The definition of idem
ii. relevant domestic law 16. Article 125 of the Swiss Criminal Code provides: “1. Anyone who negligently causes damage to the physical integrity or health of another shall, on a complaint, be liable to imprisonment or a fine. 2. If the injury is serious, the offender shall be prosecuted even in the absence of a complaint.” 17. Subsection 31(1) of the Federal Road Traffic Act provides, inter alia, that drivers shall remain in control of their vehicles at all times so as to fulfil their obligations to drive carefully. Under section 32, drivers must adapt the vehicle's speed to conditions. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 18. Mrs Oliveira applied to the Commission on 22 October 1994. She complained of a breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 19. The Commission declared the application (no. 25711/94) admissible on 13 January 1997. In its report of 1 July 1997 (Article 31), it expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of that provision (twenty-four votes to eight). The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the two dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment [3]. FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT 20. In their memorial, the Government invited the Court to hold that there had been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 in the instant case. 21. In her memorial, the applicant requested the Court “1. To find that judgments delivered in criminal proceedings under the sovereign authority of the Swiss Confederation by the single judge at the Zürich District Court, by the Court of Appeal, by the Court of Cassation of the Canton of Zürich and by the Swiss Federal Court have infringed, to the applicant’s detriment, provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and that accordingly the respondent Government have failed to fulfil their obligation to comply with the provisions of the Convention. 2. To order the respondent Government, pursuant to Article 50 of the Convention taken together with Rule 52 § 1 of Rules of Court B, to pay the applicant just satisfaction in the sum of 60,340 Swiss francs.” AS TO THE LAW alleged VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF Protocol No. 7 22. In the applicant's submission, the fact that the same incident had led to her conviction firstly for failing to control her vehicle and subsequently for negligently causing physical injury constituted a breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, which provides: “1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State. 2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. 3. No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention.” In its judgment of 7 October 1993 the Court of Appeal had noted that the police magistrate knew that the accident victim had suffered serious injuries, in respect of which he had no jurisdiction. He had nonetheless given a ruling without remitting the case file to the district attorney’s office. The police magistrate had therefore decided the case in full knowledge of the relevant facts and in that regard it did not really matter why he had chosen not to impose a heavier penalty on the applicant. Even if he had erred in his assessment of the facts and the penalty called for, it was unacceptable that the applicant should be made to suffer the consequences by being convicted twice in respect of the same incident. Neither the police magistrate’s decision nor the fine he had imposed had been set aside by the higher courts, which had also punished the applicant. In short, there had been a breach of the non bis in idem principle. 23. The Government submitted that the limits within which Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 had been conceived could not be drawn so as categorically to exclude all possibility of the same set of facts being considered in two separate sets of proceedings. In any event, the case was distinguishable in three respects from that of Gradinger v. Austria (see the judgment of 23 October 1995, Series A no. 328-C): ( i ) there had been no inconsistency in the two relevant authorities’ assessment of the facts, (ii) as the jurisdiction of the first authority (the police magistrate) was limited he would not have been able to consider all the aspects of the offending conduct and, (iii) the applicant had not been put at any disadvantage as a result of there being separate proceedings. Under Swiss law, the police magistrate’s jurisdiction did not extend to serious offences ( crimes and délits ), which were the responsibility of the district attorney’s office ( Bezirksanwaltschaft ) and the public prosecutor's office ( Staatsanwaltschaft ). The non bis in idem principle could not therefore apply in respect of a matter over which the police magistrate had no jurisdiction. The fact that he had nonetheless given a ruling was in all probability due to a misunderstanding between him and the district attorney in that, when the latter had sent the former the case file concerning a possible prosecution of the person injured in the accident, the police magistrate had taken it to be the file concerning the applicant. Whatever the position, Mrs Oliveira had not been prejudiced by his decision as the amount of the first fine had been deducted from the second. However, it would not be right either for the applicant to benefit in the name of the non bis in idem principle from that procedural error. 24. Relying on the Gradinger judgment cited above, the Commission accepted in substance the applicant’s argument. It noted that the basis for Mrs Oliveira’s two convictions had been that her car had veered onto the other side of the road hitting one car and then colliding with a second, whose driver had sustained serious injuries. The injuries had not been a separate element, but an integral part of the conduct by which they had finally been caused. Moreover, a defendant could not be deprived of the protection against a reopening of his case merely because his conviction had been based on a procedural defect. 25. The Court notes that the convictions in issue concerned an accident caused by the applicant on 15 December 1990. She had been driving on a road covered with ice and snow when her car veered onto the other side of the road hitting one car and then colliding with a second, whose driver sustained serious injuries. Mrs Oliveira was firstly ordered to pay a 200 Swiss franc (CHF) fine by the police magistrate for failing to control her vehicle as she had not adapted her speed to the road conditions (see paragraph 10 above). Subsequently, the Zürich District Court and then the Zürich Court of Appeal imposed a CHF 1,500 fine (from which, however, was deducted the amount of the initial fine) for negligently causing physical injury (see paragraphs 11–12 above). 26. That is a typical example of a single act constituting various offences ( concours idéal d’infractions ). The characteristic feature of this notion is that a single criminal act is split up into two separate offences, in this case the failure to control the vehicle and the negligent causing of physical injury. In such cases, the greater penalty will usually absorb the lesser one. There is nothing in that situation which infringes Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 since that provision prohibits people being tried twice for the same offence whereas in cases concerning a single act constituting various offences ( concours idéal d’infractions ) one criminal act constitutes two separate offences. 27. It would admittedly have been more consistent with the principles governing the proper administration of justice for sentence in respect of both offences, which resulted from the same criminal act, to have been passed by the same court in a single set of proceedings. Indeed, it appears that that is what ought to have occurred in the instant case as the police magistrate should, in view of the fact that the serious injuries sustained by the injured party were outside his jurisdiction, have sent the case file to the district attorney for him to rule on both offences together (see paragraph 10 above). The fact that that procedure was not followed in Mrs Oliveira’s case is, however, irrelevant as regards compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 since that provision does not preclude separate offences, even if they are all part of a single criminal act, being tried by different courts, especially where, as in the present case, the penalties were not cumulative, the lesser being absorbed by the greater. 28. The instant case is therefore distinguishable from the case of Gradinger cited above, in which two different courts came to inconsistent findings on the applicant’s blood alcohol level. 29. In conclusion, there has been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.
The Court noted that this was a typical example of a single act constituting various offences (concours idéal d’infractions). The characteristic feature of this notion is that a single criminal act is split up into two separate offences, in this case the failure to control the vehicle and the negligent causing of physical injury. In such cases, the greater penalty will usually absorb the lesser one. In the applicant’s case, the Court held that there had been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, since that provision prohibits people being tried twice for the same offence whereas in cases concerning a single act constituting various offences one criminal act constitutes two separate offences. The Court added that it would admittedly have been more consistent with the principles governing the proper administration of justice for sentence in respect of both offences, which resulted from the same criminal act, to have been passed by the same court in a single set of proceedings. The fact that that procedure was not followed in the applicant’s case was, however, irrelevant as regards compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 since that provision does not preclude separate offences, even if they are all part of a single criminal act, being tried by different courts, especially where, as in the present case, the penalties were not cumulative, the lesser being absorbed by the greater. The instant case was therefore distinguishable from the case of Gradinger (see above), in which two different courts came to inconsistent findings on the applicant’s blood alcohol level.