Military presence and political support
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 157. The following provisions of domestic law of the Republic of Turkey ( including the “TRNC” ) are relevant for the purposes of the present application. A. Extradition 158. Article 9 § 1 of the former Turkish Criminal Code (Law no.765) provided that: “A request for the extradition to foreign states of a Turkish national on account of a criminal offence cannot be accepted.” 159. On 1 June 2005 a new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) entered into force. Article 18 § 2 provided as follows: “A citizen cannot be extradited on account of a criminal offence except under the obligations arising out of [Turkey] being a party to the International Criminal Court. ” 160. The Law on International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Law no. 6706), which entered into force on 5 May 2016, replaced Article 18 of Law no. 5237. Article 11 § 1 ( a ), concerning the extradition of Turkish nationals, provides as follows: “1. In the circumstances listed below an extradition request shall be rejected: (a) If the person whose extradition is requested is a Turkish citizen, except for the obligations arising out of [Turkey] being a party to the International Criminal Court; ... ” 161. Section 5 of the “TRNC” Law on Extradition of Criminals, Mutual Enforcement of Court Decisions and Judicial Cooperation ( Law 43/ 19 88), in so far as relevant, provides that extradition will be refused when, inter alia, the person whose extradition is sought is a national of the country to which the request is addressed (section 5(1)( C )) [ or ] if the crime that is the subject of the extradition request was committed, wholly or partially, in the requested state or in a place/location under its jurisdiction (section 5(1)( F )). Section 19 of the above -mentioned law provides for the reciprocity principle and states that this law applies in respect of countries which have executed agreements with the “ TRNC ” regarding matters that fall within the scope of this Law, on the basis of reciprocity. B. Criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the “TRNC” 162. Section 31(1) of the “TRNC” Courts of Justice Law (Law no. 9/1976) provides that without prejudice to the constitutional provisions, the appropriate Assize Court has jurisdiction to try, inter alia, offences punishable under the criminal law or any other law which has been committed (a) in the “TRNC” ( section 31(1)( a ); or (b) outside the “TRNC” but on the island of Cyprus ( section 31(1)( b ). 163. Pursuant to section 31(2 )( b ) offences committed outside the island of Cyprus are treated as if they had been committed within the jurisdiction of the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court ( Kıbrıs adası dışında işlenen suçlar Lefkoşa Kaza Mahkemesi yetki alanı içinde işlenmiş sayılır ). III. RELEVANT COUNCIL OF EUROPE INSTRUMENTS A. Extradition 164. The European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 was ratified by Turkey on 7 January 1960 and entered into force in respect of Turkey on 18 April 1960. The four Additional Protocols to the Convention were ratified on 11 July 2016 (the Additional, Third and Fourth Protocols ) and 10 July 1992 (the Second Protocol ) and entered into force in respect of Turkey on 9 October 2016 (the Additional Protocol ), 8 October 1992 (the Second Protocol ) and 1 November 2016 (the Third and Fourth Protocols ). The Turkish Government have made, inter alia, a declaration in respect of the Additional Protocol and the Third and Fourth Additional Protocols concerning the Republic of Cyprus. In this they declared that their ratification of the above Protocols did not amount “to any form of recognition of the Greek Cypriot Administration ’ s pretention to represent the defunct ‘ Republic of Cyprus ’ as party” to these instruments, “nor should it imply any obligations on the part of Turkey to enter into any dealing with the so-called Republic of Cyprus within the framework” of these instruments. 165. This Convention was ratified by and entered into force in respect of Cyprus on 22 April 1971. The three Additional Protocols to the Convention were also ratified on 22 May 1979, 13 April 1984 and 7 February 2014 and entered into force in respect of Cyprus on 20 August 1979, 12 July 1984 and 1 June 2014 respectively. 166. The relevant provisions of this Convention read as follows: Article 6 – Extradition of nationals “ 1. (a) A Contracting Party shall have the right to refuse extradition of its nationals. ... (2) If the requested Party does not extradite its national, it shall at the request of the requesting Party submit the case to its competent authorities in order that proceedings may be taken if they are considered appropriate. For this purpose, the files, information and exhibits relating to the offence shall be transmitted without charge by the means provided for in Article 12, paragraph 1. The requesting Party shall be informed of the result of its request. ” Article 18 – Surrender of the person to be extradited “1.The requested Party shall inform the requesting Party by the means mentioned in Article 12, paragraph 1, of its decision with regard to the extradition. 2. Reasons shall be given for any complete or partial rejection. ...”. Article 27 – Territorial application “1. This Convention shall apply to the metropolitan territories of the Contracting Parties. ” B. Cooperation in criminal matters 1. The European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 167. The European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959 was ratified by Cyprus on 24 February 2000 and entered into force on 24 May 2000. Cyprus ratified the two Additional Protocols on 24 February 2000 and 12 February 2015 respectively; they came into force in respect of Cyprus on 24 May 2000 and 1 June 2015. 168. Turkey ratified the Convention on 24 June 1969. It entered into force in respect of Turkey on 22 September 1969. Turkey ratified the two Additional Protocols on 29 March 1990 and 11 July 2016 respectively; they came into force in respect of Turkey on 27 June 1990 and 1 November 2016. The Turkish Government have made the same declaration as the one they made under the European Convention on Extradition in respect of the second Additional Protocol concerning the Republic of Cyprus (see paragraph 164 above). 169. Article 1 establishes an obligation on Contracting Parties to: “ ... promptly afford each other, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, the widest measure of mutual assistance in proceedings in respect of offences the punishment of which, at the time of the request for assistance, falls within the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities of the requesting Party”. 170. Article 2 provides that assistance may be refused in the following circumstances: “(a) if the request concerns an offence which the requested Party considers a political offence, an offence connected with a political offence, or a fiscal offence; [or] (b) if the requested Party considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of its country. 171. Article 3 provides that: “1. The requested Party shall execute in the manner provided for by its law any letters rogatory relating to a criminal matter and addressed to it by the judicial authorities of the requesting Party for the purpose of procuring evidence or transmitting articles to be produced in evidence, records or documents. 2. If the requesting Party desires witnesses or experts to give evidence on oath, it shall expressly so request, and the requested Party shall comply with the request if the law of its country does not prohibit it.” 2. The European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters 172. The European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters of 15 May 1972 was ratified by Cyprus on 19 December 2001 and entered into force in respect of Cyprus on 20 March 2002. Turkey ratified the Convention on 22 October 1978 and it entered into force in respect of Turkey on 28 January 1979. The Turkish Government have made a declaration that they do not consider themselves bound to carry out the provisions of the Convention “in relation to the Greek Cypriot Administration, which is not constitutionally entitled to represent alone the Republic of Cyprus”. 173. The relevant provisions of this Convention provide as follows: Article 3 “ Any Contracting State having competence under its own law to prosecute an offence may, for the purposes of applying this Convention, waive or desist from proceedings against a suspected person who is being or will be prosecuted for the same offence by another Contracting State. Having regard to Article 21, paragraph 2, any such decision to waive or to desist from proceedings shall be provisional pending a final decision in the other Contracting State. Article 6 “1. When a person is suspected of having committed an offence under the law of a Contracting State, that State may request another Contracting State to take proceedings in the cases and under the conditions provided for in this Convention. 2. If under the provisions of this Convention a Contracting State may request another Contracting State to take proceedings, the competent authorities of the first State shall take that possibility into consideration.” PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT 174. By a letter sent on 16 August 2007 the applicants ’ representatives submitted to the Court a letter with the applicants ’ details, an outline of the case and stating their Convention complaints against Cyprus and Turkey. They requested that this letter be considered as constituting a formal introduction of the applicants ’ complaints before the Court and asked the Registry to provide them with an application form. 175. The Court responded, by a letter of 24 August 2007, enclosing an application package. It pointed out: “You must send the duly completed application form and any necessary supplementary documents to the Court as soon as possible and at the latest within six months of the date of the present letter. No extension of this period is possible. If the application form and all the relevant documents are not sent within the above period, the file opened will be destroyed without further warning.” 176. The completed application form was received by the Court on 13 December 2007 and the application was registered. THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN ALONE AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 13 177. The applicants complained that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention by both the Cypriot and Turkish (including the “TRNC”) authorities on account of their failure to conduct an effective investigation into the deaths of their relatives, Elmas, Zerrin and Eylül Güzelyurtlu. They pointed to the failure of the respondent States to cooperate in the investigation of the murders and bring the suspects to justice. The applicants contended that where there had been a systemic failure to investigate certain killings after the perpetrators had escaped by crossing a dividing line; the substantive requirement of Article 2 had also been violated, as the domestic laws in place had not protected the right to life. 178. Article 2, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “1. Everyone ’ s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.” 179. The applicants further complained under Article 13 of the Convention of the lack of an effective domestic remedy in respect of the above. They claimed that the prevailing political problems rendered any existing judicial domestic mechanisms ineffective and prevented any fruitful investigation from taking place. 180. Article 13 reads as follows: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” 181. At the outset, the Court finds that no issue arises in the case under the substantive limb of Article 2 § 1 and that the entirety of the applicants ’ complaints relate in substance to an alleged failure by the authorities of the respondent States to discharge their procedural obligations under that provision. A. Admissibility 182. The Turkish Government submitted that in so far as the application was directed against Turkey the applicants had failed to lodge their application within the six-month time-limit, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, and that they had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to them. The Cyprus Government submitted that to the extent that the application was directed against Cyprus it was manifestly ill-founded. 183. The Court will examine these pleas below. It first notes, however, that, while the Turkish Government made no plea as to the Court ’ s competence ratione loci to examine the complaints against them, the deaths of the applicants ’ relatives took place in the territory controlled by and under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus and it must examine this question of its own motion ( see Aliyeva and Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 35587/08, § 56, 31 July 2014, and mutatis mutandis Blečić v. Croatia [GC], no. 59532/00, §§ 67-69, ECHR 2006 ‑ III). 1. In so far as the application is directed against Turkey ( a ) Compatibility ratione loci of the application 184. Article 1 of the Convention provides that: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Convention.” 185. “Jurisdiction” under Article 1 is a threshold criterion. The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (see Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, § 103, ECHR 2012 (extracts), and Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, § 130, ECHR 2011 ). As the Court has emphasised, from the standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial ( ibid., § 104 and § 131, respectively) and has only extended jurisdiction beyond territoriality in exceptional situations (see Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, §§ 74-80, ECHR 2014 ). 186. The Court recalls that generally the procedural obligation under Article 2 falls on the respondent State under whose jurisdiction the victim was at the time of death (see Emin and Others v. Cyprus (dec.), nos. 59623/08, 3706/09, 16206/09, 25180/09, 32744/09, 36499/09 and 57250/09, 3 June 2010, and Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04, §§ 243-244, ECHR 2010 (extracts)). Nonetheless, as the Court explained in Rantsev, special elements in a case will justify departure from the general approach (ibid.). Where there are cross-border elements to an incident of unlawful violence leading to loss of life, the fundamental importance of Article 2 requires that the authorities of the State to which the suspected perpetrators have fled and in which evidence of the offence could be located, of their own motion, take effective measures in that regard (see O ’ Loughlin and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 23274/04, 25 August 2005, and Cummins and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 27306/05, 13 December 2005). Otherwise, those indulging in cross-border attacks will be able to operate with impunity and the authorities of the Contracting State where the unlawful attacks have taken place will be foiled in their own efforts to protect the fundamental rights of their citizens and, indeed, of any individuals within their jurisdiction. 187. In the present case, the Court observes that the suspected perpetrators of the murder of the applicants ’ relatives are or were within Turkey ’ s jurisdiction, either in the “TRNC” ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, § 77, ECHR 2001 ‑ IV ) or in mainland Turkey. The Turkish and “TRNC” authorities were informed of the crime and Red Notices concerning the suspects were published. These elements engage Turkey ’ s procedural obligation under Article 2 and thus justify departure from the general approach. 188. The Court notes that the “TRNC” authorities instituted their own criminal investigation in the case and that their courts have criminal jurisdiction over individuals who have committed crimes on the whole island of Cyprus ( compare Gray v. Germany, no. 49278/09, 2 2 May 2014, as well as Aliyeva, cited above, § 57 ). 189. In conclusion, the Court finds that the applicants ’ complaints against Turkey are compatible ratione loci with the provisions of the Convention. The extent and scope of the procedural obligation incumbent on Turkey in the circumstances of the case remains to be determined in the Court ’ s assessment of the merits of those complaints. 190. The Court will now turn to the Turkish Government ’ s inadmissibility pleas. (b) Exhaustion of domestic remedies ( i ) Submissions to the Court ( α ) The Turkish Government ’ s submissions 191. The Turkish Government submitted that the “TRNC” law provided civil, administrative and criminal remedies which, however, the applicants had not exhausted before filing their application with the Court. 192. Firstly, the applicants could have brought a civil action against the suspects before the relevant “TRNC” district court under the “TRNC” Civil Wrongs Law. As alleged by the applicants, the suspects in this case had been identified and there was enough evidence linking them to the murder of the applicants ’ relatives. The “TRNC” courts, pursuant to the Courts of Justice Law, had jurisdiction to hear civil cases where the defendant resided or worked in the “TRNC” and where the cause of action arose, in whole or in part, outside the territory of the “TRNC” but on the island of Cyprus (sections 24(1 )( b) and (c) of the “TRNC” Courts of Justice Law). Such an action could be brought by the husband, wife, parent or child of a deceased person who had been entitled at the time of his or her death to recover compensation from the person responsible (section 58(1) of the “TRNC” Civil Wrongs Law). The applicants had not had to wait for the initiation or conclusion of any criminal action before bringing such a civil action. 193. Secondly, the Turkish Government submitted that the applicants could have applied to the “TRNC” Supreme Court, sitting as the Court of Appeal ( Yargıtay ), for an order of mandamus to compel the “TRNC” authorities to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot police in order to secure the prosecution of the suspects in the “TRNC”. Under Article 151 § 3 of the “TRNC” Constitution, the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to issue such an order. Moreover, the “TRNC” Supreme Court, sitting as the High Administrative Court, also had jurisdiction to order that whatever actions the administrative authority in question had failed to perform must be undertaken. 194. Thirdly, the applicants had had the right to bring a private criminal action against the suspects. On the basis of Article 158(4)(a) of the “TRNC” Constitution the Attorney-General had the power, in the public interest, to take over proceedings in respect of an offence, provided that the necessary evidence collected by the authorities of the other side was brought before the “TRNC” courts by the applicants in a private criminal action. The Government maintained that the applicants had been in a better position to access the evidence required – in respect of both civil and criminal proceedings – than the “TRNC” authorities. For example, the Greek Cypriot police had provided them with a copy of their report dated 17 February 2006. 195. Lastly, the applicants could have complained about a violation of Article 2 of the Convention before those “TRNC” district courts that applied the Convention. ( β ) The applicants ’ submissions 196. Relying on the judgment in Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC] (no. 48939/99, § 93, ECHR 2004 ‑ XII), the applicants submitted that the failure to prosecute those responsible for endangering life had violated Article 2, irrespective of any other types of remedy which individuals might exercise on their own initiative. Therefore, the Government ’ s submissions concerning civil law remedies were misconceived. Furthermore, bringing their own criminal action had not been a practical option. The case of Öneryıldız constituted authority against such a course of action. Nor had it been open to the applicants to apply for a mandamus as, inter alia, “TRNC” law prohibited the extradition of “TRNC” nationals and therefore such a remedy would not have been effective or sufficient to provide redress. Lastly, they pointed out that all the evidence concerning the case had been provided to the “TRNC” authorities through the Court upon communication of the case in 2008. (ii ) The Court ’ s assessment 197. At the outset, the Court notes that, pursuant to Cyprus v. Turkey, ( cited above, §§ 82 ‑ 102 ) and numerous subsequent judgments (see, for instance, Kyriacou Tsiakkourmas and Others v. Turkey, no. 13320/02, §§ 157-158, 2 June 2015; Kallis and Androulla Panayi v. Turkey, no. 45388/99, § 32, 27 October 2009; Andreou v. Turkey (dec.), no. 45653/99, 3 June 2008; and Adalı v. Turkey, no. 38187/97, § 186, 31 March 2005 ), remedies available in the “TRNC” can be regarded as “domestic remedies” of the respondent State for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and that the question of their effectiveness is to be considered in the specific circumstances in which that question arises. That conclusion is not to be seen as in any way casting doubt on the view of the international community regarding the establishment of the “TRNC” or the fact that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus remained the sole legitimate government of Cyprus. In this connection, the Court had stressed in its Demopoulos and Others decision that “allowing the respondent State to correct wrongs imputable to it does not amount to an indirect legitimisation of a regime unlawful under international law” (see Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04 and 21819/04, ECHR 2010 ). Thus, “TRNC” remedies may be taken into account in this context. 198. That said, as regards the Turkish Government ’ s argument that the applicants could have brought a civil action for damages against the suspects in the “TRNC” courts, the Court has repeatedly held that civil proceedings which are undertaken on the initiative of the next of kin, not the authorities, and which do not involve the identification or punishment of any alleged perpetrator, cannot be taken into account in the assessment of the State ’ s compliance with its procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention (see, for example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, §§ 121 and 156, ECHR 2001 ‑ III). Otherwise, a Contracting State ’ s obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to conduct an investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible in cases of fatal assault might be rendered illusory if, in respect of complaints under that Article, an applicant would be required to exhaust an action leading only to an award of damages (see among many authorities, Jelić v. Croatia, no. 57856/11, § 64, 12 June 2014, and Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, §§ 119-121, 24 February 2005). 199. Nor could the applicants be required, taking into account the obligation incumbent on the State authorities to act on their own motion in cases of deaths that occurred in suspicious circumstances ( see Rantsev, cited above, § 232 and Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 111, ECHR 2005 ‑ VII), to bring private criminal proceedings against the suspects, or to apply for an order of mandamus. The Court notes that the “TRNC” authorities opened a criminal investigation ex officio in the case. In the Court ’ s view, this investigation afforded the State an opportunity to put matters right since it could have resulted in the identification and the punishment of those responsible. The applicants were thus not required in addition to embark on any other remedies on the matter (see Haász and Szabó v. Hungary, nos. 11327/14 and 11613/14, § § 30-34, 13 October 2015). 200. Lastly, as regards the argument by the Turkish Government that the applicants should have invoked Article 2 before the “TRNC” courts, the Court notes that this reference is vague and unsubstantiated. 201. In view of the above, the Turkish Government ’ s plea of non-exhaustion must be dismissed. ( c ) Six-month time-limit ( i ) Submissions to the Court ( α ) The Turkish Government ’ s submissions 202. The Turkish Government considered that the application had been introduced outside of the six-month time-limit set by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. 203. At the outset, the Turkish Government contested the date on which the application had been lodged with the Court. In their view the application had not been introduced on 16 August 2007 but on 7 January 2008, that is to say the date of the Court ’ s stamp on the application form. 204. Alternatively, should the Court consider that the six-month period began to run on 16 August 2007, the delay between date of the initial letter of intent and that of the submission of the application form (7 January 2008) had been such that the beginning of the initial correspondence had ceased to constitute the introduction of the application form. The Turkish Government relied on the decisions in Nee v. Ireland ( (dec.), no. 52787/99, 30 January 2003 ) and J.-P.P v. France ( no. 2212 3/93, Commission decision of 31 August 1994, Decisions and Reports (DR). 79-B, p. 72). They argued that that there were a number of possible starting dates for the six-month period in the present case; all of them, however, had fallen more than six months before the date of the lodging of the above application. 205. In the first place, the applicants had stated in their application form to the Court that it had become clear to them by the second week of February 2005 that the investigation had reached a stalemate. They should have therefore lodged their application by August 2005. Secondly, as could be seen from the letter dated 19 December 2005 sent by their representatives to the UNFICYP spokesman, the applicants must have received legal advice about their right to file an application before the Court before that date. Despite this they had still waited almost three years to lodge their application. Thirdly, in a letter dated 30 November 2006 to the Prime Minister of Turkey, the applicants ’ lawyer had stated that they had exhausted the possibilities for reaching the desired compromise through negotiation and mediation (see paragraph 122 above). In view of the above, and relying on Court ’ s decision in O ’ Loughlin (cited above), the Turkish Government argued that the applicants had realised long before they lodged their application that there would be no further investigation in respect of the case and had already been advised that they had grounds to bring an application to Strasbourg. Any attempts by the applicants to prolong the investigation by appealing to UNFICYP were irrelevant as the latter was not a domestic remedy to be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 § 1. The applicants ’ representative had been informed of this in a letter dated 23 February 2006 sent to them by the SPA (see paragraph 149 above). ( β ) The applicants ’ submissions 206. The applicants stressed that in the letter of intent that they sent to the Court on 16 August 2007 they had set out their Convention complaints. 207. As for the six-month time-limit, this had not yet started to run in their case as their complaints concerned a continuing situation. Firstly, the criminal investigations were still continuing on both sides. The situation in their case could not be compared to that in O ’ Loughlin (cited above), where the delay in filing the application had been striking, there had not been an on-going murder investigation, and the United Kingdom Government had not been keen to prosecute. The Government of Turkey had admitted in their observations that the case file of the “TRNC” Attorney-General was still open and awaiting the submission of evidence by the Cypriot Government (see paragraphs 101 above and 241 below ). Furthermore, the applicants ’ letters to the President of the “TRNC” and the Prime Minister of Turkey had remained unanswered ( see paragraphs 121 and 122 above ). Secondly, the applicants were in fear of their lives as a result of the failure of the respondent Governments to cooperate and punish the perpetrators of the murders. There had been an attempt to murder the first applicant on 16 July 2007 and his bodyguard had been murdered in May 2009. 208. Lastly, the applicants argued that it had been reasonable to try to get the two sides to cooperate before lodging an application with the Court. ( ii ) The Court ’ s assessment ( α ) Date of introduction of the application 209. According to the Court ’ s case-law, as applicable at the relevant time, the date of introduction of an application was as a rule considered to be the date of the first communication from the applicant indicating an intention to lodge an application and giving some indication of the nature of the application (see Oliari and Others v. Italy, nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, § 89, 21 July 2015 with further references). This was on the condition that a duly completed application form was then submitted within the time ‑ limit fixed by the Court (see, for instance, Kemevuako v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.65938/09, §§ 19-20, 1 June 2010). Such a first communication, which at the time could take the form of a letter sent by fax, would in principle interrupt the running of the six-month period (see Oliari and Others, cited above, § 89). 210. In the instant case, the first communication indicating the intention to lodge a case with the Court (together with the object of the application ) was sent by the applicants ’ representatives on 16 August 2007 (see paragraph 174 above). A completed application followed, in accordance with the instructions given by the Registry (see paragraphs 175 and 176 above ). The date of introduction in respect of the application was thus 16 August 2007. 211. It remains to be determined whether the application complies with the six-month rule. ( β ) Compliance with the six-month time-limit 212. As a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where it is clear from the outset, however, that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of knowledge of that act or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant ( see Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865/09, 45886/07 and 32431/08, § 259, ECHR 2014 (extracts), with further references). 213. In cases of a continuing situation, the period starts to run afresh each day and it is in general only when that situation ends that the six ‑ month period actually starts to run (ibid., § 261). However, where time is of the essence in resolving the issues in a case, there is a burden on the applicant to ensure that his or her claims are raised before the Court with the necessary expedition to ensure that they may be properly, and fairly, resolved ( ibid., § 262 ). This is particularly true with respect to complaints relating to any obligation under the Convention to investigate certain events. As the passage of time leads to the deterioration of evidence, time has an effect not only on the fulfilment of the State ’ s obligation to investigate but also on the meaningfulness and effectiveness of the Court ’ s own examination of the case. An applicant has to become active once it is clear that no effective investigation will be provided, in other words once it becomes apparent that the respondent State will not fulfil its obligation under the Convention ( ibid., § 261). 214. The Court has held in cases concerning the obligation to investigate under Article 2 of the Convention that where a death has occurred, applicants ’ relatives are expected to take steps to keep track of the investigation ’ s progress, or lack thereof, and to lodge their applications with due expedition once they are, or should have become, aware of the lack of any appropriate redress, including effective criminal investigation (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, § 158, ECHR 2009, with further reference therein). In particular, as regards cases of unlawful or violent death, the Court has indicated that an applicant should bring such a case to the Court within a matter of months, or at most, depending on the circumstances, a few years after the events in question ( ibid., § 162). Where there is an investigation of sorts, even if plagued by problems, the Court accepts that applicants may reasonably wait for developments which could potentially resolve crucial factual or legal issues (ibid., §166). It is in the interests of not only the applicant but also the efficacy of the Convention system that the domestic authorities, who are best placed to do so, act to put right any alleged breaches of the Convention. 215. Applying those principles to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that following the death of their relatives on 15 January 2005 two parallel investigations were taken up by the Cypriot Government and the “TRNC” authorities. In the initial year and a half or so the investigations were intensive and there was a strong involvement on the part of UNFICYP to find a solution. The applicants were in contact with all the authorities concerned and UNFICYP in their efforts to help the investigations progress. Although it appears that the applicants started to lose hope because of the lack of cooperation by the two sides, the Court considers that it was reasonable for the applicants to wait for the ongoing investigations and the mediation via UNFICYP to yield results. Nor can it be said that the applicants waited unduly before introducing their complaints before the Court on 16 August 2007, two years and seven months after the death of their relatives. At the time that they lodged their application with the Court the Cypriot Government ’ s investigation was still continuing. As for the investigation in the “TRNC” no date has been given as to when the file of the case was classified as “non-resolved for the time being ”. This must, however, have been after 22 March 2007, for – as can been seen from the “TRNC” Police Chief Inspector ’ s report – investigative steps were taken on that date (see paragraph 99 above). There is no indication that the applicants were informed at the time of this development in the investigation. In any event, the application was still filed within six months of the above date. 216. In the light of the above, the Court finds that there was no lack of due diligence on the part of the applicants in lodging their application and that the Turkish Government ’ s plea concerning the timeliness of the applicants ’ complaints must also be dismissed. 2. The well-foundedness of the application 217. The Court considers that the applicants ’ complaint under Article 2 of the Convention raises serious questions of fact and law in respect of both respondent States which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination on the merits. It cannot, therefore, be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, and no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established. It must therefore be declared admissible, along with the related complaint under Article 13. B. Merits 1. Submissions of the parties (a) The applicants (i) With regard to the scope of the procedural obligation of the Respondent States 218. The applicants submitted that the crux of the problem was the persistent refusal of the respondent States to cooperate. This stemmed primarily from the fact that the Turkish Government did not recognise the Cypriot Government, and the latter in turn did not recognise the “TRNC”. All the authorities concerned had obstinately clung to their respective positions : the Cypriot Government had not been prepared to provide the “TRNC” with any evidence and had insisted on the surrendering of the suspects for trial in their courts; the “TRNC” had not been prepared to cooperate unless all evidence was provided and the suspects were prosecuted and tried in its own courts. As a result of this failure, despite cogent and compelling evidence, the perpetrators had not been punished. 219. The applicants submitted that there was a duty on States to cooperate with investigations held outside their jurisdiction or areas under their control. This arose from the primary obligation States had under Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention. When jurisdictions overlapped or were concurrent, Member States were under an obligation to cooperate in order to secure the right to life of persons within their jurisdictions. A finding that there was no such obligation would result in a “vacuum” of protection within the “legal space of the Convention” of the right to life (relying, mutatis mutandis, on Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, § 78). 220. Referring to the principles established under Article 2 (relying, inter alia, on Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria ( no. 55523/00, § § 91-98, 26 July 2007 ) the applicants argued that the obligation to cooperate entailed (i) the duty to take steps to accommodate overlapping jurisdictions, and (ii) to have in place effective law- enforcement machinery that deterred the commission of life-endangering offences, dealt with extradition and/ or the ad hoc rendition of fugitive offenders and made provision for mutual assistance in their apprehension and punishment. Relying on O ’ Loughlin (cited above) the applicants submitted that the normal way to secure evidence and take measures in relation to suspected fugitive offenders was through early cooperation between the police and prosecutors of the States in question. This required establishing lines of communication and an exchange of information and evidence. 221. By way of example the applicants referred to the Guidance for Handling Criminal Cases with Concurrent Jurisdiction Between the United Kingdom and the United States of America (published in January 2007). This prescribed a three-stage approach: first, the early sharing of information between investigators and prosecutors, second, consultation between prosecutors, and third, in the event of failure to reach an agreement, the taking up of the issues by the State ’ s respective law officers with the aim of resolving them. The applicants also cited the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, to which both respondent States were parties, pursuant to which Member States had undertaken to provide each other with the widest measure of mutual assistance in criminal matters. 222. There was also an equivalent negative obligation on States not to have laws and practices that rendered extradition, rendition or mutual assistance impossible. 223. Here the respondent States ’ failure to cooperate had led to a gap in the protection of a fundamental human right. The respondent States were more concerned with their political agendas than with their obligations under Article 2. If there had been political will, a solution could have been found – for example, as in the Lockerbie case, the trial could have been held at a neutral venue ( The High Court of Justiciary (Proceedings in the Netherlands) (United Nations) Order 1998; (S.I. 1998 No. 2251) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1192 of 27 August 1998 on the Lockerbie case). 224. The applicants also maintained that the respondent States had failed to comply with their obligations both under the European Convention on Extradition and under the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. (ii ) With regard to the responsibility of the Cypriot Government 225. Relying on Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 331-335, ECHR 2004 ‑ VII), the applicants argued that although the Cypriot Government were prevented from exercising effective control over the “TRNC” they still had a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to secure for the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention. The existence of an unlawful breakaway administration did not absolve a state from its obligations under Articles 1 and 2. The Cypriot Government ’ s unwillingness to cooperate with any of the “TRNC” law enforcement agencies, directly or even indirectly through UNFICYP, and provide them with any evidence concerning the case, had been in violation of their procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation within the area in which they had effective control (relying on Ilaşcu, cited above, §§ 331-335). They had further failed in their free- standing obligation to disclose to the applicants all witness statements taken by the authorities during the investigation (referring to Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, 4 May 2001). 226. In the applicants ’ view, disclosing evidence to the “TRNC” police in order to enable the prosecution of the perpetrators did not in law amount to recognition of or support for the “TRNC” (relying on Ilaşcu, cited above, §§ 345-346). Nor did international law prohibit cooperation in police matters with unrecognised police entities. Indeed, police forces frequently had to cooperate with people they preferred not to have dealings with. The reasoning of the Court in its judgment in Cyprus v. Turkey (cited above, § 98) concerning the “TRNC” courts could be equally applied to the “TRNC” police. The applicants requested the Court to rule that providing evidence to enable the arrest of fugitive murderers did not imply recognition of the “TRNC” or that any such implication should be treated de minimis. 227. The applicants blamed the attitude of the Cypriot Government. It was evident that initially the “TRNC” authorities had not been averse to handing over the suspects for trial but their attitude had hardened following the Cypriot Government ’ s refusal to deal with them. Handing over the evidence would have secured at least the continued detention of the suspects. As the Cypriot Government had refused to provide the evidence, the “TRNC” authorities had not been able to take the requisite steps to hand over the suspects. 228. The argument of the Cypriot Government that they were not under an obligation to take measures vis-à-vis a separatist administration by surrendering part of their sovereignty in respect of crimes committed on their territory was not compatible with the principles established by the Court in Ilaşcu. The importance the Cypriot Government had attached to the safeguarding of its sovereignty had been disproportionate, bearing in mind the enormity of the crime and the non-derogatory nature of the right to life. Furthermore, they were a Contracting State to the 1972 European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters and had agreed in principle to request other countries to prosecute persons suspected of having committed offences within the Cypriot Government ’ s jurisdiction. 229. Moreover, the applicants submitted that it was their counsel who had repeatedly raised the absence of evidence in writing of an extradition request at a meeting with the Attorney-General at his office in August 2008. The extradition requests had been made following this meeting. They pointed out that the Cypriot Government had not explained the delay in requesting the suspects ’ extradition following the issuance of the international arrest warrants. The manner in which the requests had been made was also questionable. (iii) With regard to the responsibility of the Turkish Government 230. Turkey had concurrent extra-territorial jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention as it exercised effective control of the “TRNC” and therefore had responsibility for the stance taken by the “TRNC” in the case ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, § 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ VI ). This entailed a heavy obligation under Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention not to impede any murder investigation by another State in order to ensure that a safe haven was not created for murder suspects who had fled. There was also a positive obligation to cooperate fully in any such murder investigation ( relying on Ilaşcu, cited above, § 317). By refusing to engage at all with the Cypriot Government and to deal with the extradition requests, Turkey had been in breach of her procedural obligation under Article 2. 231. The applicants considered that the “TRNC” authorities had been wrong to claim the right to conduct a rival primary investigation knowing that they had no access to the locus delicti; it had been bound to be ineffective and doomed to fail in limine. The investigation conducted in the “TRNC” had not been genuine and had apparently been aimed at obtaining confessions. Furthermore, although there had been no indication that the evidence would be handed over, the “TRNC” authorities ’ insistence on holding a trial had only aggravated the situation. 232. Even though the “TRNC” authorities had received the evidence in the case through the Court following communication of the case in October 2009, they had not taken any action. Furthermore, following the murder of the first applicant ’ s bodyguard, two of the suspects had been in the hands of the “TRNC”. They should have been questioned about their involvement in the murder and asked to account for the presence of their DNA at the scene of the crime. The first suspect had given a statement on oath to the effect that he had been involved in the killings. Despite the Kyrenia Assize Court ’ s request that the evidence be referred to the “TRNC” Attorney-General no steps had been taken by the authorities. There had also been ballistic evidence establishing that the gun used in the murder of the first applicant ’ s bodyguard had been the same as the one that had been used in the attempt to kill the first applicant. Consequently, the applicants submitted that the “TRNC” authorities had evidence enabling them to start a prosecution for the murder of their relatives. The authorities ’ claim that they had not been able to do so due to the failure of the Cypriot Government to provide evidence had simply been an excuse and had been politically motivated. 233. It could not be ignored that the “TRNC” was an illegal entity and not recognised in international law. Its domestic laws on extradition and jurisdiction in respect of crimes committed outside its jurisdiction rendered it a safe haven for fugitive murderers. There was thus a clear lack of a legislative and administrative framework deterring the commission of murders in the areas controlled by the Cypriot Government. Furthermore, both the European Convention on Extradition and the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, to which Turkey was a party, applied to northern Cyprus, which came under Turkey ’ s effective control and lay within the Council of Europe ’ s espace juridique and thus its “metropolitan areas”. Turkey had not denounced these Conventions or made a reservation in respect of the “TRNC”. 234. Furthermore the Turkish Government could not argue that a trial in the Republic of Cyprus would be unfair due to the composition of the bench. (b) The Cypriot Government 235. The Cypriot Government submitted that they had taken all measures that had been within their power to secure the applicants ’ rights under Article 2. 236. The authorities had carried out an extensive investigation, which had included, inter alia, complete post - mortem, forensic and DNA examinations, the examination of a large number of exhibits found and collected from the scene of the crime and the victims ’ house, the tracing and questioning of numerous witnesses and obtaining statements from them, and the inspection of computer hard discs. The investigation had resulted in the identification of eight suspects. The authorities had been in contact with UNFICYP ’ s representatives for the purpose of negotiating with the “TRNC” authorities for the handing over of the suspects to the Republic. Information and evidential material had been transmitted to the “TRNC” authorities through UNFICYP for this purpose, domestic and international arrest warrants had been issued, and extradition requests had been made to the Turkish Government. 237. As the crime had been committed on the territory under its control, the Cypriot Government submitted that they had jurisdiction to try the suspects, both under domestic and international law. Under international law, the principal ground for the exercise of original jurisdiction was that of territoriality. The Court had acknowledged this in its judgment in the case of Rantsev (cited above, § 206). Furthermore, they also had jurisdiction under international law on the basis of both the active and the passive nationality principle: the victims had been and the suspects were members of the Republic ’ s Turkish Cypriot community and nationals of the Republic; the victims had had their ordinary residence in territory controlled by the Republic. Consequently, no question arose of overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction to try the crime between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey and/or the separatist local administration in the Republic ’ s occupied territory. 238. The procedural obligation incumbent on the Cypriot Government under Article 2 did not include an obligation to cede part of its sovereignty and part of its legal right as a State to prosecute and try crimes committed on its territory to the authorities of a separatist local administration. Such an obligation was not compatible with the principles established in the Ilaşcu case (cited above, §§ 339-340). In that case the cooperation measures taken by the Moldovan authorities had been of a limited character and thus were not regarded as constituting support for the Transdniestrian regime. The present case was not comparable. It was not a matter of simple police cooperation. Abandonment of the principle would have undermined its efforts to re-establish control over northern Cyprus and the administration of criminal justice with regard to crimes committed on its territory not under military occupation by Turkey. A duty to cooperate could not impose an unreasonable, impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities of the States concerned. 239. To the extent that the applicants relied on the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, they pointed out that assistance might be refused if the requested party considered that execution of the request was likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security, public order or other essential interests of its country. Thus they could rightly decline to hand over evidential material. Similarly, the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters was not relevant, as the Republic had never waived its right to prosecute and try the suspects. 240. As Turkey had effective control over northern Cyprus, there was a two-fold obligation on Turkey firstly to surrender the suspects, and secondly to communicate all relevant information concerning the suspects and the commission of the crime in order to assist the Republic ’ s efforts in bringing the suspects to justice. The “TRNC” authorities and Turkey, however, had failed to take any action to surrender the suspects. In particular the “TRNC” authorities had rejected a proposal by the Attorney-General of the Republic for all the evidence to be handed over to UNFICYP for it to determine whether it disclosed a prima facie case against the suspects, subject to an undertaking to surrender them if UNFICYP were to conclude that such evidence existed. Furthermore, the Turkish Government had failed to consider the extradition requests and to inform the Republic of a decision with reasons for their rejection as required by the European Convention on Extradition. Nor had they communicated any information or taken any steps to assist in any way the criminal investigation carried out by the Republic ’ s authorities. In fact the Cypriot Government had not been informed of any official investigation in northern Cyprus concerning the killings. The applicants had acknowledged this in their application to the Court. The Turkish Government had also failed to disclose to both the Court and the applicants developments in the case, and in particular, new evidence that had come to light following the statement that the first suspect gave during the murder trial of the first applicant ’ s bodyguard (see paragraphs 104-106 above ). (c ) The Turkish Government 241. The Turkish Government submitted that the “TRNC” authorities had conducted an in-depth investigation of the case. They had carried out a thorough examination of the evidence, and several statements had been collected from the suspects, possible suspects and various witnesses, over a considerably short space of time. The “TRNC” authorities had been willing to prosecute the suspects. They believed that the Greek Cypriot authorities would be handing over evidence enabling them to proceed with a trial. Their own investigation had not produced sufficient evidence to institute criminal proceedings. All eight suspects had been arrested and held in detention. Their detention had been extended by the appropriate “TRNC” courts a number of times. However, in the absence of adequate evidence, the authorities had not been able to apply under the relevant domestic law for the suspects ’ further detention on remand. As a result, the case file remained open, with the “TRNC” Attorney-General waiting for the evidence to be submitted by the Greek Cypriot authorities. When a copy of the investigation file had been received through the Court, the “TRNC” police authorities had questioned again the first and second suspects, who had not admitted their involvement in the incident. The cooperation of the Cypriot Government was still needed in order to ensure that witnesses, including the persons who had prepared the various reports in the investigation file, appeared before the “TRNC” courts to give evidence in court. 242. The “TRNC” authorities had worked closely with all concerned. They had held numerous meetings with UNFICYP in their efforts to ensure cooperation and the exchange of information on the murders. Seven meetings had been held between 24 January 2005 and 5 April 2005 which had dealt exclusively or in part with the case. They had made it clear that they did not have sufficient evidence to keep the suspects in custody and had warned UNFICYP that they would have to release them if such evidence was not secured. The Cyprus authorities had flatly rejected any cooperation between the two sides on the basis that this would have amounted to the recognition of the “TRNC”. 243. In so far as Turkey was concerned, the Turkish authorities had been informed of the search of the suspects by Greek Cypriot Interpol and had conducted inquiries into their identities. The fifth suspect – a Turkish national – had been arrested when he had entered Turkey following notification by Greek Cypriot Interpol. He had been questioned but as the authorities had not had any evidence to link him to the crime and in the absence of any extradition requests they had released him. The fifth suspect could have been prosecuted in Turkey if the file with the evidence had been provided. The Mersin public prosecutor had also requested the “TRNC” authorities for the investigation file concerning the first four suspects in order to evaluate the case with a view to prosecuting the fifth and seventh suspects. It had, however, been impossible to obtain the file from the Greek Cypriot authorities. 244. The Turkish Government pointed out that cooperation with the “TRNC” did not amount to its recognition. For instance, the “TRNC” authorities had cooperated with the United Kingdom authorities in criminal matters to ensure that criminals could be tried. The Turkish Government referred to a case as an example – that of Attorney - General v. Ozgay Yorgun ( “TRNC” Nicosia Assize Court, case no. 5719/99; TRNC” Supreme Court, appeal no. 67/99) – in which the United Kingdom authorities had provided witnesses and evidence for the prosecution of the suspects. 245. The Turkish Government maintained that to the extent that the applicants argued that the Court should impose an additional obligation on Turkey under Article 2 to comply with the European Convention on Extradition they had misunderstood the Court ’ s case-law. The applicants were in essence inviting the Court to create new obligations which were not already provided for in the Convention but were allegedly provided for under other international instruments. However, the main issue before the Court was the application of the Convention and not that of other bilateral or international instruments. 246. Even if the Court had decided to broaden its interpretation of Article 2 to include obligations under the European Convention on Extradition and European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the territorial applications of these Conventions only covered the metropolitan territories of Turkey, which did not include the “TRNC” (Article 27 § 1 of the European Convention on Extradition). Turkey had not entered and could not enter into a direct agreement with two or more Contracting Parties to extend its territories to the “TRNC” (Articles 25 (1) and 27(4)). Neither the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties or any other Convention gave a different interpretation of “metropolitan territories”. The ordinary meaning was clear and there was no need to look into secondary meanings. Extradition was based on treaty law and did not constitute an obligation on States in customary law. 247. The Turkish Government emphasised that there were two separate legal regimes: the “TRNC” and Turkey. Extradition, mutual enforcement of judgments and judicial cooperation in the “TRNC” was regulated by Law No. 43/88. Under that law the “TRNC” could not extradite its own nationals and was obliged to reject a request for the extradition of its nationals from any foreign country, including Turkey. Furthermore, the “TRNC” was obliged to refuse extradition when the crime that was the subject matter of the extradition request had been committed fully or partly within its territory or where the “TRNC” courts had jurisdiction. Under the Courts of Justice Law the “TRNC” Assize Courts had jurisdiction to try the suspects as the crime had been committed on the island of Cyprus (section 31 (1)(b)). To the extent that the applicants relied on what had been said by the Deputy Prime Minister of the “TRNC” in the meeting of 26 January 2005 with UNFICYP officials (see paragraph 141 above) concerning the possible surrender of the suspects, the Turkish Government clarified that what was meant was that the “TRNC” Attorney-General would review the evidence without excluding the possibility that the “TRNC” courts would apply other relevant domestic laws, as well as any other obligations regarding the non-extradition of citizens and human rights considerations, in order to effect this exchange. The Turkish Government stressed that the refusal of the Cypriot Government to submit the evidence gathered in the case had been based on purely policy, and not legal, grounds. The “TRNC” ‘ s decision to refuse to extradite, however, had been made on legal grounds. 248. In so far as Turkey was concerned, pursuant to Article 6 of the European Convention on Extradition, Turkey had the right not to extradite its own nationals. Extradition was a procedure which depended on the conditions laid down both in domestic law and the above -mentioned Convention. Each country had its own legal provisions concerning extradition. 249. In any event, the Turkish Government submitted that the extradition of the suspects could not have taken place for a number of reasons. Firstly, the necessary evidence had not been provided to the “TRNC” or Turkish authorities. Secondly, the extradition of the suspects for trial would have resulted in a violation of Articles 3, 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention due to the lack of proper judicial guarantees. In particular only Greek - Cypriot judges tried cases, which was contrary to the requirements of independence and impartiality under Article 6 of the Convention. Furthermore, as illustrated by Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, nos. 25316-25321/94 and 27207/95, ECHR 2001 ‑ V, Turkish Cypriot accused persons had sometimes been harassed by the Greek Cypriot authorities. 250. As regards the criminal proceedings against the first and second suspects for the murder of the first applicant ’ s bodyguard the Turkish Government stated that nothing had come to light in those proceedings that could have a decisive influence on their Convention obligations in the present application. The first suspect ’ s statement regarding his co-defendant, the second suspect, had been of doubtful evidential value. It had been confusing and unclear. Furthermore, he had retracted the statement in the course of the trial. He had not made any statements to the police, and indeed the Attorney - General ’ s office when reviewing the file had concluded that even if the first suspect had not retracted his statement, there had still not been enough evidence to bring charges against those suspects who had not admitted their involvement in the crime. 251. To the extent that the applicants complained under Article 13, there had been no breach of this provision as it had not been possible to bring the perpetrators to justice because of the refusal of the Cypriot Government to hand over the evidence in the case. (d) Third - party submissions by the AIRE Centre 252. The AIRE Centre noted that historically, agreements between Member States of the Council of Europe requiring cross-border cooperation in fighting crime had been intended to advance inter-governmental objectives, rather than focusing on the victim. This had been the case with the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and the 1990 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crimes. 253. This had, however, changed recently with the 2005 Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the 2007 Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. These Conventions had shifted the emphasis in inter-governmental cooperation in criminal matters to fulfilling States ’ obligations towards the victims of human rights violations. Both Conventions were victim-centred and mandated cross-border cooperation “to the widest extent possible”. This shift in emphasis also reflected a growing consensus amongst the Member States of the Council of Europe that inter-governmental cooperation in criminal matters had to be approached from an ECHR perspective, that is to say it had to address the rights and needs of those who were victims. 254. At the level of the European Union, various provisions had been adopted to ensure cross-border cooperation between Member States. There had been an evolution from an inter-governmental model of cooperation towards an approach where cooperation contributed to the fulfilment of human rights obligations. The Council of the European Union had adopted various measures designed to ensure cross-border cooperation: the European Arrest Warrant, created by Framework Decision 2002/584/ JHA, and the European Evidence Warrant, created by Framework Decision 2008 / 978 / 1JHA. Both instruments were designed to operate in such a manner as to comply with the requirements of the ECHR (recitals 13 and 27 respectively). Furthermore, they both provided for an exception to the rule of double criminality for certain offences specifically listed in the Framework Decisions. These included the offences of murder, rape, arson, and sexual exploitation of children, which involved acts contrary to Articles 2, 3, 4 and 8 of the Convention. Such acts created obligations for the State on whose territory the crime had been committed, but also for the State within whose jurisdiction evidence or persons crucial to an effective investigation could be found. The AIRE Centre submitted that the positive obligations arising under the above -mentioned instruments mandated some level of confidence on the part of Contracting Parties either between each other or with other States so as to make essential cooperation in investigating acts contrary to those Articles possible. This was necessary to ensure that the rights guaranteed under the Convention were not theoretical and illusory but practical and effective ( İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 91, ECHR 2000- VII). European Union law demonstrated a developing European consensus that inter-governmental cooperation in criminal matters had to be approached from a human rights perspective. 255. The AIRE Centre highlighted the numerous international law instruments providing for cross-border cooperation in criminal matters inside or outside of Europe. These included the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), to which both Cyprus and Turkey were parties; the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1992) and Additional Protocol (1993); the Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad (1975) and Additional Protocol (1984); the ASEAN Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (2004); the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1992); and the Mutual Assistance Pact between Member States of the Economic Community of Central African States (2002). 256. In conclusion, the AIRE Centre underlined the prevalence in European and international law of agreements relating to mutual assistance in criminal investigations. In Europe in particular there appeared to be a trend requiring cross-border cooperation when the offences raised issues under Articles 2, 3 and/or 4 of the Convention. This trend placed obligations on States to investigate such offences which had taken place outside their jurisdiction, if persons or evidence of importance to the investigation were within their territory. 2. The Court ’ s assessment (a) General principles 257. The Court reiterates that the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State ’ s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “ secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force. The investigation must be, inter alia, thorough, impartial and careful (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, § 169, 14 April 2015 ). 258. By requiring a State to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction, Article 2 imposes a duty on that State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. This obligation requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when there is reason to believe that an individual has sustained life-threatening injuries in suspicious circumstances, even where the presumed perpetrator of the fatal attack is not a State agent (ibid. , § 171). 259. In order to be “effective” as this expression is to be understood in the context of Article 2 of the Convention, an investigation must firstly be adequate. That is, it must be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts and, where appropriate, the identification and punishment of those responsible ( ibid. , § 172). The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings, including the cause of death. This obligation may include taking steps to secure relevant evidence located in other jurisdictions (see Rantsev, cited above §§ 241 and 245) or where the perpetrators are outside its jurisdiction, to seek their extradition (see Agache and Others v. Romania, no. 2712/02, § 83, 20 October 2009; see also, in relation to Article 3, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, no. 44883/09, §§ 270-272, 23 February 2016). 260. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its capability of establishing the circumstances of the case or the person responsible will risk falling short of this standard (see Nachova, cited above, § 113 ). 261. The procedural obligation also requires that persons responsible for the investigations should be independent of anyone implicated or likely to be implicated in the events ( Mustafa Tunç, cited above, § 177); it imposes a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition (ibid. , § 178); and in addition, it means that the investigation must be accessible to the victim ’ s family to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests (ibid. , § 179). (b) Application of the general principles to the present case 262. As the applicants ’ relatives ’ deaths took place in the territory controlled by the Republic of Cyprus and under that State ’ s jurisdiction, a procedural obligation arises in respect of Cyprus to investigate the death of the applicants ’ relatives. Furthermore, the Court has already ruled that Turkey ’ s procedural obligation is also engaged in the circumstances of the case (see paragraphs 187 and 189 above). 263. As observed above two parallel investigations were conducted into the killing of the applicants ’ relatives by the authorities of the Cypriot Government and the Turkish Government, including those of the “TRNC” (see paragraph 215 above). The applicants ’ complaint under Article 2 is twofold: firstly, they have a number of grievances concerning the respective investigations; secondly, they complain about the failure of respondent Governments to cooperate, resulting in an impasse in both their investigations and as a result in the investigation of the case as a whole. (i) The respective investigations 264. The Court will first address the applicants ’ criticisms of the respective investigations carried out by the authorities of the respondent States. It notes at the outset that the applicants have not called into question the independence of the investigations and that on the basis of the material before it no such issue arises. ( α ) Cyprus 265. It is undisputed that the investigation into the killing of the applicants ’ relatives started promptly and that numerous urgent and indispensable investigative steps were taken immediately upon the discovery of the victims ’ bodies. The police arrived quickly and sealed off the scene. A detailed on-the- spot investigation was conducted by the police and a forensic pathologist. An investigation was held on the same day at the victims ’ house, which was also secured and sealed off. Video recordings were made and photographs were taken during both on ‑ site inspections. Complete post-mortem examinations, during which photographs were taken and a video recording and a diary of action were made, were conducted the next day to determine the cause of the victims ’ death (see paragraphs 13 - 20 above). 266. In the framework of the investigation the Cypriot authorities, inter alia, collected and secured evidence, took statements from numerous witnesses, including the victims ’ relatives, carried out a ballistic examination and DNA tests, searched the records of vehicles that had gone through the crossing points, and examined the security system of the victims ’ house and computer hard discs (see paragraphs 21, 26, 28, 30 and 44 above). The investigative steps quickly led to the identification of eight suspects, the issuance of domestic and European arrest warrants and the publication of Red Notices following requests by the Cypriot police to Interpol (see paragraphs 27, 31, 35, 37 - 40 above ). The suspects were all added to the Cypriot Government ’ s “ stop list ” (see paragraphs 32 and 42 above ). It appears from the documents in the case file that the investigation was extended to the British bases and areas not controlled by the Cypriot Government (see paragraph 47 above). 267. On 24 April 2008 the case file was classified as “ otherwise disposed of” pending the arrests of the remaining suspects (see paragraphs 48 and 49 above ). 268. Following this, on 19 May 200 8, the case was transferred to the coroner and inquest proceedings were opened (see paragraph 50 above ). Despite contradictory submissions as to what happened at the first hearing, it is not contested that the applicants were informed of the inquest which the first applicant attended and that they were informed of the outcome (see paragraphs 50 and 120 above ). 269. The authorities arrested the eighth suspect when he crossed over to the Government controlled areas on 12 July 200 6 but had to release him for lack of evidence linking him to the crime. According to the police report, some of the allegations that had been made by him during questioning required further investigation in the “TRNC ” (see paragraph 45 above ). 270. The last step taken by the Cypriot authorities was on 4 November 2008, when extradition requests were made to Turkey concerning the six persons that remained suspects in the case (see paragraphs 55 - 57 above). No further steps have been taken since then pending the suspects ’ arrest. 271. The applicants ’ grievances against the Cypriot authorities in so far as their investigation is taken in isolation are twofold : they concern the extradition requests and the applicants ’ access to the investigation documents. 272. First, the applicants questioned whether the extradition requests had been made properly and complained about the delay on the part of the Cypriot authorities in making them. The Court notes that there is no indication that the requests were not made correctly or through the right channels. It is true that they were made more than three and half years after the issuance of the Red Notices. However, in the context of this particular case, this did not constitute any significant obstacle. It was clear very early on, following the publication of the Red Notices, that neither the Turkish nor the “TRNC” authorities were intending to surrender the suspects (see paragraphs 41, 127, 130 and 150 above). The extradition requests were simply returned to the Cypriot authorities without reply. Although both respondent States are Member States to the European Convention on Extradition there was no extradition treaty between them ( contrast Nasr and Ghali, cited above, § 271, 23 February 2016). Nor can the Cypriot Government be held liable for Turkey ’ s refusal to extradite (see Nježić and Štimac v. Croatia, no. 29823/13, § 65, 9 April 2015, and Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 4704/04, § 68, 15 February 2011). 273. Second, the applicants complained that the Cypriot authorities had not provided them with the evidence they had collected in the case, including all witness statements taken during the investigation. The Court reiterates that Article 2 does not require applicants to have access to police files, or copies of all documents during an ongoing inquiry, or for them to be consulted or informed about every step ( see, for example, Gürtekin and Others v. Cyprus, (dec.) nos. 60441/13 et al., § 29, 11 March 2014, and Charalambous and Others v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 46744/07 et al. , § 64, both with further references). It emphasises in this respect that disclosure or publication of police reports and investigative materials may involve sensitive issues with possible prejudicial effects on private individuals or other investigations and, therefore, cannot be regarded as an automatic requirement under Article 2 (see Gürtekin, § 29, cited above, and Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, § 347, ECHR 2007 ‑ II). Similarly, the investigating authorities cannot be required to indulge every wish of a surviving relative as regards investigative measures ( ibid., § 348, and Velcea and Mazăre v. Romania, no. 64301/01, § 113, 1 December 2009). However, the Court must examine whether the applicants were afforded access to the investigation to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests (see Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, § 311, ECHR 2011 (extracts) ). 274. As can be seen from the material in the case file, the applicants were involved in the investigation from the very beginning. Meetings were held with the Cypriot police and the Attorney-General and the applicants received information from them (see paragraphs 44, 107 - 108, 111 - 112 and 114 - 116 above). They were informed of the progress in the investigation and of the inquest proceedings, which the first applicant attended (see paragraphs 50 and 120 ). They also received a police report about the case upon their request (see paragraph 117 above). The Court is thus not persuaded in the present case that the applicants were excluded from the investigative process to such a degree as would infringe the minimum standard under Article 2. 275. In reality the applicants ’ grievance stems from the refusal of the Cypriot authorities to transmit the case file to the “TRNC” authorities and their wish to remedy the situation. It is therefore intertwined with their complaint concerning lack of cooperation and will be examined in that context. ( β ) Turkey 276. The “TRNC” authorities reacted quickly following news of the murders and opened an investigation immediately on 17 January 2005, when the victims ’ bodies were taken to the “TRNC”. A statement was taken from the first applicant (see paragraph 64 above ). By the end of January 2005 all the suspects had been arrested on the basis of arrest warrants issued by the relevant “TRNC” district courts ( see paragraphs 65 - 87 above). The houses of the seven suspects who lived in the “TRNC” were searched on the basis of search warrants (see paragraphs 72 and 82 above). Statements were taken from the suspects, who were remanded in custody until their release on or around 11 February 2005 due to lack of evidence connecting them to the murders (see paragraph 92 above). The “TRNC” authorities also questioned another person whom they had identified as another possible suspect ( see paragraph 95 above). During the investigation statements were taken from the suspects and the applicants, as well as other persons who knew or were somehow connected to the suspects. Evidence was also collected (see paragraph 97 above). 277. Following his release from detention in the “TRNC”, the fifth suspect was arrested and questioned in Turkey on 15 February 2005. He was subsequently released, as the Turkish authorities did not have enough evidence to link him to the crime (see paragraph 94 above ). 278. Following the suspects ’ release, very few steps were taken by the “TRNC” authorities. Sometime after 22 March 2007 the file was classified as “non- resolved for the time being ” (see paragraphs 99 - 100 above). After that, nothing happened until February 2010, when the first and second suspects were questioned again by the “TRNC” police; the authorities subsequently received a copy of the Cypriot investigation file through the Court. This, however, did not lead to anything (see paragraph 102 above). Furthermore, following a statement made by the first suspect during his and the second suspect ’ s trial for the murder of the first applicant ’ s bodyguard, the “TRNC” Attorney-General reviewed the investigation file but there was still not enough other evidence to justify prosecution ( see paragraphs 104 - 105 above). 279. The applicants complained that the “TRNC” authorities had refused to investigate or prosecute the suspects. They also complained of a failure on the part of the “TRNC” authorities to take any steps, firstly when they had eventually obtained a copy of the file through the Court and secondly in respect of new evidence that had come to light during the trial of the first and second suspects in the above -mentioned proceedings (see paragraph 278 above). 280. It is evident from the material provided that the “TRNC” authorities carried out a substantial amount of work; thus, the Court finds little substance in the applicants ’ claim that they refused to investigate. They arrested and detained all suspects; even though the first four suspects were originally arrested in respect of charges related to theft and forgery, those charges were amended to premeditated murder (see paragraphs 65, 67, 68, 71, 74 and 75 above). The investigation did not result in any prosecutions because of a lack of evidence. Whilst it must be frustrating for the applicants that suspects were identified, arrested, questioned and then released, Article 2 cannot be interpreted as imposing a requirement on the authorities to launch a prosecution irrespective of the evidence which is available ( Nježić and Štimac, § 69, and Gürtekin, § 27, both cited above ). As the Court has held on numerous occasions, the procedural obligation under Article 2 is not an obligation of result, but of means (see Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 5878/08, § 233, ECHR 2016). In this connection the Court notes that the suspects all denied involvement in the crime and the investigation carried out did not result in evidence linking them to the crime. Furthermore, although certain steps were taken by the “TRNC” authorities following the communication of the case and the trial of the first and second suspects, these did not lead to solid new evidence on which to base a prosecution. The “TRNC” and Turkish authorities had limited evidence at hand, as the crime was committed in the territory controlled by the Cypriot Government. In order to prosecute the suspects, the “TRNC” and Turkish authorities needed reliable evidence that would be admissible in a court. (γ) Conclusion 281. It is clear from the above that the authorities of the respondent States took a significant number of investigative steps promptly. The Court perceives no shortcomings that might call into question the overall adequacy of the respective investigations in themselves. The Court considers, however, that there is no need to make a finding under Article 2 on this matter, in view of the following. ( ii ) The procedural obligation and the lack of cooperation between the respondent States 282. The Court observes that both investigations reached a stalemate and the respective files were held in abeyance, pending further developments. Following the return of the extradition requests by Turkey on 24 November 2008 the Cypriot investigation came to a complete halt; the Cypriot Government still await the re-arrest and surrender of the suspects so they can try them. Similarly, the “TRNC” classified the file as “non-resolved for the time being” some time in 2007. Since then nothing concrete has been done. Although the first and second suspects were questioned again in 2010 this did not lead to anything. The Turkish Government are still waiting for all the evidence in the case to be handed over so they can try the suspects. Consequently, although the investigations remain open nothing has happened for more than eight years. All efforts through UNFICYP have proved fruitless due to the persistence of the respondent States in maintaining their respective positions. 283. There have been a few cases in which the Court has considered the extent of the procedural obligation in a cross-border or transnational/ transjurisdictional context. 284. In O ’ Loughlin (cited above) the applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention that the United Kingdom authorities had failed to assist in the investigations and the inquests carried out in Ireland into the deaths resulting from the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 17 May 1974. The suspects were in Northern Ireland. The Court stated that it did not have to decide whether, or to what extent, Article 2 could impose an obligation on one Contracting State to cooperate with inquiries or hearings conducted within the jurisdiction of another Contracting State concerning the use of unlawful force resulting in death, as the relevant complaint had been filed outside the six-month time-limit. Shortly afterwards, in Cummins (cited above), which concerned bombings in Dublin in December 1972 and January 1973, the Court declared similar complaints against the United Kingdom to be manifestly ill-founded, as a failure to cooperate with the investigations into the deaths and injuries had not been established. Since these decisions, in its judgment in Rantsev, the Court found that the corollary of the obligation on an investigating State to secure evidence located in other jurisdictions was a duty on the State where evidence was located to render any assistance within its competence and means sought under a legal assistance request by the State in which the death occurred ( Rantsev, cited above, § 245). It therefore found that the procedural obligation under Article 2 required the Cypriot authorities to seek assistance from Russia and that Russia had a corresponding obligation to assist the Cypriot authorities due to the fact that certain evidence had been located on its territory. The Court has therefore acknowledged that the procedural obligation under Article 2 mandates cooperation between states in securing available evidence. 285. The Court reiterates that in assessing whether there has been a violation of Article 2 in its procedural aspect, it will examine if the domestic authorities have done all that could be reasonably expected of them in the circumstances of the particular case (see, for example, Nježić and Štimac, cited above, § 68 ). In circumstances such as those of the present case, where the investigation of the unlawful killing unavoidably implicates more than one State, the Court finds that this entails an obligation on the part of the respondent States concerned to cooperate effectively and take all reasonable steps necessary to this end in order to facilitate and realise an effective investigation into the case overall. Such a duty is in keeping with the effective protection of the right to life as afforded by Article 2, which ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention (see, among other authorities, Nachova, cited above, § 93). Indeed, any other finding would severely diminish the purpose of the protection guaranteed by Article 2 and render illusory the guarantees in respect of an individual ’ s right to life as any real possibility of elucidating the circumstances of the killing and bringing the perpetrators to justice would be hampered and lead to impunity for those responsible. The Convention is a system for the protection of human rights and it is of crucial importance that it is interpreted and applied in a manner that renders these rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory (see Varnava, cited above, § 160). 286. This is also consistent with the position taken by the relevant Council of Europe instruments which mandate inter-governmental cooperation in order to prevent and combat transnational crimes more effectively and to punish the perpetrators. The Court reiterates in this respect that it has never considered the provisions of the Convention as the sole framework of reference for the interpretation of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein. The Court further observes that it has always referred to the “living” nature of the Convention, which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions, and that it has taken account of evolving norms of national and international law in its interpretation of Convention provisions (see Rantsev, cited above, §§ 273-74 and Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, §§ 6 5-68, 12 November 2008). 287. The nature and scope of the cooperation required by the States involved in meeting their procedural obligation under Article 2 will, inevitably, depend on the circumstances of the particular case. 288. To begin with, the Court stresses that it is not competent to review the Contracting Parties ’ compliance with instruments other than the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols, even if other international treaties may provide it with a source of inspiration it has no jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of such instruments (see Mihailov v. Bulgaria, no. 52367/99, § 3 3, 21 July 2005). It has no competence, therefore, to determine whether the respondent States have complied with their obligations under the European Convention on Extradition and the European Convention on Mutual Assistance, as the applicants suggest. 289. Furthermore, it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order for the respondent States to comply with their obligations most effectively. The Court ’ s role is to verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the circumstances of the case before it. It is not therefore for the Court to decide where the trial of the suspects should have taken place or to impose an obligation on a Member State to extradite. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court ’ s task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was possible and whether it should have been made ( see Ilaşcu, cited above, § 334). 290. It is clear from all the material before the Court, including the 2005 UN Secretary-General ’ s report on the UN operation in Cyprus (see paragraph 153 above ), that the respondent Governments were not prepared to make any compromise on their positions and find middle ground. This position arose from political considerations which reflect the long-standing and intense political dispute between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey (see, mutatis mutandis, Demopoulos, cited above, § 83). 291. On the Cypriot Government ’ s side it is evident that what drove the unwillingness to cooperate was the refusal to lend (or the fear of lending ) any legitimacy to the “TRNC”. However, the Court does not accept that steps taken with the aim of cooperation in order to further the investigation in this case would amount to recognition, implied or otherwise of the “TRNC” (see Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 61 and 238 ). Nor would it be tantamount to holding that Turkey wields internationally recognised sovereignty over northern Cyprus (see, mutatis mutandis, Demopoulos, cited above, §§ 95-96, and Foka v. Turkey, no. 28940/95, § § 83 -84, 24 June 2008 ). The United Kingdom, for example, has cooperated in criminal cases with the “TRNC” (see paragraphs 150 and 244 above) without affording it any recognition. 292. On the other hand, as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus remains the sole legitimate government of Cyprus (see Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 14, 61 and 90), it finds it striking that the extradition requests made by the Cypriot Government were ignored by the Turkish Government, who have remained silent on the matter. 293. Although the respondent States had the opportunity to find a solution and come to an agreement under the brokerage of UNFICYP, they did not use that opportunity to the full. Any suggestions made in an effort to find a compromise solution or that the authorities concerned meet each other half way were met with downright refusal on the part of those authorities. The options put forward have included meetings on neutral territory between the Cypriot and “TRNC” police, UNFICYP and the Sovereign Base Areas police, the questioning of the suspects through “ the video recording interview method ” at the Ledra Palace Hotel in the UN buffer zone, the possibility of an ad hoc arrangement or trial at a neutral venue, the exchange of evidence (under certain conditions), and dealing with the issue on a technical services level (see paragraphs 131 - 133, 136, 137, 140 and 151 above). While a number of bi-communal working groups and technical committees have been set up – including one on criminal matters (see paragraphs 154 - 156 above) – it appears that none of these committees has taken up the present case with the purpose of furthering the investigation. 294. As a result of the respondent States ’ failure to cooperate, their respective investigations remain open and nothing has been done for more than eight years. In that regard, the Court would stress that the passage of time inevitably erodes the amount and quality of evidence available and the appearance of a lack of diligence casts doubt on the good faith of the investigative efforts (see Trubnikov v. Russia, no. 49790/99, § 92, 5 July 2005). Moreover, the very passage of time is liable to compromise the chances of investigation being completed (see M.B. v. Romania, no. 43982/06, § 64, 3 November 2011). It also prolongs the ordeal for the members of the family (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 86, ECHR 2002 ‑ II). 295. In the present, ultimately straightforward, case a considerable amount of evidence was collected and eight suspects were quickly identified, traced and arrested. The failure to cooperate directly or through UNFICYP resulted in their release. If there had been cooperation, in line with the procedural obligation under Article 2, criminal proceedings may have ensued against one or more of the suspects or the investigation may have come to a proper conclusion. 296. In view of the above, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural aspect by virtue of the failure of the respondent Governments to cooperate. 297. Having regard to the above conclusion, the Court is of the opinion that there is no need to examine separately the applicants ’ complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 298. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 1. Pecuniary damage (a) The parties ’ submissions (i) The applicants 299. The applicants claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage. This sum represented the expenses incurred by the first applicant to protect his life : home security, the employment of a bodyguard ( who was murdered in 2009 ), travel expenses in respect of trips abroad following the attempt on his life and legal expenses incurred in proceedings that were brought against him for possessing a firearm in defence of his person. The applicants submitted that the above -mentioned sum had been calculated on “a rough and ready basis”, as they did not have any documents proving the expenses claimed. (ii) The Cypriot Government 300. The Cypriot Government did not comment on this head of claim. (iii) The Turkish Government 301. The Turkish Government submitted that there was no causal connection between the pecuniary damage claimed and the subject matter of the application, which had nothing to do with the first applicant ’ s right to life. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 302. The Court finds that the applicants ’ claim for pecuniary damage is unsubstantiated. It therefore rejects this claim. 2. Non-pecuniary damage (a) The parties ’ submissions (i) The applicants 303. In respect of non-pecuniary damage the applicants claimed the total sum of EUR 8 00,000 – EUR 4 0 0,000 from each respondent Government. This sum was composed of a claim in respect of each Government for EUR 100,000 by the first applicant and EUR 50,000 by each of the other applicants. 304. The applicants stressed how much unbearable anguish, pain, trauma and frustration they had suffered due to the gravity of the crime against their family and the failure of the authorities of the respondent Governments to cooperate and bring the perpetrators to justice. The applicants underlined that they had been treated with utter insensitivity and indifference. They invited the Court to condemn the callous attitude of the respondent Governments through the award of a substantial amount, even though this could not make up for the huge loss they had suffered. Furthermore, as a result of the respondent Governments ’ failure to investigate, apprehend, prosecute and punish those responsible for the murders, all the applicants, and in particular the first applicant, feared for their lives and lived in a permanent state of fear and anxiety. There had been an attempt on the first applicant ’ s life and his bodyguard had been murdered. He had also had to act as a conduit between the various authorities in the days and months immediately after the killings as they had not been cooperating. It was for these reasons that the first applicant ’ s claim under this head was higher. (ii) The Cypriot Government 305. The Cypriot Government contested the applicants ’ claims and submitted that they were excessive, bearing in mind the Court ’ s case-law. In this connection they referred to the case of Rantsev (cited above, § 342 ). (iii) The Turkish Government 306. In the Turkish Government ’ s submission the Court should refuse to make any award in respect of non-pecuniary damage as there was no violation to be compensated for. If the Court, however, were to find otherwise the finding of a violation would constitute in itself sufficient just satisfaction in respect of the alleged non-pecuniary damage. In any event, any just satisfaction should not lead to unjust enrichment. The sums claimed by the applicants were excessive, unjust and not compatible with those awarded by the Court in similar cases. They drew the Court ’ s attention to the amounts awarded in the cases of Solomou and Others v. Turkey, no. 36832/97, § 101, 24 June 2008, Isaak v. Turkey, no. 44587/98, § 139, 24 June 2008, and Kakoulli v. Turkey, no. 38595/97, § 140, 22 November 2005 ). (b) The Court ’ s assessment 307. The Court notes that it has found a violation of Article 2 under its procedural head on account of the Respondent Governments ’ failure to cooperate and thus provide an effective investigation into the death of the applicants ’ relatives. It also notes that it has found that no separate issue arises under Article 13 of the Convention. 308. As a result of the violation found the applicants suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be made good merely by the finding of a violation. 309. Regard being had to the reasons for which it has found a violation and the circumstances of the case, the Court, ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, decides that an award of EUR 8, 5 00 should be paid by each respondent Government to each of the applicants, plus any tax that may be chargeable on these amounts. B. Costs and expenses 1. The parties ’ submissions (a) The applicants 310. The applicants claimed a total of 40,000 pounds sterling (GBP) in respect of their lawyers ’ fees. The applicants submitted that this was the amount they had agreed upon with their lawyers and produced a letter of engagement (in which their lawyers ’ fee was stipulated) dated 5 December 2005, which had been signed by the fourth applicant. According to this agreement, the above -mentioned amount was broken down as follows: a fee of GBP 20,000 for all the work carried out by their representatives before the authorities of the respondent Governments and UNFICYP; and the total sum of GBP 20,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court in the event that an application was made. In this respect, the agreement stipulated that each stage of the proceedings would cost a total of GBP 7,000: the first stage comprised the filing of the application; the second stage comprised work to be done for the preparation of pleadings in the event that the application was declared admissible and for any negotiations for a friendly settlement; the third stage, failing a settlement, comprised the preparation of the observations and/or representation at a hearing of the case. The total of GBP 21,000 was rounded down to GBP 20,000. No VAT would be chargeable. (b) The Cypriot Government 311. The Cypriot Government submitted that the applicants claimed costs which had not been necessarily incurred, were not reasonable as to quantum and were not substantiated by receipts. They therefore considered that their claim under this head should be rejected. (c) The Turkish Government 312. The Turkish Government submitted that the amounts claimed on the basis of the fee agreement were speculative or abstract and unsubstantiated. No timetable accounting for the actual work carried out had been submitted, and neither had any receipts or documents proving these costs been submitted. They referred to the Court ’ s judgment in Mohd v. Greece (no. 11919/03, §§ 29-32, 27 April 2006). In any event, the applicants could not claim costs incurred at the domestic level, while the amount claimed in respect of lodging the application form before the Court was excessive. 2. The Court ’ s assessment 313. According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court further requires that an applicant submit itemised particulars of all claims, together with any relevant supporting documents. 314. The Court notes that the fee agreement, which was signed only by the fourth applicant before the lodging of the application, only refers to aggregate sums that have not been itemised. No reference is made to the specific work actually carried out, the number of hours worked and the hourly rate charged. The applicants have failed to provide any other supporting documents – such as itemised bills or invoices – substantiating their claim. 315. The Court accordingly makes no award under this head. C. Default interest 316. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court stressed that Turkey’s responsibility under the Convention could not be confined to the acts of its own soldiers and officials operating in northern Cyprus but was also engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration (“the TRNC”), which survived by virtue of Turkish military and other support. Turkey, therefore, had jurisdiction under the Convention.