Complaint about amount of damages awarded for harm caused to one’s health
THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 11. The applicant complained that her health had been endangered as a result of having drunk contaminated water. She considered that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” A. Admissibility 12. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. The parties ’ submissions 13. The applicant submitted that although the domestic courts had found a violation of her rights, the award made in her favour had been too small to compensate for the physical and mental suffering caused to her and her family. Moreover, she submitted documents confirming that she had continued to have health problems after the events of 2005, such as an acute ulcer, chronic cholecystitis, uncompensated hypothyroidism and a metabolic disorder. She had been regularly treated since then for these conditions. 14. The Government submitted that the domestic courts had in essence established a violation of the applicant ’ s rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Moreover, they had decided the amount of compensation based on their direct knowledge of the case and on the basis of the parties ’ arguments and evidence. The applicant had been awarded compensation in respect of this breach of Article 8 and consequently no longer had victim status. The award made by the domestic courts had been reasonable in the light of the relatively short period of the applicant ’ s in-patient treatment and the lack of evidence of any long-lasting effects on the applicant. 2. The Court ’ s assessment 15. As the Court has had previous occasion to remark, the concept of “private life” is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers, inter alia, the physical and psychological integrity of a person (see, for instance, X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, § 22, Series A no. 91, Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 61, ECHR 2002 ‑ III and G.B. and R.B. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 16761/09, § 29, 18 December 2012 ). It has also found that “there is no explicit right in the Convention to a clean and quiet environment, but where an individual is directly and seriously affected by noise or other pollution, an issue may arise under Article 8” (see, for instance, Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1990, § 40, Series A no. 172, López Ostra v. Spain, 9 December 1994, § 51, Series A no. 303 ‑ C, Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 57, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ I and Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022/97, § 96, ECHR 2003 ‑ VIII ). Moreover, “Article 8 may apply in environmental cases whether the pollution is directly caused by the State or whether State responsibility arises from the failure to regulate private industry properly. Whether the case is analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicants ’ rights under paragraph 1 of Article 8 or in terms of an interference by a public authority to be justified in accordance with paragraph 2, the applicable principles are broadly similar” ( Hatton and Others, cited above, § 98 ). 16. The Court recalls that it falls first to the national authorities to redress any alleged violation of the Convention. The question whether a person may still claim to be the victim of an alleged violation of the Convention essentially entails on the part of the Court an ex post facto examination of his or her situation. A decision or measure of the domestic authorities favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive her of her status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, for instance, Ciorap v. Moldova (no. 2), no. 7481/06, § 18, 20 July 2010 ). The question whether the victim of a violation of the Convention has received reparation for the damage caused – comparable to just satisfaction as provided for under Article 41 of the Convention – is an important issue. It is the Court ’ s settled case-law that where the national authorities have found a violation and their decision constitutes appropriate and sufficient redress, the party concerned can no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 179-181, ECHR 2006 ‑ V). 17. In the present case, the Court notes that the parties did not dispute the domestic courts ’ findings concerning the violation of the applicant ’ s rights by the State-owned company. Considering the materials in the file, the Court finds that an interference with the applicant ’ s rights protected under Article 8 of the Convention has taken place since her physical integrity has been affected by an unhealthy environment (see paragraph 15 above). In assessing whether the Moldovan authorities discharged their positive obligation under that provision, the Court notes that the domestic courts provided a remedy in the form of establishing the company ’ s responsibility and awarding compensation. Without expressly relying on the Convention but referring to the in-hospital treatment and the physical and mental suffering caused to the applicant (see paragraph 8 above), those courts ’ judgments could be interpreted as finding in fact a breach of the applicant ’ s Article 8 rights, as also argued by the Government (see paragraph 14 above). The Court sees no reason to depart from those findings in this respect. 18. The only issue which remains to be determined is the amount of compensation. The first-instance court awarded the applicant the equivalent of EUR 648 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, referring to such criteria as the amount of physical and mental suffering caused (see paragraph 8 above). While confirming the findings of the first-instance court, the higher court halved the award made and the Supreme Court of Justice upheld that reduced award. The higher courts relied on the same elements (degree of harm), but arrived at a different conclusion concerning the amount to be awarded. No specific reasons were given for this reduction, except a reference to the degree of responsibility of the defendant. 19. The Court takes into account the Government ’ s argument concerning the relatively short period of in-patient treatment and the absence of evidence of long-term effects on the applicant. Nevertheless, she was kept in hospital for two weeks, which implies that she sustained a certain degree of mental and physical suffering. Moreover, it considers that the sum awarded by the domestic courts is considerably below the minimum generally awarded by the Court in cases in which it has found a violation of Article 8 in respect of the Republic of Moldova, even taking into account the differences between these decisions. 20. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant can still claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Furthermore, in the light of the conclusions of the domestic courts, it finds that there has been a violation of Article 8. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 21. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 22. The applicant claimed EUR 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 23. The Government disagreed, arguing that this amount was unfounded and that the claim should thus be dismissed. 24. Having regard to the violation found above and the award made in the applicant ’ s favour by the domestic courts, the Court considers that an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage is justified in this case. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 4, 0 00. B. Costs and expenses 25. The applicant made no claim in this respect. C. Default interest 26. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect of private life) of the Convention, finding that even though the domestic courts had established responsibility and awarded compensation in the proceedings brought against the State-owned local utilities provider, the sum awarded was insufficient for the degree of harm that had been caused to the applicant’s health.