(Suspected) terrorists
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE A. DEPORTATION 57. By section 3 (5) (b) of the Immigration Act 1971 ("the 1971 Act"), a person who is not a British citizen is liable to deportation inter alia if the Secretary of State deems this to be "conducive to the public good". B. Appeal against deportation and the advisory panel procedure 58. There is a right of appeal to an adjudicator, and ultimately to an appeal tribunal, against a decision to make a deportation order (section 15 (1) of the 1971 Act) except in cases where the ground of the decision to deport was that the deportation would be conducive to the public good as being in the interests of national security or of the relations between the United Kingdom and any other country or for other reasons of a political nature (section 15(3) of the 1971 Act). 59. This exception was maintained in the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, which came into force in July 1993. 60. Cases in which a deportation order has been made on national security or political grounds are subject to a non-statutory advisory procedure, set out in paragraph 157 of the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules (House of Commons Paper 251 of 1990). The person concerned is given an opportunity to make written and/or oral representations to an advisory panel, to call witnesses on his behalf, and to be assisted by a friend, but he is not permitted to have legal representation before the panel. The Home Secretary decides how much information about the case against him may be communicated to the person concerned. The panel's advice to the Home Secretary is not disclosed, and the latter is not obliged to follow it. C. The United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees 61. The United Kingdom is a party to the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees ("the 1951 Convention"). A "refugee" is defined by Article 1 of the Convention as a person who is outside the country of his nationality due to "a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion". Article 32 of the 1951 Convention provides: "1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order. 2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall only be in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law ..." Article 33 provides: " 1. No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country." 62. Rule 161 of the Immigration Rules (House of Commons Paper 251 of 1990) provides that: "Where a person is a refugee full account is to be taken of the provisions of the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees ..." 63. In a case where a person to be deported for national security reasons claims asylum, the Secretary of State must balance the interest of the individual as a refugee against the risk to national security (R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Chahal [1994] Immigration Appeal Reports, p. 107 - see paragraph 41 above). D. Detention pending deportation 64. A person may be detained under the authority of the Secretary of State after the service upon him of a notice of intention to deport and pending the making of a deportation order, and also after the making of an order, pending his removal or departure from the country (paragraphs 2 (2) and (3) of Schedule III to the 1971 Act). 65. Any person in detention is entitled to challenge the lawfulness of his detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. This is issued by the High Court to procure the production of a person in order that the circumstances of his detention may be inquired into. The detainee must be released if unlawfully detained (Habeas Corpus Act 1679 and Habeas Corpus Act 1816, section 1). Only one application for habeas corpus on the same grounds may be made by an individual in detention, unless fresh evidence is adduced in support (Administration of Justice Act 1960, section 14 (2)). In addition, a detainee may apply for judicial review of the decision to detain him (see paragraphs 43 above and 66-67 below). In conjunction with either an application for habeas corpus or judicial review, it is possible to apply for bail (that is, temporary release) pending the decision of the court. E. Judicial review 66. Decisions of the Home Secretary to refuse asylum, to make a deportation order or to detain pending deportation are liable to challenge by way of judicial review and may be quashed by reference to the ordinary principles of English public law. These principles do not permit the court to make findings of fact on matters within the province of the Secretary of State or to substitute its discretion for the Minister's. The court may quash his decision only if he failed to interpret or apply English law correctly, if he failed to take account of issues which he was required by law to address, or if his decision was so irrational or perverse that no reasonable Secretary of State could have made it (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 King's Bench Reports, p. 223). 67. Where national security issues are involved, the courts retain a power of review, but it is a limited one because: "the decision on whether the requirements of national security outweigh the duty of fairness in a particular case is a matter for the Government to decide, not for the courts; the Government alone has access to the necessary information and in any event the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on national security" (Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] Appeal Cases, p. 374, at p. 402). See also R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Cheblak [1991] 2 All England Reports, p. 9, where a similar approach was taken by the Court of Appeal. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 68. In the application of 27 July 1993 (no. 22414/93) to the Commission (as declared admissible), the first applicant complained that his deportation to India would expose him to a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention (art. 3); that his detention had been too long and that the judicial control thereof had been ineffective and slow in breach of Article 5 paras. 1 and 4 (art. 5-1, art. 5-4); and that, contrary to Article 13 (art. 13), he had had no effective domestic remedy for his Convention claims because of the national security elements in his case. All the applicants also complained that the deportation of the first applicant would breach their right to respect for family life under Article 8 (art. 8), for which Convention claim they had no effective domestic remedy, contrary to Article 13 (art. 13). 69. On 1 September 1994 the Commission declared the application admissible. In its report of 27 June 1995 (Article 31) (art. 31) it expressed the unanimous opinion that there would be violations of Articles 3 and 8 (art. 3, art. 8) if the first applicant were deported to India; that there had been a violation of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) by reason of the length of his detention; and that there had been a violation of Article 13 (art. 13). The Commission also concluded (by sixteen votes to one) that it was not necessary to examine the complaints under Article 5 para. 4 of the Convention (art. 5-4). The full text of the Commission's opinion and of the partly dissenting opinion contained in the report is reproduced as annex to this judgment [3]. FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT 70. At the hearing on 25 March 1996 the Government, as they had done in their memorial, invited the Court to hold that the deportation order, if implemented, would not amount to a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention (art. 3, art. 8), and that there had been no breaches of Articles 5 and 13 (art. 5, art. 13). 71. On the same occasion the applicants reiterated their requests to the Court, set out in their memorial, to find violations of Articles 3, 5, 8 and 13 (art. 3, art. 5, art. 8, art. 13) and to award them just satisfaction under Article 50 (art. 50). AS TO THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION (art. 3) 72. The first applicant complained that his deportation to India would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (art. 3), which states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." The Commission upheld this complaint, which the Government contested. A. Applicability of Article 3 (art. 3) in expulsion cases 73. As the Court has observed in the past, Contracting States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. Moreover, it must be noted that the right to political asylum is not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols (see the Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, p. 34, para. 102). 74. However, it is well established in the case-law of the Court that expulsion by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3 (art. 3), and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) in the receiving country. In these circumstances, Article 3 (art. 3) implies the obligation not to expel the person in question to that country (see the Soering v. the United Kingdom judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, p. 35, paras. 90-91, the Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A no. 201, p. 28, paras. 69-70, and the above-mentioned Vilvarajah and Others judgment, p. 34, para. 103). The Government contested this principle before the Commission but accepted it in their pleadings before the Court. B. Expulsion cases involving an alleged danger to national security 75. The Court notes that the deportation order against the first applicant was made on the ground that his continued presence in the United Kingdom was unconducive to the public good for reasons of national security, including the fight against terrorism (see paragraph 25 above). The parties differed as to whether, and if so to what extent, the fact that the applicant might represent a danger to the security of the United Kingdom affected that State's obligations under Article 3 (art. 3). 76. Although the Government's primary contention was that no real risk of ill-treatment had been established (see paragraphs 88 and 92 below), they also emphasised that the reason for the intended deportation was national security. In this connection they submitted, first, that the guarantees afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) were not absolute in cases where a Contracting State proposed to remove an individual from its territory. Instead, in such cases, which required an uncertain prediction of future events in the receiving State, various factors should be taken into account, including the danger posed by the person in question to the security of the host nation. Thus, there was an implied limitation to Article 3 (art. 3) entitling a Contracting State to expel an individual to a receiving State even where a real risk of ill-treatment existed, if such removal was required on national security grounds. The Government based this submission in the first place on the possibility of implied limitations as recognised in the Court's case-law, particularly paragraphs 88 and 89 of its above-mentioned Soering judgment. In support, they furthermore referred to the principle under international law that the right of an alien to asylum is subject to qualifications, as is provided for, inter alia, by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (see paragraph 61 above). In the alternative, the threat posed by an individual to the national security of the Contracting State was a factor to be weighed in the balance when considering the issues under Article 3 (art. 3). This approach took into account that in these cases there are varying degrees of risk of ill-treatment. The greater the risk of ill-treatment, the less weight should be accorded to the threat to national security. But where there existed a substantial doubt with regard to the risk of ill-treatment, the threat to national security could weigh heavily in the balance to be struck between protecting the rights of the individual and the general interests of the community. This was the case here: it was at least open to substantial doubt whether the alleged risk of ill-treatment would materialise; consequently, the fact that Mr Chahal constituted a serious threat to the security of the United Kingdom justified his deportation. 77. The applicant denied that he represented any threat to the national security of the United Kingdom, and contended that, in any case, national security considerations could not justify exposing an individual to the risk of ill-treatment abroad any more than they could justify administering torture to him directly. 78. The Commission, with whom the intervenors (see paragraph 6 above) agreed, rejected the Government's arguments. It referred to the Court's Vilvarajah and Others judgment (cited at paragraph 73 above, p. 36, para. 108) and expressed the opinion that the guarantees afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) were absolute in character, admitting of no exception. At the hearing before the Court, the Commission's Delegate suggested that the passages in the Court's Soering judgment upon which the Government relied (see paragraph 76 above) might be taken as authority for the view that, in a case where there were serious doubts as to the likelihood of a person being subjected to treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3), the benefit of that doubt could be given to the deporting State whose national interests were threatened by his continued presence. However, the national interests of the State could not be invoked to override the interests of the individual where substantial grounds had been shown for believing that he would be subjected to ill-treatment if expelled. 79. Article 3 (art. 3) enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society (see the above-mentioned Soering judgment, p. 34, para. 88). The Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence. However, even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4 (P1, P4), Article 3 (art. 3) makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 (art. 15) even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see the Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, para. 163, and also the Tomasi v. France judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A, p. 42, para. 115). 80. The prohibition provided by Article 3 (art. 3) against ill-treatment is equally absolute in expulsion cases. Thus, whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) if removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged in the event of expulsion (see the above-mentioned Vilvarajah and Others judgment, p. 34, para. 103). In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) is thus wider than that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (see paragraph 61 above). 81. Paragraph 88 of the Court's above-mentioned Soering judgment, which concerned extradition to the United States, clearly and forcefully expresses the above view. It should not be inferred from the Court's remarks concerning the risk of undermining the foundations of extradition, as set out in paragraph 89 of the same judgment, that there is any room for balancing the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons for expulsion in determining whether a State's responsibility under Article 3 (art. 3) is engaged. 82. It follows from the above that it is not necessary for the Court to enter into a consideration of the Government's untested, but no doubt bona fide, allegations about the first applicant's terrorist activities and the threat posed by him to national security. C. Application of Article 3 (art. 3) in the circumstances of the case 1. The point of time for the assessment of the risk 83. Although there were differing views on the situation in India and in Punjab (see paragraphs 87-91 below), it was agreed that the violence and instability in that region reached a peak in 1992 and had been abating ever since. For this reason, the date taken by the Court for its assessment of the risk to Mr Chahal if expelled to India is of importance. 84. The applicant argued that the Court should consider the position in June 1992, at the time when the decision to deport him was made final (see paragraph 35 above). The purpose of the stay on removal requested by the Commission (see paragraph 4 above) was to prevent irremediable damage and not to afford the High Contracting Party with an opportunity to improve its case. Moreover, it was not appropriate that the Strasbourg organs should be involved in a continual fact-finding operation. 85. The Government, with whom the Commission agreed, submitted that because the responsibility of the State under Article 3 of the Convention (art. 3) in expulsion cases lies in the act of exposing an individual to a real risk of ill-treatment, the material date for the assessment of risk was the time of the proposed deportation. Since Mr Chahal had not yet been expelled, the relevant time was that of the proceedings before the Court. 86. It follows from the considerations in paragraph 74 above that, as far as the applicant's complaint under Article 3 (art. 3) is concerned, the crucial question is whether it has been substantiated that there is a real risk that Mr Chahal, if expelled, would be subjected to treatment prohibited by that Article (art. 3). Since he has not yet been deported, the material point in time must be that of the Court's consideration of the case. It follows that, although the historical position is of interest in so far as it may shed light on the current situation and its likely evolution, it is the present conditions which are decisive. 2. The assessment of the risk of ill-treatment (a) The arguments ( i ) General conditions 87. It was the applicant's case that the Government's assessment of conditions in India and Punjab had been profoundly mistaken throughout the domestic and Strasbourg proceedings. He referred to a number of reports by governmental bodies and by intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations on the situation in India generally and in Punjab in particular, with emphasis on those reports concerning 1994 and 1995 (see paragraphs 49-56 above) and argued that this material established the contention that human rights abuse in India by the security forces, especially the police, remained endemic. In response to the Government's offer to return him to the part of India of his choice, he asserted that the Punjab police had abducted and killed militant Sikhs outside their home State in the past. Although he accepted that there had been some improvements in Punjab since the peak of unrest in 1992, he insisted that there had been no fundamental change of regime. On the contrary, what emerged from the above reports was the continuity of the practices of the security agencies. In this respect he pointed to the fact that the director general of the Punjab police, who had been responsible for many human rights abuses during his term of office between 1992 and 1995, had been replaced upon his retirement by his former deputy and intelligence chief. 88. The Government contended that there would be no real risk of Mr Chahal being ill-treated if the deportation order were to be implemented and emphasised that the latter was to be returned to whichever part of India he chose, and not necessarily to Punjab. In this context they pointed out that they regularly monitored the situation in India through the United Kingdom High Commission in New Delhi. It appeared from this information that positive concrete steps had been taken and continued to be taken to deal with human rights abuses. Specific legislation had been introduced in this regard; the National Human Rights Commission, which performed an important function, continued to strengthen and develop; and steps had been taken by both the executive and judicial authorities to deal with the remaining misuse of power. The situation in India generally was therefore such as to support their above contention. Furthermore, with reference to the matters set out in paragraphs 45-48 above, they contended that the situation in Punjab had improved substantially in recent years. They stressed that there was now little or no terrorist activity in that State. An ombudsman had been established to look into complaints of misuse of power and the new Chief Minister had publicly declared the government's intentions to stamp out human rights abuses. Legal proceedings had been brought against police officers alleged to have been involved in unlawful activity. 89. Amnesty International in its written submissions informed the Court that prominent Sikh separatists still faced a serious risk of "disappearance", detention without charge or trial, torture and extrajudicial execution, frequently at the hands of the Punjab police. It referred to its 1995 report which documented a pattern of human rights violations committed by officers of the Punjab police acting in under-cover operations outside their home State (see paragraph 55 above). 90. The Government, however, urged the Court to proceed with caution in relation to the material prepared by Amnesty International, since it was not possible to verify the facts of the cases referred to. Furthermore, when studying these reports it was tempting to lose sight of the broader picture of improvement by concentrating too much on individual cases of alleged serious human rights abuses. Finally, since the situation in Punjab had changed considerably in recent years, earlier reports prepared by Amnesty and other organisations were now of limited use. 91. On the basis of the material before it, the Commission accepted that there had been an improvement in the conditions prevailing in India and, more specifically, in Punjab. However, it was unable to find in the recent material provided by the Government any solid evidence that the Punjab police were now under democratic control or that the judiciary had been able fully to reassert its own independent authority in the region. (ii) Factors specific to Mr Chahal 92. Those appearing before the Court also differed in their assessment of the effect which Mr Chahal's notoriety would have on his security in India. In the Government's view, the Indian Government were likely to be astute to ensure that no ill-treatment befell Mr Chahal, knowing that the eyes of the world would be upon him. Furthermore, in June 1992 and December 1995 they had sought and received assurances from the Indian Government (see paragraph 37 above). 93. The applicant asserted that his high profile would increase the danger of persecution. By taking the decision to deport him on national security grounds the Government had, as was noted by Mr Justice Popplewell in the first judicial review hearing (see paragraph 34 above), in effect publicly branded him a terrorist. Articles in the Indian press since 1990 indicated that he was regarded as such in India, and a number of his relatives and acquaintances had been detained and ill-treated in Punjab because of their connection to him. The assurances of the Indian Government were of little value since that Government had shown themselves unable to control the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere. The applicant also referred to examples of well-known personalities who had recently "disappeared". 94. For the Commission, Mr Chahal, as a leading Sikh militant suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism, was likely to be of special interest to the security forces, irrespective of the part of India to which he was returned. (b) The Court's approach 95. Under the Convention system, the establishment and verification of the facts is primarily a matter for the Commission (Articles 28 para. 1 and 31) (art. 28-1, art. 31). Accordingly, it is only in exceptional circumstances that the Court will use its powers in this area (see the Cruz Varas and Others judgment mentioned at paragraph 74 above, p. 29, para. 74). 96. However, the Court is not bound by the Commission's findings of fact and is free to make its own assessment. Indeed, in cases such as the present the Court's examination of the existence of a real risk of ill-treatment must necessarily be a rigorous one, in view of the absolute character of Article 3 (art. 3) and the fact that it enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe (see the Vilvarajah and Others judgment mentioned at paragraph 73 above, p. 36, para. 108). 97. In determining whether it has been substantiated that there is a real risk that the applicant, if expelled to India, would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3), the Court will assess all the material placed before it and, if necessary, material obtained of its own motion (see the above-mentioned Vilvarajah and Others judgment, p. 36, para. 107). Furthermore, since the material point in time for the assessment of risk is the date of the Court's consideration of the case (see paragraph 86 above), it will be necessary to take account of evidence which has come to light since the Commission's review. 98. In view of the Government's proposal to return Mr Chahal to the airport of his choice in India, it is necessary for the Court to evaluate the risk of his being ill-treated with reference to conditions throughout India rather than in Punjab alone. However, it must be borne in mind that the first applicant is a well-known supporter of Sikh separatism. It follows from these observations that evidence relating to the fate of Sikh militants at the hands of the security forces outside the State of Punjab is of particular relevance. 99. The Court has taken note of the Government's comments relating to the material contained in the reports of Amnesty International (see paragraph 90 above). Nonetheless, it attaches weight to some of the most striking allegations contained in those reports, particularly with regard to extrajudicial killings allegedly perpetrated by the Punjab police outside their home State and the action taken by the Indian Supreme Court, the West Bengal State Government and the Union Home Secretary in response (see paragraph 55 above). Moreover, similar assertions were accepted by the United Kingdom Immigration Appeal Tribunal in Charan Singh Gill v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (see paragraph 54 above) and were included in the 1995 United States' State Department report on India (see paragraph 52 above). The 1994 National Human Rights Commission's report on Punjab substantiated the impression of a police force completely beyond the control of lawful authority (see paragraph 49 above). 100. The Court is persuaded by this evidence, which has been corroborated by material from a number of different objective sources, that, until mid-1994 at least, elements in the Punjab police were accustomed to act without regard to the human rights of suspected Sikh militants and were fully capable of pursuing their targets into areas of India far away from Punjab. 101. The Commission found in paragraph 111 of its report that there had in recent years been an improvement in the protection of human rights in India, especially in Punjab, and evidence produced subsequent to the Commission's consideration of the case indicates that matters continue to advance. In particular, it would appear that the insurgent violence in Punjab has abated; the Court notes the very substantial reduction in terrorist-related deaths in the region as indicated by the respondent Government (see paragraph 45 above). Furthermore, other encouraging events have reportedly taken place in Punjab in recent years, such as the return of democratic elections, a number of court judgments against police officers, the appointment of an ombudsman to investigate abuses of power and the promise of the new Chief Minister to "ensure transparency and accountability" (see paragraphs 46 and 48 above). In addition, the 1996 United States' State Department report asserts that during 1995 "there was visible progress in correcting patterns of abuse by the [Punjab] police" (see paragraph 53 above). 102. Nonetheless, the evidence demonstrates that problems still persist in connection with the observance of human rights by the security forces in Punjab. As the respondent Government themselves recounted, the United Kingdom High Commission in India continues to receive complaints about the Punjab police, although in recent months these have related mainly to extortion rather than to politically motivated abuses (see paragraph 47 above). Amnesty International alleged that "disappearances" of notable Sikhs at the hands of the Punjab police continued sporadically throughout 1995 (see paragraph 56 above) and the 1996 State Department report referred to the killing of two Sikh militants that year (see paragraph 53 above). 103. Moreover, the Court finds it most significant that no concrete evidence has been produced of any fundamental reform or reorganisation of the Punjab police in recent years. The evidence referred to above (paragraphs 49-56) would indicate that such a process was urgently required, and indeed this was the recommendation of the NHRC (see paragraph 49 above). Although there was a change in the leadership of the Punjab police in 1995, the director general who presided over some of the worst abuses this decade has only been replaced by his former deputy and intelligence chief (see paragraph 87 above). Less than two years ago this same police force was carrying out well-documented raids into other Indian States (see paragraph 100 above) and the Court cannot entirely discount the applicant's claims that any recent reduction in activity stems from the fact that key figures in the campaign for Sikh separatism have all either been killed, forced abroad or rendered inactive by torture or the fear of torture. Furthermore, it would appear from press reports that evidence of the full extent of past abuses is only now coming to light (see paragraph 53 above). 104. Although the Court is of the opinion that Mr Chahal, if returned to India, would be most at risk from the Punjab security forces acting either within or outside State boundaries, it also attaches significance to the fact that attested allegations of serious human rights violations have been levelled at the police elsewhere in India. In this respect, the Court notes that the United Nations' Special Rapporteur on torture has described the practice of torture upon those in police custody as "endemic" and has complained that inadequate measures are taken to bring those responsible to justice (see paragraph 51 above). The NHRC has also drawn attention to the problems of widespread, often fatal, mistreatment of prisoners and has called for a systematic reform of the police throughout India (see paragraph 50 above). 105. Although the Court does not doubt the good faith of the Indian Government in providing the assurances mentioned above (paragraph 92), it would appear that, despite the efforts of that Government, the NHRC and the Indian courts to bring about reform, the violation of human rights by certain members of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India is a recalcitrant and enduring problem (see paragraph 104 above). Against this background, the Court is not persuaded that the above assurances would provide Mr Chahal with an adequate guarantee of safety. 106. The Court further considers that the applicant's high profile would be more likely to increase the risk to him of harm than otherwise. It is not disputed that Mr Chahal is well known in India to support the cause of Sikh separatism and to have had close links with other leading figures in that struggle (see paragraphs 17 and 20 above). The respondent Government have made serious, albeit untested, allegations of his involvement in terrorism which are undoubtedly known to the Indian authorities. The Court is of the view that these factors would be likely to make him a target of interest for hard-line elements in the security forces who have relentlessly pursued suspected Sikh militants in the past (see paragraphs 49-56 above). 107. For all the reasons outlined above, in particular the attested involvement of the Punjab police in killings and abductions outside their State and the allegations of serious human rights violations which continue to be levelled at members of the Indian security forces elsewhere, the Court finds it substantiated that there is a real risk of Mr Chahal being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) if he is returned to India. Accordingly, the order for his deportation to India would, if executed, give rise to a violation of Article 3 (art. 3). II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION (art. 5) A. Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) 108. The first applicant complained that his detention pending deportation constituted a violation of Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 5-1), which provides (so far as is relevant): "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ... (f) the lawful arrest or detention ... of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation ..." 109. Mr Chahal has been held in Bedford Prison since 16 August 1990 (see paragraph 25 above). It was not disputed that he had been detained "with a view to deportation" within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (f) (art. 5-1-f). However, he maintained that his detention had ceased to be "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" for the purposes of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) because of its excessive duration. In particular, the applicant complained about the length of time (16 August 1990 - 27 March 1991) taken to consider and reject his application for refugee status; the period (9 August 1991 - 2 December 1991) between his application for judicial review of the decision to refuse asylum and the national court's decision; and the time required (2 December 1991 - 1 June 1992) for the fresh decision refusing asylum. 110. The Commission agreed, finding that the above proceedings were not pursued with the requisite speed and that the detention therefore ceased to be justified. 111. The Government, however, asserted that the various proceedings brought by Mr Chahal were dealt with as expeditiously as possible. 112. The Court recalls that it is not in dispute that Mr Chahal has been detained "with a view to deportation" within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (f) (art. 5-1-f) (see paragraph 109 above). Article 5 para. 1 (f) (art. 5-1-f) does not demand that the detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing; in this respect Article 5 para. 1 (f) (art. 5-1-f) provides a different level of protection from Article 5 para. 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c). Indeed, all that is required under this provision (art. 5-1-f) is that "action is being taken with a view to deportation". It is therefore immaterial, for the purposes of Article 5 para. 1 (f) (art. 5-1-f), whether the underlying decision to expel can be justified under national or Convention law. 113. The Court recalls, however, that any deprivation of liberty under Article 5 para. 1 (f) (art. 5-1-f) will be justified only for as long as deportation proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be permissible under Article 5 para. 1 (f) (art. 5-1-f) (see the Quinn v. France judgment of 22 March 1995, Series A no. 311, p. 19, para. 48, and also the Kolompar v. Belgium judgment of 24 September 1992, Series A no. 235-C, p. 55, para. 36). It is thus necessary to determine whether the duration of the deportation proceedings was excessive. 114. The period under consideration commenced on 16 August 1990, when Mr Chahal was first detained with a view to deportation. It terminated on 3 March 1994, when the domestic proceedings came to an end with the refusal of the House of Lords to allow leave to appeal (see paragraphs 25 and 42 above). Although he has remained in custody until the present day, this latter period must be distinguished because during this time the Government have refrained from deporting him in compliance with the request made by the Commission under Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure (see paragraph 4 above). 115. The Court has had regard to the length of time taken for the various decisions in the domestic proceedings. As regards the decisions taken by the Secretary of State to refuse asylum, it does not consider that the periods (that is, 16 August 1990 - 27 March 1991 and 2 December 1991 - 1 June 1992) were excessive, bearing in mind the detailed and careful consideration required for the applicant's request for political asylum and the opportunities afforded to the latter to make representations and submit information (see paragraphs 25-27 and 34-35 above). 116. In connection with the judicial review proceedings before the national courts, it is noted that Mr Chahal's first application was made on 9 August 1991 and that a decision was reached on it by Mr Justice Popplewell on 2 December 1991. He made a second application on 16 July 1992, which was heard between 18 and 21 December 1992, judgment being given on 12 February 1993. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against this decision on 22 October 1993 and refused him leave to appeal to the House of Lords. The House of Lords similarly refused leave to appeal on 3 March 1994 (see paragraphs 34, 38 and 40-42 above). 117. As the Court has observed in the context of Article 3 (art. 3), Mr Chahal's case involves considerations of an extremely serious and weighty nature. It is neither in the interests of the individual applicant nor in the general public interest in the administration of justice that such decisions be taken hastily, without due regard to all the relevant issues and evidence. Against this background, and bearing in mind what was at stake for the applicant and the interest that he had in his claims being thoroughly examined by the courts, none of the periods complained of can be regarded as excessive, taken either individually or in combination. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 5 para. 1 (f) of the Convention (art. 5-1-f) on account of the diligence, or lack of it, with which the domestic procedures were conducted. 118. It also falls to the Court to examine whether Mr Chahal's detention was "lawful" for the purposes of Article 5 para. 1 (f) (art. 5-1-f), with particular reference to the safeguards provided by the national system. Where the "lawfulness" of detention is in issue, including the question whether "a procedure prescribed by law" has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law, but it requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of Article 5 (art. 5), namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness. 119. There is no doubt that Mr Chahal's detention was lawful under national law and was effected "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" (see paragraphs 43 and 64 above). However, in view of the extremely long period during which Mr Chahal has been detained, it is also necessary to consider whether there existed sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness. 120. In this context, the Court observes that the applicant has been detained since 16 August 1990 on the ground, essentially, that successive Secretaries of State have maintained that, in view of the threat to national security represented by him, he could not safely be released (see paragraph 43 above). The applicant has, however, consistently denied that he posed any threat whatsoever to national security, and has given reasons in support of this denial (see paragraphs 31 and 77 above). 121. The Court further notes that, since the Secretaries of State asserted that national security was involved, the domestic courts were not in a position effectively to control whether the decisions to keep Mr Chahal in detention were justified, because the full material on which these decisions were based was not made available to them (see paragraph 43 above). 122. However, in the context of Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 5-1), the advisory panel procedure (see paragraphs 29-32 and 60 above) provided an important safeguard against arbitrariness. This panel, which included experienced judicial figures (see paragraph 29 above) was able fully to review the evidence relating to the national security threat represented by the applicant. Although its report has never been disclosed, at the hearing before the Court the Government indicated that the panel had agreed with the Home Secretary that Mr Chahal ought to be deported on national security grounds. The Court considers that this procedure provided an adequate guarantee that there were at least prima facie grounds for believing that, if Mr Chahal were at liberty, national security would be put at risk and thus that the executive had not acted arbitrarily when it ordered him to be kept in detention. 123. In conclusion, the Court recalls that Mr Chahal has undoubtedly been detained for a length of time which is bound to give rise to serious concern. However, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case and the facts that the national authorities have acted with due diligence throughout the deportation proceedings against him and that there were sufficient guarantees against the arbitrary deprivation of his liberty, this detention complied with the requirements of Article 5 para. 1 (f) (art. 5-1-f). It follows that there has been no violation of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1). B. Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) 124. The first applicant alleged that he was denied the opportunity to have the lawfulness of his detention decided by a national court, in breach of Article 5 para. 4 of the Convention (art. 5-4), which provides: "Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful." He submitted that the reliance placed on national security grounds as justification for his detention pending deportation prevented the domestic courts from considering whether it was lawful and appropriate. However, he developed this argument more thoroughly in connection with his complaint under Article 13 of the Convention (art. 13) (see paragraphs 140-41 below). 125. The Commission was of the opinion that it was more appropriate to consider this complaint under Article 13 (art. 13) and the Government also followed this approach (see paragraphs 142-43 below). 126. The Court recalls, in the first place, that Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) provides a lex specialis in relation to the more general requirements of Article 13 (art. 13) (see the De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A no. 77, p. 27, para. 60). It follows that, irrespective of the method chosen by Mr Chahal to argue his complaint that he was denied the opportunity to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed, the Court must first examine it in connection with Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4). 127. The Court further recalls that the notion of "lawfulness" under paragraph 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-4) has the same meaning as in paragraph 1 (art. 5-1), so that the detained person is entitled to a review of his detention in the light not only of the requirements of domestic law but also of the text of the Convention, the general principles embodied therein and the aim of the restrictions permitted by Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) (see the E. v. Norway judgment of 29 August 1990, Series A no. 181-A, p. 21, para. 49). The scope of the obligations under Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) is not identical for every kind of deprivation of liberty (see, inter alia, the Bouamar v. Belgium judgment of 29 February 1988, Series A no. 129, p. 24, para. 60); this applies notably to the extent of the judicial review afforded. Nonetheless, it is clear that Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) does not guarantee a right to judicial review of such breadth as to empower the court, on all aspects of the case including questions of pure expediency, to substitute its own discretion for that of the decision-making authority. The review should, however, be wide enough to bear on those conditions which are essential for the "lawful" detention of a person according to Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) (see the above-mentioned E. v. Norway judgment, p. 21, para. 50). 128. The Court refers again to the requirements of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) in cases of detention with a view to deportation (see paragraph 112 above). It follows from these requirements that Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) does not demand that the domestic courts should have the power to review whether the underlying decision to expel could be justified under national or Convention law. 129. The notion of "lawfulness" in Article 5 para. 1 (f) (art. 5-1-f) does not refer solely to the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law; it requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of Article 5 (art. 5) (see paragraph 118 above). The question therefore arises whether the available proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of Mr Chahal's detention and to seek bail provided an adequate control by the domestic courts. 130. The Court recollects that, because national security was involved, the domestic courts were not in a position to review whether the decisions to detain Mr Chahal and to keep him in detention were justified on national security grounds (see paragraph 121 above). Furthermore, although the procedure before the advisory panel undoubtedly provided some degree of control, bearing in mind that Mr Chahal was not entitled to legal representation before the panel, that he was only given an outline of the grounds for the notice of intention to deport, that the panel had no power of decision and that its advice to the Home Secretary was not binding and was not disclosed (see paragraphs 30, 32 and 60 above), the panel could not be considered as a "court" within the meaning of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) (see, mutatis mutandis, the X v. the United Kingdom judgment of 5 November 1981, Series A no. 46, p. 26, para. 61). 131. The Court recognises that the use of confidential material may be unavoidable where national security is at stake. This does not mean, however, that the national authorities can be free from effective control by the domestic courts whenever they choose to assert that national security and terrorism are involved (see, mutatis mutandis, the Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom judgment of 30 August 1990, Series A no. 182, p. 17, para. 34, and the Murray v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 October 1994, Series A no. 300-A, p. 27, para. 58). The Court attaches significance to the fact that, as the intervenors pointed out in connection with Article 13 (art. 13) (see paragraph 144 below), in Canada a more effective form of judicial control has been developed in cases of this type. This example illustrates that there are techniques which can be employed which both accommodate legitimate security concerns about the nature and sources of intelligence information and yet accord the individual a substantial measure of procedural justice. 132. It follows that the Court considers that neither the proceedings for habeas corpus and for judicial review of the decision to detain Mr Chahal before the domestic courts, nor the advisory panel procedure, satisfied the requirements of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4). This shortcoming is all the more significant given that Mr Chahal has undoubtedly been deprived of his liberty for a length of time which is bound to give rise to serious concern (see paragraph 123 above). 133. In conclusion, there has been a violation of Article 5 para. 4 of the Convention (art. 5-4). III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION (art. 8) 134. All four of the applicants complained that if Mr Chahal were deported to India this would amount to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (art. 8), which states (so far as is relevant): "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security ..." 135. It was not contested by the Government that the deportation would constitute an interference with the Article 8 para. 1 (art. 8-1) rights of the applicants to respect for their family life. The applicants, for their part, conceded that the interference would be "in accordance with the law" and would pursue a legitimate aim for the purposes of Article 8 para. 2 (art. 8-2). The only material question in this connection was, therefore, whether the interference (that is, the deportation) would be "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security", within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (art. 8-2). 136. The Government asserted that Mr Chahal's deportation would be necessary and proportionate in view of the threat he represented to the national security of the United Kingdom and the wide margin of appreciation afforded to States in this type of case. 137. The applicants denied that Mr Chahal's deportation could be justified on national security grounds and emphasised that, if there were cogent evidence that he had been involved in terrorist activity, a criminal prosecution could have been brought against him in the United Kingdom. 138. The Commission acknowledged that States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation under the Convention where matters of national security are in issue, but was not satisfied that the grave recourse of deportation was in all the circumstances necessary and proportionate. 139. The Court recalls its finding that the deportation of the first applicant to India would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (art. 3) (see paragraph 107 above). Having no reason to doubt that the respondent Government will comply with the present judgment, it considers that it is not necessary to decide the hypothetical question whether, in the event of expulsion to India, there would also be a violation of the applicants' rights under Article 8 of the Convention (art. 8). IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION (art. 13) 140. In addition, the applicants alleged that they were not provided with effective remedies before the national courts, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention (art. 13), which reads: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity." 141. The applicants maintained that the only remedy available to them in respect of their claims under Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention (art. 3, art. 5, art. 8) was judicial review, the advisory panel procedure (see paragraphs 29 and 60 above) being neither a "remedy" nor "effective". They submitted, first, that the powers of the English courts to put aside an executive decision were inadequate in all Article 3 (art. 3) asylum cases, since the courts could not scrutinise the facts to determine whether substantial grounds had been shown for belief in the existence of a real risk of ill-treatment in the receiving State, but could only determine whether the Secretary of State's decision as to the existence of such a risk was reasonable according to the" Wednesbury" principles (see paragraph 66 above). This contention had particular weight in cases where the executive relied upon arguments of national security. In the instant case, the assertion that Mr Chahal's deportation was necessary in the interests of national security entailed that there could be no effective judicial evaluation of the risk to him of ill-treatment in India or of the issues under Article 8 (art. 8). That assertion likewise prevented any effective judicial control on the question whether the applicant's continued detention was justified. 142. The Government accepted that the scope of judicial review was more limited where deportation was ordered on national security grounds. However, the Court had held in the past that, where questions of national security were in issue, an "effective remedy" under Article 13 (art. 13) must mean "a remedy that is effective as can be", given the necessity of relying upon secret sources of information (see the Klass and Others v. Germany judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, p. 31, para. 69, and the Leander v. Sweden judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p. 32, para. 84). Furthermore, it had to be borne in mind that all the relevant material, including the sensitive material, was examined by the advisory panel whose members included two senior judicial figures - a Court of Appeal judge and a former president of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (see paragraph 29 above). The procedure before the panel was designed, on the one hand, to satisfy the need for an independent review of the totality of the material on which the perceived threat to national security was based and, on the other hand, to ensure that secret information would not be publicly disclosed. It thus provided a form of independent, quasi-judicial scrutiny. 143. For the Commission, the present case could be distinguished from that of Vilvarajah and Others (cited at paragraph 73 above, p. 39, paras. 122-26) where the Court held that judicial review in the English courts amounted to an effective remedy in respect of the applicants' Article 3 (art. 3) claims. Because the Secretary of State invoked national security considerations as grounds for his decisions to deport Mr Chahal and to detain him pending deportation, the English courts' powers of review were limited. They could not themselves consider the evidence on which the Secretary of State had based his decision that the applicant constituted a danger to national security or undertake any evaluation of the Article 3 (art. 3) risks. Instead, they had to confine themselves to examining whether the evidence showed that the Secretary of State had carried out the balancing exercise required by the domestic law (see paragraph 41 above). 144. The intervenors (see paragraph 6 above) were all of the view that judicial review did not constitute an effective remedy in cases involving national security. Article 13 (art. 13) required at least that some independent body should be appraised of all the facts and evidence and entitled to reach a decision which would be binding on the Secretary of State. In this connection, Amnesty International, Liberty, the AIRE Centre and JCWI (see paragraph 6 above) drew the Court's attention to the procedure applied in such cases in Canada. Under the Canadian Immigration Act 1976 (as amended by the Immigration Act 1988), a Federal Court judge holds an in camera hearing of all the evidence, at which the applicant is provided with a statement summarising, as far as possible, the case against him or her and has the right to be represented and to call evidence. The confidentiality of security material is maintained by requiring such evidence to be examined in the absence of both the applicant and his or her representative. However, in these circumstances, their place is taken by a security-cleared counsel instructed by the court, who cross-examines the witnesses and generally assists the court to test the strength of the State's case. A summary of the evidence obtained by this procedure, with necessary deletions, is given to the applicant. 145. The Court observes that Article 13 (art. 13) guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of this Article (art. 13) is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their obligations under this provision (art. 13) (see the Vilvarajah and Others judgment cited at paragraph 73 above, p. 39, para. 122). Moreover, it is recalled that in certain circumstances the aggregate of remedies provided by national law may satisfy the requirements of Article 13 (art. 13) (see, inter alia, the above-mentioned Leander judgment, p. 30, para. 77). 146. The Court does not have to examine the allegation of a breach of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 5 para. 1 (art. 13+5-1), in view of its finding of a violation of Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) (see paragraph 133 above). Nor is it necessary for it to examine the complaint under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 (art. 13+8), in view of its finding concerning the hypothetical nature of the complaint under the latter provision (art. 8) (see paragraph 139 above). 147. This leaves only the first applicant's claim under Article 3 combined with Article 13 (art. 13+3). It was not disputed that the Article 3 (art. 3) complaint was arguable on the merits and the Court accordingly finds that Article 13 (art. 13) is applicable (see the above-mentioned Vilvarajah and Others judgment, p. 38, para. 121). 148. The Court recalls that in its Vilvarajah and Others judgment (ibid., p. 39, paras. 122-26), it found judicial review proceedings to be an effective remedy in relation to the applicants' complaints under Article 3 (art. 3). It was satisfied that the English courts could review a decision by the Secretary of State to refuse asylum and could rule it unlawful on the grounds that it was tainted with illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety (see paragraph 66 above). In particular, it was accepted that a court would have jurisdiction to quash a challenged decision to send a fugitive to a country where it was established that there was a serious risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, on the ground that in all the circumstances of the case the decision was one that no reasonable Secretary of State could take (ibid., para. 123). 149. The Court further recalls that in assessing whether there exists a real risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 (art. 3) in expulsion cases such as the present, the fact that the person is perceived as a danger to the national security of the respondent State is not a material consideration (see paragraph 80 above). 150. It is true, as the Government have pointed out, that in the cases of Klass and Others and Leander (both cited at paragraph 142 above), the Court held that Article 13 (art. 13) only required a remedy that was "as effective as can be" in circumstances where national security considerations did not permit the divulging of certain sensitive information. However, it must be borne in mind that these cases concerned complaints under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention (art. 8, art. 10) and that their examination required the Court to have regard to the national security claims which had been advanced by the Government. The requirement of a remedy which is "as effective as can be" is not appropriate in respect of a complaint that a person's deportation will expose him or her to a real risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 (art. 3), where the issues concerning national security are immaterial. 151. In such cases, given the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk of ill-treatment materialised and the importance the Court attaches to Article 3 (art. 3), the notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 (art. 13) requires independent scrutiny of the claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3). This scrutiny must be carried out without regard to what the person may have done to warrant expulsion or to any perceived threat to the national security of the expelling State. 152. Such scrutiny need not be provided by a judicial authority but, if it is not, the powers and guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective (see the above-mentioned Leander judgment, p. 29, para. 77). 153. In the present case, neither the advisory panel nor the courts could review the decision of the Home Secretary to deport Mr Chahal to India with reference solely to the question of risk, leaving aside national security considerations. On the contrary, the courts' approach was one of satisfying themselves that the Home Secretary had balanced the risk to Mr Chahal against the danger to national security (see paragraph 41 above). It follows from the above considerations that these cannot be considered effective remedies in respect of Mr Chahal's Article 3 (art. 3) complaint for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention (art. 13). 154. Moreover, the Court notes that in the proceedings before the advisory panel the applicant was not entitled, inter alia, to legal representation, that he was only given an outline of the grounds for the notice of intention to deport, that the panel had no power of decision and that its advice to the Home Secretary was not binding and was not disclosed (see paragraphs 30, 32 and 60 above). In these circumstances, the advisory panel could not be considered to offer sufficient procedural safeguards for the purposes of Article 13 (art. 13). 155. Having regard to the extent of the deficiencies of both the judicial review proceedings and the advisory panel, the Court cannot consider that the remedies taken together satisfy the requirements of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 (art. 13+3). Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 13 (art. 13). V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE CONVENTION (art. 50) 156. The applicants asked the Court to grant them just satisfaction under Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50), which provides as follows: "If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the present Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party." A. Non-pecuniary damage 157. The applicants claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage for the period of detention suffered by Mr Chahal at a rate of £30,000-£50,000 per annum. The Government submitted that a finding of violation would be sufficient just satisfaction in respect of the claim for non-pecuniary damage. 158. In view of its decision that there has been no violation of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) (see paragraph 123 above), the Court makes no award for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the period of time Mr Chahal has spent in detention. As to the other complaints, the Court considers that the findings that his deportation, if carried out, would constitute a violation of Article 3 (art. 3) and that there have been breaches of Articles 5 para. 4 and 13 (art. 5-4, art. 13) constitute sufficient just satisfaction. B. Legal costs and expenses 159. In addition, the applicants claimed the reimbursement of the legal costs of the Strasbourg proceedings, totalling £77,755.97 (inclusive of value-added tax, "VAT"). With regard to the legal costs claimed, the Government observed that a substantial proportion of these were not necessarily incurred because the applicants had produced a large amount of peripheral material before the Court. They proposed instead a sum of £20,000, less legal aid. 160. The Court considers the legal costs claimed by the applicants to be excessive and decides to award £45,000 (inclusive of VAT), less the 21,141 French francs already paid in legal aid by the Council of Europe. C. Default interest 161. According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of interest applicable in the United Kingdom at the date of adoption of the present judgment is 8% per annum.
The Court held that there would be a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) if the deportation order to India were to be enforced. The Court was not satisfied by the assurances given by the Indian Government.