(Suspected) terrorists
THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 49. The applicant complained that no reasons had been given for the judgment delivered by the special Assize Court. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide: “In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...” 50. The Government contested that argument. ... B. Merits 1. The parties ’ submissions ( a) The applicant 52. The applicant stated at the outset that personal conviction, which was not the same as arbitrariness or intuition, must be based on a free assessment of the evidence. It found support in the free admissibility of evidence and not in the absence of evidence. Accordingly, if the defence adduced cogent evidence during the trial it had to be informed, if it was to understand and accept the verdict, of the main reasons why the Assize Court had found the accused to be guilty. 53. Of the sixty-three questions read out at the hearing, twenty-eight had concerned the applicant personally. The applicant added that twelve questions had related to the attack of 25 July 1995, nine to the attack of 6 October 1995 and a further nine to the attack of 17 October 1995. The applicant submitted that these twenty-eight questions had been drafted in the abstract by the president following the hearings and had not contained any factual reference or any reasoning regarding the charge of aiding and abetting. The manner in which they were drafted had left him unaware as to why the answer had been “yes” in each case despite the fact that he had denied any personal involvement in the three attacks. 54. The applicant stated in particular that certain factual elements which he disputed prevented him from understanding the reasons for his conviction. In his submission, as it had become clear at the trial that there were shortcomings in the investigation as well as inaccuracies and uncertainty as to his personal involvement, he was unable to understand the reasons for his conviction on the basis of a combined reading of the indictments and the twenty-eight questions. 55. He further submitted that the violation of Article 6 was even more evident since the verdict had not been given by a lay jury, but by a jury made up exclusively of professional judges, who were required to indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which their decisions were based. The professional judges making up an assize court bench had to give reasons for their decisions, just as they did in cases before the ordinary criminal courts; that obligation was unquestionably one of the requirements of a fair trial in the modern age. ( b) The Government 56. The Government referred first of all to the Court ’ s case-law concerning assize courts with a lay jury, while observing that the issue of the absence of reasons for a decision given in criminal proceedings in France by a jury of professional judges was being raised for the first time before the Court. The Constitutional Council, in its ruling of 3 September 1986 on the special composition of the assize courts in terrorism cases ( dec. no. 86-213), had found that the exception made in the formation of the assize court was limited in nature, that the difference in treatment was designed to circumvent the risk of pressure or threats to which lay jurors might be subjected, and that an assize court sitting in a special composition of professional judges satisfied the requirements of independence and impartiality. Furthermore, the accused benefited from the same information and the same safeguards as before the ordinary assize courts, including the possibility of appealing since the enactment of Law no. 2000-516 of 15 June 2000. 57. The Government emphasised that Law no. 2011-939 of 10 August 2011, which had made it compulsory, as of 1 January 2012, for assize court judgments to be accompanied by reasons, also applied to judgments of the special assize courts. 58. The Government therefore submitted that the procedural safeguards had enabled the applicant to understand the decision in his case and that the proceedings had complied with the Convention requirements. They noted in particular that the applicant had been the only defendant in the appeal proceedings, and that the indictments had been read out in full, as had the questions put at first instance, the answers to those questions and the judgment convicting him. The oral proceedings had lasted from 16 September to 13 October 2009 and the charges had been the subject of adversarial argument; the applicant had given evidence and had been able to defend his case by debating each item of evidence. The Government observed that no fewer than sixty-three questions had been put and that the affirmative answers had confirmed the three judgments committing the applicant for trial and the criminal conviction handed down at first instance. In particular, it had been open to the applicant to request that the questions be rephrased or that one or more additional questions be asked. 2. The Court ’ s assessment 59. The Court reiterates that, while the Convention does not require jurors to give reasons for their decision and Article 6 does not preclude a defendant from being tried by a lay jury even where reasons are not given for the verdict ( see Taxquet v. Belgium [GC], no. 926/05, § 89, ECHR 2010; Agnelet v. France, no. 61198/08, § 56, 10 January 2013; and Lhermitte v. Belgium [GC], no. 34238/09, § 66, ECHR 2016), in proceedings conducted before professional judges, the accused ’ s understanding of his conviction stems primarily from the reasons given in judicial decisions. In such cases the national courts must indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they base their decisions (see Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, no. 12945/87, 16 December 1992, § 33, Series A no. 252, and Taxquet, cited above, § 91). Reasoned decisions also serve the purpose of demonstrating to the parties that they have been heard, thereby contributing to a more willing acceptance of the decision on their part. In addition, they oblige judges to base their reasoning on objective arguments, and also preserve the rights of the defence. However, even for professional judges the extent of the duty to give reasons varies according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case ( see Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 9 December 1994, § 29, Series A no. 303 ‑ A, and Taxquet, cited above, § 91). While courts are not obliged to give a detailed answer to every argument raised (see Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 19 April 1994, § 61, Series A no. 288), it must be clear from the decision that the essential issues of the case have been addressed ( see Boldea v. Romania, no. 19997/02, § 30, 15 February 2007 ). 60. The Court also reiterates that, in any event, for the requirements of a fair trial to be satisfied, the accused, and indeed the public, must be able to understand the verdict that has been given; this is a vital safeguard against arbitrariness. As the Court has often noted, the rule of law and the avoidance of arbitrary power are principles underlying the Convention (see Taxquet, cited above, § 90, and Lhermitte, cited above, § 67). In the judicial sphere, those principles serve to foster public confidence in an objective and transparent justice system, one of the foundations of a democratic society ( see Suominen v. Finland, no. 37801/97, § 37, 1 July 2003; Tatishvili v. Russia, no. 1509/02, § 58, ECHR 2007 ‑ I; and Taxquet, cited above). 61. Seeing that compliance with the requirements of a fair trial must be assessed on the basis of the proceedings as a whole and in the specific context of the legal system concerned, the Court ’ s task in reviewing the absence of a reasoned verdict is to determine whether, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, the proceedings afforded sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness and made it possible for the accused to understand why he was found guilty ( see Taxquet, cited above, § 93). Such procedural safeguards may include, for example, directions or guidance provided by the presiding judge to the jurors on the legal issues arising or the evidence adduced, and precise, unequivocal questions put to the jury by the judge, forming a framework on which the verdict is based and sufficiently offsetting the fact that no reasons are given for the jury ’ s answers. Regard must also be had to any avenues of appeal open to the accused (see Papon v. France ( dec. ), no. 54210/00, ECHR 2001-XII; Taxquet, cited above, § 69; and Lhermitte, cited above, § 68). In this regard the Court must bear in mind that it is in the face of the heaviest penalties that respect for the right to a fair trial is to be ensured to the highest possible degree by democratic societies ( see Taxquet, cited above, § 93; Lhermitte, cited above, § 69; and Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 21980/04, § 126, ECHR 2017). 62. The Court notes that although the present case concerns an assize court it is distinguishable from comparable cases brought before it in the past in that the court in question did not sit with a lay jury, but in a special composition made up exclusively of professional judges. Accordingly, irrespective of the terminology used, the issue of the absence of reasons does not arise in the context of the involvement of a lay jury. 63. The fact remains that no reasons were given for the Assize Court of Appeal judgment of 13 October 2009, just as was the case with judgments of the assize courts sitting with a lay jury prior to the enactment of Law no. 2011-939 of 10 August 2011 (see Agnelet, cited above; Oulahcene v. France, no. 44446/10, 10 January 2013; Fraumens v. France, no. 30010/10, 10 January 2013; Legillon v. France, no. 53406/10, 10 January 2013; Voica v. France, no. 60995/09, 10 January 2013; and Matis v. France ( dec. ), no. 43699/13, 6 October 2015), which also applied to special assize courts. 64. Consequently, while stressing that in proceedings before professional judges the domestic courts must indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they base their decisions, the Court reiterates that the extent of the duty to give reasons varies according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (see paragraph 59 above). It therefore considers it relevant, in view of the specific features of these proceedings – which are broadly similar to proceedings involving a lay jury – to examine the applicant ’ s complaint in the light of the principles established in its judgment in Taxquet (cited above; see also Agnelet, Oulahcene, Fraumens, Legillon and Voica, all cited above, and Lhermitte, cited above ). 65. The Court observes at the outset that all defendants in French criminal proceedings, like the applicant, are provided with certain information and afforded certain safeguards: the indictment, or the judgment of the investigation division in the case of an appeal, is read out in full by the clerk at the trial in the assize court; the charges are read out and are then the subject of adversarial argument, each item of evidence being examined and the accused being assisted by counsel; the judges and jury withdraw to deliberate immediately after the oral proceedings have ended and the questions have been read out, without having access to the case file; accordingly, their decision can only be based on the evidence examined by the parties during the trial. Furthermore, the decisions of the assize courts are subject to review by an enlarged assize court of appeal, made up of nine judges compared with seven at first instance in the case of a special assize court (see, in particular, Agnelet, cited above, § 63). 66. With regard to the combined impact of the indictment and the questions to the Assize Court in the present case, the Court notes firstly that the applicant was not the only accused and that the case was a complex one. 67. Furthermore, the three judgments committing the applicant for trial had a limited impact since they were delivered before the oral proceedings, which formed the crucial part of the trial. The Court nevertheless notes that each of these judgments concerned a different attack and that the reasoning was particularly thorough with regard to the charges, setting out the events in a very detailed manner. Moreover, the accused had already had an opportunity during the first-instance proceedings to assess the charges against him in depth and to put forward a defence. Besides the fact that the judgments committing the applicant for trial continued to form the basis for the charges against him in the Assize Court of Appeal proceedings, the oral proceedings at first instance had afforded him a more detailed insight into the charges against him and the grounds on which he was liable to be convicted on appeal. 68. A total of sixty-three questions were asked concerning the applicant, of which twenty-six related to the events surrounding the attack of 25 July 1995, eighteen to the events surrounding the attack of 6 October 1995 and nineteen to the attack of 17 October 1995. The answer was “yes ”, by a majority, in the case of sixty-one of them ( some questions, followed by a list of victims and requiring an individual reply in each case, were also found partly “devoid of purpose”), and two questions were found to be “devoid of purpose” (see paragraph 40 above). The Court notes in particular that, besides details of the places and dates concerned in each instance and an indication of the victims according to the damage suffered (death, mutilation or permanent disability, temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days and of a maximum of eight days, destruction of or damage to property), the questions related in particular to whether or not the applicant ’ s actions had been premeditated (questions nos. 2, 8, 28 and 46), and to incitement of others to commit certain acts (questions nos. 5, 11, 20, 25, 31, 36, 43, 49, 57 and 62), the assistance lent by the applicant to the perpetrators of the attacks (questions nos. 10, 19, 24, 30, 35, 42, 48, 56 and 61) and whether the applicant had issued instructions to others to commit certain crimes (questions nos. 6, 12, 21, 26, 32, 37, 44, 50, 58 and 63). The Court considers that, owing to their number and precision, these questions formed a framework on which to base the verdict ( see, mutatis mutandis, Papon v. France (no. 2) ( dec. ), no. 54210/00, ECHR 2001 ‑ XII). It further notes that, while the applicant objected to the manner in which they were drafted (see paragraph 53 above), he did not seek either to amend them or to ask other questions (see, mutatis mutandis, Lhermitte, cited above, § 79). 69. Accordingly, in the light of the combined examination of the three judgments committing the applicant for trial, which were particularly thoroughly reasoned, the oral proceedings to which he had access both at first instance and on appeal, and the numerous and precise questions put to the Assize Court, the applicant could not claim to have been unaware of the reasons for his conviction. 70. In sum, the Court considers that in the instant case the applicant was afforded sufficient safeguards enabling him to understand why he was found guilty (compare, mutatis mutandis, Legillon, cited above, § 67; Voica, cited above, § 53; and Bodein v. France, no. 40014/10, § 42, 13 November 2014). The Court nevertheless welcomes the fact that the reforms introduced since the material time, with the enactment of Law no. 2011-939 of 10 August 2011 requiring a “statement of reasons form” to be drawn up (see Legillon, § 68; Voica, § 54; and Bodein, § 43, all cited above), also applies to special assize courts (see paragraph 63 above). 71. It follows that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF PROTOCOL No.. 7 72. The applicant contended that he had been prosecuted and convicted twice for identical facts, in view of his final conviction by the Paris Court of Appeal on 18 December 2006. He relied on Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, which provides: “1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State. 2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. 3. No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention.” 73. The Government contested that argument. ... B. Merits 1. The parties ’ submissions ( a) The applicant 75. The applicant maintained that it was clear from the Court ’ s case-law that the facts to be assessed should be understood to refer to the behaviour or conduct of which he had been accused before the criminal courts and subsequently before the assize courts. In his view, the criminal acts referred to in the Investigation Division ’ s judgments were encompassed in the facts on the basis of which he was finally convicted by the Paris Court of Appeal on 18 December 2006. 76. In his application and his observations in reply to those of the Government, the applicant raised arguments regarding the funding operations and telephone calls. In particular, with regard first of all to the attack of 25 July 1995, he stressed that the transfer of a sum of GBP 5,000 referred to in the judgment of 3 August 2001 was also taken into consideration in the Paris Court of Appeal judgment of 18 December 2006. In the applicant ’ s view, the transfer of the sum of GBP 6,945 referred to in the Investigation Division ’ s judgment of 3 August 2001 should be regarded as being encompassed in the facts of the judgment of 18 December 2006, which had taken into account all the material acts committed by the applicant in connection with his role in funding the preparations for the attacks. 77. As to the telephone calls of 24 July 1995 referred to in the judgment of 3 August 2001 committing the applicant for trial, but not mentioned in the judgment of 18 December 2006, the applicant noted that in the latter judgment the Paris Court of Appeal had convicted him specifically on account of his role as coordinator of the GIA ’ s external activities, finding that the existence of an information hub in London which he had allegedly managed was demonstrated by the correlation between the telephone calls and the attacks. The calls of 24 July were thus inextricably linked to the calls made by the applicant in his role as coordinator of the various attacks. 78. The same was true of the calls of 26 September and 22 October 1995 referred to by the Government. Although they were not mentioned in the judgment of 18 December 2006, the applicant maintained that they were inextricably linked to the other calls. ( b) The Government 79. In the Government ’ s submission, the applicant had not been convicted on the basis of the same facts since he had been charged with separate offences, the elements of which were different. The facts in respect of which the applicant had been sentenced to ten years ’ imprisonment by the Paris Court of Appeal on 18 December 2006 were not identical, or substantially the same, as those for which the special Assize Court of Appeal sentenced him to life imprisonment on 13 October 2009. In particular, the Paris Court of Appeal had examined the applicant ’ s involvement in the conspiracy, whereas the special Assize Court had tried him on charges of aiding and abetting the attacks of 25 July, 6 October and 17 October 1995. In the Government ’ s view, the facts were therefore different in the two sets of proceedings. In the criminal court proceedings, the applicant had been charged with membership of a terrorist group, whereas the special Assize Court had tried him for specific acts consisting of aiding and abetting the carrying-out of terrorist attacks. Moreover, each of the sentences passed was deemed to cover the concurrent offences, subject to the statutory limit applicable to each one. 80. In the alternative, if the Court were to consider that the facts should be understood to mean the behaviour or conduct with which the applicant had been charged by the criminal courts and subsequently by the assize courts, the Government submitted that these were likewise not identical or substantially the same. For instance, the judgment of 18 December 2006 had not mentioned certain facts that were taken into consideration subsequently. 2. The Court ’ s assessment ( a) General principles 81. The Court reiterates that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a second “offence” in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same (see Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC], no. 14939/03, § 82, ECHR 2009, and A and B v. Norway [GC], nos. 24130/11 and 29758/11, § 108, ECHR 2016). 82. The guarantee enshrined in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 becomes relevant on commencement of a new prosecution, where a prior acquittal or conviction has already acquired the force of res judicata. At this juncture the available material will necessarily comprise the decision by which the first “penal procedure” was concluded and the list of charges levelled against the applicant in the new proceedings. Normally, these documents would contain a statement of facts concerning both the offence for which the applicant has already been tried and the offence of which he or she stands accused. Such statements of fact are an appropriate starting-point for the Court ’ s determination of the issue whether the facts in both proceedings were identical or substantially the same. It is irrelevant which parts of the new charges are eventually upheld or dismissed in the subsequent proceedings, because Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 contains a safeguard against being tried or being liable to be tried again in new proceedings rather than a prohibition on a second conviction or acquittal (see Sergey Zolotukhin, cited above, § 83). 83. The Court ’ s inquiry should therefore focus on the facts set out in these statements, which constitute a set of concrete factual circumstances involving the same defendant and inextricably linked together in time and space, the existence of which must be demonstrated in order to secure a conviction or institute criminal proceedings (see Sergey Zolotukhin, cited above, § 84). 84. In so doing, the Court must determine whether the new proceedings arose from facts which were substantially the same as those which had been the subject of the final conviction (see Sergey Zolotukhin, cited above, § 82; see also Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy, nos. 18640/10 and 4 others, § 224, 4 March 2014, and Kapetanios and Others v. Greece, nos. 3453/12 and 2 others, § 68, 30 April 2015). In its judgment in A and B v. Norway, which concerned the conduct of mixed proceedings (that is, criminal and administrative), the Court reaffirmed this approach, noting that it represented the most significant contribution of the Sergey Zolotukhin judgment, cited above (see A and B v. Norway, cited above, § 108). ( b) Application of the above-mentioned principles to the present case 85. The Court notes at the outset that the judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal of 18 December 2006, convicting the applicant following criminal proceedings, became final on 14 March 2007 when his appeal on points of law was dismissed (see paragraph 27 above). From that point onwards, therefore, the applicant was to be considered as having already been finally convicted of an offence for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 86. The proceedings coming within the jurisdiction of the assize courts, which reflected the procedural choice made by the judicial authorities and gave rise to the judgments of February, August and November 2001 committing the applicant for trial, and which resulted in the applicant ’ s conviction by the special Assize Court on 26 October 2007 and on 13 October 2009, were not discontinued. 87. The Court notes that, contrary to what the Government appeared to assert (see paragraph 79 above), it is clear from the principles set forth in Sergey Zolotukhin, cited above, that the issue to be determined is not whether the elements of the offences with which the applicant was charged in the proceedings before the criminal courts and those before the assize courts were or were not identical, but whether the facts at issue in the two sets of proceedings referred to the same conduct. Where the same conduct on the part of the same defendant and within the same time frame is at issue, the Court is required to verify whether the facts of the offence of which the applicant was initially convicted, and those of the offence for which proceedings continued, were identical or substantially the same (see Sergey Zolotukhin, cited above, § 94). 88. As regards the proceedings in the criminal courts, the Court notes that the Criminal Court took care to present the facts in detail in its judgment of 29 March 2006. After setting the case in context and assessing the evidence against the applicant (see paragraphs 19-20 above), it found that his involvement in a criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise was established, as the judicial investigation had shown that several terrorist groups were based in the Lyons region, in Paris and in Lille and that the applicant ’ s contacts with the various members of these GIA support networks, who had the shared goal of carrying out attacks, were sufficient to establish his conscious and deliberate participation in a conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts on French soil. In its judgment the Criminal Court set out the facts demonstrating the applicant ’ s links to eight members of these groups and found that by providing funding and issuing propaganda on behalf of the GIA, the applicant had helped to strengthen the networks spread over several European countries (see paragraphs 21-22 above). 89. The Court further notes that in its judgment of 18 December 2006 the Paris Court of Appeal gave reasons explaining its approach. It began by giving details of the telephone calls demonstrating the existence of an information hub in London which was allegedly managed by the applicant. Hence, it referred to the calls made the day after the killing of the imam S. in Paris; two days before the attack on the Saint-Michel suburban rail station; on the day of that attack and the day after the attempted attack on the Paris-Lyon high-speed railway line at Cailloux-sur-Fontaines; on 12 September 1995, a few days after the attack of 3 September on Boulevard Richard Lenoir in Paris, the attempted attack of 4 September on Place Charles Vallin in Paris and the attack of 7 September in rue Jean ‑ Claude Vivand in Villeurbanne; the day after the shooting at the Col de Maleval and the arrest of three people; five days before the attack of 6 October and two days after it; on 16 October 1995, in other words just before the attack of 17 October; and, finally, on 1 November 1995, immediately after a telephone conversation between B.B. and S.A.B. concerning preparations for an attack on the Wazemmes market in Lille, with B.B. stating that the purpose of the call was to report to the applicant on the “final preparations” for the Lille attack ( see paragraph 23 above ). The Court notes that the Paris Court of Appeal went on to list the items of factual evidence pointing to the applicant ’ s involvement as the supervisor of a structure set up to fund the GIA ’ s activities in France. It referred to the funds sent by the applicant on 16 October 1995 under a false name and received by B.B.; the payment by the applicant of GBP 5,000 and FRF 50,000; and statements from several individuals concerning services offered in return for payment, fundraising and money transfers (see paragraph 24 above). The Court of Appeal also referred to a series of facts demonstrating, firstly, that the applicant had been the main contact person in organising and carrying out the GIA ’ s activities in Europe, as was clear in particular from a telephone conversation of 2 December 1995, from the statements of a witness who was a GIA member, and from the detailed content of several documents seized in London (press statements, authorisations to conduct the jihad, documents on the management of funds, articles and handwritten notes on the activities of Islamist groups in Europe and anti-terrorist activities, notes on military weapons and the handling of explosives, and so on); secondly, that he had been the GIA ’ s main propaganda agent outside Algeria (in view of his role on the magazine Al Ansar as established by documents seized at the applicant ’ s London address, namely a note on how to make the magazine more dynamic, a letter explaining the means of distributing it, a piece of computer equipment which the applicant would have been unable to afford, letters from readers and GIA sympathisers, a large number of magazines detailing the GIA ’ s ideas and violent actions, a substantial amount of correspondence relating to Algerian and Islamic issues, some testimonies, and a list of post-office boxes in numerous countries, used by the magazine ’ s subscribers); thirdly, that he had been at the centre of the London cell which also served as a rallying point for young recruits passing through; and fourthly, that he had been a leader with a strategic role in the GIA ’ s external organisation, as demonstrated by his links to members and correspondents of other Islamist terrorist groups worldwide (see paragraph 25 above). 90. Lastly, the Court notes that the Court of Appeal cited as reasons for its judgment the decisive role knowingly played by the applicant in the external structure set up in Europe by the GIA with the aim of overthrowing the Algerian regime. This involved creating networks in Belgium and France in particular in order to provide support to the Algerian guerrillas by supplying weapons, munitions and various items of equipment, supplying jihadists and providing safe havens to fighters who were fleeing the Algerian maquis or had arrived to carry out attacks (see paragraph 26 above). 91. As regards the assize court proceedings, the Court notes that the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal, in three judgments of 13 February, 3 August and 27 November 2001, committed the applicant for trial before the Paris Assize Court on charges of aiding and abetting the crimes committed during the attacks of 25 July and 6 and 17 October 1995 (see paragraphs 28-29 above). It observes that these judgments, which in this instance concerned specific criminal conduct aimed at the achievement of precise objectives represented by each of the attacks carried out in Paris on 25 July and 6 and 17 October 1995, set out the factual evidence forming the basis for the applicant ’ s prosecution and his committal for trial before the Assize Court. In particular, the applicant was charged, in relation to these three attacks, with transmitting instructions from the GIA ordering the attacks to be carried out with explosives and relaying to the GIA leadership operational information provided by the perpetrators of the attacks, and with issuing instructions for making the explosive devices to his accomplices in Paris, while procuring for them the funds needed to manufacture the explosives and make all the logistical arrangements for preparing and carrying out these particular attacks (see paragraph 30 above). 92. The Court observes that the Investigation Division ’ s judgments listed the following specific facts in particular. The three mobile phones used by the applicant had received calls from B.B., one of the main organisers in Paris and one of the perpetrators of the attacks, on 16 and 22 October and 1 November 1995; a receipt for an exchange transaction performed on 16 October 1995 for an amount of FRF 36,800 had been discovered at B.B. ’ s home, together with a notice of transfer for FRF 38,000; the applicant ’ s fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union office in the Londis shop; the words “LYESO – FF 36,600” had been found in the credit column of B.B. ’ s accounts and the words “West Union” and “West-Union Bank” had also been entered by B.B. in a document logging the details of the 17 October attack; the applicant had possessed the details of the Western Union branch in rue du Cloître in the Notre-Dame district of Paris; an exchange receipt dated 21 July 1995, for an amount of GBP 5,000 exchanged in London at a rate of 7.5%, had been found at the applicant ’ s home, with the number of a public payphone in Corbeil-Essonnes used by one of the perpetrators of the attacks written on the back, and an entry had been made in the credit column of B.B. ’ s accounts; a sum of GBP 6,945 had been sent on 20 July 1995; and between 20 and 25 July 1995 the sum of FRF 300 had been entered as expenditure for the purchase of a “GB ticket”, demonstrating that the funds, after being exchanged in England, had been transported to Paris in the days leading up to the attack at the Saint-Michel suburban rail station. The judges also noted, as evidence against the applicant, the content of a hard disk found in a London flat to which the applicant had had keys, containing two financial reports, one relating to the activities of the GIA in Belgium and the other to a set of accounts for the period from September 1994 to 1 November 1995, the date of B.B. ’ s arrest (see paragraph 31 above). 93. The Court also notes that the Investigation Division emphasised certain factual elements specific to the different attacks. For instance, in its judgment of 13 February 2001 concerning the attack of 17 October 1995 it stressed the fact that the applicant ’ s three telephone numbers had been called repeatedly from payphones used by B.B., around the time of the different attacks and in particular on the day before the attack of 17 October 1995, in order to report to the applicant on the preparations under way. The Investigation Division also highlighted the fact that the transfer of FRF 36,800 made from London the day before the attack of 17 October 1995 was directly linked to that attack (see paragraph 32 above). In its judgment of 3 August 2001 concerning the attack of 25 July 1995, the Investigation Division stressed that a call had been made to the applicant ’ s English mobile phone two days before the attack from a public payphone in Paris close to B.B. ’ s home which had also been used to contact another GIA member in France. The day before the attack and then on the day itself, the applicant had received calls from France on his various numbers, including from a payphone close to the previous one, concerning his role as an intermediary between the perpetrators of the attacks and the person masterminding them in Algeria. Furthermore, the applicant had on 2 and 20 July 1995 sent sums of GBP 5,000 and GBP 6,945 respectively which were directly linked to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995 (see paragraph 33 above). Finally, in its judgment of 27 November 2001 concerning the attack of 6 October 1995, the Investigation Division noted that the instructions issued by the GIA concerning the campaign of attacks, which had been accompanied by advice on the manufacture of explosives, had been transmitted via the applicant, who had been required to account for the use of the sums he had provided and had also been kept informed of the progress of the attacks, and in particular of the attack of 6 October 1995 by means of a telephone call of 8 October 1995 (see paragraph 34 above). The Assize Court went on to find that he had knowingly assisted in the manufacture or possession of explosive devices and issued instructions to that effect, in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 6 and 17 October 1995, and had knowingly incited others to manufacture or possess such devices in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 17 October 1995 (see paragraph 41 above). 94. Having thus compared the judgment of 18 December 2006 in which the Paris Court of Appeal convicted the applicant and the three judgments of the Investigation Division of 13 February, 3 August and 27 November 2001 committing him for trial before the special Assize Court, the Court notes that these decisions were based on numerous and detailed facts that were distinct from each other. In particular, it considers that although the transfer of GBP 5,000 referred to by the applicant (see paragraph 76 above) was mentioned both in the Court of Appeal judgment and in the judgments of the Investigation Division, that circumstance does not amount to a decisive similarity. As to the transfer of a sum of GBP 6,945 and the telephone calls on which the applicant relied, the Court observes – as did the applicant himself – that none of these features in both the Court of Appeal judgment convicting him and any of the Investigation Division ’ s judgments committing him for trial. On this point, it is not persuaded by the applicant ’ s claims that the transfer of funds should be regarded as being encompassed in the facts of the judgment of 18 December 2006 and that the telephone calls were inextricably linked to other calls dealt with in that judgment (see paragraphs 76 to 78 above). In any event, irrespective of these aspects referred to by the applicant in his observations, it appears that the three judgments delivered in 2001 committing the applicant for trial not only disregarded numerous factual elements raised in the criminal court proceedings, but above all concerned conduct and were based on facts that had not been referred to in the first set of proceedings. 95. The Court therefore concludes that the applicant was not prosecuted or convicted in the assize court proceedings on the basis of facts that were substantially the same as those that were the subject of his final conviction by the criminal courts. 96. Lastly, the Court reiterates that it is legitimate for Contracting States to take a firm stand against those who contribute to terrorist acts, which it cannot condone in any circumstances (see, in particular, A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 126, ECHR 2009; Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, no. 2947/06, § 126, 24 April 2008; and Daoudi v. France, no. 19576/08, § 65, 3 December 2009). Moreover, the applicant was convicted by the Assize Court not just on the basis of facts that differed from those for which he had been convicted in the first set of proceedings, but also for the crimes of aiding and abetting murder and attempted murder. The Court emphasises that these offences constitute serious violations of fundamental rights under Article 2 of the Convention, whose perpetrators States are required to prosecute and punish (see, mutatis mutandis, Marguš v. Croatia [GC], no. 4455/10, §§ 127-28, ECHR 2014 (extracts) ), provided that the procedural guarantees of the persons concerned are complied with (compare, in particular and mutatis mutandis, Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541/08 and 3 others, § 252, ECHR 2016), as they were in the applicant ’ s case. 97. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that there has been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.
The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention. It found in particular that the applicant in the present case had benefited from sufficient safeguards to enable him to understand his conviction by the special bench of the Assize Court of Appeal, considering that in view of the combined consideration of the three closely reasoned committal orders, the debates during the hearings of the applicant, as well as the many detailed questions put to the Assize Court, he could not claim not to know the reasons for his conviction. The Court also held that there had been no violation of Article 4 (right not to be tried or punished twice) of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, finding that the applicant had not been prosecuted or convicted in the framework of the criminal proceedings for facts which had been substantially the same as those of which he had been finally convicted under the prior summary proceedings. The Court reiterated in particular that it was legitimate for the Contracting States to take a firm stance against persons involved in terrorist acts, which it could in no way condone, and that the crimes of complicity in murder and attempted murder of which the applicant had been convicted amounted to serious violations of the fundamental rights under Article 2 (right to life) of the Convention, in respect of which States are required to pursue and punish the perpetrators, subject to compliance with the procedural guarantees of the persons concerned, as was the situation for the applicant in the present case.