Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 of the Convention)
II. RELEVANT LAW AND PRACTICE A. Domestic law and practice 70. The relevant domestic law provisions relied on by the judicial authorities in the instant case are set out below. 1. The Criminal Code Article 188 “ Whoever by use of force or threats compels another person to do or not to do something or to obtain the latter ’ s permission to do something ... will be sentenced to between six months ’ and one year ’ s imprisonment, and a major fine of between one thousand and three thousand liras ...” Article 191 § 1 “Whoever, apart from the situations set out in law, threatens another person with severe and unjust damage will be sentenced to six months ’ imprisonment.” Article 449 “If the act of homicide is: ( a ) committed against a wife, husband, sister or brother, adoptive mother, adopted child, stepmother, stepfather, stepchild, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter -in-law ... the offender will be sentenced to life imprisonment ...” Article 456 § § 1, 2 and 4 “ Whoever torments another person physically or damages his or her welfare or causes cerebral damage, without intending murder, will be sentenced to between six months ’ and one year ’ s imprisonment. Where the act constitutes a danger to the victim ’ s life or causes constant weakness in one of the organs or senses, or permanent difficulty in speech or permanent injuries to the face, or physical or mental illness for twenty or more days, or prevents [the victim] from continuing his regular work for the same number of days, the offender will be sentenced to between two and five years ’ imprisonment. ... If the act did not cause any illness or did not prevent [the victim] from continuing his regular work or these situations did not last for more than ten days, the offender will be sentenced to between two and six months ’ imprisonment or to a heavy fine of twelve thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand liras, provided that the injured person complains ...” Article 457 “If the acts mentioned in Article 456 are committed against the persons cited in Article 449 or if the act is committed by a hidden or visible weapon or harmful chemical, the punishment shall be increased by one - third to a half of the main sentence.” Article 460 “In situations mentioned under Articles 456 and 459, where commencement of the prosecution depends on the lodging of a complaint [by the victim], if the complainant waives his/her claims before the pronouncement of the final judgment the public prosecution shall be terminated.” 2. The Family Protection Act (Law no. 4320 of 14 January 1998) Section 1 “If a spouse or a child or another family member living under the same roof is subjected to domestic violence and if the magistrate ’ s court dealing with civil matters is notified of the fact by that person or by the Chief Public Prosecutor ’ s Office, the judge, taking account of the nature of the incident, may on his or her own initiative order one or more of the following measures or other similar measures as he or she deems appropriate. The offending spouse may be ordered: (a) not to engage in violent or threatening behaviour against the other spouse or the children (or other family members living under the same roof); (b) to leave the shared home and relinquish it to the other spouse and the children, if any, and not to approach the home in which the other spouse and the children are living, or their workplaces; (c) not to damage the property of the other spouse (or of the children or other family members living under the same roof); (d) not to disturb the other spouse or the children (or other family members living under the same roof) through the use of communication devices; (e) to surrender any weapons or similar instruments to law-enforcement officials; (f) not to arrive at the shared home when under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicating substances, or not to use such substances in the shared home. The above ‑ mentioned measures shall be applied for a period not exceeding six months. In the order, the offending spouse shall be warned that in the event of failure to comply with the measures imposed, he or she will be arrested and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The judge may order interim maintenance payments, taking account of the victim ’ s standard of living. Applications made under section 1 shall not be subject to court fees. ” Section 2 “ The court shall transmit a copy of the protection order to the Chief Public Prosecutor ’ s Office. The Chief Public Prosecutor ’ s Office shall monitor implementation of the order by means of the law-enforcement agencies. In the event of failure to comply with the protection order, the law-enforcement agency shall conduct an investigation on its own initiative, without the victim being required to lodge a complaint, and shall transmit the documents to the Chief Public Prosecutor ’ s Office without delay. The Chief Public Prosecutor ’ s Office shall bring a public prosecution in the magistrate ’ s court against a spouse who fails to comply with a protection order. The location and expeditious holding of the hearing in the case shall be subject to the provisions of Law no. 3005 on the procedure governing in flagrante delicto cases. Even if the act in question constitutes a separate offence, a spouse who fails to comply with a protection order shall also be sentenced to three to six months ’ imprisonment. ” 3. Implementing regulations for the Family Protection Act, dated 1 March 2008 71. These regulations, which were drawn up to govern the implementation of Law no. 4320, set out the measures to be taken in respect of the family members perpetrating violence and the procedures and principles governing the application of those measures, in order to protect family members subjected to domestic violence. B. Relevant international and comparative - law materials 1. The United Nations ’ position with regard to domestic violence and discrimination against women 72. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly and ratified by Turkey on 19 January 1986. 73. The CEDAW defines discrimination against women as “ ... any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” As regards the States ’ obligations, Article 2 of the CEDAW provides, in so far as relevant, the following: “States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: ... (e) to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organisation or enterprise; (f) to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women; ... ” 74. The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (hereinafter “the CEDAW Committee”) has found that “gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women ’ s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men” and is thus prohibited under Article 1 of the CEDAW. Within the general category of gender-based violence, the CEDAW Committee includes violence by “private act” [2] and “family violence” [3]. Consequently, gender-based violence triggers duties in States. General Recommendation No. 19 sets out a catalogue of such duties. They include a duty on States to “take all legal and other measures that are necessary to provide effective protection of women against gender-based violence ” [4], “ including penal sanctions, civil remedies and compensatory provisions to protect women against all kinds of violence” [5]. In its Concluding Comments on the combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Turkey (hereinafter “ the Concluding Comments”), the CEDAW Committee reiterated that violence against women, including domestic violence, is a form of discrimination (see UN doc. CEDAW/C/TUR/4-5 and Corr.1, 15 February 2005, § 28). 75. Furthermore, in its explanations of General Recommendation No. 19, the CEDAW Committee considered the following: “... 6. The Convention in Article 1 defines discrimination against women. The definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention violence. 7. Gender-based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. Comments on specific Articles of the Convention ... Articles 2 (f), 5 and 10 (c) 11. Traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men or as having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices involving violence or coercion, such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid attacks and female circumcision. Such prejudices and practices may justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or control of women. The effect of such violence on the physical and mental integrity of women is to deprive them the equal enjoyment, exercise and knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms. While this comment addresses mainly actual or threatened violence the underlying consequences of these forms of gender-based violence help to maintain women in subordinate roles and contribute to the low level of political participation and to their lower level of education, skills and work opportunities.” 76. In the case of A.T. v. Hungary (decision of 26 January 2005), where the applicant had alleged that her common-law husband and father of her two children had been physically abusing and threatening her from 1998 onwards, the CEDAW Committee directed Hungary to take measures “to guarantee the physical and mental integrity of the applicant and her family”, as well as to ensure that she was provided with a safe place of residence to live with her children, and that she received child support, legal assistance and compensation in proportion to the harm sustained and the violation of her rights. The Committee also made several general recommendations to Hungary on improving the protection of women against domestic violence, such as establishing effective investigative, legal and judicial processes, and increasing treatment and support resources. 77. In the case of Fatma Yıldırım v. Austria (decision of 1 October 2007), which concerned the killing of Mrs Yıldırım by her husband, the CEDAW Committee found that the State Party had breached its due diligence obligation to protect Fatma Yıldırım. It therefore concluded that the State Party had violated its obligations under Article 2 (a) and (c) to (f), and Article 3 of the CEDAW read in conjunction with Article 1 of the CEDAW and General Recommendation No. 19 of the CEDAW Committee and the corresponding rights of the deceased Fatma Yıldırım to life and to physical and mental integrity. 78. The United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993), in its Article 4 (c), urges States to “exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or private persons”. 79. In his third report, of 20 January 2006, to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (E/CN.4/2006/61), the special rapporteur on violence against women considered that there is a rule of customary international law that “obliges States to prevent and respond to acts of violence against women with due diligence”. 2. The Council of Europe 80. In its Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of 30 April 2002 on the protection of women against violence, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated, inter alia, that member States should introduce, develop and/or improve where necessary national policies against violence based on maximum safety and protection of victims, support and assistance, adjustment of the criminal and civil law, raising of public awareness, training for professionals confronted with violence against women, and prevention. 81. The Committee of Ministers recommended, in particular, that member States should penalise serious violence against women such as sexual violence and rape, abuse of the vulnerability of pregnant, defenceless, ill, disabled or dependent victims, as well as penalising abuse of position by the perpetrator. The Recommendation also stated that member States should ensure that all victims of violence are able to institute proceedings, make provisions to ensure that criminal proceedings can be initiated by the public prosecutor, encourage prosecutors to regard violence against women as an aggravating or decisive factor in deciding whether or not to prosecute in the public interest, ensure where necessary that measures are taken to protect victims effectively against threats and possible acts of revenge and take specific measures to ensure that children ’ s rights are protected during proceedings. 82. With regard to violence within the family, the Committee of Ministers recommended that member States should classify all forms of violence within the family as criminal offences and envisage the possibility of taking measures in order, inter alia, to enable the judiciary to adopt interim measures aimed at protecting victims, to ban the perpetrator from contacting, communicating with or approaching the victim, or residing in or entering defined areas, to penalise all breaches of the measures imposed on the perpetrator and to establish a compulsory protocol for operation by the police, medical and social services. 3. The Inter-American System 83. In Velazquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated: “An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of an act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.” [6] 84. The legal basis for the ultimate attribution of responsibility to a State for private acts relies on State failure to comply with the duty to ensure human rights protection, as set out in Article 1 § 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights [7]. The Inter-American Court ’ s case-law reflects this principle by repeatedly holding States internationally responsible on account of their lack of due diligence to prevent human rights violations, to investigate and sanction perpetrators or to provide appropriate reparations to their families. 85. The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women 1994 ( the Belém do Pará Convention) [8] sets out States ’ duties relating to the eradication of gender - based violence. It is the only multilateral human rights treaty to deal solely with violence against women. 86. The Inter-American Commission adopts the Inter-American Court of Human Right ’ s approach to the attribution of State responsibility for the acts and omissions of private individuals. In the case of Maria Da Penha v. Brazil [9], the Commission found that the State ’ s failure to exercise due diligence to prevent and investigate a domestic violence complaint warranted a finding of State responsibility under the American Convention on Human Rights and the Belém do Pará Convention. Furthermore, Brazil had violated the rights of the applicant and failed to carry out its duty ( inter alia, under Article 7 of the Belém do Pará Convention, obliging States to condemn all forms of violence against women), as a result of its failure to act and its tolerance of the violence inflicted. Specifically, the Commission held that: “... tolerance by the State organs is not limited to this case; rather, it is a pattern. The condoning of this situation by the entire system only serves to perpetuate the psychological, social, and historical roots and factors that sustain and encourage violence against women. Given the fact that the violence suffered by Maria da Penha is part of a general pattern of negligence and lack of effective action by the State in prosecuting and convicting aggressors, it is the view of the Commission that this case involves not only failure to fulfil the obligation with respect to prosecute and convict, but also the obligation to prevent these degrading practices. That general and discriminatory judicial ineffectiveness also creates a climate that is conducive to domestic violence, since society sees no evidence of willingness by the State, as the representative of the society, to take effective action to sanction such acts.” [10] 4. Comparative- law materials 87. In eleven member States of the Council of Europe, namely in Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Spain and Switzerland, the authorities are required to continue criminal proceedings despite the victim ’ s withdrawal of complaint in cases of domestic violence. 88. In twenty - seven member States, namely in Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, “ the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ”, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey and Ukraine, the authorities have a margin of discretion in deciding whether to pursue criminal proceedings against perpetrators of domestic violence. A significant number of legal systems make a distinction between crimes which are privately prosecutable (and for which the victim ’ s complaint is a prerequisite) and those which are publicly prosecutable (usually more serious offences for which prosecution is considered to be in the public interest). 89. It appears from the legislation and practice of the above-mentioned twenty - seven countries that the decision on whether to proceed where the victim withdraws his/her complaint lies within the discretion of the prosecuting authorities, which primarily take into account the public interest in continuing criminal proceedings. In some jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, in deciding whether to pursue criminal proceedings against the perpetrators of domestic violence the prosecuting authorities (Crown Prosecution Service) are required to consider certain factors, including: the seriousness of the offence; whether the victim ’ s injuries are physical or psychological; if the defendant used a weapon; if the defendant has made any threats since the attack; if the defendant planned the attack; the effect (including psychological) on any children living in the household; the chances of the defendant offending again; the continuing threat to the health and safety of the victim or anyone else who was, or could become, involved; the current state of the victim ’ s relationship with the defendant; the effect on that relationship of continuing with the prosecution against the victim ’ s wishes; the history of the relationship, particularly if there was any other violence in the past; and the defendant ’ s criminal history, particularly any previous violence. Direct reference is made to the need to strike a balance between the victim ’ s and any children ’ s Article 2 and Article 8 rights in deciding on a course of action. 90. Romania seems to be the only State which bases the continuance of criminal proceedings entirely, and in all circumstances, on the wishes/complaints of the victim. C. Reports concerning domestic violence and the situation of women in Turkey 1. The opinion of the Purple Roof Women ’ s Shelter Foundation (Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı Vakfı – “the Mor Çatı Foundation ” ) on the implementation of Law no. 4320, dated 7 July 2007 91. According to this report, Law no. 4320 (see paragraph 70 above) is not yet being fully implemented. In recent years there has been an increase in “protection orders” or injunctions issued by family courts. However, some courts, in response to applications made to them by women in mortal danger, are still setting hearings two or even three months ahead. Under these circumstances, judges and prosecutors treat an action under Law no. 4320 as if it were a form of divorce action, whereas the point of the Law is to take urgent action on behalf of women who are seeking to protect their own lives. Once the injunction has been issued, women are confronted with a number of problems with its implementation. 92. In the two years before the report was released approximately 900 women applied to the Mor Çatı Foundation and made great efforts to use Law no. 4320, but of this number only 120 succeeded. The Mor Çatı Foundation has identified serious problems with the implementation of Law no. 4320. In particular, it was observed that domestic violence is still treated with tolerance at police stations, and that some police officers try to act as arbitrators, or take the side of the male, or suggest that the woman drop her complaint. There are also serious problems in serving the injunction issued by a court under Law no. 4320 on the husband. In the case of a number of women wishing to work with the Mor Çatı Foundation, injunctions were not implemented because their husbands were police officers or had friendly relations with officers at the police station in question. 93. Furthermore, there are unreasonable delays in issuing injunctions by the courts. This results from the attitude of the courts in treating domestic violence complaints as a form of divorce action. It is considered that behind such delays lies a suspicion that women might be making such applications when they have not suffered violence. The allegations that women abuse Law no. 4320 are not correct. Since the economic burden of the home lies almost 100% with men, it would be impossible for women to request implementation of Law no. 4320 unless they were confronted with mortal danger. Finally, the injunctions at issue are generally narrow in scope or are not extended by the courts. 2. Research report prepared by the Women ’ s Rights Information and Implementation Centre of the Diyarbakır Bar Association (KA ‑ MER) on the Implementation of Law no. 4320, dated 25 November 2005 94. According to this report, a culture of violence has developed in Turkey and violence is tolerated in many areas of life. A survey of legal actions at a magistrate ’ s court dealing with civil matters ( sulh hukuk mahkemesi ) and three civil courts ( asliye hukuk mahkemesi ) in Diyarbakır identified 183 actions brought under Law no. 4320 from the date on which the Law entered into force in 1998 until September 2005. In 104 of these cases, the court ordered various measures, while in the remaining 79 actions the court held that there were no grounds for making an order, or dismissed the action, or ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. 95. Despite the importance of the problem of domestic violence, very few applications have been made under the said Law, because either the public is not generally aware of it or the level of confidence in the security forces is very low in the region. The most important problems were caused by the delay in issuing injunctions and the authorities ’ failure to monitor the implementation of injunctions. 96. Moreover, the negative attitude of police officers at police stations towards victims of domestic violence is one of the obstacles preventing women from using this Law. Women who go to police stations because they are subjected to domestic violence are confronted with attitudes which tend to regard the problem as a private family matter into which the police are reluctant to interfere. 97. This report makes recommendations to improve the implementation of Law no. 4320 and to enhance the protection of victims of domestic violence. 3. Diyarbakır KA-MER Emergency Helpline statistics for the period 1 August 1997 to 30 June 2007 98. This statistical information report was prepared following interviews conducted with 2,484 women. It appears that all of the complainants were subjected to psychological violence and approximately 60% were subjected to physical violence. The highest number of victims is in the 20-30 age group (43%). 57% of these women are married. The majority of victims are illiterate or of a low level of education. 78% of the women are of Kurdish origin. 91% of the victims who called the emergency helpline are from Diyarbakır. 85% of the victims have no independent source of income. 4. Amnesty International ’ s 2004 report entitled “Turkey: women confronting family violence” 99. According to this report, statistical information about the extent of violence against women in Turkey is limited and unreliable. Nonetheless, it appears that a culture of domestic violence has placed women in double jeopardy, both as victims of violence and because they are denied effective access to justice. Women from vulnerable groups, such as those from low-income families or who are fleeing conflict or natural disasters, are particularly at risk. In this connection, it was found that crimes against women in south - east Turkey have gone largely unpunished. 100. It was noted that women ’ s rights defenders struggle to combat community attitudes, which are tolerant of violence against women and are frequently shared by judges, senior government officials and opinion leaders in society. Even after legislative reforms have removed the legal authorisation for discriminatory treatment, attitudes that pressure women to conform to certain codes of behaviour restrict women ’ s life choices. 101. The report states that at every level of the criminal justice system the authorities fail to respond promptly or rigorously to women ’ s complaints of rape, sexual assault or other violence within the family. The police are reluctant to prevent and investigate family violence, including the violent deaths of women. Prosecutors refuse to open investigations into cases involving domestic violence or to order protective measures for women at risk from their family or community. The police and courts do not ensure that men, who are served with court orders, including protection orders, comply with them. They accord them undue leniency in sentencing, on the grounds of “provocation” by their victim and on the flimsiest of evidence. 102. There are many barriers facing women who need access to justice and protection from violence. Police officers often believe that their duty is to encourage women to return home and “make peace” and fail to investigate the women ’ s complaints. Many women, particularly in rural areas, are unable to make formal complaints, because leaving their neighbourhoods subjects them to intense scrutiny, criticism and, in some cases, violence. 103. Furthermore, although some courts appear to have begun implementing the reforms, the discretion accorded to the courts continues to accord the perpetrators of domestic violence unwarranted leniency. Sentences in such cases are still frequently reduced at the discretion of the judges, who continue to take into account the “severe provocation” of the offence to custom, tradition or honour. 104. Finally, this report makes a number of recommendations to the Turkish government and to community and religious authorities with a view to addressing the problem of domestic violence. 5. Report on Honour Crimes, prepared by the Diyarbakır Bar Association ’ s Justice For All Project and the Women ’ s Rights Information and Implementation Centre 105. This report was prepared in order to look into the judicial dimensions of the phenomenon of so-called “honour crimes”. A survey was carried out of judgments in cases before the Diyarbakır assize courts and children ’ s courts. The purpose of the survey was to identify the proportion of such unlawful killings referred to the courts, the judiciary ’ s attitude to them, the defendants ’ lines of defence in these cases, the role of social structure ( that is, family councils and custom) and the reasons for the murders. To that end, cases in the Diyarbakır assize courts and children ’ s courts between 1999 and 2005 were examined. In these seven years, 59 cases were identified in which a judgment was given. In these cases, there were 71 victims/persons killed, and 81 people were tried as defendants. 106. According to the researchers, in cases where the victim/person killed was male, it was observed that defendants claimed, in their defence, that the victim/person killed had raped, sexually assaulted, or abducted a relative of the defendant, or had attempted to draw a relative of the defendant into prostitution. In cases where the victim/person killed was a woman, defendants alleged, in their defence, that the victim/person killed had been talking to other men, had taken up prostitution, or had committed adultery. In 46 of the judgments, mitigating provisions concerning unjustified provocation were applied. In cases of 61 convictions, the provisions of Article 59 of the Turkish Criminal Code concerning discretionary mitigation were applied. THE LAW I. ADMISSIBILITY 107. The Government contested the admissibility of the application on two grounds. A. Failure to observe the six-month rule under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention 108. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to observe the six-month time-limit in respect of the events which had taken place before 2001. They argued that the events which had taken place between 1995 and 2001 should be considered as out of time. If the applicant was not satisfied with the decisions given by the domestic authorities subsequent to the events which had taken place during the above- mentioned period, she should have submitted her application to the Commission or, following the entry into force of Protocol No. 11, to the Court within six months of each decision. 109. The applicant claimed that she had lodged her application within six months of the impugned events. In her opinion the events should be taken as a whole and should not be examined separately. 110. The Court reiterates that the purpose of the six-month rule under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention is to promote security of law and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable time (see Kenar v. Turkey (dec.), no. 67215/01, 1 December 2005). According to its well-established case-law, where no domestic remedy is available the six-month period runs from the date of the act complained of. 111. In that regard, the Court notes that from 10 April 1995 the applicant and her mother had been victims of multiple assaults and threats by H.O. against their physical integrity. These acts of violence had resulted in the death of the applicant ’ s mother and caused the applicant intense suffering and anguish. While there were intervals between the impugned events, the Court considers that the overall violence to which the applicant and her mother were subjected over a long period of time cannot be seen as individual and separate episodes and must therefore be considered together as a chain of connected events. 112. This being so, the Court notes that the applicant has submitted her application within six months of the killing of her mother by H.O., which event may be considered as the time that she became aware of the ineffectiveness of the remedies in domestic law, as a result of the authorities ’ failure to stop H.O. committing further violence. Given that these circumstances do not disclose any indication of a delay on the part of the applicant in introducing her application once it became apparent that no redress for her complaints was forthcoming, the Court considers that the relevant date for the purposes of the six-month time-limit should not be considered to be a date earlier than at least 13 March 2002 (see paragraph 54 above). In any event, the applicant ’ s former husband had continued to issue threats against her life and well-being and, therefore, it cannot be said that the said pattern of violence has come to an end (see paragraphs 59-69 above). 113. In the specific context of this case, it follows that the applicant ’ s complaints have been introduced within the six-month time-limit required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The Court therefore dismisses the Government ’ s preliminary objection in this regard. B. Failure to exhaust domestic remedies 114. The Government further contended that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies since she and her mother had withdrawn their complaints many times and had caused the termination of the criminal proceedings against the applicant. They maintained that the applicant had also not availed herself of the protection afforded by Law no. 4320 and that she had prevented the public prosecutor from applying to the family court, in that she had withdrawn her complaints. They submitted further that the applicant could have availed herself of the administrative and civil law remedies whose effectiveness had been recognised by the Court in previous cases (citing Aytekin v. Turkey, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII). Finally, relying on the Court ’ s judgments in Ahmet Sadık v. Greece (15 November 1996, § 34, Reports 1996-V) and Cardot v. France (19 March 1991, § 30, Series A no. 200), the Government claimed that the applicant had failed to raise, even in substance, her complaints of discrimination before the national authorities and that, therefore, these complaints should be declared inadmissible. 115. The applicant claimed that she had exhausted all available remedies in domestic law. She argued that the domestic remedies had proven to be ineffective given the failure of the authorities to protect her mother ’ s life and to prevent her husband from inflicting ill-treatment on her and her mother. As regards the Government ’ s reliance on Law no. 4320, to the effect that she had not availed herself of the remedies therein, the applicant noted that the said law had come into force on 14 January 1998, whereas a significant part of the events at issue had taken place prior to that date. Prior to the entry into force of Law no. 4320, there was no mechanism for protection against domestic violence. In any event, despite her numerous criminal complaints to the Chief Public Prosecutor ’ s Office, none of the protective measures provided for in Law no. 4320 had been taken to protect the life and well-being of the applicant and her mother. 116. The Court observes that the main question with regard to the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies is whether the applicants have failed to make use of available remedies in domestic law, particularly those provided by Law no. 4320, and whether the domestic authorities were required to pursue the criminal proceedings against the applicant ’ s husband despite the withdrawal of complaints by the victims. These questions are inextricably linked to the question of the effectiveness of the domestic remedies in providing sufficient safeguards for the applicant and her mother against domestic violence. Accordingly, the Court joins these questions to the merits and will examine them under Articles 2, 3 and 14 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Şemsi Önen v. Turkey, no. 22876/93, § 77, 14 May 2002). 117. In view of the above, the Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION 118. The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to safeguard the right to life of her mother, who had been killed by her husband, in violation of Article 2 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides: “Everyone ’ s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law ...” A. The parties ’ submissions 1. The applicant 119. The applicant asserted at the outset that domestic violence was tolerated by the authorities and society and that the perpetrators of domestic violence enjoyed impunity. In this connection, she pointed out that, despite their numerous criminal complaints to the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor ’ s Office, none of the protective measures provided for in Law no. 4320 had been taken to protect the life and well-being of herself and her mother. Conversely, on a number of occasions, the authorities had tried to persuade the applicant and her mother to abandon their complaints against H.O. The domestic authorities had remained totally passive in the face of death threats issued by H.O. and had left her and her mother to the mercy of their aggressor. 120. The applicant pointed out that, by a petition dated 27 February 2002, her mother had applied to the Chief Public Prosecutor ’ s Office and had informed the authorities of the death threats issued by H.O. However, the public prosecutor had done nothing to protect the life of the deceased. In the applicant ’ s opinion, the fact that the authorities had not taken her mother ’ s complaint seriously was a clear indication that domestic violence was tolerated by society and the national authorities. 121. The applicant also claimed that, although H.O. had been convicted of murder, the punishment imposed on him was not a deterrent and was considerably less than the normal sentence imposed for murder. The imposition of a lenient sentence had resulted from the fact that, in his defence submissions before the Assize Court, the accused had claimed to have killed her mother in order to protect his honour. It was the general practice of the criminal courts in Turkey to mitigate sentences in cases of “honour crimes”. In cases concerning “honour crimes”, the criminal courts imposed a very lenient punishment or no punishment at all on the perpetrators of such crimes. 2. The Government 122. The Government stressed that the local authorities had provided immediate and tangible follow-up to the complaints lodged by the applicant and her mother. In this connection, subsequent to the filing of their complaints, the authorities had registered the complaints, conducted medical examinations, heard witnesses, conducted a survey of the scenes of the incidents and transmitted the complaints to the competent legal authorities. When necessary and depending on the gravity of the incident, the aggressor had been remanded in custody and had been convicted by the criminal courts. These proceedings had been carried out within the shortest time possible. The authorities had displayed diligence and were sensitive to the complaints, and no negligence had been shown. 123. However, by withdrawing their complaints, the applicant and her mother had prevented the authorities from pursuing criminal proceedings against H.O. and had thus contributed to the impunity enjoyed by the aggressor. In this regard, it did not appear from the case file that the applicant and her mother had withdrawn their complaints as a result of any pressure exerted on them either by H.O. or the public prosecutor in charge of the investigation. The pursuit of criminal proceedings against the aggressor was dependent on the complaints lodged or pursued by the applicant, since the criminal acts in question had not resulted in sickness or unfitness for work for ten days or more, within the meaning of Articles 456 § 4, 457 and 460 of the Criminal Code. Furthermore, in most cases the criminal courts had not convicted H.O. because the evidence against him was insufficient. Accordingly, the authorities could not be expected to separate the applicant and her husband and convict the latter while they were living together as a family, as this would amount to a breach of their rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 124. As regards the petition filed by the applicant ’ s mother on 27 February 2002, the Government claimed that the content of this petition was no different to the previous ones and was of a general nature. There was no tangible fact or specific indication that her life was indeed in danger. In the petition the mother had failed to request any protection at all but she had merely requested a speedy examination of her complaint and the punishment of the applicant ’ s husband. Nonetheless, subsequent to the receipt of the petition dated 27 February 2002, the authorities had registered the complaint and had held a hearing on 27 May 2002, which had been followed by other hearings. Finally, following the killing of the applicant ’ s mother by H.O., the latter had been convicted and had received a heavy punishment. 3. Interights, the third-party intervener 125. Referring to international practice, Interights submitted that where the national authorities failed to act with due diligence to prevent violence against women, including violence by private actors, or to investigate, prosecute and punish such violence, the State might be responsible for such acts. The jus cogens nature of the right to freedom from torture and the right to life required exemplary diligence on the part of the State with respect to investigation and prosecution of these acts. 126. In the context of domestic violence, victims were often intimidated or threatened into either not reporting the crime or withdrawing complaints. However, the responsibility to ensure accountability and guard against impunity lay with the State, not with the victim. International practice recognised that a broad range of interested persons, not just the victim, should be able to report and initiate an investigation into domestic violence. Further, international practice increasingly suggested that where there was sufficient evidence and it was considered in the public interest, prosecution of perpetrators of domestic violence should continue even when a victim withdrew her complaint. These developments indicated a trend away from requiring victim participation towards placing the responsibility for effective prosecution squarely on the State. 127. While a decision not to prosecute in a particular case would not necessarily be in breach of due diligence obligations, a law or practice which automatically paralysed a domestic violence investigation or prosecution where a victim withdrew her complaint would be. In respect of these obligations and with reference to the Fatma Yıldırım v. Austria decision of the CEDAW Committee (cited in the relevant international materials section above ), it was submitted that the State had not only to ensure an appropriate legislative framework, but also to ensure effective implementation and enforcement practice. B. The Court ’ s assessment 1. Alleged failure to protect the applicant ’ s mother ’ s life ( a) Relevant principles 128. The Court reiterates that the first sentence of Article 2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, § 36, Reports 1998-III). This involves a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. It also extends in appropriate circumstances to a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, § 115, Reports 1998-VIII, cited in Kontrová v. Slovakia, no. 7510/04, § 49, 31 May 2007 ). 129. Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the scope of the positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Not every claimed risk to life, therefore, can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. Another relevant consideration is the need to ensure that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice, including the guarantees contained in Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention (see Osman, cited above, § 116). 130. In the opinion of the Court, where there is an allegation that the authorities have violated their positive obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their above-mentioned duty to prevent and suppress offences against the person, it must be established to its satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. Furthermore, having regard to the nature of the right protected by Article 2, a right fundamental in the scheme of the Convention, it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge. This is a question which can only be answered in the light of all the circumstances of any particular case ( ibid.). ( b) Application of the above principles to the present case ( i) Scope of the case 131. On the above understanding, the Court will ascertain whether the national authorities have fulfilled their positive obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect the applicant ’ s mother ’ s right to life. In this connection, it must establish whether the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of the applicant ’ s mother from criminal acts by H.O. As it appears from the parties ’ submissions, a crucial question in the instant case is whether the local authorities displayed due diligence to prevent violence against the applicant and her mother, in particular by pursuing criminal or other appropriate preventive measures against H.O. despite the withdrawal of complaints by the victims. 132. However, before embarking upon these issues, the Court must stress that the issue of domestic violence, which can take various forms ranging from physical to psychological violence or verbal abuse, cannot be confined to the circumstances of the present case. It is a general problem which concerns all member States and which does not always surface since it often takes place within personal relationships or closed circuits and it is not only women who are affected. The Court acknowledges that men may also be the victims of domestic violence and, indeed, that children, too, are often casualties of the phenomenon, whether directly or indirectly. Accordingly, the Court will bear in mind the gravity of the problem at issue when examining the present case ( ii) Whether the local authorities could have foreseen a lethal attack from H.O. 133. Turning to the circumstances of the case, the Court observes that the applicant and her husband, H.O., had a problematic relationship from the very beginning. As a result of disagreements, H.O. resorted to violence against the applicant and the applicant ’ s mother therefore intervened in their relationship in order to protect her daughter. She thus became a target for H.O., who blamed her for being the cause of their problems (see paragraph 28 above). In this connection, the Court considers it important to highlight some events and the authorities ’ reaction. (i) On 10 April 1995 H.O. and A.O. beat up the applicant and her mother, causing severe physical injuries, and threatened to kill them. Although the applicant and her mother initially filed a criminal complaint about this event, the criminal proceedings against H.O. and A.O. were terminated because the victims withdrew their complaints (see paragraphs 9-11 above). (ii) On 11 April 1996 H.O. again beat the applicant, causing life-threatening injuries. H.O. was remanded in custody and a criminal prosecution was commenced against him for aggravated bodily harm. However, following the release of H.O., the applicant withdrew her complaint and the charges against H.O. were dropped (see paragraphs 13-19 above). (iii) On 5 February 1998 H.O. assaulted the applicant and her mother using a knife. All three were severely injured and the public prosecutor decided not to prosecute anyone on the ground that there was insufficient evidence (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above). (iv) On 4 March 1998 H.O. ran his car into the applicant and her mother. Both victims suffered severe injuries, and the medical reports indicated that the applicant was unfit for work for seven days and that her mother ’ s injuries were life-threatening. Subsequent to this incident, the victims asked the Chief Public Prosecutor ’ s Office to take protective measures in view of the death threats issued by H.O., and the applicant initiated divorce proceedings. The police investigation into the victims ’ allegations of death threats concluded that both parties had threatened each other and that the applicant ’ s mother had made such allegations in order to separate her daughter from H.O. for the purpose of revenge, and had also “wasted” the security forces ’ time. Criminal proceedings were instituted against H.O. for issuing death threats and attempted murder, but following H.O. ’ s release from custody (see paragraph 31 above) the applicant and her mother again withdrew their complaints. This time, although the prosecuting authorities dropped the charges against H.O. for issuing death threats and hitting the applicant, the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted him for causing injuries to the mother and sentenced him to three months ’ imprisonment, which was later commuted to a fine (see paragraphs 23-36 above). (v) On 29 October 2001 H.O. stabbed the applicant seven times following her visit to her mother. H.O. surrendered to the police claiming that he had attacked his wife in the course of a fight caused by his mother-in-law ’ s interference with their marriage. After taking H.O. ’ s statements the police officers released him. However, the applicant ’ s mother applied to the Chief Public Prosecutor ’ s Office seeking the detention of H.O., and also claimed that she and her daughter had had to withdraw their complaints in the past because of death threats and pressure by H.O. As a result, H.O. was convicted of knife assault and sentenced to a fine (see paragraphs 37-44 above). (vi) On 14 November 2001 H.O. threatened the applicant but the prosecuting authorities did not press charges for lack of concrete evidence (see paragraphs 45 and 46 above). (vii) On 19 November 2001 the applicant ’ s mother filed a petition with the local public prosecutor ’ s office, complaining about the ongoing death threats and harassment by H.O., who had been carrying weapons. Again, the police took statements from H.O. and released him, but the public prosecutor pressed charges against him for making death threats (see paragraphs 47 ‑ 49 above ). (viii) Later, on 27 February 2002, the applicant ’ s mother applied to the public prosecutor ’ s office, informing him that H.O. ’ s threats had intensified and that their lives were in immediate danger. She therefore asked the police to take action against H.O. The police took statements from H.O. and the Diyarbakır Magistrate ’ s Court questioned him about the allegations only after the killing of the applicant ’ s mother. H.O. denied the allegations and claimed that he did not wish his wife to visit her mother, who was living an immoral life (see paragraphs 51-52 above). 134. In view of the above events, it appears that there was an escalating violence against the applicant and her mother by H.O. The crimes committed by H.O. were sufficiently serious to warrant preventive measures and there was a continuing threat to the health and safety of the victims. When examining the history of the relationship, it was obvious that the perpetrator had a record of domestic violence and there was therefore a significant risk of further violence. 135. Furthermore, the victims ’ situations were also known to the authorities and the mother had submitted a petition to the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor ’ s Office, stating that her life was in immediate danger and requesting the police to take action against H.O. However, the authorities ’ reaction to the applicant ’ s mother ’ s request was limited to taking statements from H.O. about the mother ’ s allegations. Approximately two weeks after this request, on 11 March 2002, he killed the applicant ’ s mother (see paragraph 54 above ). 136. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that the local authorities could have foreseen a lethal attack by H.O. While the Court cannot conclude with certainty that matters would have turned out differently and that the killing would not have occurred if the authorities had acted otherwise, it reiterates that a failure to take reasonable measures which could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm is sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State (see E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 33218/96, § 99, 26 November 2002 ). Therefore, the Court will next examine to what extent the authorities took measures to prevent the killing of the applicant ’ s mother. ( iii) Whether the authorities displayed due diligence to prevent the killing of the applicant ’ s mother 137. The Government claimed that each time the prosecuting authorities commenced criminal proceedings against H.O., they had to terminate those proceedings, in accordance with the domestic law, because the applicant and her mother withdrew their complaints. In their opinion, any further interference by the authorities would have amounted to a breach of the victims ’ Article 8 rights. The applicant explained that she and her mother had had to withdraw their complaints because of death threats and pressure exerted by H.O. 138. The Court notes at the outset that there seems to be no general consensus among States Parties regarding the pursuance of the criminal prosecution against perpetrators of domestic violence when the victim withdraws her complaints (see paragraphs 87 and 88 above). Nevertheless, there appears to be an acknowledgement of the duty on the part of the authorities to strike a balance between a victim ’ s Article 2, Article 3 or Article 8 rights in deciding on a course of action. In this connection, having examined the practices in the member States (see paragraph 89 above), the Court observes that there are certain factors that can be taken into account in deciding to pursue the prosecution: – the seriousness of the offence; – whether the victim ’ s injuries are physical or psychological; – if the defendant used a weapon; – if the defendant has made any threats since the attack; – if the defendant planned the attack; – the effect (including psychological) on any children living in the household; – the chances of the defendant offending again; – the continuing threat to the health and safety of the victim or anyone else who was, or could become, involved; – the current state of the victim ’ s relationship with the defendant and the effect on that relationship of continuing with the prosecution against the victim ’ s wishes; – the history of the relationship, particularly if there had been any other violence in the past; and – the defendant ’ s criminal history, particularly any previous violence. 139. It can be inferred from this practice that the more serious the offence or the greater the risk of further offences, the more likely that the prosecution should continue in the public interest, even if victims withdraw their complaints. 140. As regards the Government ’ s argument that any attempt by the authorities to separate the applicant and her husband would have amounted to a breach of their right to family life, and bearing in mind that under Turkish law there is no requirement to pursue the prosecution in cases where the victim withdraws her complaint and did not suffer injuries which renders her unfit for work for ten or more days, the Court will now examine whether the local authorities struck a proper balance between the victim ’ s Article 2 and Article 8 rights. 141. In this connection, the Court notes that H.O. resorted to violence from the very beginning of his relationship with the applicant. On many instances both the applicant and her mother suffered physical injuries and were subjected to psychological pressure, given the anguish and fear. For some assaults H.O. used lethal weapons, such as a knife or a shotgun, and he constantly issued death threats against the applicant and her mother. Having regard to the circumstances of the killing of the applicant ’ s mother, it may also be stated that H.O. had planned the attack, since he had been carrying a knife and a gun and had been wandering around the victim ’ s house on occasions prior to the attack (see paragraphs 47 and 54 above). 142. The applicant ’ s mother became a target as a result of her perceived involvement in the couple ’ s relationship, and the couple ’ s children can also be considered as victims on account of the psychological effects of the ongoing violence in the family home. As noted above, in the instant case, further violence was not only possible but even foreseeable, given the violent behaviour and criminal record of H.O., his continuing threat to the health and safety of the victims and the history of violence in the relationship (see paragraphs 10, 13, 23, 37, 45, 47 and 51 above). 143. In the Court ’ s opinion, it does not appear that the local authorities sufficiently considered the above factors when repeatedly deciding to discontinue the criminal proceedings against H.O. Instead, they seem to have given exclusive weight to the need to refrain from interfering with what they perceived to be a “family matter” (see paragraph 123 above). Moreover, there is no indication that the authorities considered the motives behind the withdrawal of the complaints. This is despite the applicant ’ s mother ’ s indication to the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor that she and her daughter had withdrawn their complaints because of the death threats issued and pressure exerted on them by H.O. (see paragraph 39 above). It is also striking that the victims withdrew their complaints when H.O. was at liberty or following his release from custody (see paragraphs 9-12, 17-19, 31 and 35 above). 144. As regards the Government ’ s argument that any further interference by the national authorities would have amounted to a breach of the victims ’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court notes its ruling in a similar case of domestic violence (see Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, no. 71127/01, § 83, 12 June 2008), where it held that the authorities ’ view that no assistance was required as the dispute concerned a “private matter” was incompatible with their positive obligations to secure the enjoyment of the applicants ’ rights. Moreover, the Court reiterates that, in some instances, the national authorities ’ interference with the private or family life of the individuals might be necessary in order to protect the health and rights of others or to prevent commission of criminal acts (see K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium, nos. 42758/98 and 45558/99, § 81, 17 February 2005). The seriousness of the risk to the applicant ’ s mother rendered such intervention by the authorities necessary in the present case. 145. However, the Court regrets to note that the criminal investigations in the instant case were strictly dependent on the pursuance of complaints by the applicant and her mother on account of the domestic - law provisions in force at the relevant time; namely Articles 456 § 4, 457 and 460 of the now defunct Criminal Code, which prevented the prosecuting authorities from pursuing the criminal investigations because the criminal acts in question had not resulted in sickness or unfitness for work for ten days or more (see paragraph 70 above). It observes that the application of the above- mentioned provisions and the cumulative failure of the domestic authorities to pursue criminal proceedings against H.O. deprived the applicant ’ s mother of the protection of her life and safety. In other words, the legislative framework then in force, particularly the minimum ten days ’ sickness unfitness requirement, fell short of the requirements inherent in the State ’ s positive obligations to establish and apply effectively a system punishing all forms of domestic violence and providing sufficient safeguards for the victims. The Court thus considers that, bearing in mind the seriousness of the crimes committed by H.O. in the past, the prosecuting authorities should have been able to pursue the proceedings as a matter of public interest, regardless of the victims ’ withdrawal of complaints (see, in this respect, Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of the Committee of the Ministers, paragraphs 80-82 above). 146. The legislative framework preventing effective protection for victims of domestic violence aside, the Court must also consider whether the local authorities displayed due diligence to protect the right to life of the applicant ’ s mother in other respects. 147. In this connection, the Court notes that despite the deceased ’ s complaint that H.O. had been harassing her, invading her privacy by wandering around her property and carrying knives and guns (see paragraph 47 above), the police and prosecuting authorities failed either to place H.O. in detention or to take other appropriate action in respect of the allegation that he had a shotgun and had made violent threats with it (see Kontrová, cited above, § 53). While the Government argued that there was no tangible evidence that the applicant ’ s mother ’ s life was in imminent danger, the Court observes that it is not in fact apparent that the authorities assessed the threat posed by H.O. and concluded that his detention was a disproportionate step in the circumstances; rather the authorities failed to address the issues at all. In any event, the Court would underline that in domestic violence cases perpetrators ’ rights cannot supersede victims ’ human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity (see the Fatma Yıldırım v. Austria and A.T. v. Hungary decisions of the CEDAW Committee, both cited above, §§ 12.1.5 and 9.3 respectively). 148. Furthermore, in the light of the State ’ s positive obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk, it might have been expected that the authorities, faced with a suspect known to have a criminal record of perpetrating violent attacks, would take special measures consonant with the gravity of the situation with a view to protecting the applicant ’ s mother. To that end, the local public prosecutor or the judge at the Diyarbakır Magistrate ’ s Court could have ordered on his/her initiative one or more of the protective measures enumerated under sections 1 and 2 of Law no. 4320 (see paragraph 70 above). They could also have issued an injunction with the effect of banning H.O. from contacting, communicating with or approaching the applicant ’ s mother or entering defined areas (see, in this respect, Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of the Committee of the Ministers, paragraph 82 above). On the contrary, in response to the applicant ’ s mother ’ s repeated requests for protection, the police and the Diyarbakır Magistrate ’ s Court merely took statements from H.O. and released him (see paragraphs 47-52 above). While the authorities remained passive for almost two weeks apart from taking statements, H.O. shot dead the applicant ’ s mother. 149. In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the national authorities cannot be considered to have displayed due diligence. They therefore failed in their positive obligation to protect the right to life of the applicant ’ s mother within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention. 2. The effectiveness of the criminal investigation into the killing of the applicant ’ s mother 150. The Court reiterates that the positive obligations laid down in the first sentence of Article 2 of the Convention also require by implication that an efficient and independent judicial system should be set in place by which the cause of a murder can be established and the guilty parties punished (see, mutatis mutandis, Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, § 51, ECHR 2002 -I ). The essential purpose of such investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, §§ 69 and 71, ECHR 2002-II ). A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in the context of an effective investigation within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention (see Yaşa v. Turkey, 2 September 1998, §§ 102 ‑ 04, Reports 1998-VI, and Çakıcı v. Turkey [GC], no. 2 3657/94, §§ 80-87 and 106, ECHR 1999-IV). It must be accepted that there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation. However, a prompt response by the authorities in investigating a use of lethal force may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of tolerance of unlawful acts (see Avşar v. Turkey, no. 25657/94, § 395, ECHR 2001-VII). 151. The Court notes that a comprehensive investigation has indeed been carried out by the authorities into the circumstances surrounding the killing of the applicant ’ s mother. However, although H.O. was tried and convicted of murder and illegal possession of a firearm by the Diyarbakır Assize Court, the proceedings are still pending before the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 57 and 58 above). Accordingly, the criminal proceedings in question, which have already lasted more than six years, cannot be described as a prompt response by the authorities in investigating an intentional killing where the perpetrator had already confessed to the crime. 3. Conclusion 152. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the above-mentioned failures rendered recourse to criminal and civil remedies equally ineffective in the circumstances. It accordingly dismisses the Government ’ s preliminary objection (see paragraph 114 above) based on non-exhaustion of these remedies. 153. Moreover, the Court concludes that the criminal - law system, as applied in the instant case, did not have an adequate deterrent effect capable of ensuring the effective prevention of the unlawful acts committed by H.O. The obstacles resulting from the legislation and failure to use the means available undermined the deterrent effect of the judicial system in place and the role it was required to play in preventing a violation of the applicant ’ s mother ’ s right to life as enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention. The Court reiterates in this connection that, once the situation has been brought to their attention, the national authorities cannot rely on the victim ’ s attitude for their failure to take adequate measures which could prevent the likelihood of an aggressor carrying out his threats against the physical integrity of the victim (see Osman, cited above, § 116). There has therefore been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 154. The applicant complained that she had been subjected to violence, injury and death threats several times but that the authorities were negligent towards her situation, which caused her pain and fear in violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which provides: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A. The parties ’ submissions 155. The applicant alleged that the injuries and anguish she had suffered as a result of the violence inflicted upon her by her husband had amounted to torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. Despite the ongoing violence and her repeated requests for help, however, the authorities had failed to protect her from her husband. It was as though the violence had been inflicted under State supervision. The insensitivity and tolerance shown by the authorities in the face of domestic violence had made her feel debased, hopeless and vulnerable. 156. The Government argued that the applicant ’ s withdrawal of complaints and her failure to cooperate with the authorities had prevented the prosecuting authorities from pursuing the criminal proceedings against her husband. They further claimed that, in addition to the available remedies under Law no. 4320, the applicant could have sought shelter in one of the guest houses set up to protect women with the cooperation of public institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In this respect, the applicant could have petitioned the Directorate of Social Services and Child Protection Agency for admission to one of the guest houses. The addresses of these guest houses were secret and they were protected by the authorities. 157. Interights maintained that States were required to take reasonable steps to act immediately to stop ill-treatment, whether by public or private actors, of which they have known or ought to have known. Given the opaque nature of domestic violence and the particular vulnerability of women who are too often frightened to report such violence, it is submitted that a heightened degree of vigilance is required of the State. B. The Court ’ s assessment 1. Applicable principles 158. The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Costello - Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, § 30, Series A no. 247 ‑ C ). 159. As regards the question whether the State could be held responsible, under Article 3, for the ill-treatment inflicted on persons by non-state actors, the Court reiterates that the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see, mutatis mutandis, H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, § 40, Reports 1997 ‑ III ). Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, against such serious breaches of personal integrity (see A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, § 22, Reports 1998 ‑ VI ). 2. Application of the above principles to the case 160. The Court considers that the applicant may be considered to fall within the group of “vulnerable individuals” entitled to State protection (see A. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 22). In this connection, it notes the violence suffered by the applicant in the past, the threats issued by H.O. following his release from prison and her fear of further violence as well as her social background, namely the vulnerable situation of women in south-east Turkey. 161. The Court observes also that the violence suffered by the applicant, in the form of physical injuries and psychological pressure, were sufficiently serious to amount to ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. 162. Therefore, the Court must next determine whether the national authorities have taken all reasonable measures to prevent the recurrence of violent attacks against the applicant ’ s physical integrity. 163. In carrying out this scrutiny, and bearing in mind that the Court provides final authoritative interpretation of the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention, the Court will consider whether the national authorities have sufficiently taken into account the principles flowing from its judgments on similar issues, even when they concern other States. 164. Furthermore, in interpreting the provisions of the Convention and the scope of the State ’ s obligations in specific cases (see, mutatis mutandis, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, §§ 85 and 86, ECHR 2008) the Court will also look for any consensus and common values emerging from the practices of European States and specialised international instruments, such as the CEDAW, as well as giving heed to the evolution of norms and principles in international law through other developments such as the Belém do Pará Convention, which specifically sets out States ’ duties relating to the eradication of gender-based violence. 165. Nevertheless, it is not the Court ’ s role to replace the national authorities and to choose in their stead from among the wide range of possible measures that could be taken to secure compliance with their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Bevacqua and S., cited above, § 82). Moreover, under Article 19 of the Convention and under the principle that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective rights, the Court has to ensure that a State ’ s obligation to protect the rights of those under its jurisdiction is adequately discharged (see Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria, no. 7888/03, § 61, 20 December 2007). 166. Turning to its examination of the facts, the Court notes that the local authorities, namely the police and public prosecutors, did not remain totally passive. After each incident involving violence, the applicant was taken for medical examination and criminal proceedings were instituted against her husband. The police and prosecuting authorities questioned H.O. in relation to his criminal acts, placed him in detention on two occasions, indicted him for issuing death threats and inflicting actual bodily harm and, subsequent to his conviction for stabbing the applicant seven times, sentenced him to pay a fine (see paragraphs 13, 24 and 44 above). 167. However, none of these measures were sufficient to stop H.O. from perpetrating further violence. In this respect, the Government blamed the applicant for withdrawing her complaints and failing to cooperate with the authorities, which prevented the latter from continuing the criminal proceedings against H.O., pursuant to the domestic law provisions requiring the active involvement of the victim (see paragraph 70 above). 168. The Court reiterates its opinion in respect of the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention, namely that the legislative framework should have enabled the prosecuting authorities to pursue the criminal investigations against H.O. despite the withdrawal of complaints by the applicant on the basis that the violence committed by H.O. was sufficiently serious to warrant prosecution and that there was a constant threat to the applicant ’ s physical integrity (see paragraphs 137-48 above). 169. However, it cannot be said that the local authorities displayed the required diligence to prevent the recurrence of violent attacks against the applicant, since the applicant ’ s husband perpetrated them without hindrance and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognised by the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, 16 April 2001, Report No. 54/01, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Annual Report 2000, OEA/Ser.L/V.II.111 Doc. 20 rev. (2000), §§ 42-44). By way of example, the Court notes that, following the first major incident (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above ), H.O. again beat the applicant severely, causing her injuries which were sufficient to endanger her life, but he was released pending trial “considering the nature of the offence and the fact that the applicant had regained full health”. The proceedings were ultimately discontinued because the applicant withdrew her complaints (see paragraphs 13 and 19 above). Again, although H.O. assaulted the applicant and her mother using a knife and caused them severe injuries, the prosecuting authorities terminated the proceedings without conducting any meaningful investigation (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above). Likewise, H.O. ran his car into the applicant and her mother, this time causing injuries to the former and life-threatening injuries to the latter. He spent only twenty-five days in prison and received a fine for inflicting serious injuries on the applicant ’ s mother (see paragraphs 23-36 above). Finally, the Court was particularly struck by the Diyarbakır Magistrate ’ s Court ’ s decision to impose merely a small fine, which could be paid by instalments, on H.O. as punishment for stabbing the applicant seven times (see paragraphs 37 and 44 above ). 170. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the response to the conduct of the applicant ’ s former husband was manifestly inadequate to the gravity of the offences in question (see, mutatis mutandis, Ali and Ayşe Duran v. Turkey, no. 42942/02, § 54, 8 April 2008). It therefore observes that the judicial decisions in this case reveal a lack of efficacy and a certain degree of tolerance, and had no noticeable preventive or deterrent effect on the conduct of H.O. 171. As regards the Government ’ s assertion that, in addition to the available remedies under Law no. 4320, the applicant could have sought shelter in one of the guest houses set up to protect women, the Court notes that until 14 January 1998 – the date on which Law no. 4320 entered into force – Turkish law did not provide for specific administrative and policing measures designed to protect vulnerable persons against domestic violence. Even after that date, it does not appear that the domestic authorities effectively applied the measures and sanctions provided by that Law with a view to protecting the applicant against her husband. Taking into account the overall amount of violence perpetrated by H.O., the public prosecutor ’ s office ought to have applied on its own motion the measures contained in Law no. 4320, without expecting a specific request to be made by the applicant for the implementation of that Law. 172. This being said, even assuming that the applicant had been admitted to one of the guest houses, as suggested by the Government, the Court notes that this would only be a temporary solution. Furthermore, it has not been suggested that there was any official arrangement to provide for the security of the victims staying in those houses. 173. Finally, the Court notes with grave concern that the violence suffered by the applicant had not come to an end and that the authorities had continued to display inaction. In this connection, the Court points out that, immediately after his release from prison, H.O. again issued threats against the physical integrity of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). Despite the applicant ’ s petition of 15 April 2008 requesting the prosecuting authorities to take measures for her protection, nothing was done until after the Court requested the Government to provide information about the measures that have been taken by their authorities. Following this request, on the instructions of the Ministry of Justice, the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor questioned H.O. about the death threats issued by him and took statements from the applicant ’ s current boyfriend (see paragraphs 60-67 above). 174. The applicant ’ s legal representative again informed the Court that the applicant ’ s life was in immediate danger, given the authorities ’ continuous failure to take sufficient measures to protect her client (see paragraph 68 above). It appears that following the transmission of this complaint and the Court ’ s request for an explanation in this respect, the local authorities have now put in place specific measures to ensure the protection of the applicant (see paragraph 69 above). 175. Having regard to the overall ineffectiveness of the remedies suggested by the Government in respect of the complaints under Article 3, the Court dismisses the Government ’ s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 176. The Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention as a result of the State authorities ’ failure to take protective measures in the form of effective deterrence against serious breaches of the applicant ’ s personal integrity by her husband. IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 2 AND 3 177. The applicant complained under Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3, that she and her mother had been discriminated against on the basis of their gender. Article 14 of the Convention provides: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” A. The parties ’ submissions 1. The applicant 178. The applicant alleged that the domestic law of the respondent State was discriminatory and insufficient to protect women, since a woman ’ s life was treated as inferior in the name of family unity. The former Civil Code, which was in force at the relevant time, contained numerous provisions distinguishing between men and women, such as the husband being the head of the family, his wishes taking precedence as the representative of the family union. The then Criminal Code also treated women as second-class citizens. A woman was viewed primarily as the property of society and of the male within the family. The most important indicator of this was that sexual offences were included in the section entitled “Crimes Relating to General Morality and Family Order”, whereas in fact sexual offences against women are direct attacks on a woman ’ s personal rights and freedoms. It was because of this perception that the Criminal Code imposed lighter sentences on persons who had murdered their wives for reasons of family honour. The fact that H.O. received a sentence of fifteen years is a consequence of that classification in the Criminal Code. 179. Despite the reforms carried out by the Government in the areas of the Civil Code and Criminal Code in 2002 and 2004 respectively, domestic violence inflicted by men is still tolerated and impunity is granted to the aggressors by judicial and administrative bodies. The applicant and her mother had been victims of violations of Articles 2, 3, 6 and 13 of the Convention merely because of the fact that they were women. In this connection, the applicant drew the Court ’ s attention to the improbability of any men being a victim of similar violations. 2. The Government 180. The Government averred that there was no gender discrimination in the instant case, since the violence in question was mutual. Furthermore, it cannot be claimed that there was institutionalised discrimination resulting from the criminal or family laws or from judicial and administrative practice. Nor could it be argued that the domestic law contained any formal and explicit distinction between men and women. It had not been proven that the domestic authorities had not protected the right to life of the applicant because she was a woman. 181. The Government further noted that subsequent to the reforms carried out in 2002 and 2004, namely revision of certain provisions of the Civil Code and the adoption of a new Criminal Code, and the entry into force of Law no. 4320, Turkish law provided for sufficient guarantees, meeting international standards, for the protection of women against domestic violence. The Government concluded that this complaint should be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies or as being manifestly ill-founded since these allegations had never been brought to the attention of the domestic authorities and, in any event, were devoid of substance. 3. Interights, the third-party intervener 182. Interights submitted that the failure of the State to protect against domestic violence would be tantamount to failing in its obligation to provide equal protection of the law based on sex. They further noted that there was increasing recognition internationally – both within the United Nations and Inter-American systems – that violence against women was a form of unlawful discrimination. B. The Court ’ s assessment 1. The relevant principles 183. In its recent ruling in D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic ([GC], no. 57325/00, 13 November 2007, §§ 175-80, ECHR 2007 ‑ IV ), the Court laid down the following principles on the issue of discrimination: “175. The Court has established in its case-law that discrimination means treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations ( see Willis v. the United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, § 48, ECHR 2002 ‑ IV, and Okpisz v. Germany, no. 59140/00, § 33, 25 October 2005). ... The Court has also accepted that a general policy or measure that has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group may be considered discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed at that group (see Hugh Jordan [ v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94 ], § 154 [, 4 May 2001 ], and Hoogendijk [ v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 58461/00, 6 January 2005 ] ), and that discrimination potentially contrary to the Convention may result from a de facto situation (see Zarb Adami [ v. Malta, no. 17209/02 ], § 76 [, ECHR 2006- VIII] ). ... 177. As to the burden of proof in this sphere, the Court has established that once the applicant has shown a difference in treatment, it is for the Government to show that it was justified (see, among other authorities, Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, §§ 91-92, ECHR 1999-III, and Timishev [ v. Russia, nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00], § 57 [, ECHR 2005-XII] ). 178. As regards the question of what constitutes prima facie evidence capable of shifting the burden of proof on to the respondent State, the Court stated in Nachova and Others ( [ v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98 ], § 147 [, ECHR 2005-VII] ) that in proceedings before it there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. The Court adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties ’ submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. 179. The Court has also recognised that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges something must prove that allegation – see Aktaş v. Turkey, no. 24351/94, § 272, ECHR 2003 ‑ V). In certain circumstances, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000-VII, and Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, § 111, ECHR 2002-IV). In Nachova and Others ( cited above, § 157), the Court did not rule out requiring a respondent Government to disprove an arguable allegation of discrimination in certain cases, even though it considered that it would be difficult to do so in that particular case, in which the allegation was that an act of violence had been motivated by racial prejudice. It noted in that connection that in the legal systems of many countries proof of the discriminatory effect of a policy, decision or practice would dispense with the need to prove intent in respect of alleged discrimination in employment or in the provision of services. 180. As to whether statistics can constitute evidence, the Court has in the past stated that statistics could not in themselves disclose a practice which could be classified as discriminatory ( see Hugh Jordan, cited above, § 154). However, in more recent cases on the question of discrimination in which the applicants alleged a difference in the effect of a general measure or de facto situation ( see Hoogendijk, cited above, and Zarb Adami, cited above, §§ 77-78), the Court relied extensively on statistics produced by the parties to establish a difference in treatment between two groups (men and women) in similar situations. Thus, in Hoogendijk the Court stated: “[W]here an applicant is able to show, on the basis of undisputed official statistics, the existence of a prima facie indication that a specific rule – although formulated in a neutral manner – in fact affects a clearly higher percentage of women than men, it is for the respondent Government to show that this is the result of objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex. If the onus of demonstrating that a difference in impact for men and women is not in practice discriminatory does not shift to the respondent Government, it will be in practice extremely difficult for applicants to prove indirect discrimination.” 2. Application of the above principles to the facts of the present case ( a ) The meaning of discrimination in the context of domestic violence 184. The Court notes at the outset that when it considers the object and purpose of the Convention provisions, it also takes into account the international-law background to the legal question before it. Being made up of a set of rules and principles that are accepted by the vast majority of States, the common international or domestic law standards of European States reflect a reality that the Court cannot disregard when it is called upon to clarify the scope of a Convention provision that more conventional means of interpretation have not enabled it to establish with a sufficient degree of certainty (see Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, § 63, ECHR 2008, cited in Demir and Baykara, cited above, § 76). 185. In this connection, when considering the definition and scope of discrimination against women, in addition to the more general meaning of discrimination as determined in its case-law (see paragraph 183 above), the Court has to have regard to the provisions of more specialised legal instruments and the decisions of international legal bodies on the question of violence against women. 186. In that context, the CEDAW defines discrimination against women under Article 1 as “... any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” 187. The CEDAW Committee has reiterated that violence against women, including domestic violence, is a form of discrimination against women (see paragraph 74 above). 188. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights expressly recognised the nexus between gender-based violence and discrimination by stressing in resolution 2003/45 that “all forms of violence against women occur within the context of de jure and de facto discrimination against women and the lower status accorded to women in society and are exacerbated by the obstacles women often face in seeking remedies from the State.” 189. Furthermore, the Belém do Pará Convention, which is so far the only regional multilateral human rights treaty to deal solely with violence against women, describes the right of every woman to be free from violence as encompassing, among others, the right to be free from all forms of discrimination. 190. Finally, the Inter-American Commission also characterised violence against women as a form of discrimination owing to the State ’ s failure to exercise due diligence to prevent and investigate a domestic violence complaint (see Maria da Penha v. Brazil, cited above, § 80). 191. It transpires from the above-mentioned rules and decisions that the State ’ s failure to protect women against domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection of the law and that this failure does not need to be intentional. ( b ) The approach to domestic violence in Turkey 192. The Court observes that although the Turkish law then in force did not make explicit distinction between men and women in the enjoyment of rights and freedoms, it needed to be brought into line with international standards in respect of the status of women in a democratic and pluralistic society. Like the CEDAW Committee (see the Concluding Comments on the combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Turkey CEDAW/C/TUR/4 ‑ 5 and Corr.1, 15 February 2005, §§ 12-21), the Court welcomes the reforms carried out by the Government, particularly the adoption of Law no. 4320 which provides for specific measures for protection against domestic violence. It thus appears that the alleged discrimination at issue was not based on the legislation per se but rather resulted from the general attitude of the local authorities, such as the manner in which the women were treated at police stations when they reported domestic violence and judicial passivity in providing effective protection to victims. The Court notes that the Turkish Government have already recognised these difficulties in practice when discussing the issue before the CEDAW Committee ( ibid. ). 193. In that regard, the Court notes that the applicant produced reports and statistics prepared by two leading NGOs, the Diyarbakır Bar Association and Amnesty International, with a view to demonstrating discrimination against women (see paragraphs 94-97 and 99-104 above). Bearing in mind that the findings and conclusions reached in these reports have not been challenged by the Government at any stage of the proceedings, the Court will consider them together with its own findings in the instant case (see Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 54861/00, 6 January 2005, and Zarb Adami v. Malta, no. 17209/02, §§ 77-78, ECHR 2006-VIII ). 194. Having examined these reports, the Court finds that the highest number of reported victims of domestic violence is in Diyarbakır, where the applicant lived at the relevant time, and that the victims were all women who suffered mostly physical violence. The great majority of these women were of Kurdish origin, illiterate or of a low level of education and generally without any independent source of income (see paragraph 98 above). 195. Furthermore, there appear to be serious problems in the implementation of Law no. 4320, which was relied on by the Government as one of the remedies for women facing domestic violence. The research conducted by the above- mentioned organisations indicates that when victims report domestic violence to police stations, police officers do not investigate their complaints but seek to assume the role of mediator by trying to convince the victims to return home and drop their complaint. In this connection, police officers consider the problem as a “family matter with which they cannot interfere” (see paragraphs 92, 96 and 102 above). 196. It also transpires from these reports that there are unreasonable delays in issuing injunctions by the courts, under Law no. 4320, because the courts treat them as a form of divorce action and not as an urgent action. Delays are also frequent when it comes to serving injunctions on the aggressors, given the negative attitude of the police officers (see paragraphs 91-93, 95 and 101 above). Moreover, the perpetrators of domestic violence do not seem to receive dissuasive punishments, because the courts mitigate sentences on the grounds of custom, tradition or honour (see paragraphs 103 and 106 above). 197. As a result of these problems, the above- mentioned reports suggest that domestic violence is tolerated by the authorities and that the remedies indicated by the Government do not function effectively. Similar findings and concerns were expressed by the CEDAW Committee when it noted “the persistence of violence against women, including domestic violence, in Turkey ” and called upon the respondent State to intensify its efforts to prevent and combat violence against women. It further underlined the need to fully implement and carefully monitor the effectiveness of Law no. 4320 on the protection of the family, and of related policies in order to prevent violence against women, to provide protection and support services to the victims, and punish and rehabilitate offenders (see the Concluding Comments, § 28). 198. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant has been able to show, supported by unchallenged statistical information, the existence of a prima facie indication that the domestic violence affected mainly women and that the general and discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey created a climate that was conducive to domestic violence. ( c ) Whether the applicant and her mother have been discriminated against on account of the authorities ’ failure to provide equal protection of law 199. The Court has established that the criminal ‑ law system, as operated in the instant case, did not have an adequate deterrent effect capable of ensuring the effective prevention of unlawful acts by H.O. against the personal integrity of the applicant and her mother and thus violated their rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. 200. Bearing in mind its finding above that the general and discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey, albeit unintentional, mainly affected women, the Court considers that the violence suffered by the applicant and her mother may be regarded as gender-based violence which is a form of discrimination against women. Despite the reforms carried out by the Government in recent years, the overall unresponsiveness of the judicial system and impunity enjoyed by the aggressors, as found in the instant case, indicated that there was insufficient commitment to take appropriate action to address domestic violence (see, in particular, section 9 of the CEDAW Committee ’ s General Recommendation No. 19, cited at paragraph 74 above). 201. Taking into account the ineffectiveness of domestic remedies in providing equal protection of law to the applicant and her mother in the enjoyment of their rights guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the Court holds that there existed special circumstances which absolved the applicant from her obligation to exhaust domestic remedies. It therefore dismisses the Government ’ s objection on non-exhaustion in respect of the complaint under Article 14 of the Convention. 202. In view of the above, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3, in the instant case. V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION 203. Relying on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the criminal proceedings brought against H.O. were ineffective and had failed to provide sufficient protection for her and her mother. 204. The Government contested that argument. 205. Having regard to the violations found under Articles 2, 3 and 14 of the Convention (see paragraphs 153, 17 6 and 202 above), the Court does not find it necessary to examine the same facts also in the context of Articles 6 and 13. VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 206. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 207. The applicant claimed 70,000 Turkish liras (TRL) (approximately 35,000 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage resulting from the death of her mother and TRL 250,000 (approximately EUR 125,000) for non ‑ pecuniary damage. She explained that subsequent to the killing of her mother she had been deprived of any economic support from her. The killing of her mother and ongoing violence perpetrated by her former husband had caused her stress and anguish, as well as irreparable damage to her psychological well-being and self-esteem. 208. The Government submitted that the amounts claimed were not justified in the circumstances of the case. They claimed, in the alternative, that the amounts were excessive and that any award to be made under this head should not lead to unjust enrichment. 209. As regards the applicant ’ s claim for pecuniary damage, the Court notes that while the applicant has demonstrated that on a number of occasions she had sought shelter at her mother ’ s home, it has not been proven that she was in any way financially dependent on her. However, this does not exclude an award in respect of pecuniary damage being made to an applicant who has established that a close member of the family has suffered a violation of the Convention (see Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, § 113, Reports 1996-VI, where the pecuniary claims made by the applicant prior to his death in respect of loss of earnings and medical expenses arising out of detention and torture were taken into account by the Court in making an award to the applicant ’ s father, who had continued the application). In the present case, however, the claims for pecuniary damage relate to alleged losses accruing subsequent to the death of the applicant ’ s mother. The Court is not convinced that the applicant ’ s mother incurred any losses before her death. Thus, the Court does not find it appropriate in the circumstances of this case to make any award to the applicant in respect of pecuniary damage. 210. On the other hand, as regards the non-pecuniary damage, the Court notes that the applicant has undoubtedly suffered anguish and distress on account of the killing of her mother and the authorities ’ failure to undertake sufficient measures to prevent the domestic violence perpetrated by her husband and to give him deterrent punishment. Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 30,000 in respect of the damage sustained by her as a result of violations of Articles 2, 3 and 14 of the Convention. B. Costs and expenses 211. The applicant also claimed TRL 15,500 (approximately EUR 7,750) for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. This included fees and costs incurred in respect of the preparation of the case (38 hours ’ legal work) and attendance at the hearing before the Court in Strasbourg as well as other expenses, such as telephone, fax, translation or stationary. 212. The Government submitted that in the absence of any supporting documents the applicant ’ s claim under this head should be rejected. 213. According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 6,500 for costs and expenses for the proceedings before the Court, less EUR 1,494 received by way of legal aid from the Council of Europe. C. Default interest 214. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 2 (right to life) of the Convention concerning the murder of the applicant’s mother and a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention concerning the State’s failure to protect the applicant. It found that Turkey had failed to set up and implement a system for punishing domestic violence and protecting victims. The authorities had not even used the protective measures available and had discontinued proceedings as a “family matter” ignoring why the complaints had been withdrawn. There should have been a legal framework allowing criminal proceedings to be brought irrespective of whether the complaints had been withdrawn. The Court also held – for the first time in a domestic violence case – that there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention, in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3: it observed that domestic violence affected mainly women, while the general and discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey created a climate that was conducive to it. The violence suffered by the applicant and her mother could therefore be regarded as having been gender-based and discriminatory against women. Despite the reforms carried out by the Turkish Government in recent years, the overall unresponsiveness of the judicial system and the impunity enjoyed by aggressors, as in the applicant’s case, indicated an insufficient commitment on the part of the authorities to take appropriate action to address domestic violence.