Freedom of expression and electronic commerce
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 33. The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia ( Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus ) provides as follows. Article 17 “ No one ’ s honour or good name shall be defamed. ” Article 19 “ 1. Everyone has the right to free self-realisation. 2. Everyone shall honour and consider the rights and freedoms of others, and shall observe the law in exercising his or her rights and freedoms and in fulfilling his or her duties. ” Article 45 “ 1. Everyone has the right freely to disseminate ideas, opinions, beliefs and other information by word, print, picture or other means. This right may be restricted by law to protect public order, morals, and the rights and freedoms, health, honour and the good name of others. This right may also be restricted by law for State and local government public servants, to protect a State or business secret or information received in confidence which has become known to them by reason of their office, and the family and private life of others, as well as in the interests of justice. 2. There is to be no censorship. ” 34. Section 138 of the Civil Code (General Principles) Act ( Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus ) provides that rights are to be exercised and obligations performed in good faith. A right must not be exercised in an unlawful manner or with the aim of causing damage to another person. 35. Subsection 2 of section 134 of the Obligations Act ( Võlaõigusseadus ) provides: “ In the case of an obligation to compensate for damage arising from ... a breach of a personality right, in particular from defamation, the obligated person shall compensate the aggrieved person for non-pecuniary damage only if this is justified by the gravity of the breach, in particular by physical or emotional distress. ” 36. Section 1043 of the Obligations Act provides that a person (tortfeasor) who unlawfully causes damage to another person (victim) must compensate for the damage if the tortfeasor is culpable ( süüdi ) of causing the damage or is liable for causing the damage pursuant to the law. 37. Section 1045 of the Obligations Act provides that the causing of damage is unlawful if, inter alia, it results from a breach of a personality right of the victim. 38. The Obligations Act further provides. Section 1046 – Unlawfulness of damage to personality rights “ (1) Injuring a person ’ s honour, inter alia, by passing an undue value judgment, unjustified use of a person ’ s name or image, or breaching the inviolability of a person ’ s private life or another personality right, is unlawful unless otherwise provided by law. In establishing such unlawfulness, the type of the breach, the reason and motive for the breach and the gravity of the breach relative to the aim pursued thereby shall be taken into consideration. (2) The breach of a personality right is not unlawful if the breach is justified in view of other legal rights protected by law and the rights of third parties or public interests. In such cases, unlawfulness shall be established on the basis of a comparative assessment of the different legal rights and interests protected by law. ” Section 1047 – Unlawfulness of disclosure of incorrect information “ (1) A breach of personality rights or interference with the economic or professional activities of a person by way of disclosure [ avaldamine ] of incorrect information, or by way of incomplete or misleading disclosure of information concerning the person or the person ’ s activities, is unlawful unless the person who discloses such information proves that, at the time of such disclosure, he or she was not aware and was not required to be aware that such information was incorrect or incomplete. (2) Disclosure of defamatory matters concerning a person, or matters which may adversely affect a person ’ s economic situation, is deemed to be unlawful unless the person who discloses such matters proves that they are true. (3) Regardless of the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section, the disclosure of information or other matters is not deemed to be unlawful if the person who discloses the information or other matters or the person to whom such matters are disclosed has a legitimate interest in the disclosure, and if the person who discloses the information has verified the information or other matters with a thoroughness which corresponds to the gravity of the potential breach. (4) In the event of disclosure of incorrect information, the victim may demand that the person who has disclosed such information refute the information or publish a correction at his or her own expense, regardless of whether the disclosure of the information was unlawful or not. ” Section 1050 – Culpability [ süü ] as basis for liability “ (1) Unless otherwise provided by law, a tortfeasor is not liable for the causing of damage if the tortfeasor proves that he or she is not culpable [ süüdi ] of causing the damage. (2) The situation, age, education, knowledge, abilities and other personal characteristics of a person shall be taken into consideration in the assessment of the culpability [ süü ] of the person for the purposes of this Chapter. (3) If several persons are liable for compensation for damage and, pursuant to law, one or more of them are liable for compensation for unlawfully caused damage regardless of whether or not they are culpable, the wrongfulness of the behaviour and the form of the culpability of the persons liable for compensation for the damage shall be taken into consideration in apportioning among them the obligation to compensate for the damage. ” Section 1055 – Prohibition on damaging actions “ (1) If unlawful damage is caused continually or a threat is made that unlawful damage will be caused, the victim or the person who is threatened has the right to demand the cessation of the behaviour causing the damage or of the threats of such behaviour. In the event of bodily injury, damage to health or a breach of the inviolability of personal life or of any other personality rights, it may be demanded, inter alia, that the tortfeasor be prohibited from approaching others (restraining order), that the use of housing or communications be regulated, or that other similar measures be applied. (2) The right to demand the cessation of behaviour causing damage as specified in subsection (1) of this section shall not apply if it is reasonable to expect that such behaviour can be tolerated in conditions of human coexistence or in view of a significant public interest. In such cases, the victim shall have the right to make a claim for compensation for damage caused unlawfully. ... ” 39. The Information Society Services Act ( Infoühiskonna teenuse seadus ) provides as follows. Section 8 – Restricted liability in the case of mere transmission of information and provision of access to a public data communications network “ (1) Where a service is provided that consists of the mere transmission in a public data communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a public data communication network, the service provider shall not be liable for the information transmitted, on condition that the provider: 1. does not initiate the transmission; 2. does not select the receiver of the transmission; and 3. does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission. (2) The acts of transmission and of provision of access within the meaning of subsection 1 of this section include the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information transmitted, in so far as this takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the public data communication network, and provided that the information is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission. ” Section 9 – Restricted liability in the case of temporary storage of information in cache memory “ (1) Where a service is provided that consists of the transmission in a public data communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service, the service provider shall not be liable for the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of that information if the method of transmission concerned requires caching for technical reasons and the caching is performed for the sole purpose of making more efficient the information ’ s onward transmission to other recipients of the service at their request, on condition that: 1. the provider does not modify the information; 2. the provider complies with conditions on access to the information; 3. the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the information, specified in a manner widely recognised and used in the industry; 4. the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of technology which is widely recognised and used by the industry to obtain data on the use of the information; 5. the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it has been disabled, or that a court, the police or a State supervisory authority has ordered such removal. ” Section 10 – Restricted liability in the case of provision of an information storage service “ (1) Where a service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, the service provider shall not be liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: 1. the provider does not have actual knowledge of the content of the information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; 2. the provider, upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of the facts specified in paragraph 1 of this subsection, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. (2) Subsection 1 of this section shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider. ” Section 11 – No obligation to monitor “ (1) A service provider specified in sections 8 to 10 of this Act is not obliged to monitor information upon the mere transmission thereof or provision of access thereto, temporary storage thereof in cache memory or storage thereof at the request of the recipient of the service, nor is the service provider obliged actively to seek information or circumstances indicating illegal activity. (2) The provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall not restrict the right of an official exercising supervision to request the disclosure of such information by a service provider. (3) Service providers are required promptly to inform the competent supervisory authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information provided by recipients of their services specified in sections 8 to 10 of this Act, and to communicate to the competent authorities information enabling the identification of recipients of their service with whom they have storage agreements. ... ” 40. Articles 244 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure ( Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik ) provide for pre-trial taking of evidence ( eeltõendamismenetlus ) – a procedure in which evidence may be taken before the judicial proceedings have even been initiated if it can be presumed that evidence might be lost or that using the evidence afterwards might involve difficulties. 41. In a judgment of 21 December 2005 (case no. 3-2-1-95-05), the Supreme Court found that, for the purposes of section 1047 of the Obligations Act, disclosure ( avaldamine ) meant disclosure of information to third parties. A person who transmitted information to a media publisher ( meediaväljaanne ) could be considered a discloser ( avaldaja ) even if he or she was not the publisher of the article ( ajaleheartikli avaldaja ) in question. The Supreme Court has reiterated the same position in its subsequent judgments, for example in a judgment of 21 December 2010 (case no. 3 ‑ 2 ‑ 1-67-10). 42. In a number of domestic cases, actions for defamation have been brought against several defendants, including, for example, a publisher of a newspaper and the author of an article (Supreme Court judgment of 7 May 1998 in case no. 3-2-1-61-98), a publisher of a newspaper and an interviewee (Supreme Court judgment of 1 December 1997 in case no. 3 ‑ 2 ‑ 1-99-97), and solely against a publisher of a newspaper (Supreme Court judgments of 30 October 1997 in case no. 3-2-1-123-97, and 10 October 2007 in case no. 3-2-1-53-07). 43. Following the Supreme Court ’ s judgment of 10 June 2009 in the case giving rise to the present case before the Court (case no. 3-2-1-43-09), several lower courts have resolved the issue of liability in respect of comments relating to online news articles in a similar manner. Thus, in a judgment of 21 February 2012, the Tallinn Court of Appeal (case no. 2 ‑ 08 ‑ 76058) upheld a lower court ’ s judgment concerning a defamed person ’ s claim against a publisher of a newspaper. The publisher was found liable for defamatory online comments posted by readers in the newspaper ’ s online comments section. The courts found that the publisher was a content service provider. They rejected the publisher ’ s request for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), finding that it was evident that the defendant did not satisfy the criteria for a passive service provider as previously interpreted by the CJEU and the Supreme Court, and that the relevant rules were sufficiently clear. Therefore, no new directions from the CJEU were needed. The courts also noted that, pursuant to the judgment of 23 March 2010 of the CJEU (Joined Cases C ‑ 236/08 to C ‑ 238/08, Google France SARL and Google Inc. [2010] ECR I ‑ 2417), it was for the national courts to assess whether the role played by a service provider was neutral, in the sense that its conduct was merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge of or control over the data which it stored. The courts considered that this was not the case in the matter before them. As the publisher had already deleted the defamatory comments by the time of the delivery of the judgment, no ruling was made on that issue; the plaintiff ’ s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage was dismissed. A similar judgment was handed down by the Tallinn Court of Appeal on 27 June 2013 (case no. 2-10-46710). In that case as well, an Internet news portal was held liable for defamatory comments posted by readers and the plaintiff ’ s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage was dismissed. III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS A. Council of Europe documents 44. On 28 May 2003, at the 840th meeting of the Ministers ’ Deputies, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet. The relevant parts of the declaration read as follows. “ The member states of the Council of Europe, ... Convinced also that it is necessary to limit the liability of service providers when they act as mere transmitters, or when they, in good faith, provide access to, or host, content from third parties; Recalling in this respect Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce); Stressing that freedom of communication on the Internet should not prejudice the human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of others, especially minors; Considering that a balance has to be found between respecting the will of users of the Internet not to disclose their identity and the need for law enforcement authorities to trace those responsible for criminal acts; ... Declare that they seek to abide by the following principles in the field of communication on the Internet: Principle 1: Content rules for the Internet Member states should not subject content on the Internet to restrictions which go further than those applied to other means of content delivery. ... Principle 3: Absence of prior state control Public authorities should not, through general blocking or filtering measures, deny access by the public to information and other communication on the Internet, regardless of frontiers. This does not prevent the installation of filters for the protection of minors, in particular in places accessible to them, such as schools or libraries. Provided that the safeguards of Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are respected, measures may be taken to enforce the removal of clearly identifiable Internet content or, alternatively, the blockage of access to it, if the competent national authorities have taken a provisional or final decision on its illegality. ... Principle 6: Limited liability of service providers for Internet content Member states should not impose on service providers a general obligation to monitor content on the Internet to which they give access, that they transmit or store, nor that of actively seeking facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. Member states should ensure that service providers are not held liable for content on the Internet when their function is limited, as defined by national law, to transmitting information or providing access to the Internet. In cases where the functions of service providers are wider and they store content emanating from other parties, member states may hold them co-responsible if they do not act expeditiously to remove or disable access to information or services as soon as they become aware, as defined by national law, of their illegal nature or, in the event of a claim for damages, of facts or circumstances revealing the illegality of the activity or information. When defining under national law the obligations of service providers as set out in the previous paragraph, due care must be taken to respect the freedom of expression of those who made the information available in the first place, as well as the corresponding right of users to the information. In all cases, the above-mentioned limitations of liability should not affect the possibility of issuing injunctions where service providers are required to terminate or prevent, to the extent possible, an infringement of the law. Principle 7: Anonymity In order to ensure protection against online surveillance and to enhance the free expression of information and ideas, member states should respect the will of users of the Internet not to disclose their identity. This does not prevent member states from taking measures and co-operating in order to trace those responsible for criminal acts, in accordance with national law, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and other international agreements in the fields of justice and the police. ” 45. In its Recommendation CM/ Rec( 2007)16 to member States on measures to promote the public service value of the Internet (adopted on 7 November 2007), the Committee of Ministers noted that the Internet could, on the one hand, significantly enhance the exercise of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms while, on the other, it could adversely affect these and other such rights. It recommended that the member States draw up a clear legal framework delineating the boundaries of the roles and responsibilities of all key stakeholders in the field of new information and communication technologies. 46. Recommendation CM/ Rec( 2011)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on a new notion of media (adopted on 21 September 2011) reads as follows. “ ... The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 15. b of the Statute of the Council of Europe recommends that member states: – adopt a new, broad notion of media which encompasses all actors involved in the production and dissemination, to potentially large numbers of people, of content (for example information, analysis, comment, opinion, education, culture, art and entertainment in text, audio, visual, audiovisual or other form) and applications which are designed to facilitate interactive mass communication (for example social networks) or other content-based large-scale interactive experiences (for example online games), while retaining (in all these cases) editorial control or oversight of the contents; – review regulatory needs in respect of all actors delivering services or products in the media ecosystem so as to guarantee people ’ s right to seek, receive and impart information in accordance with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and to extend to those actors relevant safeguards against interference that might otherwise have an adverse effect on Article 10 rights, including as regards situations which risk leading to undue self-restraint or self-censorship; – apply the criteria set out in the appendix hereto when considering a graduated and differentiated response for actors falling within the new notion of media based on relevant Council of Europe media-related standards, having regard to their specific functions in the media process and their potential impact and significance in ensuring or enhancing good governance in a democratic society; ... ” The Appendix to the Recommendation states as follows, in so far as relevant. “ 7. A differentiated and graduated approach requires that each actor whose services are identified as media or as an intermediary or auxiliary activity benefit from both the appropriate form (differentiated) and the appropriate level (graduated) of protection and that responsibility also be delimited in conformity with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and other relevant standards developed by the Council of Europe. ... 30. Editorial control can be evidenced by the actors ’ own policy decisions on the content to make available or to promote, and on the manner in which to present or arrange it. Legacy media sometimes publicise explicitly written editorial policies, but they can also be found in internal instructions or criteria for selecting or processing (for example verifying or validating) content. In the new communications environments, editorial policies can be embedded in mission statements or in terms and conditions of use (which may contain very detailed provisions on content), or may be expressed informally as a commitment to certain principles (for example netiquette, motto). ... 32. Editorial process can involve users (for example peer review and take down requests) with ultimate decisions taken according to an internally defined process and having regard to specified criteria (reactive moderation). New media often resort to ex post moderation (often referred to as post-moderation) in respect of user generated content, which may at first sight be imperceptible. Editorial processes may also be automated (for example in the case of algorithms ex ante selecting content or comparing content with copyrighted material). ... 35. Again, it should be noted that different levels of editorial control go along with different levels of editorial responsibility. Different levels of editorial control or editorial modalities (for example ex ante as compared with ex post moderation) call for differentiated responses and will almost certainly permit best to graduate the response. 36. Consequently, a provider of an intermediary or auxiliary service which contributes to the functioning or accessing of a media but does not – or should not – itself exercise editorial control, and therefore has limited or no editorial responsibility, should not be considered to be media. However, their action may be relevant in a media context. Nonetheless, action taken by providers of intermediary or auxiliary services as a result of legal obligations (for example take down of content in response to a judicial order) should not be considered as editorial control in the sense of the above. ... 63. The importance of the role of intermediaries should be underlined. They offer alternative and complementary means or channels for the dissemination of media content, thus broadening outreach and enhancing effectiveness in media ’ s achievements of its purposes and objectives. In a competitive intermediaries and auxiliaries market, they may significantly reduce the risk of interference by authorities. However, given the degree to which media have to rely on them in the new ecosystem, there is also a risk of censorship operated through intermediaries and auxiliaries. Certain situations may also pose a risk of private censorship (by intermediaries and auxiliaries in respect of media to which they provide services or content they carry). ” 47. On 16 April 2014 Recommendation CM/ Rec( 2014)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on a Guide to human rights for Internet users was adopted. The relevant part of the Guide reads as follows. Freedom of expression and information “ You have the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of your choice, without interference and regardless of frontiers. This means: 1. you have the freedom to express yourself online and to access information and the opinions and expressions of others. This includes political speech, views on religion, opinions and expressions that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive, but also those that may offend, shock or disturb others. You should have due regard to the reputation or rights of others, including their right to privacy; 2. restrictions may apply to expressions which incite discrimination, hatred or violence. These restrictions must be lawful, narrowly tailored and executed with court oversight; ... 6. you may choose not to disclose your identity online, for instance by using a pseudonym. However, you should be aware that measures can be taken, by national authorities, which might lead to your identity being revealed. ” B. Other international documents 48. In his report of 16 May 2011 (A/HRC/17/27) to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression stated the following. “ 25. As such, legitimate types of information which may be restricted include child pornography (to protect the rights of children), hate speech (to protect the rights of affected communities), defamation (to protect the rights and reputation of others against unwarranted attacks), direct and public incitement to commit genocide (to protect the rights of others), and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence (to protect the rights of others, such as the right to life). ... 27. In addition, the Special Rapporteur emphasizes that due to the unique characteristics of the Internet, regulations or restrictions which may be deemed legitimate and proportionate for traditional media are often not so with regard to the Internet. For example, in cases of defamation of individuals ’ reputation, given the ability of the individual concerned to exercise his/her right of reply instantly to restore the harm caused, the types of sanctions that are applied to offline defamation may be unnecessary or disproportionate. ... ... 43. The Special Rapporteur believes that censorship measures should never be delegated to a private entity, and that no one should be held liable for content on the Internet of which they are not the author. Indeed, no State should use or force intermediaries to undertake censorship on its behalf ... ... 74. Intermediaries play a fundamental role in enabling Internet users to enjoy their right to freedom of expression and access to information. Given their unprecedented influence over how and what is circulated on the Internet, States have increasingly sought to exert control over them and to hold them legally liable for failing to prevent access to content deemed to be illegal. ” 49. A Joint Declaration by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS (Organization of American States) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, adopted on 21 December 2005, stated the following: “ No one should be liable for content on the Internet of which they are not the author, unless they have either adopted that content as their own or refused to obey a court order to remove that content. ” IV. RELEVANT EUROPEAN UNION AND COMPARATIVE LAW MATERIAL A. European Union instruments and case-law 1. Directive 2000/31/EC 50. The relevant parts of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) provide as follows. “ (9) The free movement of information society services can in many cases be a specific reflection in Community law of a more general principle, namely freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which has been ratified by all the Member States; for this reason, directives covering the supply of information society services must ensure that this activity may be engaged in freely in the light of that Article, subject only to the restrictions laid down in paragraph 2 of that Article and in Article 46(1) of the Treaty; this Directive is not intended to affect national fundamental rules and principles relating to freedom of expression. ... (42) The exemptions from liability established in this Directive cover only cases where the activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process of operating and giving access to a communication network over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored, for the sole purpose of making the transmission more efficient; this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored. (43) A service provider can benefit from the exemptions for ‘ mere conduit ’ and for ‘ caching ’ when he is in no way involved with the information transmitted; this requires among other things that he does not modify the information that he transmits; this requirement does not cover manipulations of a technical nature which take place in the course of the transmission as they do not alter the integrity of the information contained in the transmission. (44) A service provider who deliberately collaborates with one of the recipients of his service in order to undertake illegal acts goes beyond the activities of ‘ mere conduit ’ or ‘ caching ’ and as a result cannot benefit from the liability exemptions established for these activities. (45) The limitations of the liability of intermediary service providers established in this Directive do not affect the possibility of injunctions of different kinds; such injunctions can in particular consist of orders by courts or administrative authorities requiring the termination or prevention of any infringement, including the removal of illegal information or the disabling of access to it. (46) In order to benefit from a limitation of liability, the provider of an information society service, consisting of the storage of information, upon obtaining actual knowledge or awareness of illegal activities has to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information concerned; the removal or disabling of access has to be undertaken in the observance of the principle of freedom of expression and of procedures established for this purpose at national level; this Directive does not affect Member States ’ possibility of establishing specific requirements which must be fulfilled expeditiously prior to the removal or disabling of information. (47) Member States are prevented from imposing a monitoring obligation on service providers only with respect to obligations of a general nature; this does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case and, in particular, does not affect orders by national authorities in accordance with national legislation. (48) This Directive does not affect the possibility for Member States of requiring service providers, who host information provided by recipients of their service, to apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected from them and which are specified by national law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities. ... Article 1 Objective and scope 1. This Directive seeks to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by ensuring the free movement of information society services between the Member States. ... Article 2 Definitions For the purpose of this Directive, the following terms shall bear the following meanings: (a) ‘ information society services ’ : services within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/EC; (b) ‘ service provider ’ : any natural or legal person providing an information society service; (c) ‘ established service provider ’ : a service provider who effectively pursues an economic activity using a fixed establishment for an indefinite period. The presence and use of the technical means and technologies required to provide the service do not, in themselves, constitute an establishment of the provider; ... Section 4: Liability of intermediary service providers Article 12 ‘ Mere conduit ’ 1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a communication network, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information transmitted, on condition that the provider: (a) does not initiate the transmission; (b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and (c) does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission. 2. The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to in paragraph 1 include the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information transmitted in so far as this takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the communication network, and provided that the information is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission. 3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States ’ legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement. Article 13 ‘ Caching ’ 1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of that information, performed for the sole purpose of making more efficient the information ’ s onward transmission to other recipients of the service upon their request, on condition that: (a) the provider does not modify the information; (b) the provider complies with conditions on access to the information; (c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the information, specified in a manner widely recognised and used by industry; (d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information; and (e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it has been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such removal or disablement. 2. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States ’ legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement. Article 14 Hosting 1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider. 3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States ’ legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information. Article 15 No general obligation to monitor 1. Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. 2. Member States may establish obligations for information society service providers promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service or obligations to communicate to the competent authorities, at their request, information enabling the identification of recipients of their service with whom they have storage agreements. ” 2. Directive 98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/EC 51. Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services, as amended by Directive 98/48/EC, provides as follows: Article 1 “ For the purposes of this Directive, the following meanings shall apply : ... 2. ‘ service ’, any Information Society service, that is to say, any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services. For the purposes of this definition: – ‘ at a distance ’ means that the service is provided without the parties being simultaneously present, – ‘ by electronic means ’ means that the service is sent initially and received at its destination by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and entirely transmitted, conveyed and received by wire, by radio, by optical means or by other electromagnetic means, – ‘ at the individual request of a recipient of services ’ means that the service is provided through the transmission of data on individual request. An indicative list of services not covered by this definition is set out in Annex V. This Directive shall not apply to: – radio broadcasting services, – television broadcasting services covered by point (a) of Article 1 of Directive 89/552/EEC. ” 3. Case-law of the CJEU 52. In a judgment of 23 March 2010 (Joined Cases C ‑ 236/08 to C ‑ 238/08 Google France SARL and Google Inc. ), the CJEU considered that, in order to establish whether the liability of a referencing service provider could be limited under Article 14 of the Directive on electronic commerce, it was necessary to examine whether the role played by that service provider was neutral, in the sense that its conduct was merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge of or control over the data which it stored. Article 14 of the Directive on electronic commerce had to be interpreted as meaning that the rule laid down therein applied to an Internet referencing service provider in the event that that service provider had not played an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of or control over the data stored. If it had not played such a role, that service provider could not be held liable for the data which it had stored at the request of an advertiser, unless, having obtained knowledge of the unlawful nature of those data or of that advertiser ’ s activities, it had failed to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the data concerned. 53. In a judgment of 12 July 2011 (Case C ‑ 324/09, L ’ Oréal SA and Others ), the CJEU ruled that Article 14 § 1 of the Directive on electronic commerce was to be interpreted as applying to the operator of an online marketplace where that operator had not played an active role allowing it to have knowledge of or control over the data stored. The operator played such a role when it provided assistance which entailed, in particular, optimising the presentation of the offers for sale in question or promoting them. Where the operator of the online marketplace had not played such an active role and the service provided fell, as a consequence, within the scope of Article 14 § 1 of the Directive on electronic commerce, the operator none the less could not, in a case which could result in an order to pay damages, rely on the exemption from liability provided for under that Article if it had been aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator should have realised that the offers for sale in question had been unlawful and, in the event of it being so aware, had failed to act expeditiously in accordance with Article 14 § 1 (b) of the Directive on electronic commerce. 54. In a judgment of 24 November 2011 (Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA ), the CJEU ruled that an injunction could not be made against an Internet service provider requiring it to install a system for filtering all electronic communications passing via its services, in particular those involving the use of peer-to-peer software, which applied indiscriminately to all its customers, as a preventive measure, exclusively at its expense and for an unlimited period, and which was capable of identifying on that provider ’ s network the movement of electronic files containing a musical, cinematographic or audio - visual work in respect of which the applicant claimed to hold intellectual property rights, with a view to blocking the transfer of files the sharing of which would infringe copyright. 55. In a judgment of 16 February 2012 (Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA ( SABAM ) ) the CJEU held that the Directive on electronic commerce and Directives 2000/31/EC, 2001/29/EC and 2004/48/EC precluded a national court from issuing an injunction against a hosting service provider requiring it to install a system for filtering information stored on its servers by its service users, which applied indiscriminately to all those users, as a preventive measure, exclusively at its expense and for an unlimited period, and which was capable of identifying electronic files containing musical, cinematographic or audio - visual work in respect of which the applicant for the injunction claimed to hold intellectual property rights, with a view to preventing those works from being made available to the public in breach of copyright. 56. In a judgment of 13 May 2014 (Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. ), the CJEU was called upon to interpret Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. It found that the activity of an Internet search engine was to be classified as “ processing of personal data ” within the meaning of Directive 95/46/EC and held that such processing of personal data, carried out by the operator of a search engine, was liable to affect significantly the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data (guaranteed under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) when the search by means of that engine was carried out on the basis of an individual ’ s name, since that processing enabled any Internet user to obtain through the list of results a structured overview of the information relating to that individual that could be found on the Internet and thereby to establish a more or less detailed profile of him or her. Furthermore, the effect of the interference with the rights of the data subject was heightened on account of the important role played by the Internet and search engines in modern society, which rendered the information contained in such a list of results ubiquitous. In the light of the potential seriousness of that interference, it could not be justified merely by the economic interest of the operator. The CJEU considered that a fair balance should be sought between the legitimate interest of Internet users in having access to the information and the data subject ’ s fundamental rights. The data subject ’ s fundamental rights, as a general rule, overrode the interest of Internet users, but that balance might, however, depend on the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject ’ s private life and on the interest of the public in having that information. The CJEU held that in certain cases the operator of a search engine was obliged to remove from the list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of a person ’ s name links to web pages, published by third parties and containing information relating to that person, even when its publication in itself on the web pages in question was lawful. That was so in particular where the data appeared to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes for which they had been processed and in the light of the time that had elapsed. 57. In a judgment of 11 September 2014 (Case C-291/13, Sotiris Papasavvas ), the CJEU found that, since a newspaper publishing company which posted an online version of a newspaper on its website had, in principle, knowledge of the information which it posted and exercised control over that information, it could not be considered to be an “ intermediary service provider ” within the meaning of Articles 12 to 14 of Directive 2000/31 /EC, whether or not access to that website was free of charge. Thus, it held that the limitations of civil liability specified in Articles 12 to 14 of Directive 2000/31 /EC did not apply to the case of a newspaper publishing company which operated a website on which the online version of a newspaper was posted, that company being, moreover, remunerated by income generated by commercial advertisements posted on the website, since it had knowledge of the information posted and exercised control over that information, whether or not access to the website was free of charge. B. Comparative law material 58. From the information available to the Court, it would appear that in a number of the member States of the Council of Europe – which are also member States of the European Union – the Directive on electronic commerce, as transposed into national law, constitutes a primary source of law in the area in question. It would also appear that the greater the involvement of the operator in the third-party content before online publication – whether through prior censoring, editing, selection of recipients, requesting comments on a predefined subject or the adoption of content as the operator ’ s own – the greater the likelihood that the operator will be held liable for that content. Some countries have enacted certain further regulations specifically concerning the take-down procedures relating to allegedly unlawful content on the Internet, and provisions concerning distribution of liability in this context. THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 59. The applicant company complained that holding it liable for the comments posted by the readers of its Internet news portal infringed its freedom of expression as provided for in Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows. “ 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. ” 60. The Government contested that argument. A. The Chamber judgment 61. In its judgment of 10 October 2013, the Chamber noted at the outset that the parties ’ views diverged as to the applicant company ’ s role in the present case. According to the Government, the applicant company was to be considered the discloser of the defamatory comments, whereas the applicant company was of the opinion that its freedom to impart information created and published by third parties was at stake, and that the applicant company itself was not a publisher of the third-party comments. The Chamber did not proceed to determine the exact role to be attributed to the applicant company ’ s activities and noted that it was not, in substance, in dispute between the parties that the domestic courts ’ decisions in respect of the applicant company constituted an interference with its freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention. 62. As regards the lawfulness of the interference, the Chamber rejected the applicant company ’ s argument that the interference with its freedom of expression was not “ prescribed by law ”. The Chamber observed that the domestic courts had found that the applicant company ’ s activities did not fall within the scope of the Directive on electronic commerce and the Information Society Services Act. It considered that it was not its task to take the place of the domestic courts and that it was primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. The Chamber was furthermore satisfied that the relevant provisions of the civil law – although they were quite general and lacked detail in comparison with, for example, the Information Society Services Act – along with the relevant case-law, made it clear that a media publisher was liable for any defamatory statements made in its publication. The Chamber had regard to the fact that the applicant company was a professional publisher which operated one of the largest news portals in Estonia, and also that a degree of notoriety had been attributable to comments posted in its commenting area. Against that background, the Chamber considered that the applicant company had been in a position to assess the risks related to its activities and that it must have been able to foresee, to a reasonable degree, the consequences which these could entail. 63. The Chamber further found that the restriction of the applicant company ’ s freedom of expression had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights of others. In the Chamber ’ s view, the fact that the actual authors of the comments were also in principle liable did not remove the legitimate aim of holding the applicant company liable for any damage to the reputation and rights of others. 64. As regards the proportionality of the interference, the Chamber noted that there was no dispute that the comments in question had been of a defamatory nature. In assessing the proportionality of the interference with the applicant company ’ s freedom of expression, the Chamber had regard to the following elements. It examined firstly the context of the comments, secondly, the measures applied by the applicant company in order to prevent or remove defamatory comments, thirdly, the liability of the actual authors of the comments as an alternative to the applicant company ’ s liability, and, fourthly, the consequences of the domestic proceedings for the applicant company. 65. In particular, the Chamber considered that the news article published by the applicant company that had given rise to the defamatory comments had concerned a matter of public interest and the applicant company could have foreseen the negative reactions and exercised a degree of caution in order to avoid being held liable for damaging the reputation of others. However, the prior automatic filtering and notice-and-take-down system used by the applicant company had not ensured sufficient protection for the rights of third parties. Moreover, publishing news articles and making readers ’ comments on them public had been part of the applicant company ’ s professional activities and its advertising revenue depended on the number of readers and comments. The applicant company had been able to exercise a substantial degree of control over readers ’ comments and it had been in a position to predict the nature of the comments a particular article was liable to prompt and to take technical or manual measures to prevent defamatory statements from being made public. Furthermore, there had been no realistic opportunity of bringing a civil claim against the actual authors of the comments as their identity could not easily be established. In any event, the Chamber was not convinced that measures allowing an injured party to bring a claim only against the authors of defamatory comments would have guaranteed effective protection of the injured party ’ s right to respect for his or her private life. It had been the applicant company ’ s choice to allow comments by non-registered users, and by doing so it had to be considered to have assumed a certain responsibility for such comments. For all the above reasons, and considering the moderate amount of damages the applicant company had been ordered to pay, the restriction on its freedom of expression was considered to have been justified and proportionate. There had accordingly been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. B. The parties ’ submissions to the Grand Chamber 1. The applicant company (a) General remarks 66. The applicant company argued that in today ’ s world, Internet media content was increasingly created by the users themselves. User-generated content was of high importance – comments on news stories and articles often raised serious debates in society and even informed journalists of issues that were not publicly known, thereby contributing to the initiation of journalistic investigations. The possibility for “ everyone ” to contribute to public debate advanced democracy and fulfilled the purposes of freedom of expression in the best possible way. It was a great challenge in this setting to hold those who infringed the rights of others accountable while avoiding censorship. 67. As regards user-generated content, the applicant company was of the opinion that it was sufficient for a host to expeditiously remove third-party content as soon as it became aware of its illegal nature. If this was deemed insufficient by the Court, anonymous public speech would be prohibited or there would be arbitrary restrictions on commenters ’ freedom of communication by the intermediary, which would be impelled to err on the side of caution to avoid possible subsequent liability. (b) Delfi ’ s role 68. The applicant company called on the Grand Chamber to look at the case as a whole, including the question whether the applicant company was to be characterised as a traditional publisher or an intermediary. A publisher was liable for all content published by it regardless of the authorship of the particular content. However, the applicant company insisted that it should be regarded as an intermediary and it had as such been entitled to follow the specific and foreseeable law limiting the obligation to monitor third-party comments. It argued that intermediaries were not best suited to decide upon the legality of user-generated content. This was especially so in respect of defamatory content since the victim alone could assess what caused damage to his reputation. (c) Lawfulness 69. The applicant company argued that the interference with its freedom of expression – including its right to store information and to enable users to impart their opinions – was not prescribed by law. It submitted that there was no legislation or case-law stating that an intermediary was to be considered a publisher of content which it was not aware of. On the contrary, the applicable law expressly prohibited the imposition of liability on service providers for third-party content. In this connection, the applicant company referred to the Directive on electronic commerce, the Estonian Information Society Services Act and the Council of Europe Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet. The Directive provided for limited and notice-based liability with take-down procedures for illegal content. Service providers were exempted from liability where, upon obtaining actual knowledge of illegal activities, they acted expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information concerned. Such removal or disabling of access had to be undertaken in the observance of the principle of freedom of expression and of procedures established for this purpose at national level ( Recital 46 of the Preamble to the Directive). The applicant company argued that this law was indisputably formulated with sufficient precision to enable a citizen to regulate his conduct. According to the applicant company, its behaviour had been in full compliance with the applicable law as it had removed the defamatory comments the same day it had been notified by the original plaintiff. 70. The applicant company further argued that even the existing tort law did not classify disseminators (postal workers, libraries, bookstores and others) as publishers. Thus, it remained entirely unclear how the existing tort law had been applied to a “ novel area related to new technologies ” as held in the Chamber judgment, that is, to an online news portal operator providing a service enabling users to interact with journalists and each other and to contribute valuable ideas to the discussion of matters of public interest. There was no law imposing an obligation on the applicant company to proactively monitor user comments. (d) Legitimate aim 71. The applicant company did not dispute that the interference in question had a legitimate aim. (e) Necessary in a democratic society 72. According to the applicant company, the interference was not necessary in a democratic society. It argued that as a result of the Chamber judgment it had two choices. Firstly, it could employ an army of highly trained moderators to patrol (in real time) each message board (for each news article) to screen any message that could be labelled defamatory (or that could infringe intellectual property rights, inter alia ); at the end of the day, these moderators would, just in case, remove any sensitive comments and all discussions would be moderated so that they were limited to the least controversial issues. Otherwise, it could simply avoid such a massive risk and shut down these fora altogether. Either way, the technological capability to provide ordinary readers with an opportunity to comment freely on daily news and assume responsibility independently for their own comments would be abandoned. 73. The applicant company argued that the Supreme Court ’ s judgment had had a “ chilling effect ” on freedom of expression and that it had restricted the applicant company ’ s freedom to impart information. It amounted to the establishment of an obligation to censor private individuals. 74. In support of its argument that the interference was not necessary in a democratic society, the applicant company relied on the following factors. 75. Firstly, it argued that the comments were reactions from members of the public to an event caused by the Saaremaa Shipping Company and not to the article as such. Furthermore, the article was a balanced and neutral one. It addressed an issue of great importance to the residents of the biggest island of Estonia affecting their everyday lives. The readers ’ negative reactions had not been caused by the article but by the shipping company. 76. Secondly, the applicant company had taken sufficient measures to prevent or remove defamatory comments; in the present case, the comments in question had been removed on the same day that the applicant company had been notified of them. 77. Thirdly, the applicant company argued that the actual authors of the comments should bear responsibility for their contents. It disagreed with the Chamber ’ s finding that it was difficult to establish the identity of the authors of the comments and contended that the authors ’ identities could be established in the “ pre-trial taking of evidence ” procedure under Article 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Once the names and addresses of the authors were established, a claim against them could be brought without any difficulties. 78. Fourthly, the applicant company insisted that there was no pressing social need for a strict liability standard for service providers. It argued that there was a European consensus that no service provider should be liable for content of which it was not the author. Accordingly, the margin of appreciation afforded to the Contracting States in this respect was necessarily a narrow one. Furthermore, it considered that the modest sum it had been ordered to pay in compensation for non-pecuniary damage did not justify the interference. It also emphasised that if the applicant company enjoyed limited liability the original plaintiff would not have been left without a remedy – he could have sued the actual authors of the comments. The applicant company objected to the establishment of private censorship and contended that it was sufficient to have a two-pronged system for the protection of the rights of third parties: a notice-and-take-down system and the possibility of bringing a claim against the authors of defamatory comments. There was no convincingly established “ pressing social need ” for the liability of Internet service providers. 79. The applicant company also emphasised the importance of anonymity for free speech on the Internet; this encouraged the full involvement of all, including marginalised groups, political dissidents and whistle-blowers, and allowed individuals to be safe from reprisals. 80. Lastly, the applicant company contended that the domestic courts had clearly misinterpreted European Union (EU) law. It submitted that the Chamber judgment had created a collision of obligations and legal uncertainty since adhering to EU law on the issue of liability for host service providers would render the State liable under the Convention, whereas adhering to the test set out in the judgment would not be in conformity with EU law. 2. The Government (a) General remarks 81. The Government made the following remarks in respect of the scope of the case. Firstly, according to the Court ’ s case-law it was for the domestic courts to decide on the domestically applicable law and interpret it. Furthermore, interpretation of EU law was the task of the CJEU. The domestic courts, in reasoned decisions, had found that the Obligations Act, rather than the Directive on electronic commerce or the Information Society Services Act, was applicable. The Grand Chamber should also proceed from this presumption and the applicant company ’ s allegations regarding the applicability of EU law were inadmissible. Secondly, the Government stressed that there existed a number of different types of Internet portals and the issue of their operators ’ liability could not be generalised. The present case was limited to the activities of the Delfi portal at the material time. In that connection the Government pointed out that Delfi had actively invited readers to comment on the articles it had chosen itself; it had published anonymous comments posted on those articles and in the same section; and the comments could be amended or deleted only by Delfi. The applicant company ’ s liability should be assessed in that specific context. 82. The Government emphasised that there was no dispute that the comments in question had been defamatory. 83. The Government noted that, despite the applicant company ’ s allegations to that effect, it had not been forced to disable anonymous comments or to change its business model. On the contrary, Delfi remained the largest Internet portal in Estonia; it was still possible to post anonymous comments on the portal and the number of comments had risen from 190,000 comments a month in 2009 to 300,000 in 2013. According to an article published on 26 September 2013, Delfi deleted 20,000 to 30,000 comments monthly (7 - 10% of all comments). Postimees, the second-largest portal, deleted up to 7% of a total of 120,000 comments. Both portals had five employees who dealt with taking down insulting comments. Since December 2013 Delfi had used a two-tier comments section where registered comments and anonymous comments were shown separately. (b) Lawfulness 84. The Government insisted that the interference with the applicant company ’ s rights had been “ prescribed by law ”. They referred to the domestic legislation and case-law summarised in paragraphs 32 to 36, 38 and 39 of the Chamber judgment, as well as the Court ’ s relevant case-law as summarised in the Chamber judgment. The Government also pointed out that there was no Estonian case-law on the basis of which Delfi – which encouraged the posting of comments on the articles selected and published by it – could have presumed that the owner of an Internet portal as a new media publication was not liable for the damage caused by comments posted on its articles, which formed an integral part of the news and which only Delfi could administer. Further, by the time the domestic judgments had been handed down in Delfi, it was more than clear that Internet media had a wide influence over the public and that, in order to protect the private life of others, liability rules had to apply to new media as well. 85. The Government reiterated that the applicant company ’ s references to EU law and the Information Society Services Act should be disregarded. The Grand Chamber could only assess whether the effects of the interpretation of the Obligations Act were compatible with Article 10 § 2 of the Convention and could not assess the legislation the domestic courts had found not to be applicable. They also pointed out that the domestic courts had paid sufficient attention to the question whether the applicant company might be regarded as a caching or hosting service provider. However, they had found this not to be the case. In particular, in the event of hosting, the service provider merely provided a data storage service, while the stored data and their insertion, amendment, removal and content remained under the control of the service users. In Delfi ’ s comments section, however, commenters lost control of their comments as soon as they had entered them, and they could not change or delete them. Having regard also to the other aspects of the case – Delfi chose the articles and their titles; Delfi invited readers to comment and set the Rules on posting comments (including that the comments had to be related to the article); the amount of advertising revenue Delfi received increased the more comments were posted; Delfi also selectively monitored the comments – the domestic courts had found that Delfi had not acted only as a technical intermediary service provider and could not be classified either as a cache or as a host. The Government also emphasised that the CJEU had never adjudicated on a case similar to the Delfi case. In any event, even if the CJEU ’ s case-law, such as L ’ Oréal SA and Others (cited above), was of relevance, it could be concluded that the role played by Delfi was an active one and it could not be granted the exemptions from liability provided in the Directive on electronic commerce. (c) Legitimate aim 86. The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant company ’ s rights under Article 10 had the legitimate aim of protecting the honour of others. (d) Necessary in a democratic society 87. As regards the question whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, the Government emphasised at the outset the importance of the balance between Articles 10 and 8 of the Convention. 88. The Government referred extensively to the relevant reasoning of the Chamber judgment. In addition, they emphasised the following. 89. Firstly, as regards the context of the comments, the Government noted that the domestic courts had attached importance to the fact that the selection and publication of the news articles and the publication of readers ’ comments on these articles in the same section had been part of the applicant company ’ s professional activity as a discloser of information. Delfi invited readers to comment on its articles – often giving the articles provocative headlines and showing the number of comments on the main page immediately after the title of an article in bold red, so that commenting on an article would be more enticing – which in turn brought in advertising revenue. 90. Secondly, in respect of the measures applied by the applicant company, the Government stressed the importance of ensuring the protection of third parties in relation to the Internet, which had become an extensive medium available to the majority of the population and used on a daily basis. The Government added that the applicant company ’ s responsibility for the comments had also been obvious as the actual writers of comments could not modify or delete their comments once they were posted on the Delfi news portal – only the applicant company had the technical means to do this. The Government also pointed out that any information communicated via the Internet spread so quickly that measures taken weeks or even days later to protect a person ’ s honour were no longer sufficient because the offensive comments had already reached the general public and done the damage. The Government further argued that the biggest international news portals did not allow anonymous (that is, unregistered) comments and referred to an opinion that there was a trend away from anonymity. At the same time, anonymous comments tended to be more insulting than the comments by persons who had registered, and harsh comments attracted more readers. The Government argued that Delfi had been notorious for exactly this reason. 91. Thirdly, as regards the liability of the actual authors, the Government submitted that in civil proceedings – a remedy which was preferable to criminal remedies in defamation cases – investigative measures such as surveillance procedures were not accessible. In respect of the procedure for “ pre-trial taking of evidence ”, the Government argued that this was not a reasonable alternative in the case of anonymous comments for the following two reasons: (a) the relevant Internet Protocol ( IP) addresses could be not always established, for example if the user data or the comment had been deleted or an anonymous proxy had been used; and (b) even if the computers used for posting the comments could be identified, it could still prove impossible to identify the persons who had posted them, for example in cases where a public computer, a Wi-Fi hotspot, a dynamic IP address or a server in a foreign country had been used, or for other technical reasons. 92. Fourthly, as regards the consequences of the domestic proceedings for the applicant company, the Government noted that Delfi had not needed to change its business model or disallow anonymous comments. In fact, the total number of comments – the majority of which were anonymous – had increased, while Delfi now employed five moderators. The Government also pointed out that the finding of liability was not aimed at obtaining huge or punitive awards of compensation. Indeed, in Delfi ’ s case the compensation it had been obliged to pay for non-pecuniary damage was negligible (EUR 320), and in the subsequent case-law (see paragraph 43 above) the courts had held that finding a violation or deleting a comment could be a sufficient remedy. The Government concluded that the applicant company ’ s civil liability had not had a “ chilling effect ” on the freedom of expression, but was justified and proportionate. 93. Lastly, referring to the legislation and practice of several European countries, the Government contended that there was no European consensus on or trend towards excluding the liability of an Internet portal owner which acted as a content service provider and the discloser of anonymous comments on its own articles. C. The third-party interveners ’ submissions 1. The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights 94. The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in Warsaw emphasised the differences between the Internet and traditional media. It noted that online services like Delfi acted simultaneously in two roles: as content providers with regard to their own news, and as host providers with regard to third-party comments. It submitted that moderation of user-generated content or the power to remove access to it should not be regarded as having effective editorial control. Intermediary service providers should not be treated as traditional media and should not be subject to the same liability regime. 95. The Helsinki Foundation argued that authors should be accountable for their defamatory comments and the State should provide a regulatory framework making it possible to identify and prosecute online offenders. At the same time, it also contended that the possibility of publishing anonymously on the Internet should be regarded as a value. 2. Article 19 96. Article 19 argued that one of the most innovative features of the Internet was the ease with which it allowed any person to express his or her views to the entire world without seeking the prior approval of publishers. Comment platforms enabled and promoted public debate in its purest form and this had very little to do with the provision of news. As a matter of fact and form, comments sections on news websites were better understood as newspapers appropriating the private discussion model that was native to the Internet rather than the other way round. Article 19 argued that making websites responsible for comments made by users would impose an unacceptable burden on websites. 97. Article 19 contended that the Directive on electronic commerce was meant to shield websites from liability for their users ’ comments, regardless of their own content. Article 19 insisted that, while the normal liability rules should continue to apply to online news sites for the articles they published, they should be regarded as hosts – rather than publishers – for the purposes of the comments section on their website. As hosts, online news sites should in principle be immune from liability for third-party content in circumstances where they had not been involved in directly modifying the content in issue. They should not be held liable when they took all reasonable steps to remove content upon being notified, and they should not automatically be held liable simply because they decided not to remove a comment reported to them. 3. Access 98. According to Access, anonymity and pseudonymity supported the fundamental rights of privacy and freedom of expression. A regulatory prohibition on anonymous use of the Internet would constitute an interference with the rights to privacy and freedom of expression protected under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, and blanket restrictions on anonymous and pseudonymous expression would impair the very essence of these rights. Access referred to the long-standing case-law of several countries protecting the right to anonymous communication, both on and offline. 99. Furthermore, Access pointed out that services designed to provide enhanced confidentiality and anonymity while using the Internet had become more popular in the wake of revelations of mass surveillance online. It further argued that restricting Internet users to identified expression would harm the Internet economy, and referred to research which had concluded that the most important contributors online were those using pseudonyms. 100. As regards real-name policy, evidence from China showed that such a measure had caused a dramatic drop in the number of comments posted. Experience in South Korea had demonstrated that real-name policy failed to improve meaningfully comments, whereas it was discriminatory against domestic Internet companies, as the users had sought alternative, international platforms that still allowed anonymous and pseudonymous comments. 4. Media Legal Defence Initiative 101. Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI) made its submissions on behalf of twenty-eight non-governmental and media organisations and companies. It noted that the vast majority of online media outlets allowed reader comments. Through the comments facility, readers could debate the news amongst themselves as well as with journalists. This transformed the media from a one-way flow of communication into a participatory form of speech which recognised the voice of the reader and allowed different points of view to be aired. 102. MLDI noted that the boundaries between access and content were now increasingly blurred and “ intermediaries ” included enhanced search services, online marketplaces, web 2.0 applications and social networking sites. From the users ’ perspective, they all facilitated access to and use of content and were crucial to the realisation of the right to freedom of expression. 103. MLDI contended that it was the States ’ task to ensure a regulatory framework that protected and promoted freedom of expression whilst also guarding other rights and interests. It provided a detailed overview of the regulatory framework for intermediary liability in the United States of America and in the European Union. It noted that approaches in these jurisdictions were distinct, but nevertheless similar in that it was acknowledged that some level of protection for intermediaries was vital and that there was no requirement that intermediaries should monitor user content. It also noted that in some member States notice-and-take-down procedures had resulted in excessive liability on intermediaries and the taking down of legitimate content. 104. MLDI also elaborated on the emerging good practices in the regulation of user-generated content by online media. It pointed out that the majority of publications in North America and Europe did not screen or monitor comments before they were posted. They did, however, engage in some kind of post-publication moderation. Many online media outlets also ran filtering software and had mechanisms in place to block users who consistently broke the rules. The majority of online media, including leading European news outlets, required user registration but users were not required to disclose their real names. 5. EDiMA, CCIA Europe and EuroISPA 105. The European Digital Media Association (EDiMA), the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA Europe) and EuroISPA, a pan-European association of European Internet Services Providers Associations, made joint submissions as third parties. 106. The third-party interveners argued that there was an established balance struck to date in legislation, international agreements and recommendations according to which, firstly, host service providers were exempt from liability for content in the absence of “ actual knowledge ” and, secondly, States were prohibited from requiring host providers to carry out general monitoring of content. 107. They noted that, while some information available online came from traditional publishing sources such as newspapers, and was rightly regulated by the law applicable to publishers, a large amount of online content came instead from individual speakers who could state their views unmediated by traditional editorial institutions. Comment facilities allowed for a right of reply and were thus fundamentally different from traditional publications, where no such right existed. 108. The third-party interveners argued that the technology and operating processes for an online news discussion forum like Delfi were technologically indistinguishable from hosting services such as social media/networking platforms, blogs/microblogs and others. Content composed and uploaded by users was automatically made publicly visible without human intervention. For many hosts considerations of scale made proactive human review of all user content effectively impossible. For small websites and start-ups, content control was likely to be particularly challenging and could be so costly as to be prohibitive. 109. The third-party interveners argued that established law in the European Union and other countries envisaged the notice-and-take-down system as a legal and practical framework for Internet content hosting. This balance of responsibilities between users and hosts allowed platforms to identify and remove defamatory or other unlawful speech, whilst at the same time enabling robust discussion on controversial topics of public debate; it made the operation of speech-hosting platforms practicable on a large scale. D. The Court ’ s assessment 1. Preliminary remarks and the scope of the Court ’ s assessment 110. The Court notes at the outset that user-generated expressive activity on the Internet provides an unprecedented platform for the exercise of freedom of expression. That is undisputed and has been recognised by the Court on previous occasions (see Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, no. 3111/10, § 48, ECHR 2012, and Times Newspapers Ltd (nos. 1 and 2) v. the United Kingdom, nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, § 27, ECHR 2009 ). However, alongside these benefits, certain dangers may also arise. Defamatory and other types of clearly unlawful speech, including hate speech and speech inciting violence, can be disseminated like never before, worldwide, in a matter of seconds, and sometimes remain persistently available online. These two conflicting realities lie at the heart of this case. Bearing in mind the need to protect the values underlying the Convention, and considering that the rights under Articles 10 and 8 of the Convention deserve equal respect, a balance must be struck that retains the essence of both rights. Thus, while the Court acknowledges that important benefits can be derived from the Internet in the exercise of freedom of expression, it is also mindful that the possibility of imposing liability for defamatory or other types of unlawful speech must, in principle, be retained, constituting an effective remedy for violations of personality rights. 111. On this basis, and in particular considering that this is the first case in which the Court has been called upon to examine a complaint of this type in an evolving field of technological innovation, the Court considers it necessary to delineate the scope of its inquiry in the light of the facts of the present case. 112. Firstly, the Court observes that the Supreme Court recognised (see paragraph 14 of its judgment of 10 June 2009, set out in paragraph 31 above) that “ [p] ublishing of news and comments on an Internet portal is also a journalistic activity. At the same time, because of the nature of Internet media, it cannot reasonably be required of a portal operator to edit comments before publishing them in the same manner as applies for a printed media publication. While the publisher [of a printed media publication] is, through editing, the initiator of the publication of a comment, on the Internet portal the initiator of publication is the author of the comment, who makes it accessible to the general public through the portal. Therefore, the portal operator is not the person to whom information is disclosed. Because of [their] economic interest in the publication of comments, both a publisher of printed media and an Internet portal operator are publishers/disclosers as entrepreneurs. ” 113. The Court sees no reason to call into question the above distinction made by the Supreme Court. On the contrary, the starting-point of the Supreme Court ’ s reflections, that is, the recognition of differences between a portal operator and a traditional publisher, is in line with the international instruments in this field, which manifest a certain development in favour of distinguishing between the legal principles regulating the activities of the traditional print and audio - visual media, on the one hand and Internet-based media operations, on the other. In the recent Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to the member States of the Council of Europe on a new notion of media, this is termed a “ differentiated and graduated approach [that] requires that each actor whose services are identified as media or as an intermediary or auxiliary activity benefit from both the appropriate form (differentiated) and the appropriate level (graduated) of protection and that responsibility also be delimited in conformity with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and other relevant standards developed by the Council of Europe ” (see paragraph 7 of the Appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)7, quoted in paragraph 46 above). Therefore, the Court considers that because of the particular nature of the Internet, the “ duties and responsibilities ” that are to be conferred on an Internet news portal for the purposes of Article 10 may differ to some degree from those of a traditional publisher as regards third-party content. 114. Secondly, the Court observes that the Supreme Court of Estonia found that the “ legal assessment by the courts of the twenty comments of a derogatory nature [ was ] substantiated. The courts [had] correctly found that those comments [were] defamatory since they [were] of a vulgar nature, degrade[d] human dignity and contain[ ed ] threats ” (see paragraph 15 of the judgment, set out in paragraph 31 above). Further, in paragraph 16 of its judgment, the Supreme Court reiterated that the comments degraded “ human dignity ” and were “ clearly unlawful ”. The Court notes that this characterisation and analysis of the unlawful nature of the comments in question (see paragraph 18 above) is obviously based on the fact that the majority of the comments are, viewed on their face, tantamount to an incitement to hatred or to violence against L. 115. Consequently, the Court considers that the case concerns the “ duties and responsibilities ” of Internet news portals, under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, when they provide for economic purposes a platform for user-generated comments on previously published content and some users – whether identified or anonymous – engage in clearly unlawful speech, which infringes the personality rights of others and amounts to hate speech and incitement to violence against them. The Court emphasises that the present case relates to a large professionally managed Internet news portal run on a commercial basis which published news articles of its own and invited its readers to comment on them. 116. Accordingly, the case does not concern other fora on the Internet where third-party comments can be disseminated, for example an Internet discussion forum or a bulletin board where users can freely set out their ideas on any topic without the discussion being channelled by any input from the forum ’ s manager; or a social media platform where the platform provider does not offer any content and where the content provider may be a private person running the website or blog as a hobby. 117. Furthermore, the Court notes that the applicant company ’ s news portal was one of the biggest Internet media publications in the country; it had a wide readership and there was a known public concern regarding the controversial nature of the comments it attracted (see paragraph 15 above). Moreover, as outlined above, the impugned comments in the present case, as assessed by the Supreme Court, mainly constituted hate speech and speech that directly advocated acts of violence. Thus, the establishment of their unlawful nature did not require any linguistic or legal analysis since the remarks were on their face manifestly unlawful. It is against this background that the Court will proceed to examine the applicant company ’ s complaint. 2. Existence of an interference 118. The Court notes that it was not in dispute between the parties that the applicant company ’ s freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention had been interfered with by the domestic courts ’ decisions. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. 119. Such an interference with the applicant company ’ s right to freedom of expression must be “ prescribed by law ”, have one or more legitimate aims in the light of paragraph 2 of Article 10, and be “ necessary in a democratic society ”. 3. Lawfulness 120. The Court reiterates that the expression “ prescribed by law ” in the second paragraph of Article 10 not only requires that the impugned measure should have a legal basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, which should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see, among other authorities, VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, no. 24699/94, § 52, ECHR 2001 ‑ VI; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 52, ECHR 2000-V; Gawęda v. Poland, no. 26229/95, § 39, ECHR 2002-II; and Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 30, ECHR 2004-I). However, it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 140, ECHR 2012; Kruslin v. France, 24 April 1990, § 29, Series A no. 176-A; and Kopp v. Switzerland, 25 March 1998, § 59, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II). 121. One of the requirements flowing from the expression “ prescribed by law ” is foreseeability. Thus, a norm cannot be regarded as a “ law ” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct; he must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague, and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (see, for example, Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 41, ECHR 2007 ‑ IV, and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above, § 141 ). 122. The level of precision required of domestic legislation – which cannot provide for every eventuality – depends to a considerable degree on the content of the law in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed ( ibid., § 142). The Court has found that persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation, can on this account be expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such activity entails (see Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July, cited above, § 41, with further references to Cantoni v. France, 15 November 1996, § 35, Reports 1996 ‑ V, and Chauvy and Others v. France, no. 64915/01, §§ 43-45, ECHR 2004 ‑ VI). 123. In the present case the parties ’ opinions differed as to whether the interference with the applicant company ’ s freedom of expression was “ prescribed by law ”. The applicant company argued that there was no domestic law according to which an intermediary was to be taken as a professional publisher of comments posted on its website by third parties regardless of whether it was aware of their specific content. On the contrary, the applicant company relied on the domestic and European legislation on Internet service providers and argued that it expressly prohibited the imposition of liability on service providers for third-party content. 124. The Government referred to the relevant provisions of the civil law and domestic case-law to the effect that media publishers were liable for their publications along with the authors. They added that there was no case-law on the basis of which the applicant company could have presumed that the owner of an Internet news portal as a new media publication was not liable for the comments posted on its articles. In their view the Court should proceed from the facts as established and the law as applied and interpreted by the domestic courts and not take account of the applicant company ’ s references to EU law. In any event, the EU law referred to by the applicant company actually supported the domestic courts ’ interpretations and conclusions. 125. The Court observes that the difference in the parties ’ opinions as regards the law to be applied stems from their diverging views on the issue of how the applicant company is to be classified. According to the applicant company, it should be classified as an intermediary as regards the third-party comments, whereas the Government argued that the applicant company was to be seen as a media publisher, including with regard to such comments. 126. The Court observes (see paragraphs 112 - 13 above) that the Supreme Court recognised the differences between the roles of a publisher of printed media, on the one hand, and an Internet portal operator engaged in media publications for an economic purpose, on the other. However, the Supreme Court found that because of their “ economic interest in the publication of comments, both a publisher of printed media and an Internet portal operator [were] publishers/disclosers ” for the purposes of section 1047 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 14 of the judgment, set out in paragraph 31 above). 127. The Court considers that, in substance, the applicant company argues that the domestic courts erred in applying the general provisions of the Obligations Act to the facts of the case as they should have relied upon the domestic and European legislation on Internet service providers. Like the Chamber, the Grand Chamber reiterates in this context that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see, among others, Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above, § 140, and Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, § 35, ECHR 1999 ‑ III ). The Court also reiterates that it is not for it to express a view on the appropriateness of methods chosen by the legislature of a respondent State to regulate a given field. Its task is confined to determining whether the methods adopted and the effects they entail are in conformity with the Convention (see Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 67, ECHR 2004 ‑ I). Thus, the Court confines itself to examining whether the Supreme Court ’ s application of the general provisions of the Obligations Act to the applicant company ’ s situation was foreseeable for the purposes of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 128. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the Civil Code (General Principles) Act and the Obligations Act (see paragraphs 33 ‑ 38 above), as interpreted and applied by the domestic courts, the applicant company was considered a publisher and deemed liable for the publication of the clearly unlawful comments. The domestic courts chose to apply these norms, having found that the special regulation contained in the Information Society Services Act transposing the Directive on electronic commerce into Estonian law did not apply to the present case since the latter related to activities of a merely technical, automatic and passive nature, unlike the applicant company ’ s activities, and that the objective pursued by the applicant company was not merely the provision of an intermediary service (see paragraph 13 of the Supreme Court ’ s judgment, set out in paragraph 31 above). In this particular context the Court takes into account the fact that some countries have recognised that the importance and the complexity of the subject matter, involving the need to ensure proper balancing of different interests and fundamental rights, call for the enactment of specific regulations for situations such as that pertaining in the present case (see paragraph 58 above). Such action is in line with the “ differentiated and graduated approach ” to the regulation of new media recommended by the Council of Europe (see paragraph 46 above) and has found support in the Court ’ s case-law (see, mutatis mutandis, Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, no. 33014/05, §§ 63-64, ECHR 2011 ). However, although various legislative approaches are possible in legislation to take account of the nature of new media, the Court is satisfied on the facts of this case that the provisions of the Constitution, the Civil Code (General Principles) Act and the Obligations Act, along with the relevant case-law, made it foreseeable that a media publisher running an Internet news portal for an economic purpose could, in principle, be held liable under domestic law for the uploading of clearly unlawful comments, of the type in issue in the present case, on its news portal. 129. The Court accordingly finds that, as a professional publisher, the applicant company should have been familiar with the legislation and case-law, and could also have sought legal advice. The Court observes in this context that the Delfi news portal is one of the largest in Estonia. Public concern had already been expressed before the publication of the comments in the present case and the Minister of Justice had noted that victims of insults could bring a suit against Delfi and claim damages (see paragraph 15 above). Thus, the Court considers that the applicant company was in a position to assess the risks related to its activities and that it must have been able to foresee, to a reasonable degree, the consequences which these could entail. It therefore concludes that the interference in issue was “ prescribed by law ” within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. 4. Legitimate aim 130. The parties before the Grand Chamber did not dispute that the restriction of the applicant company ’ s freedom of expression had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights of others. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. 5. Necessary in a democratic society (a) General principles 131. The fundamental principles concerning the question whether an interference with freedom of expression is “ necessary in a democratic society ” are well established in the Court ’ s case-law (see, among other authorities, Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 August 1998, § 46, Reports 1998 ‑ VI; Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, § 87, ECHR 2005 ‑ II; Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], no. 16354/06, § 48, ECHR 2012; and Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08, § 100, ECHR 2013) and have been summarised as follows. “ ( i ) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual ’ s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to ‘ information ’ or ‘ ideas ’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘ democratic society ’. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which ... must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly ... (ii) The adjective ‘ necessary ’, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the existence of a ‘ pressing social need ’. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a ‘ restriction ’ is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10. (iii) The Court ’ s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was ‘ proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued ’ and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are ‘ relevant and sufficient ’ ... In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts ... ” 132. Furthermore, the Court has emphasised the essential function the press fulfils in a democratic society. Although the press must not overstep certain bounds, particularly as regards the reputation and rights of others and the need to prevent the disclosure of confidential information, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest (see Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 31, Series A no. 298; De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 24 February 1997, § 37, Reports 1997 ‑ I; and Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 58, ECHR 1999 ‑ III). Journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation (see Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 26 April 1995, § 38, Series A no. 313, and Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 59). The limits of permissible criticism are narrower in relation to a private citizen than in relation to politicians or governments (see, for example, Castells v. Spain, 23 April 1992, § 46, Series A no. 236; Incal v. Turkey, 9 June 1998, § 54, Reports 1998 ‑ IV; and Tammer v. Estonia, no. 41205/98, § 62, ECHR 2001 ‑ I). 133. Moreover, the Court has previously held that in the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public ’ s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information in general ( see Ahmet Yıldırım, cited above, § 48, and Times Newspapers Ltd, cited above, § 27 ). At the same time, the risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press (see Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel, cited above, § 63). 134. In considering the “ duties and responsibilities ” of a journalist, the potential impact of the medium concerned is an important factor and it is commonly acknowledged that the audio - visual media often have a much more immediate and powerful effect than the print media (see Purcell and Others v. Ireland, no. 15404/89, Commission decision of 16 April 1991, Decisions and Reports 70, p. 262). The methods of objective and balanced reporting may vary considerably, depending among other things on the media in question (see Jersild, cited above, § 31 ). 135. The Court has held that the “ punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another person in an interview would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so ” (see Jersild, cited above, § 35; Thoma v. Luxembourg, no. 38432/97, § 62, ECHR 2001 ‑ III; and, mutatis mutandis, Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria, no. 76918/01, § 31, 14 December 2006, and Print Zeitungsverlag GmbH v. Austria, no. 26547/07, § 39, 10 October 2013 ). 136. Moreover, the Court has held that speech that is incompatible with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention is not protected by Article 10 by virtue of Article 17 of the Convention. The examples of such speech examined by the Court have included statements denying the Holocaust, justifying a pro-Nazi policy, linking all Muslims with a grave act of terrorism, or portraying the Jews as the source of evil in Russia (see Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 September 1998, §§ 47 and 53, Reports 1998 ‑ VII; Garaudy v. France (dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003 ‑ IX; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 23131/03, ECHR 2004 ‑ XI; Witzsch v. Germany (dec.), no. 7485/03, 13 December 2005; and Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), no. 35222/04, 20 February 2007). 137. The Court further reiterates that the right to protection of reputation is a right which is protected by Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life (see Chauvy and Others, cited above, § 70; Pfeifer v. Austria, no. 12556/03, § 35, 15 November 2007; and Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, no. 34147/06, § 40, 21 September 2010). In order for Article 8 to come into play, however, an attack on a person ’ s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and be made in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (see A. v. Norway, no. 28070/06, § 64, 9 April 2009, and Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, § 83, 7 February 2012). 138. When examining whether there is a need for an interference with freedom of expression in a democratic society in the interests of the “ protection of the reputation or rights of others ”, the Court may be required to ascertain whether the domestic authorities have struck a fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each other in certain cases, namely, on the one hand, freedom of expression protected by Article 10, and, on the other, the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8 (see Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, no. 71111/01, § 43, 14 June 2007; MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, no. 39401/04, § 142, 18 January 2011; and Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 84 ). 139. The Court has found that, as a matter of principle, the rights guaranteed under Articles 8 and 10 deserve equal respect, and the outcome of an application should not, in principle, vary according to whether it has been lodged with the Court under Article 10 of the Convention by the publisher of an offending article or under Article 8 of the Convention by the person who was the subject of that article. Accordingly, the margin of appreciation should in principle be the same in both cases (see Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 87, and Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 106, ECHR 2012, with further references to Hachette Filipacchi Associés ( ICI PARIS ), no. 12268/03, § 41, 23 July 2009; Timciuc v. Romania (dec.), no. 28999/03, § 144, 12 October 2010; and Mosley v. the United Kingdom, no. 48009/08, § 111, 10 May 2011). Where the balancing exercise between those two rights has been undertaken by the national authorities in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court ’ s case-law, the Court would require strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts (see Axel Springer AG, cited above, § 88, and Von Hannover, cited above, § 107, with further references to MGN Limited, cited above, §§ 150 and 155, and Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06, § 57, ECHR 2011 ). In other words, there will usually be a wide margin afforded by the Court if the State is required to strike a balance between competing private interests or competing Convention rights (see Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 77, ECHR 2007 ‑ I; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 113, ECHR 1999 ‑ III; and Ashby Donald and Others v. France, no. 36769/08, § 40, 10 January 2013 ). (b) Application of the above principles to the present case (i) Elements in the assessment of proportionality 140. The Court notes that it is not disputed that the comments posted by readers in reaction to the news article published in the comments section on the applicant company ’ s Internet news portal were of a clearly unlawful nature. Indeed, the applicant company removed the comments once it was notified by the injured party, and described them as “ infringing ” and “ illicit ” before the Chamber (see paragraph 84 of the Chamber judgment). Moreover, the Court is of the view that the majority of the impugned comments amounted to hate speech or incitements to violence and as such did not enjoy the protection of Article 10 (see paragraph 136 above). Thus, the freedom of expression of the authors of the comments is not in issue in the present case. Rather, the question before the Court is whether the domestic courts ’ decisions, holding the applicant company liable for these comments posted by third parties, were in breach of its freedom to impart information as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. 141. The Court observes that, although the applicant company immediately removed the comments in question from its website upon notification by L. ’ s lawyers (see paragraphs 18 - 19 above), the Supreme Court held the applicant company liable on the basis of the Obligations Act as it should have prevented the publication of comments with clearly unlawful contents. It then referred to section 1047(3) of the Obligations Act, according to which disclosure of information or other matters is not deemed to be unlawful if the person who discloses the information or other matters or the person to whom such matters are disclosed has a legitimate interest in the disclosure, and if the person who discloses the information has verified the information or other matters with a thoroughness which corresponds to the “ gravity of the potential violation ”. The Supreme Court thus held that, after the disclosure, the applicant company had failed to remove the comments – the unlawful content of which it should have been aware of – from the portal on its own initiative. The inactivity of the applicant company was thus deemed unlawful as it had not “ proved the absence of culpability ” under section 1050(1) of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 16 of the Supreme Court judgment, set out in paragraph 31 above). 142. In the light of the Supreme Court ’ s reasoning, the Court must, according to its consistent case-law, examine whether the domestic courts ’ finding of liability on the part of the applicant company was based on relevant and sufficient grounds in the particular circumstances of the case (see paragraph 131 above). The Court observes that, in order to resolve the question whether the domestic courts ’ decisions holding the applicant company liable for the comments posted by third parties were in breach of its freedom of expression, the Chamber identified the following aspects as relevant for its analysis: the context of the comments, the measures applied by the applicant company in order to prevent or remove defamatory comments, the liability of the actual authors of the comments as an alternative to the applicant company ’ s liability, and the consequences of the domestic proceedings for the applicant company (see paragraphs 85 et seq. of the Chamber judgment). 143. The Court agrees that these aspects are relevant for the concrete assessment of the proportionality of the interference in issue within the scope of the Court ’ s examination of the present case (see paragraphs 112 - 17 above ). (ii) Context of the comments 144. As regards the context of the comments, the Court accepts that the news article about the ferry company, published on the Delfi news portal, was a balanced one, contained no offensive language and gave rise to no arguments regarding unlawful statements in the domestic proceedings. The Court is aware that even such a balanced article on a seemingly neutral topic may provoke fierce discussions on the Internet. Furthermore, it attaches particular weight, in this context, to the nature of the Delfi news portal. It reiterates that Delfi was a professionally managed Internet news portal run on a commercial basis which sought to attract a large number of comments on news articles published by it. The Court observes that the Supreme Court explicitly referred to the fact that the applicant company had integrated the comments section into its news portal, inviting visitors to the website to complement the news with their own judgments and opinions (comments). According to the findings of the Supreme Court, in the comments section, the applicant company actively called for comments on the news items appearing on the portal. The number of visits to the applicant company ’ s portal depended on the number of comments; the revenue earned from advertisements published on the portal, in turn, depended on the number of visits. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the applicant company had an economic interest in the posting of comments. In the view of the Supreme Court, the fact that the applicant company was not the author of the comments did not mean that it had no control over the comments section (see paragraph 13 of the judgment, set out in paragraph 31 above). 145. The Court also notes in this regard that the Rules on posting comments on the Delfi website stated that the applicant company prohibited the posting of comments that were without substance and/or off topic, were contrary to good practice, contained threats, insults, obscene expressions or vulgarities, or incited hostility, violence or illegal activities. Such comments could be removed and their authors ’ ability to post comments could be restricted. Furthermore, the actual authors of the comments could not modify or delete their comments once they were posted on the applicant company ’ s news portal – only the applicant company had the technical means to do this. In the light of the above and the Supreme Court ’ s reasoning, the Court agrees with the Chamber ’ s finding that the applicant company must be considered to have exercised a substantial degree of control over the comments published on its portal. 146. In sum, the Court considers that it was sufficiently established by the Supreme Court that the applicant company ’ s involvement in making public the comments on its news articles on the Delfi news portal went beyond that of a passive, purely technical service provider. The Court therefore finds that the Supreme Court based its reasoning on this issue on grounds that were relevant for the purposes of Article 10 of the Convention. (iii) Liability of the authors of the comments 147. In connection with the question whether the liability of the actual authors of the comments could serve as a sensible alternative to the liability of the Internet news portal in a case like the present one, the Court is mindful of the interest of Internet users in not disclosing their identity. Anonymity has long been a means of avoiding reprisals or unwanted attention. As such, it is capable of promoting the free flow of ideas and information in an important manner, including, notably, on the Internet. At the same time, the Court does not lose sight of the ease, scope and speed of the dissemination of information on the Internet, and the persistence of the information once disclosed, which may considerably aggravate the effects of unlawful speech on the Internet compared to traditional media. It also refers in this connection to a recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Google Spain SL and Google Inc. (cited above), in which that court, albeit in a different context, dealt with the problem of the availability on the Internet of information seriously interfering with a person ’ s private life over an extended period of time, and found that the individual ’ s fundamental rights, as a rule, overrode the economic interests of the operator of a search engine and the interests of other Internet users (see paragraph 56 above). 148. The Court observes that different degrees of anonymity are possible on the Internet. An Internet user may be anonymous to the wider public while being identifiable by a service provider through an account or contact data that may be either unverified or subject to some kind of verification – ranging from limited verification (for example, through activation of an account via an e-mail address or a social network account) to secure authentication, be it by the use of national electronic identity cards or online banking authentication data allowing rather more secure identification of the user. A service provider may also allow an extensive degree of anonymity for its users, in which case the users are not required to identify themselves at all and they may only be traceable – to a limited extent – through the information retained by Internet access providers. The release of such information would usually require an injunction by the investigative or judicial authorities and would be subject to restrictive conditions. It may nevertheless be required in some cases in order to identify and prosecute perpetrators. 149. Thus, in the judgment in K.U. v. Finland, concerning an offence of “ malicious misrepresentation ” of a sexual nature against a minor, the Court found that “ [a] lthough freedom of expression and confidentiality of communications are primary considerations and users of telecommunications and Internet services must have a guarantee that their own privacy and freedom of expression will be respected, such guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder or crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ” (see K.U. v. Finland, no. 2872/02, § 49, ECHR 2008). The Court in that case rejected the Government ’ s argument that the applicant had had the possibility of obtaining damages from the service provider, finding that this was not sufficient in the circumstances of the case. It held that there had to be a remedy enabling the actual offender to be identified and brought to justice, whereas at the relevant time the regulatory framework of the respondent State had not provided for the possibility of ordering the Internet service provider to divulge the information required for that purpose (ibid., §§ 47 and 49). Although K.U. v. Finland concerned a breach classified as a criminal offence under the domestic law and involved a more sweeping intrusion into the victim ’ s private life than the present case, it is evident from the Court ’ s reasoning that anonymity on the Internet, while an important factor, must be balanced against other rights and interests. 150. As regards the establishment of the identity of the authors of the comments in civil proceedings, the Court notes that the parties ’ positions differed as to its feasibility. On the basis of the information provided by the parties, the Court observes that the Estonian courts, in the “ pre-trial taking of evidence ” procedure under Articles 244 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 40 above), have granted requests by defamed persons for the disclosure by online newspapers or news portals of the IP addresses of authors who had posted allegedly defamatory comments and for the disclosure by Internet access providers of the names and addresses of the subscribers to whom the IP addresses in question had been assigned. The examples provided by the Government show mixed results: in some cases it had proved possible to establish the computer from which the comments had been made, while in other cases, for various technical reasons, this had proved impossible. 151. According to the Supreme Court ’ s judgment in the present case, the injured person had the choice of bringing a claim against the applicant company or the authors of the comments. The Court considers that the uncertain effectiveness of measures allowing the identity of the authors of the comments to be established, coupled with the lack of instruments put in place by the applicant company for the same purpose with a view to making it possible for a victim of hate speech to bring a claim effectively against the authors of the comments, are factors that support a finding that the Supreme Court based its judgment on relevant and sufficient grounds. The Court also refers, in this context, to the judgment in Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria (no. 4) ( no. 72331/01, § 32, 9 November 2006) in which it found that shifting the risk of the defamed person obtaining redress in defamation proceedings to the media company, which was usually in a better financial position than the defamer, was not as such a disproportionate interference with the media company ’ s right to freedom of expression. (iv) Measures taken by the applicant company 152. The Court notes that the applicant company highlighted the number of comments on each article on its website, and therefore the articles with the most lively exchanges must have been easily identifiable for the editors of the news portal. The article in issue in the present case attracted 185 comments, apparently well above average. The comments in question were removed by the applicant company some six weeks after they were uploaded on the website, upon notification by the injured person ’ s lawyers to the applicant company (see paragraphs 17 - 19 above). 153. The Court observes that the Supreme Court stated in its judgment that “ [o]n account of the obligation arising from law to avoid causing harm, the [applicant company] should have prevented the publication of comments with clearly unlawful contents ”. However, it also held that “ [a]fter the disclosure, the [applicant company had] failed to remove the comments – the unlawful content of which it should have been aware of – from the portal on its own initiative ” (see paragraph 16 of the judgment, set out in paragraph 31 above). Therefore, the Supreme Court did not explicitly determine whether the applicant company was under an obligation to prevent the uploading of the comments to the website or whether it would have sufficed under domestic law for the applicant company to have removed the offending comments without delay after publication to escape liability under the Obligations Act. The Court considers that, when assessing the grounds upon which the Supreme Court relied in its judgment entailing an interference with the applicant company ’ s Convention rights, there is nothing to suggest that the national court intended to restrict its rights to a greater extent than that required to achieve the aim pursued. On this basis, and having regard to the freedom to impart information as enshrined in Article 10, the Court will thus proceed on the assumption that the Supreme Court ’ s judgment must be understood to mean that had the applicant company removed the comments without delay after publication, this would have sufficed for it to escape liability under domestic law. Consequently, and taking account of the above findings (see paragraph 145 ) to the effect that the applicant company must be considered to have exercised a substantial degree of control over the comments published on its portal, the Court does not consider that the imposition on the applicant company of an obligation to remove from its website, without delay after publication, comments that amounted to hate speech and incitements to violence, and were thus clearly unlawful on their face, amounted, in principle, to a disproportionate interference with its freedom of expression. 154. The pertinent issue in the present case is whether the national court ’ s findings that liability was justified, as the applicant company had not removed the comments without delay after publication, were based on relevant and sufficient grounds. With this in mind, account must first be taken of whether the applicant company had put in place mechanisms that were capable of filtering comments amounting to hate speech or speech entailing an incitement to violence. 155. The Court notes that the applicant company took certain measures in this regard. There was a disclaimer on the Delfi news portal stating that the writers of the comments – and not the applicant company – were accountable for them, and that the posting of comments that were contrary to good practice or contained threats, insults, obscene expressions or vulgarities, or incited hostility, violence or illegal activities, was prohibited. Furthermore, the portal had an automatic system of deletion of comments based on stems of certain vulgar words and it had a notice-and-take-down system in place, whereby anyone could notify it of an inappropriate comment by simply clicking on a button designated for that purpose to bring it to the attention of the portal administrators. In addition, on some occasions the administrators removed inappropriate comments on their own initiative. 156. Thus, the Court notes that the applicant company cannot be said to have wholly neglected its duty to avoid causing harm to third parties. Nevertheless, and more importantly, the automatic word-based filter used by the applicant company failed to filter out odious hate speech and speech inciting violence posted by readers and thus limited its ability to expeditiously remove the offending comments. The Court reiterates that the majority of the words and expressions in question did not include sophisticated metaphors or contain hidden meanings or subtle threats. They were manifest expressions of hatred and blatant threats to the physical integrity of L. Thus, even if the automatic word-based filter may have been useful in some instances, the facts of the present case demonstrate that it was insufficient for detecting comments whose content did not constitute protected speech under Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraph 136 above). The Court notes that as a consequence of this failure of the filtering mechanism these clearly unlawful comments remained online for six weeks (see paragraphs 18 -19 above). 157. The Court observes in this connection that on some occasions the portal administrators did remove inappropriate comments on their own initiative and that, apparently some time after the events of the present case, the applicant company set up a dedicated team of moderators. Having regard to the fact that there are ample opportunities for anyone to make his or her voice heard on the Internet, the Court considers that a large news portal ’ s obligation to take effective measures to limit the dissemination of hate speech and speech inciting violence – the issue in the present case – can by no means be equated to “ private censorship ”. While acknowledging the “ important role ” played by the Internet “ in enhancing the public ’ s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information in general ” ( see Ahmet Yıldırım, cited above, § 48, and Times Newspapers Ltd, cited above, § 27 ), the Court reiterates that it is also mindful of the risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet (see Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel, cited above, § 63; see also Mosley, cited above, § 130). 158. Moreover, depending on the circumstances, there may be no identifiable individual victim, for example in some cases of hate speech directed against a group of persons or speech directly inciting violence of the type manifested in several of the comments in the present case. In cases where an individual victim exists, he or she may be prevented from notifying an Internet service provider of the alleged violation of his or her rights. The Court attaches weight to the consideration that the ability of a potential victim of hate speech to continuously monitor the Internet is more limited than the ability of a large commercial Internet news portal to prevent or rapidly remove such comments. 159. Lastly, the Court observes that the applicant company has argued (see paragraph 78 above) that the Court should have due regard to the notice-and-take-down system that it had introduced. If accompanied by effective procedures allowing for rapid response, this system can in the Court ’ s view function in many cases as an appropriate tool for balancing the rights and interests of all those involved. However, in cases such as the present one, where third-party user comments are in the form of hate speech and direct threats to the physical integrity of individuals, as understood in the Court ’ s case-law (see paragraph 136 above), the Court considers, as stated above (see paragraph 153 ), that the rights and interests of others and of society as a whole may entitle Contracting States to impose liability on Internet news portals, without contravening Article 10 of the Convention, if they fail to take measures to remove clearly unlawful comments without delay, even without notice from the alleged victim or from third parties. (v) Consequences for the applicant company 160. Finally, turning to the question of consequences of the domestic proceedings for the applicant company, the Court notes that it was obliged to pay the injured person the equivalent of EUR 320 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. It agrees with the finding of the Chamber that this sum, also taking into account the fact that the applicant company was a professional operator of one of the largest Internet news portals in Estonia, can by no means be considered disproportionate to the breach established by the domestic courts (see paragraph 93 of the Chamber judgment). The Court notes in this connection that it has also had regard to the post- Delfi domestic case-law on the liability of the operators of Internet news portals (see paragraph 43 above). It observes that in these cases the lower courts have followed the Supreme Court ’ s judgment in Delfi but no awards have been made for non-pecuniary damage. In other words, the tangible result for the operators in post- Delfi cases has been that they have taken down the offending comments but have not been ordered to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 161. The Court also observes that it does not appear that the applicant company had to change its business model as a result of the domestic proceedings. According to the information available, the Delfi news portal has continued to be one of Estonia ’ s largest Internet publications and by far the most popular for posting comments, the number of which has continued to increase. Anonymous comments – now existing alongside the possibility of posting registered comments, which are displayed to readers first – are still predominant and the applicant company has set up a team of moderators carrying out follow-up moderation of comments posted on the portal (see paragraphs 32 and 83 above). In these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that the interference with the applicant company ’ s freedom of expression was disproportionate on that account either. (vi) Conclusion 162. Based on the concrete assessment of the above aspects, taking into account the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the present case, in particular the extreme nature of the comments in question, the fact that the comments were posted in reaction to an article published by the applicant company on its professionally managed news portal run on a commercial basis, the insufficiency of the measures taken by the applicant company to remove without delay after publication comments amounting to hate speech and speech inciting violence and to ensure a realistic prospect of the authors of such comments being held liable, and the moderate sanction imposed on the applicant company, the Court finds that the domestic courts ’ imposition of liability on the applicant company was based on relevant and sufficient grounds, having regard to the margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent State. Therefore, the measure did not constitute a disproportionate restriction on the applicant company ’ s right to freedom of expression. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
EU Directive 2000/31/EC