Access to a lawyer
II. RELEVANT LAW AND PRACTICE A. Domestic law 1. The legislation in force at the time of the application 27. The relevant provisions of the former Code of Criminal Procedure ( Law no. 1412), namely Articles 135, 136 and 138, provided that anyone suspected or accused of a criminal offence had a right of access to a lawyer from the moment they were taken into police custody. Article 138 clearly stipulated that for juveniles, legal assistance was obligatory. 28. According to section 31 of Law no. 3842 of 18 November 1992, which amended the legislation on criminal procedure, the above-mentioned provisions were not applicable to persons accused of offences falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. 2. Recent amendments 29. On 15 July 2003, by Law no. 4928, the restriction on an accused ’ s right of access to a lawyer in proceedings before the State Security Courts was lifted. 30. On 1 July 2005 a new Code of Criminal Procedure entered into force. According to the relevant provisions of the new Code (Articles 149 and 150), all detained persons have the right of access to a lawyer from the moment they are taken into police custody. The appointment of a lawyer is obligatory if the person concerned is a minor or if he or she is accused of an offence punishable by a maximum of at least five years ’ imprisonment. 31. Finally, section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), as amended on 29 June 2006, provides that for terrorist - related offences, the right of access to a lawyer may be delayed for twenty-four hours on the order of a public prosecutor. However, the accused cannot be interrogated during this period. B. Relevant international law materials 1. Procedure in juvenile cases ( a ) Council of Europe 32. The Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States of the Council of Europe concerning new ways of dealing with juvenile delinquency and the role of juvenile justice (Rec (2003)20), adopted on 24 September 2003 at the 853 rd meeting of the Ministers ’ Deputies, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “15. Where juveniles are detained in police custody, account should be taken of their status as a minor, their age and their vulnerability and level of maturity. They should be promptly informed of their rights and safeguards in a manner that ensures their full understanding. While being questioned by the police they should, in principle, be accompanied by their parent/legal guardian or other appropriate adult. They should also have the right of access to a lawyer and a doctor ...” 33. The Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States of the Council of Europe on social reactions to juvenile delinquency ( Recommendation No. R (87) 20), adopted on 17 September 1987 at the 410 th meeting of the Ministers ’ Deputies, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “Recommends the governments of member States to review, if necessary, their legislation and practice with a view: 8. to reinforcing the legal position of minors throughout the proceedings, including the police interrogation, by recognising, inter alia : – the right to the assistance of a counsel who may, if necessary, be officially appointed and paid by the State.” ( b ) United Nations ( i ) Convention on the Rights of the Child 34. Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “States Parties shall ensure that: ... (d) every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on any such action.” (ii) General Comment No. 10 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, dated 25 April 2007 (CRC/C/GC/10) 35. The relevant part of this text concerning legal assistance to minors in police custody provides as follows: “49. The child must be guaranteed legal or other appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of his/her defence. CRC does require that the child be provided with assistance, which is not necessarily under all circumstances legal but it must be appropriate. It is left to the discretion of the States Parties to determine how this assistance is provided but it should be free of charge ... ... 52. The Committee recommends that the States Parties set and implement time ‑ limits for the period between the communication of the offence and the completion of the police investigation, the decision of the prosecutor (or other competent body) to bring charges against the child, and the final adjudication and decision by the court or other competent judicial body. These time - limits should be much shorter than those set for adults. But at the same time, decisions without delay should be the result of a process in which the human rights of the child and legal safeguards are fully respected. In this decision-making process without delay, the legal or other appropriate assistance must be present. This presence should not be limited to the trial before the court or other judicial body, but also applies to all other stages of the process, beginning with the interviewing (interrogation) of the child by the police.” (iii) Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Turkey, dated 9 July 2001 (CRC/C/15/Add.152) 36. The relevant part of this text provides as follows: “66. The Committee recommends that the State Party continue reviewing the law and practices regarding the juvenile justice system in order to bring it into full compliance with the Convention [on the Rights of the Child], in particular Articles 37, 40 and 39, as well as with other relevant international standards in this area, such as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) and the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines), with a view to raising the minimum legal age for criminal responsibility, extending the protection guaranteed by the Juvenile Law Court to all children up to the age of 18 and enforcing this law effectively by establishing juvenile courts in every province. In particular, it reminds the State Party that juvenile offenders should be dealt with without delay, in order to avoid periods of incommunicado detention, and that pre-trial detention should be used only as a measure of last resort, should be as short as possible and should be no longer than the period prescribed by law. Alternative measures to pre-trial detention should be used whenever possible.” 2. Right of access to a lawyer during police custody ( a ) Council of Europe ( i ) Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers 37. Rule 93 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Resolution (73) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe) provides: “An untried prisoner shall be entitled, as soon as he is imprisoned, to choose his legal representation ... and to receive visits from his legal adviser with a view to his defence and to prepare and hand to him and to receive, confidential instructions. At his request, he shall be given all necessary facilities for this purpose. ... Interviews between the prisoner and his legal adviser may be within sight but not within hearing, either direct or indirect, of a police or institution official.” 38. Furthermore, the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States of the Council of Europe on the European Prison Rules (Rec(2006)2), adopted on 11 January 2006 at the 952 nd meeting of the Ministers ’ Deputies, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “ Legal advice 23.1 All prisoners are entitled to legal advice, and the prison authorities shall provide them with reasonable facilities for gaining access to such advice. 23.2 Prisoners may consult on any legal matter with a legal adviser of their own choice and at their own expense. ... 23.5 A judicial authority may in exceptional circumstances authorise restrictions on such confidentiality to prevent serious crime or major breaches of prison safety and security.” (ii) European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) 39. Following its visit to Turkey in July 2000, the CPT published its report dated 8 November 2001 (CPT/ Inf (2001)25 ). It stated: “61. Despite the many changes to legislation in recent years, certain weaknesses remain as regards formal safeguards against ill - treatment. Perhaps the most important shortcoming is that persons detained on suspicion of collective offences falling under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts are still not entitled to access to a lawyer during the first four days of their custody. Further, despite earlier affirmations to the contrary, the Turkish authorities made clear in their response to the report on the February/March 1999 visit that such persons are being denied during the first four days of their custody the possibility to inform a relative of their situation. Such incommunicado detention can only facilitate the infliction of ill - treatment. The CPT must therefore reiterate once again the recommendation that all persons deprived of their liberty by the law enforcement agencies, including persons suspected of offences falling under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, be granted as from the outset of their custody the right of access to a lawyer. The CPT recognises that in order to protect the legitimate interests of the police investigation, it may exceptionally be necessary to delay for a certain period a detained person ’ s access to a lawyer of his choice; however, in such cases, access to another independent lawyer should be arranged. The implementation of the above recommendation will require legislative measures. However, in the meantime, immediate steps should be taken to ensure that existing legal provisions are complied with. Indeed, the information gathered during the July 2000 ad hoc visit clearly indicates that even after the first four days of police custody, access to a lawyer for persons suspected of State Security Court offences is in practice the exception rather than the rule. The CPT recommends that the officials responsible for carrying out checks and inspections under the previously-mentioned compliance monitoring procedure be instructed to pay particular attention to whether persons suspected of collective offences falling under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts are being informed of their right to have access to a lawyer after the first four days of their custody and are being placed in a position effectively to exercise that right.” 40. The CPT visited Turkey again in September 2001 and in its report dated 24 April 2002 (CPT/ Inf (2002)8) stated: “12. The amendments made to Article 16 of the Law on the Organisation and Trial Procedures of State Security Courts have also introduced an improvement as regards access to a lawyer for persons detained on suspicion of collective offences falling under the jurisdiction of State Security Courts. For such persons, the right of access to a lawyer becomes operative after the prosecutor has issued a written order for the extension of police custody beyond forty-eight hours; in other words, they are now denied access to a lawyer only for two days as compared to four days under the previous law. Whilst welcoming this step forward, the CPT regrets that the opportunity was not taken to guarantee to persons detained for collective State Security Court offences a right of access to a lawyer as from the very outset of their custody (and hence align their rights in this respect with those of ordinary criminal suspects). The CPT trusts that the Turkish authorities will in the near future implement the Committee ’ s long-standing recommendation that all persons deprived of their liberty by law enforcement agencies, including persons suspected of offences falling under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, be granted as from the outset of their custody the right of access to a lawyer. ... 46. Reference has been made earlier to recent positive legislative developments concerning the rights of access to a lawyer and to have one ’ s custody notified to a relative (cf. paragraphs 12 to 14). They have further improved an already impressive legal and regulatory framework to combat torture and ill-treatment. Nevertheless, the CPT remains very concerned by the fact that persons detained on suspicion of collective offences falling under the jurisdiction of State Security Courts are still denied access to a lawyer during the first two days of their custody; its position on this point has been made clear in paragraph 12. Further, the actual content of the right of access to a lawyer for persons suspected of State Security Court offences remains less well developed than in the case of ordinary criminal suspects. In particular, as far as the CPT can ascertain, it is still the case that such suspects are not entitled to have the lawyer present when making a statement to the police and that the procedure allowing for the appointment of a lawyer by the Bar Association is not applicable to them. Similarly, the provision making obligatory the appointment of a lawyer for persons under 18 still does not apply to juveniles who are detained on suspicion of State Security Court offences. In this regard, the CPT reiterates the recommendation already made in the report on the October 1997 visit, that the relevant provisions of Articles 135, 136 and 138 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be rendered applicable to persons suspected of offences falling under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. ” ( b ) United Nations ( i ) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 41. Article 14 § 3 (b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence is to be entitled “[t]o have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing”. (ii) United Nations Committee against Torture 42. In its Conclusions and Recommendations on Turkey, dated 27 May 2003 (CAT/C/CR/30/5), the Committee stated the following: “5. The Committee expresses concern about ... ( c) allegations that persons in police custody have been denied prompt and adequate access to legal and medical assistance and that family members have not been promptly notified of their detention; ... 7. The Committee recommends that the State Party (a) ensure that detainees, including those held for offences under the jurisdiction of State Security Courts, benefit fully in practice from the available safeguards against ill-treatment and torture, particularly by guaranteeing their right to medical and legal assistance and to contact with their families; ... ” 43. In its General Comment No. 2, dated 24 January 2008 (CAT/C/GC/2), the Committee stated: “13. Certain basic guarantees apply to all persons deprived of liberty. Some of these are specified in the Convention, and the Committee consistently calls upon the States Parties to use them. The Committee ’ s recommendations concerning effective measures aim to clarify the current baseline and are not exhaustive. Such guarantees include, inter alia, ... the right promptly to receive independent legal assistance ... ” ( c ) European Union 44. Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights states that “[r] espect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed”. Article 52 § 3 further states that the meaning and scope of the right guaranteed under Article 48 are the same as the equivalent right laid down by the European Convention on Human Rights. THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION A. Access to a lawyer during police custody 45. The applicant alleged that his defence rights had been violated as he had been denied access to a lawyer during his police custody. He relied on Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention, which provides: “3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ... (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.” 1. The Chamber judgment 46. In its judgment of 26 April 2007, the Chamber held that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention. In that connection, it pointed out that the applicant had been represented during the trial and appeal proceedings by a lawyer and that the applicant ’ s statement to the police was not the sole basis for his conviction. According to the Chamber, the applicant had had the opportunity of challenging the prosecution ’ s allegations under conditions which did not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent. The Chamber also noted that in convicting the applicant, the İzmir State Security Court had had regard to the circumstances in which the applicant was arrested, the expert report concerning the handwriting on the banner, and witness statements. In view of the above, it concluded that the fairness of the applicant ’ s trial had not been prejudiced by the lack of legal assistance during his police custody. 2. The parties ’ submissions ( a ) The applicant 47. The applicant contested the grounds on which the Chamber had found that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention. He stated that the assistance of a lawyer in police custody was a fundamental right. He reminded the Court that all the evidence which had been used against him had been collected at the preliminary investigation stage, during which he had been denied the assistance of a lawyer. At this point, the applicant also argued that although the domestic court had convicted him, there had been no evidence to prove that he was guilty. He also stated that he had been ill-treated during his police custody and had signed his statement to the police under duress. That statement had been used by the İzmir State Security Court, although he had clearly retracted it before the public prosecutor, the investigating judge and at the trial. The applicant also stressed that he had been a minor at the material time and had no previous criminal record. In his submission, in view of the serious charges that had been brought against him, the lack of legal assistance had breached his right to a fair trial. He also argued that the Government had failed to submit any good reason to justify the lack of legal assistance. ( b ) The Government 48. The Government asked the Grand Chamber to endorse the Chamber ’ s finding that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention. They stated, firstly, that the legislation had been changed in 2005. Furthermore, in their submission, the restriction imposed on the applicant ’ s access to a lawyer had not infringed his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. Referring to the case-law of the Court ( see, in particular, Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, Series A no. 275; John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ I; Averill v. the United Kingdom, no. 36408/97, ECHR 2000 ‑ VI; Magee v. the United Kingdom, no. 28135/95, ECHR 2000 ‑ VI; and Brennan v. the United Kingdom, no. 39846/98, ECHR 2001 ‑ X ), they maintained that in assessing whether or not the trial was fair, regard should be had to the entirety of the proceedings. Thus, as the applicant had been represented by a lawyer during the proceedings before the İzmir State Security Court and the Court of Cassation, his right to a fair hearing had not been violated. The Government further drew attention to several Turkish cases ( see Saraç v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 35841/97, 2 September 2004; Yurtsever v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 42086/02, 31 August 2006; Uçma v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 15071/03, 3 October 2006; Yavuz and Others v. Turkey ( dec. ), no. 38827/02, 21 November 2006; and Yıldız v. Turkey ( dec. ), nos. 3543/03 and 3557/03, 5 December 2006), in which the Court had declared similar complaints inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded on the ground that, since the police statements had not been the only evidence to support the convictions, the lack of legal assistance during police custody had not constituted a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. 49. Turning to the facts of the instant case, the Government maintained that when the applicant was taken into police custody, he was reminded of his right to remain silent and that during the ensuing criminal proceedings his lawyer had had the opportunity to challenge the prosecution ’ s allegations. They further emphasised that the applicant ’ s statement to the police was not the sole basis for his conviction. 3. The Court ’ s assessment ( a ) The general principles applicable in this case 50. The Court reiterates that, even if the primary purpose of Article 6 of the Convention, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, is to ensure a fair trial by a “tribunal” competent to determine “any criminal charge”, it does not follow that the Article has no application to pre-trial proceedings. Thus, Article 6 – especially paragraph 3 thereof – may be relevant before a case is sent for trial if and so far as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with its provisions ( see Imbrioscia, cited above, § 36). As the Court has already held in its previous judgments, the right set out in Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention is one element, among others, of the concept of a fair trial in criminal proceedings contained in Article 6 § 1 ( see Imbrioscia, cited above, § 37, and Brennan, cited above, § 45 ). 51. The Court further reiterates that although not absolute, the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial ( see Poitrimol v. France, 23 November 1993, § 34, Series A no. 277 ‑ A, and Demebukov v. Bulgaria, no. 68020/01, § 50, 28 February 2008). Nevertheless, Article 6 § 3 (c) does not specify the manner of exercising this right. It thus leaves to the Contracting States the choice of the means of ensuring that it is secured in their judicial systems, the Court ’ s task being only to ascertain whether the method they have chosen is consistent with the requirements of a fair trial. In this respect, it must be remembered that the Convention is designed to “guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective” and that assigning counsel does not in itself ensure the effectiveness of the assistance he may afford an accused ( see Imbrioscia, cited above, § 38 ). 52. National laws may attach consequences to the attitude of an accused at the initial stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of the defence in any subsequent criminal proceedings. In such circumstances, Article 6 will normally require that the accused be allowed to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation. However, this right has so far been considered capable of being subject to restrictions for good cause. The question, in each case, has therefore been whether the restriction was justified and, if so, whether, in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, it has not deprived the accused of a fair hearing, for even a justified restriction is capable of doing so in certain circumstances (see John Murray, cited above, § 63; Brennan, cited above, § 45; and Magee, cited above, § 44). 53. These principles, outlined in paragraph 5 2 above, are also in line with the generally recognised international human rights standards (see paragraphs 37 ‑ 42 above) which are at the core of the concept of a fair trial and whose rationale relates in particular to the protection of the accused against abusive coercion on the part of the authorities. They also contribute to the prevention of miscarriages of justice and the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6, notably equality of arms between the investigating or prosecuting authorities and the accused. 54. In this respect, the Court underlines the importance of the investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings, as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in which the offence charged will be considered at the trial ( see Can v. Austria, no. 9300/81, Commission ’ s report of 12 July 1984, § 50, Series A no. 96). At the same time, an accused often finds himself in a particularly vulnerable position at that stage of the proceedings, the effect of which is amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal procedure tends to become increasingly complex, notably with respect to the rules governing the gathering and use of evidence. In most cases, this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer whose task it is, among other things, to help to ensure respect of the right of an accused not to incriminate himself. This right indeed presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, § 100, ECHR 2006 ‑ IX, and Kolu v. Turkey, no. 35811/97, § 51, 2 August 2005). Early access to a lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards to which the Court will have particular regard when examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination (see, mutatis mutandis, Jalloh, cited above, § 101). In this connection, the Court also notes the recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ( CPT ) ( see paragraphs 39 ‑ 40 above), in which the CPT repeatedly stated that the right of a detainee to have access to legal advice is a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment. Any exception to the enjoyment of this right should be clearly circumscribed and its application strictly limited in time. These principles are particularly called for in the case of serious charges, for it is in the face of the heaviest penalties that respect for the right to a fair trial is to be ensured to the highest possible degree by democratic societies. 55. Against this background, the Court finds that in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently “practical and effective” (see paragraph 51 above), Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction – whatever its justification – must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6 (see, mutatis mutandis, Magee, cited above, § 44). The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction. ( b ) Application of the above principles to the present case 56. In the present case, the applicant ’ s right of access to a lawyer was restricted during his police custody, pursuant to section 31 of Law no. 3842, as he was accused of committing an offence falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. As a result, he did not have access to a lawyer when he made his statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge respectively. Thus, no other justification was given for denying the applicant access to a lawyer than the fact that this was provided for on a systematic basis by the relevant legal provisions. As such, this already falls short of the requirements of Article 6 in this respect, as set out at paragraph 5 2 above. 57. The Court further observes that the applicant had access to a lawyer following his detention on remand. During the ensuing criminal proceedings, he was also able to call witnesses on his behalf and had the possibility of challenging the prosecution ’ s arguments. It is also noted that the applicant repeatedly denied the content of his statement to the police, both at the trial and on appeal. However, as is apparent from the case file, the investigation had in large part been completed before the applicant appeared before the investigating judge on 1 June 2001. Moreover, not only did the İzmir State Security Court not take a stance on the admissibility of the applicant ’ s statements made in police custody before going on to examine the merits of the case, it also used the statement to the police as the main evidence on which to convict him, despite his denial of its accuracy (see paragraph 23 above). In this connection, the Court observes that in convicting the applicant, the İzmir State Security Court in fact used the evidence before it to confirm the applicant ’ s statement to the police. This evidence included the expert ’ s report dated 1 June 2001 and the statements of the other accused to the police and the public prosecutor. In this respect, however, the Court finds it striking that the expert ’ s report mentioned in the judgment of the first-instance court was in favour of the applicant, as it stated that it could not be established whether the handwriting on the banner matched the applicant ’ s (see paragraph 15 above). It is also significant that all the co-defendants, who had testified against the applicant in their statements to the police and the public prosecutor, retracted their statements at the trial and denied having participated in the demonstration. 58. Thus, in the present case, the applicant was undoubtedly affected by the restrictions on his access to a lawyer in that his statement to the police was used for his conviction. Neither the assistance provided subsequently by a lawyer nor the adversarial nature of the ensuing proceedings could cure the defects which had occurred during police custody. However, it is not for the Court to speculate on the impact which the applicant ’ s access to a lawyer during police custody would have had on the ensuing proceedings. 59. The Court further notes that neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial (see Kwiatkowska v. Italy ( dec. ), no. 52868/99, 30 November 2000). However, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, a waiver of the right to take part in the trial must be established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 86, ECHR 2006 ‑ II; Kolu, cited above, § 53; and Colozza v. Italy, 12 February 1985, § 28, Series A no. 89). Thus, in the present case, no reliance can be placed on the assertion in the form stating his rights that the applicant had been reminded of his right to remain silent (see paragraph 14 above). 60. Finally, the Court notes that one of the specific elements of the instant case was the applicant ’ s age. Having regard to a significant number of relevant international law materials concerning legal assistance to minors in police custody (see paragraphs 32 ‑ 36 above), the Court stresses the fundamental importance of providing access to a lawyer where the person in custody is a minor. 61. Still, in the present case, as explained above, the restriction imposed on the right of access to a lawyer was systematic and applied to anyone held in police custody, regardless of his or her age, in connection with an offence falling under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. 62. In sum, even though the applicant had the opportunity to challenge the evidence against him at the trial and subsequently on appeal, the absence of a lawyer while he was in police custody irretrievably affected his defence rights. (c) Conclusion 63. In view of the above, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 in the present case. B. The non-communication of the written opinion of the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation 64. The applicant complained that the written opinion of the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation had not been communicated to him. In this respect, he relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides: “In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...” 1. The Chamber judgment 65. In its judgment of 26 April 2007, the Chamber found that, in the light of the established case-law on the matter, the non-communication to the applicant of the written opinion of the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation had infringed his right to adversarial proceedings. It therefore concluded that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 2. The parties ’ submissions 66. The parties filed no further observations on this question. 3. The Court ’ s assessment 67. The Court considers, for the reasons given by the Chamber, that the applicant ’ s right to adversarial proceedings has been breached. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 68. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 1. The parties ’ submissions 69. The applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 70. The Government contended that the amounts claimed were excessive and unacceptable. 2. The Chamber judgment 71. The Chamber did not award any pecuniary compensation to the applicant, holding that he had failed to substantiate his claims. It considered that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant. 3. The Court ’ s assessment 72. The Court reiterates that the most appropriate form of redress for a violation of Article 6 § 1 would be to ensure that the applicant, as far as possible, is put in the position in which he would have been had this provision not been disregarded (see Teteriny v. Russia, no. 11931/03, § 56, 30 June 2005; Jeličić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 41183/02, § 53, ECHR 2006 ‑ XII; and Mehmet and Suna Yiğit v. Turkey, no. 52658/99, § 47, 17 July 2007 ). The Court finds that this principle applies in the present case as well. Consequently, it considers that the most appropriate form of redress would be the retrial of the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, should the applicant so request (see, mutatis mutandis, Gençel v. Turkey, no. 53431/99, § 27, 23 October 2003). 73. As regards the remaining non-pecuniary damage, ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 2,000. B. Costs and expenses 1. The parties ’ submissions 74. The applicant claimed EUR 3,500 for the costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and before the Chamber, without submitting any documents in support of his claims. It is to be noted that the applicant has not amended the initial claim he made before the Chamber, but has submitted a legal-aid request for the expenses incurred before the Grand Chamber. 75. The Government contested the claim, arguing that it was unsubstantiated. 2. The Chamber judgment 76. The Chamber awarded the applicant EUR 1,000 for costs and expenses. 3. The Court ’ s assessment 77. The Court observes that the applicant had the benefit of legal aid for the costs and expenses incurred during the Grand Chamber proceedings. As a result, the costs and expenses only include those incurred in the proceedings before the domestic courts and the Chamber. 78. According to the Court ’ s established case-law, costs and expenses will not be awarded under Article 41 unless it is established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and are also reasonable as to quantum. Furthermore, legal costs are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (see, among other authorities, Beyeler v. Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 33202/96, § 27, 28 May 2002, and Sahin v. Germany [GC], no. 30943/96, § 105, ECHR 2003 ‑ VIII). 79. In the light of the above, the Court awards the applicant the sum already awarded by the Chamber, namely EUR 1,000. C. Default interest 80. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The European Court of Human Rights held that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) (right to legal assistance) taken together with Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It found that even though the applicant had been able to contest the charges at his trial, the fact that he could not be assisted by a lawyer while in police custody had irretrievably affected his defence rights, especially as he was a minor.