Affiliation- and inheritance-related rights
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. Inter vivos division of property and action for abatement 24. Under French law, estate-owners can divide their estate themselves between their heirs. An inter vivos division ( donation-partage ) is a deed by which the donor divides his or her property immediately among his or her heirs ( inter vivos transfer). It is an anticipated, definitive and negotiated division. Title to the property is transferred at the time of the donation, which is also the first (anticipated) step in a succession that will be opened later. According to the case-law of the Court of Cassation, an inter vivos division becomes a division for the purposes of inheritance on the donor’s death. The succession is both opened and definitively liquidated or divided on the date of the ascendant’s death (Court of Cassation, 7 March 1876; First Civil Division, 5 October 1994, Bull. 1994, I, no. 27). 25. A descendant who has not received a share of the estate may claim his or her reserved portion from the assets existing when the succession is opened. If there are insufficient assets in the estate, he can bring an action for abatement within five years of the donor’s death. This was the remedy used by the applicant in accordance with Articles 1077-1 and 1077-2 of the Civil Code, which read as follows at the material time:- Article 1077-1 “A descendant who has not participated in the inter vivos division of the estate, or has received a lower share than his or her reserved portion, may bring an action for abatement if, when the succession is opened, there are insufficient assets not included in the division of the estate to constitute or complete his or her reserved portion, regard being had to any voluntary dispositions from which he may have benefited.” Article 1077-2 “ Inter vivos divisions are subject to the rules governing inter vivos gifts as regards determination of the amount, calculation of the reserved portion and reductions. An action for abatement cannot be brought until after the death of the ascendant who has made the division or the surviving ascendant in the event of a division by the mother and father of their estate among all their issue. Such an action shall become time-barred five years after the death. A child not yet conceived at the time of the inter vivos division may bring a similar action for the purpose of constituting or supplementing his or her reserved portion.” 26. Articles 913 and 915 of the Civil Code on “the disposable portion of assets” in inter vivos gifts and wills, which have since been repealed, provided as follows: Article 913 “Voluntary dispositions, whether granted inter vivos or by will, shall not exceed half of the donor’s assets where he leaves only one child on his death; one third where he leaves two children; and one quarter where he leaves three or more children; no distinction shall be made between legitimate children and children born outside marriage, save in the case provided for in Article 915.” Article 915 “A child born outside marriage whose father or mother was, at the time of his conception, bound by marriage to another person is entitled to inherit under his parent’s estate in competition with the legitimate children born of the marriage; account shall be taken of his presence when calculating the disposable portion; however, he shall receive only half the share to which he would have been entitled if all the children, including himself, had been legitimate. The children born of the marriage injured by the adultery shall inherit in equal shares the portion by which the adulterine child’s share of the estate is thus reduced.” B. Development of the law relating to children “born of adultery” 27. The inheritance laws relating to children born outside marriage were amended by the Filiation Law of 1972, which conferred equal status on them for inheritance purposes save for the case of children “born of adultery” (see Mazurek, cited above, § 17), whose rights were limited to “half the share to which they would have been entitled if all the children of the deceased, including themselves, had been legitimate” (see former Articles 757 and 760 of the Civil Code, ibid; see also, regarding gifts, paragraph 26 above ). 28. The 2001 Law, which was enacted following the Court’s judgment in the case of Mazurek, eliminated the restrictions on inheritance rights of children “born of adultery” and conferred equal status for inheritance purposes on all children, be they legitimate, born to unmarried parents or “born of adultery”. Section 1 provides that “no distinction shall be made between birth within or birth outside marriage when determining which relatives are entitled to inherit” (Article 733 of the Civil Code) and that “children or their issue shall inherit from their father and mother or other ascendants, irrespective of sex or primogeniture, and even if they are born of different unions” (Article 735 of the Civil Code). The provisions governing the restriction on the reserved portion of children “born of adultery” and their ability to receive gifts have been repealed. Lastly, order no. 2005-759 of 4 July 2005 reforming the filiation rules establishes the principle of equal status regardless of birth, thus eliminating the very concepts of legitimate children and children born outside marriage. C. Transitional provisions 1. Transitional provisions of the 1972 Law 29. These provisions limited the scope of the reform introduced by the 1972 Law. Section 14 had excluded any immediate application of the new inheritance rights of children born to unmarried parents or “of adultery”, in successions opened before it came into force, and had precluded such children from challenging inter vivos gifts granted before the Law came into force on 1 August 1972. It was on the basis of that provision that the Montpellier Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s action (see paragraph 20 above). 2. Section 25 of the 2001 Law 30. Under section 25(1) of the 2001 Law, entry into force of that Law was in principle deferred until 1 July 2002. However, regarding the repeal of the provisions of the Civil Code concerning the rights of children “born of adultery”, the legislature decided, exceptionally, that the Law would come into force immediately on the date of publication of the Law in the Official Gazette, that is, on 4 December 2001. Accordingly, section 25(2) provides: “The present Law shall apply to successions that are already open from [1 July 2002], subject to the following exceptions: ... (2) Subject to any prior agreement between the parties or final court decision, the following shall apply to successions already open on the date of publication of the present Law in the Official Gazette of the French Republic and not having given rise to division prior to that date: (a) the provisions relating to the new inheritance rights of children born outside marriage whose father or mother was, at the time of conception, bound by marriage to another person; ...” 31. In so far as it concerns the rights of children “born of adultery”, the 2001 Law is therefore applicable to all successions open on 4 December 2001, on condition that there has been no division prior to that date. 3. Law of 23 June 2006 reforming successions and voluntary dispositions 32. This Law amended section 25(2) of the 2001 Law by repealing the terms “whose father or mother was, at the time of their conception, bound by marriage to another person”. Section 25(2)(2) no longer mentions whether a child was born of adultery or not. 4. Relevant case-law of the Court of Cassation 33. In a judgment of 6 January 2004 (Court of Cassation, First Civil Division, Bull. 2004, I, no. 10) the Court of Cassation applied the transitional provisions of the 2001 Law, without referring to the provisions of the Convention, in quashing an appeal judgment of 2002 which had set aside gifts granted to a child “born of adultery” under the old provisions whereas there had not yet been division of the estate. In a judgment of 7 June 2006 ( Court of Cassation, First Civil Division, Bull. 2006, I, no. 297), also applying the transitional provisions, the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal by a child “born of adultery” who had received half the share that he would have received if he had been a legitimate child as division had been made before 4 December 2001 (on 13 March 1996 in that case). In a judgment of 15 May 2008, the Court of Cassation held that the provisions of the 2001 Law relating to the new rights of children “born of adultery” were applicable to a succession opened before 1 August 1972 (in 1962 in that case) where this had not given rise to a division prior to 4 December 2001 (Court of Cassation, First Civil Division, Bull. 2008, I, no. 139). III. ELEMENTS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 34. In the great majority of the countries studied (forty States out of forty-two) a child’s status for inheritance purposes is independent of the marital status of their parents. Twenty-one countries confer equal status on all children, while nineteen others (Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Ukraine) make a distinction between legitimate children and children born to unmarried parents/of adultery, but expressly grant them equal status for inheritance purposes. The concept of a child “born of adultery” is not at all common, such children generally being put in the same category as children born outside marriage. Some differences between legitimate children and children born outside marriage/ “of adultery” still exist, for inheritance purposes, in Malta. The only State Party that still makes a clear distinction, for inheritance purposes, regarding children born outside marriage is Andorra, where the latter are treated less favourably than legitimate children. IV. RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AND EUROPEAN CASE-LAW 35. The Committee of Ministers Rapporteur Group (GR-J) is still examining the draft recommendation [CM/Rec (2012)] to member states on the rights and legal status of children and parental responsibilities (with the explanatory memorandum) which has been presented to the Committee of Ministers. The draft recommendation seeks to replace the obsolete standards of the European Convention of 1975 on the Legal Status of Children Born out of Wedlock (Convention which France has not ratified), which are no longer in conformity with the Court’s case-law. The text, as currently drafted, contains a central element which is the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Principle 1, which provides: “Children should not be discriminated against on grounds such as ... birth ... In particular, children should not be discriminated against on the basis of the civil status of their parents.” Principle 5 – “Rights of succession” – provides that subject to the definition of parents given in Principle 2 and Principle 17(2) (posthumous conception), “children should regardless of the circumstances of their birth have equal rights of succession to the estate of each of their parents and of those parents’ family.” The relevant paragraph of the explanatory memorandum is worded as follows: “22. Having regard to the general principle of non-discrimination as set out in Principle 1 and to the Court’s rulings in Mazurek v. France, Camp and Bourimi v. the Netherlands and Marckx v. Belgium, that ruled respectively that discrimination against children of adulterous relationships and children born out of wedlock with regard to inheritance rights violated Article 14 of the ECHR, taken in conjunction with Article 1 of the first Protocol in the former case, and Article 8 in the latter case, Principle 5 states in broad terms that children should have equal rights of succession regardless of the circumstances of their birth. In this respect, it has a wider application than Article 9 of the 1975 European Convention on the Legal Status of Children born out of Wedlock which gives such children the same rights of succession as children born in wedlock. Principle 5 is subject to the definition of parents given in Principle 2.” THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 36. The applicant complained that, as a child “born of adultery”, he was unable to assert his inheritance rights and that such unjustified discrimination persisted after the Court’s judgment in Mazurek and despite the enactment of the 2001 Law. He alleged that there had been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which read respectively as follows: Article 14 “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as ... birth ...” Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” A. The Chamber judgment 37. In its judgment of 21 July 2011 the Chamber held that the applicant’s complaint fell within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which sufficed to render Article 14 of the Convention applicable. As his maternal filiation had been recognised in 1983, the applicant had an interest, enforceable in the domestic courts, in asserting his right to receive a share of his mother’s estate in a manner compatible with Article 14 of the Convention (see paragraphs 38-42 of the Chamber judgment). 38. The Chamber observed, on the merits, that the 1972 and 2001 Laws had put in place specific transitional provisions in respect of the new inheritance rights enshrined in those Laws. It noted that the domestic courts had considered that the applicant could not benefit from those provisions at the time of lodging his action for abatement of the inter vivos gift of 1970. According to the Court of Appeal, the transitional provision of the 1972 Law precluded any challenge to inter vivos gifts granted before the Law came into force. The Court of Cassation had held that as division of the estate had taken place on the mother’s death in 1994, this precluded – under section 25(2) of the 2001 Law – application of the new provisions providing for equal inheritance rights. Those interpretations of domestic law pursued the legitimate aim of safeguarding the principle of legal certainty and the long-standing rights of the legitimate children. Moreover, they did not appear unreasonable, arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with the prohibition of discrimination. The Chamber distinguished the specific situation in the present case from the cases in which there had not yet been division of the estate ( Mazurek, cited above, and Merger and Cros v. France, no. 68864/01, 22 December 2004) in concluding that the difference in treatment in question was proportionate to the aim pursued and that there had been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraphs 50-59 of the Chamber judgment). B. The parties’ submissions 1. The Government (a) Applicability of Article 14 of the Convention 39. The Government submitted that the facts complained of by the applicant did not fall within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which rendered Article 14 of the Convention inapplicable. They observed in that connection that the inter vivos division of 1970 had vested title to the property in the two legitimate children and established an acquired legal situation which precluded the applicant from obtaining a share in his mother’s estate. Neither the 1972 Law nor the 2001 Law had had the effect of enabling him to acquire the share in the estate to which he would have been entitled if the deed of 1970 had not existed. Unlike the cases of Mazurek and Merger and Cros, in which the applicants had automatically acquired inheritance rights following the death of their parent, the succession in the present case had been settled in 1970 before the death of the applicant’s mother. Moreover, division of the property had taken effect several years before the applicant’s filiation had been established in 1983. Consequently, according to the Government, the applicant had no inheritance rights in respect of the estate (they referred, mutatis mutandis, to Alboize-Barthes and Alboize-Montezume v. France (dec.), no. 44421/04, 21 October 2008). (b) Merits 40. As they had previously submitted before the Chamber, the Government maintained that the applicant had not been “excluded” from his mother’s succession but, in so far as the assets had already been disposed of under the terms of the deed of inter vivos division of 1970, he could not acquire the share to which he would have been entitled under the 1972 and 2001 Laws if that deed had not existed. Accordingly, it was not the judicial decisions in question which had prevented the applicant from inheriting under his mother’s estate, but a prior deed of transfer of property which had established an acquired legal situation. 41. It was to those rights acquired by the other heirs that the legislature in 2001 – having, moreover, fully satisfied the general obligations incumbent on it to execute the Mazurek judgment – had had to have regard when bringing the Law into force. Application of the new Law to pre-existing situations necessarily had to abide by the principles of legal certainty and foreseeability of the law established by the case-law of the Court. Section 25 of the 2001 Law thus excluded application of the new rights to successions already open on the date of its publication that had given rise to division before that date. In the Government’s view, the Court of Cassation’s interpretation did not therefore conflict with the Mazurek judgment. Unlike that judgment and the case of Merger and Cros, in which the applicants had challenged situations that were not yet established when they lodged their action in the domestic courts, the action for abatement brought by the applicant in 1998 had sought to challenge a situation in which there had already been division of the estate. 42. The Government acknowledged that a judgment finding a violation of the Convention could give rise to general measures in the respondent State and have an impact going beyond the dispute concerning the parties before the Court. Nevertheless, they stated that the Court had never recognised a retroactive effect of its judgments. To claim that the Mazurek judgment should apply to the present case, that is, to a legal situation that had been definitively established before it was delivered, and that it should have retroactive effect, would render Article 46 of the Convention nugatory. 2. The applicant (a) Applicability of Article 14 of the Convention 43. The applicant did not file additional observations with the Grand Chamber to those produced before the Chamber in which he had expressed his disagreement with the Government on this point (paragraph 37 of the Chamber judgment). He submitted that the establishment of his maternal filiation in 1983 had vested inheritance rights in him at the opening of his mother’s succession – pending on the day he lodged his application – which fell within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. (b) Merits 44. According to the applicant, the effectiveness of Article 14 of the Convention had to be guaranteed and only “very weighty” reasons could lead to a difference in treatment on the ground of birth being regarded as compatible with the Convention. Legal certainty was neither a right guaranteed by the Convention nor a public-interest ground capable of justifying an infringement of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 45. What might have been tolerable in 1972, on grounds of the concept of legal certainty, in frustrating the principle of non-discrimination guaranteed by Article 14 could no longer be so after Mazurek. However, the applicant stressed that rights unfairly acquired should not be made secure by the transitional provisions of the 2001 Law, which was meant to put an end to violations of the type found in that judgment. In his submission, in redressing the damage caused to Mr Mazurek the Court had refused to secure pre-existing legal situations obtaining prior to its judgment. The applicant considered that the Court should take note here of the failure to observe the binding force of Mazurek and find against France accordingly. To conclude otherwise would be tantamount to accepting that a State enacting legislation designed to draw the consequences of the Court’s case ‑ law had an indefinite period of time in which to transpose its decisions, and could be concerned, in the particular circumstance, only with future successions, and thus validate ex post facto recognised violations of the Convention. The applicant complained of continuing discrimination which perpetuated the effects of the 1972 Law that had been the subject of a finding against France by the Court and disavowed by the legislature in 2001. 46. He further submitted that the action for abatement that he had brought in 1998 had been pending when the 2001 Law was published, which should have resulted in his benefiting from the new rights granted to children “born of adultery”. Consequently, as his action had been pending, his mother’s estate could not have been definitively divided; to conclude otherwise would amount to making actions for abatement of inter vivos divisions an ineffective remedy. C. The Court’s assessment 1. Applicability of Article 14 of the Convention (a) General principles 47. According to the established case-law of the Court, Article 14 of the Convention complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions – and to this extent it is autonomous – there can be no room for its application unless the facts in issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see, among many other authorities, Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1997, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ I; Petrovic v. Austria, 27 March 1998, § 22, Reports 1998 ‑ II; Zarb Adami v. Malta, no. 17209/02, § 42, ECHR 2006 ‑ VIII; and Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], no. 30078/06, § 124, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). (b) Whether the facts of the case fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 48. In the present case it therefore needs to be determined whether the applicant’s complaint, regarding his inability to assert his inheritance rights by means of an action for abatement of the inter vivos division signed by his mother without regard for his reserved portion, falls within the ambit, that is, the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 49. The Court reiterates that the concept of “possessions” referred to in the first part of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to ownership of physical goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as “property rights”, and thus as “possessions” for the purposes of this provision (see Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 100, ECHR 2000 ‑ I). 50. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee the right to acquire possessions (see Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], no. 48321/99, § 121, ECHR 2002 ‑ II (extracts), and Ališić and Others v. Bosnia ‑ Herzegovina Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 60642/08, § 52, 17 October 2011), in particular on intestacy or through voluntary dispositions (see, mutatis mutandis, Marckx, cited above, § 50, and Merger and Cros, cited above, § 37). However, “possessions” can be either “existing possessions” or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right (see, among other authorities, Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, 20 November 1995, § 31, Series A no. 332; Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004 ‑ IX; and Association nationale des pupilles de la Nation v. France (dec.), no. 22718/08, 6 October 2009). A legitimate expectation must have a “sufficient basis in national law” (see Kopecký, cited above, § 52; Depalle v. France [GC], no. 34044/02, § 63, ECHR 2010; and Saghinadze and Others v. Georgia, no. 18768/05, § 103, 27 May 2010). Likewise, the concept of “possessions” may extend to a particular benefit of which the persons concerned have been deprived on the basis of a discriminatory condition of entitlement (see Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], no. 55707/00, § 79, ECHR 2009). However, the hope of recognition of the survival of an old property right which it has long been impossible to exercise effectively cannot be considered as a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition (see the recapitulation of the relevant principles in Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000 ‑ XII, with further references to the Commission’s case-law; see also Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], no. 42527/98, § 85, ECHR 2001 ‑ VIII; Nerva and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 42295/98, § 43, ECHR 2002 ‑ VIII; and Stretch v. the United Kingdom, no. 44277/98, § 32, 24 June 2003). 51. The issue that needs to be examined in each case is whether the circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Bozcaada Kimisis Teodoku Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi Vakfı v. Turkey, nos. 37639/03, 37655/03, 26736/04 and 42670/04, § 41, 3 March 2009; Depalle, cited above, § 62; Plalam S.P.A. v. Italy (merits), no. 16021/02, § 37, 18 May 2010; and Di Marco v. Italy (merits), no. 32521/05, § 50, 26 April 2011). The Court considers that that approach requires it to take account of the following points of law and of fact. 52. In the present case the Court observes that it is purely on account of his status as a child “born of adultery” that the applicant was refused the right to request an abatement of the inter vivos division signed by his mother, that status being the basis of the Court of Cassation’s decision – interpreting the transitional provisions of the 2001 Law – to exclude application in his case of the provisions relating to the new inheritance rights recognised by that Law. In cases, such as the present, concerning a complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the applicant has been denied all or part of a particular asset on a discriminatory ground covered by Article 14, the relevant test is whether, but for the discriminatory ground about which the applicant complains, he or she would have had a right, enforceable under domestic law, in respect of the asset in question (see, mutatis mutandis, Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 55, ECHR 2005 ‑ X, and Andrejeva, cited above, § 79). That test is satisfied in the present case. 53. The Government argued that the applicant could not claim any inheritance rights in respect of the inter vivos gift of 1970 because this had had the effect of immediately and irrevocably distributing his mother’s assets, and had done so before his maternal filiation had been judicially established (see paragraph 39 above). The Court cannot accept that argument, however. It notes that whilst inter vivos gifts have the immediate effect of transferring ownership, according to the case-law of the Court of Cassation this does not become a division for inheritance purposes until the death of the donor. The succession is both opened and definitively liquidated or divided on the date of the ascendant’s death (see paragraph 24 above), which in this case was not until 1994. By that date the applicant’s filiation had been established. It was thus indeed on grounds of his status as a child “born of adultery” that the applicant was excluded from his mother’s estate. 54. In that connection the present case resembles those of Mazurek and Merger and Cros, cited above, and can be distinguished from the case of Alboize-Barthes and Alboize-Montezume v. France (dec.), cited above, in which it was decided that the liquidation of the applicants’ father’s estate – in 1955, and thus well before their filiation had been established – precluded them from asserting inheritance rights to their late father’s estate and claiming title to a “possession”. 55. It follows that the applicant’s pecuniary interests fall within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions which it safeguards. This is sufficient to render Article 14 of the Convention applicable. 2. The merits (a) General principles 56. The Court reiterates that in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, Article 14 affords protection against different treatment, without an objective and reasonable justification, of persons in similar situations. For the purposes of Article 14, a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it “has no objective and reasonable justification”, that is, if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised” (see Mazurek, cited above, §§ 46 and 48). Moreover, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment (see Stec and Others, cited above, §§ 51 and 52, ECHR 2006 ‑ VI). The scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and the background, but the Court must determine in the last resort whether the Convention requirements have been complied with. Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must however have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved (see Konstantin Markin, cited above, § 126). 57. According to the Court’s established case-law since Marckx, cited above, the distinction established for inheritance purposes between children “born outside marriage” and “legitimate” children has raised an issue under Article 8 of the Convention taken alone (see Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112) and under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 (see Vermeire v. Belgium, 29 November 1991, Series A no. 214 ‑ C, and Brauer v. Germany, no. 3545/04, 28 May 2009) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Inze v. Austria, 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126; Mazurek, cited above; and Merger and Cros, cited above). The Court has extended this case-law to voluntary dispositions by confirming the prohibition on discrimination where testamentary dispositions are concerned (see Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, no. 69498/01, ECHR 2004 ‑ VIII). Accordingly, as early as 1979, in Marckx, the Court held that restrictions on children’s inheritance rights on grounds of birth were incompatible with the Convention. It has constantly reiterated this fundamental principle, establishing the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of a child’s birth “outside marriage” as a standard of protection of European public order. 58. The Court also observes that common ground between the member States of the Council of Europe regarding the importance of equal treatment of children born within and children born outside marriage has been established for a long time, which has, moreover, led to a uniform approach today by the national legislatures on the subject – the principle of equality eliminating the very concepts of legitimate children and children born outside marriage – and to social and legal developments definitively endorsing the objective of achieving equality between children (see paragraphs 28, 34 and 35 above). 59. Accordingly, very weighty reasons have to be advanced before a distinction on grounds of birth outside marriage can be regarded as compatible with the Convention (see Inze, cited above, § 41; Camp and Bourimi v. the Netherlands, no. 28369/95, § 38, ECHR 2000 ‑ X; and Brauer, cited above, § 40). 60. The Court is not in principle required to settle disputes of a purely private nature. That being said, in exercising the European supervision incumbent on it, it cannot remain passive where a national court’s interpretation of a legal act, be it a testamentary disposition, a private contract, a public document, a statutory provision or an administrative practice appears unreasonable, arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with the prohibition of discrimination established by Article 14 and more broadly with the principles underlying the Convention (see Larkos v. Cyprus [GC], no. 29515/95, §§ 30-31, ECHR 1999 ‑ I; Pla and Puncernau, cited above, § 59; and Karaman v. Turkey, no. 6489/03, § 30, 15 January 2008). (b) Application in the present case (i) Whether there was a difference in treatment on grounds of birth outside marriage 61. It is not in dispute in the present case that the applicant was deprived of a reserved portion and definitively placed in a different situation from that of the legitimate children regarding inheritance of their mother’s estate. He was precluded from obtaining an abatement of the inter vivos division from which he had been excluded and a reserved portion on grounds of his status as a child “born of adultery”. 62. That difference in treatment between the applicant and his half-brother and half-sister derives from section 25(2) of the 2001 Law, which restricts application of the new inheritance rights of children “born of adultery” to successions opened prior to 4 December 2001 that have not given rise to division before that date (see paragraph 30 above). In interpreting the transitional provision concerned, the Court of Cassation considered that division for inheritance purposes had taken place in 1994, at the time of the applicant’s mother’s death (see paragraph 23 above), in line with long-standing case-law authority to the effect that in respect of inter vivos divisions the death of the donor triggers both the opening of the succession and the division (see paragraph 24 above). A legitimate child who had been omitted from the inter vivos division or not yet conceived when the deed was signed would not have been precluded from obtaining his or her reserved portion or share of the estate in accordance with Articles 1077-1 and 1077-2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 25 above). It is therefore not disputed that the only reason for the difference in treatment suffered by the applicant was the fact that he had been born outside marriage. 63. The Court reiterates that its role is not to rule on which interpretation of the domestic legislation is the most correct, but to determine whether the manner in which that legislation has been applied has infringed the rights secured to the applicant under Article 14 of the Convention (see, among many other authorities and mutatis mutandis, Padovani v. Italy, 26 February 1993, § 24, Series A no. 257 ‑ B, and Pla and Puncernau, cited above, § 46). In the instant case its task is thus to establish whether there was objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment in question, which had its basis in a provision of domestic law. (ii) Justification for the difference in treatment (α) Pursuit of a legitimate aim 64. The Government did not advance any further justification for discriminating between legitimate children and children “born of adultery”. The Court notes that the French State agreed to amend its legislation following the Court’s judgment in the case of Mazurek, cited above, and reformed the rules of inheritance law by repealing all the discriminatory provisions relating to children “born of adultery” less than two years after the judgment had been delivered. Moreover, it welcomes this measure bringing French law into line with the Convention principle of non-discrimination. 65. However, according to the Government, it was not possible to undermine rights acquired by third parties – in the instant case by the other heirs – and that justified restricting the retroactive effect of the 2001 Law to those successions that were already open on the date of its publication and had not given rise to division by that date. The transitional provisions had accordingly been enacted in order to safeguard peaceful family relations by securing the rights acquired by beneficiaries where the estate had already been divided. 66. The Court is not convinced that denying the inheritance rights of one or more of its members can contribute to strengthening peaceful relations within a family. However, it accepts that the protection of acquired rights can serve the interests of legal certainty, an underlying value of the Convention (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999 ‑ VII; Beian v. Romania (no. 1), no. 30658/05, § 39, ECHR 2007 ‑ V (extracts); Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 13279/05, §§ 56-57, 20 October 2011; and Albu and Others v. Romania, nos. 34796/09 and 63 other cases, § 34, 10 May 2012). Accordingly, with regard to a succession accepted by a child “born of adultery” when it was opened, in 1993, and liquidated in 1996, it has held that the Court of Cassation’s ruling of inadmissibility on the ground that there had already been division, which precluded the applicant from benefiting from the new rights, under the transitional provisions of the 2001 Law, was in accordance with the principle of legal certainty as reiterated in Marckx. Indeed “a judicial body cannot be required to set aside a freely accepted division in the light of a judgment of the Court delivered after the said division” (see E.S. v. France (dec.), no. 49714/06, 10 February 2009). The Court concludes that the concern to ensure the stability of completed inheritance arrangements, which was an overriding requirement in the opinion of the legislature and the court dealing with the case, constitutes a legitimate aim capable of justifying the difference in treatment in the present case. However, the difference in treatment must have been proportionate to that aim. (β) Proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued 67. The Court observes that in the present case, subject to the statutory right to bring an action for abatement, the applicant’s half-brother and half ‑ sister obtained property rights on the basis of the inter vivos division of 1970 by virtue of which Mrs M.’s estate passed to them on her death in July 1994. On that basis this case is distinguishable from those of Mazurek and Merger and Cros, cited above, in which the estate had not yet passed to the beneficiaries. 68. However, the Court reiterates that “protecting the ‘legitimate expectation’ of the deceased and their families must be subordinate to the imperative of equal treatment between children born outside and children born within marriage” (see Brauer, cited above, § 43). In that connection it considers that the applicant’s half-brother and half-sister knew – or should have known – that their rights were liable to be challenged. At the time of their mother’s death in 1994 there was a statutory five-year time-period for bringing an action for abatement of an inter vivos division. The legitimate heirs should therefore have known that their half-brother had until 1999 to claim his share in the estate and that such an action was capable of calling into question not the division as such, but the extent of the rights of each of the descendants. Moreover, the action for abatement that the applicant did finally bring in 1998 was pending before the national courts at the time of delivery of the judgment in Mazurek, which declared that inequality of inheritance rights on grounds of birth was incompatible with the Convention, and at the time of publication of the 2001 Law, which executed that judgment by incorporating the principles established therein into French law. Lastly, the applicant was not a descendant whose existence was unknown to them, as he had been recognised as their mother’s “illegitimate” son in a judgment delivered in 1983 (see paragraph 12 above; see, mutatis mutandis, Camp and Bourimi, cited above, § 39). That was sufficient to arouse justified doubts as to whether the estate had actually passed on Mrs M.’s death in 1994 (see the conclusions of the advocate-general, paragraph 22 above). 69. The Court observes on that point that, according to the Government, the specific nature of inter vivos divisions precluded any calling into question of an existing legal situation – in this case the division effected in 1970 and subsequently definitively implemented on the estate-owner’s death – notwithstanding the legal proceedings under way (see paragraphs 40 and 41 above). The applicant challenged that submission (see paragraph 46 above). In the particular circumstances of the case, in which European case-law and the national legislative reforms showed a clear tendency towards eliminating all discrimination regarding the inheritance rights of children born outside marriage, the Court considers that the action brought by the applicant before the domestic courts in 1998 and dismissed in 2007 is a weighty factor when examining the proportionality of the difference in treatment (see paragraphs 22 and 68 above, and paragraph 72 below). The fact that that action was still pending in 2001 could not but relativise the expectation of Mrs M.’s other heirs that they would succeed in establishing undisputed rights to her estate. 70. Accordingly, in the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the legitimate aim of protecting the inheritance rights of the applicant’s half-brother and half-sister was not sufficiently weighty to override the claim by the applicant to a share in his mother’s estate. 71. Moreover, it would appear that, even in the eyes of the national authorities, the expectations of heirs who are the beneficiaries of an inter vivos division are not to be protected in all circumstances. Indeed, if the same action for an abatement of the inter vivos division had been brought at the same time by another legitimate child, born at a later date or wilfully excluded from the division, it would not have been declared inadmissible. 72. In that connection the Court questions the decision of the national court, in 2007 – years after the Marckx and Mazurek judgments cited above – to apply the principle of protection of legal certainty differently according to whether it was asserted against a legitimate child or a child “born of adultery”. It also notes that the Court of Cassation did not address the applicant’s principal ground of appeal relating to an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination as guaranteed by Article 14 of the Convention. The Court has previously held that where an applicant’s pleas relate to the “rights and freedoms” guaranteed by the Convention the courts are required to examine them with particular rigour and care and that this is a corollary of the principle of subsidiarity (see Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01, § 96, 28 June 2007, and Magnin v. France (dec.), no. 26219/08, 10 May 2012). (γ) Conclusion 73. In the light of all the aforementioned considerations, the Court concludes that there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the legitimate aim pursued. There was therefore no objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment regarding the applicant. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 74. This conclusion does not call into question the right of States to enact transitional provisions where they adopt a legislative reform with a view to complying with their obligations under Article 46 § 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Antoni v. the Czech Republic, no. 18010/06, 25 November 2010; Compagnie des gaz de pétrole Primagaz v. France, no. 29613/08, § 18, 21 December 2010; Mork v. Germany, nos. 31047/04 and 43386/08, §§ 28 to 30 and 54, 9 June 2011; and Taron v. Germany, (dec.), no. 53126/07, 29 May 2012). 75. However, whilst the essentially declaratory nature of the Court’s judgments leaves it up to the State to choose the means by which to erase the consequences of the violation (see Marckx, cited above, § 58, and Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, § 61, ECHR 2009), it should at the same time be pointed out that the adoption of general measures requires the State concerned to prevent, with diligence, further violations similar to those found in the Court’s judgments (see, for example, Salah v. the Netherlands, no. 8196/02, § 77, ECHR 2006 ‑ IX (extracts). This imposes an obligation on the domestic courts to ensure, in conformity with their constitutional order and having regard to the principle of legal certainty, the full effect of the Convention standards, as interpreted by the Court. This was not done in the present case, however. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 8 76. The applicant complained, on the same grounds as those relied on above in connection with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, of unjustified discrimination infringing his right to respect for his private and family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, which provides: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ... 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” A. Chamber judgment 77. As in the Mazurek judgment, the Chamber did not consider it necessary to examine this question separately, as no distinct arguments had been submitted (see paragraph 60 of the Chamber judgment). B. The parties’ submissions 78. The applicant made no observation under Article 8 of the Convention. 79. The Government submitted, as their main argument, that there had been no interference in the present case. Questions concerning inheritance on intestacy could fall within the scope of Article 8 but that provision did not guarantee a right to inherit. A decision not to call into question a legal situation acquired in 1970 was not an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. 80. If, however, the Court were to consider that there had been interference, this had been prescribed by law, namely, the 1972 Law prohibiting heirs to a reserved portion of the estate from exercising those rights to the detriment of gifts granted prior to 1972. It had pursued a legitimate aim, namely, guaranteeing peaceful family relations by securing long-standing rights. Relying on the Court’s judgment in Marckx, the Government submitted that it would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty to set aside a division implemented several years (1972 Law) or even several decades (2001 Law) before the legislative and jurisprudential changes amending the inheritance rules applicable to children “born of adultery”. Lastly, that interference had been proportionate because the implementation of the impugned provisions by the domestic courts was limited both in time and in respect of the voluntary dispositions concerned. The Government concluded that the transitional provisions, as interpreted by the domestic courts, were in conformity with the decision in Mazurek and with the Convention. The 2001 Law, in particular, provided for application of the new provisions with regard to the time factor, taking account of acquired situations that it would be undesirable from a social point of view – and unfeasible in certain cases – to call into question. The Government stressed the margin of appreciation available to the State when balancing the competing interests. C. The Court’s assessment 81. Having regard to the Court’s conclusions regarding Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 73 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine separately whether there has been a violation of that provision read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 82. Under Article 41 of the Convention “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 83. The applicant claimed EUR 128,550.75, which is the share of the estate that would have been paid to him if he had been treated as having equal rights to his half-brother and half-sister, plus interest. The applicant also claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage which he assessed at EUR 30,000. Lastly, the applicant assessed at EUR 20,946 the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court. 84. The Government submitted that the finding of a violation would be adequate compensation for the pecuniary loss suffered by the applicant. Any monetary compensation awarded for non-pecuniary damage could only be symbolic. With regard to costs and expenses, the Government considered that the award of an aggregate sum of EUR 10,000 would be appropriate. 85. In the circumstances of the present case the Court finds that the question of the application of Article 41 of the Convention is not ready for decision. Consequently, it will reserve the question in its entirety and fix the subsequent procedure, bearing in mind the possibility of an agreement being reached between the respondent State and the applicant (Rule 75 § 1 of the Rules of Court). The Court gives the parties three months for that purpose.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article 1 (protection of property) of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It found in particular that the legitimate aim of protecting the inheritance rights of the applicant’s half-brother and half-sister did not outweigh the applicant’s claim to a share of his mother’s estate and that the difference of treatment in his regard was discriminatory, as it had no objective and reasonable justification6.