Right to life and right to respect for private life
THE LAW THE GOVERNMENT ’ S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION A. The Government ’ s submissions to the Grand Chamber 19. In their memorial to the Court of 7 January 2014, the Government stated that when preparing their memorial they had taken the precaution of enquiring about the applicant ’ s situation at the municipality where she lived and had found out that she had died on 10 November 2011. Thus, by the time the Chamber had adopted its judgment in this case, she had been dead for approximately one and a half years. Relying on the Court ’ s decision in the case of Predescu v. Romania ( no. 21447/03, § 25, 2 December 2008 ), they requested the Court to declare the application inadmissible on the ground of abuse of the right of petition, in accordance with Article 35 § § 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 20. The Government submitted that the applicant’s counsel had not only failed to inform the Court of the applicant ’ s death – which he should have done at the latest when the Court ’ s Registry provided him with the statement of facts, assuming her to be alive – but had also misled the Court in his submissions by giving the impression that the applicant was still alive. 21. In the Government ’ s view, the conduct of the applicant ’ s counsel had been such as to mislead the Court as regards an essential aspect for its examination of the application. B. Counsel for the applicant ’ s submissions to the Grand Chamber 22. The applicant’s counsel responded that he had not had any personal contact with his client since January 2010 and had only become aware of her death on 9 January 2014, when he had received a copy of the Government ’ s memorial of 7 January 2014. 23. Counsel explained that the applicant had expressed her wish that counsel should send any further correspondence to Mr F., a retired pastor who also voluntarily worked for the assisted - suicide association EXIT. The reason for this arrangement was, inter alia, that receiving letters from her counsel directly had caused her stress and that she therefore needed assistance from a person of trust. Thus, after her appeal to the Federal Supreme Court in January 2010, it had been agreed that Mr F. would bring any communications to her personally and explain them to her. Counsel submitted that he had complied with those instructions. 24. Upon receipt of the Government ’ s submissions on 9 January 2014, counsel had immediately contacted Mr F., who had explained to him that he had refrained from notifying him of the applicant ’ s death at the applicant ’ s express request because she feared that the ongoing proceedings would otherwise be discontinued. In the summer of 2011, when it had become clear that the applicant would end her life, she had informed Mr F. that counsel had told her that if she died during the proceedings the case would be at an end, and that she did not want this to happen as she wanted “to open the way for other people in her situation”. Mr F. had taken the view that a spiritual adviser ’ s professional duty did not permit disclosure against the applicant ’ s express wishes. Counsel for the applicant further stated that he found it extremely regrettable that Mr F. had not informed him immediately of the applicant ’ s death, as counsel would have duly informed the Court and would have made an application for the proceedings to be continued nevertheless. 25. Relying on the Court ’ s case-law in previous cases where an applicant had died or had expressed the wish to withdraw his or her complaint during the proceedings before the Commission or the Court (counsel referred to the Court ’ s judgments in Scherer v. Switzerland, 25 March 1994, Series A no. 287, and Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, § 21, Series A no. 26 ), he argued that upon lodging an application with the Convention institutions the latter became master of the proceedings. It was thus for the Court to decide whether the proceedings in a given case should be continued. The decisive factor in that regard was whether, in the Court ’ s view, the case raised general questions of public interest that required further examination. 26. In the instant case, counsel for the applicant invited the Court to continue the proceedings on the ground that the case raised substantive questions regarding compliance with the Convention which required further examination in the public interest. “ Euthanasia” was a contentious and much - debated issue in many European countries. Cases of this nature were generally brought by persons who were elderly and/or ill. If proceedings were to be systematically abandoned when such a person died, the questions raised by such cases could never be decided by the Court. C. The Court ’ s assessment 27. Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention provides: “The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that: (a) the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual application; ... ” 28. The Court reiterates that under this provision an application may be rejected as an abuse of the right of individual application if, among other reasons, it was knowingly based on untrue facts (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § § 53-54, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ IV; Varbanov v. Bulgaria, no. 31365/96, § 36, ECHR 2000 ‑ X; Rehak v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 67208/01, 18 May 2 004; Popov v. Moldova (no. 1), no. 74153/01, § 48, 18 January 2005; Kerechasvili v. Georgia (dec.), no. 5667/02, ECHR 2006 ‑ V; Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, no. 798/05, § 63, 15 September 2009; and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 97, ECHR 2012 ). The submission of incomplete and thus misleading information may also amount to an abuse of the right of application, especially if the information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation has been provided for the failure to disclose that information (see Hüttner v. Germany ( dec. ), no. 23130 /04, 1 9 June 2006; Predescu, cited above, §§ 25 ‑ 26; and Kowal v. Poland ( dec. ), no. 2912/11, 18 September 2012). The same applies if important new developments have occurred during the proceedings before the Court and where, despite being expressly required to do so by Rule 47 § 7 (former Rule 47 § 6 ) of the Rules of Court, the applicant has failed to disclose that information to the Court, thereby preventing it from ruling on the case in full knowledge of the facts ( see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above, and Miroļubovs and Others, cited above). However, even in such cases, the applicant ’ s intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty ( see Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, § 8 9, 20 June 2002; Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286/01, §§ 58-60, 28 March 2006; Nold v. Germany, no. 27250/02, § 87, 29 June 2006; and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above). 29. Turning to the circumstances of the instant case, the Court notes at the outset that in her application lodged with the Court on 10 November 2010 the applicant complained, relying on Article 8 of the Convention, that the Swiss authorities, by depriving her of the possibility of obtaining a lethal dose of sodium pentobarbital, had violated her right to decide by what means and at what point her life would end. It further observes that on 5 January 2012 notice of her application was given to the respondent Government and that on 14 May 2013 the Chamber delivered a judgment in which it held (by four votes to three) that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, a finding which was based on the assumption that the applicant was still alive (see paragraphs 65 - 67 of the Chamber judgment). 30. However, it was later revealed that in the meantime, on 24 October 2011, the applicant had obtained a medical prescription for a lethal dose of sodium pentobarbital and that on 10 November 2011 she had ended her life by imbibing the prescribed substance. 31. This development was not brought to the Court ’ s attention by the applicant or her counsel but by the Government, in their memorial of 7 January 2014, after the case had been referred to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention. When preparing their memorial, the Government had enquired about the applicant ’ s situation and had found out about the fact and the circumstances of her death. 32. The Court has taken note of the explanation submitted in reply by counsel for the applicant that he had been unaware of his client ’ s death because he had only had contact with her via an intermediary, Mr F., who – at her request – had purposely refrained from notifying counsel of her death. According to Mr F., this was because of her fear that the disclosure of such a fact might prompt the Court to discontinue the proceedings in her case. As her spiritual adviser he had considered himself bound by a professional duty of confidentiality preventing him from disclosing that information against her wishes. 33. However, in the Court ’ s view, and bearing in mind the particular nature of the present case, the fact that counsel for the applicant had no direct contact with his client but agreed to communicate with her indirectly through an intermediary gives rise to a number of concerns regarding his role as a legal representative in the proceedings before it. In addition to the duties of an applicant to cooperate with the Court (see Rule 44A of the Rules of Court; see also Rule 44C, “Failure to participate effectively”, including the possibility of drawing inferences from the failure of a party “to divulge relevant information of its own motion” ) and to keep it informed of all circumstances relevant to his or her application (see Rule 47 § 7, former Rule 47 § 6), a representative bears a particular responsibility not to make misleading submissions (see Rule 44D). 34. It transpires from her counsel ’ s explanation that the applicant had not only failed to inform him, and by implication the Court, of the fact that she had obtained the required medical prescription, but had also taken special precautions to prevent information about her death from being disclosed to counsel and eventually to the Court in order to stop the latter discontinuing the proceedings in her case. 35. Against this background, the Grand Chamber considers that the fact and the circumstances of the applicant ’ s death did indeed concern the very core of the matter underlying her complaint under the Convention. It is also conceivable that had these facts been known to the Chamber they might have had a decisive influence on its judgment of 14 May 2013 concluding that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court; Pardo v. France (revision – admissibility), 10 July 1996, §§ 21-22, Reports 1996 ‑ III; Pardo v. France (revision – merits), 29 April 1997, § 23, Reports 1997 ‑ III; and Gustafsson v. Sweden (revision – merits), 30 July 1998, § 27, Reports 1998 ‑ V ). However, there is no need for the Grand Chamber to speculate on this since in any event, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the Chamber ’ s judgment of 14 May 201 3 has not become final. 36. According to Mr F., the applicant ’ s motive for withholding the relevant information had been that, regardless of the fact that the ongoing grievance arising from her own personal situation had ceased, the proceedings in her case should continue for the benefit of other people who were in a similar situation. While such a motive may be understandable from the applicant ’ s perspective in the exceptional situation in which she found herself, the Court finds it sufficiently established that by deliberately omitting to disclose that information to her counsel the applicant intended to mislead the Court on a matter concerning the very core of her complaint under the Convention. 37. Accordingly, the Court upholds the Government ’ s preliminary objection that the applicant ’ s conduct constituted an abuse of the right of application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.
In its Chamber judgment in the case on 14 May 2013, the Court held, by a majority, that there had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private life) of the Convention. It found in particular that Swiss law was not clear enough as to when assisted suicide was permitted. The case was subsequently referred to the Grand Chamber at the request of the Swiss Government. In January 2014 the Swiss Government informed the Court that it had learned that the applicant had died in November 2011. In its Grand Chamber judgment of 30 September 2014 the Court has, by a majority, declared the application inadmissible. It came to the conclusion that the applicant had intended to mislead the Court on a matter concerning the very core of her complaint. In particular, she had taken special precautions to prevent information about her death from being disclosed to her counsel, and thus to the Court, in order to prevent the latter from discontinuing the proceedings in her case. The Court therefore found that her conduct had constituted an abuse of the right of individual application (Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention). As a result of this judgment, the findings of the Chamber judgment of 14 May 2013, which had not become final, are no longer legally valid.