Discriminatory statements or publications
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A. Civil Code 35. Article 24 of the Civil Code reads as follows: “Any person whose personal rights are unlawfully infringed may apply to a judge for protection against all those causing the infringement. An infringement is unlawful unless it is justified by the consent of the person whose rights have been infringed or is made necessary by an overriding private or public interest or by law.” Furthermore, according to Article 25 of the Civil Code: “A claimant may ask a judge to prevent a threat of infringement, to order the cessation of an ongoing infringement or to establish the unlawfulness of such an infringement even where it has already ceased. In addition to such action the claimant may also request that the rectification or the judgment be published or served on third parties. ...” B. Criminal Code 36. Article 312 § 2 of the former Criminal Code provided as follows: “Any person who incites others to hatred or hostility on the basis of a distinction between social class, race, religion, denomination or region shall, on conviction, be liable to between one and three years’ imprisonment and to a fine of between nine thousand and thirty-six thousand liras. If this incitement endangers public safety, the sentence shall be increased by between one third and one half.” 37. On 1 June 2005 a new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) came into force. Article 216 of the new Code provides as follows: “1. Any person who publicly provokes hatred or hostility in one section of the public against another section with different characteristics based on social class, race, religion, sect or regional differences, such as to create a clear and close danger to public safety, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one to three years. 2. Any person who publicly denigrates a section of the public on grounds of social class, race, religion, sect, gender or regional differences shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six months to one year. ...” THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 40. The applicant alleged that the book The Gypsies of Turkey and the dictionaries referred to in paragraphs 26 to 28 above contained expressions and definitions which offended his Roma/Gypsy identity. 41. The Government disputed this claim. A. As to whether the applications should be examined under Article 8 or under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 42. The Grand Chamber observes that the Chamber examined the applicant’s complaints under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. These provisions read as follows: Article 8 “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Article 14 “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” 43. The Grand Chamber reiterates that the Court is the master of the characterisation to be given in domestic law to the facts of the case and is not bound by the characterisation given by the applicant or the Government (see Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 54, 17 September 2009). Discrimination for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention means treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations. There will be no objective and reasonable justification if the difference in treatment does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see, amongst many other authorities, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, § 175, ECHR 2007 ‑ IV, and Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, § 60, ECHR 2008). 44. The Court observes that discrimination on account of, inter alia, a person’s ethnic origin is a form of racial discrimination. Racial discrimination is a particularly invidious kind of discrimination and, in view of its perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction. It is for this reason that the authorities must use all available means to combat racism, thereby reinforcing democracy’s vision of a society in which diversity is not perceived as a threat but as a source of enrichment (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 145, ECHR 2005 ‑ VII, and Timishev v. Russia, nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00, § 56, ECHR 2005 ‑ XII). The Court further notes that as a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority. As the Court has noted in previous cases, they therefore require special protection (see D.H. and Others, cited above, § 182). 45. The Court observes that in the present case the applicant, who is of Roma origin, argued that a book and two dictionaries that had received government funding included remarks and expressions that reflected anti-Roma sentiment. He considered that these statements constituted an attack on his Roma identity. However, the Court observes that the case does not concern a difference in treatment, and in particular ethnic discrimination, as the applicant has not succeeded in producing prima facie evidence that the impugned publications had a discriminatory intent or effect. The case is therefore not comparable to other applications previously lodged by members of the Roma community (see, regarding education, ibid., §§ 175 ‑ 210; regarding housing, Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, § 73, ECHR 2001 ‑ I; and, regarding elections, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, § 45, ECHR 2009). Accordingly, the main issue in the present case is whether the impugned publications, which allegedly contained racial insults, constituted interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and, if so, whether this interference was compatible with the said right. The Court will therefore examine the present case under Article 8 of the Convention only. B. The Government’s preliminary objection 1. The parties’ submissions (a) The Government 46. The Government contested the applicant’s victim status in both applications, arguing that they were actio popularis applications. According to the Government, the applicant had failed to show that he had been directly affected by the impugned remarks and expressions. (b) The applicant 47. The applicant alleged that because of his Roma/Gypsy origins, the debasing remarks and expressions contained in the book and dictionaries had caused him pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. He therefore considered himself to have victim status under Article 34 of the Convention. (c) The third party 48. The Greek Helsinki Monitor stated that any member of an ethnic group allegedly targeted by generally discriminatory expressions based on race had the status of victim, as such expressions created prejudice against every member of that group. They further stated that the Court’s protection should be no less than that afforded under the domestic system: where a person’s victim status had been recognised domestically, it should not be refused by the Court. 2. The Chamber judgment 49. The Chamber observed that although the applicant had not been directly targeted in person in either the book or the dictionaries in question, he had been able to initiate compensation proceedings and to argue the merits of his case before the domestic courts under the domestic legislation, namely Articles 24 and 25 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 35 above). As a result, the Chamber considered that the applicant had victim status under Article 34 of the Convention. 3. The Court’s assessment 50. The Court reiterates that in order to be able to lodge a petition by virtue of Article 34 of the Convention, a person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals must be able to claim to be a victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. To claim to be a victim of such a violation, a person must be directly affected by the impugned measure: the Convention does not, therefore, envisage the bringing of an actio popularis for the interpretation of the rights set out therein or permit individuals to complain about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention (see Burden, cited above, § 33, and Tănase v. Moldova [GC], no. 7/08, § 104, ECHR 2010). 51. Consequently, the existence of a victim who was personally affected by an alleged violation of a Convention right is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion, although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid and inflexible way (see Bitenc v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 32963/02, 18 March 2008). The question of whether the applicant can claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of the Convention is relevant at all stages of the proceedings under the Convention (see Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498/00, § 30, ECHR 2002 ‑ III). 52. The Court reiterates that it interprets the concept of “victim” autonomously and irrespective of domestic concepts such as those concerning an interest or capacity to act (see Sanles Sanles v. Spain (dec.), no. 48335/99, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI), even though the Court should have regard to the fact that an applicant was a party to the domestic proceedings (see Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, § 48, ECHR 2009). 53. The Court observes that in the present case the applicant, who is of Roma origin, complained about remarks and expressions which allegedly debased the Roma community. It is true that the applicant was not personally targeted; he could, however, have felt offended by the remarks concerning the ethnic group to which he belonged. Furthermore, there was no dispute in the domestic proceedings regarding the applicant’s standing before the court. Hence, the merits of his case were examined at two levels of jurisdiction. 54. In view of the foregoing and given the need to apply the criteria governing victim status in a flexible manner, the Court accepts that the applicant, although not directly targeted by the contested passages, can be considered a victim of the facts complained of within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. It therefore rejects the Government’s preliminary objection that the applicant lacked victim status. C. The merits of the case 1. Application no. 4149/04 (a) The parties’ submissions (i) The applicant 55. The applicant alleged that certain passages of the book The Gypsies of Turkey contained remarks and expressions which debased the Roma community. In particular, he referred to the chapter of the book which provided information about the lifestyle of the Roma people living in certain cities in Turkey, and in particular their alleged involvement in illegal activities (see paragraph 12 above). According to the applicant, the author’s overall intention was not important, as these passages in themselves constituted a clear insult to the Roma community. He also expressed his dissatisfaction with the domestic court decisions dismissing his compensation request. (ii) The Government 56. The Government stated that the book had been published by the Ministry of Culture on the recommendation of the publications advisory board. According to the report of the advisory board, the book in question was a piece of comparative academic research which had been prepared as a contribution to ethnic studies in Turkey. It gave information about the origins of the Roma community, their language, traditions, beliefs, festivals, cuisine, clothing, music and living conditions. The Government stated that, following the applicant’s objection, the book had been examined once again by a number of university professors, who reported that it did not include any insulting statements. Finally, the Government submitted that the Ministry of Culture was working hard to promote Roma culture and traditions. (b) The Chamber judgment 57. The Chamber held that although the passages and remarks cited by the applicant, read on their own, appeared to be discriminatory and insulting, when the book was examined as a whole it was not possible to conclude that the author had acted in bad faith or had any intention to insult the Roma community. The Chamber had particular regard to the conclusion to the book, in which the author had made it clear that The Gypsies of Turkey was an academic study which conducted a comparative analysis and focused on the history and socio-economic living conditions of the Roma people in Turkey. The Chamber concluded that the author had referred to the biased portrayal of the Roma in order to demonstrate the perception of the Roma community by the public. As a result, the Chamber found no violation of the applicant’s rights as protected by the Convention. (c) The Court’s assessment (i) Applicability of Article 8 of the Convention 58. The Court reiterates that the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of the guarantees provided for by Article 8. It can therefore embrace multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity. The Court further reiterates that it has accepted in the past that an individual’s ethnic identity must be regarded as another such element (see S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, § 66, ECHR 2008, and Ciubotaru v. Moldova, no. 27138/04, § 49, 27 April 2010). In particular, any negative stereotyping of a group, when it reaches a certain level, is capable of impacting on the group’s sense of identity and the feelings of self-worth and self-confidence of members of the group. It is in this sense that it can be seen as affecting the private life of members of the group. 59. Furthermore, while the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this negative undertaking there may be positive obligations inherent in the effective respect for private life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (see Tavlı v. Turkey, no. 11449/02, § 28, 9 November 2006, and Ciubotaru, cited above, § 50). 60. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant, who is of Roma origin, felt offended by certain passages of the book The Gypsies of Turkey, which focused on the Roma community. He therefore initiated civil proceedings against the author of the book and the Ministry of Culture (see paragraphs 19-25 above). As a result, what is at stake in the present case is a publication allegedly affecting the identity of a group to which the applicant belonged, and thus his private life. The Court further notes that although The Gypsies of Turkey was published by the Ministry of Culture (see paragraph 10 above), the latter subsequently returned the copyright to the author of the book (see paragraph 17 above). Moreover, the applicant did not lodge an appeal against the decision of the Ankara Administrative Court dismissing his administrative complaint against the Ministry of Culture (see paragraph 25 above). He therefore did not pursue his case against the State authorities for their involvement in the publication in issue. 61. Under these circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that the main question raised in the present application is not whether there was direct interference by the domestic authorities with the private life of the applicant, but rather whether the Government complied with their positive obligation under Article 8 to protect the applicant’s private life from alleged interference by a third party, namely the author of the book. In other words the Court will seek to ascertain whether, in the light of Article 8 of the Convention, the Turkish courts ought to have upheld the applicant’s civil claim by awarding him a sum in respect of non-pecuniary damage and banning the distribution of the book. (ii) Compliance with Article 8 of the Convention (α) General principles 62. The boundary between the State’s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 does not lend itself to precise definition. The applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar. In both contexts, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation (see, amongst many other authorities, Keegan v. Ireland, 26 May 1994, § 49, Series A no. 290; Botta v. Italy, 24 February 1998, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ I; and Gurgenidze v. Georgia, no. 71678/01, § 38, 17 October 2006). 63. In cases like the present one where the complaint is that rights protected under Article 8 have been breached as a consequence of the exercise by others of their right to freedom of expression, due regard should be had, when applying Article 8, to the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention (see, for instance and mutatis mutandis, Von Hannover v. Germany, no. 59320/00, § 58, ECHR 2004 ‑ VI). Thus, in such cases the Court will need to balance the applicant’s right to “respect for his private life” against the public interest in protecting freedom of expression, bearing in mind that no hierarchical relationship exists between the rights guaranteed by the two Articles (see Timciuc v. Romania (dec.), no. 28999/03, § 144, 12 October 2010). 64. In this context the Court reiterates that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic society (see, amongst many authorities, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 49, Series A no. 24, and Reinboth and Others v. Finland, no. 30865/08, § 74, 25 January 2011). This freedom is subject to the exceptions set out in Article 10 § 2 which must, however, be strictly construed. The need for any restrictions must therefore be established convincingly (see, for example, Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, § 41, Series A no. 103, and Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no. 23118/93, § 43, ECHR 1999 ‑ VIII). 65. Under Article 10 of the Convention, the Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether an interference with the right to freedom of expression was “necessary in a democratic society”. However, this margin goes hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court (see Tammer v. Estonia, no. 41205/98, § 60, ECHR 2001 ‑ I; Peck v. the United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, § 77, ECHR 2003 ‑ I; and Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, no. 53678/00, § 38, ECHR 2004 ‑ X). The Court’s task in exercising its supervision is not to take the place of the national authorities but rather to review, in the light of the case as a whole, the decisions that they have taken pursuant to their margin of appreciation (see Petrenco v. Moldova, no. 20928/05, § 54, 30 March 2010; Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, no. 34147/06, § 41, 21 September 2010; and Petrov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 27103/04, 2 November 2010). 66. In similar cases the Court therefore attached significant weight to the fact that the domestic authorities had identified the existence of conflicting rights and the need to ensure a fair balance between them (see, for instance and mutatis mutandis, Tammer, cited above, § 69; White v. Sweden, no. 42435/02, § 27, 19 September 2006; Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 2), no. 21277/05, § 52, 4 June 2009; Lappalainen v. Finland (dec.), no. 22175/06, 20 January 2009; and Papaianopol v. Romania, no. 17590/02, § 30, 16 March 2010). 67. If the balance struck by the national judicial authorities is unsatisfactory, in particular because the importance or the scope of one of the fundamental rights at stake was not duly considered, the margin of appreciation accorded to the decisions of the national courts will be a narrow one. However, if the assessment was made in the light of the principles resulting from its well-established case-law, the Court would require strong reasons to substitute its own view for that of the domestic courts, which consequently will enjoy a wider margin of appreciation (see MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, no. 39401/04, §§ 150 and 155, 18 January 2011, and Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2 ) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 107, ECHR 2012). 68. All of this presupposes that an effective legal system was in place and operating for the protection of the rights falling within the notion of “private life”, and was available to the applicant (see Karakó v. Hungary, no. 39311/05, § 19, 28 April 2009). This must also be examined by the Court. (β) Application of these principles to the present case 69. In the present case the domestic courts were called upon to strike a fair balance between the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention as a member of the Roma community and the freedom of the author of the book in issue to carry out academic/scientific research on a specific ethnic group and publish his findings. The applicant claimed that the book, and in particular the chapter providing information about the living conditions of Roma in different cities of Turkey, constituted an insult towards the Roma community. In dismissing this claim at two levels of jurisdiction the Turkish courts relied, inter alia, on a report prepared by seven university professors which found that the book in dispute was an academic study based on scientific research (see paragraph 25 above). They considered that the remarks and expressions were not insulting, were of a general nature, did not concern all Roma and did not constitute an attack on the applicant’s identity (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above). Moreover, the Ankara Civil Court of General Jurisdiction found that the book examined the social structure of the Turkish Roma/Gypsy community and was based on scientific data (see paragraph 21 above). 70. In the Court’s opinion, these conclusions cannot be considered to be unreasonable or based on a misrepresentation of the relevant facts. In this connection it is important to note, that while the author pointed to certain illegal activities on the part of some members of the Roma community living in particular areas, nowhere in the book did he make negative remarks about the Roma population in general or claim that all members of the Roma community were engaged in illegal activities. Furthermore, in different parts of the book, namely in the preface, introduction and conclusion, the author emphasised in clear terms that his intention was to shed light on the unknown world of the Roma community in Turkey, who had been ostracised and targeted by vilifying remarks based mainly on prejudice (see paragraphs 10-11 and 13 above). In view of the foregoing, and in the absence of any evidence justifying the conclusion that the author’s statements were insincere, it was not unreasonable for the domestic courts to hold that he had put effort into his work and had not been driven by racist intentions (see, mutatis mutandis, Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 36, Series A no. 298). 71. Moreover, despite the somewhat laconic manner in which some of them were expressed, the reasons put forward by the domestic courts in support of their conclusions were in keeping with the principles set forth in the Court’s case-law. In particular, the Turkish courts attached importance to the fact that the book had been written by an academic and was therefore to be considered as an academic work. In recent judgments, the Court has also stressed the importance of such works (see Sorguç v. Turkey, no. 17089/03, §§ 21-35, 23 June 2009, and Sapan v. Turkey, no. 44102/04, § 34, 8 June 2010). It is therefore consistent with the Court’s case-law to submit to careful scrutiny any restrictions on the freedom of academics to carry out research and to publish their findings. 72. It is also in line with the Court’s approach to consider the impugned passages not in isolation but in the context of the book as a whole and to take into account the method of research used by the author of the publication. In this connection the Court observes that the latter explained that he had collected information from members of the Roma community, local authorities and the police. He also stated that he had lived with the Roma community to observe their lifestyle according to scientific observation principles (see paragraph 11 above). 73. Moreover, it is to be noted that an effective legal system was operating for the protection of the rights falling within the notion of “private life” and was available to the applicant in the present case (see paragraph 68 above). The applicant was able to bring his case before two levels of jurisdiction and obtained reasoned decisions dealing with his claim. Furthermore, when he lodged a complaint with the Ministry of Culture, as a precautionary measure the Ministry ordered the withdrawal of the remaining 299 copies of the book, and the copyright was returned to the author at the latter’s request (see paragraphs 15 and 17 above). 74. In the light of the above, the Court is satisfied that in balancing the conflicting fundamental rights under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, the Turkish courts made an assessment based on the principles resulting from the Court’s well-established case-law. 75. The Court would nonetheless reiterate that the vulnerable position of Roma/Gypsies means that special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle, both in the relevant regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases (see Chapman, cited above, § 96, and D.H. and Others, cited above, § 181). The Court also agrees with the conclusions of ECRI (see paragraph 38 above) that the Government should pursue their efforts to combat negative stereotyping of the Roma. 76. It follows from the considerations set forth above that in the present case the Turkish authorities did not overstep their margin of appreciation and did not disregard their positive obligation to secure to the applicant effective respect for his private life. 77. Consequently, there has been no violation of Article 8 in respect of application no. 4149/04. 2. Application no. 41029/04 (a) The parties’ submissions (i) The applicant 78. The applicant alleged that the expressions contained in the two impugned dictionaries printed by the Turkish Language Association were insulting towards the Roma/Gypsy community. In particular, he referred to the term “becoming a Gypsy” which was defined as “displaying miserly behaviour”, and submitted that such insulting definitions should be removed from the dictionaries. (ii) The Government 79. The Government stated that the words and expressions contained in the dictionaries were based on historical and sociological facts and that there was no intention to debase the Roma community. They further informed the Court that the Ministry of Culture had made a financial contribution of 2,700 euros in total to the publication of the dictionaries in 1991 and 1998. However, the Government stressed that the dictionary for pupils was not a school textbook and that it was not distributed to schools or recommended by the Ministry of Education as part of the school curriculum. Finally, they pointed out that these dictionaries had not been reprinted and were actually out of print. (b) The Chamber judgment 80. The Chamber had regard in particular to the fact that the definitions provided in the dictionaries had been prefaced with the comment that their use was “metaphorical”. It therefore found that these expressions could not be considered as harming the applicant’s ethnic identity. As a result, the Chamber found no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. (c) The Court’s assessment 81. The Court notes at the outset that the applicant considered himself to be the victim of negative stereotyping on account of some of the entries contained in the impugned dictionaries. Article 8 of the Convention is therefore applicable, for the reasons set forth in paragraph 60 above. The Court further observes that, although the publication of the dictionaries in issue was part-financed by the Ministry of Culture, the applicant merely brought a civil action against the Language Association, a non-governmental organisation, and did not bring any administrative proceedings against the Ministry in the domestic courts (see paragraphs 31 ‑ 34 above). Therefore, as with application no. 4149/04 (see paragraphs 60-61 above), the Court will examine, in the light of the general principles set forth in paragraphs 62 to 68 above, whether the Government complied with their positive obligation under Article 8 to protect the applicant’s private life from alleged interference by a third party, namely the Language Association. 82. In rejecting the applicant’s claim, the Ankara Civil Court observed that the definitions and expressions in the dictionaries were based on historical and sociological reality and that there had been no intention to humiliate or debase the Roma community. It further noted that there were similar expressions in Turkish concerning other ethnic groups, which appeared in dictionaries and encyclopaedias (see paragraph 33 above). 83. Thus, the domestic court examined the impugned entries in order to ascertain whether they had unlawfully interfered with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention. In doing so, it applied the principles laid down in the Court’s case-law (see paragraph 66 above). 84. In this connection the Court observes that a dictionary is a source of information which lists the words of a language and gives their various meanings, the basic one being simply descriptive or literal, while others may be figurative, allegorical or metaphorical. It reflects the language used by society. In both dictionaries the literal definition of the word “ çingene ” (“Gypsy”) was given on page 279. It is therefore clear that these dictionaries were substantial in volume and were meant to cover the entire Turkish language. The Court also notes the first definition of the word “Gypsy” given by the said dictionaries, which reads: “[A]n ethnic group or person belonging to an ethnic group originating from India, whose members lead a nomadic way of life and are widely dispersed in the world.” As a second meaning, it was stated that, in the metaphorical sense, the word “Gypsy” also meant “miserly” (see paragraph 28 above). On the same page, the dictionaries gave further definitions of certain expressions regarding the Gypsies, such as “Gypsy money” and “Gypsy pink”. The Court notes in this connection that, as explained by the Ankara Civil Court, these expressions are part of spoken Turkish. 85. It is true that, although they had the same content, the dictionaries had different target groups, as the second dictionary’s title was Turkish Dictionary for Pupils. It is clear that in a dictionary aimed at pupils, more diligence is required when giving the definitions of expressions which are part of daily language but which might be construed as humiliating or insulting. In the Court’s view, it would have been preferable to label such expressions as “pejorative” or “insulting”, rather than merely stating that they were metaphorical. Such a precaution would also be in line with ECRI’s General Policy Recommendation No. 10, which stipulates that States should “[promote] critical thinking among pupils and [equip] them with the necessary skills to become aware of and react to stereotypes or intolerant elements contained in [the] material they use” (see paragraph 39 above). 86. However, this element alone is insufficient for the Court to substitute its own view for that of the domestic courts, having regard also to the fact that the impugned dictionary was not a school textbook and that it was not distributed to schools or recommended by the Ministry of Education as part of the school curriculum (see paragraph 79 above). 87. Finally, the Court observes that the applicant’s case against the Language Association was examined at two levels of jurisdiction in the domestic courts (see paragraphs 31-34 above). Although ultimately his case was dismissed, the Court is satisfied that the applicant was provided with an effective means of redress, as required by Article 8 of the Convention. 88. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the domestic authorities did not overstep their margin of appreciation and did not disregard their positive obligation to secure to the applicant effective respect for his private life. 89. Consequently, there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of application no. 41029/04.
The Court reiterated that discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention was to be understood as treating people in relevantly similar situations differently, without an objective or reasonable justification. However, the applicant had not managed to build a case to prove that the publications had a discriminatory intent or effect. The applicant’s case did not therefore concern a difference of treatment and the Court decided to examine the case only under Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention. In the applicant’s case, the Court held that there had been no violation of Article 8, finding that neither the book nor the dictionaries were offensive to Roma. It found in particular that the Turkish authorities had taken all necessary steps to comply with their obligation under Article 8 to protect the applicant’s effective right to respect for his private life as a member of the Roma community. It did mention, however, that it would have been preferable to label a second definition of the word “Gypsy” – “miserly” – in the dictionaries as “pejorative” or “insulting” rather than “metaphorical”.