Applications lodged by the abducting parent
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE A. The Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 34. The relevant provisions of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction state as follows: “The States signatory to the present Convention, Firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody, Desiring to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access, Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have agreed upon the following provisions – ... Article 1 The objects of the present Convention are – a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States. ... Article 3 The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where – a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State. Article 4 The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years. Article 5 For the purposes of this Convention – a) ’rights of custody’ shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence; b) ’rights of access’ shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence. ... Article 11 The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children. If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay. ... Article 12 Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. Where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child. Article 13 Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that – a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s habitual residence. Article 14 In ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention within the meaning of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative decisions, formally recognised or not in the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions which would otherwise be applicable. ... Article 16 After receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child in the sense of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not lodged within a reasonable time following receipt of the notice. Article 17 The sole fact that a decision relating to custody has been given in or is entitled to recognition in the requested State shall not be a ground for refusing to return a child under this Convention, but the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take account of the reasons for that decision in applying this Convention. ... Article 19 A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue. Article 20 The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. ...” 35. The Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, prepared by Elisa Pérez-Vera and published by The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) in 1982, seeks to throw into relief the principles which form the basis of the 1980 Convention and to supply to those who must apply the Convention a detailed commentary on its provisions. It appears from this report that, in order to discourage the possibility for the abducting parent to have his or her action recognised as lawful in the State to which the child has been taken, the Convention enshrines, in addition to its preventive aspect, the restoration of the status quo, by an order for immediate return of the child, which would make it possible to restore the situation that had been unilaterally and wrongfully changed. Compliance with custody rights is almost entirely absent from the scope of this Convention, as this matter is to be discussed before the relevant courts in the State of the child’s habitual residence prior to removal. The philosophy of the Hague Convention is to fight against the multiplication of international abductions, based always on a wish to protect children by acting as interpreter of their real interests. Accordingly, the objective of prevention and immediate return corresponds to a specific conception of “the child’s best interests”. However, as the child’s removal may be justified for objective reasons which have to do either with his or her person, or with the environment with which he or she is most closely connected, the Convention allows for certain exceptions to the general obligations on the States to ensure an immediate return (§ 25). Since the return of the child is the basic principle of the Convention, the exceptions to the general duty to secure it form an important element in understanding the exact extent of this duty, and it is possible to distinguish exceptions which derive their justification from three different principles (§ 27). Firstly, the authorities of the requested State are not bound to order the return of the child if the person requesting the return was not actually exercising custody rights or where his or her behaviour shows acceptance of the new situation (§ 28). Secondly, the first paragraph, (b), and second paragraph of Article 13 contain exceptions which clearly derive from a consideration of the interests of the child, to which the Convention gives a definite content. Thus, the interest of the child in not being removed from his or her habitual residence without sufficient guarantees of stability in the new environment gives way before the primary interest of any person in not being exposed to physical or psychological danger or being placed in an intolerable situation (§ 29). Lastly, there is no obligation to return a child when, in terms of Article 20, his or her return “would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (§ 31). The explanatory report, which sets out those exceptions, also emphasises the margin of appreciation inherent in the judicial function. 36. In 2003 the HCCH published Part II of the Guide to Good Practice under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Although primarily intended for the new Contracting States and without binding effect, especially in respect of the judicial authorities, this document seeks to facilitate the Convention’s implementation by proposing numerous recommendations and clarifications. The Guide repeatedly emphasises the importance of the Explanatory Report to the 1980 Convention, known as the Pérez-Vera Report, in helping to interpret coherently and understand the 1980 Convention (see, for example, points 3.3.2 “Implications of the transformation approach” and 8.1 “Explanatory Report on the Convention: the Pérez-Vera Report”). In particular, it emphasises that the judicial and administrative authorities are under an obligation, inter alia, to process return applications expeditiously, including on appeal (point 1.5 “Expeditious procedures”). Expeditious procedures should be viewed as procedures which are both fast and efficient: prompt decision-making under the Convention serves the best interests of children (point 6.4 “Case management”). The Guide to Good Practice specifies that delays in enforcement of return orders, or their non-enforcement, in certain Contracting States are matters of serious concern, and recommends that States Parties ensure that there are simple and effective mechanisms to enforce orders for the return of children within their domestic systems, noting that the return must actually be effected and not just ordered (point 6.7 “Enforcement”). B. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 37. The relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed in New York on 20 November 1989, read as follows: Preamble “The States Parties to the present Convention, ... Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community, Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding, ... Have agreed as follows: ... Article 7 1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth... to know and be cared for by his or her parents. ... Article 9 1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will ... Article 14 1. States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. ... Article 18 1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern. ...” 38. The concept of the child’s best interests, derived from the second principle of the Declaration on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1959, was reproduced in 1989 in Article 3 § 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” 39. In its General Comment No. 7 (2005) on Implementing child rights in early childhood, the Committee on the Rights of the Child wished to encourage recognition by States Parties that young children are holders of all rights enshrined in this Convention and that early childhood is a critical period for the realisation of these rights. The best interests of the child are examined, in particular, in section 13, which is worded as follows: “13. Best interests of the child. Article 3 sets out the principle that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in all actions concerning children. By virtue of their relative immaturity, young children are reliant on responsible authorities to assess and represent their rights and best interests in relation to decisions and actions that affect their well-being, while taking account of their views and evolving capacities. The principle of best interests appears repeatedly within the Convention (including in articles 9, 18, 20 and 21, which are most relevant to early childhood). The principle of best interests applies to all actions concerning children and requires active measures to protect their rights and promote their survival, growth, and well-being, as well as measures to support and assist parents and others who have day-to-day responsibility for realizing children’s rights: (a) Best interests of individual children. All decision-making concerning a child’s care, health, education, etc. must take account of the best interests principle, including decisions by parents, professionals and others responsible for children. States parties are urged to make provisions for young children to be represented independently in all legal proceedings by someone who acts for the child’s interests, and for children to be heard in all cases where they are capable of expressing their opinions or preferences; ...” 40. For a more in-depth discussion, see Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, §§ 49-55, ECHR 2010. C. European Union law 41. The relevant provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provide: Article 7 Respect for private and family life “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications. Article 24 The rights of the child 1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. 3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.” 42. Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (known as “the Brussels II bis Regulation”) reads, in particular, as follows: “... (12) The grounds of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility established in the present Regulation are shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity. This means that jurisdiction should lie in the first place with the Member State of the child’s habitual residence, except for certain cases of a change in the child’s residence or pursuant to an agreement between the holders of parental responsibility. (13) In the interest of the child, this Regulation allows, by way of exception and under certain conditions, that the court having jurisdiction may transfer a case to a court of another Member State if this court is better placed to hear the case. However, in this case the second court should not be allowed to transfer the case to a third court. ...” D. Relevant Latvian law 1. The Constitution 43. The relevant provisions of the Constitution read as follows: Article 89 “The State shall recognise and protect fundamental human rights in accordance with this Constitution, laws and international agreements binding upon Latvia.” Article 110 “The State shall protect and support marriage – a union between a man and a woman, the family, the rights of parents and rights of the child. The State shall provide special support to disabled children, children left without parental care or who have suffered from violence.” 2. The Latvian Civil Procedure Act 44. Section 644 19 of the Latvian Civil Procedure Act, as in force at the material time, regulates matters concerning the unlawful removal of children across borders into Latvia. It provides that the courts are to rule on any application of this type after a court hearing in which the parties participate and to which a representative of the Bāriņtiesa has been invited. In addition, the courts are to ascertain the point of view of the child if he or she is capable of formulating it. 45. In ruling on the application, the court may take any evidence of its own motion. It may use the most appropriate procedural means and the most rapid methods of establishing the facts, so that a decision can be reached within a period of six weeks after the submission of the application. 46. Where the court determines that the child has been unlawfully removed to or retained in Latvia and where one of the following conditions is met, the court orders the return of the child to the country of his or her residence: (a) the period following the unlawful removal of the child to Latvia or detention in Latvia does not exceed one year from the time the relevant person or institution discovered the whereabouts of the child; or (b) the period following the unlawful removal of the child to Latvia or detention in Latvia does exceed one year but the child has not adapted to life in Latvia. 47. Where the court determines that the child has been unlawfully removed to or retained in Latvia and where one of the following circumstances exists, it may decide not to permit the return of the child to the country of his or her residence: (a) more than one year has passed since the relevant person or institution has discovered or had the practical possibility of discovering the whereabouts of the child, but during this period neither has brought proceedings before the relevant institution to seek the return of the child to the country of his or her residence; (b) the child has adapted to life in Latvia and his or her return is not in the best interests of the child. 48. The above-mentioned paragraphs are applicable in so far as they comply with the Hague Convention and Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of the Council of the European Union. E. Family Law Act 1975 of the Commonwealth of Australia 49. Section 61B defines parental responsibility as “all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to children”. 50. Section 61C provides that each of the parents of a child who is not 18 has parental responsibility for the child. It has effect subject to court orders. 51. Section 111B(4) provides as follows: “For the purposes of the [Hague] Convention: (a) each of the parents of a child should be regarded as having rights of custody in respect of the child unless the parent has no parental responsibility for the child because of any order of a court for the time being in force; and (b) subject to any order of a court for the time being in force, a person: (i) with whom a child is to live under a parenting order; or (ii) who has parental responsibility for a child under a parenting order; should be regarded as having rights of custody in respect of the child; and (c) subject to any order of a court for the time being in force, a person who has parental responsibility for a child because of the operation of this Act or another Australian law and is responsible for the day-to-day or long-term care, welfare and development of the child should be regarded as having rights of custody in respect of the child; and (d) subject to any order of a court for the time being in force, a person: (i) with whom a child is to spend time under a parenting order; or (ii) with whom a child is to communicate under a parenting order; should be regarded as having a right of access to the child.” THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 52. Before the Grand Chamber, the applicant claimed to have been a victim, on account of the decision by the Latvian courts to order the return of her daughter to Australia, of an infringement of her right to respect for her family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, which provides: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” A. Applicability of Article 8 53. The Grand Chamber notes that the Government expressly indicated in the proceedings before it that they did not contest that the decisions by the Latvian courts ordering the applicant to send E. back to Australia amounted to interference with her right to respect for her family life as protected by Article 8 of the Convention. 54. The interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private and family life found above is in breach of Article 8 unless it satisfies the requirements of paragraph 2 of that provision. It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was “in accordance with the law”, pursued one or more legitimate aims as defined in that paragraph and was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve them. B. Whether the interference was justified 1. Legal basis (a) The Chamber judgment 55. The Chamber held that the provisions of the domestic law and the Hague Convention indicated in a sufficiently clear manner that, in ascertaining whether the removal was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention, the Latvian courts had had to decide whether it had been carried out in breach of the custody rights as attributed under Australian law, Australia being the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately prior to her removal. While noting that the Australian authorities had ruled on T.’s parental responsibility after the child’s removal, it observed that it had merely been confirmed, and not established, that the applicant and T. had enjoyed joint parental responsibility from her birth by virtue of the Australian Family Law Act. The Chamber further noted that the applicant had not been prevented from participating in the proceedings in Australia leading to the above-mentioned ruling or from submitting an appeal and, in addition, that she had not challenged before the national courts the evidence adduced to demonstrate that T. was the child’s father. The Chamber assumed that the Latvian court’s decision of 19 November 2008 ordering the child’s return to Australia, which had become enforceable on 26 January 2009, had been in accordance with the law within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. (b) The parties’ submissions (i) The applicant 56. Before the Chamber, the applicant maintained that the domestic courts had had no grounds for applying the provisions of the Hague Convention, since she had been raising her daughter as a single parent at the time of her departure for Latvia. She made no submissions to the Grand Chamber on this question. (ii) The Government 57. The Government considered that the interference was indisputably “in accordance with the law”, given that it was based on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. (c) The Court’s assessment 58. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the expression “in accordance with the law” not only requires that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see, among many other authorities, Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 50, ECHR 2000 ‑ II; Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, § 100, ECHR 2003 ‑ X; and Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 341, ECHR 2012). 59. The Court observes that the decision to return the child to Australia was taken by the Riga Regional Court on the basis of the Hague Convention of 1980, a text signed and ratified by Latvia in 1982. Furthermore, the Latvian Civil Procedure Act, section 644 of which governs matters regarding the unlawful removal of children across borders into Latvia, makes its application conditional on express compliance with the Hague Convention, the Brussels II bis Regulation and the European Convention on Human Rights. 60. The applicant alleged that at the time of her departure from Australia she had been alone in exercising parental responsibility for her daughter. 61. The Court notes, however, that that issue was expressly examined by the Latvian courts dealing with the application for the child’s return. Those courts, while stating that they could neither interpret nor alter it, applied the Australian Family Court’s decision of 6 November 2008, which confirmed T.’s paternity and the existence of joint parental responsibility for the child from her birth. In consequence, both the District Court and the Riga Regional Court found that T.’s application complied with the Hague Convention in this respect. 62. Moreover, the Court considers that it is not for it to decide whether the international removal of a child was or was not “unlawful” within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. Indeed, it is not the Court’s function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999 ‑ I): it is for the domestic courts to resolve problems of interpretation and application of domestic legislation, and of rules of general international law and international treaties (see Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, § 79, 6 December 2007, and Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 100). In the instant case, the applicant, in addition to failing to exercise the available remedies to challenge the Australian decision confirming T.’s paternity and the existence of joint parental responsibility for the child at the time of her departure from Australia, which was a direct precondition for application of the Hague Convention, has not shown either that it was impossible for her to challenge the Australian decision or how the domestic courts had erred in that respect. 63. In conclusion, the Court considers that the impugned interference was in accordance with the law within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. 2. Legitimate aim (a) The Chamber judgment 64. The Chamber considered that the interference was intended to protect the rights of T. and of the child, which was a legitimate aim for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. (b) The parties’ arguments (i) The applicant 65. The applicant did not express a view on this point. (ii) The Government 66. According to the Government, the interference pursued a legitimate aim, namely, the protection of the rights and freedoms of T. and of his daughter. (c) The Court’s assessment 67. The Grand Chamber shares the Chamber’s opinion that the decision to order the child’s return had the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of T. and of E., which, moreover, has not been challenged by the parties in these proceedings. 3. Necessity of the interference in a democratic society (a) The Chamber judgment 68. With regard to whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”, the Chamber considered, while noting that it was not its task to take the place of the domestic authorities in determining the existence of a grave risk within the meaning of Article 13 (b), that it had to ascertain whether, in applying and interpreting the Hague Convention, the courts had complied with the requirements of Article 8, particularly in the light of the principles established by the Court in Neulinger and Shuruk (cited above). Turning its attention firstly to the psychologist’s report, drawn up at the mother’s request following the first-instance judgment, the Chamber found that the Regional Court had dismissed it, on the ground that it concerned the question of custody of the child and that the latter would be protected in accordance with the Australian legislation. In the Chamber’s opinion, although the failure to question the child did not raise an issue, given her age, the Regional Court ought nonetheless to have examined the conclusions of the psychological assessment and the objections raised by the Bāriņtiesa; moreover, there had been nothing to prevent the court from ordering a psychological report of its own motion. 69. The Chamber further indicated that the courts should also have assessed whether there were other sufficient safeguards to ensure that the return took place in the best possible conditions for the child, particularly with regard to her material well-being in Australia, and the possibility for the applicant to follow her daughter and to maintain contact with her. 70. While observing that the Latvian courts’ decision in this case contrasted with the approach taken in other Hague Convention proceedings in Latvia (see Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, no. 14737/09, § 94, 12 July 2011), and having both dismissed the Government’s argument that the applicant had failed to cooperate and noted the traumatic manner in which the decision had been executed, the Chamber concluded that an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of factors had been absent from the Latvian courts’ approach, therefore rendering the interference disproportionate within the meaning of Article 8. (b) The parties’ submissions (i) The applicant 71. The applicant considered the Chamber judgment as an exemplary text for assisting domestic authorities in ascertaining the best interests of the child. She noted that, while the Government had expressed regret in their request for referral to the Grand Chamber that the Chamber had not had available to it all the documents in the case file as examined by the domestic courts, it had been their responsibility to submit those documents. She argued that the best interests of the child had not been the goal of the domestic authorities, and considered that psychological reports were the only method of determining the child’s best interests; in this case, however, the domestic courts had refused to examine the psychological report submitted by her, thus violating Article 12 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (hearing of the child, either directly or through a representative or appropriate body). She emphasised that in determining the “best interests”, consideration was generally given to a number of factors related to the child’s circumstances and to the circumstances and capacity of the child’s potential carers, with the child’s safety and well-being as the paramount concern. 72. The applicant added that, in applying to the Court, her main goal was to challenge the domestic courts’ position in various cases relating to the Hague Convention and to demonstrate the necessity of ensuring the best interests of the child. (ii) The Government 73. The Government noted that the Court imposed a number of obligations on the domestic authorities, and in particular: ensuring that the parents were involved in the decision-making process to a degree sufficient to provide them with protection of their interests ( Iosub Caras v. Romania, no. 7198/04, § 41, 27 July 2006); preventing further harm to the child or prejudice to the interested parties, as stipulated by Article 7 of the Hague Convention (ibid., § 34, and Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679/96, § 99, ECHR 2000-I); ensuring urgent handling of proceedings relating to the return of an abducted child, including enforcement of the decisions taken (see Carlson v. Switzerland, no. 49492/06, § 69, 6 November 2008); and providing redress to the requesting parent in the event of failure to comply with the six-week deadline provided for in Article 11 of the Hague Convention (ibid., § 55). 74. They considered that these principles should be applied in a manner that would ensure to the maximum extent a balance between the rights of each parent and of the child. Nonetheless, they noted the difficulty of the domestic authorities’ task when faced with the international abduction of a child, which did not always allow for protection of the best interests of all parties, and especially those of the child, each party having a different, if not contradictory, definition from that of the others. They further insisted on the clear distinction to be drawn between return proceedings and custody proceedings. 75. The Government considered that the domestic authorities enjoyed a margin of appreciation in applying those principles to the circumstances of each case. The Court’s task was not to analyse every detail of the domestic proceedings, but to review whether the decision-making process, seen as a whole, had provided the individuals concerned with the requisite protection of his or her interests (see Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino, no. 32250/08, § 187, 27 September 2011), since the Court was not a court of fourth instance. Consequently, it could only be otherwise if the shortcomings observed had been decisive for the outcome of the case (see Broka v. Latvia, no. 70926/01, §§ 25-26, 28 June 2007). 76. In the instant case, they were of the opinion that the domestic authorities had complied with the above principles and had conducted an “in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of factors” (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 139), but that the examination of the overall family situation had to differ depending on the case, depending on the existence or not of prima facie concerns or at least of reasonable doubts. Moreover, the risk provided for in Article 13 (b) had to be “grave”, in addition to the fact that the child’s best interests also required expeditious proceedings. 77. The Government stated that the request submitted by the Australian authorities to the Latvian authorities on 15 September 2008 certified that T. had joint parental authority for the child and that, contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the decision of 6 November 2008 did not confer this right on him, but confirmed its existence at the time of his daughter’s departure from Australia. Both the Australian and Latvian courts had established that T. effectively exercised his parental responsibilities, that there were sufficient grounds to presume that T. was the child’s biological father, and that the applicant, for her part, had made false statements to the authorities in order to obtain advantages. 78. They pointed out that the psychological report had been drawn up on a private basis at the applicant’s request, and that the Bāriņtiesa was not a judicial institution. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the psychologist’s report and the observations from the Bāriņtiesa, the courts had examined the family situation in the light of the evidence available to them, which was an inherent part of their jurisdiction, there being nothing in the Court’s case-law to call into question that power. The Latvian courts had found that the applicant’s departure from Australia with her daughter had been motivated solely by her personal disagreements with T. and that there was no apparent risk of harm to the child in the event of return; it followed that the Latvian authorities had not applied the Hague Convention automatically or mechanically, in disregard of the principles established by Article 8 of the Convention. 79. The Government emphasised that “the understanding and cooperation of all concerned are always important ingredients” in evaluating the individual circumstances of a case (see Maumousseau and Washington, cited above, § 83, and Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 140). They considered, however, that the applicant had demonstrated a lack of cooperation with the Australian and Latvian authorities by ignoring the invitation to take part in the proceedings before the Australian court, by preventing the representatives of the Bāriņtiesa from assessing her living conditions with her daughter in Latvia, by hindering contacts between T. and his daughter, and by her extremely aggressive conduct towards T. during the proceedings. 80. They also considered that the courts had been correct in dismissing the question of the child’s integration into her new environment, given that she had spent only a few months in Latvia. 81. They noted that the courts had not ordered the child’s return to her father, but to Australia, thus drawing a clear distinction between the return of the child and the issue of her custody, an approach that had been endorsed by the Court (see M.R. and L.R. v. Estonia (dec.), no. 13420/12, §§ 47-48, 15 May 2012, and Tarkhova v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 8984/11, 6 September 2011). In any event, T.’s financial situation was not such as to prevent him from caring for his daughter. 82. The Government emphasised the need to distinguish the issue of the applicant’s relationship with the child, and the risk of this relationship being weakened in the event of return, from the question of a risk to the child’s fundamental interests within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. As an Australian citizen, the applicant was not faced by insurmountable difficulties if she returned to Australia, since she enjoyed the full spectrum of fundamental rights, in contrast to the applicants in Neulinger and Shuruk (cited above). In the present case, both the child and the mother had Australian citizenship; moreover, the mother had access to the labour-market, given that she had found a job since her return, and could have access to social security benefits. There was no history of family violence or abuse of authority on the part of T., whereas the applicant had demonstrated a lack of cooperation and an aggressive attitude. Lastly, the Government drew the Court’s attention to the fact that they could not be held responsible for the decisions taken by the Australian authorities (they referred to M.R. and L.R. v. Estonia, cited above). (c) Third-party interveners (i) The Finnish Government 83. The Finnish Government noted that the 1980 Hague Convention was based on the best interests of the child and was aimed at protecting the child from the detrimental effects of the abduction, while laying down a number of grounds for refusing a return. They emphasised that Article 11 of the Brussels II bis Regulation, applicable within the European Union, narrowed down even further the exceptions to the child’s return, and reflected the view of the European Union member States that the effectiveness of the Hague Convention served the best interests of children and families. They further referred to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 84. With regard to the instant case, they considered, in particular, that the obligation on the domestic courts deciding on a child’s return to conduct an “in-depth examination of the entire family situation”, as the Chamber required in its judgment, contradicted the Hague Convention, which provided that matters concerning custody or residence of the child came under the jurisdiction of the courts of the child’s place of habitual residence. 85. Moreover, they considered that the domestic courts were best placed to assess the child’s best interests: the Court ought not to take their place, but merely verify whether the requirements of Article 8 had been satisfied. Requiring such an in-depth examination would ultimately level out the differences between the procedure for return and custody proceedings, which would frustrate the meaning of the Hague Convention. They emphasised that the latter text provided for exceptions to the return of the child in Articles 12, 13 and 20. 86. With regard to the psychological report to which the domestic courts had not, according to the Chamber judgment, attached sufficient importance, the Finnish Government noted that it had been submitted by the mother to demonstrate the existence of a grave risk in the event of return within the meaning of Article 13 of the Hague Convention. In finding those allegations unfounded, the appeal court had dismissed them under Article 13 of the Hague Convention, within the margin of discretion permitted by and in line with the objective pursued by the Hague Convention. In the light of these arguments, and referring also to the dissenting opinion of Judges Myjer and López Guerra annexed to the Chamber judgment, the Finnish Government were of the view that there had not been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in this case. (ii) The Czech Government 87. The Czech Government considered that the Grand Chamber’s forthcoming decision would be of considerable importance not only for the respondent State and the Convention system, but also for the operation of the Hague Convention and for countries outside the European continent. They considered that the Hague Convention provided an appropriate procedure, given the serious consequences of abduction for both the child and the parent complaining of the abduction. In order to preclude the harmful effects of abduction, rapid proceedings and a prompt return were required, the Hague Convention being based on the assumption that the restoration of the status quo that existed prior to the unlawful removal was the best starting-point to ensure protection of the rights in question. They also referred, in a similar vein, to the Brussels II bis Regulation, applicable within the European Union. 88. The Czech Government further stated that the Hague Convention had explicitly left the issue of custody to the courts of the country of the child’s habitual residence and that refusal of the child’s return was provided for in cases of a grave risk to the child. They considered that the development of the Court’s case-law in this field, the main points of which they set out, undermined the principle of subsidiarity and ran contrary to the aim pursued by the Hague Convention. An “in-depth examination of the entire family situation” amounted to examining the issue of custody itself, and thus slowing down the proceedings, even though the passage of time could play a significant role where the child was heard in the proceedings. In addition, basic fairness should mean that the abducting parent, who was required to prove in a short period of time the existence of a grave threat in the event of the child’s return, was deprived of any procedural advantage rather than having access to the courts of the country of his or her choice to determine the merits of a custody dispute. 89. The Czech Government noted, in particular, a conflict between the requirement of speed laid down in the Hague Convention and the high standard of proof set out in the Court’s recent case-law. Assessment of the best interests of the child differed significantly depending on whether it was carried out in the course of return proceedings before a court in the country to which the child had been taken or whether it took place in the context of custody proceedings by another court in the child’s country of habitual residence. As those States who were party to both the Convention and the Hague Convention were required to comply with their obligations in respect of both of these texts, they required consistent interpretation and application which reconciled them, it being noted that the Brussels II bis Regulation was even stricter than the Hague Convention. The database created by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (INCADAT) showed that national courts tended to impose strict application of the Hague Convention, in compliance with its purpose. The Czech Government, arguing for a return to the principle of subsidiarity, invited the Grand Chamber to overturn the Chamber judgment and to set limits on the examination of the family situation by the court deciding on an application for a child’s return. (iii) Reunite International Child Abduction Centre (“Reunite”) 90. Reunite noted that the Hague Convention had been designed to facilitate the protection of children who had been subjected to a wrongful cross-border abduction, on the basis of the assumption that, with certain exceptions, the child’s prompt return was in his or her best interests. Reunite entirely endorsed the Court’s summary of the aims and objectives of the Hague Convention in its judgment in Maumousseau and Washington (cited above, § 69). It noted in particular that the Hague Convention, which is enormously successful in combating international child abduction, aimed to protect not adults but children. It provided for a limited number of exceptions to the child’s prompt return, leaving the issues of the child’s long-term welfare to the courts in the child’s country of habitual residence. The latter thus had the task of conducting an in-depth examination of the situation, in the child’s interests, unlike the courts in the State to which the child had been abducted, which, when examining an application for return, were required to make a decision following an examination limited to the framework laid down in the Hague Convention. 91. While observing that the Court, in its case-law, had identified a number of factors central to the proper functioning of the Hague Convention, Reunite noted that recent developments suggested that courts were being required to conduct a fuller examination when determining the exceptions to the child’s return. It therefore invited the Grand Chamber to clarify the question of the requirement for an in-depth examination of the entire family situation in the context of the Hague Convention, and to make it clear that this concerned only the compatibility of a return with the Convention and did not call into question the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts in the country of habitual residence to rule on the merits. (d) The Court’s assessment (i) General principles 92. The Court considers it appropriate to reiterate at the outset certain principles which must guide it in its examination of the case, and to which it drew attention in its recent judgment in Nada v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 10593/08, § 167, ECHR 2012), in the following terms: “168. According to established case-law, a Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations. Article 1 makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned and does not exclude any part of a Contracting Party’s ‘jurisdiction’ from scrutiny under the Convention (see Bosphorus [ Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, no. 45036/98], § 153[, ECHR 2005-VI], and United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 29, Reports [ of Judgments and Decisions ] 1998-I). Treaty commitments entered into by a State subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention in respect of that State may thus engage its responsibility for Convention purposes (see Al ‑ Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, no. 61498/08, § 128, ECHR 2010, and Bosphorus, cited above, § 154, and the cases cited therein). 169. Moreover, the Court reiterates that the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must be interpreted in harmony with the general principles of international law. Account should be taken, as indicated in Article 31 § 3 (c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’, and in particular the rules concerning the international protection of human rights (see, for example, Neulinger and Shuruk [, cited above], § 131 ...; Al ‑ Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, § 55, ECHR 2001-XI; and Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 29, Series A no. 18). 170. When creating new international obligations, States are assumed not to derogate from their previous obligations. Where a number of apparently contradictory instruments are simultaneously applicable, international case-law and academic opinion endeavour to construe them in such a way as to coordinate their effects and avoid any opposition between them. Two diverging commitments must therefore be harmonised as far as possible so that they produce effects that are fully in accordance with existing law (see, to this effect, Al ‑ Saadoon and Mufdhi, cited above, § 126; Al ‑ Adsani, cited above, § 55; and [ Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99], §§ 55-57[, ECHR 2001-XII]; see also the references cited in the International Law Commission study group’s report entitled ‘Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law’ ...).” 93. As regards, more specifically, the question of the relationship between the Convention and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of 25 October 1980, the Court reiterates that in the area of international child abduction the obligations imposed by Article 8 on the Contracting States must be interpreted in the light of the requirements of the Hague Convention (see Ignaccolo-Zenide, cited above, § 95; Iglesias Gil and A.U.I. v. Spain, no. 56673/00, § 51, ECHR 2003 ‑ V; and Maumousseau and Washington, cited above, § 60 ) and those of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 (see Maire v. Portugal, no. 48206/99, § 72, ECHR 2003-VII; Maumousseau and Washington, cited above; and Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 132), and of the relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations between the Contracting Parties (see Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, § 67, ECHR 2008). 94. This approach involves a combined and harmonious application of the international instruments, and in particular in the instant case of the Convention and the Hague Convention, regard being had to its purpose and its impact on the protection of the rights of children and parents. Such consideration of international provisions should not result in conflict or opposition between the different treaties, provided that the Court is able to perform its task in full, namely “to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties” to the Convention (see, among other authorities, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, § 93, Series A no. 310), by interpreting and applying the Convention’s provisions in a manner that renders its guarantees practical and effective (see, in particular, Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37, and Nada, cited above, § 182). 95. The decisive issue is whether the fair balance that must exist between the competing interests at stake – those of the child, of the two parents, and of public order – has been struck, within the margin of appreciation afforded to States in such matters (see Maumousseau and Washington, cited above, § 62), taking into account, however, that the best interests of the child must be of primary consideration and that the objectives of prevention and immediate return correspond to a specific conception of “the best interests of the child” (see paragraph 35 above). 96. The Court reiterates that there is a broad consensus – including in international law – in support of the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests must be paramount (see paragraphs 37-39 above). 97. The same philosophy is inherent in the Hague Convention, which associates this interest with restoration of the status quo by means of a decision ordering the child’s immediate return to his or her country of habitual residence in the event of unlawful abduction, while taking account of the fact that non-return may sometimes prove justified for objective reasons that correspond to the child’s interests, thus explaining the existence of exceptions, specifically in the event of a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation (Article 13, first paragraph, (b)). The Court further notes that the European Union subscribes to the same philosophy, in the framework of a system involving only European Union member States and based on a principle of mutual trust. The Brussels II bis Regulation, whose rules on child abduction supplement those already laid down in the Hague Convention, likewise refers in its Preamble to the best interests of the child (see paragraph 42 above), while Article 24 § 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights emphasises that in all actions relating to children the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration (see paragraph 41 above). 98. Thus, it follows directly not only from Article 8 of the Convention but also from the Hague Convention itself, given the exceptions expressly enshrined therein to the principle of the child’s prompt return to his or her country of habitual residence, that such a return cannot be ordered automatically or mechanically (see Maumousseau and Washington, cited above, § 72, and Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 138). 99. As the Court reiterated in Neulinger and Shuruk (cited above, § 140), the obligations incumbent on States in this connection were defined in Maumousseau and Washington (cited above, § 83). 100. The child’s best interests do not coincide with those of the father or the mother, except in so far as they necessarily have in common various assessment criteria related to the child’s individual personality, background and specific situation. Nonetheless, they cannot be understood in an identical manner irrespective of whether the court is examining a request for a child’s return in pursuance of the Hague Convention or ruling on the merits of an application for custody or parental authority, the latter proceedings being, in principle, unconnected to the purpose of the Hague Convention (Articles 16, 17 and 19; see also paragraph 35 above). 101. Thus, in the context of an application for return made under the Hague Convention, which is accordingly distinct from custody proceedings, the concept of the best interests of the child must be evaluated in the light of the exceptions provided for by the Hague Convention, which concern the passage of time (Article 12), the conditions of application of the Convention (Article 13 (a)) and the existence of a “grave risk” (Article 13 (b)), and compliance with the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 20). This task falls in the first instance to the national authorities of the requested State, which have, inter alia, the benefit of direct contact with the interested parties. In fulfilling their task under Article 8, the domestic courts enjoy a margin of appreciation, which, however, remains subject to a European supervision whereby the Court reviews under the Convention the decisions that those authorities have taken in the exercise of that power (see, mutatis mutandis, Hokkanen v. Finland, 23 September 1994, § 55, Series A no. 299 ‑ A; and also Maumousseau and Washington, cited above, § 62, and Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 141 ). 102. Specifically, in the context of this examination, the Court reiterates that it does not propose to substitute its own assessment for that of the domestic courts (see, for example, Hokkanen, cited above, and K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 154, ECHR 2001 ‑ VII). Nevertheless, it must satisfy itself that the decision-making process leading to the adoption of the impugned measures by the domestic courts was fair and allowed those concerned to present their case fully, and that the best interests of the child were defended (see Eskinazi and Chelouche v. Turkey (dec.), no. 14600/05, ECHR 2005 ‑ XIII; Maumousseau and Washington, cited above; and Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 139). 103. In this connection, the Government considered, in particular, that the overall family situation had to be examined according to the circumstances of each case (see paragraph 75 above). For their part, the third-party interveners either considered that the requirement of an “in-depth examination of the entire family situation” (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above) conflicted with the Hague Convention (see paragraphs 84 and 88 above), or asked the Court to clarify this question (see paragraph 91 above) and to set limits on the examination of the family situation by the court deciding on an application for a child’s return (see paragraph 89 above). 104. On this point, the Court observes that the Grand Chamber judgment in Neulinger and Shuruk (cited above, § 139) to which a number of subsequent judgments refer (see, inter alia, Raban v. Romania, no. 25437/08, § 28, 26 October 2010; Šneersone and Kampanella, cited above, § 85; and, more recently, the decision in M.R. and L.R. v. Estonia, cited above, § 37) may and has indeed been read as suggesting that the domestic courts were required to conduct an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of factors. That wording had already been used by a Chamber in Maumousseau and Washington (cited above, § 74), such an in-depth examination having, in fact, been carried out by the national courts. 105. Against this background the Court considers it opportune to clarify that its finding in paragraph 139 of Neulinger and Shuruk does not in itself set out any principle for the application of the Hague Convention by the domestic courts. 106. The Court considers that a harmonious interpretation of the European Convention and the Hague Convention (see paragraph 94 above) can be achieved provided that the following two conditions are observed. Firstly, the factors capable of constituting an exception to the child’s immediate return in application of Articles 12, 13 and 20 of the Hague Convention, particularly where they are raised by one of the parties to the proceedings, must genuinely be taken into account by the requested court. That court must then make a decision that is sufficiently reasoned on this point, in order to enable the Court to verify that those questions have been effectively examined. Secondly, these factors must be evaluated in the light of Article 8 of the Convention (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 133). 107. In consequence, the Court considers that Article 8 of the Convention imposes on the domestic authorities a particular procedural obligation in this respect: when assessing an application for a child’s return, the courts must not only consider arguable allegations of a “grave risk” for the child in the event of return, but must also make a ruling giving specific reasons in the light of the circumstances of the case. Both a refusal to take account of objections to the return capable of falling within the scope of Articles 12, 13 and 20 of the Hague Convention and insufficient reasoning in the ruling dismissing such objections would be contrary to the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention and also to the aim and purpose of the Hague Convention. Due consideration of such allegations, demonstrated by reasoning of the domestic courts that is not automatic and stereotyped, but sufficiently detailed in the light of the exceptions set out in the Hague Convention, which must be interpreted strictly (see Maumousseau and Washington, cited above, § 73), is necessary. This will also enable the Court, whose task is not to take the place of the national courts, to carry out the European supervision entrusted to it. 108. Furthermore, as the Preamble to the Hague Convention provides for children’s return “to the State of their habitual residence”, the courts must satisfy themselves that adequate safeguards are convincingly provided in that country, and, in the event of a known risk, that tangible protection measures are put in place. (ii) Application of these principles to the present case 109. The Court, which must make its assessment in the light of the situation existing at the time of the impugned measure (see, mutatis mutandis, Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, § 91, ECHR 2008), notes firstly that, unlike in Neulinger and Shuruk (cited above), the circumstances of which were in any event particularly unusual, especially on account of the very considerable passage of time involved, only a short period had elapsed in this case by the time the Latvian authorities received the application under the Hague Convention. The child had spent the first years of her life in Australia and arrived in Latvia aged three years and five months. The application for return was submitted to the central authority two months after the departure from Australia, and the judgments of the District Court and of the Riga Regional Court were delivered four and six months respectively after the applicant and her daughter had arrived in Latvia. Finally, T. encountered E. and began the return journey with her to Australia on 14 March 2009. It follows that not only the submission of the return application to the Latvian authorities, but also the domestic proceedings and the child’s return took place within the period of less than one year referred to in the first paragraph of Article 12 of the Hague Convention, which provides for an immediate return in such cases. 110. Moreover, the Court notes that the domestic courts, at first instance and on appeal, were unanimous as to the response to be given to the application for return submitted by T. By a judgment of 19 November 2008, the District Court, which ruled after a hearing attended by both parents, held that the Hague Convention was applicable and granted T.’s application, ordering the child’s immediate return to Australia. On 26 January 2009, after a hearing which was also held in the presence of both parents, the Riga Regional Court upheld that judgment. 111. With regard more specifically to the reasoning given by the Latvian courts, the Court notes that at first instance the court dismissed, in a reasoned manner, the applicant’s objections to the child’s return on the basis of Article 13 of the Hague Convention, notably after examining the evidence submitted by the parties, including the photographs and copies of e-mails between the applicant and T.’s relatives, as well as witness statements submitted by the applicant. The court, having refused however to request information from the Australian authorities about T.’s previous convictions and the charges allegedly brought against him, ultimately dismissed the allegation of a risk of psychological harm to the child in the event of her return, finding that the applicant had failed to substantiate it (see paragraph 21 above). 112. The Court observes that the situation was subsequently presented differently before the Riga Regional Court, the applicant having submitted, in the context of her appeal, a certificate prepared at her request by a psychologist on 16 December 2008, that is, after the first-instance judgment. This document indicated that, while the child’s young age prevented her from expressing a preference as to her place of residence, an immediate separation from her mother was to be ruled out on account of the likelihood of psychological trauma (see paragraph 22 above). 113. Yet, while the District Court, examining the request for a stay of execution of the return order, took account of that certificate in ordering, in the child’s interests, a stay of execution of the return order pending the outcome of the appeal proceedings (see paragraph 24 above), the Regional Court refused to take it into consideration. 114. The Court notes that the appeal court considered that the findings of the psychological report concerned the merits of the custody issue and could not therefore serve as evidence in ruling on the question of the child’s return that was before it. In so doing, and in view of this reasoning, the Riga Regional Court refused to examine the conclusions of the psychological report in the light of the provisions of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, even though it was directly linked to the best interests of the child in that it drew attention to a risk of psychological trauma in the event of immediate separation from her mother (see, conversely, Maumousseau and Washington, cited above, § 63). 115. Article 8 of the Convention imposed a procedural obligation on the Latvian authorities, requiring that an arguable allegation of “grave risk” to the child in the event of return be effectively examined by the courts and their findings set out in a reasoned court decision (see paragraph 107 above). 116. Under Article 13, first paragraph, (b) of the Hague Convention, the courts examining the return request are not obliged to grant it “if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that ... there is a grave risk”. It is the parent who opposes the return who must, in the first place, adduce sufficient evidence to this effect. In the instant case, it was therefore for the applicant to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate her allegations, which, moreover, had to concern the existence of a risk specifically described as “grave” by Article 13, first paragraph, (b). Furthermore, the Court notes that while the latter provision is not restrictive as to the exact nature of the “grave risk” – which could entail not only “physical or psychological harm” but also “an intolerable situation” – it cannot be read, in the light of Article 8 of the Convention, as including all of the inconveniences necessarily linked to the experience of return: the exception provided for in Article 13, first paragraph, (b) concerns only the situations which go beyond what a child might reasonably bear. The applicant fulfilled her obligation by submitting a psychologist’s certificate concluding that there existed a risk of trauma for the child in the event of immediate separation from her mother. Furthermore, she had also submitted that T. had criminal convictions and referred to instances of ill-treatment by him. It was therefore for the Latvian courts to carry out meaningful checks, enabling them to either confirm or exclude the existence of a “grave risk” (see B. v. Belgium, no. 4320/11, §§ 70-72, 10 July 2012). 117. The Court accordingly considers that the refusal to take into account such an allegation, substantiated by the applicant in that it was based on a certificate issued by a professional, the conclusions of which could disclose the possible existence of a grave risk within the meaning of Article 13, first paragraph, (b) of the Hague Convention, was contrary to the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention. The non-adversarial nature of the psychological report did not suffice to absolve the courts from their obligation to examine it effectively, especially as the Regional Court’s judicial powers would have enabled it to submit the document for cross-examination by the parties, or even to order a second expert report of its own motion, as permitted by Latvian law (see paragraph 45 above). The issue of whether it was possible for the mother to follow her daughter to Australia and to maintain contact with her should also have been dealt with. The Court further emphasises that, in any event, since the rights safeguarded by Article 8 of the Convention, which is part of Latvian law and directly applicable, represent “fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” within the meaning of Article 20 of the Hague Convention, the Regional Court could not dispense with such a review in the circumstances of this case. 118. As to the need to comply with the short time-limits laid down by the Hague Convention and referred to by the Riga Regional Court in its reasoning (see paragraph 25 above), the Court reiterates that while Article 11 of the Hague Convention does indeed provide that the judicial authorities must act expeditiously, this does not exonerate them from the duty to undertake an effective examination of allegations made by a party on the basis of one of the exceptions expressly provided for, namely Article 13 (b) in this case. 119. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant suffered a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for her family life, in that the decision-making process under domestic law did not satisfy the procedural requirements inherent in Article 8 of the Convention, the Riga Regional Court having failed to carry out an effective examination of the applicant’s allegations under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. 120. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 121. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 122. As the applicant has made no claim in respect of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers that no award should be made under this head. B. Costs and expenses 123. The applicant claimed 1,996.91 Latvian lati (2,858.84 euros (EUR)) for the costs and expenses incurred before the Grand Chamber and submitted a number of documents in support of that claim. 124. The Government considered that the applicant’s claims were neither justified nor reasonable, with the exception of a sum of EUR 485.19 which related to costs arising from the journey by the applicant’s representative to take part in the hearing before the Court. 125. The Court reiterates that an award can be made in respect of costs and expenses only in so far as they have been actually and necessarily incurred by the applicant and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, and having regard to the information in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 2,000 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before it. C. Default interest 126. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It considered that the European Convention and the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 had to be applied in a combined and harmonious manner, and that the best interests of the child had to be the primary consideration. In the present case, it considered that the Latvian courts had not complied with the procedural requirements of Article 8 of the European Convention, in that they had refused to take into consideration an arguable allegation of a “serious risk” to the child in the event of her return to Australia.