Internet sites containing legal information
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 19. Article 44 § 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia ( Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus ) provides that everyone has the right to freely obtain information disseminated for public use. 20. The Public Information Act ( Avaliku teabe seadus ) stipulates the conditions and procedure for accessing information that is obtained or created in the course of carrying out public duties. A request for information ( teabenõue ) may be made orally or in writing (section 13) and the holder of such information, subject to certain exceptions, must release the information in the manner requested by the person making the request (section 17). 21. Section 31-1 of the Imprisonment Act ( Vangistusseadus ), which entered into force on 1 June 2008, provides that prisoners are prohibited from using the Internet, except on computers specially adapted for said purpose by a prison which has allowed such access ( under the supervision of the prison authorities) to the official databases of legislation and the database of judicial decisions. This provision is still in force and has not been substantially amended. III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS A. Council of Europe documents 22. The Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervisionof the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 May 2006 at the 964th meeting of the Ministers ’ Deputies, read as follows: Rule 6 – Information to the Committee of Ministers on the execution of the judgment “2. When supervising the execution of a judgment by the High Contracting Party concerned, pursuant to Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers shall examine: ... b. if required, and taking into account the discretion of the High Contracting Party concerned to choose the means necessary to comply with the judgment, whether: ... THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 26. The applicant complained that the authorities ’ refusal to grant him access to certain websites violated his right to receive information “ without interference by public authority ”, in breach of Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 27. The Government contested that argument. A. Admissibility 28. The Government considered that the application was manifestly ill-founded. They pointed out that the applicant could have requested access to the information contained on the websites in question by means other than through the Internet. 29. The applicant considered the Government ’ s argument not appropriate and contended that his wish to undertake legal research on the Internet sites in question in order to understand his rights was a very different matter from making specific requests to be sent the information in question. 30. The Court considers that the applicant ’ s complaint relates to his right to receive information and as such falls under Article 10 of the Convention. It considers that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. The parties ’ submissions (a) The applicant 31. The applicant considered that the ban on his accessing the websites of the Council of Europe Information Office in Tallinn, the Chancellor of Justice and the Riigikogu violated his right to receive information and was in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. He submitted that he had been engaged in a number of court proceedings against the Estonian prison system. The information available on the websites in question was relied on by the Estonian courts; thus, the applicant also needed access to this information in order to be able to protect his rights. 32. The applicant pointed to the sheer scope of information accessible nowadays through the Internet (legal acts, case-law, parliamentary activities, newspapers, and so on). He argued that a ban on Internet access actually amounted to a total ban on access to information. 33. The applicant submitted that his aim was to be able to undertake legal research in order to understand his rights and obligations and in order to be able to defend his rights in court on an equal footing, if necessary. Undertaking legal research and making specific requests for information were two very different matters. His aim was to keep himself informed and to undertake legal research via the three above-mentioned websites. 34. The applicant rejected the Government ’ s arguments concerning the information-technology threats posed by the three websites in question. He argued that the authorised websites also contained references, search engines, links ( including links to social networks ), and so on. However, he noted that those links were effectively blocked by the Ministry of Justice server. Thus, there was no reason to distinguish the websites to which the applicant sought access from those to which access was already granted. 35. According to the applicant, the means that the Government suggested that he employ (as an alternative to using the Internet) to obtain the information that he sought were clumsy, roundabout and unreasonable. Furthermore, the total weight of belongings ( including paper documents ) that detainees were allowed to possess was limited to 30 kilograms. This restriction, along with a 21-page limit on free print-outs of documents, constituted a further restriction on prisoners ’ freedom of information. (b) The Government 36. The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. They argued that neither the Estonian Constitution nor the Convention prescribed that everyone should be entitled to obtain through the Internet information such as that in issue in the present case. The State had a discretion to restrict the right of specific groups of people (such as prisoners) to access information through specific channels. According to the Government, prisoners were not in a position comparable to that of persons at liberty. 37. The Government submitted that the restriction of prisoners ’ access to the Internet had a legal basis in section 31-1 of the Imprisonment Act. The aim of that provision was to maintain prison security and the safety of persons outside the prison, as well as the prevention of crime and the protection of victims. 38. The Government considered that the restriction was proportionate to the aims pursued. Granting access only to specific websites that constituted the official databases of legislation and the database of judicial decisions was justified by the demands of security. Making additional websites available and technically as secure as possible would incur additional expense. In view of the fact that all websites contained references, search engines, links ( including to social networks ), and the like, and having regard to the fact that websites were updated on a daily basis, it was impossible to completely avoid or prevent security vulnerabilities. It could not be ruled out, for technical reasons, that prisoners could misuse the Internet. Thus, granting prisoners access to additional websites would increase the risk that they might obtain information prejudicial to the realisation of the objectives of imprisonment. The effort needed to reduce the risks arising from such additional access – such risks could not be completely eliminated – would be excessive in comparison with the benefits gained by granting prisoners wider access to the Internet. Thus, the distinction between permitted and prohibited websites was a carefully weighed compromise between the applicant ’ s rights and public safety. 39. The Government pointed out that the restriction in question only concerned one channel of information and did not restrict the right of prisoners to engage in correspondence and make telephone calls as alternative ways of obtaining public information. Thus, the applicant was still able exercise his right to information under Article 10; the applicable legislation only restricted the possibility to obtain such information through the Internet. The Government also provided a detailed overview of the information contained on the websites in question and explained how the applicant could access it by means other than the Internet. 40. The Government noted that the website of the Council of Europe Information Office in Tallinn had been operational until 29 December 2010. Since 2010 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had published retroactively Estonian translations of the Court ’ s judgments made in respect of Estonia and summaries in Estonian of key judgments made in respect of other countries. On 20 January 2012 the online version of Riigi Teataja had started publishing Estonian summaries of the judgments of the Court, and since 2013 it had also contained Estonian translations of all judgments in respect of Estonia. 2. The Court ’ s assessment 41. The Court has consistently recognised that the public has a right to receive information of general interest. Within this field, it has developed case-law in relation to press freedom, the purpose of which is to impart information and ideas on such matters. The Court has also found that the function of creating forums for public debate is not limited to the press. That function may also be exercised by non-governmental organisations, the activities of which are an essential element of informed public debate (see, for example, Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, no. 39534/07, §§ 33-34, 28 November 2013, with further references). 42. Furthermore, the Court has held that the right to receive information basically prohibits a Government from preventing a person from receiving information that others wished or were willing to impart (see Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, § 74, Series A no. 116). It has also held that the right to receive information cannot be construed as imposing on a State positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion (see Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 53, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ I). 43. In the present case, however, the question in issue is not the authorities ’ refusal to release the requested information; the applicant ’ s request concerned information that was freely available in the public domain. Rather, the applicant ’ s complaint concerns a particular means of accessing the information in question : namely, that he, as a prisoner, wished to be granted access – specifically, via the Internet – to information published on certain websites. 44. In this connection, the Court reiterates that in the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public ’ s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information in general ( see Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, § 133, ECHR 2015; Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, no. 3111/10, § 48, ECHR 2012; and Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, § 27, ECHR 2009). 45. Nevertheless, the Court notes that imprisonment inevitably involves a number of restrictions on prisoners ’ communications with the outside world, including on their ability to receive information. It considers that Article 10 cannot be interpreted as imposing a general obligation to provide access to the Internet, or to specific Internet sites, for prisoners. However, it finds that in the circumstances of the case, since access to certain sites containing legal information is granted under Estonian law, the restriction of access to other sites that also contain legal information constitutes an interference with the right to receive information. 46. The Court observes that it is not in dispute that the restriction on prisoners ’ use of the Internet was based on the Imprisonment Act, which limits prisoners ’ Internet access to the official databases of legislation and the database of judicial decisions. Internet access beyond the authorised websites was prohibited. The Court is thus satisfied that the interference at issue was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 47. Furthermore, the Court accepts the Government ’ s argument that the interference in question served the aims of the protection of the rights of others and the prevention of disorder and crime. 48. As regards the issue of whether the interference was “necessary” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, the Court notes that according to the Government, granting prisoners access to a greater number of Internet sites would have increased security risks and required the allocation of additional material and human resources in order to mitigate such risks. By contrast, the applicant was of the opinion that allowing access to three more websites ( in addition to those already authorised ) would not have given rise to any additional security issues. Possible security issues were already effectively managed by the Ministry of Justice, which blocked any links or other such features on already authorised websites that could cause security concerns; there was no reason, according to the applicant, why this should be different in the case of the three requested additional websites. 49. The Court reiterates that under section 31-1 of the Imprisonment Act, prisoners are granted limited access to the Internet – including access to the official databases of legislation and the database of judicial decisions available on the Internet. 50. The Court notes that the websites of the Council of Europe Information Office in Tallinn, the Chancellor of Justice, and the Riigikogu, to which the applicant wished to have access, predominantly contained legal information and information related to fundamental rights, including the rights of prisoners. For example, the website of the Riigikogu contained bills together with explanatory memoranda to them, verbatim records of the sittings of the Riigikogu, and minutes of committee sittings. The website of the Chancellor of Justice (who is also an ombudsman in Estonia) contained his selected legal opinions. The Court considers that the accessibility of such information promotes public awareness and respect for human rights and gives weight to the applicant ’ s argument that the Estonian courts used such information and the applicant needed access to it for the protection of his rights in the court proceedings. The Court has also taken note of the applicant ’ s argument that legal research in the form of browsing through available information (in order to find relevant information) and making specific requests for information were different matters and that the websites were meant for legal researches rather than making specific requests. Indeed, in order to make a specific request one would need to be aware of which particular information is available in the first place. The Court also notes that the domestic authorities have referred to alternative means of making available to the applicant the information stored on the websites in question (for example, by mail – see paragraph 17 above), but did not compare the costs of these alternative means with the additional costs that extended Internet access would allegedly incur. 51. The Court further notes that in the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements, publication of the Court ’ s judgments in the language of the respondent State is mentioned as an example of the general measures to be taken in order to execute judgments (see paragraph 22 above). The Court notes, in this connection, that when the applicant lodged his complaint with the domestic courts, the Estonian translations and summaries of the Court ’ s judgments were only available on the website of the Council of Europe Information Office and it was only later that this information was published elsewhere – in the online version of Riigi Teataja (see paragraph 40 above). 52. The Court cannot overlook the fact that in a number of Council of Europe and other international instruments the public-service value of the Internet and its importance for the enjoyment of a range of human rights has been recognised. Internet access has increasingly been understood as a right, and calls have been made to develop effective policies to attain universal access to the Internet and to overcome the “digital divide” (see paragraphs 23 to 25 above). The Court considers that these developments reflect the important role the Internet plays in people ’ s everyday lives. Indeed, an increasing amount of services and information is only available on the Internet, as evidenced by the fact that in Estonia the official publication of legal acts effectively takes place via the online version of Riigi Teataja and no longer through its paper version (see paragraph 7 above). The Court reiterates that the online version of Riigi Teataja also currently carries Estonian summaries and Estonian translations of the Court ’ s judgments (see paragraph 40 above). 53. Lastly, the Court reiterates that under the Imprisonment Act the prisoners have been granted limited access to the Internet via computers specially adapted for that purpose and under the supervision of the prison authorities. Thus, the Court observes that arrangements necessary for the use of the Internet by prisoners have in any event been made and the related costs have been borne by the authorities. While the security and economic considerations cited by the domestic authorities may be considered as relevant, the Court notes that the domestic courts undertook no detailed analysis as to the security risks allegedly emerging from the access to the three additional websites in question, also having regard to the fact that these were websites of State authorities and of an international organisation. The Supreme Court limited its analysis on this point to a rather general statement that granting access to additional Internet sites could increase the risk of detainees engaging in prohibited communication, thus giving rise to the need for increased levels of monitoring. The Court also considers that the Supreme Court and the Government have failed to convincingly demonstrate that giving the applicant access to three additional websites would have caused any noteworthy additional costs. In these circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that sufficient reasons have been put forward in the present case to justify the interference with the applicant ’ s right to receive information. 54. The Court concludes that the interference with the applicant ’ s right to receive information, in the specific circumstances of the present case, cannot be regarded as having been necessary in a democratic society. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 55. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 56. The applicant claimed compensation for the non-pecuniary damage he had sustained as a result of the alleged violation of his rights and asked the Court to determine a fair level of compensation. 57. The Government considered that given that the Convention had not been violated in respect of the applicant, there was no basis for awarding any compensation. Furthermore, they submitted that, should the Court find a violation of the applicant ’ s rights, such a finding would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction. 58. The Court considers that in the circumstances of this case the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. B. Costs and expenses 59. The applicant claimed reimbursement of courier costs, without specifying the sum claimed. 60. The Government asked the Court to reject this claim as the sum had not been specified and no evidence regarding the costs borne had been submitted. 61. According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. However, in the present case the applicant failed to submit documentary evidence proving his costs and expenses. Therefore, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, finding that the refusal to grant the applicant access to Internet websites containing legal information had breached his right to receive information. The Court noted in particular that Contracting States are not obliged to grant prisoners access to Internet. It found, however, that if a State was willing to allow prisoners access, as was the case in Estonia, it had to give reasons for refusing access to specific sites. In the specific circumstances of the applicant’s case, the reasons, namely the security and costs implications, for not allowing him access to the Internet sites in question had not been sufficient to justify the interference with his right to receive information. Notably, the authorities had already made security arrangements for prisoners’ use of Internet via computers specially adapted for that purpose and under the supervision of the prison authorities and had borne the related costs. Indeed, the domestic courts had undertaken no detailed analysis as to the possible security risks of access to the three additional websites in question, bearing in mind that they were run by an international organisation and by the State itself.