Attacks on Roma villages and destruction of houses and possessions
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE Code of Civil Procedure 79. Article 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Government Order no. 59/2001, provides that a court examining a civil action can suspend the proceedings: “...2. if criminal proceedings have been instituted in relation to a crime, the determination of which is decisive for the outcome of the civil dispute.” Code of Criminal Procedure Article 10 (c) “Criminal proceedings cannot be instituted and, if instituted, cannot be continued if ... c) the act was not committed by the defendant; ... ” Article 15 “The person who has suffered civil damage can join the criminal proceedings... He or she can do so either during the criminal investigation... or before the court...” Article 22 “The findings contained in a final judgment of the criminal court concerning the issue whether the act in question has been committed, and the identification of the perpetrator and his guilt, are binding on the civil court when it examines the civil consequences of the criminal act.” Article 343 § 3 “In case of a conviction or an acquittal, or the termination of the criminal trial, the court shall deliver a judgment in which it also decides on the civil action. Civil damages cannot be awarded if an acquittal was decided on the ground that the impugned act did not exist or was not committed by the accused.” Civil Code 80. Articles 999 and 1000 of the Civil Code provide that any person who has suffered damage can seek redress by bringing a civil action against the person who has negligently caused it. 81. Article 1003 of the Civil Code provides that, where more than one person has committed an intentional tort, they shall be jointly and severally liable. Case law of the domestic courts 82. The Government submitted a number of cases in which domestic courts had decided that the prosecutor's decision, based on Article 10 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, not to open a criminal investigation on account of the absence of intention – as an element of the offence – did not prevent the civil courts from examining a civil claim arising out of the commission of the act by the person in question. 83. The Government submitted only one case, dating back to 1972, in which the Supreme Court had decided that the prosecutor's decision, based on Article 10 (a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, not to open a criminal investigation having regard to the fact that the acts were not committed at all or were not committed by the defendant, should not prevent civil courts from examining a civil claim arising out of the commission of the same act by the person in question. The Supreme Court's decision dealt solely with the competence issue and did not specify whether there was a legal provision offering a chance of success for such an action. Legal doctrine 84. The common view of the criminal-procedure specialists is that a civil court cannot examine a civil action filed against a person against whom the prosecutor has refused to open a criminal investigation on the grounds provided for in Article 10 (a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the acts were not committed at all or were not committed by the defendant (see Criminal Procedural Law – General Part, Gheorghe Nistoreanu and Others, p. 72, Bucharest 1994, and A Treaty on Criminal Procedural Law – General Part, Nicolae Volonciu, pp. 238-39, Bucharest 1996). 85. The common view of the civil-procedure specialists and of some criminal-procedure specialists is that the prosecutor's decision refusing to open a criminal investigation on the grounds mentioned in the previous paragraph, does not prevent a civil court from examining a civil action brought against the defendant. In such a case, civil courts are entitled to decide whether the acts were committed and by whom, but have to rely on the findings of the prosecutor set out in the decision refusing to open a criminal investigation (see The Civil Action and the Criminal Trial, Anastasiu Crişu, RRD no. 4/1997, and Criminal Procedural Law, Ion Neagu, p. 209, Bucharest 1988). THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION 86. Article 3 of the Convention provides as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 87. Article 8 of the Convention provides, insofar as relevant, as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, [and] his home... 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of ... public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” A. Arguments of the parties 1. The applicants 88. The applicants complained that, after the destruction of their houses, they could no longer enjoy the use of their homes and had to live in very poor, cramped conditions, in violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. 89. The applicants claimed that State officials had been involved in the destruction of their homes, including police officers and a deputy mayor, the latter having been convicted of a criminal offence in the case. They pointed out that the State had positive obligations under Article 8, and relied in that connection on a number of cases, for instance Burton v. the United Kingdom (no. 31600/96, Commission decision of 10 September 1996), Marzari v. Italy (decision, no. 36448/97, 4 May 1999) and Fadele v. the United Kingdom (no. 13078/87, Commission decision of 12 February 1990). The applicants alleged that the State also had positive obligations under Article 3, and claimed that it was incumbent on the Romanian Government to provide sufficient compensation to restore the applicants to their previous living conditions. Moreover, local officials were responsible for the management or mismanagement of the reconstruction funds and efforts, and had made decisions not to rebuild particular homes in retaliation for perceived “behavioural problems”. The applicants also claimed that the houses rebuilt by the State had been badly constructed and were largely uninhabitable. 90. They further submitted that the Government's failure to respect their positive obligations had resulted in families with small children and elderly members being forced to live in cellars, hen-houses, stables, burned-out shells, or to move in with friends and relatives in such overcrowded conditions that illness frequently occurred. 2. The Government 91. The Government denied that the State authorities bore any responsibility for the destruction of the applicants' houses. Therefore, the State had only positive obligations under Article 8, obligations which had been fulfilled in this case by granting aid to the applicants to rebuild their homes. In any event, the Government considered that there was no obligation under the Convention to provide a home to persons who were in difficulties. They relied in this connection on the cases of Buckley v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 25 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ IV), and Chapman v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 27238/95, § 99, ECHR 2001 ‑ I). 92. The Government submitted that the State's positive obligations under Article 3 had also been fulfilled in this case by granting aid to the applicants to rebuild their homes. B. The Court's assessment 1. General principles 93. The Court has consistently held that, although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference. There may, in addition to this primary negative undertaking, be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life and the home. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for these rights even in the sphere of relations between individuals (see X and Y. v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, p. 11, § 23). 94. In addition, the acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals within its jurisdiction may engage the State's responsibility under the Convention (see Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV, § 81). A State may also be held responsible even where its agents are acting ultra vires or contrary to instructions (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 64, § 159). 95. A State's responsibility may be engaged because of acts which have sufficiently direct repercussions on the rights guaranteed by the Convention. In determining whether this responsibility is effectively engaged, regard must be had to the subsequent behaviour of that State (see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 317, 382, 384-85 and 393, ECHR 2004-...). 96. Further, the Court has not excluded the possibility that the State's positive obligation under Article 8 to safeguard the individual's physical integrity may extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of a criminal investigation (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII, p. 3164, § 128). 97. Whatever analytical approach is adopted – positive duty or interference – the applicable principles regarding justification under Article 8 § 2 are broadly similar (see Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172). In both contexts, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole. In both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention (see Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022/97, § 98, ECHR 2003-VIII; Rees v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A no. 106, p. 15, § 37, and Leander v. Sweden, judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p. 25, § 59). Furthermore, even in relation to the positive obligations flowing from Article 8 § 1, in striking the required balance, the aims mentioned in Article 8 § 2 may be of relevance (see Rees, cited above, loc. cit .; see also Lopez Ostra v. Spain, judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-C, p. 54, § 51). 98. The obligation of the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, §§ 149-50, ECHR 2004-...; A. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VI, p. 2699, § 22; Z. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, §§ 73-75, ECHR 2001-V, and E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 33218/96, 26 November 2002). 99. Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim's behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV). 100. According to the Court's case law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative. It depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, § 162). 101. The Court has considered treatment to be “inhuman” because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering. It has deemed treatment to be “degrading” because it was such as to arouse in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see, for example, Kudla v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 92, ECHR 2000-XI). In considering whether a particular form of treatment is “degrading” within the meaning of Article 3, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3 (see, for example, Raninen v. Finland, judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports 1997-VIII, pp. 2821-22, § 55). However, the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see, for example, Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95, § 74, ECHR 2001-III). 2. Application of the above principles 102. The Court notes that the actual destruction of the applicants' houses and belongings, as well as their forceful expulsion from the village, took place in September 1993, before the ratification of the Convention by Romania in June 1994. It cannot therefore examine them (see Moldovan and Others v. Romania decision, nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01 joined, 13 March 2001). 103. It is clear from the evidence submitted by the applicants, and the civil court judgments, that police officers were involved in the organised action of burning the houses and later, also after June 1994, tried to cover up the incident (see paragraphs 39, 40, 48, 50, 52 and 53 above). Following this incident, having been hounded from their village and homes, the applicants had to live, and some of them still live, in crowded and improper conditions – cellars, hen-houses, stables, etc. - and frequently changed address, moving in with friends or family in extremely overcrowded conditions. 104. Therefore, having regard to the direct repercussions of the acts of State agents on the applicants' rights, the Court considers that the Government's responsibility is engaged as regards the applicants' subsequent living conditions. 105. In the present case, there is no doubt that the question of the applicants' living conditions falls within the scope of their right to respect for family and private life, as well as their homes. Article 8 is thus clearly applicable to these complaints. 106. The Court's task is therefore to determine whether the national authorities took adequate steps to put a stop to breaches of the applicants' rights. 107. In this context, the Court notes the following: (a) despite the involvement of State agents in the burning of the applicants' houses, the Public Prosecutors' Office failed to institute criminal proceedings against them, and thus prevented the domestic courts from establishing the responsibility of these officials and punishing them; (b) the domestic courts refused for many years to award pecuniary damages for the destruction of the applicants' belongings and furniture and justified this refusal by making allegations as to the applicants' good faith (see paragraph 71); (c) it is only in the judgment delivered on 12 May 2003, ten years after the events, by the Mureş Regional Court, that compensation was awarded for the destroyed houses, although not for the loss of belongings; (d) in the judgment in the criminal case against the accused villagers, discriminatory remarks about the applicants' Roma origin were made (see paragraph 44); (e) the applicants' requests for non-pecuniary damages were also rejected at first instance, the civil courts considering that the events - the burning of their houses and the killing of some of their family members - were not of a nature to create any moral damage (see paragraphs 72 and 76); (f) when dealing with a request from the applicant Floarea Maria Zoltan for a maintenance allowance for her minor child, whose father was burnt alive during the events, the Târgu-Mureş Regional Court awarded in its judgment of 12 May 2003, which became final on 25 February 2005, an amount equivalent to a quarter of the statutory minimum wage, and decided to halve this amount on the ground that the deceased victims had provoked the crimes; (g) three houses have not to date been rebuilt and, as can be seen from the photographs submitted by the applicants, the houses rebuilt by the authorities are uninhabitable, with large gaps between the windows and the walls and incomplete roofs; and (h) most of the applicants have not to date returned to their village, and live scattered throughout Romania and Europe. 108. In the Court's view, the above elements taken together disclose a general attitude of the authorities – prosecutors, criminal and civil courts, Government and local authorities – which perpetuated the applicants' feelings of insecurity after June 1994 and constituted in itself a hindrance of the applicants' rights to respect for their private and family life and their homes (see, mutatis mutandis, Akdivar v. Turkey, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1215, § 88). 109. The Court concludes that the above hindrance and the repeated failure of the authorities to put a stop to breaches of the applicants' rights, amount to a serious violation of Article 8 of the Convention of a continuing nature. 110. It furthermore considers that the applicants' living conditions in the last ten years, in particular the severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment and its detrimental effect on the applicants' health and well-being, combined with the length of the period during which the applicants have had to live in such conditions and the general attitude of the authorities, must have caused them considerable mental suffering, thus diminishing their human dignity and arousing in them such feelings as to cause humiliation and debasement. 111. In addition, the remarks concerning the applicants' honesty and way of life made by some authorities dealing with the applicants' grievances (see the decisions of the civil and criminal courts and remarks made by the mayor of Cheţani, paragraphs 44, 66 and 71 above) appear to be, in the absence of any substantiation on behalf of those authorities, purely discriminatory. In this connection the Court reiterates that discrimination based on race can of itself amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see East African Asians v. the United Kingdom, Commission Report, 14 December 1973, DR 78, p. 5, at p. 62). Such remarks should therefore be taken into account as an aggravating factor in the examination of the applicants' complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. 112. The Court considers that the above findings are not affected by the conclusions reached in the judgment of 24 February 2004 of the Târgu-Mureş Court of Appeal, which became final on 25 February 2005, since the Court notes that the said judgment neither acknowledged nor afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see, for example, Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports 1996-III, p. 846, § 36, and Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 44, ECHR 1999-VI). 113. In the light of the above, the Court finds that the applicants' living conditions and the racial discrimination to which they have been publicly subjected by the way in which their grievances were dealt with by the various authorities, constitute an interference with their human dignity which, in the special circumstances of this case, amounted to “degrading treatment” within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. 114. Accordingly, there has also been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION 115. The applicants complained that the failure of the authorities to carry out an adequate criminal investigation, culminating in formal charges and the conviction of all individuals responsible, had denied them access to court for a civil action in damages against the State regarding the misconduct of the police officers concerned. Several applicants also complained that, owing to the length of the criminal proceedings, the civil proceedings had not yet ended. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” A. As to the right of access to court 116. The applicants contended that, having regard to the fact that the decision not to prosecute was based on the finding that the accused had not committed the acts in question (Article 10 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure), they could not bring a civil action against the police. Such a finding precluded such proceedings, which presuppose that the purported defendant had committed the impugned act. The applicants agreed that the situation would have been different had the prosecutor based his decision not to prosecute on the police officers' lack of guilt. Moreover, under Article 1003 of the Civil Code, all civil defendants had to be sued in the same proceedings, being jointly liable. Therefore, the applicants could not have sued the police officers separately from the civilians. When filing their criminal complaint, the applicants had joined their civil claim to the criminal proceedings against all potential defendants, including the police officers. Despite suggestions in the criminal court's statements that many more than the indicted defendants were guilty, the civil court had only assessed the damage caused by the convicted defendants or their heirs. It had done so because, under Article 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the criminal court's findings as to the existence of acts, the identity of the perpetrator and their guilt was binding on the civil court. Thus, the civil court could not have contradicted the criminal court's findings as to who the guilty parties were. Finally, the applicants considered that the present situation differed from that in the case of Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria (judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII). In that case the police could have been sued in a civil court on the basis of the Law on State Responsibility for Damage, the action being exempted from the payment of court costs. Romanian law did not have provisions enabling a person to sue a police officer in a civil court for alleged ill-treatment. Even assuming that the applicants could have filed a civil action against the police officers, because of their indigence they would not have been able to pay the court costs – around 10% of the damages requested - which would have resulted in the court refusing to examine the merits of the claim. 117. The Government submitted that, despite the prosecutor's decision not to pursue the police officers allegedly involved in the riots, the applicants could have brought a civil action against the police based on Articles 999 and 1000 of the Civil Code if the police had been shown to have caused damage for which they were responsible. Moreover, Article 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not prevent the applicants from bringing such a civil action. They pointed out that the right of access to a court did not include a right to bring criminal proceedings against a third person or to see that person convicted. They relied in that respect on the aforementioned Assenov case. 118. The Court recalls that Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. The right of access to a court in civil matters constitutes one aspect of the “right to a court” embodied in Article 6 § 1 (see, amongst many authorities, Aksoy v. Turkey judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, p. 2285, § 92; Waite and Kennedy v. Germany [GC], no. 26083/94, § 50, ECHR 1999-I; Golder v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A, no. 18, p. 18, § 36.) This provision undoubtedly applies to a civil claim for compensation in cases where State agents were allegedly involved in treatment contrary to Article 3, including the destruction of homes and property. The requirement of access to court must be entrenched not only in law but also in practice, failing which the remedy lacks the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see, mutatis mutandis, Akdivar and Others, cited above, p. 1210, § 66). This is particularly true for the right of access to courts in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair hearing (see, for example, Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, pp. 12-13, § 24). Furthermore, only an institution that has full jurisdiction, including the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the challenged decision, merits the description “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see, for example, Umlauft v. Austria, judgment of 23 October 1995, Series A no. 328-B, pp. 39-40, §§ 37-39). In assessing the existence of an effective remedy in a case of destruction of houses, the Court must bear in mind the insecurity and vulnerability of the applicants' position and the fact that they must have become dependent on the authorities in respect of their basic needs after the events (see Akdivar, cited above, p. 1213, § 73). 119. The Government maintained that the applicants should have instituted proceedings against the police officers allegedly involved in the events before the civil courts, which could have made a determination on the merits of the compensation claim irrespective of the outcome of the domestic criminal investigation. That hypothesis has not however been tested, since the applicants have not at any stage pursued such a claim for compensation against the police officers. As regards the domestic case law submitted by the parties, the Court observes that in none of those cases was it held that a civil court would not be bound by the decision of the prosecuting authorities terminating a criminal investigation on the ground that the acts had not been committed by the accused. This is also true in respect of the case dating back to 1972 submitted by the Government (paragraph 83 above), in which the only issue was whether a civil court was competent to examine a civil claim despite the discontinuation of criminal proceedings. In that case, the Supreme Court did not rule on the question whether the civil court was bound by the criminal authorities' findings. 120. Consequently, the Court finds that it has not been shown that there was a possibility to institute an effective civil action for damages against the police officers in the particular circumstances of the present case. The Court is not, therefore, able to determine whether the domestic courts would have been able to adjudicate on the applicants' claims had they, for example, brought a tort action against individual members of the police. 121. However, it is to be observed that the applicants lodged a civil action against the civilians who had been found guilty by the criminal court, claiming compensation in respect of their living conditions following the destruction of their homes. This claim was successful and effective, the applicants being granted compensation (paragraph 77 above). In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicants cannot claim an additional right to a separate civil action against the police officers allegedly involved in the same incident. 122. In the light of these considerations, the Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 as regards the applicants' effective access to a tribunal. B. As to the length of the proceedings 123. The applicants claimed that, despite the numerous potential defendants and witnesses involved, the case was not very complex. The facts were relatively straightforward, the applicants having been able to provide the police with the names of many of the people involved. The case did not present any novel or complex legal issues. The Romanian authorities had delayed the arrest of the accused from September 1993 until January 1997, without providing any credible reason. The applicants refuted the Government's allegation that the delay had resulted from their non-payment of the expert's fees. They pointed out that they were impoverished, living in abysmal conditions and unable to pay for expert assistance. If their financial inability to pay such fees resulted in the loss of their right to a determination of their civil claims, that in itself would constitute a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Moreover, the civil claims involved very high stakes for the applicants –their efforts to rebuild shattered homes and lives in order to provide decent living conditions for their children and other family members. They relied on a considerable body of case law of the Court, including the cases of Torri v. Italy (judgment of 1 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ IV), Corigliano v. Italy (judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 57), Bunkate v. the Netherlands (judgment of 26 May 1993, Series A no. 248 ‑ B), and De Micheli v. Italy (judgment of 26 February 1993, Series A no. 257-D). 124. The Government considered that the case was complex, given that it concerned crimes committed by many villagers during a whole night, and that an expert assessment of the value of the damaged property was needed. They alleged that the applicants were partly responsible for the length of the civil proceedings, as for many weeks they had refused to pay the expert appointed by the court. 125. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). 126. Criminal proceedings are to be taken into account in calculating the relevant period where the result of such proceedings is capable of affecting the outcome of the civil dispute before the ordinary courts (see Rezette v. Luxembourg, no. 73983/01, § 32, 13 July 2004). 127. While the Court's jurisdiction ratione temporis covers only the period after the entry into force of the Convention with respect to Romania on 20 June 1994, it will take into account the state of proceedings existing on the material date (see, among other authorities, mutatis mutandis, Yağci and Sargin v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A no. 319-A, p. 16, § 40). 128. The period under consideration began in September 1993, when the applicants lodged their complaints and an application to join the proceedings as a civil party, and ended on 25 February 2005. They lasted more than eleven years, of which some nine months were prior to the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Romania. Three judicial instances have dealt with this aspect of the case. 129. The Court notes that five years elapsed before the civil case was severed from the criminal complaints on 23 June 1998 (see paragraph 43) in order to accelerate the procedure. However, it was only on 12 January 2001 that a first judgment was delivered, that is, more than seven years after the civil claim was lodged. That judgment was quashed on 17 October 2001 because of a substantial number of procedural errors (see paragraph 75 above). It was not until two years later, in May 2003, that the Regional Court was able to deliver another judgment on the merits. On 24 February 2004 the Court of Appeal amended the lower court's ruling in part. The Supreme Court upheld, in its final judgment of 25 February 2005, the judgment of the Court of Appeal. While the Court is aware of the difficulty of organising proceedings with more than thirty defendants and civil parties, and which required experts to assess the losses incurred by the victims, it notes that the delays were not due to the time taken to obtain expert reports, since the main report had been ready in 1999. The delays were rather due to the various errors committed by the domestic courts. 130. Having regard to the criteria established in its case law for the assessment of the reasonableness of the length of proceedings and the particular circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the length of the civil proceedings instituted by the applicants failed to satisfy the reasonable-time requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 131. Consequently, there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 in this respect also. V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 6 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION 132. The applicants submitted that, on account of their ethnicity, they were victims of discrimination by judicial bodies and officials, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention, which provides as follows: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” 133. They submitted that the remarks made by the Târgu-Mureş County Court in its judgment of 17 July 1998 contained clear anti-Roma sentiment, and that the refusal of the authorities to improve their living conditions after the events of September 1993 was an expression of the hostility against the Roma population. They contended that local officials, in particular the mayor of Hădăreni in his information note concerning the situation of the Gypsy houses to be rebuilt, had demonstrated an obvious bias against the Roma families, in violation of Article 8 combined with Article 14. Moreover, the remarks made by the Târgu-Mureş County Court in its judgment of 17 July 1998, although made in the course of the criminal proceedings after the severance of the civil and criminal cases, could have had consequences for the outcome of the civil case, having regard to the close relation in Romanian law between the criminal proceedings and the civil claims. 134. Furthermore, the civil court's abrupt dismissal, in the judgment of 12 January 2001, of any claims relating to goods or furnishings, its comments characterising the applicants as liars and tax evaders, its refusal to award non-pecuniary damages for the destruction of homes, and the very low, inappropriate award of damages, constituted discrimination in the enjoyment of the applicants' right to a fair hearing of their civil claims, in violation of Article 6 combined with Article 14. 135. The Government submitted that, in the absence of a violation of Article 8, the applicants could not allege a violation of Article 14. In any event, the State authorities had provided help to the Roma community in Hădăreni on the same terms as that provided to other categories of the population, for instance those affected by natural disasters. No discrimination had therefore been established. Insofar as the applicants relied on Article 6 combined with Article 14, the Government admitted that the impugned terms had been used, but contended that this had happened during criminal proceedings in which the applicants had not been the accused, but civil parties. Article 6 did not therefore apply to those proceedings and Article 14 could not be relied on. 136. The Court reiterates that Article 14 only complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions – and to that extent it is autonomous – there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see, among many other authorities, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, p. 35, § 71, and Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, judgment of 18 July 1994, Series A no. 291-B, p. 32, § 22). 137. As to the scope of the guarantee provided under Article 14, according to established case law, a difference in treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification, i.e. if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. Moreover, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment (see, for example, the Gaygusuz v. Austria judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1142, § 42, and Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, § 34, ECHR 2002-I). 138. The Court finds that the facts of the instant case fall within the scope of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention (see paragraphs 105, 109, 126 and 131 above) and that, accordingly, Article 14 is applicable. 139. It notes first that the attacks were directed against the applicants because of their Roma origin. The Court is not competent ratione temporis to examine under the Convention the actual burning of the applicants' houses and the killing of some of their relatives. It observes, however, that the applicants' Roma ethnicity appears to have been decisive for the length and the result of the domestic proceedings, after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Romania. It further notes the repeated discriminatory remarks made by the authorities throughout the whole case determining the applicants' rights under Article 8, when rejecting claims for goods or furnishings, and their blank refusal until 2004 to award non-pecuniary damages for the destruction of the family homes. As to the judgment of 24 February 2004, confirmed by the Court of Cassation on 25 February 2005, the decision to reduce the non-pecuniary damages granted was motivated by remarks related directly to the applicants' ethnic specificity. 140. The Court observes that the Government advanced no justification for this difference in treatment of the applicants. It concludes accordingly that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 6 and 8. VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION A. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage 141. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 142. The applicants claimed pecuniary damages in respect of the loss of their houses and household property. They conceded that some of the houses had been rebuilt by the Government, but the constructions were defective and most of them had in any event only been partially rebuilt. Their claims in respect of the loss of the houses were based on the findings of an expert appointed by the Târgu-Mureş Regional Court. They stressed that in most cases they had no independent proof as to the value of their household goods, as any written proof would have been destroyed in the fire. They insisted that, despite their level of poverty, none of the houses had been empty, and submitted, relying on the aforementioned Akdivar judgment, that if their declaration of goods and proposed valuations were not accepted, the Court could assess the value of simple furnishings and other household goods on an equitable basis. Some of the applicants claimed the costs of alternative accommodation following their relocation after the destruction of their houses. 143. In particular, the applicants claimed the following sums: Iulius Moldovan claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) for the destruction of his house and EUR 55,000 for the destruction of his household goods and other assets, including the proceeds from the sale of 400 sheep which had burnt during the fire; Melenuţa Moldovan EUR 2,133 for the destruction of her household goods; Maria Moldovan EUR 947 for the destruction of her house and belongings; Otilia Rostaş EUR 2,573 for the destruction of her belongings; Petru (Gruia) Lăcătuş EUR 10,738 for the destruction of his house and belongings; Maria Floarea Zoltan EUR 2,240 for the destruction of her belongings, and Petru (Dîgăla) Lăcătuş EUR 5,530 for the destruction of his house and household goods. 144. The applicants further contended that the frustration and helplessness suffered by them with respect to the non-indictment of the police, the lengthy delays in the trial of their civil claims, the racist attitudes of the judges, the insecurity of their housing situation, and the conditions under which they were living – and still lived in some cases – required an award of non-pecuniary damages in order to achieve just satisfaction. In their representative's letter of 29 August 2003, they claimed under this head amounts ranging between EUR 30,000 and EUR 50,000 per applicant, depending on their individual situations: the applicants whose homes had been rebuilt requested EUR 30,000 each, whereas the applicants whose homes had not been rebuilt, that is, Petru (Dîgăla) Lăcătuş and Maria Floarea Zoltan, requested EUR 50,000 each. 145. On 29 January 2003 Mrs Maria Floarea Zoltan requested EUR 1,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage. She pointed out that, after the events in September 2003, she and her son were chased away from Hădăreni and all attempts to return there had failed. Moreover, she had suffered humiliation and harassment by the secret police, who had been observing her, and as a result of a massive media campaign in Romania describing the Roma population as criminals. Consequently, she and her son had gone to the United Kingdom in 2001, where they had obtained political asylum. She and her son were currently undergoing treatment at the Medical Foundation for the Victims of Torture, among other institutions, for the psychological disturbance they had suffered following these events. In a letter sent to the Court on 19 July 2004, Mrs Otilia Rostaş claimed EUR 120,000 in damages and Mrs Melenuţa Moldovan claimed EUR 100,000. Mr Iulius Moldovan requested, in a letter dated 6 July 2004, EUR 196,875 for the destruction of his house and household goods, having regard to the devaluation of the Romanian national currency in the last ten years. He also requested EUR 300,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 146. In short, taking all the heads of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage together, the applicants claimed the following sums: Iulius Moldovan EUR 496,875; Melenuţa Moldovan, EUR 100,000; Maria Moldovan EUR 30,947; Otilia Rostaş, EUR 120,000; Petru (Gruia) Lăcătuş, EUR 40,738; Maria Floarea Zoltan, EUR 1,002,240 and Petru (Dîgăla) Lăcătuş EUR 55,530. 147. The applicants made no claims for costs and expenses. 148. The Government submitted that they could not be held responsible for the alleged violations and that, in any event, they had granted money for the reconstruction of the applicants' homes. In October 2003 they had submitted a report prepared at their request by a local expert. According to the report, the applicants' living conditions after the reconstruction of some of the houses were either “good” or “satisfactory”. It was considered, however, that further works were needed in order to ensure that these buildings were habitable: masonry and work on the electricity, ceiling and drainpipes, the value of which was estimated at EUR 1,000. In any event, they considered the sums claimed to be excessive and unsubstantiated. 149. The Court reiterates its findings that: - the applicants were subject to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention; - there was an interference with their right to respect for their private and family lives and their homes in violation of Article 8; - the length of the civil proceedings failed to satisfy the reasonable-time requirement of Article 6 § 1; and - the applicants were discriminated against within the meaning of Article 14 on the ground of their ethnic origin in the exercise of their rights under Article 8. All these breaches of the Convention had occurred because of the applicants' living conditions following the interference by the authorities after June 1994 with the applicants' rights and their repeated failure to put a stop to the breaches. 150. The Court considers that there is a causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage claimed, since the Government were found to be responsible for the failure to put an end to the breaches of the applicants' rights that generated the unacceptable living conditions. It notes that the expert reports submitted by the parties are inaccurate and inconsistent. It also takes the view that, as a result of the violations found, the applicants undeniably suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be made good merely by the finding of a violation. 151. Consequently, regard being had to the seriousness of the violations of the Convention of which the applicants were victims, to the amounts already granted at the domestic level by the final judgment of 25 February 2005, and ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards them the following sums, plus any amount that may be chargeable in tax: (a) EUR 60,000 to Iulius Moldovan for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage; (b) EUR 13,000 to Melenuţa Moldovan for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage; (c) EUR 11,000 to Maria Moldovan for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage; (d) EUR 15,000 to Otilia Rostaş for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage; (e) EUR 17,000 to Petru (Gruia) Lăcătuş for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage; (f) EUR 95,000 to Maria Floarea Zoltan for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage; and (g) EUR 27,000 to Petru (Dîgăla) Lăcătuş for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 152. The Court considers that these sums should constitute full and final settlement of the case, including that awarded at the domestic level. B. Default interest 153. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court could not examine the applicants’ complaints about the destruction of their houses and possessions or their expulsion from the village, because those events took place in September 1993, before the ratification of the Convention by Romania in June 1994. However, it found violations concerning the complaints about the applicants’ subsequent living conditions and noted that the applicants’ ethnicity had been decisive in the excessive length and result of the domestic proceedings. In particular, the Court held that: - there had been a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention; - there had been and was a continuing violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life and home) of the Convention; - there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 (access to court) of the Convention; - there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention on account of the length of the proceedings; - there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 6 § 1 and 8.