Journalists and publishing companies
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 30. Freedom of the Press Act of 29 July 1881 ( as worded at the material time ) Section 29 “ It shall be defamatory to make any statement or allegation of a fact that damages the honour or reputation of the person or body of whom the fact is alleged. The direct publication or reproduction of such a statement or allegation shall be an offence, even if expressed in tentative terms or if made about a person or body not expressly named but identifiable by the terms of the disputed speeches, shouts, threats, written or printed matter, placards or posters. It shall be an insult to use any abusive or contemptuous language or invective not containing an allegation of fact.” Section 30 “ Anyone who by one of the means set out in section 23 makes a statement that is defamatory of a court of first instance or of appeal, the Army, Navy or Air Force, a constitutional body or a public authority shall be liable on conviction to between eight days ’ and one year ’ s imprisonment and a fine of between 300 and 300,000 francs, or to one only of these penalties.” Section 31 “ Defamation by like means by reference to the functions or capacity of one or more ministers or ministry officials, one or more members of one of the two legislative chambers, a civil servant, a representative or officer of the law, a minister of religion in receipt of a State salary, a citizen temporarily or permanently responsible for a public service or discharging a public mandate, a member of a jury or a witness on the basis of his witness statement shall be punishable by the same penalty. Defamatory statements about the private lives of the above persons shall be punishable under section 32 below. ” Section 32 “ Anyone who by any of the means set out in sections 23 and 28 makes a statement that is defamatory of private individuals shall be liable on conviction to between five days ’ and six months ’ imprisonment and a fine of between 150 and 80,000 francs, or to one only of these sentences. ... ” Law no. 51-19 of 5 January 1951 Section 28 “ For the purposes of section 30 of the Act of 29 July 1881, recognised Resistance movements and networks shall be deemed to form part of the Army and Navy.” Extracts from the Court of Cassation ’ s case-law Judgment of 12 January 1956 “ The originating summons referred only to section 32 of the Act of 29 July 1881, which makes it an offence to make statements that are defamatory of private individuals; the statements which the tribunals of fact found to be defamatory amounted, on the contrary, to offences under sections 30 and 31 of the Act, as the allegations were made against a Resistance group that was likened to the regular Army, or against its leader acting in that capacity and in respect of his functions. ” Judgment of 13 November 1978 “When the defamatory accusation is made against the leader of a Resistance group that is likened to the regular Army acting in that capacity and with respect to his functions ..., a charge will lie only under section 31 ... ” Judgment of 4 October 1989 ( Pierre de Bénouville ) “ By virtue of a combination of sections 30 and 31 of the Freedom of Press Act and section 28 of the Act of 5 January 1951, the protection against defamation afforded to certain recognised Resistance movements which are likened to the Army and Navy extends to the members of these movements if the defamatory statement concerns their status or actions as members. ” THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 31. The applicants complained of the lack of quality, foreseeability and accessibility of the statutory provisions that had resulted in the imposition of a penalty that was not “prescribed by law” and was disproportionate. They relied on Article 10 of the Convention, which provides: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” A. Whether there was an interference 32. The Government did not dispute that there was “interference by public authority” with the exercise of the applicant ’ s freedom of expression. 33. The Court notes that such interference will infringe the Convention unless it satisfies the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 10. It must therefore determine whether it was “prescribed by law”, was directed towards one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve them. B. Justification for the interference 1. “Prescribed by law ” (a) The parties ’ submissions 34. The applicants submitted, firstly, that the combination of sections 30 and 31 of the Freedom of the Press Act of 29 July 1881 and the Act of 5 January 1951 could not satisfy the requirements as to the quality, foreseeability and accessibility of the law imposed by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 35. They maintained that at the time the book was published French legislation did not make it possible to affirm that public defamation of a member of the Resistance fell within section 31 rather than section 32 of the Act of 29 July 1881. Yet, the court ’ s sentencing powers and the remedies available to the victims depended on which section was applicable. The applicants considered that it was common ground that no French legislation existed in which a member of the Resistance had been likened to any of the persons referred to in section 31 and that by applying that provision in the instant case the domestic courts had adopted a wide interpretation by analogy. 36. They went on to argue that the decisions in which that wide interpretation had been used were not sufficiently accessible or foreseeable: the Court of Cassation ’ s judgment of 12 January 1956 was indexed in the Bulletin officiel des arrêts de la Cour de cassation ( official law reports of the Court of Cassation ’ s decisions ) with keywords that made no reference to defamation of members of the Resistance or to the Act of 5 January 1951, nor was there any reference to that Act in the text of the judgment; the Court of Cassation ’ s judgment of 13 November 1978 was published in the same set of reports under the reference “leader of a Resistance group”, but there was no mention of the Act of 5 January 1951; the judgment of 4 October 1989 was not reported in the Bulletin officiel des arrêts de la Cour de cassation. The applicants further submitted that mere publication of an extract of a judicial decision in a review published by a trading company could not be regarded as satisfying the condition as to foreseeability and accessibility. 37. They added that, in terms of quantity, three decisions did not suffice to constitute foreseeable case-law. 38. The Government submitted that, under the Court ’ s case-law, the law had to be sufficiently accessible and foreseeable, which meant that the public had to be able to have an indication that was adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case and the law formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. They referred in that connection to The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) ( judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p.31, § 49) and Goodwin v. the United Kingdom ( judgment of 27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II, pp. 496-97, § 31). 39. They maintained that the Court of Cassation ’ s construction of sections 30 and 31 of the Act of 29 July 1881 and section 28 of the Act of 5 January 1951 was long-standing and settled and said that, in their view, the applicants must have been aware when they were prosecuted that the Court of Cassation considered that section 31 of the 1881 Act applied to cases in which a member of a Resistance movement or network had been defamed. The Government submitted that the requirement regarding the clarity of the law had therefore been satisfied in the instant case. 40. They further argued that those two Acts and the decisions holding that section 31 of the Act of 29 July 1881 applied to members of Resistance networks, which had been published in various legal journals, satisfied the condition as to accessibility. 41. The Government submitted, lastly, that, through their profession, the applicants must have been aware of the provisions on defamation in the Freedom of the Press Act, a statute which regulated a substantial part of media law. Furthermore, since the book attacked former members of Resistance networks, the applicants could have acquainted themselves with the case-law that supplemented the Freedom of the Press Act. Each of the applicants had been assisted by a lawyer who would, in principle, have been familiar with that case-law. 42. The Government therefore considered that the law as applied in the present case complied with the conditions of clarity, accessibility and foreseeability required by Article 10 of the Convention. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 43. The Court reiterates that a norm cannot be regarded as a “law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct; he must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice ( see, among other authorities, The Sunday Times, cited above, § 49, and Hertel v. Switzerland, judgment of 25 August 1998, Reports 1998-VI, pp. 2325-26, § 35). 44. The scope of the notion of foreseeability depends to a considerable degree on the content of the text in issue, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed ( see Cantoni v. France, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V, p. 1629, § 35). A law may still satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail ( see, among other authorities, Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A no. 316-B, p. 71, § 37, and Grigoriades v. Greece, judgment of 25 November 1997, Reports 1997-VII, p. 2587, § 37). 45. This is particularly true in relation to persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation. They can on this account be expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such activity entails ( see Cantoni, loc. cit. ). 46. With specific regard to the question of the accessibility and foreseeability of the law, the Court notes that the applicants in the instant case are respectively a journalist, a publisher and a publishing company. 47. The relevant law comprised two pieces of legislation ( the Acts of 29 July 1881 and 5 January 1951 ) and three Court of Cassation decisions (of 12 January 1956, 13 November 1978 and 4 October 1989 ) which interpreted the legislation consistently and which those engaged in the press and publishing sectors must have been aware of. 48. The Court accordingly finds that, as professional book publishers, the publisher and the publishing company must at least have been familiar with the legislation and settled case-law that was applicable in this sphere and could have sought advice from specialist counsel. In view of the nature of the book, they could not have been unaware of the risks to which the author ’ s challenging of previously undisputed historical facts exposed them. They were accordingly in a position to assess the risks and to alert the author to the risk of prosecution if the book was published as it stood. Furthermore, the publisher and, through him, the author should have known that it was settled case- law that a failure to exercise caution and care when collecting historical evidence and drawing conclusions therefrom could be treated by the domestic courts as a constitutive element of the offence of defamation of persons whose honour or reputation risked being tarnished by publication. 49. In conclusion, the Court considers that the applicants ’ contention that they were unable to foresee “to a reasonable degree” the consequences publication of the book was liable to have for them in the courts is untenable. It therefore finds that the interference in issue was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. 2. Legitimate aim 50. The applicants expressed no view on this point. 51. The Government argued that the domestic courts ’ decisions were intended to protect Mr and Mrs Aubrac from defamation in a case in which the damage to their reputation was considerable given the accusation of treachery that had been levelled against them. The decisions were thus aimed at “the protection of the reputation or rights of others” and the interference had pursued a legitimate aim for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention. 52. The Court finds that the aim of the relevant decisions in the present case was indisputably to protect the reputation of Mr and Mrs Aubrac, whose activities as members of the Resistance have made them public figures since the Second World War. 53. Consequently, the interference complained of pursued at least one of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 of Article 10. “Necessary in a democratic society” (a) The parties ’ submissions 54. The applicants stressed that the book was a historical work and submitted that the general public ’ s right to know its own history had to be taken into account and entailed different approaches by the journalist and the historian. 55. They criticised the stance taken by the domestic courts which authorised judicial intervention in historical debate and the judicial scrutiny of any historical work, thereby prohibiting all historical conjecture, denying the right to debate the official version of history that was generally accepted in France and depriving the applicants of all freedom of expression on historical matters. They submitted that the French courts had conclusively decided to regard Mr and Mrs Aubrac as valiant members of the Resistance and refused to permit any historian to examine their conduct in order to assess the role they had played in the events that had culminated in the meeting at Caluire on 21 June 1943. Consequently, the applicants argued that there had been no “ pressing social need ” that justified removing that episode from the scope of historians ’ freedom of opinion. 56. The applicants went on to explain that the author of the book had relied on authentic sources that had been cross-checked, and that Klaus Barbie ’ s written submissions had been just one of a number of sources, all of which had been read critically. Their approach had been systematically to treat Klaus Barbie ’ s accusations with caution. They added that they had also taken into account the statements of two members of the Resistance who had been direct witnesses of the matters which they had researched. They stressed, lastly, that the book was written in measured tones and contended that it was legitimate for a historian with doubts about an assertion to regard it as an “ unverifiable ” accusation if he had not been able to assemble all the documentation on the issue. 57. The applicants submitted that in those circumstances there had been a breach of their rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention on account both of their convictions by the domestic courts and of the severity of the sentences. 58. The Government maintained that the domestic courts had correctly weighed up the various interests at stake by carrying out a detailed examination of the structure of the book and analysing each individual basis for the accusation made against Mr and Mrs Aubrac. It had become apparent from that examination that the author had devoted the majority of the book to criticism of the Aubracs, his main accusation being their role in Jean Moulin ’ s arrest at Caluire. 59. The point which the domestic courts criticised in their decisions was the central role Klaus Barbie ’ s written submissions had been allowed to play as a basis for challenging Mr and Mrs Aubrac ’ s version of events – despite the fact that he had been shown to be an unreliable source – without any precaution being taken with regard to presentation, any reference to the official documents or any questioning of those direct witnesses who were still alive when the book was written. 60. The Government submitted that by constructing his argument in that way, the first applicant had failed to comply with a fundamental ethical rule of journalism that required the provision of “information that is accurate and creditworthy in compliance with the journalist ’ s code of conduct”. 61. The Government emphasised, lastly, that the penalties imposed on the applicants could not be regarded as particularly severe and that the book containing the author ’ s ideas continued to be accessible to the public. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 62. The Court reiterates the fundamental principles established by its case-law on Article 10 ( see, among many other authorities, The Sunday Times (no. 1), cited above, pp. 40-41, § 65, and Association Ekin v. France, no. 39288/98, § 56, ECHR 2001-VIII). 63. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each individual ’ s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly. 64. The adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the existence of a “pressing social need”. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10. 65. When exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court ’ s task is not to substitute its own view for that of the relevant national authorities but rather to review under Article 1 0 the decisions they delivered in the exercise of their discretion. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully or in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”. 66. Article 10 does not in terms prohibit the imposition of prior restraints on circulation or all bans on dissemination, but the dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court. 67. The Court has on many occasions stressed the essential role the press plays in a democratic society. It has, inter alia, stated that although the press must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them ( see, among many other authorities, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, §§ 59 and 62, ECHR 1999-III, and Colombani and Others v. France, no. 51279/99, § 5 5, ECHR 2002-V ). The national margin of appreciation is circumscribed by the interest of democratic society in enabling the press to exercise its vital role of “public watchdog” ( see, among other authorities, the Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 59). 68. These principles apply to the publication of books or other written materials such as periodicals that have been or are due to be published ( see, in particular, C. S.Y. v. Turkey, no. 27214/95, § 42, 4 March 2003), if they concern issues of general interest. 69. The Court considers that it is an integral part of freedom of expression to seek historical truth and it is not the Court ’ s role to arbitrate the underlying historical issues, which are part of a continuing debate between historians that shapes opinion as to the events which took place and their interpretation. As such, and regardless of the doubts one might have as to the probative value or otherwise of the document known as “ Barbie ’ s written submissions” or the “ Barbie testament ”, the issue does not belong to the category of clearly established historical facts – such as the Holocaust – whose negation or revision is removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17 of the Convention ( see Lehideux and Isorni v. France, judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998 ‑ VII, pp. 2885-86, § 51, and Garaudy v. France (dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX; as regards Jean Moulin ’ s arrest at Caluire, see paragraph 10 above ). However, the Court must balance the public interest in being informed of the circumstances in which Jean Moulin, the main leader of the internal Resistance in France, was arrested by the Nazis on 21 June 1943, and the need to protect the reputation of Mr and Mrs Aubrac, who were themselves important members of the Resistance. More than half a century after the events, there was a risk that there their honour and reputation would be seriously tarnished by a book that raised the possibility, albeit by way of innuendo, that they had betrayed Jean Moulin and had thereby been responsible for his arrest, suffering and death. 70. In exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court must look at the impugned interference in the light of the case as a whole, including the content of the remarks held against the applicants and the context in which they made them. In particular, it must determine whether the interference in issue was “proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”. In so doing, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts ( see, among many other authorities, Zana v. Turkey, judgment of 25 November 1997, Reports 1997-VII, pp. 2547- 48, § 51). In addition, in the exercise of its European supervisory duties, the Court must verify whether the authorities struck a fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each other in this type of case, namely, on the one hand, freedom of expression protected by Article 10 and, on the other, the right of the persons attacked by the book to protect their reputation, a right which is protected by Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life. 71. In the present case, in order to come to a guilty verdict, the Paris tribunal de grande instance performed a three-part examination. It began by looking at the alleged defamatory accusations in the chronological order of the underlying events and comparing the text of Klaus Barbie ’ s signed written submissions with the text of the first applicant ’ s book, noting that the very purpose of the book was to: “ compare the allegations of these ‘ written submissions ’ with the account of events given by Mr and Mrs Aubrac on various occasions and the other oral and documentary evidence relating to that period. ... ” 72. The tribunal de grande instance thus examined the circumstances of Raymond Aubrac ’ s initial arrest in March 1943 and his release in May 1943, the escape from L ’ Antiquaille Hospital, the Caluire episode, events post - Caluire and the escape from boulevard des Hirondelles ( see paragraph 17 above ) : “Thus ..., without formally corroborating the direct accusations made in ‘ Barbie ’ s written submissions ’, the [first applicant] sets about sowing confusion by combining a series of facts, witness statements and documents of different types and varying degrees of importance which together serve to discredit the accounts given by the civil parties; he also questions the motives for their deception and lies ... As for the author ’ s comments, they constitute defamation by innuendo in that they encourage the reader to believe that very grave questions exist over Mr and Mrs Aubrac ’ s conduct in 1943 that outweigh the certainties that have been hitherto accepted; they thus lend credence to Barbie ’ s accusations.” 73. After considering which statutory provisions were applicable, the tribunal de grande instance turned to the issue of the applicants ’ good faith, which is of central importance in defamation cases. With regard to that issue, the tribunal de grande instance found that the characteristic features of the applicant ’ s book were the excessive importance given to Barbie ’ s written submissions, a manifest lack of adequate documentation on the circumstances of Raymond Aubrac ’ s first arrest on 15 March 1943 and his release, a failure to rank the sources of information on the escape from L ’ Antiquaille Hospital in order of importance, insufficient qualification of his remarks on Caluire and the escape of 21 October, a lack of critical analysis of the German sources and documents as such and its neglect of the statements of those who took part in the events. It explained and gave reasons for each of these assertions and concluded that the author ’ s plea of good faith had to be rejected ( see paragraph 19 above ). 74. The Paris Court of Appeal adopted the Paris tribunal de grande instance ’ s reasoning as regards the defamatory nature of the statements. It added with regard to the question of defamation by innuendo (see paragraph 24 above): “ Having thus decided how the book would be balanced: systematic doubt where the Aubracs are concerned and the use of Barbie ’ s document as a reference – albeit one to be treated with caution – [the first applicant] proceeds, in circumstances that are accurately described in the judgment, systematically to refuse to accord any credit to Mr and Mrs Aubrac ’ s account. ” 75. It rejected the plea of good faith on the ground that the first applicant had repeatedly failed to exercise sufficient caution. 76. The Court observes that the domestic courts carried out a detailed and very thorough examination of the book and, in particular, the manner in which the facts and arguments were presented before concluding that the applicants were guilty of public defamation of Mr and Mrs Aubrac, in their capacity as members of a recognised Resistance movement. 77. It considers that the convictions in the instant case were based on relevant and sufficient reasons. In that connection, it finds convincing the evidence and reasoning which persuaded the civil courts, both at first instance and on appeal, to find that the author had failed to respect the fundamental rules of historical method in the book and had made particularly grave insinuations. It refers in particular to the meticulous analysis of the book by both the Paris tribunal de grande instance in its judgment of 2 April 1998 and the Court of Appeal in its judgment of 10 February 1999. It therefore sees no reason to disagree with the domestic courts ’ analysis of the case or to find that they construed the principle of freedom of expression too restrictively or the aim of protecting the reputation and the rights of others too extensively. 78. As to the sentences which were imposed, the Court reiterates that, in assessing the proportionality of the interference, the nature and severity of the penalties imposed are also factors to be taken into account (see, for example, Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, § 64, ECHR 1999 ‑ IV ). It notes, firstly, that no order was made for the book ’ s destruction or prohibiting its publication ( see, mutatis mutandis and by converse implication, Editions Plon v. France, no. 58148/00, § 53, ECHR 2004-IV ). Further, the Court notes that, contrary to what has been suggested by the applicants (see paragraph 57 above), the levels of the fines and orders for damages ( see paragraphs 20 and 27 above ) appear to have been relatively modest ( see, by converse implication, Tolstoy Miloslavsky, cited above ) and the sums the applicants were thus required to pay justified in the circumstances of the case. Nor, lastly, does the requirement to publish a statement in five periodicals and to include a warning in like terms in each copy of the book appear unreasonable or unduly restrictive of freedom of expression. 79. In addition, the Court reiterates that just as, by providing authors with a medium for publication, publishers participate in the exercise of freedom of expression, as a corollary thereto they are vicariously subject to the “duties and responsibilities” which authors take on when they disseminate their opinions to the public (see, mutatis mutandis, Sürek (no. 1), cited above, § 63). Thus, the fact that the third applicant was found jointly and severally liable in tort with the first two applicants and ordered to pay damages to the civil parties is not in itself incompatible with the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention. 80. In conclusion, the Court finds that the interference with the applicants ’ freedom of expression in the instant case was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Consequently, there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention, finding that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had not been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely to protect the Aubracs from damage to their reputation. Noting in particular that the quest for historical truth was an integral part of freedom of expression, the Court considered that it was not its task to settle the substantive historical issue, which was part of an ongoing debate among historians and even public opinion about the events and their interpretation. However, in order to determine whether the measure in question had been necessary in a democratic society, the Court had to balance the public interest in knowing the circumstances of Jean Moulin’s arrest against the requirement of protecting the reputation of Mr and Mrs Aubrac, who had themselves been major figures of the Resistance.