Applications lodged by the parent whose child had been abducted by the other parent
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE A. Hague Convention 57. For the purposes of the present case, the key provisions of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction state as follows: “The States signatory to the present Convention, Firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody, Desiring to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access, Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have agreed upon the following provisions – ... Article 1 The objects of the present Convention are – (a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and (b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States. ... Article 11 The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children. ... Article 12 Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. ... Article 13 Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that – (a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or (b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. ... In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child ’ s habitual residence. ... Article 20 The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. ...” B. Further relevant provisions of European and international law 58. Further relevant provisions of the Hague Convention, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Regulation No. 2201/2003 have recently been summarised in the Court ’ s judgment in the case of X v. Latvia ([GC], no. 27853/09, §§ 34-42, ECHR 2013). C. Relevant domestic law and practice 1. Constitution 59. Article 127 reads as follows: “1. The Constitutional Court shall decide on complaints by natural or legal persons alleging a violation of their fundamental rights or freedoms ... unless the protection of such rights and freedoms falls within the jurisdiction of a different court. 2. If the Constitutional Court finds a complaint to be justified, it shall deliver a decision stating that the person ’ s rights or freedoms as set out in paragraph 1 have been violated by a final decision, specific measure or other act and shall quash that decision, measure or act. If the violation that has been found is the result of a failure to act, the Constitutional Court may order [the authority] which has violated the [person ’ s] rights or freedoms to take the necessary action. At the same time it may remit the case to the authority concerned for further proceedings, order that authority to refrain from violating the [person ’ s] fundamental rights and freedoms ... or, where appropriate, order those who have violated the rights or freedoms set out in paragraph 1 to restore the situation to that existing prior to the violation. 3. In its decision on a complaint the Constitutional Court may grant appropriate financial compensation to a person whose rights under paragraph 1 have been violated. 4. The liability for damage or other loss of a person who has violated the rights or freedoms as referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be affected by the Constitutional Court ’ s decision.” 2. Constitutional Court Act (Law no. 38/1993 Col., as amended) 60. Article 21 : “1. The parties to proceedings ( účastníci konania ) are the plaintiff and, as the case may be, the person against whom the application is directed, as well as [other] persons so identified under this Act. 2. Intervening parties to proceedings ( vedľajší účastníci konania ) are persons so identified under this Act, as long as they do not waive this status. They have the same rights and duties in the proceedings as the parties, but they act always in their own name. ” 61. Article 51 “ The parties to proceedings [ concerning individual complaints] are the complainants and the person against whom the complaint is directed.” 3. The Constitutional Court ’ s practice as regards third-party interventions 62. In a judgment of 27 May 2010 in case no I. ÚS 223/09, the Constitutional Court ruled on the merits of an individual complaint by a private entity against decisions of the Supreme Court in an administrative case. In the proceedings leading up to that judgment, the Constitutional Court had admitted sixteen individuals and one municipality to the proceedings as third parties on behalf of the Supreme Court. It observed that, as regards proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court Act was the lex specialis in relation to the CCP. It further observed that, contrary to the CCP (Article 93 § 1), the Constitutional Court Act (section 21(2)) provided no basis for third parties to intervene in proceedings on individual complaints. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court found that there could be no doubt that the individuals and the municipality in question had a legal interest in the outcome of the proceedings. Therefore, in conformity with the applicable constitutional principles, the standing of an intervening third party was to be granted to them and their observations were to be taken into account. 63. In its judgment cited in the precedent paragraph, the Constitutional Court referred to its previous judgments of 9 September 2008 (case no. II. ÚS 91/08 ) and 14 June 2006 (case no. II. ÚS 122/05 ). In the former case, a municipality had claimed the status of an intervening party. Although this status was declined with reference to section 21(2) of the Constitutional Court Act as having no legal basis, the views of the municipality were nevertheless taken into account, as it was recognised that it had a legal interest in having a fair trial. In the latter case, a third party was denied the right to intervene without any explanation. 64. In another unrelated case, no. IV. ÚS 249/11, the Constitutional Court examined an individual complaint of an alleged violation of the complainant ’ s rights to judicial protection and fair trial in the proceedings in an action by his former wife against him for maintenance payments. In a judgment of 20 June 2013 the Constitutional Court observed that, upon the request of the complainant ’ s former wife, she had been allowed to make written submissions in respect of the complaint. In its judgment, the Constitutional Court cited the relevant part of those submissions but there is no indication how, if at all, it took them into account. There is equally no indication that it took any formal decision as to the standing of the complainant ’ s former wife in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court. 4. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Hague Convention in Slovakia 65. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child entered into force in respect of Slovakia on 6 February 1991 (Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs no. 104/1991 Coll.), while the Hague Convention did so on 1 February 2001 (Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs no. 119/2001 Coll.). 5. Other practice 66. In an unrelated international child abduction case before the Bratislava II District Court (case no. 49P 414/2007 ), an extraordinary appeal on points of law was lodged by the PPS against a final, binding and enforceable return order. On 4 February 2009, in response to an enquiry prompted by the father of the child concerned, the President of the District Court provided the Office of the President of Slovakia with an update on the state of the proceedings and added the following comment: “It does not behove me to judge the actions of the Office of the Prosecutor General. I am not privy to the reasons why an extraordinary appeal on points of law was lodged. I detect a problem in the system, which allows for such a procedure even in respect of decisions on the return of minor children abroad ( ‘ international child abductions ’ ). Irrespective of the outcome of the specific case, the possibility of lodging an appeal on points of law and an extraordinary appeal on points of law in cases of international child abduction protracts the proceedings and negates the object of the [Hague Convention], which is as expeditious a restoration of the original state [of affairs] as possible, that is to say the return of the child to their country of habitual residence within the shortest possible time.” THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION 67. Relying on Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that : (i) the Slovakian authorities had failed to ensure the prompt return of the child; (ii) the proceedings for the child ’ s return had not been expeditious; (iii) in the Hague Convention proceedings he had not been provided with a translation of judgments and decisions into a language he understood; (iv ) those proceedings had been interfered with by an arbitrary judgment of the Constitutional Court, given in proceedings to which he had not been a party, and had thus not been able to affect the outcome of despite having a direct interest in it; and (v) as a result of the foregoing, he had been deprived of contact with his child for a protracted period of time. A. Admissibility 68. The Government objected that the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention did not apply ratione materiae to the proceedings commenced by the mother ’ s petition of 31 August 2010 for an order governing the exercise of parental rights and responsibilities in respect of the child (see paragraphs 8 to 10 above) and to those concerning her petition for reopening of the Hague Convention proceedings (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above). 69. The Government also objected that, as far as the Hague Convention proceedings were concerned, the applicant had failed to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, especially in so far as he was complaining under Article 6 of the Convention about the length of those proceedings and their alleged unfairness and under Article 8 of the Convention of a violation of his right to respect for his private and family life in those proceedings. In the Government ’ s submission, the applicant could have, but had not, raised such matters before the Constitutional Court by way of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution. 70. The Court observes, first of all, that the present application is not directly concerned with the specific proceedings referred to in the Government ’ s first objection, as summarised in paragraph 68 above, and that these proceedings are captured in the present judgment merely as a part of the background and context of the present case. It therefore finds that this part of the Government ’ s submission calls for no separate judicial examination. 71. As to the Government ’ s non-exhaustion objection, in respect of the complaints summarised under numerals (i) to (iii) in paragraph 67 above, the Court observes that the proceedings under the Hague Convection ended by the dismissal on 20 November 2012 of the applicant ’ s appeal against the ruling refusing his application for an order for the return of the child (see paragraph 49 above). 72. The Court is in agreement with the Government ’ s argument that, in so far as the applicant has complained of the length of these proceedings and their final outcome, including the question of the language of the proceedings, be it under Article 6 or Article 8 of the Convention, such complaints could and should first have been made before the Constitutional Court. By not having done so, the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In consequence, the relevant part of the application must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. 73. However, the Court notes that the applicant also complained of a violation of his Convention rights due to the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment of 13 December 2011 ( the complaints summarised under numerals (iv) and (v) in paragraph 67 above). 74. As regards those complaints, the Court observes that the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment was final and not amenable to appeal before the Constitutional Court or any other body (see paragraph 4 7 above). 75. Therefore, in respect of the relevant part of the application, the Government ’ s objection of non ‑ exhaustion of domestic remedies has to be dismissed. Noting that it is neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other ground, the Court finds that it must be declared admissible. B. Merits 76. Relying on Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the Hague Convention proceedings had been arbitrarily interfered with by the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment of 13 December 2011 and that he had consequently been deprived of contact with his child for a protracted period of time. 77. The Court considers that, on the facts of the present case, these complaints most naturally fall to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ... 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 1. The parties ’ arguments 78. The applicant contended that he had not been informed of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court leading up to its judgment of 13 December 2011, let alone been able to be a party to them. Yet this judgment had had a direct impact on his rights, in that it had quashed the final, binding and enforceable order for the return of the child, had led to a new round of the Hague Convention proceedings, with the attendant continued deprivation of his contact with the child, and, in view of the critical importance of the passage of time in those proceedings, had ultimately led to the denial of the child ’ s return. 79. In reply, the Government admitted that the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment of 13 December 2011 had constituted an interference with the applicant ’ s Article 8 rights but contended that such interference had been justified, in that it had pursued the legitimate aim of promoting the best interests of the child. In addition, the Government relied on the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment of 27 May 2010 in case no I. ÚS 223/09 (see paragraph 6 2 above) and submitted that, just as had been possible in that case, it had been open to the applicant to seek admission to the Constitutional Court proceedings in the present case as an intervening third party. The Government emphasised that the entire Hague Convention proceedings had been expeditious and considered that the proceedings before the Constitutional Court had also been conducted with sufficient promptness. In addition, they submitted that the applicant had ignored the mother ’ s invitations to come and see the child in Slovakia and had limited himself to telephone communications with the child, despite having been in Slovakia on several occasions. 80. In a rejoinder, the applicant submitted that his first step towards the initiation of the Hague Convention proceedings had not been his application of 21 October 2010 to the Bratislava I District Court, but rather his complaint of 5 August 2010 to the Spanish Central Authority (see paragraphs 1 1 and 1 2 above). In addition, he contended that he had in fact been made to contribute towards the maintenance of the child under the interim measure of 14 September 2010, and had done so after it had been served on him on 9 February 20 11 (see paragraph 9 above). As to the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the applicant emphasised that they had concerned a final, binding and enforceable court order and that neither he nor his lawyer had been informed of them, which was why he had not, in fact, had any ability to take part in them. In so far as the Constitutional Court judgment complained of had been based on the failure of the court-appointed representative to show up at scheduled hearings, such failure had not been imputable to him and it had been unfair to make him bear the consequences of such failure. As a result of the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment, the Hague Convention proceedings had been arbitrarily protracted and their purpose frustrated. Lastly, the applicant submitted that he considered the mother ’ s actions to be criminal in nature, which had made him apprehensive and reluctant to seek more active contact with the child upon the mother ’ s invitation. 81. In a further rejoinder, the Government argued that the Constitutional Court was under no statuary duty to notify third parties of the commencement of proceedings on individual complaints with possible repercussions on such third parties ’ rights and interests. This was due to the specific role the Constitutional Court played in the constitutional system of Slovakia. As to the final outcome of the Hague Convention proceedings, the Government referred to the reasons relied on by the domestic courts and emphasised that the child had already spent a significant amount of time in Slovakia and had become fully integrated into society there. 2. The Court ’ s assessment 82. The Court observes that there was no dispute between the parties that the relationship between the applicant and the child was one of family life, that the proceedings for the return of the child under the Hague Convention impacted on the applicant ’ s right to respect for his family life and that, consequently, his complaint fell within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention. 83. The Court reiterates that, while the essential object of Article 8 of the Convention is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by the public authorities, there are in addition positive obligations inherent in an effective “respect” for family life (see, for example, Chabrowski v. Ukraine, no. 61680/10, § 104, 17 January 2013, with further references). 84. In that respect, the Court reiterates that positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for family life even in the sphere of relations between individuals, including both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudicatory and enforcement machinery protecting individuals ’ rights and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific measures (see, mutatis mutandis, Tysiąc v. Poland, no. 5410/03, § 110, ECHR 2007 ‑ I). 85. On the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the primary interference with the applicant ’ s right to respect for his family life may not be attributed to an action or omission by the respondent State but rather to the actions of the mother, a private party, who – as the domestic courts concluded – has wrongfully retained the child in Slovakia. 86. It therefore remains to be ascertained whether there were any positive obligations on the part of the respondent State that required to be taken with a view to securing to the applicant his right to respect for his family life and, if so, whether any such positive obligations have been complied with by the respondent State. 87. Furthermore, the Court has held in the past that the State ’ s positive obligations under Article 8 include a right for parents to have access to measures which will enable them to be reunited with their children and an obligation on the national authorities to take such action (see Chabrowski, cited above, § 105). 88. The Court observes that in disputes over the status of children comprising an international element a question often arises as to the jurisdiction to deal with such disputes and that, in a situation of international child abduction, that question is answered under Regulation No. 2201/2003 with reference to the child ’ s habitual residence immediately before the wrongful removal or retention (Article 10). 89. Moreover, the Court notes that, by operation of the Hague Convention, the courts of the country where a child is removed or retained are to carry out proceedings aimed at establishing whether the removal or retention has been wrongful (Article 3 of the Hague Convention) and, unless there are circumstances preventing the child ’ s return within the meaning of Article 13 or 20 of the Hague Convention, to order the return of the child to his or her country of habitual residence (Article 12 of the Hague Convention ). In the European Union this is subject to the provisions of Article 11 §§ 2 – 8 of Regulation No. 2201/2003. 90. The Court further observes that Slovakia is both a Member State of the European Union and a Contracting State of the Hague Convention. It follows that, in the circumstances of the present case, it was under an obligation to carry out the proceedings for the return of the child, which it did relying on the Hague Convention, as complemented by Regulation No. 2201/2003 (see paragraphs 12 et seq. and 50 et seq. above), with a view to enabling the courts in the country of the child ’ s habitual residence to resolve all questions relating to the child ’ s status, including matters relating to the applicant ’ s parental rights and responsibilities. In that respect, the Court notes that the parties have pleaded the case exclusively in terms of the Hague Convention and that the domestic courts essentially dealt with the case within the framework of that instrument. 91. As to the ensuing question whether in discharging its obligations under the Hague Convention Slovakia has complied with its positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court finds it opportune, at the outset, to refer to the summary of the general principles applicable in any assessment under the Convention of complaints concerning proceedings under the Hague Convention set out in its recent judgment in the case of X v. Latvia [GC] (cited above, §§ 99-108). 92. In respect of those general principles, the Court would observe, in particular, that the extent of its jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Convention is limited to matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto. Nevertheless, in the area of international child abduction, the obligations imposed on the Contracting States by Article 8 of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the requirements of the Hague Convention and those of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and of the relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations between the Contracting Parties (see X v. Latvia [GC], cited above, § 93, with further references). 93. The decisive issue in that type of case is whether the fair balance that must exist between the competing interests at stake – those of the child, of the two parents, and of public order – has been struck, within the margin of appreciation afforded to States in such matters, taking into account, however, that the best interests of the child must be the primary consideration and that the objectives of prevention and immediate return correspond to a specific conception of “the best interests of the child” (see X v. Latvia [GC], cited above, § 95, with further references). 94. In addition, whilst Article 8 of the Convention contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision ‑ making process involved must be fair and such as to ensure due respect of the interests safeguarded by Article 8 (see Buckley v. the United Kingdom, no. 20348/92, § 76, ECHR 1996-IV). In other words, the procedural protection enjoyed by applicants at the domestic level in respect of their rights protected under Article 8 of the Convention has to be practical and effective (see, among many other authorities, Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece, § 42, 24 June 1993, Series A no. 260-B, and also Turek v. Slovakia, no. 57986/00, § 113, ECHR 2006 ‑ II (extracts) ), and consequently compatible with that Article. 95. Turning again to the specific circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that, in the initial round of examination, the applicant ’ s application for the return of the child under the Hague Convention was examined once by courts at two levels of jurisdiction, that their order for the return of the child became final, binding and enforceable, and that the order was nevertheless subsequently examined by the Supreme Court and the PPS, neither of these institutions having established any errors of substance or procedure justifying its quashing. 96. It was then that the Constitutional Court intervened, by quashing the Supreme Court ’ s decision, which then led to the quashing of the return order and the remittal of the matter to the first - instance court. 97. The Court observes that although the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment in the present case did not constitute a final decision on the applicant ’ s Hague Convention application, in view of the critical importance attached to the passage of time in the proceedings of this type it was instrumental in the ultimate determination of the applicant ’ s application. 98. The Court therefore finds it appropriate to examine whether the Constitutional Court ’ s intervention in the proceedings was compatible with the respondent State ’ s positive obligation as specified above. 99. In that respect, the Court notes that there is no issue in terms of the lawfulness of the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment and considers that it may be acknowledged that the judgment served the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, namely those of the child. 100. The Court shall therefore proceed to examine whether the contested judgment could be considered as having struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. From that perspective, the Court finds the applicant ’ s procedural standing and protection, if any, in relation to the proceedings before the Constitutional Court to be of particular importance. 101. In that respect, the Court observes that the Constitutional Court proceedings were initiated by the mother and that the defendant was the Supreme Court. Consequently, the applicant was neither plaintiff nor defendant in those proceedings. 102. The Court further observes that the proceedings before the Constitutional Court are governed by the Constitutional Court Act, as the lex specialis, and that this Act does not envisage third parties, such as the applicant in the present case, having standing to intervene. 103. In so far as the Government argued that it was open to the applicant to seek admission to the Constitutional Court proceedings as an intervening third party by virtue of the subsidiary application of the relevant provisions of the CCP, the Court finds the Constitutional Court ’ s practice in that respect at the time of its judgment complained of in the present case to be rather inconclusive. 104. Be that as it may, the Court notes that there does not appear to be any official means by which a third party could learn about Constitutional Court proceedings concerning it. 105. Moreover, in the present case there is no indication that, at the relevant time, the applicant actually had any knowledge of the constitutional complaint by the mother. As a result, the proceedings before the Constitutional Court were carried out without his participation and he had no opportunity to influence their outcome, despite having a legitimate interest in it. 106. The Court finds that the complete lack of any procedural protection for the applicant before the Constitutional Court in this case was aggravated by an additional factor. 107. In particular, the Court considers that the impugned judgment has to be seen in a wider procedural context, taking into account the fact that, prior to it being rendered, all ordinary and extraordinary remedies against the return order had been exhausted. These included the mother ’ s appeal, appeal on points of law, petition for an extraordinary appeal on points of law, petition for reopening, and repeated petitions to have the enforcement proceedings stayed. To make matters worse, it is to be noted that, upon one of such petitions being filed, the enforcement proceedings were stayed on a ground ( petition for reopening pending ) that later turned out to be wholly unsupported at law (reopening of proceedings concluded by a decision impermissible at law) (see paragraphs 30, 36 and 37 above). 108. As regards the existing procedural framework for Hague Convention proceedings in Slovakia, which the present case was ultimately concluded under as a result of the impugned Constitutional Court judgment, the Court notes in particular the opinion expressed by the President of the Bratislava II District Court (see paragraphs 6 6 above), which may be understood as suggesting that there is a systemic problem in that appeals and extraordinary appeals on points of law are allowed in the course of return proceedings, with the attendant effect of negating the object and purpose of the Hague Convention. 109. The remittal of the present case to the ordinary courts resulted in yet more time being taken to deal with the case, which in the given type of case is of relevance for the outcome of the proceedings. The ultimate dismissal of the applicant ’ s application under the Hague Convection bears witness to this premise, as, in fact, does the relevant part of the Government ’ s arguments before the Court (see paragraph 81 above). 110. As a result, for a protracted period of time the status of the child has not been determined by any court, the courts in Slovakia having no jurisdiction to do so, and the courts in Spain having no practical opportunity to do so, a state of affairs which can by no means be said to have been in the child ’ s best interests. 111. The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the respondent State has failed to secure to the applicant the right to respect for his family life by providing him with proceedings for the return of the child under the Hague Convention in compliance with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention. 112. In view of this finding, the Court considers it unnecessary to examine separately the substantive grounds behind the Constitutional Court ’ s judgment of 13 December 2011. For similar reasons, the Court finds it unnecessary to examine separately the remaining admissible complaint. 113. In sum, there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS 114. Lastly, the applicant alleged a violation of Articles 1, 7, 11 and 12 of the Hague Convention. 115. As observed above, the Court has no jurisdiction ratione materiae to examine issues of compliance with the Hague Convention taken alone. It follows that the remainder of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 116. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 117. By way of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed 150,000 euros (EUR) for either of the alleged violations of his rights under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. He also claimed EUR 15,000 in respect of each month until the child returned to Spain. Moreover, he claimed EUR 692.40 in respect of pecuniary damage, this amount consisting of the amounts he had been made to pay by way of contribution to the child ’ s maintenance and a fee for the child ’ s registration in a Spanish kindergarten (see paragraphs 9 and 55 above). 118. The Government contested the claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage as overstated, the claim for a monthly payment until the return of the child as not having any basis in the Court ’ s case-law, and the claim in respect of pecuniary damage as unfounded. 119. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. 120. In so far as the applicant may be understood as seeking a form of aggravated or punitive damages, the Court recalls that it has declined to make any such awards in the past (see, for example, Greens and M.T. v. the United Kingdom, nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, § 97, ECHR 2010 (extracts), with further references). Having found no reasons for reaching a different conclusion in the present case, the Court rejects this claim. 121. However, it awards the applicant EUR 19,500 in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage. B. Costs and expenses 122. The applicant also claimed EUR 6,079.94 for legal costs at the domestic level; EUR 7,080 for legal costs incurred before the Court; EUR 1,760.95 for translation costs; and EUR 1,921.53 for transportation and accommodation expenses incurred in connection with his travel to and from Slovakia and with his stay there. 123. The Government considered the claim concerning legal costs before the Court to be overstated. As for the costs and expenses incurred by the applicant at the domestic level, they requested that in the event of a finding of a violation of the applicant ’ s Convention rights compensation in that regard only be ordered in so far as those expenses had reasonably been incurred. 124. According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 7 ,500 covering costs under all heads. C. Default interest 125. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It observed that the applicant had had no standing in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court which lead to the quashing of a final and enforceable order previously issued by the ordinary courts for the return of his child to Spain. He had not been informed of the constitutional proceedings, let alone been able to participate in them, despite having a legitimate interest in the matter. In addition, the Court took into account that the Constitutional Court’s intervention in the case had come at a point when all other remedies had been exhausted, and that there was an indication that there might be a systemic problem due to the fact that those remedies were available in child return proceedings in Slovakia.