Interception of communications, phone tapping and secret surveillance
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. The Constitution 35. Articles 37 and 38 of the Constitution, which provide for the protection of privacy of correspondence and other means of communication and the protection of personal data, respectively, provide as follows: Article 37 “The privacy of correspondence and other means of communication shall be guaranteed. Only a law may prescribe that on the basis of a court order the protection of the privacy of correspondence and other means of communication and the inviolability of personal privacy be suspended for a set time where such is necessary for the institution or course of criminal proceedings or for reasons of national security.” Article 38 “The protection of personal data shall be guaranteed. The use of personal data contrary to the purpose for which it was collected is prohibited. The collection, processing, designated use, supervision, and protection of the confidentiality of personal data shall be provided for by law. Everyone has the right of access to the collected personal data that relates to him and the right to judicial protection in the event of any abuse of such data.” B. Criminal Procedure Act 36. Section 149b of the Criminal Procedure Act (Official Gazette no. 8/06), in the chapter regulating measures taken by the police in pre-trial proceedings, provided: “(1) If there are grounds for suspecting that a criminal offence for which a perpetrator is prosecuted ex officio has been committed, is being committed or is being prepared or organised, and information on communications using electronic communications networks needs to be obtained in order to uncover this criminal offence or the perpetrator thereof, the investigating judge may, at the request of the public prosecutor adducing reasonable grounds, order the operator of the electronic communications network to furnish him with information on the participants and the circumstances and facts of electronic communications, such as: the number or other form of identification of users of electronic communications services; the type, date, time and duration of the call or other form of electronic communications service; the quantity of data transmitted; and the place where the electronic communications service was performed. (2) The request and order must be in written form and must contain information that allows the means of electronic communication to be identified, an indication of reasonable grounds, the time period for which the information is required and other important circumstances that dictate use of the measure. (3) If there are grounds for suspecting that a criminal offence for which a perpetrator is prosecuted ex officio has been committed or is being prepared, and information on the owner or user of a certain means of electronic communication whose details are not available in the relevant directory, as well as information on the time that the means of communication was or is in use, needs to be obtained in order to uncover this criminal offence or the perpetrator thereof, the police may request that the operator of the electronic communications network furnish them with this information, at their written request and even without the consent of the individual to whom the information refers. (4) The operator of electronic communications networks may not disclose to its clients or a third party the fact that it has given certain information to an investigating judge (first paragraph of this section) or the police (preceding paragraph), or that it intends to do so.” C. Electronic Communications Act 37. At the time the data in question were obtained (August 2006), the Electronic Communications Act ( “ECA”, Official Gazette nos. 43/04 and 86/04) was in force. This Act implemented, among other things, Directive 2002/58/EC (see paragraph 56 below). The following provisions were relevant: Section 1 Content of the Act “This Act regulates the conditions for the provision of electronic communication networks and for the provision of electronic communication services ... determines the rights of users ... regulates the protection of the secrecy and confidentiality of electronic communications and regulates other questions related to electronic communications.” Section 3 Terms used “ The terms used in this Act have the following meaning: ... 25. Traffic data are any data processed for the purpose of the conveyance of communication on an electronic communications network or for the billing thereof. ... ” Section 103 Confidentiality of communications “ (1) Confidentiality of communications refers to : 1. the content of communications; 2. traffic data and location data connected to the communication mentioned in subsection (1)1 above; 3. facts and circumstances relating to unsuccessful attempts to establish connections. (2) An operator and anyone involved in the provision and performance of its activities must continue to safeguard the confidentiality of communications after ceasing performance of the activity for which it was bound to safeguard confidentiality. (3) Those entities liable under subsection (2) above may only obtain the information on communications referred to in subsection (1) above to the extent necessary for the provision of specific publicly available communications services, and may only use or transfer [ posreduje ] this information to others in order to provide these services. (4) Where operators obtain information on the content of communications or record or retain communications and the traffic data related to them under subsection (3) above, they must notify the user of this when the subscriber contract is signed or upon the commencement of provision of the publicly available communications service, and erase information on the content of communications or the communications themselves as soon as this is technically feasible and the information is no longer necessary for the provision of the particular publicly available communications service. (5) All forms of surveillance or interception, such as listening, tapping, recording, retention and transfer [ posredovanje ] of the communications referred to in subsection (1) above shall be prohibited, unless this is permitted under subsection (4) above or under section 107 of this Act, or if this form of surveillance or interception is necessary for the sending of messages (e.g. facsimile messages, electronic mail, electronic mailboxes, voicemail and SMS services). ... ” Section 104 Traffic data “ (1) Traffic data relating to subscribers and users, and processed and stored by the operator, should be deleted or rendered anonymous, as soon as they are no longer needed for the transfer of messages. (2) Without prejudice to the provision of subsection (1) above, an operator may, until complete payment for a service but no longer than until the expiry of the limitation period, retain and process traffic data required for the purposes of calculation and of payment relating to interconnection. (3) For the purpose of marketing electronic communications services or for the provision of value-added services, the provider of a publicly available electronic communications service may process the data referred to in subsection (1) above to the extent and for the duration necessary for such services or marketing, but only if the subscriber or user to whom the data relate has given his prior consent. Subscribers or users must be informed, prior to giving consent, of the types of traffic data which are processed and the duration of such processing. A user or subscriber shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. (4) For the purposes referred to in subsection (2) above, a service provider must indicate in the general terms and conditions which traffic data will be retained and processed, and the duration thereof, and declare that they will be treated in accordance with the law on data protection. (5) Traffic data may only be processed under subsections (1) to (4) above by persons acting under the authority of an operator and handling billing or traffic management, responding to customer enquiries, detecting fraud, marketing electronic communications services or providing a value-added service, and this processing must be limited to what is necessary for the purposes of such activities. (6) Without prejudice to the provisions of subsections (1), (2), (3) and (5) above, an operator shall, upon a written request of a competent body set up for the purpose of settling disputes, in particular interconnection or billing disputes, and in accordance with the applicable legislation, send traffic data to such body. ” Section 107 Lawful interception of communications “ ... (2) An operator should enable the lawful interception of communications at a determined point of the public communication network as soon as it receives a copy of the operative part of the order of the competent authority indicating the point ... at which a lawful interception of communications should take place and other data related to the means, scope and duration of this measure. ” 38. Further amendments to the ECA, namely ECA-A, which were enacted on 28 November 2006, that is after the contested measures had been taken in the present case ( Official Gazette no. 129/06 ), regulated the retention of traffic data for the purposes of, inter alia, criminal proceedings. This included data necessary for the identification of the source of communication, such as the name and address of the subscriber to whom a certain IP address was assigned, data needed for the identification of the destination of communications, and data needed to identify the date, time and duration of communications (sections 107.a and 107.b). No distinction between the static and the dynamic IP address was made in this regard. Furthermore, the amendment, introduced by section 107.č, stipulated that the operator was under an obligation to allow access to or to transfer the retained data immediately and no later than three days after receiving the transcript of the “order” issued by the “competent body”. Section 107.e of the amended Act provided that “the court that has ordered that certain data be accessed should keep a record of data concerning orders for access and transfer of the retained data ”. It also regulated the reporting procedure on access to retained data – from the courts to the Ministry of Justice and then from the ministry to the European Commission. 39. On 20 December 2012 a new Electronic Communications Act (“ECA-1”, Official Gazette 109/2012) was adopted. Its sections 166 and 168 provide as follows: Section 166 Transfer of retained data to competent bodies “ (1) An operator must, immediately or without undue delay, transfer retained data as soon as it receives a copy of the operative part of an order from a competent body stating all the required data on the scope of access. ... (4) An operator may not disclose an order to the persons to whom the order ... relates or to third parties, nor disclose that it has transferred or will transfer retained data to the competent body under this section. ... (7) The information commissioner shall monitor the fulfilment of the obligations by the providers under this section, in so far as they do not fall under the supervision of other competent bodies on the basis of other laws.” Section 168 Data on access orders and data transfers “ (1) A court that has ordered access to data shall keep a record of access orders and the transfers of data retained pursuant to section 166 of this Act, comprising: 1. the number of cases in which access to retained data was ordered; 2. a statement of the date or period for which the data was requested, the date on which the competent body issued the data access order and the date of the transfer of the data; 3. the number of cases in which data access orders could not be executed. (2) The competent court shall forward the record referred to in subsection (1) above for the current year to the ministry responsible for justice by no later than 31 January the following year. (3) The ministry responsible for justice shall, on the basis of the records received from all courts, prepare a joint report on access to retained data by no later than 20 February each year for the previous year. It shall forward it to the ministry, which shall in turn forward it without delay to the European Commission and to the National Assembly Committee responsible for supervising the intelligence and security services. (4) The ministry responsible for justice shall, after obtaining the prior opinion of the President of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, issue instructions using the reporting forms under this section. ” D. Personal Data Protection Act 40. Further to Slovenia becoming a member of the European Union, the Slovenian Parliament adopted, on 15 July 2004, a new Personal Data Protection Act (Official Gazette no. 86/ 04 ), underpinned by Directive 95/46/ES (see paragraph 53 below). It provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: Section 1 Contents of the Act “This Act determines the rights, responsibilities, principles and measures to prevent unconstitutional, unlawful and unjustified encroachments on the privacy and dignity of an individual (hereinafter: individual) in the processing of personal data.” Section 6 Meaning of terms “The terms used in this Act shall have the following meanings: 1. Personal data - are any data relating to an individual, irrespective of the form in which they are expressed. 2. Individual - is an identified or identifiable natural person to whom personal data relate; an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity, where the method of identification does not incur significant costs or a disproportionate effort or require a large amount of time. ... 18. Anonymising - is an alteration to the form of personal data such that they can no longer be linked to the individual or where such link can only be made with disproportionate efforts, expense or use of time. 19. Sensitive personal data - are data on racial, national or ethnic origin, political, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, health status, sexual life, ... ” 41. Section 2 of the Personal Data Protection Act provided that personal data should be processed lawfully and fairly. Section 8 provided that personal data could be processed if the law provided for doing so or on the basis of the consent of the individual affected. Under section 12, personal data could be processed without any other legal basis if this was urgently necessary for the protection of a person ’ s life or limb. 42. The Personal Data Protection Act also provided that data could be collected only for defined and lawful purposes and processed accordingly ( section 16) and only on condition that this was necessary for the achievement of those purposes ( section 21). Thereafter they should be deleted, destroyed, blocked or anonymised (ibid). The Act also set out the measures and procedures that should be taken by operators and contracted processors to secure personal data, and to prevent accidental or deliberate unauthorised destruction of data, their alteration, loss or unauthorised processing ( sections 24 and 25). E. Criminal Code 43. The Criminal Code applicable at the material time prohibited, in its Article 187, the presentation of pornographic material to minors under the age of fourteen and the manufacturing and distributing of pornographic material depicting minors. The relevant provision reads as follows: “ ... (2) Whosoever abuses a minor for the manufacturing of pornographic pictures, audio-visual or other objects of pornographic content, or uses a minor to act in a pornographic performance, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of between six months and five years. (3) Whosoever produces, distributes, sells, imports or exports pornographic or other sexual material depicting minors, supplies it in any other way, or possesses such material with the intent of producing, distributing, selling, importing, exporting or offering it in any other way, shall be liable to the same sentence as in subsection (2) above. ... ” F. Constitutional Court decision no. Up-106/05 of 2 October 2008 44. Case no. Up-106/05 concerned a complainant who had been convicted of the illicit manufacture and trade in narcotics, based on data (a list of telephone numbers and text messages) obtained from his SIM card, without a court order. He complained that his conviction had been based on unlawfully obtained evidence, as the police had monitored his mobile telephone communication without a court order. The Constitutional Court upheld the complaint and quashed the lower courts ’ judgments. 45. The Constitutional Court found that not only the content of the communication but also the circumstances and facts connected to the communication were protected, including the data stored in the telephone ’ s memory, which were an integral element of communication privacy. Therefore, obtaining data on the last dialled and last unanswered calls entailed an examination of the content and circumstances of the communication, and were consequently an interference with the right determined in the first paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitution. The court pointed out that such interference was, pursuant to Article 37 § 2 of the Constitution, admissible if the following conditions were met: ( 1) the interference was prescribed by law; ( 2) the interference was allowed on the basis of a court order; ( 3) the duration of the interference was precisely determined; and ( 4) the interference was necessary for the institution or course of criminal proceedings or for reasons of national security. III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW A. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 46. The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (opened for signature on 28 January 1981, ETS No. 108, hereinafter “the 1981 Convention”) was ratified by all Council of Europe Member States and entered into force with respect to Slovenia on 1 September 1994. Article 1 sets out the object and purpose of the Convention, which is “to secure in the territory of each Party for every individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him ( ‘ data protection ’ ).” The 1981 Convention, among other things, protects individuals against abuses and applies to all data processing carried out by both the private and public sector, such as data processing by the judiciary and law - enforcement authorities. In Article 2 “ personal data ” are defined as any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual. Article 5 requires that personal data undergoing automatic processing be obtained and processed fairly and lawfully. B. Convention on Cybercrime 47. The Convention on Cybercrime ( opened for signature on 23 November 2001, came into force on 1 July 2004, ETS No. 185, hereinafter “the Cybercrime Convention”) took effect in Slovenia on 1 January 2005. 48. The Cybercrime Convention is the first international treaty on crimes committed via the Internet and is open to all States. It requires countries to establish as criminal offences, among others, child pornography. 49. Article 1 defines, for the purposes of the Cybercrime Convention, “ traffic data ” as “any computer data relating to a communication by means of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of communication, indicating the communication ’ s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service.” Its Explanatory Report further provides, in the relevant part, as follows ( § 30) : “The ‘ origin ’ refers to a telephone number, Internet Protocol (IP) address, or similar identification of a communications facility to which a service provider renders services. The ‘ destination ’ refers to a comparable indication of a communications facility to which communications are transmitted. The term ‘ type of underlying service ’ refers to the type of service that is being used within the network, e.g., file transfer, electronic mail, or instant messaging.” 50. Pursuant to the Cybercrime Convention the following measures should be available to the authorities to combat the crimes listed therein: Article 18 – Production order “1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to order: ... b ) a service provider offering its services in the territory of the Party to submit subscriber information relating to such services in that service provider ’ s possession or control. 2. The powers and procedures referred to in this article shall be subject to Articles 14 and 15. 3. For the purpose of this article, the term ‘ subscriber information ’ means any information contained in the form of computer data or any other form that is held by a service provider, relating to subscribers of its services other than traffic or content data and by which can be established: a ) the type of communication service used, the technical provisions taken thereto and the period of service; b ) the subscriber ’ s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access number, billing and payment information, available on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement; c ) any other information on the site of the installation of communication equipment, available on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement.” Article 20 – Real-time collection of traffic data “ 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to: a) collect or record through the application of technical means on the territory of that Party, and b) compel a service provider, within its existing technical capability: ( i ) to collect or record through the application of technical means on the territory of that Party; or ( ii ) to co-operate and assist the competent authorities in the collection or recording of, traffic data, in real-time, associated with specified communications in its territory transmitted by means of a computer system. ... 4. The powers and procedures referred to in this article shall be subject to Articles 14 and 15.” Article 21 – Interception of content data “ 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary, in relation to a range of serious offences to be determined by domestic law, to empower its competent authorities to: a) collect or record through the application of technical means on the territory of that Party, and b) compel a service provider, within its existing technical capability: ( i ) to collect or record through the application of technical means on the territory of that Party, or ( ii ) to co-operate and assist the competent authorities in the collection or recording of, content data, in real-time, of specified communications in its territory transmitted by means of a computer system. ... 4. The powers and procedures referred to in this article shall be subject to Articles 14 and 15.” 51. With regard to the production order, the Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime ( Budapest, 23 November 2001, ETS No. 185 ) states that, in the course of a criminal investigation, subscriber information may be needed mainly in two situations. Firstly, to identify which services and related technical measures have been used or are being used by a subscriber, such as the type of telephone service used, the type of other associated services used (for example, call forwarding, voicemail), or the telephone number or other technical address (for example, the email address). Secondly, where a technical address is known, subscriber information is needed in order to assist in establishing the identity of the person concerned. According to the explanatory report, a production order provides a less intrusive and less onerous measure which law - enforcement authorities can apply instead of measures such as interception of content data and real-time collection of traffic data, which must or can be limited only to serious offences. 52. The Cybercrime Convention requires that the aforementioned measures provided for in Articles 18, 20 and 21 be subject to the conditions set out in Articles 14 and 15, which, as far as relevant, read as follows: Article 14 – Scope of procedural provisions “1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish the powers and procedures provided for in this section for the purpose of specific criminal investigations or proceedings. ... ” Article 15 – Conditions and safeguards “1. Each Party shall ensure that the establishment, implementation and application of the powers and procedures provided for in this Section are subject to conditions and safeguards provided for under its domestic law, which shall provide for the adequate protection of human rights and liberties, including rights arising pursuant to obligations it has undertaken under the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1966 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other applicable international human rights instruments, and which shall incorporate the principle of proportionality. 2. Such conditions and safeguards shall, as appropriate in view of the nature of the procedure or power concerned, inter alia, include judicial or other independent supervision, grounds justifying application, and limitation of the scope and the duration of such power or procedure.” IV. RELEVANT EUROPEAN UNION LAW A. Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 53. Article 2 (1) (a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31, hereinafter “the Data Protection Directive”) provides that “ personal data ” means “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ( ‘ data subject ’ )”. Furthermore, under the aforementioned provision, an “ identifiable person ” is “one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity”. The Data Protection Directive does not apply to the area of police and criminal justice. 54. Recital 26 provides that in determining whether a person is identifiable, “ account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used ... to identify the said person ”; the principles of protection will not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable. 55. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119/1, p. 1 ), entered into force on 24 May 2016. When it takes effect (25 May 2018), it will replace the Data Protection Directive. Article 4 defines an “ identifiable natural person ” as “one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier ... ”. Recital 26 further provides that, in ascertaining whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, “account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments.” It further explains that “[t]he principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable.” B. Directive 2002/58/EC 56. In addition, specifically for the field of electronic communications, Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ 2002 L 201, p. 37 ) was adopted on 12 July 2002. It does not apply to the area of police and criminal justice but harmonises the provisions of the member States required to ensure an equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data in the electronic communications sector. Article 2 provides a definition of a “ user ” as meaning “any natural person using a publicly available electronic communications service, for private or business purposes, without necessarily having subscribed to this service”. It further defines “ traffic data ” as “any data processed for the purpose of the conveyance of a communication on an electronic communications network or for the billing thereof”. Moreover, it defines “ communication ” as “any information exchanged or conveyed between a finite number of parties by means of a publicly available electronic communications service”. C. Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA and Directive (EU) 2016/680 57. Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters ( OJ 2008 L 350, p. 60, hereinafter “ Data Protection Framework Decision ” ) aims at providing protection of personal data of natural persons when their personal data are processed for the purpose of preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting a criminal offence or of executing a criminal penalty. The Data Protection Framework Decision relies to a large extent on the principles and definitions which are contained in the 1981 Convention and in the Data Protection Directive. 58. Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 89) governs the handling of data by competent authorities, such as police and criminal justice authorities, for the purposes of, inter alia, investigation and prosecution of criminal offence. Article 3(1) contains the same definition of “ identifiable natural person ” and recital 21 the same explanation concerning the means of identification as the General Data Protection Regulation (see paragraph 55 above). Furthermore, Article 4 requires that personal data should be, inter alia, processed lawfully and fairly. Article 1 (3) provides that member States may provide for higher safeguards than those contained in the directive. 59. The directive replaces Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA with effect from 6 May 2018. D. Selected decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union 60. As regards the concept of “ personal data ” under Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) found in a judgment of 24 November 2011 in Scarlet Extended, C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771, paragraph 51, that users ’ IP addresses “were protected personal data because they allow those users to be precisely identified”. 61. In its judgment of 19 October 2016 in Breyer, C-582/14, EU:C:2016:779, the CJEU dealt with the question of the specific character of dynamic IP addresses. It noted as follows : “[ 15] IP addresses are series of digits assigned to networked computers to facilitate their communication over the internet. When a website is accessed, the IP address of the computer seeking access is communicated to the server on which the website consulted is stored. That connection is necessary so that the data accessed maybe transferred to the correct recipient. [16] Furthermore, it is clear from the order for the reference and the documents before the Court that internet service providers allocate to the computers of internet users either a ‘ static ’ IP address or a ‘ dynamic ’ IP address, that is to say an IP address which changes each time there is a new connection to the internet. Unlike static IP addresses, dynamic IP addresses do not enable a link to be established, through files accessible to the public, between a given computer and the physical connection to the network used by the internet service provider.” 62. The CJEU was of the view that a dynamic IP address did not constitute information relating to an “ identified natural person ”, since such an address did not directly reveal the identity of the natural person who owned the computer from which a website had been accessed, or that of another person who might have used that computer (ibid, § 38). The CJEU went on to determine whether a dynamic IP address, in that case registered by an online media service provider, may be treated as data relating to an “ identifiable natural person ” within the meaning of Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive. For that purpose the CJEU, relying on recital 26, considered whether the possibility to combine the dynamic IP address, which was in the case at issue in the hands of the online media service provider, with the additional data held by the ISP constituted a means likely reasonably to be used to identify the data subject (§§ 41 and 45). The ECJU drew the following conclusion on that point: “[49] Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person.” V. COMPARATIVE LAW A. German Federal Constitutional Court 63. The applicant referred to the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (“ the GFCC”) of 24 January 2012, BVerfG, 1 BvR 1299/05. The GFCC partly upheld complaints concerning, inter alia, manual retrieval of information on dynamic IP addresses stored by the telecommunications service providers. 64. Under section 113 of the Telecommunications Act (“ the TCA ”) the telecommunications service providers were required to supply, at the request of the competent (including law - enforcement) agencies, information on certain data collected, for the purpose of, inter alia, prosecuting criminal offences or regulatory offences. The impugned statutory provision was designed to be able to attribute if possible all telecommunications numbers to their respective subscribers (and in addition, ultimately, if possible, to their users). As found by the GFCC, the provision gave no specific thresholds of encroachment which would have defined its scope in more detail. Instead, it always permitted information in the individual case if this was necessary to perform the aforementioned duties. The GFCC did not find this in itself unconstitutional. However, the question that also arose was whether the impugned provision also covered information on the owner of a dynamic IP address. At the outset, the GFCC addressed the issue of a link between the subscriber information and the pre-existing content information which could be attributed to it. It found as follows ( § 113, a citation from a translation provided on the GFCC ’ s website ): “ ... the secrecy of telecommunications [Article 10.1 of the Basic Law] does not protect the confidentiality of the circumstances of each provision of telecommunications services, such as for example the attribution of the telecommunications numbers allocated by the service providers to particular subscribers.” 65. The GFCC went on to note the distinction between static and dynamic IP addresses, finding as follows ( §§ 115 and 116): “ ... the attribution of a static IP address to a particular subscriber – more precisely, to a network interface of the subscriber – as a rule also gives indirect information on a particular telecommunications event involving the person in question, since such addresses, even if they are static, are registered and become the subject of attributions identifying an individual almost only in connection with specific communications events. However, here too the conveying of information in this connection is as such limited exclusively to the abstract attribution of number and subscriber. ... In contrast, the situation is different when dynamic IP addresses are attributed to identified persons, for such addresses are particularly closely related to specific telecommunications events. This attribution is within the area of protection of Article 10.1 of the Basic Law. However, here too this does not automatically follow from the fact that the attribution of a dynamic IP address necessarily always relates to a specific telecommunications event of which it therefore indirectly also provides information. For in this connection too the information itself only relates to data which are abstractly attributed to a subscriber. There is therefore no fundamental difference from the attribution of static IP addresses. However, the application of Article 10.1 of the Basic Law is here based on the fact that when the telecommunications enterprises identify a dynamic IP address, they have to take an intermediate step, in which they examine the relevant connection data of their customers, that is, [they] must access specific telecommunications events. These telecommunications connections individually stored by the service providers are subject to the secrecy of telecommunications, irrespective of whether they have to be kept available by the service providers under a statutory duty ... or whether they are stored by them on a contractual basis. Insofar as the legislature imposes a duty on the telecommunications enterprises to access these data and to evaluate them in the interest of the state ’ s performance of its duties, this is an encroachment upon Article 10.1 of the Basic Law. This is the case not only if the service providers must supply the connection data themselves, but also if they have to use the data as a preliminary question for information. ” 66. The GFCC concluded that section 113.1 of the TCA was in breach of Article 10.1 of the Basic Law to the extent that it was a basis for the supply of information on dynamic IP addresses. 67. Furthermore, although the GFCC did not find automated retrieval of data ( section 12 of the TCA) concerning the static IP address unconstitutional, such a finding was made against the limited use of such addresses in the following context ( §§ 160 and 161) : “ ... The allocation of static IP addresses, whose attribution is at present in any case publicly accessibly in practice, is essentially restricted to institutions and large-scale users. The possibility of retrieving such numbers has little weight in these circumstances. However, § 112 TKG [TCA] may acquire substantially greater weight of encroachment if static IP addresses in future – for example on the basis of Internet Protocol Version 6 – should become more widely used as the basis of internet communication. For the question of the weight of encroachment of the identification of an IP address does not primarily depend – even if a number of fundamental rights apply in this case – on whether an IP address is technically dynamic or static, but on the actual significance of the creation of a duty of information in this connection. But if in practice static IP addresses are allocated to a great extent to private persons too, this may possibly mean that the identities of internet users are broadly or at least largely determined and that communications events in the internet are de-anonymised not only for a limited period of time, but permanently. Such a far-reaching possibility of de-anonymisation of communication in the internet goes beyond the effect of a traditional telephone number register. ... [T]he weight for the person affected of the attribution of an IP address to a subscriber may not be equated to that of the identification of a telephone number, because the former makes it possible to access information whose scope and content are substantially more far-reaching .... In view of this increased information potential, the general possibility of the identification of IP addresses would only be constitutionally permissible subject to narrower limits ... ” B. The Canadian Supreme Court 68. The R v. Spencer (2014 SCC 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212) case concerned the retrieval, without prior judicial authorisation, of the appellant ’ s sister ’ s subscriber information associated with a dynamic IP address, which the police had obtained in relation to online file-sharing involving child pornography. On the basis of the subscriber information received from the ISP, the police obtained a search warrant against the appellant. The latter sought to exclude the evidence found on his computer on the basis that the police actions in obtaining his address from the ISP without prior judicial authorisation amounted to an unreasonable search contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada ( “the SCC ” ) of 13 June 2014, finding in favour of the appellant, was delivered by Judge Cromwell. 69. Referring to the previous case-law on the matter, the judgment noted that the reasonable expectation of privacy standard was normative rather than simply descriptive and that it was inevitably “laden with value judgments which [were] made from the independent perspective of the reasonable and informed person who [was] concerned about the long-term consequences of government action for the protection of privacy” ( § 18). The SCC, contrary to the opinion of the trial judge, found that the appellant ’ s subjective expectation of privacy was justified by the fact that he had been the one using the network connection to transmit sensitive information. The judgment went on to determine whether the appellant ’ s subjective expectation of privacy had been reasonable. For that purpose the judgment looked at two circumstances: the nature of the privacy interest at stake and the statutory and contractual framework governing the ISP ’ s disclosure of subscriber information. As to the former, Judge Cromwell drew the following conclusions: “ [ 31 Thus, it is clear that the tendency of information sought to support inferences in relation to other personal information must be taken into account in characterizing the subject matter of the search. [ 36 ] ... The analysis turns on the privacy of the area or the thing being searched and the impact of the search on its target, not the legal or illegal nature of the items sought ... [ 41 ] There is also a third conception of informational privacy that is particularly important in the context of Internet usage. This is the understanding of privacy as anonymity. In my view, the concept of privacy potentially protected by s. 8 [right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure] must include this understanding of privacy. [ 50 ] ... In the circumstances of this case, the police request to link a given IP address to subscriber information was in effect a request to link a specific person (or a limited number of persons in the case of shared Internet services) to specific online activities. This sort of request engages the anonymity aspect of the informational privacy interest by attempting to link the suspect with anonymously undertaken online activities, activities which have been recognized by the Court in other circumstances as engaging significant privacy interests .... [51] I conclude therefore that the police request to Shaw [ISP] for subscriber information corresponding to specifically observed, anonymous Internet activity engages a high level of informational privacy. I agree with Caldwell J.A. ’ s conclusion on this point: .. . a reasonable and informed person concerned about the protection of privacy would expect one ’ s activities on one ’ s own computer used in one ’ s own home would be private.. .. In my judgment, it matters not that the personal attributes of the Disclosed Information pertained to Mr. Spencer ’ s sister because Mr. Spencer was personally and directly exposed to the consequences of the police conduct in this case. As such, the police conduct prima facie engaged a personal privacy right of Mr. Spencer and, in this respect, his interest in the privacy of the Disclosed Information was direct and personal ... ” 70. The judgment also answered the concerns of the prosecution authorities to the effect that recognising a right to online anonymity would carve out a crime-friendly Internet landscape. While acknowledging that this concern could not be taken lightly, Judge Cromwell explained that recognising an interest could not be equated to a right to anonymity and that in the present case, for example, it had seemed clear that the police could have easily obtained a production order for the subscriber information. 71. As regards the question whether the expectation of privacy was reasonable in the face of the relevant contractual and statutory provisions, the judgment found that the ISP ’ s collection, use and disclosure of the personal information of its subscribers had been subject to the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act ( “ PIPEDA ” ), which protected personal information held by organisations engaged in commercial activity from being disclosed without the knowledge or consent of the person to whom the information related. The judgment found as follows: “[ 62 ] Section 7(3) ( c. 1)(ii) allows for disclosure without consent to a government institution where that institution has identified its lawful authority to obtain the information. But the issue is whether there was such lawful authority which in turn depends in part on whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the subscriber information. PIPEDA thus cannot be used as a factor to weigh against the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy ... Given that the purpose of PIPEDA is to establish rules governing, among other things, disclosure “of personal information in a manner that recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to their personal information” ( s. 3 ), it would be reasonable for an Internet user to expect that a simple request by police would not trigger an obligation to disclose personal information or defeat PIPEDA ’ s general prohibition on the disclosure of personal information without consent.” 72. The judgment went on to establish that the police request had had no lawful authority and that the information had therefore been obtained unconstitutionally. The court refused to draw a parallel with other police routine inquires, such as an interview with the victim of a crime. Referring to R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, it found as follows: “[ 67 ] ... In Duarte, the Court distinguished between a person repeating a conversation with a suspect to the police and the police procuring an audio recording of the same conversation. The Court held that the danger is ‘ not the risk that someone will repeat our words but the much more insidious danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words ’ ... Similarly in this case, the police request that the ISP disclose the subscriber information was in effect a request to link Mr. Spencer with precise online activity that had been the subject of monitoring by the police and thus engaged a more significant privacy interest than a simple question posed by the police in the course of an investigation.” THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 73. The applicant complained that his right to privacy had been breached because (i) the Internet service provider (hereinafter “ the ISP ” ) had retained his alleged personal data unlawfully and (ii) the police had obtained subscriber data associated with his dynamic IP address and consequently his identity arbitrarily, without a court order, in breach of Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” A. Admissibility 1. As regards the alleged unlawful retention of personal data by the Internet service provider (ISP) 74. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to complain to the domestic courts of the unlawful retention of his personal data by the ISP. Consequently, the domestic courts had not addressed this issue in the impugned decisions. They further argued that as the ISP was a private entity, the applicant could have sued it for damages in civil proceedings. One way or another, this part of the application should, in their view, be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion. 75. In addition, the Government maintained that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of Article 8 concerning the retention of the personal data, as those data had not concerned him but the Internet service subscriber, which was his father. 76. The applicant argued that the ISP had retained his personal data for almost six months without having a clear legal basis for such action and thus in violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In his observations, submitted on 15 October 2015, the applicant claimed that he had lodged his application with the Court not because the ISP had failed to keep his personal data secret or because it had retained them beyond the statutory time-limit, but because the State had obtained and used the data in question in the criminal proceedings against him. He argued that he had maintained, throughout the criminal proceedings, that the courts had relied on illegally obtained evidence. 77. The Court notes that the Government objected to the applicant ’ s victim status with respect to this complaint. However, it does not consider it necessary to address this objection because this part of the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons. 78. The Court observes that the purpose of Article 35 § 1 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Convention institutions. That rule is an important aspect of the principle that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. Thus the complaint intended to be made subsequently to the Court must first have been made – at least in substance – to the appropriate domestic body, and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law (see, among other authorities, Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, §§ 43-44, ECHR 2006 ‑ II). 79. In the present case, the applicant complained in his application to the Court of the retention by the ISP of what he alleged were his personal data. However, he has failed to exhaust domestic remedies in this regard as he had not made this complaint – at least in substance – in the domestic proceedings. 80. Consequently, this part of the application should be declared inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. 2. As regards the disclosure of the subscriber information 81. The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be a victim because the subscriber information that the ISP had disclosed to the police concerned his father. 82. The applicant disputed that view. He argued that it was his privacy that had been breached, not the subscriber ’ s, and that the issue at stake was not that of ownership but that of the right to privacy. 83. The Court notes that this issue is closely related to the merits of the complaint and therefore joins the Government ’ s objection to the merits. 84. It considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. The parties ’ submissions (a) The applicant 85. The applicant referred to the definition of personal data in the 1981 Convention (see paragraph 46 above), arguing that the obtaining of data without a court order (see paragraph 7 above) had led to his identification. 86. He also argued that although he had disclosed the contents of his communication to an unidentifiable public, he had not waived his right to privacy with regard to traffic (metering ) data, that is data relating to the length and time of the use of the Internet and data relating to who used the Internet and what site he or she accessed during that use. In his view, such data enjoyed separate protection under the concept of private life, comprising the privacy of communications and informational privacy. 87. He submitted in this connection that the significant distinction between static and dynamic IP addresses should be recognised. While it might be possible to draw an analogy between a static IP address which was permanently attributed to the device, and a telephone number, a dynamic IP address was assigned every time the computer accessed the Internet. Referring to the German Federal Constitutional Court ’ s judgment of 24 January 2012 (see paragraph 63 above), the applicant argued that by choosing a dynamic IP address, as had the subscriber in the present case, one chose to have his or her identity concealed, as additional data were required for identifying the computer used to access the Internet and thereby the subscriber. In his view, the dynamic IP address therefore fell within the scope of traffic data (metering), to which section 149b(1) applied. 88. The applicant further pointed out that the data on the content of communication had been obtained without the Slovenian authorities ’ involvement. The Slovenian authorities would have needed a court order for obtaining such data, but had avoided that otherwise necessary step by requesting the subscriber information on the basis of section 149b(3) of the CPA. As regards the letter, the applicant alleged that at the time when the Slovenian police had obtained the data connecting his IP address to his identity, the law regulating access to such data had not been clear ( lex certa ) and therefore the lawfulness required by the second paragraph of Article 8 had not been met. In particular, at the time of the interference (August 2006), the domestic law provisions regarding this issue had been contradictory. The second paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitution required a court order for interference with the right to privacy of communication. The ECA provided that traffic data should be kept secret and that communication could be intercepted only on the basis of an order by a competent authority. In the domestic legal system that could only be a court order or, theoretically, a prosecution order. Anyhow, under section 107 it was possible only to “intercept” data and not to hand over certain retained data. Moreover, the providers were under an obligation to delete retained data pursuant to section 104 as soon as they no longer needed them for billing purposes. On the other hand, section 149b ( 1 ) and ( 3 ) of the CPA provided for different conditions of accessing data and it was unclear what the distinction in application between the two was. As a result of that uncertainty in the domestic legislation, one could not say that the legal protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the right to privacy was sufficient. 89. In the applicant ’ s opinion, the ECA was lex specialis in relation to the CPA and it did not provide for a possibility to transfer personal data to the police. In such a situation of lacunae in the law, the Constitution should be applied directly, and the Constitution clearly required a court order for the transfer of such data. (b) The Government 90. The Government explained that IP addresses were personal data and that likewise dynamic IP addresses were personal data but did not amount to traffic data. The only difference between the two was that the static IP address stayed with the subscriber as long as he did not change ISP, whereas a new dynamic IP address was assigned every time the subscriber accessed the Internet. With regard to both, the ISP stored data concerning the time of the use of a specific IP address. 91. The Government argued that the investigation had focused on the applicant only after the seizure and inspection of the computers had taken place and after those living at his address had been questioned. Thus the link between the subscriber and the applicant had become apparent only after the home search, which had been carried out on the basis of a valid court order. 92. While acknowledging that the IP address was an item of personal data because it allowed for the identification of an individual, the Government pointed out that it was each user ’ s choice whether to use a website that allowed disclosure of personal data and/or content of communication to an unidentifiable and unlimited circle of individuals. The Government submitted that the applicant had not argued that he had hidden the IP address he had used to access the file-exchange program. As the disclosure of the IP address implied the disclosure of subscriber information, the applicant had not shown intent to keep his identity private or hidden and his right to private life was thus not engaged in the present case. 93. The Government argued that the applicant could not have expected that the subscriber information related to the dynamic IP address would have been withheld from the police. In their view, the contested measures had been lawful and proportionate to the aim of safeguarding the integrity of children, who, as particularly vulnerable individuals, enjoyed special protection under the Convention. 94. The Government drew a parallel with the situation where a suspect had been caught on closed-circuit television camera when driving. In such a situation, the suspect ’ s photograph and his registration plates sufficed to identify him. Similarly, in the present case, it must be assumed that the moment the police had had the dynamic IP address and the timeline of its use, the user had been identified by way of such data. The Government thus argued that the domestic courts had correctly applied section 149b(3) instead of section 149b(1), as the latter concerned traffic data, not data concerning the owner or user of a communication device. 2. The Court ’ s assessment (a) Preliminary observations and scope of the Court ’ s assessment 95. The Court at the outset observes the particular context of the present case, which concerns the disclosure of subscriber information associated with a dynamic IP address. It takes note of the extensive legislation and of the case-law concerning personal data protection and privacy of electronic communication within the European Union and will rely on them and on other relevant comparative-law material in assessing some of the technical matters applicable to the present case. It will also have regard, where appropriate, to the legal doctrines established therein. 96. As a preliminary matter, the Court further notes that an IP address is a unique number assigned to every device on a network, which allows the devices to communicate with each other. Unlike the static IP address, which is permanently allocated to a particular network interface of a particular device, a dynamic IP address is assigned to a device by the ISP temporarily, typically each time the device connects to the Internet (see paragraphs 61, 87 and 90 above). The IP address alone enables certain details, such as the ISP to which the user is connected and a broader physical location, most likely the location of the ISP, to be determined. Most dynamic IP addresses can thus be traced to the ISP and not to a specific computer. To obtain the name and address of the subscriber using a dynamic IP address, the ISP is normally required to look up this information and for that purpose to examine the relevant connection data of its subscribers (see paragraphs 61 and 65 above). 97. In the present case the information on the dynamic IP address and the time it had been assigned were collected by the Swiss police, who had carried out a monitoring exercise of users of the specific Internet network involving child pornography material. They forwarded the information to the Slovenian police, who obtained from the ISP the name and address of the subscriber associated with the dynamic IP address in question – the applicant ’ s father (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). 98. The Government argued that Article 8 of the Convention did not apply in this case because the applicant had not been directly affected by the contested measure and because even if he had been affected, he had willingly renounced his right to privacy by publicly exchanging the files in question (see paragraphs 92 and 93 above). In order to answer those questions, the Court must consider whether the applicant, or any other individual using the Internet, had a reasonable expectation that his otherwise public online activity would remain anonymous (see paragraphs 115 to 118 above). 99. The Court reiterates in this connection that sexual abuse is unquestionably an abhorrent type of wrongdoing, with debilitating effects on its victims. Children and other vulnerable individuals are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, from such grave types of interference with essential aspects of their private lives, and that protection includes a need to identify the offenders and bring them to justice (see K.U. v. Finland, no. 2872/02, § 46, ECHR 2008-V ). However, the questions raised by the Government concerning the applicability of Article 8 are to be answered independently from the legal or illegal character of the activity in question, as well as without any prejudice to the Convention ’ s requirement that protection of vulnerable individuals must be provided by the member States, as pointed out in, amongst others, K.U. v. Finland (cited above). (b ) Applicability of Article 8 (i) Recapitulation of the relevant principles 100. The Court reiterates that private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. Article 8 protects, inter alia, the right to identity and personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world. There is, therefore, a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of “private life” (see Uzun v. Germany, no. 35623/05, § 43, ECHR 2010-VI (extracts) ). 101. There are a number of elements relevant to the consideration of whether a person ’ s private life is concerned by measures affected outside his or her home or private premises. In order to ascertain whether the notions of “private life” and “correspondence” are applicable, the Court has on several occasions examined whether individuals had a reasonable expectation that their privacy would be respected and protected ( see Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], no. 61496/08, § 73, ECHR 2017, and Copland v. the United Kingdom, no. 62617/00, § § 41- 42, ECHR 2007-I ). In that context, it has stated that a reasonable expectation of privacy is a significant though not necessarily conclusive factor (see Bărbulescu, cited above, § 73 ). 102. In the context of personal data, the Court has pointed out that the term “private life” must not be interpreted restrictively. It has found that the broad interpretation corresponds with that of the 1981 Convention, the purpose of which is “to secure in the territory of each Party for every individual ... respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him” (Article 1). Such personal data are defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual” (Article 2) ( see Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 65, ECHR 2000 ‑ II; see also paragraph 46 above ). 103. It further follows from well-established case-law that where there has been a compilation of data on a particular individual, the processing or use of personal data or publication of the material concerned in a manner or degree beyond that normally foreseeable, private life considerations arise ( see Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, § 136, ECHR 2017 (extracts) ). Article 8 of the Convention thus provides for the right to a form of informational self-determination, allowing individuals to rely on their right to privacy as regards data which, albeit neutral, are collected, processed and disseminated collectively and in such a form or manner that their Article 8 rights may be engaged (ibid., § 137). 104. The Court has previously considered information such as metering data on the telephone numbers dialled ( see Malone v. the United Kingdom, 2 August 1984, § 84, Series A no. 82), personal information relating to telephone, email and Internet usage ( see Copland, cited above, §§ 41 and 43), information stored by the prosecution authorities on a card concerning the facts relating to the applicant ’ s business relations ( see Amann, cited above, § 66) and public information stored by the authorities on the applicant ’ s distant past ( see Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, §§ 43 and 44, ECHR 2000 ‑ V) to fall within the ambit of Article 8. 105. Moreover, the Court has previously acknowledged in Delfi AS v. Estonia ([GC] no. 64569/09, § 147, ECHR 2015) the importance of online anonymity, noting that it has long been a means of avoiding reprisals or unwanted attention. As such, it is capable of promoting the free flow of ideas and information in an important manner, including, notably, on the Internet. At the same time, the Court does not lose sight of the ease, scope and speed of the dissemination of information on the Internet, and the persistence of the information once disclosed, which may considerably aggravate the effects of unlawful speech on the Internet compared to traditional media (ibid). 106. In the aforementioned case the Court elaborated also on different degrees of anonymity engaged in online activity and observed as follows ( ibid., § 148) : “The Court observes that different degrees of anonymity are possible on the Internet. An Internet user may be anonymous to the wider public while being identifiable by a service provider through an account or contact data that may be either unverified or subject to some kind of verification – ranging from limited verification (for example, through activation of an account via an e-mail address or a social network account) to secure authentication, be it by the use of national electronic identity cards or online banking authentication data allowing rather more secure identification of the user. A service provider may also allow an extensive degree of anonymity for its users, in which case the users are not required to identify themselves at all and they may only be traceable – to a limited extent – through the information retained by Internet access providers. The release of such information would usually require an injunction by the investigative or judicial authorities and would be subject to restrictive conditions. It may nevertheless be required in some cases in order to identify and prosecute perpetrators.” (ii ) Application of the above principles to the present case ( α ) Nature of the interest involved 107. The Government did not dispute that the subscriber information in principle concerned personal data (see paragraphs 90 and 92 above). Such a conclusion also follows from the definitions contained in the 1981 Convention, the legislation of the European Union, as well as domestic legislation aimed at their implementation (see paragraphs 40, 46, 53 and 57 above). 108. In addition, the Court notes that the subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses assigned at certain times was not publicly available and therefore could not be compared to the information found in the traditional telephone directory or public database of vehicle registration numbers referred to by the Government (see paragraph 94 above). Indeed, it would appear that in order to identify a subscriber to whom a particular dynamic IP address had been assigned at a particular time, the ISP must access stored data concerning particular telecommunication events (see, for instance, paragraphs 29, 61, 65 and 95 above ). Use of such stored data may on its own give rise to private life considerations (see paragraph 103 above). 109. Furthermore, the Court cannot ignore the particular context in which the subscriber information was sought in the present case. The sole purpose of obtaining the subscriber information was to identify a particular person behind the independently collected content revealing data he had been sharing. The Court notes in this connection that there is a zone of interaction of a person with others which may fall within the scope of “private life” (see paragraph 100 above). Information on such activities engages the privacy aspect the moment it is linked to or attributed to an identified or identifiable individual ( for reference to identifiability, albeit in a rather different context, see Peck v. the United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, § 62, ECHR 2003 ‑ I, and J.S. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 445/10, §§ 70 and 72, 3 March 2015). Therefore what would appear to be peripheral information sought by the police, namely the name and address of a subscriber, must in situations such as the present one be treated as inextricably connected to the relevant pre - existing content revealing data ( see the dissenting Constitutional Court judges ’ opinions cited in paragraphs 31 and 34; compare also with the position of the Canadian Supreme Court, cited in paragraphs 69 and 72 above, and the German Federal Constitutional Court, cited in paragraphs 64 and 65 above ). To hold otherwise would be to deny the necessary protection to information which might reveal a good deal about the online activity of an individual, including sensitive details of his or her interests, beliefs and intimate lifestyle. 110. In view of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the present case concerns privacy issues capable of engaging the protection of Article 8 of the Convention. ( β ) Whether the applicant was identified by the contested measure 111. The Court must next address the Government ’ s argument that the subscriber information obtained by the police disclosed only the name and address of the applicant ’ s father, and not the applicant (see paragraph 91 above ). In this connection, the Court observes that it has been generally accepted that the definition of personal data refers to information relating not only to identified but also to identifiable individuals ( see paragraphs 40, 47, 53, 54, 55 and 58 above ). 112. In the present context, the applicant was no doubt the user of the Internet service in question (see paragraph 56 above) and it was his online activity that was monitored by the police. The Court further observes that the applicant used the Internet by means of what would appear to be his own computer at his own home. It is of little significance that the applicant ’ s name was not mentioned in the subscriber information obtained by the police. Indeed, it is not unusual for one household to have a single subscription to the Internet service used by several members of the family. The fact that they are not personally subscribed to the Internet service has no effect on their privacy expectations, which are indirectly engaged once the subscriber information relating to their private use of the Internet is revealed. 113. It is clear that the purpose of the contested measure, that is the obtaining by the police, without a court order, of subscriber information associated with the dynamic IP address provided by the Swiss police (see paragraph 7 above), was to connect the computer usage to a location and, potentially, to a person. The subscriber information, which contained also the address, allowed the police to identify the home from which the Internet connections in question had been made. This led them to identify the applicant as the then suspected user of the Razorback network. 114. Having regard to the foregoing and bearing also in mind that the domestic courts did not dismiss the case on the grounds that the applicant had not been the subscriber to the Internet service in question, the Court concludes that this fact cannot be taken as a bar to the application of Article 8 in the present case. It accordingly dismisses the Government ’ s objection concerning the alleged lack of victim status (see paragraph 83 above). ( γ ) Whether the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 115. In order to ascertain whether the notion of a “private life” is applicable to the present case, it remains for the Court to examine whether, in view of the publicly accessible nature of the network in question, the applicant had a reasonable expectation that his privacy would be respected and protected ( see paragraph 101 above ). In this connection, the Slovenian Constitutional Court and the respondent Government (see paragraphs 14 and 18 of the Constitutional Court ’ s decision, cited in paragraph 29 above; see also paragraph 92 above) found it important that the applicant had participated in the Razorback network to which access had not been restricted. They considered that he had knowingly exposed his online activity and associated dynamic IP address to the public. Thus, in their opinion, his expectation of privacy had not been legitimate and, moreover, he should have been considered to have waived it ( ibid. ). 116. The Court, like the Constitutional Court, accepts that the applicant, when exchanging files with pornographic material through the Razorback network, expected, from his subjective angle, that that activity would remain private and that his identity would not be disclosed (see paragraph 14 of the Constitutional Court ’ s decision cited in paragraph 29 above). However, unlike the Constitutional Court, the Court considers that the fact that he did not hide his dynamic IP address, assuming that it is possible to do so, cannot be decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint. In this connection, it notes that the question is clearly not whether the applicant could have reasonably expected to keep his dynamic IP address private but whether he could have reasonably expected privacy in relation to his identity. 117. The Court has previously acknowledged the anonymity aspect of online privacy (see Delfi AS, cited in paragraph 105 above, see also paragraph 12 of the Constitutional Court ’ s decision, cited in paragraph 29 above ), relating to the nature of the online activity, in which the users participate without necessarily being identifiable. This anonymity conception of privacy is an important factor to be taken into account in the present assessment. In particular, it has not been argued that the applicant had ever disclosed his identity in relation to the online activity in question (see in this connection the dissenting opinion of Judge Jadek Pensa, cited in paragraph 33 above ) or that he was for example identifiable by the particular website provider through an account or contact data. His online activity therefore engaged a high degree of anonymity (see Delfi AS, cited in paragraph 105 above, § 148), as confirmed by the fact that the assigned dynamic IP address, even if visible to other users of the network, could not be traced to the specific computer without the ISP ’ s verification of data following a request from the police. 118. Lastly, the Court notes that the applicable legal and regulatory framework might also be a relevant, though not necessarily decisive, factor in determining the reasonable expectation of privacy ( see, for instance, J.S. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), cited above, § 70, and Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, § 39, 26 July 2007 ). In the present case, neither of the parties submitted information regarding the terms of the contract on the basis of which the Internet service had been provided to the applicant ’ s father. As to the statutory framework, the Court finds it sufficient to note that Article 37 of the Constitution guaranteed the privacy of correspondence and of communications and required that any interference with this right be based on a court order (see paragraph 35 above). Therefore, also from the standpoint of the legislation in force at the relevant time, the applicant ’ s expectation of privacy with respect to his online activity could not be said to be unwarranted or unreasonable. ( δ ) Conclusion 119. For all of the above reasons, the Court concludes that the applicant ’ s interest in having his identity with respect to his online activity protected falls with the scope of the notion of “private life” and that Article 8 is therefore applicable to this complaint. (c) Compliance with Article 8 (i) Whether there was interference 120. Having regard to the above conclusion that the applicant ’ s right to respect for his private life as guaranteed by Article 8 § 1 was engaged in the present case, the Court further finds it established that the police request to the ISP and their use of the subscriber information leading to the applicant ’ s identification amounted to an interference with this right (see, mutatis mutandis, Rotaru, cited above, § 46, and Uzun, cited above, § 52). In view of the foregoing, it does not consider it necessary to determine whether the measure in question amounted also to an interference with the applicant ’ s right to respect for his correspondence. 121. The Court must therefore examine whether the interference with the applicant ’ s right to privacy was in conformity with the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 8, in other words whether it was “in accordance with the law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve the aim or aims in question. (ii) Whether the interference was in accordance with the law 122. The Court notes that the expression “in accordance with the law”, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 requires firstly that the contested measure should have some basis in domestic law. Second, the domestic law must be accessible to the person concerned. Third, the person affected must be able to foresee the consequences of the domestic law for him, and fourth, the domestic law must be compatible with the rule of law (see, among many other authorities, Rotaru, cited above, § 52; Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 58243/00, § 59, 1 July 2008; and Sallinen and Others v. Finland, no. 50882/99, § 76, 27 September 2005 ). 123. The Court also reiterates that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. However, the Court is required to verify whether the way in which the domestic law is interpreted and applied produces consequences that are consistent with the principles of the Convention as interpreted in the light of the Court ’ s case-law (see Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 81 and 82, ECHR 2006 ‑ V). 124. In the present case, assuming that the obtaining by the police of the subscriber information associated with the dynamic IP address in question had some basis in domestic law because section 149b(3) of the CPA provided that the police could obtain information on the owner or user of a certain means of electronic communication from the ISP (see paragraph 36 above), the Court must examine whether that law was accessible and foreseeable and compatible with the rule of law. 125. It notes that the present case raises no issues with respect to the accessibility of the law. As regards the remaining requirements, the Court reiterates that a rule is “foreseeable” if it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable any individual – if need be with appropriate advice – to regulate his conduct (see Rotaru, cited above, § 55 and the principles summarised therein). In addition, compatibility with the rule of law requires that domestic law provides adequate protection against arbitrary interference with Article 8 rights (see, mutatis mutandis, Amann, cited above, §§ 76-77; Bykov v. Russia [GC], no. 4378/02, § 76, 10 March 2009; see also Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), no. 54934/00, § 94, ECHR 2006 ‑ XI; and Liberty and Others, cited above, § 62). The Court must thus be satisfied also that there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse. This assessment depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to permit, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law (see Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, no. 62540/00, § 77, 28 June 2007, with reference to Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, § 50, Series A no. 28, and Uzun, cited above, § 63 ). 126. Having regard to the particular context of the case, the Court would emphasise that the Cybercrime Convention obliges the States to make measures such as the real-time collection of traffic data and the issuing of production orders available to the authorities in combating, inter alia, crimes related to child pornography (see paragraphs 47 to 51 above). However, such measures are, pursuant to Article 15 of that Convention, “ subject to conditions and safeguards provided for under [State parties ’ ] domestic law” and must “as appropriate in view of the nature of the procedure or power concerned, inter alia, include judicial or other independent supervision, grounds justifying application, and limitation of the scope and the duration of such power or procedure” (see paragraph 52 above). 127. In the present case, the Court notes that section 149 b (3) of the CPA (see paragraph 36 above), relied on by the domestic authorities, concerned a request for information on the owner or user of a certain means of electronic communication. It did not contain specific rules as to the association between the dynamic IP address and subscriber information. The Court further notes that Article 37 of the Constitution required a court order for any interference with privacy of communication (see paragraph 35 above). Furthermore, the ECA (see paragraph 37 above), which specifically regulated the secrecy and confidentiality of electronic communication, did not at the relevant time provide for the possibility that subscriber information and related traffic data be accessed and transferred for the purposes of criminal proceedings. It provided that electronic communications, including the related traffic data, were confidential and as such should be protected by the ISP (see paragraph 37 above). It further stipulated that the ISP should not transfer the traffic data to others unless this was necessary for the provision of the service, except where the lawful interception of communications had been ordered by the competent authority (see section 103 of the ECA, cited in paragraph 37 above). Therefore, the legislation was, at the very least, not coherent as regards the level of protection afforded to the applicant ’ s privacy interest. 128. Having said that, the Court would be usurping the function of national courts were it to attempt to make an authoritative statement as to which law should have prevailed in the present case. It must instead turn to the reasoning offered by the domestic courts. It notes in this connection that the Constitutional Court considered that the “ identity of the communicating individual [was] one of the important aspects of communication privacy” and that its disclosure required a court order pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 37 of the Constitution (see paragraph 18 of the Constitutional Court ’ s decision, cited in paragraph 29 above). More specifically, according to the Constitutional Court ’ s interpretation, which was consistent with its previous case-law finding that the traffic data, as defined under the domestic law, fell within the protection of Article 37 of the Constitution ( ibid. ), the disclosure of subscriber information associated with a certain dynamic IP address in principle required a court order and could not be obtained by means of a simple written request by the police. 129. The Court observes that, indeed, the only reason for the Constitutional Court dismissing the applicant ’ s complaint – that is, for approving of the disclosure of the subscriber information without a court order – was the presumption that the applicant had “waived the legitimate expectation of privacy” (see paragraph 18 of the Constitutional Court ’ s decision, cited in paragraph 29 above). However, the Court, having regard to its findings in the context of the applicability of Article 8, does not find the Constitutional Court ’ s position on that question to be reconcilable with the scope of the right to privacy under the Convention (see paragraphs 115 to 118 above). Bearing in mind the Constitutional Court ’ s finding that the “identity of the communicating individual” fell within the scope of the protection of Article 37 of the Constitution (see paragraph 128 above) and the Court ’ s conclusion that the applicant had a reasonable expectation that his identity with respect to his online activity would remain private ( see paragraphs 115 to 118 above), a court order was necessary in the present case. Moreover, nothing in the domestic law prevented the police from obtaining it given that they, a few months after obtaining the subscriber information, during which time apparently no investigative steps had been taken in the case, requested and obtained a court order for what would seem to be, at least in part, the same information as that which had already been in their possession (see paragraph 8 above). The domestic authorities ’ reliance on section 149b(3) of the CPA was therefore manifestly inappropriate and, what is more, it offered virtually no protection from arbitrary interference. 130. In this connection, the Court notes that at the relevant time there appears to have been no regulation specifying the conditions for the retention of data obtained under section 149b(3) of the CPA and no safeguards against abuse by State officials in the procedure for access to and transfer of such data. As regards the latter, the police, having at their disposal information on a particular online activity, could have identified an author by merely asking the ISP provider to look up that information. Furthermore no independent supervision of the use of these police powers has been shown to have existed at the relevant time, despite the fact that those powers, as interpreted by the domestic courts, compelled the ISP to retrieve the stored connection data and enabled the police to associate a great deal of information concerning online activity with a particular individual without his or her consent (see paragraphs 108 and 109 above). 131. The Court further notes that soon after the contested measure had been taken against the applicant, the Parliament adopted amendments to the ECA (see paragraph 38 above, as well as the relevant provisions in the subsequent new law cited in paragraph 39 ). Those amendments provided, among other things, rules on the retention of data concerning the origin of communications, that is, inter alia, the name and address of the subscriber to whom a certain IP address had been assigned, and the procedure for accessing and transferring them. This, however, had no effect on the applicant ’ s situation. 132. Bearing in mind the above, the Court is of the view that the law on which the contested measure, that is the obtaining by the police of subscriber information associated with the dynamic IP address in question (see paragraph 7 above), was based and the way it was applied by the domestic courts lacked clarity and did not offer sufficient safeguards against arbitrary interference with Article 8 rights. 133. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the interference with the applicant ’ s right to respect for his private life was not “in accordance with the law” as required by Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Consequently, the Court need not examine whether the contested measure had a legitimate aim and was proportionate. 134. Having considered all of the above, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 135. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 136. The applicant claimed 32,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, which included EUR 7,000 for the distress he had suffered because of the trial against him, EUR 15,000 because he had been unjustifiably imprisoned and EUR 10,000 for the stigmatisation he had suffered in the society as a result of his conviction. 137. The Government argued that the applicant ’ s claim for non-pecuniary damage was unsubstantiated and excessive. They further argued that there was no connection between the violation of Article 8 alleged in the present case and the alleged non-pecuniary damage in relation to the applicant ’ s criminal conviction and prison sentence. In particular, even if the information in question had been excluded from the file, the applicant could not have avoided the criminal proceedings against him. Moreover, the Government maintained that as the applicant had admitted that he could request the reopening of the proceedings in the event of the finding of a violation, a declaratory finding by the Court should suffice. 138. The Court considers that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage that may have been sustained by the applicant. B. Costs and expenses 139. The applicant also claimed EUR 4,335.50 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 2,600 for those incurred before the Court plus value-added tax ( VAT ). He argued that those sums had been calculated on the basis of the official tariff for lawyers. 140. The Government argued that the costs the applicant had claimed with respect to his representation in the domestic proceedings included VAT. They also included the costs of a legal opinion, namely EUR 2,000, which had clearly not been produced for the purposes of the domestic proceedings. As regards the claim for the cost of the proceedings before the Court, the Government argued that it was excessive. Moreover, except for the bill for the aforementioned legal opinion, the applicant had not submitted any evidence that he had incurred costs on account of his legal representation. 141. According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 922 for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and EUR 2,600 for the proceedings before the Court. In total, he should thus be awarded EUR 3,522 for costs and expenses. C. Default interest 142. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It found in particular that the legal provision used by the police to obtain the subscriber information associated with the dynamic IP address had not met the Convention standard of being “in accordance with the law”. The provision had lacked clarity, offered virtually no protection from arbitrary interference, had no safeguards against abuse and no independent supervision of the police powers involved.