Access to a lawyer
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. The Constitution of the Russian Federation 55. An arrested or detained person or a person accused of a criminal offence is entitled to legal assistance from the time of his or her arrest, placement in custody, or when charges are brought (Article 48 § 2). B. The Criminal Code 56. The Criminal Code fixes the age of criminal responsibility at 16 years of age. For certain offences, including extortion, the age of criminal responsibility is fixed at 14 years of age (Article 20). 57. Under Article 43 § 2 of the Code, the purposes of criminal punishment are restoration of social justice, reformation of the offender and the prevention of further crimes. 58. Article 87 § 1 of the Criminal Code regulates the criminal liability of minors, defining them as persons between 14 and 18 years of age, and states that mandatory measures of an educational nature or punishment may be applied to minors who have committed a criminal offence. Article 87 § 2 provides that, where a court relieves a minor of punishment, the minor may still be placed in a special closed educational facility run by a body of the Ministry of Education. C. The Code of Criminal Procedure 59. A suspect or an accused is entitled to legal assistance from the time of arrest (Articles 46 § 4 (3), 47 § 4 (8) and 49 § 3). 60. The presence of a defence lawyer is mandatory if the suspect or the accused is a minor. If neither the minor nor his guardian has retained a defence lawyer, one must be appointed by the police officer, the investigator, the prosecutor or the judge in charge of the case (Article 51 §§ 1 and 3). 61. A defence lawyer must be present during each questioning of the minor suspect. The presence of a psychologist or a teacher is also mandatory if the suspect is under the age of 16. The police officer, investigator or prosecutor in charge of the questioning must ensure that a psychologist or a teacher is present during each questioning (Article 425 §§ 2-4). 62. The guardian of a juvenile suspect is entitled to participate in all investigative actions starting from the first questioning (Article 426 §§ 1 and 2 (3)). 63. Witnesses are to be examined directly by the trial court (Article 278). Statements given by the victim or a witness during the pre ‑ trial investigation can be read out with the consent of the parties in two cases: (i) if there is a substantial discrepancy between those statements and the testimony before the court; or (ii) if the victim or witness has failed to appear in court (Article 281). D. The Minors Act 64. The Federal Law no. 120-FZ on the basic measures for preventing child neglect and delinquency of minors of 24 June 1999 (“the Minors Act”) defines a minor as a person under the age of 18 (section 1). 65. A minor with special educational needs who has committed a delinquent act before reaching the statutory age of criminal responsibility may be placed in a “closed educational institution” for up to three years (section 15(4-7)). The main aims of closed educational institutions are as follows: (i) the accommodation, upbringing and education of minors between eight and 18 years old requiring a special educational approach; (ii) the psychological, medical and pedagogical rehabilitation of minors, as well as individual preventive work; (iii) the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of minors, and the provision of medical care and of secondary and professional education; (iv) the provision of social, psychological and pedagogical assistance to minors with health, behavioural or educational difficulties; (v) the organisation of sports, science or other clubs or sections and encouragement of participation by minors in such clubs or sections; (vi) the implementation of programmes and policies aimed at developing law-abiding behaviour in minors (section 15(2)). 66. A minor may only be placed in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for the shortest possible time necessary for appropriate accommodation to be found, and for a maximum of thirty days (section 22(6)), in the following cases: (i) a minor whose placement in a closed educational institution has been ordered by a court may be placed in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for the time necessary to prepare his transfer to the closed educational institution (section 22(1)(3) and 22(2)(1) and section 31(1)); (ii) a minor in respect of whom a request for placement in a closed educational institution is pending before a court may be placed in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for a period of up to thirty days if it is necessary in order to protect his life or health or to prevent him from committing a further delinquent act, or if he has no fixed residence, has absconded or has failed to appear at court hearings or medical examinations more than twice without a valid reason (sections 22(2)(2) and 26(6)); (iii) a minor who has escaped from a closed educational institution may be placed in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for the time necessary for appropriate accommodation to be found for him (section 22(2)(3)); (iv) a minor who has committed a delinquent act before reaching the statutory age of criminal responsibility may be placed in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders if it is necessary in order to protect his life or health or to prevent him from committing a further delinquent act, or if his identity is unknown, he has no fixed place of residence, resides in a region other than the one where the delinquent act was committed, or if he cannot be immediately placed in the charge of his parents or guardians owing to the remoteness of their place of residence (section 22(2)(4-6)). 67. The main aims of temporary detention centres for juvenile offenders are as follows: (i) the temporary detention of juvenile offenders with the aim of protecting their life and health and preventing them from committing further delinquent acts; (ii) individual preventive work with minors with the aim of discovering whether they are involved in the commission of delinquent acts, establishing the circumstances, reasons and conditions conducive to such acts, and informing the competent law-enforcement authorities; (iii) the transfer of minors to closed educational institutions and other measures aimed at finding accommodation for minors temporarily placed in the centre’s care (section 22(1)). 68. Placement in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders is to be ordered by a judge (section 22(3)(2)) at the request of the local department of the interior, which must submit the following materials in support of the request: evidence confirming that the minor has committed a delinquent act; materials indicating the aims of, and reasons for, the placement of the minor in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders; and materials confirming that such placement is necessary to protect the life or health of the minor or to prevent him from committing a further delinquent act (section 31.1). The minor and his parents or guardian are entitled to study these materials. The materials are then examined by a single judge at a hearing with the participation of the minor concerned, his parents or guardian, defence lawyer, a prosecutor, and representatives of the local department of the interior and of the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. The judge issues a reasoned decision either granting or rejecting the request for the placement of the minor in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders (section 31.2). The minor or his parents, guardian, or defence lawyer may, within ten days, appeal against the decision to a higher court (section 31.3). E. The Instruction on temporary detention centres for juvenile offenders 69. The Instruction on the organisation of the activities of temporary detention centres for juvenile offenders, adopted by Order no. 215 of the Ministry of the Interior on 2 April 2004 (in force at the material time), provided that temporary detention centres for juvenile offenders were to be managed by the local departments of the interior (§ 4). 70. On admission to a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, the minor and his belongings had to be searched. Prohibited belongings had to be confiscated, while money, valuables and other belongings had to be deposited with the centre’s accountant (§§ 14-15). 71. Temporary detention centres had to be enclosed and the enclosures equipped with an alarm system and an entry checkpoint (§ 19). The disciplinary regime was maintained by a duty squad (§ 22). 72. The director of the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders was responsible for security arrangements, which had to ensure the twenty ‑ four-hour surveillance of inmates, including while asleep, and had to exclude any possibility of unauthorised leaving of the premises by inmates (§ 39). 73. A personal file had to be opened in respect of each minor and contain the following information: the documents which served as the basis for the minor’s admission to the centre, the search report, the record of preventive work carried out and of rewards and punishment applied, the medical certificates documenting the minor’s condition on admission, and any others (§ 18). Personal files had to be stored for two years and be destroyed after the expiry of that time-limit (Appendix no. 5). 74. The temporary detention centre’s “accounting and statistical records” for each minor had to be kept indefinitely in the centre (Appendix 4, endnote 2). 75. If appropriate, individual preventive work might be carried out with the minors, taking into account their age, conduct, the gravity of the delinquent acts committed and other circumstances (§ 24). In order to make the preventive work more efficient, incentives and punishment might be applied to minors (§ 25). 76. With the aim of preventing delinquency, the staff of temporary detention centres for juvenile offenders might take the following measures in the context of preventive work: (i) establishing the living and educational conditions of the minor’s family, the minor’s personal qualities and interests, his or her reasons for running away from home or for abandoning school, and the facts of the minor’s participation in the commission of any delinquent acts and the circumstances in which they were committed, including information on any accomplices and how any stolen property was disposed of; (ii) passing to the law-enforcement authorities any information concerning those involved in delinquent acts, or any other information that may contribute to the investigation of such delinquent acts; (iii) taking individual educational measures, with particular emphasis on developing positive qualities and interests, to combat any defects of character and to motivate the minors in studying and working (§ 26). III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS A. Council of Europe 77. The relevant parts of Recommendation No. R (87) 20 on social reactions to juvenile delinquency, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 September 1987, state as follows. “... Considering that young people are developing beings and in consequence all measures taken in their respect should have an educational character; Considering that social reactions to juvenile delinquency should take account of the personality and specific needs of minors and that the latter need specialised interventions and, where appropriate, specialised treatment based in particular on the principles embodied in the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child; ... Convinced that minors must be afforded the same procedural guarantees as adults; ... Recommends the governments of member states to review, if necessary, their legislation and practice with a view: ... THE LAW I. SCOPE OF THE CASE BEFORE THE GRAND CHAMBER 90. In their submissions before the Grand Chamber, the Government invited the Court to refine the Chamber’s reasoning in respect of the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention relating to the hearing of 11 April 2005. For his part, the applicant maintained his complaints under Article 6 of the Convention that he had had insufficient time to study the case file and that the court-appointed counsel had been ineffective. 91. The Court observes that, according to its case-law, the “case” referred to the Grand Chamber is the application as it has been declared admissible (see D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, § 109, ECHR 2007-IV, and K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 141, ECHR 2001-VII). It notes that, in its judgment of 14 November 2013, the Chamber declared inadmissible the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 that he had had insufficient time to study the case file and that the court-appointed counsel had been ineffective, as well as his complaint under Article 5 § 4 relating to the hearing held on 11 April 2005. Accordingly, these complaints are not within the scope of the case before the Grand Chamber. II. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS 92. The Government, in their written submissions of 20 May 2014, contended for the first time that the applicant had neither exhausted domestic remedies nor complied with the six-month time-limit as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in respect of his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention, and his complaints under Article 6 relating to the pre-investigation inquiry. A. Exhaustion of domestic remedies 93. Concerning the applicant’s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention relating to the alleged lack of medical care in the temporary detention centre, the Government submitted that, after his release, the applicant could have instituted civil proceedings which was a domestic remedy capable of affording him adequate redress in the form of monetary compensation for any damage caused to him. 94. Regarding the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 relating to the pre-investigation inquiry, the Government contended that the applicant had failed to lodge a complaint with the domestic courts under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, according to which anyone whose legitimate rights and interests had been affected by a decision not to institute criminal proceedings could appeal against that decision to a court. 95. The applicant did not expressly respond to the Government’s objections, but submitted that the Chamber had made a correct assessment of his complaints. 96. The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Rule 55 of the Rules of Court, any plea of inadmissibility must, in so far as its character and the circumstances permit, be raised by the respondent Contracting Party in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, § 79, 17 July 2014; Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 41, ECHR 2006 ‑ II; and K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 145). The Chamber ruled on the admissibility and merits of the application in its judgment of 14 November 2013. The Court observes that the Government did not raise either of these two objections in their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case before the Chamber, or at any other point during the Chamber proceedings. 97. The Government have not claimed that there were any exceptional circumstances that could have dispensed them from the obligation to raise these objections in a timely manner. The Court therefore holds that the Government are estopped from raising their preliminary objections of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies at the present stage of the proceedings (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev, § 82, and Sejdovic, § 42, both cited above). 98. The Government’s preliminary objections must therefore be rejected. B. Six-month time-limit 99. The Government contended that the applicant had failed to lodge with the Court his complaint under Article 3 relating to the lack of medical care in the temporary detention centre within the six-month time-limit provided for in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They submitted that the applicant’s grandfather had only raised this complaint, in a summary fashion, in a letter of 30 November 2005 to the prosecution authorities who had replied on 16 December 2005, more than six months before the application was lodged on 1 November 2006. 100. According to the Government, the applicant had also failed to comply with the six-month time-limit with regard to his complaint under Article 6 relating to the pre-investigation inquiry, since the revised ruling refusing to initiate criminal proceedings against the applicant had been made on 6 July 2005 and a reply to the applicant’s grandfather’s last complaint concerning this matter to the prosecution authorities had been given on 16 December 2005. 101. The applicant did not address the Government’s objections but maintained that the Chamber’s judgment was correct. 102. The Government did not raise their objections as to non-compliance with the six-month rule in the proceedings before the Chamber, and the Chamber did not examine the issue. However, the Court has already held that the six-month rule is a public policy rule and that, consequently, it has jurisdiction to apply it of its own motion (see Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, § 29, 29 June 2012; Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, § 85; Blečić v. Croatia [GC], no. 59532/00, § 68, ECHR 2006-III; and Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34979/97, ECHR 2000 ‑ I ). Furthermore, the Court has decided that, notwithstanding the requirements of Rule 55, Governments are not estopped from raising the issue of the six-month rule before the Grand Chamber (see Sabri Güneş, cited above, § 30). 103. Consequently, the Grand Chamber has jurisdiction to examine the issue of compliance with the six-month rule in relation to the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention as well as under Article 6 concerning the pre-investigation inquiry. 1. Compliance with the six-month time-limit in respect of the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention (a) The parties’ submissions 104. The Government submitted that it appeared from paragraph 40 of the Chamber judgment that the applicant’s grandfather had lodged only one complaint with the prosecution authorities, dated 4 October 2005, concerning the quality of medical care in the temporary detention centre. This was more than one year prior to the applicant lodging the application with the Court on 1 November 2006. However, the Government argued that the complaint of 4 October 2005 had not contained any grievances concerning the lack of medical care and, moreover, a reply had been prepared on 9 November 2005 by the prosecutor’s office of the Sovetskiy district of Novosibirsk. Furthermore, they stated that a similar complaint, in which the grievances had been set out in a summary fashion and sent by the applicant’s grandfather to the prosecution authorities on 30 November 2005, had been replied to on 16 December 2005 by the prosecutor’s office of the Novosibirsk region. However, the Government stressed that this was still outside the six ‑ month time-limit. 105. The applicant did not reply to this objection in his submissions to the Grand Chamber. (b) The Court’s assessment 106. The Court reiterates that, as a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of knowledge of that act or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant (see Dennis and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 76573/01, 2 July 2002). Moreover, Article 35 § 1 cannot be interpreted in a manner which would require an applicant to seize the Court of his complaint before his position in connection with the matter has been finally settled at the domestic level. Where, therefore, an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 to take the start of the six-month period from the date when the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, § 157, ECHR 2009, and Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 46477/99, 7 June 2001). 107. Turning to the present case, the Court has to ascertain whether the applicant had an effective remedy available to him and, if so, whether he made use of it and then seized the Court within the required time-limit. In doing so, the Court will not consider whether the applicant should have made use of civil proceedings since it has found above (see paragraphs 96 ‑ 98) that the Government are estopped from raising an objection of non-exhaustion at this stage of the proceedings. 108. The Court notes at the outset that, on 28 February 2005, the applicant’s grandfather lost his status as the applicant’s guardian and that he was only reinstated at some point at the beginning of 2006. Thus, during the entire period when the grandfather was not the guardian, the applicant appears to have been under the guardianship of the State, and the grandfather had no legal rights to represent the applicant or defend his interests. Since the applicant was released from the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders on 23 March 2005, he had at that time only the State to protect his interests. Consequently, the authorities were under no legal obligation during that period of time to reply to the grandfather’s complaints concerning the applicant since he was not his guardian. 109. However, the Court observes that the grandfather continued to endeavour to protect the applicant’s interests. Hence, it appears from the grandfather’s letter of 30 November 2005 to a Deputy Prosecutor General that he had been informed that his complaint of 4 October 2005 to the Prosecutor General had been sent to various prosecutors’ offices. Moreover, in his letter of 30 November 2005, the grandfather did indeed repeat the complaints regarding the applicant’s treatment in the temporary detention centre and his poor health which he had already set out in his previous letter of 4 October 2005 (see paragraph 46 above). The Court notes that the prosecutor’s reply of 9 November 2005 and the regional prosecutor’s reply of 16 December 2005 nevertheless contained no information in response to the grandfather’s complaints concerning the applicant’s medical condition or the authorities’ failure to treat him while in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. 110. Furthermore, the Court has regard to the fact that, once reinstated as the applicant’s guardian, the grandfather pursued the matter of the legality of the applicant’s detention and, within the framework of those proceedings, raised the issue of the applicant’s frail health and the lack of medical treatment. In particular, in the complaint against the decision of 21 February 2005, which was examined by the President of the Novosibirsk Regional Court on 29 May 2006, the grandfather cited the applicant’s diagnosis and the impossibility for him of being detained in the absence of medical advice. The President of the Regional Court responded in its judgment that the fact that the applicant suffered from various illnesses could not serve as a ground for quashing the decision of 21 February 2005, given that it had already been enforced in March 2005. 111. Against this background the Court finds that, in the absence of any answer from the prosecutors’ offices to the grandfather’s complaints in October and November 2005, the grandfather, once reinstated as the applicant’s guardian, used other possible avenues to argue the applicant’s case pertaining to his poor health and the lack of medical treatment in the temporary detention centre. Since the only concrete answer he received to that complaint was through the judgment of 29 May 2006 when, in essence, he was told that there was no point in complaining any further as the applicant’s detention had already ended, the Court considers that, in the specific circumstances of the present case, the six-month period should be calculated from that date, as further complaints to the authorities would have had no prospects of success. Noting that the application was lodged with the Court on 1 November 2006, it follows that the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 fall within the six-month time-limit. 112. The Government’s objection must therefore be dismissed. 2. Compliance with the six-month time-limit in respect of the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 concerning the pre-investigation inquiry (a) The parties’ submissions 113. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month time-limit in so far as his complaint under Article 6 related to the pre-investigation inquiry, since the revised ruling refusing to initiate criminal proceedings against the applicant had been made on 6 July 2005 and a reply to the applicant’s grandfather’s last complaint on this matter to the prosecution authorities had been given on 16 December 2005. 114. In this regard, the Government stressed that the present case involved two separate sets of proceedings, not one as found by the Chamber in its judgment. The first of these – the pre-investigation inquiry, conducted in accordance with Chapters 19 and 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – was to verify information on an alleged crime and decide whether there was sufficient evidence that a crime had been committed and whether to institute criminal proceedings. The second set – the proceedings deciding on the placement of the applicant in the temporary detention centre, conducted in accordance with Chapter 3.1 of the Minors Act – did not require a pre-investigation inquiry to be conducted and were not limited in scope to information obtained during the inquiry. Thus, the outcome of the first set of proceedings did not, in itself, constitute a decisive ground for initiating the second set of proceedings, as exemplified in the applicant’s case where only the last two inquiries, out of five, had been followed by the second set of proceedings for his placement in the temporary detention centre, and then because it had become obvious that other preventive measures had been unsuccessful. Hence, the Government found no grounds for treating the two sets of proceedings as a single process, as the Chamber had done in its judgment, and argued that the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 should be examined separately in respect of each set of proceedings in question. 115. The applicant did not explicitly address the Government’s objection or whether the two sets of proceedings should be considered separately or together. However, he maintained that the Chamber’s judgment was correct and should be followed. (b) The Court’s assessment 116. The Court will firstly consider the Government’s claim that the pre-investigation inquiry and the proceedings leading to the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre should be considered separately, since the result on this point will determine whether or not the Court needs to consider the Government’s objection relating to the six-month rule. 117. While the Court acknowledges that the pre-investigation inquiry and the placement proceedings were, formally, two unrelated procedures, governed by separate legal rules, it notes that in the present case there was a close link, both in law and in fact, between them. In particular, the domestic courts gave as the main reason for the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre that he had committed a delinquent act punishable by the Criminal Code. The District Court referred at length to the witness statements made by S. and his mother in its judgment, and relied on those and the pre-investigation inquiry’s findings when making its ruling (see paragraph 27 above). Moreover, both the District Court and the Regional Court found that the placement of the applicant in the temporary detention centre was necessary to prevent him from committing further delinquent acts, which shows that the placement was a direct consequence of the outcome of the pre-investigation inquiry. 118. Consequently, the Court finds that the two sets of proceedings should be considered together as a single set of proceedings for the purposes of the present case, and will proceed with its examination of the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 on this basis. The Government’s objection as to compliance with the six-month time-limit in relation to the pre-investigation inquiry must, therefore, be rejected since the final domestic decision, regarding the proceedings as a whole, was taken on 29 May 2006 when the President of the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the initial judgment ordering the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile delinquents. Since the application was lodged with the Court on 1 November 2006, it was introduced within the six-month time-limit. 119. The Government’s objection must therefore be dismissed. III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 120. The applicant complained that he had not received adequate medical care while in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders and that the conditions of his detention there had been inhuman, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A. The Chamber judgment 121. The Chamber found that the lack of adequate medical treatment for the applicant in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. It noted in particular that, despite its request for a copy of the applicant’s medical records from the temporary detention centre, the Government had failed to produce one, claiming that the records had been destroyed in accordance with domestic regulations which had not been submitted to the Court or published or made accessible to the public. Moreover, the Chamber observed that the normal time-limit for storage of medical records was ten years in the Russian Federation. Thus, since the applicant’s grandfather had repeatedly informed the authorities of the applicant’s health problems, the Chamber found no reason to doubt that the staff at the temporary detention centre had been made aware of his state of health. There was no evidence that the applicant had been examined during his detention by a neurologist or psychiatrist or that he had received any of his prescribed medication. The Chamber found this lack of medical attention, resulting in the applicant being hospitalised a day after his release, unacceptable. 122. In view of its finding of a violation due to the lack of medical treatment, the Chamber did not consider it necessary to examine the remainder of the applicant’s complaints under Article 3. B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant 123. The applicant emphasised that, at the time of being placed in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, he was suffering from neurosis, ADHD, psychopathic conduct and enuresis. While he acknowledged that these conditions did not require immediate medical aid at the time of being detained, he emphasised that the pressure exerted on him throughout his detention at the police station and the questioning there, together with the thirty days at the temporary detention centre, had resulted in a sharp exacerbation of all of his conditions and an immediate need for medical treatment. This had been proved by the medical certificates submitted by him during the proceedings before the Chamber, which confirmed that he had been forcibly hospitalised in a psychiatric hospital immediately upon release from the temporary detention centre. He argued that there were no other possible causes for the worsening of his conditions. 124. In his view, the Russian authorities had failed to take timely measures to avoid his illnesses getting worse. In particular, he alleged that, when requesting that he be placed in the temporary detention centre, the head of the Sovetskiy district Police Department was required to submit to the District Court a decision by the relevant health-care facility on the presence or absence of contraindications of a medical nature, including a psychiatric examination, against placing him in the temporary detention centre. However, no such decision had been submitted either to the court or the temporary detention centre. 125. The applicant further maintained his submissions before the Chamber, claiming that both he and his grandfather had informed the teachers and employees of the temporary detention centre of his illnesses and had asked that he have unrestricted access to the bathroom. However, this had been ignored and he had suffered badly, both psychologically and physically, owing to his enuresis. 126. Having regard to all of the circumstances of his case, the applicant maintained that the conditions in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, at the time of his stay there, had been incompatible with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. 2. The Government 127. The Government maintained that the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 did not disclose any violation of that provision. 128. They reiterated that the applicant’s personal file from the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, which might have included a medical record describing the applicant’s health on admission, had been destroyed in accordance with the instructions in force at the time (see paragraph 73 above). Moreover, other medical records and logbooks from the temporary detention centre for the period of the applicant’s stay had been destroyed as soon as they were no longer “needed”, as no time-limits for keeping such documents existed at the material time. Order no. 340 of 12 May 2006, referred to in paragraph 34 of the Chamber judgment, had come into force only after those documents had been destroyed. 129. However, the Government noted that the applicant’s “accounting and statistical record” from his stay at the temporary detention centre in September 2004 and in February 2005 had been retained since its storage period was unlimited in accordance with Order no. 215 of 2 April 2004 (see paragraph 74 above). According to the Government, the Court had mistakenly called these records “medical records” in paragraphs 32 and 90 of the Chamber judgment and had therefore reached a wrong conclusion in paragraph 90. 130. They further stated that, since they had only been given notice of the present case on 1 October 2010, more than five and a half years after the events in question and following the destruction of most of the relevant records, they had to rely on the report by the head of the temporary detention centre, dated 28 December 2010, and the explanation of a supervisor at the same centre, dated 23 December 2010 (see paragraph 41 above). From these documents it appeared that all children kept at the temporary detention centre, including the applicant, had been examined daily by the medical staff. This was further supported by the “daily routine” approved on 17 January 2013 and submitted to the Court. Moreover, children could ask for medical assistance at any time; there were properly equipped medical rooms; access to toilets was not restricted; and special night-time arrangements were made for children suffering from enuresis. No complaints had been made by the applicant concerning any of these matters during his stay at the temporary detention centre. In this respect, the Government pointed out that minors kept in the temporary detention centre could receive unrestricted visits and telephone calls from their relatives, provided that they did not interfere with the activities foreseen in the daily schedule. The applicant’s grandfather had never claimed to have been prevented from visiting the applicant and did not appear to have made any written or oral complaints during such visits. 131. Lastly, the Government submitted that, according to the staff schedule of the temporary detention centre in force from 18 June 2003 to 3 October 2005, a psychiatrist, a paediatrician, a doctor’s assistant and a nurse were present at the centre. An information note further stated that the quality of medical care and the living conditions at the temporary detention centre had not been subject to any departmental or other inspection during 2004 or 2005. In view of all of the above, and since the applicant had not submitted any documents to substantiate his claims, the Government argued that there was no indication that the temporary detention centre was not suitable to accommodate, for a maximum period of thirty days, a child suffering from enuresis and a behavioural disorder. 132. With regard to the applicant’s health, the Government pointed out that his enuresis was not mentioned in any medical documents submitted by the applicant (issued after 2003) nor in the applicant’s “accounting and statistical record” from the temporary detention centre. Moreover, the degree of manifestation of this illness was not mentioned in any of the available documents. Turning to the applicant’s behavioural disorder, the Government noted that, according to the extract from medical history no. 3624 (submitted by the applicant to the Court in October 2007), the applicant had suffered from a social behavioural disorder at the material time which seemed to be a result of external factors rather than of his other illnesses. In their view, the applicant had failed to submit any medical certificate to substantiate the allegation that this disorder prevented his placement in the temporary detention centre. He had also failed to produce a report by a medical expert confirming that his stay at the temporary detention centre had caused his health to deteriorate. 133. Consequently, the Government considered that the applicant’s complaints did not disclose a violation of Article 3. 3. The third-party intervener 134. The Mental Disability Advocacy Center (“the MDAC”) stressed that children with mental disabilities faced a “double disadvantage” – both as children and as individuals with mental disabilities. These children were particularly vulnerable to violations of their rights and had additional needs which had to be protected through stringent and effective safeguards. The MDAC referred to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted on 13 December 2006, UNTS 2515 – “the CRPD”) and in particular its main object to ensure equality and non-discrimination in all domains (Article 5 § 2). It further referred to the CRC, emphasising that the best interests of the child should always be a primary consideration and that States Parties undertook to ensure the child such protection and care as was necessary for his or her well-being (Article 3 – see paragraph 81 above). Moreover, Article 23 of the CRC specifically related to children with disabilities and the MDAC observed that the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its General Comment No. 9 (2006), set out further guidance as to the treatment of children with disabilities in conflict with the law. Thus, the Committee stated that “children with disabilities in conflict with the law should not be placed in a regular juvenile detention centre by way of pre-trial detention nor by way of a punishment” (see paragraph 83 above). The MDAC emphasised that the Court had held that States had an obligation to take particular measures to provide effective protection of vulnerable persons from ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge (they referred to Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, § 73, ECHR 2001-V). C. The Court’s assessment 1. General principles 135. The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic society, prohibiting in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see, among other authorities, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, § 201, ECHR 2012). However, to come within the scope of the prohibition contained in Article 3, the treatment inflicted on or endured by the victim must reach a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is a relative one, depending on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see M.S. v. the United Kingdom, no. 24527/08, § 38, 3 May 2012, and Price v. the United Kingdom, no. 33394/96, § 24, ECHR 2001 ‑ VII). 136. Article 3 further imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical care (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 94, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI; Mouisel v. France, no. 67263/01, § 40, ECHR 2002-IX; and Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696/00, § 93, 26 October 2006). Thus, the Court has held on many occasions that lack of appropriate medical care may amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see, for example, M.S. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, §§ 44 ‑ 46; Wenerski v. Poland, no. 44369/02, §§ 56-65, 20 January 2009; and Popov v. Russia, no. 26853/04, §§ 210-13 and 231-37, 13 July 2006). 137. In this connection, the “adequacy” of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court reiterates that the mere fact that a detainee is seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical assistance was adequate (see Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852/03 and 13413/04, § 116, 29 November 2007). The authorities must also ensure that a comprehensive record is kept concerning the detainee’s state of health and his or her treatment while in detention (see Khudobin, cited above, § 83 ), that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286/01, § § 104-06, 28 March 2006, and Hummatov, cited above, § 115), and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee’s health problems or preventing their aggravation, rather than addressing them on a symptomatic basis (see Popov, cited above, § 211; Hummatov, cited above, §§ 109 and 114; and Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857/13, § 93, 27 November 2014 ). The authorities must also show that the necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be actually followed through (see Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649/05, § 117, 7 November 2006, and Hummatov, cited above, § 116). Furthermore, medical treatment provided within prison facilities must be appropriate, that is, at a level comparable to that which the State authorities have committed themselves to provide to the population as a whole. Nevertheless, this does not mean that every detainee must be guaranteed the same level of medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447/05, § 66, 7 February 2012). 138. On the whole, the Court reserves sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be “compatible with the human dignity” of a detainee, but should also take into account “the practical demands of imprisonment” (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468/06, § 140, 22 December 2008). When dealing with children, the Court considers that, in line with established international law, the health of juveniles deprived of their liberty shall be safeguarded according to recognised medical standards applicable to juveniles in the wider community (see, for example, Rules 57, 62.2, 62.5, 69.2, and 73 (d) of the 2008 European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures, Article 3 § 3 of the CRC, and Rules 49-53 of the Havana Rules in paragraphs 79, 81 and 87 above). The authorities should always be guided by the child’s best interests, and the child should be guaranteed proper care and protection. Moreover, if the authorities are considering depriving a child of his or her liberty, a medical assessment should be made of the child’s state of health to determine whether or not he or she can be placed in a juvenile detention centre. 139. The Court further stresses that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. In assessing evidence, the Court has adopted the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. However, it has never been its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that standard. Its role is not to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States’ responsibility under the Convention. In the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties’ submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 147, ECHR 2005 ‑ VII, with further references; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 121, ECHR 2000 ‑ IV; Amirov, cited above, § 80; and Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, § 121, 10 January 2012). 140. In this connection it should be noted that the Court has held that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges something must prove that allegation). According to the Court’s case-law under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries, damage and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Çakıcı v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, § 85, ECHR 1999 ‑ IV; Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000-VII; and Amirov, cited above, § 92 ). In the absence of such an explanation the Court can draw inferences that may be unfavourable for the respondent Government (see, for instance, Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, § 274, 18 June 2002, and Buntov v. Russia, no. 27026/10, § 161, 5 June 2012). 2. Application to the present case 141. The Court notes from the outset that both the applicant’s young age and his state of health are circumstances of relevance in assessing whether the minimum level of severity has been attained (see paragraph 135 above) and it will have particular regard to the principles set out in paragraph 138 above. 142. In the present case, the Court notes that the Government have submitted numerous documents in support of their submissions before the Grand Chamber to show that the conditions at the temporary detention centre were good and that medical treatment was provided. However, the great majority of these documents date from 2008 to 2014, several years after the applicant’s stay at the temporary detention centre and, consequently, do not shed light on the conditions in the centre during his placement there. Moreover, as concerns the report by the head of the temporary detention centre, dated 28 December 2010, and the explanation of a supervisor at the centre, dated 23 December 2010, the Court finds it unlikely that they would remember whether or not one child, who had stayed at the temporary detention centre for thirty days almost six years earlier, had complained of the conditions or access to the toilets. It has also on previous occasions found that reports or certificates like those submitted by the Russian Government were of little evidentiary value as they lacked references to original documentation held by the relevant prison or detention centre (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, § 124, with further references). 143. Thus, while the Court does not question the submission that some of the documents from the temporary detention centre relating to the applicant may have been destroyed in accordance with the relevant rules in force at that time, this does not absolve the Government from the obligation to support their factual submissions with appropriate evidence (ibid., § 125). 144. The parties have submitted a number of relevant documents that allow the Court to examine the applicant’s complaints in depth. In particular, it finds it established through the medical certificates submitted by the applicant that he was examined by a neurologist and a psychiatrist on 27 December 2004 and 19 January 2005, that is, only slightly over a month before being placed in the temporary detention centre. At that time, medication was prescribed for him, as well as regular supervision by a neurologist and a psychiatrist and regular psychological counselling for his ADHD. It has further been established through medical records that the applicant was hospitalised the day after his release from the temporary detention centre and treated for neurosis and ADHD. He remained in hospital at least until 12 April 2005, thus for approximately three weeks. 145. Moreover, the Court notes that the applicant’s grandfather submitted medical certificates at the detention hearing on 21 February 2005 to show that the applicant suffered from ADHD, thereby ensuring that the authorities were aware of his condition. In this connection, the Court observes that an officer from the Juveniles Inspectorate was present at the hearing on 21 February 2005 and that, in accordance with section 31.2 of the Minors Act, a representative of the temporary detention centre was also required to be present. Since the applicant’s grandfather drew attention to the applicant’s medical condition during the hearing, the relevant authorities responsible for the applicant’s placement at the temporary detention centre were made aware of his condition. 146. Thus, even if the applicant’s personal file from the temporary detention centre has been destroyed, the Court considers that there is sufficient evidence to show that the authorities were aware of the applicant’s medical condition upon his admission to the temporary detention centre and that he was in need of treatment. Moreover, the fact that he was hospitalised the day after his release, and kept in the psychiatric hospital for almost three weeks, provides an indication that he was not given the necessary treatment for his condition at the temporary detention centre. The applicant has thereby provided the Court with a prima facie case of lack of adequate medical treatment. Having regard to the considerations set out above (see paragraphs 142-43 above) concerning the documents submitted by the Government and the lack of any other convincing evidence, the Court finds that the Government have failed to show that the applicant received the medical care required by his condition during his stay at the temporary detention centre where he was kept for thirty days without the right to leave and entirely under the control and responsibility of the staff at the centre. In these circumstances, the authorities were under an obligation to safeguard the applicant’s dignity and well-being, and are responsible under the Convention for the treatment he experienced (see M.S. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 44). 147. As concerns the applicant’s enuresis, the Court notes that it is not mentioned in the medical certificates of 27 December 2004 and 19 January 2005 and that it was not the reason for his hospitalisation following his detention. Thus, in the Court’s view, the applicant has not submitted sufficient prima facie evidence to show whether and, if so, to what extent he suffered from enuresis on admission to the temporary detention centre and whether the personnel at the centre were, or should have been, aware of it. Since most of the medical certificates and files from the temporary detention centre concerning the applicant have been destroyed, it appears difficult to obtain any clarification on this point. On the other hand, the Court has already found it established that the applicant suffered from ADHD. 148. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 3 on account of the lack of necessary medical treatment at the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, having regard to his young age and particularly vulnerable situation, suffering as he was from ADHD. 149. There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 150. In view of this finding of a violation of Article 3, and like the Chamber in its judgment, the Court does not find it necessary to examine the remainder of the applicant’s complaints under this provision. IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 151. The applicant complained that his detention in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders had violated Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.” A. The Chamber judgment 152. In its judgment, the Chamber found that the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre amounted to a deprivation of liberty since the centre was closed and guarded, inmates were routinely searched on admission, all personal belongings were confiscated, and a disciplinary regime was applied to the inmates. 153. The Chamber further considered that the detention had not been intended for educational supervision within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (d) since, under domestic law, temporary detention centres were designed for the temporary detention of minors while more appropriate accommodation was being sought, such as a return to the family or placement in an educational institution. Moreover, domestic law did not provide for any educational activities in the centres. Thus, the Chamber concluded that the temporary detention centres were not designed to provide educational supervision, and that the applicant’s detention in the centre had not been “for the purpose of” educational supervision, since he had been placed there for “behaviour correction” and the prevention of further delinquent acts. 154. The Chamber then found that the applicant’s detention could not be “reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence”, within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c), since neither the domestic authorities nor the Government had mentioned any concrete and specific delinquent acts which the applicant had to be prevented from committing. Moreover, Article 5 § 1 (c) required that detention to prevent a person from committing an offence was “effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority”, which was not the case for the applicant, who had been placed in the temporary detention centre by order of a court at the end of the proceedings against him. 155. The Chamber further considered that since the applicant had not been convicted of an offence because he had not reached the statutory age of criminal responsibility, his detention could not be regarded as “lawful detention after conviction by a competent court” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a). Furthermore, it found that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty did not fall under Article 5 § 1 (b) of the Convention and that sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) were clearly not relevant in the present case. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the applicant’s detention in the temporary detention centre had not had any legitimate purpose under Article 5 § 1 and had accordingly been arbitrary. B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant 156. The applicant agreed with the reasoning in the Chamber judgment in relation to Article 5 § 1. He had been placed in the temporary detention centre for thirty days for the “correction of conduct”, which did not involve “educational supervision” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (d). In his view, the temporary detention centre was in no sense an institution intended for educational supervision and, according to section 22 of the Minors Act, its tasks did not include carrying out educational work with the minor. In fact, according to domestic legislation, temporary detention centres were not included in the system of educational institutions. The applicant emphasised that special closed institutions existed that did have the specific task of bringing up and educating children and young persons of deviant behaviour. 157. Moreover, section 22(4)(2) of the Minors Act contained a list of situations in which a minor could be placed in a temporary detention centre (see paragraph 66 above) and the applicant’s situation did not fall under any of these. He emphasised that his identity had been known as had his place of residence and that his guilt in respect of the allegation of extortion had never been established by a court verdict. Furthermore, the applicant noted that, under section 22(6) of the Minors Act, a minor should only be kept in a temporary detention centre for the minimum time necessary for putting his or her affairs in order, and no more than thirty days. This implied that the purpose of the temporary detention centre was not educational supervision, but solely the detention of minors until such time as they could be handed over to their guardian or placed in a special educational institution. In any event, the Government had not submitted any relevant documents confirming that the applicant had received any individual precautionary instructions or had any school lessons while detained in the centre. 158. Lastly, the applicant submitted that his placement in the temporary detention centre did not serve any of the purposes listed in Article 5 § 1 (a), (b), or (c) either. 159. He concluded that his detention had been unlawful as it fell outside the scope of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. 2. The Government 160. The Government maintained that the applicant’s detention in the temporary detention centre had been in accordance with Article 5 § 1 (d) of the Convention since his placement had been ordered precisely for the purposes of “educational supervision”. They noted that the national courts had authorised the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre to prevent him from committing further offences – by correcting his behaviour through individual preventive work – in accordance with section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act. They observed that other preventive measures taken earlier had not resulted in the improvement of the applicant’s behaviour and that his family had been unable to ensure proper supervision. In relation to this, the Government emphasised the applicant’s troubled background with alcoholic parents, placements in orphanages, anti ‑ social and aggressive behaviour and commission of offences which had led to his being placed under the preventive supervision of the Juveniles Inspectorate between 2002 and 2005. They noted that the case file concerning the preventive supervision of the applicant had been destroyed in 2011. 161. Moreover, the Government submitted that individual preventive work, foreseen by the Minors Act, included an element of “educational supervision”, and its implementation at the temporary detention centre had been expressly required in the applicant’s situation. While the applicant’s personal file from the centre had been destroyed in accordance with domestic rules, the Government relied on other documents that indirectly confirmed that individual preventive work had been carried out with the applicant during his stay, such as an undated personality profile ( характеристика ) of the applicant issued by the temporary detention centre at the request of his representative (submitted to the Court by the applicant’s grandfather in 2007). They further relied on a number of documents to demonstrate that temporary detention centres in general were designed to provide “educational supervision” and secondary-school education, such as the staff schedule approved on 18 June 2003, the contracts of 1 September 2004 and 1 September 2005 between the temporary detention centre and school no. 15 of Novosibirsk on the provision of education to minors placed at the centre, and the licence issued to that school for the period from 4 September 2002 until 19 June 2007 to work with the educational and consultation centre of the temporary detention centre. 162. The Government also claimed that the regime in closed educational institutions, as foreseen by section 15(4) of the Minors Act, was similar to the regime in temporary detention centres, as specified in section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act. Although the emphasis was placed differently in the wording of the two provisions, the essence, methods and aims of the work conducted with the minors were the same in both places. The difference was merely in the duration of the stay. The main objects of the closed educational institutions, as specified in section 15 of the Minors Act, were fully applicable to temporary detention centres. 3. The third-party intervener 163. The MDAC pointed out that, pursuant to Article 37 (b) of the CRC, the arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child must be in conformity with the law and used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible time (see paragraph 82 above). It further observed that the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its General Comment No. 9 (2006), stated that “[c]hildren with disabilities in conflict with the law should not be placed in a regular juvenile detention centre by way of pre-trial detention nor by way of a punishment. Deprivation of liberty should only be applied if necessary with a view to providing the child with adequate treatment ... and the child should be placed in an institution that has specially trained staff” (see paragraph 83 above). Moreover, Rule 28 of the Havana Rules (see paragraph 87 above) provided that “[t]he detention of juveniles should only take place under conditions that took full account of their particular needs, status and special requirements according to their age, personality, sex and type of offence, as well as mental and physical health, and which ensured their protection from harmful influences and risk situations”. C. The Court’s assessment 164. The Court notes at the outset that the Government have not maintained their claim that the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre fell outside the scope of Article 5 of the Convention on the ground that the placement did not constitute a deprivation of liberty. In any event, the Court confirms the Chamber’s finding that the applicant’s placement for thirty days in the temporary detention centre amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1, noting in particular that the centre was closed and guarded, with twenty-four-hour surveillance of inmates to ensure that they did not leave the premises without authorisation, and with a disciplinary regime enforced by a duty squad (see paragraphs 71-72 above). 165. Moreover, the applicant has submitted that his placement in the temporary detention centre fell outside the scope of all sub-paragraphs of Article 5 § 1 while the Government, in their submissions to the Grand Chamber, have claimed that the placement was in accordance with Article 5 § 1 (d), without arguing that it could also fall under one of the other sub-paragraphs of the said provision. In view of this, and agreeing with the Chamber’s findings that the applicant’s detention did not come within the scope of Article 5 § 1 (a), (b), (c), (e) or (f) of the Convention (see paragraphs 117-27 of the Chamber judgment), the Court will focus its examination on whether or not the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre was in accordance with Article 5 § 1 (d). 166. The Court reiterates that the list of exceptions to the right to liberty set out in Article 5 § 1 is an exhaustive one and only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his liberty (see, among many others, Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, § 25, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ IV ). Moreover, in the context of the detention of minors, the words “educational supervision” must not be equated rigidly with notions of classroom teaching: in the context of a young person in local-authority care, educational supervision must embrace many aspects of the exercise, by the local authority, of parental rights for the benefit and protection of the person concerned (see P. and S. v. Poland, no. 57375/08, § 147, 30 October 2012; D.G. v. Ireland, no. 39474/98, § 80, ECHR 2002 ‑ III; and Koniarska v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 33670/96, 12 October 2000). 167. Further, detention for educational supervision pursuant to Article 5 § 1 (d) must take place in an appropriate facility with the resources to meet the necessary educational objectives and security requirements. However, placement in such a facility does not necessarily have to be immediate. Sub-paragraph (d) does not preclude an interim custody measure being used as a preliminary to a regime of supervised education, without itself involving any supervised education. In such circumstances, however, the interim custody measure must be speedily followed by actual application of a regime of educational supervision in a setting (open or closed) designed – and with sufficient resources – for the purpose (see Bouamar v. Belgium, 29 February 1988, §§ 50 and 52, Series A no. 129, and D.G. v. Ireland, cited above, § 78). 168. In the present case, it appears from the relevant provisions in the Minors Act that a placement in such a centre should be of a temporary character – as the name itself indicates – and for the shortest possible time, thirty days at the most. Thus, for instance, a minor may be placed there while his identity and place of residence are established or for the time necessary to prepare his transfer to, or return following an escape from, a closed educational institution (section 22(2)(4-6) of the Minors Act). However, none of these grounds is relevant in the present case since the applicant’s placement was for the purpose of “correcting his behaviour”. In any event, the various reasons provided for in the Minors Act for placing a minor in a temporary detention centre indicate that its purpose is interim accommodation only until a permanent solution is found and not for “educational supervision”. 169. In the Court’s view, and contrary to the Government’s claims, the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre cannot be compared to a placement in a closed educational institution, which is a separate and long-term measure intended to try to help minors with serious problems (compare A. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 51776/08, §§ 66-74, 29 November 2011). As noted above, placement in a temporary detention centre is a short-term, temporary solution, and the Court fails to see how any meaningful educational supervision to change a minor’s behaviour and offer him or her appropriate treatment and rehabilitation, can be provided during a maximum period of thirty days. 170. As concerns the Government’s submission that the applicant did receive schooling in the temporary detention centre, the Court finds that the documents relied on by the Government show that an agreement existed with a local school to provide education to the juveniles at the temporary detention centre during the time that the applicant was there. In this connection, the Court considers that, in order to avoid gaps in their education, schooling in line with the normal school curriculum should be standard practice for all minors deprived of their liberty and placed under the State’s responsibility, even when they are placed in a temporary detention centre for a limited period of time,. This is also supported by international instruments dealing with the deprivation of liberty of minors (see, for instance, Rules 77, 78.3 and 78.5 of the 2008 European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions and measures; Guidelines 21 and 28 of the Council of Europe Guidelines on child friendly justice; Rule 26.2 of the Beijing Rules; and Rule 38 of the Havana Rules. All of these sources are cited above in paragraphs 79, 80, 86 and 87 respectively). Consequently, while the Court accepts that some schooling was provided in the centre, it considers that this does not substantiate the Government’s argument that the applicant’s placement was “for the purpose” of educational supervision. On the contrary, the centre was characterised by its disciplinary regime rather than by the schooling provided. 171. The Court further considers it to be of importance that none of the domestic courts examining the applicant’s detention order stated that the placement was for educational purposes. Instead, they referred to “behaviour correction” and the need to prevent him from committing further delinquent acts, neither of which is a valid ground covered by Article 5 § 1 (d) of the Convention. In fact, the Court observes that the purpose of “behaviour correction” coincides with the aims of criminal punishment found in Article 43 § 2 of the Criminal Code and in Article 87 § 2 of the Code for minors between 14 and 18 years of age (see paragraphs 57-58 above). 172. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre did not fall under Article 5 § 1 (d) of the Convention. Since it has already established that the detention did not fall within the ambit of any of the other sub-paragraphs of this provision, it follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1. V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION 173. The applicant further complained that the proceedings relating to his placement in the temporary detention centre had been unfair. In particular, he alleged that he had been questioned by the police without his guardian, a defence lawyer or a teacher present and that he had not had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him during the proceedings. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, which in their relevant parts read as follows: “1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ... ... 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ... (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ...” A. Applicability of Article 6 to the present case 1. The parties’ submissions 174. Firstly, in their submissions before the Grand Chamber, the Government considered that the court hearing of 21 February 2005 ordering the applicant’s detention in the temporary detention centre should be examined for compliance with the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, instead of Article 6, since it concerned the imposition of a measure for the purposes foreseen by Article 5 § 1 (d). In this connection they noted that the Chamber had already examined another court hearing, namely that of 11 April 2005 relating to the applicant’s appeal against his placement in the temporary detention centre, for compliance with Article 5 § 4. Moreover, the Court had previously relied on this provision in relation to similar measures (in Ichin and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 28189/04 and 28192/04, §§ 41 and 43, 21 December 2010, and A. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§ 81 and 107). 175. In any event, the Government maintained their stance that Article 6 of the Convention was not applicable to the proceedings in the present case. 176. They contended that, as far as the pre-investigation inquiry was concerned, it had only involved one informal act with the participation of the applicant – the questioning – which should not be confused with a formal interview. They further reiterated that the pre-investigation inquiry concerned only the establishment of the facts and could not lead to the imposition of any punishment and thus did not involve the determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The inquiry could only lead to a decision whether or not to institute criminal proceedings. Since the applicant was under the age of criminal responsibility, the institution of criminal proceedings was excluded. Thus, as in the situation of a mentally ill defendant, the possibility of conviction was completely excluded. Referring to Kerr v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 63356/00, 23 September 2003) and Antoine v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 62960/00, 13 May 2003), the Government observed that, for exactly these reasons, the Court had found that Article 6 was not applicable to criminal proceedings in respect of mentally ill defendants. 177. Regarding the proceedings leading to the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre, the Government argued that Article 6, under its criminal head, was not applicable. They referred to sections 22(2)(4) and 31.1(2) of the Minors Act and to the domestic court rulings of 21 February 2005 and 29 May 2006. In their view, these sources confirmed that the purpose of the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre had been to prevent him from committing further offences, by correcting his behaviour, and not to punish him for the latest offence he had committed. Thus, the domestic courts had examined not only the circumstances of the latest offence, but the entire record of the applicant’s anti-social and delinquent behaviour, as well as his living conditions and family situation, and had concluded that he lacked the necessary supervision and that the preventive measures previously put in place had been inadequate. Consequently, the domestic court could not, and had not, established the applicant’s guilt in respect of a crime but had merely assessed the sufficiency of the evidence confirming his commission of an act prohibited by the Criminal Code. This could not amount to a “determination of a criminal charge” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. Furthermore, the court hearing of 21 February 2005 had been conducted in accordance with the procedure foreseen by the Minors Act, not by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had expressly stated that this procedure under the Minors Act constituted a type of civil proceedings (finding of 14 May 2013, no. 690-O). 178. The applicant contested the applicability of Article 5 § 4 and maintained that the Chamber’s approach had been the correct one and that the proceedings fell within the scope of Article 6 and should be considered in terms of compliance with that provision. He contended that his placement in the temporary detention centre had not been aimed at educational supervision but to punish him for the crime he had allegedly committed. In his view, the authorities had used the placement as a measure of criminal prosecution since they were prevented from instituting criminal proceedings against him on account of his age. 2. The Court’s assessment 179. The Court notes that, in its judgment, the Chamber came to the conclusion that the proceedings against the applicant constituted criminal proceedings within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention (see paragraph 149 of the Chamber judgment). It held as follows. “139. The Court reiterates that the concept of a ‘criminal charge’ within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 is an autonomous one. The Court’s established case-law sets out three criteria, commonly known as the “Engel criteria” (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 82, Series A no. 22), to be considered in determining whether or not there was a ‘criminal charge’ within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The first criterion is the legal classification of the offence under national law, the second is the very nature of the offence, and the third is the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring. The second and third criteria are alternative, and not necessarily cumulative. This, however, does not exclude a cumulative approach where separate analysis of each criterion does not make it possible to reach a clear conclusion as to the existence of a criminal charge (see, in particular, Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, §§ 30-31, ECHR 2006 ‑ XIV, and Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39665/98 and 40086/98, § 82, ECHR 2003 ‑ X). 140. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that, after establishing that the applicant’s actions contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion, the domestic authorities refused to institute criminal proceedings against him because he was under the statutory age of criminal responsibility ... Subsequently, in separate proceedings, a court ordered the applicant’s placement in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days on the ground that he had committed a delinquent act – extortion – and it was necessary to ‘correct his behaviour’ and prevent him from committing further delinquent acts ... 141. The Court takes note of the Government’s argument that the proceedings against the applicant were not classified as criminal under domestic law. It has already recognised that States, in the performance of their task as guardians of the public interest, are entitled to create or maintain a distinction between different categories of offences for the purposes of their domestic law and to draw a dividing line between what belongs to the criminal sphere and what does not. By removing certain forms of conduct from the category of criminal offences under domestic law, the law-maker may be able to serve the needs of the proper administration of justice, as well as the interests of the individual, as in the present case for example, by exempting minors under a certain age from criminal liability for their actions according to the level of development of their mental and intellectual capacities. Nevertheless, the legal characterisation of the procedure under national law cannot be the sole criterion of relevance for the applicability of Article 6. Otherwise, the application of this provision would be left to the discretion of the Contracting States to a degree that might lead to results incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention (see Öztürk v. Germany, 21 February 1984, § 49, Series A no. 73; Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, § 68, Series A no. 80; Ezeh and Connors, cited above, § 83; and Matyjek v. Poland (dec.), no. 38184/03, § 45, 30 May 2006). In view of the above, the fact that the proceedings against the applicant were not classified as criminal under Russian law has only a formal and relative value; the ‘very nature of the offence is a factor of greater import’ (see Ezeh and Connors, cited above, § 91). 142. It was not disputed before the Court that the delinquent act imputed to the applicant corresponded to an offence in the ordinary criminal law. Indeed, the decision not to institute criminal proceedings stated that ‘[the applicant’s] actions ... contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion, punishable by Article 163 of the Criminal Code’ ... At the same time, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the criminal charges against the applicant were not pursued on the ground that he had not reached the statutory age of criminal responsibility. It is, however, not necessary to decide whether, despite the indisputably criminal nature of the imputed offence, the fact that criminal prosecution of the applicant was legally impossible because of his age removed the proceedings against him from the ambit of the criminal limb of Article 6. The Court will instead concentrate on the third criterion: the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the applicant risked incurring. 143. The Court observes that under Russian law a minor who has committed a delinquent act before reaching the statutory age of criminal responsibility may be placed in a closed educational institution for up to three years, or in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for up to thirty days ... In the present case, within a month of the refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant, the local department of the interior asked a court to place him in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders on the ground that he had committed a delinquent act for which he could not be held criminally liable because of his age. Referring to his unruly way of life and previous delinquent acts, the local department of the interior claimed that it was necessary to detain the applicant in order to ‘correct’ his behaviour and prevent him from committing further delinquent acts ... The District Court ordered the applicant’s placement in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days for ‘behaviour correction’, on the grounds that he had not ‘drawn proper conclusions’ from his previous placements in that centre and had committed a further delinquent act ... The Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal, referring to the fact that the applicant had committed a delinquent act punishable by the Criminal Code and to his family situation and poor school performance. It found that his placement in the centre was necessary to prevent him from committing further delinquent acts ... 144. The Court is not oblivious to the fact that the decision to place the applicant in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders was taken in separate proceedings which were formally unrelated to the criminal pre-investigation inquiry regarding the applicant. However, taking into account that the domestic courts referred to the fact that the applicant had committed a delinquent act as the main reason for his placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, and that in their decisions they extensively relied on the documents obtained and the findings made during the criminal pre-investigation inquiry, the Court considers that there was a close link, both in law and fact, between the criminal pre-investigation inquiry and the placement proceedings. Indeed, the wording of the applicable legal provisions and of the judicial decisions, both cited in paragraph 143 above, clearly shows that the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders was a direct consequence of the local department of the interior’s finding that his actions had contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion. 145. The Court has already found that the placement in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders amounted to a deprivation of the applicant’s liberty ... There is therefore a presumption that the proceedings against the applicant were ‘criminal’ within the meaning of Article 6, a presumption which was rebuttable only in entirely exceptional circumstances and only if the deprivation of liberty could not be considered “appreciably detrimental” given its nature, duration or manner of execution (see Ezeh and Connors, cited above, § 126). 146. As already found above, the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders did not pursue the purpose of educational supervision ... The stated purpose of the applicant’s placement in the detention centre for juvenile offenders was to correct his behaviour and to deter him from committing further delinquent acts rather than to punish him. However, the Court’s case-law indicates that it may be necessary to look beyond the appearances and the language used and concentrate on the realities of the situation (see Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, § 64, ECHR 2002 ‑ IV, and Ezeh and Connors, cited above, § 123). 147. The Court notes that the applicant’s detention lasted thirty days and was served in a detention centre for juvenile offenders rather than in an educational institution. As established above, the centre was closed and guarded to prevent inmates from leaving without authorisation. Inmates were subject to constant supervision and to a strict disciplinary regime ... The Court therefore considers that the deprivation of liberty, imposed after a finding that the applicant’s actions contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion and served in a detention centre for juvenile offenders subject to a quasi-penitentiary regime as described above, contained punitive elements as well as elements of prevention and deterrence. The Court finds it difficult to distinguish between the punishment and deterrent aims of the measure in question, these objectives not being mutually exclusive and being recognised as characteristic features of criminal penalties. Indeed, in the Court’s case-law criminal penalties have customarily been recognised as comprising the twin objectives of punishment and deterrence (see Öztürk, cited above, § 53; Bendenoun v. France, 24 February 1994, § 47, Series A no. 284; Lauko v. Slovakia, 2 September 1998, § 58, Reports 1998 ‑ VI; and Ezeh and Connors, cited above, §§ 102 and 105). 148. In view of the nature, duration and manner of execution of the deprivation of liberty which was liable to be, and which actually was, imposed on the applicant, the Court finds no exceptional circumstances capable of rebutting the presumption that the proceedings against the applicant were “criminal” within the meaning of Article 6. 149. In view of the above, the Court concludes that the nature of the offence, together with the nature and severity of the penalty, were such that the proceedings against the applicant constituted criminal proceedings within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. This Article therefore applies to the proceedings against the applicant.” 180. The Court does not see any reason to depart from the Chamber’s findings, which are detailed and well reasoned. Like the Chamber, it emphasises the need to look beyond appearances and the language used and to concentrate on the realities of the situation (see paragraph 146 of the Chamber judgment). When doing so in the applicant’s case, the Court considers that his placement for thirty days in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders had clear elements of both deterrence and punishment (see paragraph 147 of the Chamber judgment). 181. Having regard to the above, the Court does not agree with the Government’s contention that the complaints should be considered under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. In its view, since the proceedings taken against the applicant concerned the determination of a criminal charge, the applicant’s complaints should be seen in the context of the more far-reaching procedural guarantees enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention rather than Article 5 § 4. The Court would add that it does not agree with the Government’s submission that the applicant’s situation should be treated in the same way as that of a mentally ill defendant. In cases of mentally ill defendants, the proceedings can lead to their being placed in closed institutions for treatment and to prevent them from committing further criminal acts. There are no punitive or deterrent elements involved, unlike in the applicant’s case. 182. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the proceedings against the applicant constituted criminal proceedings within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention and that this provision is therefore applicable in the present case. B. Compliance with the requirements of Article 6 1. The Chamber judgment 183. With regard to the applicant’s complaint that he had been questioned by the police in the absence of his guardian, a defence lawyer or a teacher, the Chamber noted that there was no evidence to support the Government’s claim that the applicant’s grandfather, his guardian, or anyone else had been present during the questioning. Moreover, having regard to his young age, it considered the circumstances surrounding the questioning to have been psychologically coercive. The Chamber further observed that the applicant’s confession to the police had been used against him in the ensuing proceedings. Thus, the absence of a lawyer while in police custody had irremediably affected his defence rights and undermined the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. There had therefore been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c). 184. Next, the Chamber noted that the applicant had had no opportunity to cross-examine S. and his mother although their witness statements were the only evidence against him and had therefore been decisive. Moreover, no efforts had been made by the authorities to secure the appearance of S. or his mother in court, nor had they made a reasonable effort to compensate for this. It therefore found that the applicant’s right to question and challenge witnesses had been restricted to an extent incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d). 185. Lastly, the Chamber observed that the above-mentioned restrictions on the applicant’s defence rights had been due to the special legal regime applicable to his situation because he had not reached the statutory age of criminal responsibility. The Minors Act, applicable to the proceedings against the applicant, provided for significantly restricted procedural guarantees. In view of the above considerations, the proceedings against the applicant had not been fair and there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1. 2. The parties’ submissions (a) The applicant 186. The applicant fully agreed with the Chamber judgment. He maintained that he had been deprived of his right to a defence both at the time of his initial questioning at the police station and during the court proceedings to place him in the temporary detention centre. He had also been deprived of legal safeguards such as the right to question witnesses and be presumed innocent. (b) The Government 187. The Government submitted that the applicant had been questioned by a specially trained officer from the Juveniles Inspectorate at the police station in the presence of his grandfather. He had also been informed of his right not to make self-incriminating statements, which was confirmed by his signature on the first page of his confession statement. 188. Moreover, since the Government considered that the court hearing of 21 February 2005 ordering the applicant’s detention in the temporary detention centre should be examined for compliance with the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, instead of Article 6, they developed their arguments with reference to that provision. They emphasised, in particular, that the procedure under Article 5 § 4 did not necessarily have to be attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6 for criminal proceedings. 189. Thus, the Government pointed out that the hearing of 21 February 2005 had been held in compliance with section 31.2(2) of the Minors Act and attended by the applicant, his grandfather, a court-appointed lawyer, the officer from the Juveniles Inspectorate who had delivered the ruling of 12 January 2005 on the refusal to initiate criminal proceedings against the applicant, as well as a prosecutor. The applicant’s grandfather had denied that the applicant had committed any offences, referring to his visit to a doctor earlier on the relevant day, and the applicant had refused to give any explanation. The court-appointed lawyer had objected to the applicant’s placement in the temporary detention centre. While acknowledging that S. and his mother had not been heard during the hearing, the Government expressed doubts as to whether the applicant had even requested their attendance, since this did not appear from the judgment. Moreover, the court hearing record had been destroyed together with the case file in 2013. Furthermore, in his cassation complaint of 2 March 2005, the applicant’s grandfather did not claim to have made such a request to the court. The Government further noted that section 31.2 of the Minors Act neither required nor prohibited the examination of witnesses. 190. In view of the above, the Government considered that the applicant’s complaints concerning the fairness of the proceedings did not disclose any violation of the Convention. (c) Third-party interveners (i) The MDAC 191. The MDAC stressed that States had a positive obligation to apply stringent and effective safeguards in order to ensure that rights were “practical and effective” and that this was particularly important in relation to children with disabilities, who were very vulnerable. Article 13 of the CRPD addressed the specific issue of access to justice of persons with disabilities and stated that States Parties must ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities, including through the provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodation, in order to facilitate their effective role as direct or indirect participants in all legal proceedings. Reasonable accommodation meant that appropriate modification and adjustments, which did not impose a disproportionate or undue burden, should be taken in each particular case. Moreover, Article 40 of the CRC dealt with children in conflict with the law and listed the minimum guarantees for children, including the right to legal assistance (see paragraph 82 above). The MDAC reiterated that the best interests of the child had to be of primary importance. (ii ) League of Human Rights 192. The League of Human Rights (“the LIGA”) also referred to Article 40 of the CRC. It further referred to the Beijing Rules (see paragraph 86 above), the Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System (Annex to UN Resolution 1997/30, adopted on 21 July 1997) and the Havana Rules (see paragraph 87 above) which all provided for a right to legal counsel and assistance for children in conflict with the law. Moreover, the LIGA pointed out that Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)11 on the European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures (see paragraph 79 above) provided that juveniles should not have fewer legal rights and safeguards than those provided to adult offenders by the general rules of criminal procedure. The LIGA also stressed that the right to legal assistance, referred to in various international instruments, applied from the very outset of a procedure, including the police questioning stage, involving children and those under the age of criminal responsibility. Since children below the age of criminal responsibility were often subject to very paternalistic proceedings on the grounds that the proceedings were not penal but protective, the traditional procedural safeguards were often not applied. That approach was based on the theory of welfare juvenile justice systems which had emerged in the United States of America and Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and had been systematically criticised by a number of scholars for its overall paternalistic approach to children, typically suppressing their procedural rights and treating them as objects of care and discipline. 193. According to the LIGA, the particular vulnerability of children should instead require additional protection of their rights. In particular, legal assistance should be provided to all children on a mandatory basis. Lastly, it noted that Guideline 30 of the Council of Europe Guidelines on child friendly justice (see paragraph 80 above) stated that a child who had been taken into custody should not be questioned in respect of criminal behaviour, or asked to make or sign a statement concerning such involvement, except in the presence of a lawyer or one of the child’s parents or, if no parent was available, another person whom the child trusted. 3. The Court’s assessment (a) General principles 194. The Court reiterates that, as the requirements of paragraph 3 of Article 6 are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by paragraph 1, it often examines the complaints under both provisions taken together (see, among many other authorities, Lucà v. Italy, no. 33354/96, § 37, ECHR 2001 ‑ II; Krombach v. France, no. 29731/96, § 82, ECHR 2001 ‑ II; and Poitrimol v. France, 23 November 1993, § 29, Series A no. 277 ‑ A). Moreover, where the applicant complains of numerous procedural defects, the Court may examine the various grounds giving rise to the complaint in turn in order to determine whether the proceedings, considered as a whole, were fair (see Insanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 16133/08, §§ 159 et seq. 14 March 2013, and Mirilashvili v. Russia, no. 6293/04, §§ 164 et seq., 11 December 2008 ). 195. As regards juvenile defendants, the Court has held that the criminal proceedings must be so organised as to respect the principle of the best interests of the child. It is essential that a child charged with an offence is dealt with in a manner which takes full account of his age, level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities, and that steps are taken to promote his ability to understand and participate in the proceedings (see Adamkiewicz v. Poland, no. 54729/00, § 70, 2 March 2010; Panovits v. Cyprus, no. 4268/04, § 67, 11 December 2008; V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, § 86, ECHR 1999 ‑ IX; and T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724/94, § 84, 16 December 1999). The right of a juvenile defendant to effective participation in his criminal trial requires that the authorities deal with him with due regard to his vulnerability and capacities from the first stages of his involvement in a criminal investigation and, in particular, during any questioning by the police. The authorities must take steps to reduce, as far as possible, the child’s feelings of intimidation and inhibition and ensure that he has a broad understanding of the nature of the investigation, of what is at stake for him, including the significance of any penalty which may be imposed as well as of his rights of defence and, in particular, of his right to remain silent ( see Martin v. Estonia, no. 35985/09, § 92, 30 May 2013; Panovits, cited above, § 67; and S.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60958/00, § 29, ECHR 2004 ‑ IV ). 196. In view of his status as a minor, when a child enters the criminal-justice system his procedural rights must be guaranteed and his innocence or guilt established, in accordance with the requirements of due process and the principle of legality, with respect to the specific act which he has allegedly committed. On no account may a child be deprived of important procedural safeguards solely because the proceedings that may result in his deprivation of liberty are deemed under domestic law to be protective of his interests as a child and juvenile delinquent, rather than penal. Furthermore, particular care must be taken to ensure that the legal classification of a child as a juvenile delinquent does not lead to the focus being shifted to his status as such, while neglecting to examine the specific criminal act of which he has been accused and the need to adduce proof of his guilt in conditions of fairness. Processing a child offender through the criminal-justice system on the sole basis of his status of being a juvenile delinquent, which lacks legal definition, cannot be considered compatible with due process and the principle of legality (see, mutatis mutandis, Achour v. France [GC], no. 67335/01, §§ 45-47, ECHR 2006 ‑ IV, relating to the legal classification of recidivism). Discretionary treatment, on the basis of someone being a child, a juvenile, or a juvenile delinquent, is only acceptable where his interests and those of the State are not incompatible. Otherwise – and proportionately – substantive and procedural legal safeguards do apply. (i) Right to legal assistance 197. The Court notes that, although not absolute, the right under Article 6 § 3 (c) of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial (see Poitrimol, cited above, § 34). 198. As regards legal assistance at the pre-trial stages of the proceedings, the Court has emphasised the importance of the investigative stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings, as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in which the offence charged will be considered at trial. Therefore, the Court has held that the particular vulnerability of the accused at the initial stages of police questioning can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer, whose task is, among other things, to help to ensure respect of the right of an accused not to incriminate himself. Indeed, this right presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. It is further important to protect the accused against coercion on the part of the authorities and contribute to the prevention of miscarriage of justice and ensure equality of arms. Accordingly, in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently “practical and effective”, Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as soon as a suspect is questioned by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict that right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction – whatever its justification – must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced where incriminating statements made during police questioning without access to a lawyer are used to secure a conviction (see Panovits, cited above, §§ 64-66, and Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391/02, §§ 50-55, ECHR 2008). 199. In view of the particular vulnerability of children, and taking into account their level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities, the Court stresses in particular the fundamental importance of providing access to a lawyer where the person in custody is a minor (see Salduz, cited above, § 60; see also the case-law cited in paragraph 195 above). (ii) Right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses 200. The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 3 (d) enshrines the principle that, before an accused can be convicted, all evidence against him must usually be produced in his presence at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument. Exceptions to this principle are possible but must not infringe the rights of the defence, which, as a rule, require that the accused should be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either when that witness makes his statement or at a later stage of the proceedings (see Lucà, cited above, §§ 39-40). 201. Moreover, having regard to the Court’s case-law, firstly, there must be a good reason for the non-attendance of a witness at the trial and, secondly, when a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on depositions that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defence may be restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 (see Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, § 119, ECHR 2011, as refined in Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC], no. 9154/10, §§ 107 and 118, ECHR 2015 ). 202. Where a conviction is based solely or decisively on the evidence of absent witnesses, the Court must subject the proceedings to the most searching scrutiny. The question in each case is whether there are sufficient counterbalancing factors in place, including measures that permit a fair and proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence to take place. This would permit a conviction to be based on such evidence only if it is sufficiently reliable given its importance in the case (see Al-Khawaja and Tahery, cited above, § 147, and as further developed in Schatschaschwili, cited above, § 116). (b) Application to the present case 203. The Court notes from the outset that the applicant in the present case was only 12 years old when the police took him to the police station and questioned him. He was thus well below the age of criminal responsibility set by the Criminal Code (fourteen years) for the crime that he was accused of, namely, extortion. In view of this, he was in need of special treatment and protection by the authorities, and it is clear from a variety of international sources (see, for instance, Council of Europe Recommendations No. R (87) 20 and Rec(2003)20; Guidelines 1, 2, and 28 to 30 of the Council of Europe Guidelines on child friendly justice; Article 40 of the CRC, and General Comment No. 10, point 33; and Rule 7.1. of the Beijing Rules, all cited above in paragraphs 77, 78, 80, 82, 84 and 86 respectively) that any measures against him should have been based on his best interests and that, from the time of his apprehension by the police, he should have been guaranteed at least the same legal rights and safeguards as those provided to adults. Moreover, the fact that the applicant suffered from ADHD, a mental and neurobehavioural disorder (see paragraph 12 above), made him particularly vulnerable and thus he required special protection (see Guideline 27 of the Council of Europe Guidelines on child friendly justice, and Article 23 of the CRC, and General Comment No. 9, points 73-74, all cited above in paragraphs 80 and 82-83 respectively). 204. Against this background, the Court will look at the applicant’s specific complaints under Article 6, that is, whether he was provided with legal assistance and had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, in order to determine whether the proceedings to place him in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders were fair. (i) Right to legal assistance 205. The Court observes that it is undisputed that the applicant was taken to the police station without being told why. He also had to wait a certain amount of time before being questioned by a police officer. However, there is no indication that the applicant was in any form or manner informed that he had the right to call his grandfather, a teacher, a lawyer or another person of confidence during this period for them to come and assist him during the questioning. Nor were any steps taken to ensure that legal assistance was provided to him during the questioning. The Government’s submission that the applicant’s grandfather was present during the questioning remains unsupported by evidence. Moreover, the Court notes that the confession statement signed by the applicant – the probative value of which must be considered to be extremely questionable given his young age and health condition – did not mention the grandfather’s presence and was not countersigned by him. The written statement signed by his grandfather on the same day could, as claimed by the applicant, have been signed later, after the applicant had been questioned by the police officer, and thus does not prove his presence during the questioning. In this connection, the Court notes that it was marked on the applicant’s confession statement that he had been informed of his right not to make self-incriminating statements. However, that document did not mention that the applicant had been informed of his right to have legal counsel or someone else present during the questioning or that any such person had indeed been present. 206. Therefore the Court considers it established that the police did not assist the applicant in obtaining legal representation. Nor was the applicant informed of his right to have a lawyer and his grandfather or a teacher present. This passive approach adopted by the police was clearly not sufficient to fulfil their positive obligation to furnish the applicant, a child, suffering, moreover, from ADHD, with the necessary information enabling him to obtain legal representation (see Panovits, cited above, § 72). 207. The fact that the domestic law does not provide for legal assistance to a minor under the age of criminal responsibility when interviewed by the police is not a valid reason for failing to comply with that obligation. The Court has previously found that a systematic restriction on the right of access to legal assistance, on the basis of statutory provisions, is sufficient in itself to constitute a violation of Article 6 (see Salduz, cited above, § 56). Moreover, it is contrary to the basic principles set out in international sources according to which a minor should be guaranteed legal, or other appropriate, assistance (see, for example, Article 40 § 2 (b) (ii) of the CRC, and the comments thereto; Rule 7.1 of the Beijing Rules; and Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (87) 20, point 8, all cited in paragraphs 82, 83-84, 86 and 77 above). 208. Furthermore, the Court considers that the applicant must have felt intimidated and exposed while being held alone at the police station and questioned in an unfamiliar environment. In fact, he retracted the confession immediately when his grandfather came to the police station, and protested his innocence. In this regard, the Court emphasises that the confession statement, made in the absence of a lawyer, was not only used against the applicant in the proceedings to place him in the temporary detention centre but actually formed the basis, in combination with the witness statements of S. and his mother, for the domestic courts’ finding that his actions contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion, thus providing the ground for his placement in the centre. 209. In view of the above, the Court finds that the absence of legal assistance during the applicant’s questioning by the police irretrievably affected his defence rights and undermined the fairness of the proceedings as a whole (see Panovits, cited above, §§ 75-76, and Salduz, cited above, §§ 58 and 62). 210. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention. (ii) Right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses 211. Turning to the applicant’s complaint that he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine S. or his mother during the District Court hearing to decide on his placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, the Court firstly notes that it was a single judge at the Sovetskiy District Court of Novosibirsk, in accordance with sections 22(3)(2) of the Minors Act, who ordered the applicant’s placement, after holding a hearing. At the hearing, the applicant, his grandfather and court-appointed counsel were present, as were a prosecutor and the officer from the Juveniles Inspectorate who had ruled on 12 January 2005 not to initiate criminal proceedings against the applicant. From the judgment, it appears that the applicant and his grandfather had the opportunity to address the court and submit documents. Thus, the Court notes that, on the face of it, it would appear that the proceedings afforded certain procedural safeguards for the applicant. 212. However, the District Court was provided with the results of the pre-investigation inquiry, among other material concerning the applicant. This included the statements made by the alleged victim S. and his mother, as well as the confession statement signed by the applicant. The Court reiterates that the applicant had retracted the confession and had claimed that it had been obtained under duress. Moreover, as found above, the applicant did not benefit from the assistance of a lawyer during the questioning at the police station, which irremediably affected his defence rights. Furthermore, the grandfather also claimed that the applicant had been at a doctor’s surgery earlier on the relevant day. However, the Court observes that neither S. nor his mother was called to the hearing to give evidence and provide the applicant with an opportunity to cross-examine them, despite the fact that their testimonies were of decisive importance to the pre-investigation inquiry’s conclusion that the applicant had committed a delinquent act, namely, extortion. 213. In this connection, it is also relevant to note that there is no indication, nor has it been claimed by the Government, that S. and his mother were not available or that it would otherwise have been difficult to summon them to the hearing as witnesses. There was, consequently, no good reason for the witnesses’ non-attendance. Moreover, in view of the fact that the applicant had retracted his confession, the Court considers that it was important for the fairness of the proceedings that S. and his mother be heard. In the Court’s view, this safeguard is even more important when the matter concerns a minor under the age of criminal responsibility in proceedings determining such a fundamental right as his right to liberty. 214. Furthermore, although court-appointed counsel was present at the hearing to represent the applicant, it is unclear when she was appointed and to what extent she actually defended the applicant’s rights. If it is correct, as indicated by the Government, that no request to hear S. or his mother was made to the District Court by the applicant, then this would indicate a lack of diligence on the part of counsel and, in the Court’s view, also on the part of the judge, who should have ensured that the principle of equality of arms was respected during the proceedings. In fact, no efforts were made by the authorities to secure the appearance of S. and his mother in court, even though the Minors Act does provide for the possibility of hearing witnesses, as acknowledged by the Government. Having regard to the fact that what was at stake for the applicant in the placement proceedings was his deprivation of liberty for thirty days – not a negligible length of time for a 12-year-old boy – the Court considers that it was of utmost importance that the District Court guarantee the fairness of the proceedings. 215. Lastly, the Court notes that there were no counterbalancing factors to compensate for the applicant’s inability to cross-examine S. and his mother at any stage of the proceedings. As noted by the Chamber in paragraph 173 of its judgment, the applicant was not provided with an opportunity to scrutinise the witnesses’ questioning by the investigator, nor was he then or later provided with the opportunity to have his own questions put to them. Furthermore, as the witnesses’ statements to the investigator were not recorded on video, neither the applicant nor the judges were able to observe the witnesses’ demeanour under questioning and thus form their own impression of their reliability (see, for similar reasoning, Makeyev v. Russia, no. 13769/04, § 42, 5 February 2009). 216. Having regard to all of the above, the Court finds that the applicant’s defence rights, in particular the right to challenge and question witnesses, were restricted to an extent incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, and there has accordingly been a violation of these provisions. (iii) Conclusion 217. The Court has found that the applicant’s defence rights were restricted to an extent incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 of the Convention because of the absence of legal assistance during police questioning and the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose evidence against him had been decisive for the domestic court’s decision to place him in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days. 218. However, the Court considers it important to add, as did the Chamber (see paragraph 176 of its judgment), that the above restrictions were due to the fact that the applicant was under the age of criminal responsibility and therefore fell outside the protection offered by the procedural guarantees provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 59-63 above). Instead, the Minors Act was applicable to the applicant. This Act provided for significantly restricted procedural safeguards (see paragraph 68 above) since it was intended as protective legislation for minors. According to the Court, and as also noted by the LIGA in its submission (see paragraph 192 above), this is where, as illustrated by the present case, the legislature’s intention to protect children and ensure their care and treatment comes into conflict with reality and the principles set out in paragraph 196 above, since the child is deprived of his liberty without having the procedural rights to defend himself properly against the imposition of such a harsh measure. 219. In the Court’s view, minors, whose cognitive and emotional development in any event requires special consideration, and in particular young children under the age of criminal responsibility, deserve support and assistance to protect their rights when coercive measures, albeit in the guise of educational measures, are applied in their regard. As is clear from the relevant international materials before the Court (see paragraphs 77-89 above), this has been established in many international documents. It has also been emphasised by the third-party interveners. Thus, the Court is convinced that adequate procedural safeguards must be in place to protect the best interests and well-being of the child, certainly when his or her liberty is at stake. To find otherwise would be to put children at a clear disadvantage compared with adults in the same situation. In this connection, children with disabilities may require additional safeguards to ensure that they are sufficiently protected. The Court would point out that this does not mean, however, that children should be exposed to a fully fledged criminal trial; their rights should be secured in an adapted and age-appropriate setting in line with international standards, in particular the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 220. Having regard to all of the above-mentioned considerations, the Court concludes that the applicant was not afforded a fair trial in the proceedings leading to his placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders in violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) and (d) of the Convention. VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 221. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 1. The parties’ submissions 222. The applicant claimed 7,500 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, as awarded to him by the Chamber in its judgment, although he submitted that it would not fully cover all costs for the recovery of his physical and mental health. 223. The Government contested that sum and considered that if the Court were to find a violation of the Convention, the Court’s judgment in this respect should in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant. 2. The Chamber judgment 224. The Chamber, making an assessment on an equitable basis, awarded the applicant EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount. 3. The Court’s assessment 225. The Court observes that it has found the same combination of violations as the Chamber in the present case. Moreover, the applicant has requested the same sum as granted to him by the Chamber in its judgment. The Court finds this to be an equitable amount and thus awards the applicant EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount. B. Costs and expenses 1. The parties’ submissions 226. The applicant also claimed a total of 24,979 roubles (RUB) (approximately EUR 417) for legal fees (RUB 20,000), translation costs (RUB 4,620) and postal expenses (RUB 359) incurred before the Grand Chamber, in addition to the sum granted by the Chamber in its judgment. 227. The Government contested both the sum awarded by the Chamber and the applicant’s additional claims before the Grand Chamber. They considered that the available payment receipts submitted to the Court could not be viewed as valid documentary evidence since they bore stamps of a Bar association but were signed by the representative himself. Moreover, no legal-assistance contract between the applicant, or his grandfather, and the representative had been submitted to the Court. The random payment receipts from a translation centre were also insufficient to confirm translation expenses. The Government further pointed out that the representative was not mentioned in any of the domestic courts’ decisions and that his involvement in the proceedings before the Court had been limited, most of the work having been done by the applicant’s grandfather. 2. The Chamber judgment 228. The Chamber awarded the applicant EUR 1,493 for legal fees and translation expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount. 3. The Court’s assessment 229. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the Court finds no reason to question the sum granted by the Chamber to the applicant for his costs and expenses. It further finds that the invoices and payment receipts submitted by the applicant to the Court prove that he has paid his representative RUB 20,000 for his legal services in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber. It also accepts in full the invoices and payment receipts relating to costs for translations and postal services. 230. In the light of the above, the Court grants the applicant the full amount claimed, that is, EUR 1,493, for the proceedings before the Chamber and EUR 417 for the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, namely, a total amount of EUR 1,910, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount. C. Default interest 231. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Grand Chamber held that there had been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention. It agreed with the Chamber judgment in the case that the proceedings concerning the boy’s placement in the temporary detention centre were to be considered criminal proceedings for the purpose of Article 6, although they had not been classified as criminal under Russian law. In particular, the domestic courts had referred to the fact that the boy had committed a delinquent act as the main reason for his placement in the detention centre. His defence rights had been violated because he had been questioned by the police without legal assistance and the statements of two witnesses whom he was unable to question had served as a basis for his placement in temporary detention.