Unaccompanied foreign minor
THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 40. The applicant complained that the French authorities had failed to fulfil their obligation to protect foreign unaccompanied minors who, like him, were living in the Calais heath area. He complained more specifically about the fact that the decision of the Youth Judge of the Boulogne-sur-Mer tribunal de grande instance of 22 February 2016, ordering his temporary placement in facilities of the child welfare service had not been implemented. He relied on Article 3, Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention, the first of which reads as follows: Article 3 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 41. Reiterating that it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, and finding that these complaints converge, the Court finds it appropriate to examine the applicant’s allegations under Article 3 of the Convention alone (see, for example, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, § 55, ECHR 2015, and Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], no. 56080/13, § 145, 19 December 2017; see also Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018). It will thus seek to ascertain whether the respondent State has failed in its obligations under that Article by not implementing the necessary means to enforce the decision of the Youth Judge of the Boulogne-sur-Mer tribunal de grande instance of 22 February 2016 ordering the applicant’s temporary placement and thus failing to take him into shelter when he had spent several months in the Calais heath area. Admissibility 42. The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies. In their view he should have lodged an urgent application for the protection of a fundamental freedom ( référé-liberté under Article L. 251-2 of the Code of Administrative Justice) asking the judge to order the local authority ( conseil départemental ) to take him into shelter on the basis of his right to emergency accommodation. 43. The applicant pointed out that the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies was confined to a normal use of effective remedies, merely to penalise the failure to make use of any essential course of action. He added, in particular, that he had availed himself of the “genuinely appropriate procedure” by applying to the Youth Judge to decide on his placement, emphasising that such a decision was in itself immediately enforceable. 44. The Court notes that the States, such as the respondent State, which are parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, are required by Article 20 thereof to “ensure alternative care”, “in accordance with their national laws”, for any child who, within their jurisdiction, is “temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment”; while Article 2 states that this obligation is irrespective of the child’s national origin (see paragraph 38 above). Moreover, it can be seen from the Court’s case-law that, as part of their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention, the States Parties are required to protect and take care of unaccompanied foreign minors (see paragraphs 70-71 below). 45. The provision of protection and care to the applicant could thus be regarded as an automatic obligation imposed on the domestic authorities. 46. Owing to the particularly difficult conditions in which he found himself, the applicant, through the non-governmental organisation Cabane juridique, lodged an application with the Youth Judge under Article 375 of the Civil Code seeking to be taken into care by the child welfare services. This provision authorises the judge to order educational assistance measures if the health, safety or morals of an unemancipated minor are in danger, or if the conditions of his or her education or physical, emotional, intellectual and social development are seriously compromised. The judge may in particular receive an application from the youth himself or from the public prosecutor’s office; he may also examine the matter of his own motion on an exceptional basis (see paragraph 37 above). Taking into account the applicant’s situation of danger and the need to take him into shelter, the Youth Judge granted the request by a decision of 22 February 2016, which was automatically enforceable on a provisional basis and against which no appeal was lodged (see paragraph 31 above). The authorities were required to enforce this decision, without any further proceedings being required under domestic law for this purpose. They could also be required to protect and take care of the applicant from the moment they became aware of his situation. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the application to the Youth Judge gave the respondent State the opportunity to prevent or remedy the breach of the positive obligations that Article 3 of the Convention could impose on it on account of the minor’s situation. Thus, in the very particular circumstances of his case, the applicant did what could reasonably be expected of him for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. 47. Accordingly, the objection is rejected. 48. The Court notes, moreover, that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. MeritsParties’ observations Parties’ observations Parties’ observations (a) The applicant 49. The applicant pointed out that, in the Rahimi v. Greece judgment (no. 8687/08, 5 April 2011), the Court found that the failure of the national authorities to take care of an unaccompanied foreign minor constituted a breach of Article 3 of the Convention in so far as they had left him to fend for himself and in general he had been taken care of solely by local non ‑ governmental organisations. He further emphasised that the authorities were required to take account of the extreme vulnerability of such minors. He complained that the decision on his provisional placement of 22 February 2016 had not been enforced, stressing that he had never opposed its enforcement and had absolutely no objection to being taken into shelter. He considered more generally that the authorities should have gone to the “jungle” to provide him with basic material support and initiate welfare formalities that would enable him to be directed to facilities where he could be taken into shelter, such as the child welfare service’s accommodation. He pointed out that départements and the State had a particular obligation to protect unaccompanied minors and minors in situations of danger. He observed that the Government had not adduced any evidence to show that steps had been taken to trace him. He also rejected the Government’s argument that his lawyer or the associations following his case should have taken physical steps, in particular by taking him and the other minors concerned to the child welfare services. Pointing out that only the prefect and the local authority ( conseil départemental ) were responsible for the organisation of the reception and placement of unaccompanied foreign minors, he took the view that it would be legally erroneous and unacceptable to shift this burden to others, adding that his lawyer would not have had the material resources to take such action. The Rahimi judgment, cited above, showed that the obligation to take care of unaccompanied foreign minors did not fall on third parties but on the authorities, and on the latter alone. 50. The applicant also criticised the State for proceeding with the demolition of the southern part of the “jungle” without having first taken into shelter the unaccompanied minors who had been living there. He had thus been deprived of shelter, when he was only twelve years old and the operation had taken place in mid-winter. 51. The applicant adduced, inter alia, a report broadcast on the France 3 television news on 8 April 2016, showing that unaccompanied minors had seen their shelters demolished during the clearance of the southern part of the heath area without being informed of an alternative solution, and that several of them had been forced to settle in the northern part of the heath where many other people were already living and where they were confronted with particularly difficult living conditions. The report also showed that, in the aftermath of the clearance of the southern zone, in spite of the decisions of the urgent applications judge of November 2015 ordering the prefect to enumerate the unaccompanied foreign minors present on the site with a view to their placement (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above), the deputy prefect, who was interviewed in the report, did not have a list of their names. This showed, in the applicant’s submission, that no steps had been taken by the authorities to identify the unaccompanied minors who were the subject of a placement decision. 52. The applicant also referred to a decision of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal of 29 January 2016, which noted the dangers that prevailed on the heath, including the exploitation of unaccompanied children. He further relied on the concluding observations of 23 February 2016 of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and on a report of 12 October 2016 of the Special Representative of the Council of Europe Secretary General on migration and refugees, which showed that the mechanisms for identifying, and for providing care and support to, unaccompanied foreign minors in Calais were inadequate. He also noted that the non-governmental organisations present on the heath had not been contacted by the authorities to seek a global solution for the unaccompanied minors. (b) The Government 53. The Government submitted that the failure to comply with the protection measure ordered by the Youth Judge on 22 February 2016 could be attributed to the applicant’s conduct, which had allegedly prevented its implementation. Although the decision had been requested by the applicant, he had not appeared at the hearing. They emphasised that the child welfare service of the département had taken the necessary action. In that connection, the service had prepared a placement for the applicant (and for the other eleven minors concerned by a similar measure on the same day) but he had not turned up; and neither his ad hoc guardian, nor the associations that supported him, nor his lawyer, had taken him to that location or informed the service of his whereabouts. The child welfare service had then taken steps to trace the applicant on the heath. It had contacted the association which provided emergency shelter there on behalf of the département and to which the State had entrusted the task of enumerating unaccompanied minors ( France Terre d’Asile ), but it replied that it did not know the applicant. 54. According to the Government, the fact that the applicant had not appeared at the hearing before the Youth Judge, that he had not kept in touch with his ad hoc guardian, his lawyer or the association following his case, that he had not appeared at the home designated for his placement, and that he had entered the United Kingdom in the week of 20 March – less than a month after his request for care – showed that he was not seeking long ‑ term shelter and care from the French authorities but had above all wished to travel to the United Kingdom. Observations of third-party interveners (a) Défenseur des droits 55. The Défenseur des droits (Defender of rights) pointed out that this case was an illustration of the dramatic humanitarian situation in which displaced people found themselves in the Calais and Grande Synthe areas, caused in particular by the Franco-British agreements and the pitfalls of European migration policy. He stated that, following an in-depth investigation, on-site inspections and meetings with all stakeholders and his British counterpart, he had issued reports and decisions, and had made recommendations to the competent authorities specifically concerning the situation of unaccompanied minors, their reception and care – in particular the establishment of an unconditional shelter scheme on the heath – also monitoring their implementation. He added that to date their situation still remained a major concern for him. 56. The Défenseur des droits referred to his report of October 2015, in which he had described the alarming living conditions of unaccompanied minors on the Calais heath and had taken the view that they substantiated a situation of danger which automatically imposed an obligation of protection on the authorities; he had also described the dangers to which these minors were exposed (violence, risk of trafficking and prostitution, risky behaviour such as alcohol abuse, and trauma related to living conditions and risky attempts to cross the sea to England), aggravated by the lack of regular and adequate medical follow-up. He pointed out that the French authorities were bound by both domestic and international law to shelter and take care of them (he referred in particular to Article 20 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6 of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium (no. 13178/03, ECHR 2006-XI) and Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta (nos. 25794/13 and 28151/13, 22 November 2016) judgments, Article 375 of the Civil Code and Article L. 112-3 of the Social Action and Family Code). Above all, the authorities had been required to enumerate the minors concerned and offer them appropriate protection, as indeed the Administrative Court had ordered them to do on 2 November 2015. Having been informed that 316 unaccompanied minors had been identified on the heath as of 5 January 2016, the Défenseur des droits expressed concern about the lack of information regarding the identification and monitoring of 77 of them. He added that, on 23 February 2016, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child had expressed concern about the precarious situation of children, the authorities’ refusal to register them and the insufficient resources allocated to infrastructure and services. He also emphasised that, when an unaccompanied minor was entrusted to the child protection services by judicial decision, the failure of the authorities to implement that decision deprived the right to protection of its substance. 57. The Défenseur des droits further noted that the right to education of unaccompanied minors living on the Calais heath was far from being guaranteed, that few of them had been informed of their rights or supported in their efforts to be reunited with their families, efforts which were complicated by the fact that before they could submit asylum applications it was necessary in practice for them first to have been taken into the care of the child welfare service or even to have been placed under guardianship. 58. The Défenseur des droits indicated that following the clearance of the southern part of the heath in February 2016, associations had deplored the disappearance of around 100 unaccompanied minors. The living conditions of those who were still there remained worrying: as the authorities had not sufficiently anticipated the consequences of this operation for the situation of unaccompanied minors, many of them, being homeless, had been forced to live in even more extreme squalor. On 20 April 2016 he had recommended the implementation of regular and intensive socio-educational outreach by specially trained social workers, with a view to establishing a relationship of trust and allowing the stabilisation of unaccompanied minors on the site and effective care, stressing that the minor’s acceptance of the protection measure should be sought but should not constitute a precondition for any attempt to find a solution. In his view, the fact that some did not request child protection and did not support the proposed measures could not justify the inaction on the part of the public authorities, which had an obligation to ensure their protection and to consider how to achieve it, taking into account the specific circumstances of the group concerned. 59. The Défenseur des droits additionally observed that, in spite of insisting that the authorities should act on this matter, the unconditional and adapted sheltering of unaccompanied minors that he had advocated had never taken place, as the facilities provided by the authorities – among them a reception centre 45 km from Calais – were ineffective. He pointed out that the specificity of these minors – their wish to go to England and refusal to settle in France – should have been taken into account before any considerations about their care. In this connection he had, in particular, recommended that an accommodation centre and a daytime reception facility be opened near the heath. (b) Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme 60. The Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (“CNCDH” – National Advisory Commission on Human Rights), which stated that it had conducted three fact-finding missions to Calais in 2015 and 2016, referred to the opinions and statements that it had issued: opinion “on the situation of unaccompanied foreign minors in France; taking stock one year after the circular of 31 May 2013 on the arrangements for taking care of unaccompanied foreign youths (national system for taking to shelter, assessment and orientation)” (26 June 2014); opinion “on the situation of migrants in Calais and its surroundings” (2 July 2015); opinion on the situation of migrants in Grande-Synthe (26 May 2016); opinion “on the situation of migrants in Calais and its surroundings” (7 July 2016); statements on “the clearance of the Calais shantytown and its consequences: the case of minors” (adopted 8 November 2016); statement “on the situation of unaccompanied minors placed in migrant reception and orientation centres” (26 January 2017); and a declaration on the treatment of migrants (17 October 2017). 61. The CNCDH highlighted the worrying situation in which many unaccompanied foreign minors found themselves during the period when the applicant was in the Calais area. It observed that in France child protection fell within the remit of the départements, while the State was responsible for migration matters, and that, in the case of unaccompanied foreign minors, who did not have a specific status, this led to an “institutional ping-pong”, preventing a coherent understanding of their specificity and particular vulnerability, and neglecting the best interests of the child, whereas they were above all to be seen as children rather than aliens. Their access to rights and justice was limited, in particular as regards their access to the asylum procedure: an ad hoc guardian could only be appointed to represent them once they had taken steps to benefit from protection, while some steps (including withdrawal of the asylum application) could only be taken after such appointment. This procedure, in addition to the steps to be taken under the head of child protection, was complex and slow. According to the CNCDH, the difficulties encountered by unaccompanied foreign minors in the context of asylum applications or their administrative situation revealed a security logic that led to the minor being regarded first and foremost as a foreigner, while a child in danger had be covered by a protection measure regardless of his or her personal status and situation in terms of the rules on entry and residence. 62. The CNCDH also took the view that the State’s shortcomings in the care of unaccompanied foreign minors in Calais had been numerous and systematic. First, court decisions had not been enforced, in particular placement decisions. Secondly, the reception facilities were inadequate, so that between 2014 and the end of 2016 several hundred unaccompanied foreign minors had been living in appalling conditions in the Calais shantytown, characterised by squalor, deprivation and insecurity. Thirdly, their protection against the risks of trafficking and exploitation was inadequate. Fourthly, their rights to education and health were insufficiently guaranteed: even in cases of emergency temporary shelter, schooling or training had rarely been put in place; extreme and inhumane living conditions on the heath were triggering or aggravating disease, as well as traumas linked to their chaotic migration history, conditions of anxiety and depression and impaired mental health due to exhaustion and survival needs. On this last point, the CNCDH added that the significant increase in population density in the northern part of the camp caused by the clearance of the southern zone in February 2015 had considerably increased the risk of contagion of infectious diseases. The State’s shortcomings and failures were all the more unjustifiable as it had been more than twenty years since the Calais area had first been confronted with a large number of migrants wishing to travel to the United Kingdom, and therefore the situation was not exceptional. (c) Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés 63. The non-governmental organisation Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés (“GISTI” – Migrant Information and Support Group) submitted that the material living conditions of unaccompanied minors in the heath area of Calais had led to systematic violations of Article 3 of the Convention, given their particular vulnerability. The chronic failure to provide them with care, before, during and after the clearance of the southern zone had increased their vulnerability, and the authorities had not enforced decisions in their favour, whereas particular attention should have been paid to them because of their age and their particularly insecure situation. It referred to the observations by the Défenseur des droits since 2015 and by UNICEF in 2016 regarding the poor living conditions of unaccompanied minors on the heath, the dangers to which they were exposed, the State’s failure in its duty to protect and take care of them, the lack of legal assistance and the ineffectiveness of the procedures initiated for family reunion. It further pointed out that in law, the fact that an individual was a minor took precedence over his or her status as an alien. 64. GISTI denounced the shortcomings of the French asylum procedure and the failure to provide information to minors in this connection, noting that this had been observed by the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the UK’s Upper Tribunal in its decision of 29 January 2016 (cited above) and by the Lille Administrative Court which, on 11 February 2016, had compelled the authorities to register applications from minors who had been refused by officials in charge of the relevant service. 65. It further noted that, as a result of the clearance of the Calais heath area, a large number of unaccompanied foreign minors had been left homeless or had been inadequately or inappropriately provided for, their number having been estimated at 1,932 in October 2016. 66. GISTI referred to the December 2016 report of the Défenseur des droits on the dismantling of the camps and the provision made for the displaced migrants. The report stated that the authorities had failed to take the necessary measures to protect unaccompanied minors, had allowed them to live in inhumane conditions and in situations of danger, and had not taken them to shelter or found placements for them prior to the clearance operation. The third party also noted that, in a decision of 26 June 2017, the urgent applications judge at the Lille Administrative Court had found that unaccompanied minors still present in the Calais area were very often exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment on account of the ineffectiveness of the identification and orientation measures put in place. (d) Cabane juridique 67. The non-governmental organisation Cabane juridique, present in the heath area of Calais before and during the clearance operation, observed that in the years 2015 and 2016 the authorities had unduly decided not to introduce any arrangements in Calais for the care of unaccompanied foreign minors, in order to avoid a “pull factor”, or set up any shelters, so that minors would be encouraged to move away from the city rather than remaining in contact with the people smugglers. 68. First of all, Cabane juridique deplored the inadequacies of the provisions for unaccompanied foreign minors from a quantitative standpoint. No accommodation had been provided in Calais and the facility set up to receive and support them was located in Saint-Omer, some 50 kilometres away, and as noted by the Défenseur des droits the outreach efforts in Calais were insufficient. While a temporary reception centre of 1,500 places had been set up in the northern part of the heath after the clearance of the southern part, it was not open to unaccompanied minors. According to the third party, during the entire existence of the shantytown, no specific reception and care facilities for unaccompanied minors had existed in Calais, with the result that they had been forced to remain in makeshift shelters unless they pretended to be adults in order to be admitted to the temporary reception centre. 69. Cabane juridique further denounced the insufficient provision for unaccompanied foreign minors in Calais from a qualitative standpoint, observing in particular that inadequate consideration had been given to their migration plans. It noted, for example, that until the end of February 2016, it had been very difficult for those wishing to join a family member in the United Kingdom to obtain even the registration of an asylum application for the purpose of implementing the family reunion procedure under the Dublin III Regulation; while applications could subsequently be lodged, they had been processed very slowly. Moreover, throughout the shantytown’s existence, the unaccompanied minors concerned had received very little information on how to travel legally to the United Kingdom. It was also because the authorities had not sufficiently taken into account the migration plans of unaccompanied minors that the accommodation system put in place had been shunned and misunderstood by the minors concerned and had thus been a failure. 70. Cabane juridique further pointed out that, without an accommodation solution, unaccompanied foreign minors on the heath had been exposed to violence. About twenty of them had reported to it that they had been victims of violence. Referring to the above-mentioned UNICEF report, it alluded to mental health problems, sexual abuse, physical violence and cases of prostitution, trafficking and exploitation. It also referred to a police report which showed that between 1 and 21 February 2016, 103 tear gas grenades had been thrown in Calais against the migrants during particularly violent police operations, giving rise to almost daily clashes. 71. The third party took the view that the State engaged its responsibility under Article 3 of the Convention whenever an unaccompanied minor was left homeless and exposed to risks of inhuman and degrading treatment as a result of the inadequacy of the protection system. It noted that, in its decision of 23 November 2015 (see paragraph 15 above), the Conseil d’État had found that the shortcomings of the authorities in the handling of minors in the Calais shantytown characterised a disregard for the principle of the dignity of the human person. It added that, even at the present time when the shantytown no longer existed, nothing was being done in the Calais area to guarantee prompt protection measures for unaccompanied foreign minors. The Court’s assessment (a) General considerations and principles 72. Ill‑treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of that severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. The Court has previously deemed treatment to be “degrading” because it was such as to arouse in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see, among many other authorities, Rahimi, cited above, § 59, and the judgments cited therein). 73. The obligation on High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. Those Articles, taken together, should enable effective protection to be provided, particularly to children and other vulnerable members of society, including reasonable measures to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge (see, among many other authorities, Rahimi, cited above, §§ 60 and 62, and the judgments cited therein). 74. In cases concerning foreign minors, whether accompanied or unaccompanied, the child’s situation of extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and it takes precedence over considerations relating to his or her status as an irregular migrant (see, for example, N.T.P. and Others v. France, no. 68862/13, § 44, 24 May 2018, and the judgments cited therein, and Rahimi, cited above, § 87). The Court thus emphasised in Rahimi (ibid.) that as an unaccompanied foreign minor without leave to remain the applicant fell into “the category of the most vulnerable individuals in society”, and that it had been incumbent on Greece to protect him and provide for him by taking appropriate measures in accordance with its positive obligations under Article 3. 75. The Rahimi case concerned the situation in Greece of an unaccompanied minor, an Afghan national aged 15. Having arrived alone on the island of Lesbos, he had been arrested and held there for two days. He had been released after being notified of a removal measure. Having reached Athens, the day after his release, he remained there for about a day, left to his own devices, until he was picked up by a non-governmental organisation. He had not yet filed an asylum application. The Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, taking the view that, particularly on account of the authorities’ failure to monitor and provide for the applicant, the threshold of severity required for that Article to be engaged had been attained. It observed that the applicant had been left to his own devices after being released by the Greek authorities, basing its finding on reports about the lack of provision for unaccompanied foreign minors in Greece by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Greek Ombudsman and the non-governmental organisations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, together with the testimony of non-governmental organisations which had followed the applicant’s case on Lesbos and in Athens. It noted in particular that his accommodation and his protection more generally had been provided for solely by local non-governmental organisations. It found that on account of the conduct of the authorities, which had been indifferent towards him, the applicant must have felt extremely anxious and worried, especially from the time of his release until he was looked after in Athens by a non-governmental organisation, which indicated that when he was admitted to the accommodation centre for minors he had trouble going to sleep without leaving the light on, had difficulty speaking and was very under-nourished. (b) The present case 76. The Court notes the applicant’s young age at the material time. He was 11 years old when he arrived in France in September 2015. He was 12 when the southern zone of the Calais heath was cleared (in February 2016) and when he left France (in the week of 20 March 2016). 77. The Court further observes that, in the applicant’s submission, he settled on the Calais heath in September 2015. Moreover, his presence on the site is established by a video-recording of 21 February 2016, produced by him in support of his observations, and by the decisions of 19 and 22 February 2016 (see paragraphs 30-31 above). Further noting that the Government neither disputed the applicant’s presence on the heath nor claimed that he arrived there later or left before 20 March 2016, the Court finds that he lived there for about six months. 78. The applicant has not described in detail the material conditions of his life on that site. He merely stated that, as he was not under the care of the authorities, he lived in a “hut” in the southern zone of the heath, and that after the demolition of this hut during the clearance operations he had moved to a “makeshift shelter” in the northern zone. He also stated that he had received support from non-governmental organisations. 79. That being said, the Court finds that the Government did not dispute the applicant’s claim that he had not received any care from the authorities. This is borne out by the decision of the Youth Judge of the Boulogne-sur-Mer tribunal de grande instance of 22 February 2016 (see paragraph 31 above), and several of the documents mentioned in paragraph 39 above show that this was the case for the majority of unaccompanied foreign minors in the Calais area (see, for example, the “Follow-up opinion on the situation of migrants in Calais and its surroundings” by the CNCDH, § 95). 80. As to the living conditions on the heath, they are described by the urgent applications judge of the Conseil d’État in his decision of 23 November 2015 (see paragraph 15 above) and also by national and international bodies (paragraphs 7-13 and 39 above) and by non-governmental organisations. 81. It can be seen from those documents that the authorities only distributed 2,500 meals, once a day, whereas, according to the above-mentioned decision, 6,000 people were living on the heath in November 2015. They also show that most of those people lived in cramped conditions, in tents or makeshift shelters made of wooden boards and tarpaulins, and in very poor conditions of hygiene due to inadequate sanitation, drainage and waste collection facilities, and that they had limited access to safe drinking water and healthcare. The Défenseur des droits described the heath in particular as a “shantytown” and the living conditions of the majority of its occupants as “inhumane” (see paragraph 12 above). The urgent applications judge of the Conseil d’État, who used the term “shantytown” in his decision of 23 November 2015, found that provision for the basic needs of those concerned with regard to their hygiene and drinking water was “manifestly inadequate” and that this revealed “a deficiency of such a nature as to expose them, to a severe degree, to inhuman or degrading treatment, thus causing a serious and manifestly unlawful breach of a fundamental freedom” (see paragraph 15 above). 82. The Government indicated that, pursuant to the decision of the urgent applications judge, the heath site had been tidied up, ten additional water access points and fifty toilets had been installed, together with a roadway for emergency access and a waste collection system. The Court would observe, however, that having regard in particular to the number of people present on the heath, these measures could only bring about a relative improvement of the occupants’ living conditions (see, in particular, the above-cited “Follow-up opinion on the situation of migrants in Calais and its surroundings” by the CNCDH, § 36). The prefect’s order of 19 February 2016 for the clearance of the southern zone was indeed based on considerations relating to public health and human dignity (see paragraph 17 above). 83. Following the clearance of the southern zone many of its occupants settled in the northern zone of the heath, thus exacerbating the cramped living conditions there. The CNCDH thus reported in April 2016 that, in spite of the measures taken by the authorities “between 2,000 and 3,500 individuals continue[d] to live in the shantytown in dangerous and unhealthy makeshift shelters, in a state of total squalor”, and that “many of those makeshift installations [were] becoming permanent, in the absence of any alternative accommodation provided by the State” (document cited above, § 37). 84. In that context, unaccompanied foreign minors were, being left to their own devices, also exposed to various dangers such as the risk of physical violence, including sexual abuse (see, for example, the UNICEF report “Neither safe nor sound; investigation into unaccompanied children in northern France”; see also paragraphs 13, 55-56, 61, 63 and 69 above). 85. Accordingly, in the absence of protection by the authorities and in spite of the support he was able to find from non-governmental organisations on the heath, the applicant spent six months in an environment that was manifestly unsuited to his status as a child, characterised in particular by unhealthy, precarious and unsafe conditions. It was precisely on the grounds of the danger in which he found himself, and the fact that the danger had been exacerbated by the clearance of the southern zone of the heath, that the Youth Judge of the Boulogne-sur-Mer tribunal de grande instance ordered on 22 February 2016 that he be placed in the care of the child welfare services (see paragraph 31 above). 86. In the Court’s view, while already extremely problematic before the clearance of the southern zone, the failure to provide the applicant with care was even more so in the aftermath of that operation, owing to the demolition of the hut in which he had been living and the general deterioration of living conditions on the site that the operation had caused. The applicant’s statements on the latter point (see paragraph 32 above) are consistent in particular with the information reported by the Défenseur des droits (see paragraph 58 above), by the CNCDH (see paragraph 62 above) and by the non-governmental organisation GISTI (see paragraph 65 above). 87. The Government submitted that every effort had been made by the authorities to take charge of the applicant in accordance with the decision of 22 February 2016, but that the applicant had not turned up at the home designated to receive him. They added that neither his ad hoc guardian, nor the associations that had supported him, nor his lawyer, had taken him there. They indicated that the child welfare service had then tried unsuccessfully to trace him by contacting the association to which the State had entrusted the enumeration of unaccompanied minors. In their submission, this showed that the applicant was not seeking long-term shelter and care in France (see paragraphs 53-54 above). 88. In the Court’s view, the fact that it was necessary to wait for the Youth Judge to order the applicant’s placement before his case could actually be considered by the competent authorities raises in itself a question as to the respondent State’s compliance, in respect of the applicant, with its obligation to protect and take care of unaccompanied foreign minors under Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 74 above). It follows that, until that point, the competent authorities had not even identified the applicant for that purpose, even though he had been on the heath for several months and his young age should have particularly attracted their attention. 89. In this connection, it appears that, as complained of by the applicant (see paragraph 51 above) and as noted in particular by the Special Representative of the Council of Europe Secretary General on Migration and Refugees (see the “Report of the fact-finding mission on the situation of migrants and refugees in Calais and Grande-Synthe, France”, cited in paragraph 39 above), the steps taken to identify unaccompanied foreign minors on the heath were insufficient. This shortcoming explains, at least in part, the difficulty encountered by the child welfare service in tracing the applicant in order to enforce the 22 February 2016 decision. 90. With regard to the Government’s argument that the failure to comply with that decision could be attributed to the applicant’s lack of cooperation, it appears from the file that unaccompanied foreign minors on the heath did not always go along with the proposed care measures (see, for example, the recommendation of the Défenseur des droits of 20 April 2016, cited above; see also paragraph 58 above). However, the Court notes that, in the opinion of the Défenseur des droits in particular, the reluctance of unaccompanied minors on the heath could be explained by the fact that the shelter system was unsuited to their situation, in particular because of the distance of the facilities; it further observes that, according to the Défenseur des droits, their reluctance could not, in any event, justify the inaction of the authorities, which had an obligation to ensure their protection and therefore to find the best means to fulfil it, taking into account the specificities of the minors’ situation (ibid.). In the present case the applicant stated that he himself was in favour of an alternative accommodation solution. The Court would point out that he was a child of only twelve years old who, moreover, probably had only a limited knowledge of the French language. It is not therefore persuaded by the Government’s assertion that it was for the applicant himself to take the necessary steps to ensure that his protection measures were implemented. Nor does it consider that the non-governmental organisations which had provided support to the applicant on a voluntary basis, the lawyer who had represented him in the proceedings leading to the decision of 22 February 2016, and the ad hoc guardian who had been appointed on 19 February 2016, could be reproached for not having taken him to the home designated by the authorities for his placement, since this was clearly the responsibility of the State. 91. The Court is aware of the complexity of the task facing the national authorities, in particular with regard to the number of persons present on the heath at the relevant time, together with the difficulty of identifying unaccompanied minors among them and of establishing and implementing arrangements adapted to their situation when they were not always seeking protection. On the latter point, it notes the ambiguity of the applicant’s conduct: although he applied to the Youth Judge for his provisional placement, his intention was not to remain in France but to leave the country and travel to the United Kingdom. The Court further notes that the national authorities did not remain totally inactive since they took steps to enforce the decision of 22 February 2016. 92. In view of the foregoing, however, the Court is not persuaded that the authorities, which ultimately failed to implement the decision of the Youth Judge of the Boulogne-sur-Mer tribunal de grande instance of 22 February 2016 ordering the applicant’s provisional placement, did all that could reasonably be expected of them to fulfil the obligation to provide care and protection to the applicant, such obligation being imposed on the respondent State as he was an unaccompanied foreign unaccompanied minor and irregular migrant, at the age of twelve, and therefore an individual falling with the category of the most vulnerable individuals in society (see paragraph 74 above). 93. The applicant thus spent several months in the shantytown of the Calais heath, in an environment totally unsuited to his status as a child, whether in terms of safety, housing, hygiene or access to food and care, and in unacceptably precarious conditions in view of his young age. 94. The Court is of the view that these particularly serious circumstances and the failure to enforce the decision of the Youth Judge ordering measures for the applicant’s protection, when taken together, constitute a breach of the obligations imposed on the respondent State, thus attaining the threshold of severity required for Article 3 of the Convention to be engaged. It thus concludes that the applicant found himself, as a result of the failings of the French authorities, in a situation which contravened that provision and which it considers to have constituted degrading treatment. 95. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION AND Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 96. The applicant complained of the destruction of his shelter, which was his home, without sufficient notice or any offer of alternative accommodation and protection, even though he was an unaccompanied minor. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which read as follows: Article 8 “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 97. Having regard to the facts of the case, to the parties’ submissions and to the conclusion it has reached under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court takes the view that it has examined the main legal question raised by the present application and that it does not need to rule separately on the other complaints (see, in particular, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 98. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” Damage 99. The applicant claimed 29,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage that he alleged to have sustained as a result of the failure to take him into care and the demolition of his shelter. 100. The Government submitted that the applicant’s claim should be rejected. They took the view, first, that the alleged pecuniary damage had not been substantiated and that the non-pecuniary damage claimed had been the result of the applicant’s own conduct, as he had eschewed the alternative accommodation offered to him. They added that, should the Court nevertheless find the pecuniary damage to be substantiated, the finding of a violation of the Convention would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction. 101. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation of Article 3 that it has found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it finds it appropriate to award the applicant EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Costs and expenses 102. The applicant also claimed EUR 1,000 for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court. 103. The Government noted that the applicant had failed to adduce any documents to substantiate the reality and amount of the costs that he was claiming. They inferred that no award should be made to him on this basis. 104. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, noting that the applicant did not provide any supporting documents, the Court rejects the entire claim for costs and expenses. Default interest 105. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention, finding that, on account of the failure of the French authorities to take the requisite action, the applicant had found himself in a situation tantamount to degrading treatment. In particular, the Court was not convinced that the authorities had done all that could reasonably be expected of them to fulfil the obligation of protection and care incumbent on the respondent State vis-à-vis an unaccompanied foreign minor unlawfully present on French territory, that is to say an individual belonging to the category of the most vulnerable persons in society. For several months the applicant had thus lived in the “lande de Calais” shanty town, in an environment completely unsuited to his status as a child and in a situation of insecurity rendered unacceptable by his young age. The Court therefore held that the extremely negative circumstances prevailing in the makeshift camps and the failure to enforce the court order intended to secure protection for the applicant amounted to a violation of the respondent State’s obligations.