Freedom of expression
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE Relevant domestic law and practiceIndependence and impartiality of courts Independence and impartiality of courts Independence and impartiality of courts 75. The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania read: Article 109 “In the Republic of Lithuania, justice shall be administered only by courts. When administering justice, judges and courts shall be independent. When considering cases, judges shall obey only the law. ...” Article 114 “Interference by any institutions of State power and governance, Members of the Seimas or other officials, political parties, political or public organisations, or citizens with the activities of a judge or court shall be prohibited and shall incur liability as provided for by law. ...” 76. Article 7 §§ 1, 2 and 4 of the Law on Administrative Procedure establishes that when administering justice, judges and courts are independent and obey only the law. They examine administrative cases on the basis of the law, and under conditions which do not enable any external influence on them. Interference with the activities of judges and courts by State institutions, the Seimas and its members, or any other individuals or entities is not allowed and incurs liability under the law. Should such interference occur, the judge or court must respond in accordance with the law. Conduct of pre-trial investigations 77. Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that prosecutors and pre-trial investigation authorities must, in each case where there are indications that a criminal activity may have been committed, take all the actions provided for by law which are within their remit in order to complete the investigation within the shortest possible time and to shed light on the criminal activity. 78. Article 170 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the prosecutor has the right to conduct a pre-trial investigation or to carry out separate investigative actions. When the investigation or separate investigative actions are carried out by a pre-trial investigation officer, the prosecutor must supervise the investigation. 79. The Recommendations on the actions of a prosecutor when organising and supervising a pre-trial investigation, approved by the Prosecutor General ’ s order no. I-86 of 19 June 2008 and valid at the material time, provided that the chief prosecutor or the deputy chief prosecutor of a given prosecutor ’ s office were responsible for the supervision of the pre-trial investigation carried out by a prosecutor of that office (point 15). A prosecutor could give instructions orally or in writing (point 25). 80. Article 63 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that procedural decisions taken by a prosecutor during a pre-trial investigation can be appealed against before a senior prosecutor. However, in line with Article 181 § 1 of that Code, a prosecutor ’ s refusal to grant access to the investigation file has to be appealed against before a pre-trial investigation judge. 81. The Recommendations on granting access to the pre-trial investigation file to the parties to the proceedings, approved by the Prosecutor General ’ s order no. I-58 of 18 April 2003 and valid at the material time, provided that when deciding whether to grant such access, the prosecutor had to assess whether it might interfere with the success of the investigation (point 13). Access to the investigation file could be denied, inter alia, where the essential data of the investigation had not been established; material objects had not been examined; there was a risk that material objects could be damaged or lost; or the investigation concerned allegations of sexual offences (point 14). Duties and liability of prosecutors 82. Article 118 of the Constitution provides that when performing their duties, prosecutors must be independent and obey only the law. The Prosecutor General is appointed and dismissed by the President upon the assent of the Seimas. 83. At the material time, Article 4 §§ 1, 2 and 5 of the Law on the Prosecution Service provided that the Prosecutor General was the head of prosecution service and was accountable to the President and to the Seimas. The Seimas established the priorities for the activities of prosecutors ’ offices and ensured their parliamentary supervision. The Prosecutor General had the duty to inform the Government and the public about the activities of prosecutors ’ offices. 84. At the material time, Article 4 § 3 of the Law on the Prosecution Service provided that procedural activities of prosecutors were supervised by senior prosecutors and by courts, who had the authority to establish procedural violations and to annul unlawful decisions. 85. At the material time, Article 40 of the Law on the Prosecution Service established the following disciplinary penalties: (1) warning; (2) reprimand; (3) relegation to a lower qualification rank; (4) demotion; and (5) dismissal. 86. At the material time, the Regulations on the conduct of disciplinary inquiries and application of disciplinary penalties to prosecutors, approved by the Prosecutor General ’ s order no. I-9 of 30 January 2007, provided that when choosing a disciplinary penalty, the following criteria had to be taken into account: the nature of the disciplinary offence committed, the reasons for its commission, the type of misconduct, the consequences of the offence, and other relevant circumstances (point 6.2). Parliamentary inquiries 87. At the material time, Article 49 § 9 of the Statute of the Seimas provided that parliamentary committees had, among others, the following powers: (1) when performing parliamentary supervision, to hear information and reports by ministries and other State institutions on the compliance with laws and other legal instruments; and (2) on their own initiative or at the request of the Seimas, to carry out parliamentary inquiries into specific problems and to provide their conclusions to the Seimas. 88. At the material time, Article 56 § 4 of the Statute of the Seimas provided that when carrying out parliamentary inquiries at the request of the Seimas, parliamentary committees acted in accordance with Articles 75 and 76 of the Statute, which regulated ad hoc parliamentary commissions of inquiry and control, and they had the same powers as those commissions (see paragraph 89 below). 89. Article 75 § 3 of the Statute of the Seimas provides that the powers of ad hoc parliamentary commissions of inquiry and control are established by law. Article 3 § 2 of the Law on Ad Hoc Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry and Control states that when investigating issues assigned to them and in the exercise of their powers, the said commissions may not interfere with the activities of courts, judges, prosecutors and pre-trial investigation officers, in relation to the conduct of a pre-trial investigation or judicial examination of a case. 90. In its ruling of 4 April 2006 the Constitutional Court held as follows: “In a democratic State governed by the rule of law, Parliament – the representation of the Nation – cannot be denied the power to take measures, inter alia ... to receive information about various processes taking place in the State and society, about the situation in various areas of life and the problems arising. Otherwise Parliament ... would be unable to properly discharge its functions and adopt the necessary decisions ... In accordance with the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, and other relevant provisions of the Constitution, it must be concluded that the Seimas does not have the power to create such ad hoc commissions of inquiry which, in the course of their investigation, would interfere with the powers of other institutions. For example, an ad hoc parliamentary commission of inquiry may not take over the constitutional powers of courts or otherwise interfere with the implementation of their constitutional remit, or undermine the independence of judges and courts in the course of the administration of justice, let alone administer justice by itself ... However, [the aforementioned limitations] do not mean that ad hoc parliamentary commissions of inquiry may not have any powers whatsoever with respect to State or municipal institutions, their officials and other persons. Such powers may be established by law, in compliance with the Constitution.” Relevant international and comparative material 91. At its 98th plenary session, held on 21-22 March 2014, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) adopted the Amicus Curiae brief in the case of Rywin v. Poland (nos. 6091/06, 4047/07 and 4070/07), which at that time was pending before the European Court of Human Rights. Its relevant parts read: “ 7. Parliamentary committees of inquiry are an instrument for what is usually referred to as the ‘ control ’, ‘ supervisory ’ or ‘ oversight ’ function of parliament, the essence of which is to oversee and scrutinise the work of the executive branch. The main purpose of this supervision is to ensure democratic political accountability and to improve the transparency and efficiency of the government and the administration. But the supervisory function may also provide parliament with information of relevance to its own legislative and budgetary procedures. ... 19. Parliamentary committees of inquiry conduct processes that are essentially of a political nature and which should not be confused with criminal investigations and proceedings. Such committees should not assess or pronounce themselves on the question of criminal responsibility of the persons covered by the inquiry, which should be for the public prosecutor and the courts alone to assess. 20. At the same time, it is in the nature of (alleged) political ‘ scandals ’ that they may give rise to parallel processes, so that a case which is under parliamentary inquiry may at the same time be subject both to administrative inquiries and to legal investigations or proceedings. There is in itself nothing unusual or illegitimate in this. But it does put extra responsibility on all parties involved to ensure that proper distance is kept between the parliamentary (political) inquiry and the criminal investigations and legal proceedings before the courts ... 21. ... For such procedures to unduly interfere with the rights protected under Article 6 [of the European Convention on Human Rights] they would have to interfere with and in some way unduly influence the proceedings before the courts ... which can only be assessed on the basis of the individual case at hand. ... 28. A basic premise for the Venice Commission is that parliaments as autonomous institutions distinct from the judiciary cannot be impeded from carrying out their own inquiries. The composition of a parliamentary committee is always the result of a political choice. Its mandate is meant to be temporary. Even when they look into the possibly criminally relevant conduct of individual persons, parliamentary committees of inquiry conduct processes that are essentially of a political nature, and which should not be confused with criminal investigations and proceedings. The result of these activities does not alter the legal order. The report which closes its work is in itself only an incentive to parliamentary discussion. The ultimate aim of the committees ’ investigations is transparency with a view of ensuring that the public is informed of matters which affect the res publica (the public good). 29. ... Searching for offences cannot be the only goal of the inquiry conducted by a parliamentary committee, or even the main purpose of its creation. This would be unconstitutional, even if domestic law provides no sanction. Indeed, the means conferred to the committee must always serve the jurisdiction of the parliament in a system of separation of powers – either to establish the responsibility of government and ministers or to collect information necessary for more effective legislation or to present political recommendations to government. 30. Even if identical items may be subject to both criminal proceedings and a parliamentary inquiry, the aim should always be different. The criminal investigation should lead to an individual legal measure, the conviction or acquittal of the accused. The committee of inquiry has no power over individuals, except to call them to testify.” THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND 2 OF THE CONVENTION 92. The applicant complained that she had not received a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the disciplinary proceedings against her because of the political and media involvement in the case. She relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read: “1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law ... 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” AdmissibilityApplicability ratione materiae Applicability ratione materiae Applicability ratione materiae (a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 93. The parties did not dispute the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the present case. 94. The Court has previously found that provision to be applicable under its civil head to “ordinary labour disputes” between civil servants and the State, including those relating to recruitment/appointment, career/promotion, transfer and termination of service (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 105, 23 June 2016, and the cases cited therein). 95. In the present case, the applicant was subject to disciplinary proceedings where one of the possible penalties was dismissal (see paragraph 85 above). She was found to have committed disciplinary violations and demoted to a lower position in the prosecution service (see paragraph 26 above), which penalty she contested before the administrative courts (see Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, § 62, 19 April 2007). In such circumstances, the Court is satisfied that, in accordance with its established case-law, Article 6 was applicable to the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant under its civil head. (b) Article 6 § 2 of the Convention 96. The Government submitted that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention was inapplicable ratione materiae because the disciplinary proceedings had not concerned a determination of a criminal charge against the applicant. 97. The applicant contested the Government ’ s submission. 98. The Court observes that the proceedings against the applicant were aimed at determining whether she had failed to properly carry out her duties as a supervising prosecutor and had thereby committed a disciplinary violation. The harshest penalty for such violations, provided by domestic law, was dismissal (see paragraph 85 above). Accordingly, those proceedings were of a purely disciplinary nature and did not involve the determination of a criminal charge against the applicant (see Kamenos v. Cyprus, no. 147/07, §§ 50-53, 31 October 2017, and the cases cited therein). 99. Therefore, as the applicant was not “charged with a criminal offence” within the meaning of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, it follows that the complaint under that provision is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and must be declared inadmissible, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. Exhaustion of domestic remedies (a) The parties ’ submissions 100. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies. In particular, she could have lodged a civil claim against the State for damage caused by allegedly unlawful acts of public officials, or brought a civil claim for defamation against specific individuals or media outlets, or lodged a complaint with the Office of the Inspector of Journalistic Ethics with regard to improper media reporting, but had not used any of those avenues. 101. The applicant submitted that she had chosen to defend her rights by complaining to the administrative courts, and that following their unfavourable decisions, lodging any civil claims had become futile. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 102. The Court reiterates that if there are a number of domestic remedies which an individual can pursue, that person is entitled to choose a remedy which addresses his or her essential grievance. In other words, when a remedy has been pursued, the use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective is not required (see O ’ Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810/09, §§ 109 and 111, ECHR 2014 (extracts), and the cases cited therein). 103. In the present case, the applicant raised the complaint about the political and media interference before the administrative courts in the disciplinary proceedings (see paragraphs 52 and 61 above). The Government did not argue that this had not been an appropriate remedy in the applicant ’ s situation. In such circumstances, the Court considers that, having raised her complaints before the administrative courts, the applicant was not required to institute any additional proceedings (see Paulikas v. Lithuania, no. 57435/09, § 41, 24 January 2017, and the case-law cited therein). It therefore dismisses the Government ’ s objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Conclusion on admissibility 104. The Court notes that the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. MeritsThe parties ’ submissions The parties ’ submissions The parties ’ submissions (a) The applicant 105. The applicant submitted that the disciplinary proceedings against her had not been fair. She contended that the Prosecutor General and the administrative courts had not based the decision to demote her on her professional performance but that they had been influenced by public opinion, statements of high-level politicians and public officials, and the heightened media attention. In particular, the applicant referred to several public statements made by the President in which the latter had emphasised the need to impose harsh penalties on the officers who had been involved in the pre-trial investigation of the alleged sexual abuse, irrespective of their role and actual impact on the investigation (see paragraphs 41 and 44 above). The applicant also referred to the findings of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs, which had specifically indicated that she and the KCDPO had failed to properly carry out the pre-trial investigation (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above). 106. The applicant submitted that, as the Prosecutor General and judges were appointed and dismissed by the President with the approval of the Seimas, they must have felt obligated to follow the opinion publicly expressed by the President and the Committee and to impose harsh punishments on the prosecutors, including herself. 107. Lastly, she argued that the courts which had examined her complaint against her demotion had reached arbitrary and unfounded conclusions, which had also demonstrated their bias, and they had failed to take into account her positive character references and lack of previous disciplinary penalties. She also pointed out that the courts which had examined the complaint brought by G.R. against her dismissal had found that penalty to be disproportionately harsh (see paragraphs 72 above). (b) The Government 108. The Government submitted that the heightened attention of the public and the media with regard to the pre-trial investigation into D.K. ’ s complaints had been justified by its extremely sensitive subject matter: allegations of sexual abuse of a minor with the possible involvement of her mother, as well as the suspected involvement of public officials in the alleged criminal activity (see paragraphs 7 and 14 above). The nature and seriousness of the allegations, the inability of the authorities to promptly solve the case, and the ensuing murders (see paragraph 14 above) had triggered a large-scale scandal, raising serious questions about the ability of the domestic law enforcement authorities to properly react to similar crimes. Accordingly, the public had had a legitimate interest in being informed about the pre-trial investigation and the measures taken to address the shortcomings which had been revealed, and the media reporting had contributed to a public debate on matters of serious public concern. 109. The Government further submitted that none of the statements made by politicians and public officials had implied that the applicant was liable for any specific offence, and many of them had not referred to her at all. Furthermore, a number of statements invoked by the applicant had not been made until after the Prosecutor General ’ s Office had issued the findings of the disciplinary inquiry and thus could not have influenced that inquiry, which had found that the applicant had improperly carried out her duties and recommended her demotion. Moreover, no politicians or public officials had made any interventions in the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. The Government contended that those officials had merely displayed their interest in the proper investigation of serious criminal cases. 110. The Government also submitted that media interest in certain cases was inevitable in a democratic society and courts could not be expected to operate in a vacuum. However, the applicant ’ s case had been decided by professional judges who, due to their professional training and experience, had been able to disregard any external influence. There had not been any indications of bias on the part of any of the judges who had examined the applicant ’ s case, and her concerns with regard to impartiality had been adequately addressed during the proceedings (see paragraphs 49, 63 and 64 above). 111. With regard to the parliamentary inquiry, the Government submitted that the Seimas, being the representative of the nation, needed to have the right to obtain information about various processes taking place in society in order to be able to exercise parliamentary control, including over prosecutors. However, there were adequate safeguards against any potential political interference with judicial processes (see paragraphs 89 and 90 above). Furthermore, unlike the disciplinary proceedings, the parliamentary inquiry had primarily sought to assess whether there was a need for legislative amendments in order to improve the conduct of pre-trial investigations, and not to make any findings as to liability of specific individuals (see paragraph 28 above). The Government submitted that the recommendations adopted by the Committee had been general and formulated in an abstract way, and it had not made recommendations with regard to any particular individuals (see paragraph 35 above). The Committee ’ s findings had not been binding on judicial authorities nor had they had a higher probative value than other evidence, and thus the independence and impartiality of the judges who had subsequently examined the applicant ’ s case had not been affected by them. 112. Lastly, the Government submitted that the administrative courts had thoroughly examined the applicant ’ s complaints against the disciplinary penalty and adopted well-founded decisions. They had taken into account the applicant ’ s role as the supervising prosecutor, her duties in performing that role, and the actions she had taken in the course of the investigation (see paragraphs 57 - 59 and 66 above). There were no indications that the courts had operated with a preconceived notion of the applicant ’ s guilt or that they had been unduly influenced by external factors; in fact, some of the findings of the commission of inquiry had been annulled in the court proceedings (see paragraph 56 above). The Court ’ s assessment (a) Scope of the case 113. In the present case, the disciplinary penalty was imposed on the applicant by the Prosecutor General, following an inquiry carried out by the Prosecutor General ’ s Office (see paragraphs 23 - 26 above). The applicant then challenged that penalty before the administrative courts, which examined her complaint at two levels of jurisdiction. 114. In her submissions before the Court, the applicant raised complaints with regard, inter alia, to the fairness of the decision taken by the Prosecutor General (see paragraphs 105 and 106 above). In this connection, the Court reiterates its settled case-law according to which, even where an administrative body determining disputes over “civil rights and obligations” does not comply with Article 6 § 1 in some respect, no violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body are “subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 § 1”, that is, if any structural or procedural shortcomings identified in the proceedings before an administrative authority are remedied in the course of the subsequent review by a judicial body enjoying full jurisdiction (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 132, 6 November 2018 and the cases cited therein). 115. It was not disputed that the administrative courts which examined the applicant ’ s complaint against the disciplinary penalty were judicial bodies within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and that they had full jurisdiction over the matter. In such circumstances, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings conducted by the Prosecutor General ’ s Office complied with Article 6 § 1. It will limit its examination to the issue of fairness of the proceedings before the administrative courts. (b) Approach to be taken in the present case 116. The applicant complained that the fairness of the proceedings before the administrative courts had been affected by the findings of the parliamentary inquiry, the prejudicial statements made by politicians and public officials in the media, and the heightened media attention to the case. 117. The Court has previously acknowledged, in cases concerning the fairness of civil proceedings, that public statements made by high-ranking politicians might, in view of their content and the manner in which they were made, be incompatible with the notion of an “independent and impartial tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, no. 48553/99, § 80, 25 July 2002, and Kinský v. the Czech Republic, no. 42856/06, § 94, 9 February 2012). It also held that what was at stake was not actual proof of influence or pressure on judges but the importance of the appearance of impartiality (see, mutatis mutandis, Kinský, cited above, § 98). 118. Accordingly, the Court considers that the applicant ’ s complaints should be examined from the perspective of the independence and impartiality of the courts which examined the case against her. 119. To date, when examining cases concerning the impact of statements made by public officials on the independence and impartiality of courts in civil proceedings, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention where the State authorities acting at the highest level had intervened in the civil proceedings on a number of occasions (see Sovtransavto Holding, cited above, § 80), as well as where several politicians had made strong negative statements regarding decisions in the type of cases brought by the applicant, including the applicant ’ s own cases, and about the judges deciding them, had unequivocally expressed the opinion that the courts ’ decisions upholding the applicant ’ s claims had been wrong and undesirable, and those statements had been directly aimed at the judges (see Kinský, cited above, §§ 91-93). The Court considers that the reasoning of the aforementioned judgments is directly relevant to the present case and should be duly taken into account when assessing the statements made by public officials complained of by the applicant. 120. The Court has also held in previous cases, albeit in the context criminal proceedings, that in certain situations a virulent media campaign can adversely affect the fairness of court proceedings and engage the State ’ s responsibility, with regard to, inter alia, the impartiality of courts under Article 6 § 1 (see Paulikas, cited above, § 57, and the cases cited therein). 121. In this connection, the Court reiterates that the requirements inherent in the concept of “fair hearing” are not necessarily the same in cases concerning the determination of civil rights and obligations as they are in cases concerning the determination of a criminal charge. This is borne out by the absence of detailed provisions such as paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 applying to cases of the former category. Thus, although these provisions have a certain relevance outside the strict confines of criminal law, the Contracting States have greater latitude when dealing with civil cases concerning civil rights and obligations than they have when dealing with criminal cases. However, the Court considers it necessary, when examining proceedings that fall within the civil-law aspect of Article 6, to draw inspiration from its approach to criminal-law matters (see Jokela v. Finland, no. 28856/95, § 68, ECHR 2002 ‑ IV; Carmel Saliba v. Malta, no. 24221/13, § 67, 29 November 2016; and Hodžić v. Croatia, no. 28932/14, § 67, 4 April 2019). 122. With the above considerations in mind, the Court emphasises, in particular, that a fair hearing can still be held after intensive adverse publicity. In a democracy, high-profile cases will inevitably attract comment by the media; however, that cannot mean that any media comment whatsoever will inevitably prejudice a defendant ’ s right to a fair hearing. In such cases, the Court will examine whether there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that the proceedings as a whole are fair. It will require cogent evidence that concerns about the impartiality of judges are objectively justified before any breach of Article 6 § 1 can be found (see Paulikas, cited above, § 58, and the cases cited therein). 123. The Court will address separately the three aspects of the applicant ’ s complaint (firstly, the findings of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs, secondly, various public statements made by high-ranking politicians, and thirdly, an alleged media campaign). It will also examine whether the administrative courts in their decisions adequately addressed her concerns with regard to the fairness of the proceedings. (i) As to the parliamentary inquiry 124. In accordance with Lithuanian law, the Seimas has the right to carry out parliamentary inquiries, either by entrusting them to one of the existing parliamentary committees or by creating an ad hoc commission of inquiry; when conducting such inquiries, both those bodies follow the same rules (see paragraphs 87 - 89 above). The Court takes note of the findings of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania and the Venice Commission, both of which recognised the right of Parliament to obtain information necessary for it to fulfil its lawful duties and the importance of parliamentary oversight in a democratic society (see paragraphs 90 and 91 above). The applicant did not argue that the very fact of the Seimas opening a parliamentary inquiry had, in and of itself, infringed the fairness of the proceedings in her case, and the Court has no grounds to find otherwise. 125. The applicant ’ s complaint concerned some of the findings made by the Parliamentary Committee – namely, that the KCDPO had “obviously procrastinated” in the pre-trial investigation and that she had been one of the officers responsible for the inaction (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above). 126. In this connection, the Court firstly observes that the purpose of the parliamentary inquiry was not to establish the liability of the applicant or any other individual officers, but to make an overall assessment of how the pre-trial investigation into D.K. ’ s complaints had been carried out, and whether general measures were necessary in order to improve the conduct of pre-trial investigations (see paragraph 28 above). Accordingly, the purpose of the parliamentary inquiry was not the same as that of either the criminal proceedings concerning D.K. ’ s complaints or the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant (see, mutatis mutandis, Rywin v. Poland, nos. 6091/06 and 2 others, § 226, 18 February 2016; see also the position of the Venice Commission on the purposes of parliamentary inquiries in paragraph 91 above). The Court also notes that the Constitutional Court has held that parliamentary inquiries could not interfere with the constitutional powers of courts, or undermine the independence of judges and courts, or administer justice themselves (see paragraph 90 above). 127. Turning to the specific statements complained of by the applicant, the Court observes that the Committee held several times, both in the descriptive part of its report and in its conclusions, that the KCDPO had “obviously procrastinated” in the pre-trial investigation, that it had failed to ensure that the essential investigative measures were taken, and had thereby acted incompetently (see paragraphs 32 and 35 above). While these statements unequivocally expressed the Committee ’ s view as to whether the KCDPO had acted properly, the Court emphasises that they did not engage the individual liability of any specific officers of the KCDPO. Similarly, the Seimas in its resolution endorsing the Committee ’ s findings did not make any mention of the applicant (see paragraph 36 above). The Court therefore considers that those statements were of a general nature and unable to affect the fairness of the disciplinary proceedings concerning the applicant ’ s individual liability (see, mutatis mutandis, Paulikas, cited above, § 52, and the cases cited therein). 128. As for the other statement complained of by the applicant, the Court notes that it indeed referred specifically to her – namely, that “the commission [of the Prosecutor General ’ s Office] which had conducted the disciplinary inquiry found that the persons responsible for the said inaction were the prosecutor of the KCDPO who had initially supervised the pre-trial investigation and had later taken over its conduct, and the Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the KCDPO” (see paragraph 31 above). 129. In this connection, the Court reiterates that any statement must be assessed in the context of the particular circumstances in which it was made (ibid., § 49). In the present case, the Committee did not carry out a separate investigation but based its findings on the documents provided to it by other authorities, including the Prosecutor General ’ s Office (see paragraph 29 above). At the time when the Committee adopted its report, the Prosecutor General ’ s Office had already concluded its disciplinary proceedings, in which it had identified various shortcomings in the work of the police and prosecutors – including the KCDPO and the applicant (see paragraphs 24 and 25 above). 130. In the Court ’ s view, the Committee ’ s report made it clear that the aforementioned finding had been reached by the Prosecutor General ’ s Office and not by the Committee itself. The Committee did not express any assessment of its own as to the accuracy of the Prosecutor General ’ s finding – it neither endorsed nor criticised it, and it did not make any additional observations with regard to the applicant ’ s possible role in the pre-trial investigation (see, for a similar situation, Rywin, cited above, § 217). Furthermore, the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Committee did not contain any statements implying that the applicant was individually liable (see paragraph 35 above). 131. In such circumstances, the Court considers that the impugned statements made by the Committee in its report, when read in their context and in the light of the report as a whole, cannot be seen as implying that the applicant was individually liable for any shortcomings in the work of the KCDPO, and thus they did not give cause to doubt the independence and impartiality of the administrative courts in her case (contrast the cases cited in paragraph 119 above). (ii) As to the public statements of high-ranking politicians 132. The applicant also complained that the fairness of the disciplinary proceedings against her had been affected by the many public statements made by high-level State officials, who had insisted on the accountability and harsh punishment of prosecutors involved in the criminal proceedings concerning D.K. ’ s complaints. 133. The Court notes that the impugned statements were made by the President, the Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs and some Members of Parliament in a context that was independent of the disciplinary proceedings themselves, that is, by way of public statements or interviews in the national press (see paragraphs 39 - 45 above and contrast the cases cited in paragraph 119 above). The Court acknowledges that the circumstances of the case – allegations of sexual abuse against a minor, two murders, and the apparent inability of the law enforcement authorities to conduct criminal proceedings promptly and diligently – created a legitimate public interest in being informed about, inter alia, the authorities ’ actions when investigating those allegations, the problems identified in their response, and the measures taken to address those problems. The Court is also of the view that those same circumstances justified the wish of high-level State officials to express their reaction to the shortcomings in the work of the law enforcement authorities and to keep the public informed about the individual and general measures taken to address those shortcomings (see the Government ’ s observations to that effect in paragraph 108 above). However, the Court reiterates that those circumstances in and of themselves could not justify each and every use of words by the officials in their statements to the press (see, mutatis mutandis, Paulikas, cited above, § 50, and the case-law cited therein). 134. The Court will first look at the statements which were made before the Prosecutor General ’ s Office concluded its disciplinary proceedings and decided to give the applicant a disciplinary penalty (see paragraphs 24 - 26 above). The President issued several public statements criticising the pre-trial investigation as protracted and calling for the identification and personal accountability of all officers who had acted negligently and who had failed to perform their duties diligently (see paragraphs 41 and 42 above). Furthermore, the Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs stated that the pre-trial investigation had been carried out “rather dismissively and slowly” and that he had seen “displays of procrastination and negligence” in the actions of investigating officers (see paragraphs 39 and 40 above). In addition, a Member of Parliament implied that the deliberate inaction of the authorities might have driven D.K. to commit two murders (see paragraph 39 above). The Court observes that none of those statements referred to the applicant or implied that she had been responsible for any of the alleged inadequacies in the criminal proceedings (see Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia, no. 9043/05, § 104, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). It is unable to accept that such statements of a general nature could have affected the fairness of the proceedings in which the applicant ’ s individual liability was determined (see Paulikas, cited above, § 52, and the cases cited therein and contrast the cases cited in paragraph 119 above). 135. Soon after the Prosecutor General ’ s Office concluded its disciplinary inquiry and recommended demoting the applicant and giving several other prosecutors disciplinary penalties ranging from a warning to dismissal (see paragraphs 24 and 25 above), the President gave a statement to a news website in which she admitted that she had expected the “Kaunas prosecutors” to receive harsher penalties (see paragraph 44 above). In the Court ’ s view, this statement was sufficiently specific and referred to an identifiable group of prosecutors which included the applicant. The applicant contended that the President ’ s insistence on harsh penalties had affected the fairness of the proceedings before the administrative courts. 136. The Court does not wish to speculate as to what effect the aforementioned statement may have had on the course of the proceedings in issue (see Kinský, cited above, § 94, and the case-law cited therein). However, it cannot be overlooked that the administrative courts which examined the applicant ’ s complaint against the demotion did not give her a harsher penalty than the one chosen by the Prosecutor General (see paragraphs 55 and 65 above). Furthermore, the courts justified the appropriateness of the demotion by referring to the specific duties of a supervising prosecutor and listing the concrete actions which the applicant had failed to take (see paragraphs 59 and 67 above). In such circumstances, the Court does not consider that the President ’ s statement with regard to the penalties to be given to the “Kaunas prosecutors” gave cause to doubt the independence and impartiality of the courts in the proceedings concerning the applicant ’ s individual liability (see, mutatis mutandis, Dimitrov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 77938/11, § 163, 1 July 2014). (iii) As to the alleged media campaign 137. The Court acknowledges that, in certain situations, a virulent media campaign can adversely affect the fairness of court proceedings and engage the State ’ s responsibility (see paragraph 120 above). At the same time, the Court notes that press coverage of current events is an exercise of freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. If there is a virulent press campaign surrounding the proceedings, what is decisive is not the subjective apprehensions of the affected individual concerning the absence of prejudice required of the courts, however understandable, but whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, his or her fears can be held to be objectively justified (see, mutatis mutandis, Paulikas, cited above, § 57, and the cases cited therein). 138. In the present case, there was extensive media coverage of the criminal proceedings concerning the alleged case of sexual abuse and of the subsequent disciplinary proceedings against various prosecutors, including the applicant. The Court has already accepted that the interest in the case was justified by the seriousness and nature of the criminal complaints brought by D.K. and the apparent inability of the authorities to adequately address those complaints (see paragraph 133 above). Therefore, although various State officials discussed the case in the media, it cannot be said that the coverage was prompted by the authorities, and nor did the applicant allege otherwise (ibid., § 60, and the cases cited therein). 139. The Court is unable to accept that the language used in the media reports with regard to the applicant while the court proceedings against her were ongoing was such as to create the perception of her responsibility for any specific offences (contrast Paulikas, cited above, § 61). Furthermore, the case against the applicant was decided by professional judges who were less likely than a jury to be influenced by the press campaign on account of their professional training and experience, which allows them to disregard improper external influence (ibid., § 62, and the cases cited therein). In addition, domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction issued well-reasoned decisions and they upheld some of the applicant ’ s complaints (see paragraphs 55 - 60 and 65 ‑ 67 above). Accordingly, the Court finds no cogent evidence to suggest that the judges who assessed the arguments put forward by the applicant were influenced by any of the publications in the press (see the principles cited in paragraph 122 above). (iv) As to the reasoning of the administrative courts 140. The Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention includes, in particular, the right of the parties to submit any observations that they consider relevant to their case. The purpose of the Convention being to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective, this right can only be seen to be effective if the observations are actually “heard”, that is, duly considered by the court. In other words, the effect of Article 6 is, among others, to place the “tribunal” under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence presented by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant (see, among many other authorities, Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 80, ECHR 2004-I, and Paliutis v. Lithuania, no. 34085/09, § 39, 24 November 2015). 141. However, while Article 6 § 1 obliges the courts to give reasons for their judgments, it cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument put forward by the parties. The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision. It is moreover necessary to take into account, inter alia, the diversity of the submissions that a litigant may bring before the courts and the differences existing between the Contracting States with regard to statutory provisions, customary rules, judicial opinion and the presentation and drafting of judgments. That is why the question as to whether a court has failed to fulfil the obligation to state reasons, deriving from Article 6 of the Convention, can only be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (see, among many other authorities, Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 9 December 1994, § 29, Series A no. 303-A, and Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01, § 90, 28 June 2007). 142. In the present case, it does not escape the Court ’ s attention that neither of the administrative courts which examined the applicant ’ s complaint addressed her argument, raised before both the first-instance court and the appellate court, that the fairness of the proceedings had been prejudiced by public statements of politicians and by media reporting (see paragraphs 52, 60, 61 and 68 above; contrast Arrigo and Vella v. Malta ( dec. ), no. 6569/04, 10 May 2005, and Paulikas, cited above, § 25). 143. At the same time, it observes that the courts answered the applicant ’ s main arguments, namely that she had acted in accordance with the relevant legal instruments and that the penalty given to her had been disproportionate (see paragraphs 47, 56 - 59, 66 and 67 above and compare Buzescu v. Romania, no. 61302/00, § 67, 24 May 2005). In view of the rather general way in which the applicant formulated her complaint concerning the fairness of the proceedings (see paragraphs 52 and 61 above), as well as the detailed reasons given by the courts to justify the decision to give her a disciplinary penalty (see paragraph 136 above), the Court is prepared to accept that their silence on this issue can reasonably be construed as an implied rejection (see Ruiz Torija, cited above, § 30, and Yanakiev v. Bulgaria, no. 40476/98, § 71, 10 August 2006). 144. Furthermore, the Court has found no grounds to believe that the independence and impartiality of the administrative courts were compromised by public statements of State officials and politicians (see paragraphs 127, 131, 134, 136 and 139 above). Nor is there anything in the case file that would enable it to doubt the overall fairness of the proceedings before the administrative courts. Taking all these circumstances into account, the Court considers that the courts ’ omission to explicitly address the applicant ’ s argument concerning the alleged political and media interference did not render the proceedings, taken as a whole, unfair. (c) Conclusion 145. In the light of all the aforementioned circumstances, the Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the applicant. It found in particular no grounds to believe that the independence and impartiality of the administrative courts had been compromised by the public statements of State officials and politicians or by media reporting on the case. Nor, furthermore, had there been anything in the case file to make the Court doubt the overall fairness of the proceedings in the Lithuanian courts.