him (see paragraph 35 above), as were the documents (such as photographic evidence) and minutes of the meetings and examinations held in the course of those investigations (compare Giuliani and Gaggio, § 310; Tagayeva and Others, §§ 628 ‑ 31; and Mustafić-Mujić and Others, §§ 102 ‑ 06, all cited above). 215. The Federal Prosecutor General questioned the suspects and the other soldiers present at the command centre and found credible their testimonies that they had operated on the assumption that only insurgents and no civilians had been present at the sand bank (see paragraphs 37-39 above). He noted that this account was corroborated by objective circumstances (distance from inhabited settlements, time of night, presence of armed Taliban) and evidence which could not be tampered with, such as audio-recordings of the radio traffic between the command centre and the pilots of the USAF F ‑ 15 aircraft and the thermal images from the aircraft’s infrared cameras, which had been secured immediately. The Federal Prosecutor General established that Colonel K. had had at least seven calls put through to the informant in order to verify that no civilians were present at the scene and that the information given by the informant, who had previously proven to be reliable, corresponded to the video feed from the aircraft. To that end, he examined Captain X., who had been the only person present at the time the informant’s intelligence was transmitted. 216. The Court has no reason to doubt the assessment of the Federal Prosecutor General, and that of the Federal Constitutional Court, that no additional insights as to whether Colonel K. had acted in the expectation of civilian casualties when ordering the air strike could have been gleaned by examining further witnesses (see paragraphs 39 and 60 above). This is true with regard to the questioning of the pilots of the F ‑ 15 aircraft and that of persons affected by the air strike, including the applicant. The Court takes note of the Federal Prosecutor General’s determination that the number of civilian casualties could not serve as circumstantial evidence from which Colonel K.’s subjective expectations could be deduced and that the number of people present at the scene at the time of the air strike did not constitute a reason to question Colonel K.’s assumption that he was dealing exclusively with Taliban fighters (see paragraphs 40 above and 218 below). 217. Nor can the Court discern a need for the involvement of additional military experts or for the simulation of the situation at the command centre. The report of the ISAF investigation team was prepared by military experts from different countries. Relying on that report, the Federal Prosecutor General determined that all precautionary measures which had been feasible in the circumstances had been taken, that Colonel K., at the time of ordering the air strike, had not had reason to suspect the presence of civilians near the fuel tankers and that no advance warning had been required (see paragraphs 46 and 48 above). 218. The Court observes that under normal circumstances the establishment of the precise number and status of the victims of the use of lethal force is an essential element of any proper investigation of incidents involving a high number of casualties. In the present case, having regard to the divergent findings of the various reports, the methods by which they had been established and the available evidence, including the video material, the Federal Prosecutor General concluded that about fifty persons were likely to have been killed or injured by the air strike and that there were significantly more Taliban fighters than civilians among the victims (see paragraph 40 above). The Court is prepared to acknowledge that a more accurate assessment would not appear to have been possible in the circumstances, given that the air strike occurred in an active combat zone at night-time, that the bodies were removed from the scene by the local population within hours of the air strike, and that the use of modern forensic techniques was difficult in view of the social and religious mores of the local population. At any rate, the Court notes that the precise number of civilian victims did not have any bearing on the legal assessment in respect of the criminal liability of Colonel K., which focused on his subjective assessment at the time of ordering the air strike. In these particular circumstances, the Court takes the view that the fact that the authorities did not establish the precise number and status of the victims of the air strike did not amount to a deficiency capable of calling into question the investigation’s compliance with Convention standards. 219. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the facts surrounding the air strike which killed the applicant’s two sons, including the decision-making and target verification process leading up to the order of the air strike (see Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 163), were established in a thorough and reliable manner in order to determine the legality of the use of lethal force. 220. In so far as the applicant complained of the lack of an effective judicial remedy by which to complain about the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation, the Court reiterates that the procedural obligation in Article 2 of the Convention does not necessarily require a judicial review of investigative decisions as such (see Armani Da Silva, cited above, §§ 278 ‑ 79, with further references). The Government indicated that in any event the applicant had had at his disposal two effective judicial remedies to challenge the effectiveness of the investigation, and had used both, namely (i) his motion to compel public charges before the Court of Appeal and (ii) his constitutional complaint. 221. The Court observes that the Court of Appeal declared the applicant’s motion to compel public charges inadmissible and that it is in dispute between the parties whether the admissibility requirements were excessive. The application of the admissibility requirements was consistent with the well-established case-law of the domestic courts in this respect (see paragraphs 53, 62 and 99 above). In any event, the Court of Appeal engaged in a thorough review of the evidence referred to by the applicant and of the decision by the Federal Prosecutor General, as also pointed out by the Federal Constitutional Court (see paragraph 61 above). 222. The Federal Constitutional Court reviewed the effectiveness of the investigation, following the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It expressly emphasised that the Federal Prosecutor General’s decision not to bring charges was not only in line with the standards of the Federal Constitutional Court, but also with the requirements established by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (see paragraphs 59-60 above). Noting that the Federal Constitutional Court is able to set aside a decision to discontinue a criminal investigation (see paragraph 100 above), the Court concludes that the applicant had at his disposal a remedy to challenge the effectiveness of the investigation (see also Hentschel and Stark, cited above, § 102). (b) Promptness, reasonable expedition and independence 223. In so far as the applicant alleged a delay and a lack of independence in relation to the on-site reconnaissance, the Court considers that this aspect has to be examined against the background of ongoing hostilities in the bomb release area. The members of PRT Kunduz who arrived on the scene at 12.34 p.m. to perform the initial on-site reconnaissance were afforded protection by some one hundred members of the Afghan security forces, but nonetheless came under fire (see paragraph 27 above). This constitutes a significant difference compared with Al-Skeini and Others and Jaloud (both cited above), where the deaths to be investigated did not occur in the active hostilities phase of an extraterritorial armed conflict. Under these circumstances, the Court does not consider that the German military contingent could realistically have been expected to perform on-site reconnaissance more promptly than they did. While the Court accepts, as submitted by the applicant, that it may have been possible to perform additional reconnaissance through a drone prior to the on-site visit, it is not in a position to determine whether this could possibly have led to gleaning information beyond what had already been established through the inspection by the unmanned aircraft at 8 a.m. that morning (see paragraph 24 above). While the Court concurs with the applicant that it would have been preferable, in terms of independence, if the initial on-site assessment had not been done exclusively by members of PRT Kunduz, who were under Colonel K.’s command, it notes that the investigation team from the German military police, whose deployment from Masar-i-Sharif had been ordered that morning, had not yet arrived at the time the on-site reconnaissance was conducted (see paragraphs 26-27 above). Ensuring their participation would thus have resulted in a delay, albeit one of a minor nature, illustrating the interrelatedness of promptness and independence. 224. Reiterating that the procedural duty under Article 2 must be applied realistically (see Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 168) and that the German civilian prosecution authorities did not have legal powers to undertake investigative measures in Afghanistan, the Court does not consider that the fact that the German military police were under the overall command of the German ISAF contingent affected their independence to the point of impairing the quality of their investigations (see Jaloud, cited above, §§ 189-90). While the Court found in Al-Skeini and Others that an investigation carried out solely by the commanding officers of the soldiers alleged to be responsible, and limited to taking statements from the soldiers involved, fell short of the requirements of Article 2 (cited above, §§ 153 and 171), it would not suggest that commanders must be excluded from investigations against their subordinates entirely, having regard also to the duty assigned to commanders in this respect under international humanitarian law (see paragraphs 84 and 193 above). 225. By contrast, the Court considers that Colonel K. should not have been involved in investigative steps in Afghanistan, including interviews and visits on 4 and 5 September 2009 (see paragraphs 27-28 above), given that the investigation concerned his own responsibility in connection with ordering the air strike. 226. Yet the Court cannot conclude that this involvement of Colonel K. as such rendered the investigation ineffective (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç, cited above, § 225). The responsibility for the criminal investigation rested with the civilian prosecution authorities, notably the Federal Prosecutor General, who could rely on a considerable amount of material from investigations conducted by different actors and who undertook further investigative measures (compare and contrast Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, §§ 153 and 171). More importantly still, the Federal Prosecutor General’s determination that Colonel K. had not incurred criminal liability was primarily based on the finding in respect of Colonel K.’s mens rea at the time of ordering the air strike, which was corroborated by evidence which could not be tampered with, such as audio-recordings of the radio traffic between the command centre and the pilots of the USAF F ‑ 15 aircraft and the thermal images from the latter’s infrared cameras, which had been secured immediately. 227. In these circumstances there was, realistically, no risk that evidence decisive for the determination of Colonel K.’s criminal liability could become contaminated and unreliable. This applies equally in respect of such a risk allegedly stemming from Colonel K.’s involvement in certain investigative steps in Afghanistan as it does in respect of the delay in questioning him and the other soldiers present at the command post by the Federal Prosecutor General. This marks a significant difference between the present case and those of Jaloud (where it remained unclear who had fired the shots which killed the applicant’s son) and Al-Skeini and Others (where relevant circumstances surrounding the deaths of the relatives of the first five applicants remained uncertain). 228. In so far as the applicant alleged a lack of promptness of the investigation by the civilian prosecution authorities in Germany, the Court observes that on the day of the air strike, the chief legal officer of the armed forces informed the Potsdam public prosecutor of the air strike (see paragraph 30 above). The public prosecutor launched a preliminary investigation three days later, which was eventually transferred to the Federal Prosecutor General, who had in parallel initiated a preliminary investigation on 8 September 2009, four days after the air strike. The competent German authorities thus initiated investigations into the air strike, including with a view to establishing any criminal liability of those involved, promptly after the possibility of the deaths of civilians had become known. 229. Having regard to the powers of the prosecution authorities during the preliminary investigation (see paragraph 97 above), the investigative measures taken and the sustained investigative activities (see paragraph 31 above), in the Court’s opinion the fact that the investigation remained at the preliminary investigation stage for about six months until the opening of the formal criminal investigation on 12 March 2010, while regrettable, did not affect the effectiveness of the investigation. (c) Participation of the next of kin and public scrutiny 230. The Court observes that on 12 April 2010 the applicant filed a criminal complaint regarding the death of his two sons and requested access to the investigation file (see paragraph 50 above). Nonetheless, the Federal Prosecutor General closed the investigation four days later, without having heard the applicant or granting his lawyer access to the file. In terms of the involvement of the applicant, as the father of two persons killed by the air strike, in the investigation, this would at first sight appear problematic, bearing in mind his submission that it could not be ruled out that he possessed relevant information, notably as to the identity of those present at the bomb site. 231. However, in the circumstances of the present case, the failure to examine the applicant as a witness prior to discontinuing the investigation did not render the investigation deficient. It was not in doubt that the applicant’s two sons had been killed by the air strike which had been ordered by Colonel K., and the applicant would not have been in a position to provide additional insights relevant to the determination of Colonel K.’s criminal liability, in view of the grounds on which the Federal Prosecutor General relied. The Court also notes that counsel for the applicant did not elaborate further on the additional relevant information the applicant allegedly possessed, mirroring the Government’s submission that the applicant’s statements as to his presence at the bomb site remained vague. The Court of Appeal, for its part, found that the applicant had failed to offer suitable evidence, or any evidence at all, for a number of submissions incriminating the suspects, including that many civilians had been outside on the night of the air strike (see paragraph 53 above). 232. Furthermore, the Federal Prosecutor General reviewed the submissions which the applicant made in his letters of 9 June and 7 July 2010, and rejected them as ill-founded by letters of 16 July and 3 September 2010 (see paragraph 50 above). Had the applicant’s statements contained new evidence or led to the existing evidence being viewed in a different light, this could have led to the reopening of the investigation (see paragraph 98 above). The applicant has thus not been deprived of the opportunity to influence the investigation, even though he was not heard prior to the discontinuation decision. In this respect the Court reiterates that Article 2 does not impose a duty on the investigating authorities to satisfy every request for a particular investigative measure made by a relative in the course of the investigation (see Giuliani and Gaggio, §§ 304 and 312 et seq.; Velcea and Mazăre, § 113; and Ramsahai and Others, § 348, all cited above). 233. Observing that the question of access to the investigation file was adjudicated by the Federal Constitutional Court at an earlier date in a separate decision, which the applicant did not challenge (see paragraph 57 above), the Court is, in any event, unable to discern any undue restrictions or delay as regards the applicant’s access to the investigation file. Initially, the applicant’s representative had requested access to the file on behalf of a large number of individuals, whose victim status required a certain amount of time to verify (see paragraph 50 above). Once the applicant’s representative restricted the request to the applicant, access to the unclassified parts of the file was granted two days later. The investigative material contained sensitive information concerning a military operation in an ongoing armed conflict, and it cannot be regarded as an automatic requirement under Article 2 that a deceased victim’s surviving next of kin be granted access to the ongoing investigation (see Ramsahai and Others, § 347; Giuliani and Gaggio, § 304; and McKerr, § 129, all cited above). 234. In so far as the applicant complained about the delay in the service of the discontinuation decision, the Court considers that it was reasonable that the decision of 16 April 2010 was not published or served on injured parties straightaway, but was first redacted, given that it contained classified military information. The key aspects of the decision were nonetheless published in a press release (see paragraph 34 above). Two days after the redacted version had been finalised on 13 October 2010, it was served on the applicant’s legal representative. Importantly, the one-month time-limit for filing a motion seeking to compel public charges started to run from the date of service of the discontinuation decision (see paragraph 99 above). Thus, the delay in serving the redacted version of the discontinuation decision did not negatively affect the applicant’s ability to challenge that decision (compare and contrast Damayev, cited above, § 87). 235. Lastly, the Court observes that the investigation into the air strike by the parliamentary commission of inquiry (see paragraph 69 above) ensured a high level of public scrutiny (see Tagayeva and Others, §§ 629 ‑ 31, and Mustafić-Mujić and Others, §§ 102-06, both cited above; see also Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, §§ 71, 157 and 176). Conclusion 236. In view of the foregoing, and having regard to the circumstances of the present case, the Court concludes that the investigation into the deaths of the applicant’s two sons which was performed by the German authorities complied with the requirements of an effective investigation under Article 2 of the Convention. There has accordingly been no violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention.
The Court held that there had been no violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 (right to life) of the Convention, finding that the investigation by the German authorities into the deaths of the applicant’s two sons had complied with the requirements of an effective investigation under Article 2. It noted, in particular, that the fact that Germany had retained exclusive jurisdiction over its troops deployed within the International Security Assistance Force with respect to serious crimes, which, moreover, it was obliged to investigate under international and domestic law, constituted “special features” which, taken in combination, triggered the existence of a jurisdictional link for the purposes of Article 1 (obligation to respect human rights) of the Convention in relation to the procedural obligation to investigate under Article 2. The Court further noted that the German civilian prosecution authorities had not had legal powers to undertake investigative measures in Afghanistan under the ISAF Status of Forces Agreement, but would have been required to resort to international legal assistance to that end. However, the Federal Prosecutor General had been able to rely on a considerable amount of material concerning the circumstances and the impact of the airstrike. The Federal Constitutional Court had reviewed the effectiveness of the investigation on the applicant’s constitutional complaint. Noting that the Federal Constitutional Court was able to set aside a decision to discontinue a criminal investigation, the Court concluded that the applicant had had at his disposal a remedy enabling him to challenge the effectiveness of the investigation. Lastly, the Court observed that the investigation into the airstrike by the parliamentary commission of inquiry had ensured a high level of public scrutiny of the case.