Taking of children into care
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. The Child Welfare Act 122. The relevant sections of the Child Welfare Act of 17 July 1992 ( barnevernloven ) provide : Section 4-1. Consideration of the child ’ s best interests “When applying the provisions of this chapter, decisive importance shall be attached to finding measures which are in the child ’ s best interests. This includes attaching importance to giving the child stable and good contact with adults and continuity in the care provided.” Section 4-6. Interim orders in emergencies “If a child is without care because the parents are ill or for other reasons, the child welfare services shall implement such assistance as is immediately required. Such measures shall not be maintained against the will of the parents. If there is a risk that a child will suffer material harm by remaining at home, the head of the child welfare administration or the prosecuting authority may immediately make an interim care order without the consent of the parents. In such a case the head of the child welfare administration may also make an interim order under section 4-19. If an order has been made under the second paragraph, an application for measures as mentioned in section 7-11 shall be sent to the county social welfare board as soon as possible, and within six weeks at the latest, but within two weeks if it is a matter of measures under section 4-24. If the matter has not been sent to the county social welfare board within the time-limits mentioned in the fourth paragraph, the order shall lapse.” Section 4-12. Care orders “A care order may be issued (a) if there are serious deficiencies in the daily care received by the child, or serious deficiencies in terms of the personal contact and security needed by a child of his or her age and development, (b) if the parents fail to ensure that a child who is ill, disabled or in special need of assistance receives the treatment and training required, (c) if the child is mistreated or subjected to other serious abuse at home, or (d) if it is highly probable that the child ’ s health or development may be seriously harmed because the parents are unable to take adequate responsibility for the child. An order may only be made under the first paragraph when necessary due to the child ’ s current situation. Hence, such an order may not be made if satisfactory conditions can be created for the child by assistance measures under section 4-4 or by measures under section 4-10 or section 4-11. An order under the first paragraph shall be made by the county social welfare board under the provisions of Chapter 7.” Section 4-19. Contact rights. Secret address “Unless otherwise provided, children and parents are entitled to have contact with each other. When a care order has been made, the county social welfare board shall determine the extent of contact, but may, for the sake of the child, also decide that there should be no contact. The county social welfare board may also decide that the parents should not be entitled to know the child ’ s whereabouts. ... The private parties cannot request that a case regarding contact be dealt with by the county social welfare board if the case has been dealt with by the county social welfare board or a court of law in the preceding twelve months. ...” Section 4-20. Withdrawal of parental responsibilities. Adoption “If the county social welfare board has made a care order for a child, it may also decide that the parents must be stripped of all parental responsibilities. If, as a result of the parents being stripped of parental responsibilities, the child is left without a guardian, the county social welfare board shall as soon as possible take steps to have a new guardian appointed for the child. Where an order has been made withdrawing parental responsibilities, the county social welfare board may give its consent for a child to be adopted by persons other than the parents. Consent may be given if (a) it must be regarded as probable that the parents will be permanently unable to provide the child with proper care or the child has become so attached to persons and the environment where he or she is living that, on the basis of an overall assessment, removing the child may lead to serious problems for him or her, and (b) adoption would be in the child ’ s best interests, and (c) the persons applying for adoption have been the child ’ s foster parents and have shown themselves fit to bring up the child as their own, and (d) the conditions for granting an adoption under the Adoption Act are satisfied. Where the county social welfare board consents to adoption, the Ministry [ of Children and Equality] shall issue an adoption order.” Section 4-20a. Contact between the child and his or her biological parents after adoption [added in 2010] “Where the county social welfare board issues an adoption order under section 4-20, it shall, if any of the parties have requested it, at the same time consider whether there shall be contact between the child and his or her biological parents after the adoption has been carried out. If limited contact after adoption in such cases is in the child ’ s best interests, and the persons applying for adoption consent to such contact, the county social welfare board shall make an order for such contact. In such case, the county social welfare board must at the same time determine the amount of contact. ... A contact order may only be reviewed if special reasons justify doing so. Special reasons may include the child ’ s opposition to contact or the biological parents ’ failure to comply with the contact order. ...” Section 4-21. Revocation of care orders “The county social welfare board shall revoke a care order where it is highly probable that the parents will be able to provide the child with proper care. The decision shall nonetheless not be revoked if the child has become so attached to persons and the environment where he or she is living that, on the basis of an overall assessment, removing the child may lead to serious problems for him or her. Before a care order is revoked, the child ’ s foster parents shall be entitled to state their opinion. The parties may not request that a case concerning revocation of a care order be dealt with by the county social welfare board if the case has been dealt with by the county social welfare board or a court of law in the preceding twelve months. If a request for revocation of the previous order or judgment was not upheld with reference to section 4-21, first paragraph, second sentence, new proceedings may only be requested where documentary evidence is provided to show that significant changes have taken place in the child ’ s situation.” Section 7-5. The board ’ s composition in individual cases “In individual cases, the county social welfare board shall consist of a chairman/chairwoman, one member of the ordinary committee and one member of the expert committee. When necessary due to the complexity of the case, the chairman/chairwoman may decide that the board, in addition to the chairman/chairwoman, shall consist of two members of the ordinary committee and two members of the expert committee. If the parties consent thereto, the chairman/chairwoman may decide cases as mentioned in the first paragraph alone unless this is precluded by due regard for the satisfactory hearing of the case. Where the case concerns a request for an alteration in a previous decision/order or judgment, the chairman/chairwoman may decide the case alone if this is unobjectionable with due regard for the subject of the case, its complexity, the need for professional expertise, and a proper hearing of the case. Where the case concerns an extension of a placement order made by the county social welfare board under section 4-29, the chairman/chairwoman shall decide the case alone.” B. Case-law under the Child Welfare Act 123. The Supreme Court has delivered several judgments on the Child Welfare Act. Of relevance in the present context is its judgment of 23 May 1991 ( Rt. 1991, page 557), in which the Supreme Court stated that since withdrawal of parental responsibilities with a view to adoption involves permanently severing the legal ties between the child and its biological parents and other relatives, strong reasons have to be present in order for a decision of that sort to be taken. It emphasised, moreover, that a decision to withdraw parental responsibilities must not be taken without first having carried out a thorough examination and consideration of the long-term consequences of alternative measures, based on the concrete circumstances of each case. 124. In a later judgment, of 10 January 2001 ( Rt. 2001, page 14), the Supreme Court considered that the legal criterion “strong reasons” in this context should be interpreted in line with the Court ’ s case-law, in particular Johansen v. Norway, no. 17383/90, § 78, 7 August 1996. This meant, according to the Supreme Court, that consent to adoption contrary to the wish of the biological parents could only be given in “extraordinary circumstances”. 125. The above case-law was developed further, inter alia, in the Supreme Court ’ s judgment of 20 April 2007 ( Rt. 2007, page 561), after the Court had declared a second application by the applicant in the above ‑ mentioned case of Johansen v. Norway inadmissible (see Johansen v. Norway ( dec. ), 12750/02, 10 October 2002). The Supreme Court reiterated that the requirement that adoption be in the child ’ s best interests, as set out in section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 above), meant that “strong reasons” ( sterke grunner ) must be present in order for consent to adoption to be given contrary to the wish of the biological parents. In addition, the Supreme Court emphasised that a decision of this kind had to be based on the concrete circumstances of each case, but also take account of general experience, including experience from research into child psychology or child psychiatry. The Supreme Court examined the general principles in the case-law of the Strasbourg Court and concluded that the domestic law was in conformity with those principles: an adoption could only be authorised where “particularly weighty reasons” were present. That case was subsequently brought before the Court, which found no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see Aune, cited above, § 37, for a recapitulation of the Supreme Court ’ s analysis of the general principles developed in the case-law of the Supreme Court and the Court). 126. The Supreme Court again set out the general principles applicable to adoption cases in a judgment of 30 January 2015 ( Rt. 2015, page 110). It reiterated that forced adoptions had a severe impact and generally inflicted profound emotional pain on the parents. Family ties were protected by Article 8 of the Convention and Article 102 of the Constitution. Adoption was also an intrusive measure for the child and could, under Article 21 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 134 below), accordingly only be decided when in his or her best interests. However, where there were decisive factors from the child ’ s point of view in favour of adoption, the parents ’ interests would have to yield, as had been provided for in Article 104 of the Constitution and Article 3 § 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ibid.). Reference was made to Aune, cited above, § 66, where the Court had stated that an adoption could only be authorised where justified by “an overriding requirement pertaining to the child ’ s best interests”, which corresponded to the standard of “particularly weighty reasons” as established by the Supreme Court in the judgment that had been scrutinised by the European Court of Human Rights in Aune (see paragraph 125 above). 127. Parliament had examined, and a majority had supported, a proposal from the Government ( Ot.prp. no. 69 (2008-2009)) discussing the issue of a considerable decline in adoptions in Norway. In the proposal it had been suggested that the child welfare services had developed a reluctance to propose adoptions in the aftermath of the Court ’ s finding of a violation in Johansen, cited above, even though research had shown that it was in a child ’ s best interests to be adopted rather than experience a continuous life in foster care until reaching their majority. The Supreme Court interpreted the proposal as emphasising that the child welfare services should ensure that adoption would actually be proposed where appropriate, but that the proposal did not imply that the legal threshold, under Article 8 of the Convention, had changed. The Supreme Court added that the general information obtained from research on adoption was relevant to the concrete assessment of whether an adoption should be authorised in an individual case. 128. The Supreme Court also examined the implication of amendments of the rules concerning contact between the child and the biological parents, which had been coined as an “open adoption” in the above proposal. The rules had been incorporated into section 4-20a of the Child Welfare Act, which had been in force since 2010. They required that an “open adoption” be in the child ’ s best interests and that the adoptive parents consent (see paragraph 122 above). It observed that the legislature ’ s reasons for introducing the system of “open adoptions” had been to secure the child stable and predictable surroundings in which to grow up, while at the same time ensuring some contact with its biological parents where this would be in the child ’ s best interests. The child would thus have all the benefits of the adoption, while still having contact with its biological parents. The Supreme Court found that the introduction of the system of “open adoptions” had not meant that the legal threshold for authorising adoptions had been lowered. However, in some cases further contact between the child and the biological parents could mitigate some of the arguments against adoption. Reference was made to Aune, cited above, § 78. 129. The Supreme Court considered anew the general principles concerning adoption in a judgment of 11 September 2018. The Supreme Court observed, inter alia, that the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Mohamed Hasan v. Norway, no. 27496/15, § 148, 26 April 2018, had stressed the strict procedural requirements that must be met by the domestic decision-making authorities in cases concerning adoption. When summarising the subject of its review, the Supreme Court stated that the best interests of the child were the most important and weighty concerns when deciding the adoption issue. As adoption was such a radical and irreversible measure, it could only be justified – from the child ’ s point of view – by particularly weighty reasons. These grounds had to be balanced against the consequences of adoption for the child ’ s contact with its biological parents in the individual case. Where there had been little or no contact between the parents and the child, the concern for protection of their family life would be given less weight than in cases where a more normal family life had existed. 130. The current position in respect of knowledge and research on adopted children had been studied by a court-appointed expert and presented in an appendix to his statement to the Supreme Court. The expert believed that the summary in the Supreme Court ’ s judgment of 20 April 2007 ( Rt. 2007, page 561; see paragraph 125 above) was still accurate. Based on an updated study of relevant research and professional experience as a psychologist, the expert had stated the following in the case at hand: “ Children in long-term foster care who are adopted undergo better psychosocial development than children in a similar situation who are not adopted. It is the durability of the child ’ s sense of belonging that seems to be essential.” 131. The expert had specified in his statement before the Supreme Court that this was a difficult area of research, one of the reasons being that few forced adoptions were carried out annually in Norway. And, as had been emphasised in the Supreme Court ’ s judgment of 20 April 2007 ( Rt. 2007 page 561; see paragraph 125 above), a specific, individual assessment had to be made in each case. But, as emphasised in the same judgment, such a research- and experienced-based perception of what was generally best for the child, had to be given particular weight. Also, the abovementioned (see paragraph 127 ) proposal from the Government ( Ot.prp. no. 69 (2008-2009) ) had stressed that research showed that “ ... for some children, adoption may give a safer and more predictable upbringing than long-term foster care”. C. The Adoption Act 132. The Adoption Act of 28 February 1986, in force at the relevant time, contained the following relevant provisions: Section 2 “An adoption order must only be issued where it can be assumed that the adoption will be to the benefit of the child [( til gagn for barnet )]. It is further required that the person applying for adoption either wishes to foster or has fostered the child, or that there is another special reason for the adoption.” Section 12 “Adoptive parents shall, as soon as is advisable, tell the adopted child that he or she is adopted. When the child has reached 18 years of age, he or she is entitled to be informed by the Ministry [ of Children and Equality] of the identity of his or her biological parents.” Section 13 “On adoption, the adopted child and his or her heirs shall have the same legal status as if the adopted child had been the adoptive parents ’ biological child, unless otherwise provided by section 14 or another statute. At the same time, the child ’ s legal relationship to his or her original family shall cease, unless otherwise provided by special statute. Where one spouse has adopted a child of the other spouse or cohabitant, the said child shall have the same legal status in relation to both spouses as if he or she were their joint child. The same applies to children adopted pursuant to section 5 b, second, third and fourth paragraphs.” Section 14 a. Contact after adoption “In the case of adoptions carried out as a result of decisions pursuant to section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act, the effects of the adoption that follow from section 13 of the present Act shall apply, subject to any limitations that may have been imposed by a decision pursuant to section 4-20 a of the Child Welfare Act regarding contact between the child and his or her biological parents.” D. The Dispute Act 133. The first paragraph of section 36-4 and the third paragraph of section 36-10 of the Dispute Act of 17 June 2005 ( tvisteloven ) read: Section 36-4 The composition of the court. Expert panel “(1) The district court shall sit with two lay judges, one of whom shall be an ordinary lay judge and the other an expert. In special cases, the court may sit with two professional judges and three lay judges, one or two of whom shall be experts.” Section 36-10 Appeal “(3) An appeal against the judgment of the district court in cases concerning the County Board ’ s decisions pursuant to the Child Welfare Act requires the leave of the court of appeal. Leave can only be granted if a) the appeal concerns issues whose significance extends beyond the scope of the current case, b) there are grounds to rehear the case because new information has emerged, c) the ruling of the district court or the procedure in the district court is seriously flawed [( vesentlige svakheter ved tingrettens avgjørelse eller saksbehandling )], or d) the judgment provides for coercive measures that were not approved by the County Board.” III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIALS A. The United Nations 134. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, concluded in New York on 20 November 1989, contains, inter alia, the following provisions: Article 3 “1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” Article 9 “1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child ’ s place of residence. 2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views known. 3. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child ’ s best interests. 4. Where such separation results from any action initiated by a State Party, such as the detention, imprisonment, exile, deportation or death (including death arising from any cause while the person is in the custody of the State) of one or both parents or of the child, that State Party shall, upon request, provide the parents, the child or, if appropriate, another member of the family with the essential information concerning the whereabouts of the absent member(s) of the family unless the provision of the information would be detrimental to the well-being of the child. States Parties shall further ensure that the submission of such a request shall of itself entail no adverse consequences for the person(s) concerned.” Article 18 “1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern. 2. For the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth in the present Convention, States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children. 3. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that children of working parents have the right to benefit from child-care services and facilities for which they are eligible.” Article 20 “1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the State. 2. States Parties shall in accordance with their national laws ensure alternative care for such a child. 3. Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement, kafalah of Islamic law, adoption or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of children. When considering solutions, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child ’ s upbringing and to the child ’ s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background.” Article 21 “States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall: (a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by competent authorities who determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the child ’ s status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if required, the persons concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the basis of such counselling as may be necessary; ...” 135. In its General Comment no. 7 (2005) on implementing child rights in early childhood, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child sought to encourage the States Parties to recognise that young children were holders of all rights enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and that early childhood was a critical period for the realisation of those rights. In particular, the Committee referred to the best interests of the child: “13. Article 3 sets out the principle that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in all actions concerning children. By virtue of their relative immaturity, young children are reliant on responsible authorities to assess and represent their rights and best interests in relation to decisions and actions that affect their well-being, while taking account of their views and evolving capacities. The principle of best interests appears repeatedly within the Convention (including in articles 9, 18, 20 and 21, which are most relevant to early childhood). The principle of best interests applies to all actions concerning children and requires active measures to protect their rights and promote their survival, growth, and well-being, as well as measures to support and assist parents and others who have day-to-day responsibility for realizing children ’ s rights: (a) Best interests of individual children. All decision-making concerning a child ’ s care, health, education, etc. must take account of the best interests principle, including decisions by parents, professionals and others responsible for children. States parties are urged to make provisions for young children to be represented independently in all legal proceedings by someone who acts for the child ’ s interests, and for children to be heard in all cases where they are capable of expressing their opinions or preferences.” 136. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1), 29 May 2013, mentions the following as elements “to be taken into account when assessing the child ’ s best interests” : “(a) The child ’ s views ... (b) The child ’ s identity ... (c) Preservation of the family environment and maintaining relations ... (d) Care, protection and safety of the child ... (e) Situation of vulnerability ... (f) The child ’ s right to health ... (g) The child ’ s right to education ... ” Under the headings “Balancing the elements in the best-interests assessment” and “Procedural safeguards to guarantee the implementation of the child ’ s best interests”, inter alia, the following is included: “84. In the best-interests assessment, one has to consider that the capacities of the child will evolve. Decision-makers should therefore consider measures that can be revised or adjusted accordingly, instead of making definitive and irreversible decisions. To do this, they should not only assess the physical, emotional, educational and other needs at the specific moment of the decision, but should also consider the possible scenarios of the child ’ s development, and analyse them in the short and long term. In this context, decisions should assess continuity and stability of the child ’ s present and future situation. ... 85. To ensure the correct implementation of the child ’ s right to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration, some child-friendly procedural safeguards must be put in place and followed. As such, the concept of the child ’ s best interests is a rule of procedure .... ... 87. States must put in place formal processes, with strict procedural safeguards, designed to assess and determine the child ’ s best interests for decisions affecting the child, including mechanisms for evaluating the results. States must develop transparent and objective processes for all decisions made by legislators, judges or administrative authorities, especially in areas which directly affect the child or children.” B. The Council of Europe 137. The Council of Europe ’ s Revised Convention on the Adoption of Children of 27 November 2008 contains, inter alia, the following provisions: Article 3 – Validity of an adoption “An adoption shall be valid only if it is granted by a court or an administrative authority (hereinafter the ‘ competent authority ’ ).” Article 4 – Granting of an adoption “1. The competent authority shall not grant an adoption unless it is satisfied that the adoption will be in the best interests of the child. 2. In each case the competent authority shall pay particular attention to the importance of the adoption providing the child with a stable and harmonious home.” Article 5 – Consents to an adoption “1. Subject to paragraphs 2 to 5 of this article, an adoption shall not be granted unless at least the following consents to the adoption have been given and not withdrawn: a the consent of the mother and the father; or if there is neither father nor mother to consent, the consent of any person or body who is entitled to consent in their place; b the consent of the child considered by law as having sufficient understanding; a child shall be considered as having sufficient understanding on attaining an age which shall be prescribed by law and shall not be more than 14 years; c the consent of the spouse or registered partner of the adopter. 2. The persons whose consent is required for adoption must have been counselled as may be necessary and duly informed of the effects of their consent, in particular whether or not an adoption will result in the termination of the legal relationship between the child and his or her family of origin. The consent must have been given freely, in the required legal form, and expressed or evidenced in writing. 3. The competent authority shall not dispense with the consent or overrule the refusal to consent of any person or body mentioned in paragraph 1 save on exceptional grounds determined by law. However, the consent of a child who suffers from a disability preventing the expression of a valid consent may be dispensed with. 4. If the father or mother is not a holder of parental responsibility in respect of the child, or at least of the right to consent to an adoption, the law may provide that it shall not be necessary to obtain his or her consent. 5. A mother ’ s consent to the adoption of her child shall be valid when it is given at such time after the birth of the child, not being less than six weeks, as may be prescribed by law, or, if no such time has been prescribed, at such time as, in the opinion of the competent authority, will have enabled her to recover sufficiently from the effects of giving birth to the child. 6. For the purposes of this Convention ‘ father ’ and ‘ mother ’ mean the persons who according to law are the parents of the child.” 138. The Council of Europe ’ s Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 2049 on 22 April 2015. The Resolution includes, inter alia, the following: “5. Financial and material poverty should never be the only justification for the removal of a child from parental care, but should be seen as a sign for the need to provide appropriate support to the family. Moreover, showing that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his or her upbringing is not enough to remove a child from his or her parents, and even less of a reason to sever family ties completely. ... 8. The Assembly thus recommends that member States: ... 8.2. put into place laws, regulations and procedures which truly put the best interest of the child first in removal, placement and reunification decisions; 8.3. continue and strengthen their efforts to ensure that all relevant procedures are conducted in a child-friendly manner, and that the children concerned have their views taken into account according to their age and level of maturity; 8.4. make visible and root out the influence of prejudice and discrimination in removal decisions, including by appropriately training all professionals involved; 8.5. support families with the necessary means (including financially, materially, socially and psychologically) in order to avoid unwarranted removal decisions in the first place, and in order to increase the percentage of successful family reunifications after care; 8.6. ensure that any (temporary) placement of a child in alternative care, where it has become necessary as a measure of last resort, be accompanied by measures aimed at the child ’ s subsequent reintegration into the family, including the facilitation of appropriate contact between the child and his or her family, and be subject to periodic review; 8.7. avoid, except in exceptional circumstances provided for in law and subject to effective (timely and comprehensive) judicial review, severing family ties completely, removing children from parental care at birth, basing placement decisions on the effluxion of time, and having recourse to adoptions without parental consent; 8.8. ensure that the personnel involved in removal and placement decisions are guided by appropriate criteria and standards (if possible in a multidisciplinary way), are suitably qualified and regularly trained, have sufficient resources to take decisions in an appropriate time frame, and are not overburdened with too great a caseload; ... 8.10. ensure that, except in urgent cases, initial removal decisions are based only on court orders, in order to avoid unwarranted removal decisions and to prevent biased assessments.” 139. The Council of Europe ’ s Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 2232 (“Striking a balance between the best interest of the child and the need to keep families together”) on 28 June 2018. The Resolution states, inter alia : “4. The Assembly reaffirms that the best interest of the child should be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, the implementation of this principle in practice depends on the context and the specific circumstances. It is sometimes easier to say what is not in the best interests of children: coming to serious harm at the hands of their parents, or being removed from a family without good cause. 5. It is with this caveat in mind that the Assembly reiterates the recommendations it made in Resolution 2049 (2015) and recommends that Council of Europe member States focus on the process in order to achieve the best results for children and their families alike. Member States should: ... 5.2. give the necessary support to families in a timely and positive manner with a view to avoiding the necessity for removal decisions in the first place, and to facilitating family reunification when possible and in the child ’ s best interest: this includes the need to build better collaboration with parents, with a view to avoiding possible mistakes based on misunderstandings, stereotyping and discrimination, mistakes which can be difficult to correct later on once the trust has gone; ... 5.5. seek to keep at a minimum the practices of removing children from parental care at birth, basing placement decisions on the effluxion of time, and adoptions without parental consent, and only in extreme cases. Where in the child ’ s best interests, efforts should be made to maintain family ties; 5.6. where the decision to remove a child from their family has been made, ensure that: 5.6.1. such decisions are a proportionate response to a credible and verified assessment by competent authorities subject to judicial review that there is a real risk of actual and serious harm to the children involved; 5.6.2. a detailed decision is provided to the parents and a copy of the decision is also retained, that the decision is explained in an age-appropriate way to the child or that the child is otherwise granted access to the decision, and that the determination outlines the circumstances that led to the decision and provides reasons for the removal; 5.6.3. removing children is a last resort and should be done only for the necessary period of time; 5.6.4. siblings are kept together in care in all cases where it is not against the best interest of the child; 5.6.5. as long as it is in the best interest of the child, children are cared for within the wider family unit so as to minimise the disruption of family bonds for the children involved; 5.6.6. regular consideration is given to family reunification and/or family access as is appropriate taking into account the best interests and views of the child; 5.6.7. visitation and contact arrangements facilitate the maintenance of the family bond and work towards reunification unless manifestly inappropriate;” THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 140. The applicants complained that the refusal to discontinue the public care of X and the deprivation of the first applicant ’ s parental responsibilities for him and the authorisation granted to his foster parents to adopt him had violated their right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, which reads: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 141. The Government contested that submission. A. Preliminary issues before the Grand Chamber 1. Scope of the case before the Grand Chamber (a) Temporal scope ( i ) The parties ’ submissions 142. The Government maintained that it fell outside the Grand Chamber ’ s jurisdiction to consider whether the domestic proceedings relating to the taking into care of X and the first applicant ’ s contact rights –prior to those relating to the authorisation of adoption – had complied with Article 8 of the Convention. Contrary to the requirements in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies and to comply with the six - month time-limit with respect to the emergency care order of 17 October 2008, the care order of 2 March 2009 and the decisions on contact rights. In any event, the application to the Court of 12 April 2013 had been directed only at the measures upheld by the Supreme Court decision of 15 October 2012, that is, the removal of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption. The Chamber minority had overstepped the Court ’ s competence and disregarded the scope of the applicants ’ application in order to voice abstract criticism against an entire child welfare system. It was not open to the applicants to expand the case through their referral request to the Grand Chamber. While the latter could have regard to prior proceedings, this was only to the extent that they had been referred to and relied upon in the decision relating to the removal of parental responsibilities and the authorisation of adoption. 143. Disagreeing with the Government ’ s position, the applicants submitted that the Grand Chamber had competence to examine not only the removal of parental responsibilities and the authorisation of adoption but also the initial emergency decisions, the decisions relating to X ’ s being taken into public care and those relating to the first applicant ’ s contact rights. Its jurisdiction comprised the entirety of the domestic proceedings – even if it were ultimately to find a violation only in respect of a part of these. The consent to adoption had to be considered as the final decision in a sequence of events that had started with the emergency decision. The decision to remove parental responsibilities and to authorise adoption had been a consequence of the lack of attachment between X and the first applicant, which in turn had been a direct result of the decisions of 2 March 2009 and 22 April 2010 on long-term public care, in which the first applicant ’ s contact rights had been considerably and unjustifiably reduced. (ii) The Court ’ s considerations 144. The Court reiterates that the content and scope of the “case” referred to the Grand Chamber are delimited by the Chamber ’ s decision on admissibility. This means that the Grand Chamber cannot examine those parts of the application which have been declared inadmissible by the Chamber (see, for example, Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], nos. 10211/12 and 27505/14, § 100, 4 December 2018). In the present case, the Grand Chamber notes that the Chamber declared admissible the complaint lodged by the applicants (see paragraph 2 above), which concerned the deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption first decided by the County Social Welfare Board on 8 December 2011 and then upheld on appeal (see, inter alia, paragraphs 3, 76, 93, 94 and 111 of the Chamber ’ s judgment). 145. The Grand Chamber observes that X was taken into emergency foster care in 2008 (see paragraphs 20-22 above) and into ordinary foster care following the decision of the County Social Welfare Board of 2 March 2009 (see paragraphs 38-46 above). In the same decision the first applicant was granted limited contact rights (see paragraphs 42 - 46 above). She appealed against that decision, which was ultimately upheld by the High Court in its judgment of 22 April 2010 (see paragraphs 65-75 above), again granting the first applicant limited contact rights (see paragraph 75 above). As the applicant did not avail herself of the possibility of lodging an appeal, the High Court ’ s judgment became final on the expiry of the time ‑ limit for doing so. 146. In their request for referral to the Grand Chamber, the applicants sought to expand their complaints to encompass also the above proceedings from 2008 to 2010. These grievances did not, however, form part of their application as it was declared admissible by the Chamber. They were in any event filed for the first time before the Grand Chamber more than six months after the last domestic decisions taken in the proceedings in question and, as mentioned above (see paragraph 145), without domestic remedies having been exhausted in the most recent of these. 147. Consequently, the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the compatibility with Article 8 of the Convention of the proceedings, including those relating to the restrictions on contact rights, that predated or ended with the High Court ’ s judgment of 22 April 2010 (see paragraph 76 above). 148. Nonetheless, in its review of the proceedings relating to the County Social Welfare Board ’ s decision of 8 December 2011 and the decisions taken on appeal against that decision, notably the City Court ’ s judgment of 22 February 2012, the Court will have to put those proceedings and decisions in context, which inevitably means that it must to some degree have regard to the former proceedings and decisions (see, similarly, for example, Jovanovic v. Sweden, no. 10592/12, § 73, 22 October 2015, and Mohamed Hasan, cited above, § 151). (b) Material scope 149. The Court observes that the applicants ’ application lodged with the Court on 12 April 2013 expressly targeted only the decision to withdraw the first applicant ’ s parental responsibilities in respect of X and to authorise the latter ’ s adoption by his foster parents (see the City Court ’ s decision in paragraphs 107-12 above), not the concurrent conclusion reached on the same occasion that the conditions for lifting the care order concerning X had not been met (see paragraphs 99-106 above). 150. The Chamber considered that the decision not to lift the care order was nonetheless intrinsically related to the decision to deprive the first applicant of her parental responsibilities for X and to authorise the latter ’ s adoption, and accordingly reviewed the former decision on the merits (see paragraphs 113 - 17 of the Chamber ’ s judgment) regardless of the applicants ’ having focused expressly on the latter decision in their application and submissions before the Chamber. 151. The Grand Chamber notes that, while the respondent Government did not express disagreement with the Chamber ’ s approach in this regard, the applicants made submissions before it indicating that their complaint also encompassed the decision not to lift the care order taken in the same proceedings. 152. The Grand Chamber observes that the refusal to lift the public care order is so closely related to and intertwined with the decision to remove the first applicant ’ s parental responsibilities and to authorise adoption that it must be considered to be an aspect of her initial complaint to the Court. Indeed, as follows from the terms of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 above), it was a prerequisite for application of that provision that public care continued to be justified. The Grand Chamber will therefore, as was done by the Chamber, include the decision not to lift the care order in its examination of whether the applicants ’ Article 8 rights have been violated. 2. The first applicant ’ s standing to lodge a complaint on behalf of the second applicant (a) The Chamber ’ s judgment 153. The Chamber, emphasising that the complaint concerned the decision to deprive the first applicant of her parental responsibilities for X and to authorise his adoption – which resulted in the former losing legal guardianship over X – rather than facts subsequent to that decision, concluded that the first applicant was competent to lodge a complaint on behalf of the second applicant, X. (b ) The parties ’ submissions 154. By way of preliminary objection before the Grand Chamber, the Government argued that the first applicant did not have standing to lodge an application on behalf of X. His adoptive parents would have had standing, but had not done so. The Court ’ s acceptance of the mother ’ s lodging of an application on her child ’ s behalf in Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 138, ECHR 2000 ‑ VIII, had been due to the particular circumstances of that case. In the instant case X ’ s interests were also represented by his adoptive parents, who had intervened before the Court. 155. The applicants submitted that, according to the Court ’ s established case law, a biological parent whose parental responsibilities had been withdrawn could submit a complaint against that withdrawal on behalf of the child in question. The first applicant accordingly had an unquestionable right to represent X in the instant case. ( c ) The Court ’ s considerations 156. The Court observes that the disputed deprivation of parental responsibilities and the authorisation of adoption decided by the County Social Welfare Board on 8 December 2011 and upheld by the City Court on 22 February 2012, against which leave to appeal was refused by the appellate courts, undoubtedly led to the severance of the legal ties between the first and second applicants. The Court has held that this factor is not decisive for whether a parent may have locus standi to lodge an application on behalf of the child before the Court (see, for example, A.K. and L. v. Croatia, no. 37956/11, § 46, 8 January 2013). In that judgment, the Court further stated: “ ... The conditions governing the individual applications under the Convention are not necessarily the same as national criteria relating to locus standi. National rules in this respect may serve purposes different from those contemplated by Article 34 and, while those purposes may sometimes be analogous, they need not always be so (see, mutatis mutandis, Norris v. Ireland, 26 October 1988, § 31, Series A no. 142). 47. The Court would draw attention to the principle that the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its provisions, both procedural and substantive, be interpreted and applied so as to render its safeguards both practical and effective (see amongst other authorities, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, §§ 70-72, Series A no. 310). The position of children under Article 34 calls for careful consideration, as children must generally rely on other persons to present their claims and represent their interests, and may not be of an age or capacity to authorise any steps to be taken on their behalf in any real sense ( P.C. and S. v. the United Kingdom ( dec. ), no. 56547/00, 11 November 2001). The Court considers that a restrictive or technical approach in this area is to be avoided” ( ibid., § 46-47). 157. Since X was adopted, his only representatives under national law in respect of any issues concerning facts that occurred after the adoption had become final would be his adoptive parents. However, in respect of the adoption proceedings, conducted at a time when the first applicant still had full responsibilities for X, according to the Court ’ s case-law, it is in principle in a child ’ s interests to preserve family ties, save where weighty reasons exist to justify severing those ties (see, for example, A.K. and L. v. Croatia, cited above, § 49 ). In addition, on several occasions the Court has accepted in the context of Article 8 of the Convention that parents who did not have parental rights could apply to it on behalf of their minor children (see Scozzari and Giunta, cited above, §§ 138 ‑ 39 ), the key criterion for the Court in these cases being the risk that some of the children ’ s interests might not be brought to its attention and that they would be denied effective protection of their Convention rights (see mutatis mutandis, Lambert and Others v. France [GC], no. 46043/14, § 9 4, ECHR 2015 (extracts) ). 158. Where an application has been lodged before it by a biological parent on behalf of his or her child, the situation may nonetheless be that the Court identifies conflicting interests between parent and child. A conflict of interest is relevant to the question of whether an application lodged by one person on behalf of another is admissible (see, for example, Kruškić v. Croatia ( dec. ), no. 10140/13, §§ 101- 02, 25 November 2014). The Government have objected on such grounds in the instant case. 159. The Court considers that the question of a possible conflict of interest between the first and second applicants overlaps and is closely intertwined with those which it is called upon to examine when dealing with the complaint, formulated by the first applicant on her own behalf and on behalf of the second applicant, of violations of their right to respect for family life under Article 8. It discerns no such conflict of interest in the present case as would require it to dismiss the first applicant ’ s application on behalf of the second applicant. Accordingly, the Government ’ s objection must be dismissed. B. Merits 1. The Chamber ’ s judgment 160. The Chamber was satisfied that the domestic proceedings complained of were in accordance with 1992 Child Welfare Act and pursued the legitimate aims of “the protection of health or morals” and the “rights and freedoms” of X in accordance with Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. As to the further question whether the disputed interference was also “necessary”, the Chamber considered that the first applicant had been fully involved in the domestic proceedings, seen as a whole, and that the domestic decision-making process had been fair and capable of safeguarding the applicants ’ rights under Article 8. The majority of the Chamber further observed that the City Court had been faced with the difficult and sensitive task of striking a fair balance between the relevant competing interests in a complex case. In the majority ’ s view, the City Court had clearly been guided by the interests of X, notably his particular need for security in his foster-home environment, given his psychological vulnerability. Also taking into account the City Court ’ s conclusion that there had been no positive development in the first applicant ’ s competence in contact situations throughout the three years in which she had had contact rights and the fact that the domestic authorities had had the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned, the majority of the Chamber found that there were such exceptional circumstances in the present case as could justify the measures in question and that the domestic authorities had been motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to X ’ s best interests. 2. The parties ’ submissions (a) The applicants 161. The applicants submitted that in its judgment the Chamber had failed to take account of the particular context concerning Norway, namely that there was widespread criticism both nationally and internationally of the Norwegian child welfare system, indicating a serious systemic problem. 162. Under the Court ’ s case-law, the margin - of - appreciation concept was, in the applicants ’ opinion, characterised by its casuistic nature. The margin to be accorded to the competent national authorities would vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake. It was well established that in cases relating to placement of children in public care and adoption, the domestic authorities enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation. However, the Court tended to hide behind the margin - of - appreciation concept in a way which could to some extent undermine its control and functions. 163. Given the nature and seriousness of the interference at stake, the margin of appreciation ought to have been particularly narrow even in regard to the first child - welfare measures that had been taken. The Chamber majority had, moreover, not addressed the grounds for the extremely limited contact rights that had been granted from the beginning. 164. It was clearly established in the Court ’ s case-law that the protection of the biological family was a priority. The instant case concerned a very young child; in such cases the authorities could act only on extraordinarily compelling grounds. X ’ s particular vulnerability referred to by the domestic authorities in their decisions had never been supported by concrete and tangible evidence. Nor had his special care needs ever been explained, as pointed out by the minority in the Chamber. 165. Contact rights in Norway were notably restrictive and had been denounced by the Court in several cases. Considering that limited contact rights had a particularly detrimental impact in the first weeks, months and years of an infant ’ s life, the facts of the instant case were particularly shocking. The first applicant ’ s contact rights had been drastically limited without objective reasons and over a very short space of time. The imposition of extremely restricted access rights had destroyed any chance of family reunification and had made it impossible for X to forge natural bonds with the first applicant. Since the domestic authorities were directly responsible for the family breakdown, the argument that X had had no psychological bonds with his mother was unacceptable. 166. There had been a conflict between the first applicant, the foster mother and the child welfare services; a conflict of that nature was hardly exceptional and was readily understandable. The authorities had done absolutely nothing to pacify the first applicant ’ s relations with the authorities and the foster mother. On the contrary, the foster mother had been present during all contact sessions, even though this had not been ordered or permitted by any of the domestic decisions. The positive obligation incumbent on the authorities under Article 8 of the Convention required that they proposed altering the terms of the contact rights or took decisions to that effect. The County Social Welfare Board and the City Court had focused only on the short-term consequences of a separation of X from his foster parents and had failed to consider the long-term impact on him of a permanent separation from his biological mother. The domestic authorities should have resorted to less intrusive measures. 167. The domestic authorities had not dealt with the case in good faith, quite the contrary. The alleged lack of caring skills on the part of the first applicant was firmly contradicted by the case-material. She could not be blamed for having asked the same questions several times when at the parent-child institution, and the institution ’ s staff had threatened her with taking X into public care. While the expert reports contained global formulas such as “a severe lack of the abilities that are required in the mothering role”, “problems with emotional regulation” and “inadequate basic parent skills”, these had not been substantiated. There had been no concrete and tangible evidence to justify the alleged fundamental limitations of the first applicant and her caring skills. 168. Old and new research on infant attachment suggested that the domestic authorities had failed to abide by basic and fundamental attachment principles to support reunification. They had not proved that returning X to the first applicant would cause him serious problems. (b) The Government 169. Overall, the Government invited the Grand Chamber to follow the approach of the Chamber majority, which had been correct and exemplary both in interpretation and application of Convention law. In contrast, they cautioned against the Chamber minority ’ s attempt to carry out a “forensic examination of the facts” : reassessing facts that had been established by the national courts many years ago risked making the review arbitrary and was contrary to the Court ’ s fourth - instance doctrine. 170. The Government argued that the domestic decision-making process had been fair and capable of safeguarding the applicants ’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention. The case had been reviewed independently and impartially by several levels of court. 171. The child ’ s best interests, which had changed over time, were paramount. The first applicant sought to assert her right to family life, but although she had submitted a claim that had to be assessed under Article 8 of the Convention, it was in essence not so much a claim for the protection of existing “family life”, as an assertion of a biological right even under circumstances involving little or no actual attachment. The second applicant, X, also had a right under Article 8 to have his family life protected. The question therefore arose as to whether his “family life” consisted of his biological ties to the first applicant or of the only family life that he had known, namely with the persons who had assumed care for him since he was three weeks old and who, in his mind, were his actual parents. 172. The case involved competing interests, but there was no consensus among the Contracting States as to the extent to which public authorities could interfere with family life in the interests of the well-being of a child, which suggested that they should be accorded a wider margin of appreciation. In the case under consideration, the reasons given by the domestic authorities for the impugned decisions had been relevant and sufficient. X had been subjected to very serious neglect during the first weeks of his life. The first applicant had subsequently failed to show any development with regard to her approach to him. X was vulnerable to a repetition of the same pattern of disturbances and reactions. If his care needs were not met, there was a risk of retraumatisation and a reversal of positive development with regard to his functioning. The first applicant had continued to appear “completely devoid of any such empathy and understanding” that would be called for should X be returned to her. 173. The domestic authorities had complied with their positive obligations. The first applicant had not accepted help from the child welfare services. The authorities had also taken note of her recent marriage and second child, but those developments had not been sufficient to outweigh the necessity of the impugned measures. The Chamber minority had erroneously assumed that the inquiry made by the child welfare services in the municipality to which the first applicant had moved had disclosed “no shortcomings”. 174. The Chamber minority had disregarded Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and had “ reopened ” earlier cases. In doing so, the minority had wrongfully applied the standard of a “stricter scrutiny”, not merely to the adoption decision, but also to the prior decisions relating to the taking into care of X. In addition, the minority had erred with respect to the facts. There had been a previous order awarding the minimum legal contact rights; further contact had not been precluded had this been in X ’ s best interest. However, three experts had concluded that there had been no positive development whatsoever in the relationship between X and the first applicant. Rather than availing herself of the supportive measures, the first applicant had continued to use the contact sessions as an arena for cultivating her opinion that she had been a victim of injustice, instead of focusing on X. It had been primarily in the first applicant ’ s and her family ’ s view that there had been a “conflict” between the first applicant, the child welfare services and the foster mother. 175. In short, the circumstances had been exceptional and the impugned decisions had clearly been motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to X ’ s best interests. The City Court had succeeded in its difficult and sensitive task of striking a fair balance between the relevant competing interests in a complex case. 3. Third-party comments (a) The Government of Belgium 176. The Government of Belgium stated that, while perceptions varied as to what manner of intervention with respect to child welfare was appropriate, Belgian legislation did not allow for adoption contrary to the biological parents ’ wishes. They further submitted that domestic authorities in cases such as the present one had to balance the best interests of the child against the interests of the biological parents. The Belgian Government went on to express a number of considerations as to the facts as they had been restated in the Chamber judgment, and highlighted that these differed from those in the case of Aune, cited above. (b) The Government of Bulgaria 177. The Government of Bulgaria submitted that the child welfare case should be reviewed in its entirety because earlier decisions such as on placement in care and contact rights were intrinsically linked to the adoption proceedings. The Contracting Parties had a wide margin of appreciation when deciding on placement in public care, but a stricter scrutiny was called for in respect of any further limitations. When further limitations were involved, the Court was called upon not only to examine the procedural aspects of the decision-making process, but to go beyond the form, if necessary, and assess the substance of the case. Furthermore, the Bulgarian Government emphasised the positive duty to make concrete efforts to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible and stressed that it was not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing. ( c ) The Government of the Czech Republic 178. The Government of the Czech Republic focused mainly on the approach of the respective authorities after emergency or permanent placements of children in foster care, since, they submitted, immediate active work with the biological families after the placement as well as the frequency of contact between the children and their biological parents appeared to be crucial factors in maintaining original family ties. 179. They further stressed that when assessing the compliance of authorities with their obligations under Article 8 of the Convention, the situation of all members of the family must be taken into account. There was a broad consensus, including in international law, that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests must be paramount. However, the “best interests” principle was not designed to be a kind of “trump card”. Article 8 covered both the best interests of the child and the right of the parents to be assisted by the State in staying or being reunited with their children. The child welfare systems should not disregard the existence of the biological parents ’ rights, which should be duly taken into account and balanced against the best interests of the child, rather than minimised to the point of being ignored. 180. In addition, the Government of the Czech Republic emphasised the importance of contact between biological parents and their child in public care and other measures to reunite the family, inter alia, in order to ensure that a taking into care remained a temporary measure: restrictions on contact could be the starting point of the child ’ s alienation from his or her biological family and, thus, of the impossibility for the family to reunite. In order for the effort to reunite the family to be serious, contact would have to occur several times a week, even under supervision or with assistance, and increase in time up to daily visits. If that were the case, it would be possible to talk about a slow establishment of a bond between the child and their biological parents. Speedy procedures were also required. 181. As to adoption, they maintained that the Court must strike a balance between the rights of the biological and the adoptive parents. The best interests of the child had to be assessed on an ad hoc basis that sometimes conflicted with other interests involved: there were other rights that had to be taken into account when determining whether or not a child should be considered adoptable. ( d ) The Government of Denmark 182. The Government of Denmark argued that the domestic authorities had made a comprehensive and thorough evaluation of the matter, and the Court ’ s assessment should be limited to an assessment of the decision-making process. The Court should not, as had the Chamber minority, carry out a “forensic examination of the facts” and substitute its own assessment for that of the domestic courts, who had undertaken a balancing exercise in conformity with the criteria laid down in Article 8 of the Convention and the Court ’ s jurisprudence. 183. The Chamber majority had made a correct assessment of the matter and there were no strong reasons why the Court should reassess the facts of the case as a fourth-instance tribunal several years after the incidents and based on documentary evidence presented to the Court. Reference was made to paragraph 28(c) of the Copenhagen Declaration. By expressing a dissenting opinion implying an entirely new assessment, the Chamber minority had attempted to don the mantle of a fourth-instance tribunal. The domestic authorities had clearly demonstrated that they had made a thorough assessment of the matter comprising a comprehensive balancing of opposing interests and had shown an understanding of the fact that the case concerned far-reaching intrusions into family and private life, and had also taken into account Article 8 of the Convention and loyally applied the criteria laid down in the Court ’ s jurisprudence. (e) The Government of Italy 184. The Government of Italy submitted that the first applicant ’ s interests did not necessarily align with those of X. If the Court wanted to ensure that X ’ s interests were looked after, it could indicate to the respondent Government that counsel should be appointed for him. Moreover, the Italian Government argued that the decisions taken prior to that concerning X ’ s adoption had become final and if the Court were to re ‑ examine them now in connection with the complaint against the adoption decision, this would run counter to Article 35 of the Convention. Those prior decisions were only facts and ought to be treated as such. 185. In addition, the Italian Government emphasised that there was no European consensus on the topic of protecting parents and children ’ s rights to respect for their family life; the Contracting Parties had a wide margin of appreciation. There were examples in the Court ’ s jurisprudence of cases that had been approached in contradiction to the general principles usually set out by the Court, cases where the Court had taken on a fourth - instance role and examined whether there existed circumstances justifying the removal of the child – which was linked to the idea of a “forensic examination of the facts” mentioned in the dissenting opinion in the Chamber judgment – as well as cases in which the Court had assumed that the best interests of the child coincided with those of his or her biological parents. 186. As to the best interests of the child, the Italian Government emphasised that in the relevant international materials a child was considered to be neglected when the parents did not maintain the necessary relations for his or her upbringing or development, or provide psychological and material assistance. In that connection the Italian Government raised issues with long-term care; children in care lived in limbo between biological parents and substitute carers, with resulting problems such as loyalty conflicts. References were made to Barnea and Caldararu v. Italy, no. 37931/15, 22 June 2017 and Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], no. 25358/12, 24 January 2017. Specialists and experts had emphasised that it was not a rule that biological family ties should be preserved, and that should only be the case where it represented a benefit to the child in the specific case. Only the national decision-makers could carry out the necessary assessment of that individual question. The Court did not have the necessary tools to be a fourth - instance tribunal and carry out a “forensic examination of the facts”. ( f ) The Government of Slovakia 187. The Government of Slovakia submitted that the Court ’ s case-law was perfectly clear in that it primarily protected the biological family. Placing a child in foster care was an extreme measure and domestic authorities were required to adopt other measures if such were able to achieve the pursued aim. In particular, where a decision had been explained in terms of a need to protect the child from danger, the existence of such a danger should be actually established. Simultaneously, taking a child into care should be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permitted, and any measure of implementation should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parent with his or her child. 188. The Slovakian Government made further comments on a case in which Slovak citizens had been affected by child welfare measures and on international concern about child welfare measures adopted in the respondent State. (g) The Government of the United Kingdom 189. The Government of the United Kingdom submitted that in cases such as the present the Court ought in principle to focus on the adequacy of the procedures and sufficiency of the reasons adopted by the domestic authorities, rather than undertake a de novo analysis of the facts. 190. The Court had enumerated a number of identifiable factors that were likely to be relevant in a case such as the present. The UK Government noted, in particular, that permanency was an inherent part of any adoption decision, and that a balancing of interests was required, but guided by the paramountcy of the best interests of the child. The child ’ s bonds to his or her de facto family were therefore to be considered, and Article 8 of the Convention did not require that domestic authorities make endless attempts at family reunification. 191. With respect to subsidiarity, the UK Government pointed to paragraph 28 of the Copenhagen Declaration. In cases such as the present, account should be taken of the relative expertise and involvement of the domestic authorities compared with the Court, the level of participation of the parties affected by the domestic process, and the level of consensus amongst Contracting States. The seriousness of the intervention at issue was also relevant, but a closer scrutiny could not entail a fresh assessment of the facts and particularly not if considerable time had elapsed since the decision under review. The Chamber minority could be understood as seeking to establish that the Court should undertake its own assessment of the underlying facts, rather than reviewing the decisions, particularly by its reference to the need for “a forensic examination of the facts” and by indications that the dissenting judges envisaged that the Court itself should render a “substantive” decision. The Grand Chamber was invited to reject this approach; as had been stated by the Chamber majority, the Court was required to consider whether the domestic authorities had adduced relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions, but only the domestic authorities were in a position to determine what was in the child ’ s best interests. (h) ADF International 192. ADF International submitted that family was internationally recognised as the fundamental group of society and of particular importance to children. According to the Court ’ s case-law, the Contracting Parties were required to organise their child welfare services in a manner aimed at facilitating family reunification, unless there was clear evidence of danger to the child ’ s welfare. Furthermore, ADF International emphasised the duty to maintain contact between parents and children and to provide practical assistance to families. ( i ) The AIMMF 193. The AIMMF emphasised the importance of personal participation of the natural parent, with legal assistance, before the domestic authorities, as had been the case for the first applicant. In addition to making some comments on the emergency decision, the organisation also highlighted the need for the child to have legal assistance in order to ensure that his or her best interests be protected. 194. Furthermore, the AIMMF submitted that the multi-disciplinary composition of the County Social Welfare Board and the City Court was a particularly important aspect that had also been highlighted by the Court in Paradiso and Campanelli, cited above, § 212. Decision-makers with multi ‑ disciplinary competences formed a crucial aspect of a justice system adapted for children. 195. Moreover, the organisation emphasised the importance of bearing in mind that this case concerned X specifically, and solutions had to be found for him in the light of his vulnerability and history, including the experiences with contact sessions and his ties to the foster parents. Based on the Chamber judgment, the Chamber majority had shown a greater understanding of X ’ s needs than what was reflected in the dissenting opinion. It was precisely on the basis of X ’ s individual circumstances and history that the domestic authorities had arrived at the conclusion that it was in his best interests to strengthen his relations with the foster parents. (j) The AIRE Centre 196. The AIRE Centre invited the Court to reiterate that the Convention was a “living instrument” and that the evolving nature of children ’ s rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child had to be taken into account. 197. As to the assessment of the child ’ s best interests, the organisation emphasised the importance of family unity and the child ’ s right to be heard, as protected by Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. With respect to the thresholds for removal and adoption of a child, the organisation reiterated the principles relevant to the questions of necessity and proportionality. It further pointed to the need for both legal certainty and flexibility, and highlighted “ adoption simple ” or long-term fostering as alternatives to a “closed” adoption. While it could be that in very exceptional circumstances it would not be in a child ’ s best interests to retain contact with the birth parents (for example, when those parents had been operating a paedophile ring or engaging in child trafficking or serial child abuse), this conclusion should not flow automatically from the decision that the child needed a stable, permanent home that was not with the birth parents. 198. The AIRE Centre further submitted that children of parents with intellectual disabilities were commonly taken away as infants, with neglect such as slow weight gain, general failure to thrive, and lack of understanding of children ’ s needs, as the primary concern. Parents with intellectual disabilities had the right to support and, inter alia, General Comment No. 14 (2013) to the Convention on the Rights of the Child stressed this positive obligation. (k) The adoptive parents 199. X ’ s adoptive parents submitted that his representation before the Court raised a crucial question in the case. The principle of the best interests of the child had also to be applied to the procedural rules of representation. Under the Court ’ s case-law, the rules relating to representation of children had been flexible and applied so as to ensure that all relevant interests would be brought to the Court ’ s attention. Allowing the natural parents to represent a child who had a protected family life with foster or adoptive parents did not ensure an effective protection of the child ’ s rights under the Convention. 200. According to the Court ’ s case-law, “family life” was essentially a question of fact. Striking a fair balance between the public interest and the many different private interests at play had been emphasised by the Court as particularly important in a case where the child had developed family ties with two different families. Reference was made to, inter alia, Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy, no. 16318/07, 27 April 2010. Due regard also had to be given to other ties that had formed, for instance with siblings. 201. Furthermore, the Court ’ s case-law had established the principle of the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration and the decisive factor in cases relating to the placement in public care and adoption of children. The Grand Chamber should seek to combine the case-law concerning family life between the child and the foster parents and that concerning the paramountcy of the best interests of the child in the instant case. 4. The Court ’ s considerations (a) General principles 202. The first paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention guarantees to everyone the right to respect for his or her family life. As is well established in the Court ’ s case-law, the mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other ’ s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life, and domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the right protected by this provision. Any such interference constitutes a violation of this Article unless it is “in accordance with the law”, pursues an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under its second paragraph and can be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society” (see, among other authorities, K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 151, ECHR 2001 ‑ VII; and Johansen, cited above, § 52). 203. In determining whether the latter condition was fulfilled, the Court will consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify that measure were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (see, among many other authorities, Paradiso and Campanelli, cited above, § 179). The notion of necessity further implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, regard being had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the relevant competing interests ( ibid., § 181). 204. In so far as the family life of a child is concerned, the Court reiterates that there is a broad consensus, including in international law, in support of the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests are of paramount importance (see, among other authorities, Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, § 135, ECHR 2010). Indeed, the Court has emphasised that in cases involving the care of children and contact restrictions, the child ’ s interests must come before all other considerations (see Jovanovic, cited above, § 77, and Gnahoré v. France, no. 40031/98, § 59, ECHR 2000 ‑ IX ). 205. At the same time, it should be noted that regard for family unity and for family reunification in the event of separation are inherent considerations in the right to respect for family life under Article 8. Accordingly, in the case of imposition of public care restricting family life, a positive duty lies on the authorities to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible ( K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 178). 206. In instances where the respective interests of a child and those of the parents come into conflict, Article 8 requires that the domestic authorities should strike a fair balance between those interests and that, in the balancing process, particular importance should be attached to the best interests of the child which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override those of the parents (see, for instance, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], no. 31871/96, § 64, ECHR 2003 ‑ VIII (extracts)), and the references therein). 207. Generally, the best interests of the child dictate, on the one hand, that the child ’ s ties with its family must be maintained, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit, since severing those ties means cutting a child off from its roots. It follows that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, if and when appropriate, to “rebuild” the family (see Gnahoré, cited above, § 59). On the other hand, it is clearly also in the child ’ s interest to ensure its development in a sound environment, and a parent cannot be entitled under Article 8 to have such measures taken as would harm the child ’ s health and development (see, among many other authorities, Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 136; Elsholz v. Germany [GC], no. 25735/94, § 50, ECHR 2000-VIII; and Maršálek v. the Czech Republic, no. 8153/04, § 71, 4 April 2006). An important international consensus exists to the effect that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child ( see Article 9 § 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, recited in paragraph 134 above ). In addition, it is incumbent on the Contracting States to put in place practical and effective procedural safeguards for the protection of the best interests of the child and to ensure their implementation (see the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration, paragraphs 85 and 87, quoted at paragraph 136 above). 208. Another guiding principle is that a care order should be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit, and that any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child ( see, for instance, Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 24 March 1988, § 81, Series A no. 130). The above - mentioned positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible will begin to weigh on the competent authorities with progressively increasing force as from the commencement of the period of care, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to consider the best interests of the child (see, for example, K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 178). In this type of case the adequacy of a measure is to be judged by the swiftness of its implementation, as the passage of time can have irremediable consequences for relations between the child and the parent with whom it does not live (see, inter alia, S.H. v. Italy, no. 52557/14, § 42, 13 October 2015). Thus, where the authorities are responsible for a situation of family breakdown because they have failed in their above-mentioned obligation, they may not base a decision to authorise adoption on the grounds of the absence of bonds between the parents and the child ( see Pontes v. Portugal, no. 19554/09, §§ 92 and 99, 10 April 2012). Furthermore, the ties between members of a family and the prospects of their successful reunification will perforce be weakened if impediments are placed in the way of their having easy and regular access to each other (see Scozzari and Giunta, cited above, § 174; and Olsson ( No. 1), cited above, § 81). However, when a considerable period of time has passed since the child was originally taken into public care, the interest of a child not to have his or her de facto family situation changed again may override the interests of the parents to have their family reunited ( see K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 155). 209. As regards replacing a foster home arrangement with a more far-reaching measure such as deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption, with the consequence that the applicants ’ legal ties with the child are definitively severed, it is to be reiterated that “such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child ’ s best interests” (see, for example, Johansen, cited above, § 78, and Aune, cited above, § 66). It is in the very nature of adoption that no real prospects for rehabilitation or family reunification exist and that it is instead in the child ’ s best interests that he or she be placed permanently in a new family ( see R. and H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 35348/06, § 88, 31 May 2011). 210. In determining whether the reasons for the impugned measures were relevant and sufficient for the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court will have regard to the fact that perceptions as to the appropriateness of intervention by public authorities in the care of children vary from one Contracting State to another, depending on such factors as traditions relating to the role of the family and to State intervention in family affairs and the availability of resources for public measures in this particular area. However, consideration of what is in the best interests of the child is in every case of crucial importance. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the national authorities have the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned, often at the very stage when care measures are being envisaged or immediately after their implementation. It follows from these considerations that the Court ’ s task is not to substitute itself for the domestic authorities in the exercise of their responsibilities for the regulation of the care of children and the rights of parents whose children have been taken into public care, but rather to review under the Convention the decisions taken by those authorities in the exercise of their power of appreciation (see, for example, K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 154; and Johansen, cited above, § 64). 211. The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake, such as, on the one hand, the importance of protecting a child in a situation which is assessed as seriously threatening his or her health or development and, on the other hand, the aim to reunite the family as soon as circumstances permit. The Court thus recognises that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care (see, for example, K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 15 5; and Johansen, cited above, § 64). However, this margin is not unfettered. For example, the Court has in certain instances attached weight to whether the authorities, before taking a child into public care, had first attempted to take less drastic measures, such as supportive or preventive ones, and whether these had proved unsuccessful (see, for example, Olsson (no. 1), cited above, §§ 72-74; R.M.S. v. Spain, no. 28775/12, § 86, 18 June 2013, § 86; and Kutzner v. Germany, no. 46544/99, § 75, ECHR 2002 ‑ I ). A stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by the authorities on parental rights of access, and of any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life. Such further limitations entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young child are effectively curtailed (see K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, ibid., and Johansen, cited above, ibid.). 212. In cases relating to public - care measures, the Court will further have regard to the authorities ’ decision-making process, to determine whether it has been conducted such as to secure that the views and interests of the natural parents are made known to and duly taken into account by the authorities and that they are able to exercise in due time any remedies available to them (see, for instance, W. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, § 63, Series A no. 121, and Elsholz, cited above, § 52). What has to be determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests and have been able fully to present their case (see, for example, W. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 64; T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28945/95, § 72, ECHR 2001 ‑ V (extracts); Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 139; and Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 4547/10, § 138, 13 March 2012). From the foregoing considerations it follows that natural parents ’ exercise of judicial remedies with a view to obtaining family reunification with their child cannot as such be held against them. In addition, in cases of this kind there is always the danger that any procedural delay will result in the de facto determination of the issue submitted to the court before it has held its hearing. Equally, effective respect for family life requires that future relations between parent and child be determined solely in the light of all relevant considerations and not by the mere effluxion of time (see W. v. the United Kingdom. , cited above, § 65). 213. Whether the decision-making process sufficiently protected a parent ’ s interests depends on the particular circumstances of each case (see, for example, Sommerfeld, cited above, § 68 ). With a view to its examination of the present instance, the Court observes that in the aforementioned case it was called upon to examine the issue of ordering a psychological report on the possibilities of establishing contact between the child and the applicant. It observed that as a general rule it was for the national courts to assess the evidence before them, including the means to ascertain the relevant facts (see Vidal v. Belgium, 22 April 1992, § 33, Series A no. 235 ‑ B ). It would be going too far to say that domestic courts are always required to involve a psychological expert on the issue of awarding contact to a parent not having custody, but this issue depends on the specific circumstances of each case, having due regard to the age and maturity of the child concerned (see Sommerfeld, cited above, § 71). ( b ) Application of those principles to the present case 214. It is common ground between the parties, and the Court finds it unequivocally established, that the impugned decisions taken in the proceedings instituted by the first applicant on 29 April 2011 (see paragraph 81 above), starting with the Board ’ s decision of 8 December 2011 and ending with the Supreme Court Appeals Board ’ s decision of 15 October 2012, entailed an interference with the applicants ’ right to respect for their family life under the first paragraph of Article 8. It is further undisputed that they were taken in accordance with the law, namely the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 122 above), and pursued legitimate aims, namely the “protection of health or morals” and “rights and freedoms” of X. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. The interference thus fulfilled two of the three conditions of justification envisaged by the second paragraph of Article 8. The dispute in the present case relates to the third condition: whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. 215. Bearing in mind the limitations on the scope of its examination as described in paragraphs 147 to 148 above, the Court will centre its examination on the City Court ’ s review as reflected in its judgment of 22 February 2012, which ultimately gained legal force on 15 October 2012 when the Supreme Court Appeals Board dismissed the first applicant ’ s appeal (see paragraphs 98-113, 118 and 121 above). 216. At the outset the Court notes that the City Court ’ s bench was composed of a professional judge, a lay person and a psychologist. It held a three-day hearing that the first applicant attended together with her legal - aid counsel and in which twenty-one witnesses, including experts, gave testimony (see paragraph 98 above ). In addition, the Court notes that the City Court acted as an appeal instance and that proceedings similar to those before that court had previously been conducted, and similarly extensive reasons given, by the County Social Welfare Board, which had also had a composition similar to that of the City Court (see paragraphs 89-95 above). The City Court ’ s judgment was subject to review in leave - to - appeal proceedings before the High Court (see paragraphs 114-18 above), which were in turn examined by the Supreme Court Appeals Board (see paragraphs 119-21 above). 217. In its judgment the City Court decided not to lift the care order for X, to deprive the first applicant of her parental responsibilities for him and to authorise his adoption by his foster parents, in accordance with sections 4-21 and 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act respectively (see paragraph 122 above). While observing that the City Court relied on several grounds in order to justify its decisions, the Court notes that under the aforementioned provisions a central condition for the imposition of the impugned measures related to the natural parent ’ s ability to assume care. Thus, pursuant to section 4-21, a precondition for revoking the care order was the high probability that the parent would be able to provide the child with proper care. Under section 4-20, consent to adoption could be given if it had to be regarded as probable that the parent would be permanently unable to provide the child with proper care. 218. The City Court assessed that issue primarily in the part of its reasoning devoted to the applicant ’ s request to have the care order lifted, which can be summarised as follows. Her situation had improved in some areas (see paragraph 100 above). However, X was a vulnerable child who had shown emotional reactions in connection with the contact sessions (see paragraphs 101- 0 2 above). The evidence adduced had clearly shown that the first applicant ’ s fundamental limitations at the time of the High Court ’ s judgment in the previous set of proceedings still persisted. She had not improved her ability to handle contact situations; she had affirmed that she would fight until the child was returned to her; and she had stated that she did not consider that public exposure and repeated legal proceedings could be harmful for the child in the long term (see paragraphs 103- 0 4 above). Moreover, the experts who had testified in court, other than K.M., had advised against returning X to his mother (see paragraph 105 above). There was no reason to consider in further detail any other arguments regarding the first applicant ’ s ability to provide care, since returning X to her was in any event not an option owing to the serious problems it would cause him to be moved from the foster home (see paragraph 106 above). 219. In deciding on the child welfare services ’ application for removal of the first applicant ’ s parental responsibilities in respect of X and authorisation of the latter ’ s adoption, the City Court endorsed the Board ’ s reasoning regarding the alternative criteria in letter (a) of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act, namely that it had to be regarded as probable that the first applicant would be permanently unable to provide X with proper care or that X had become so attached to his foster home and the environment there that, on the basis of an overall assessment, removing him could cause him serious problems (see paragraph 108 above). In so far as the question of caring skills is concerned, the following findings of the Board are noteworthy in this context. There was nothing to indicate that the first applicant ’ s caring skills had improved since the High Court ’ s judgment of 22 April 2010. She had not realised that she had neglected X and was unable to focus on the child and what was best for him. Whilst note had been taken of the information that the first applicant had married and had had a second child, this was not decisive in respect of her capacity to care for X. He was a particularly vulnerable child and had experienced serious and life-threatening neglect during the first three weeks of his life. The Board had also taken account of the experience during the contact sessions. Moreover, since X had lived in the foster home for three years and did not know the first applicant, returning him to her would require a great capacity to empathise with and understand him and the problems that he would experience. Yet the first applicant and her family were completely devoid of any such empathy and understanding (see paragraph 90 above). 220. The Court is fully conscious of the primordial interest of the child in the decision-making process. However, the process leading to the withdrawal of parental responsibilities and consent to adoption shows that the domestic authorities did not attempt to perform a genuine balancing exercise between the interests of the child and his biological family (see paragraphs 20 7 and 20 8 above), but focused on the child ’ s interests instead of trying to combine both sets of interests, and moreover did not seriously contemplate any possibility of the child ’ s reunification with his biological family. In this context, the Court, in particular, is not persuaded that the competent domestic authorities duly considered the potential significance of the fact that at the time when the first applicant applied to have the care order lifted or, in the alternative, to be granted extended contact rights she was going through substantial changes in her life : in the same summer and autumn as the impugned proceedings commenced she married and had a second child. In this regard, as the City Court ’ s decision was largely premised on an assessment of the first applicant ’ s lack of capacity to provide care, the factual basis on which it relied in making that assessment appears to disclose several shortcomings in the decision - making process. 221. The Court notes that the decisions under consideration had been taken in a context where there had only been very limited contact between the first applicant and X. The Board, in its decision of 2 March 2009, and the High Court, in its judgment of 22 April 2010 ( overturning the City Court ’ s judgment of 19 August 2009 ), had relied on the consideration that it was most likely that the foster care arrangement would be a long-term one, and that X would grow up in the foster home (see paragraphs 31, 43 and 75 above). The High Court stated that contact sessions could thus serve as a means of maintaining contact between the mother and son, so that he would be familiar with his roots. The purpose was not to establish a relationship with a view to the child ’ s future return to the care of his biological mother (ibid.). As regards the implementation of the contact arrangements, the Court also notes that these had not been particularly conducive to letting the first applicant freely bond with X, for example with regard to where the sessions had been held and who had been present. Although the contact sessions had often not worked well, it appears that little was done to try out alternative arrangements for implementing contact. In short, the Court considers that the sparse contact that had taken place between the applicants since X was taken into foster care had provided limited evidence from which to draw clear conclusions with respect to the first applicant ’ s caring skills. 222. Furthermore, the Court regards it as significant that there were no updated expert reports since those that had been ordered during the previous proceedings between 2009 and 2010 relating to the taking into public care. Those were the report by psychologist B.S. and family therapist E.W.A, ordered by the child welfare services and concerning X ’ s reactions to the contact sessions in the beginning of September 2009 (see paragraph 58 above), and the report by psychologist M.S., who had been appointed by the High Court on 15 November 2009 (see paragraph 61 above). The former dated back to 20 February 2010 and the latter to 3 March 2010 (see paragraphs 62 and 63 above respectively). When the City Court delivered its judgment on 22 February 2012, both reports were two years old. Indeed, alongside other witnesses such as family members, psychologists B.S. and M.S. also gave evidence during the hearing held by the City Court in 2012 (see paragraph 98 above). However, the two psychologists had not carried out any examinations since those prior to their reports dating back to early 2010 and only one of the reports, the one by psychologist M.S., had been based on observations of the interplay between the applicants, and then only on two occasions ( see paragraph 63 above ). 223. The Court does not overlook the fact that the child welfare services had sought information from the first applicant concerning her new family that she apparently refused to provide (see paragraphs 85 and 115 above). At the same time it notes that counsel for the first applicant had expressly requested that a new expert assessment be made but that the High Court dismissed the request (see paragraphs 114 and 118 above). Nor had the City Court ordered a new expert examination proprio motu in the course of the proceedings before it. While it would generally be for the domestic authorities to decide whether expert reports were needed (see, for example, Sommerfeld, cited above, § 71), the Court considers that the lack of a fresh expert examination substantially limited the factual assessment of the first applicant ’ s new situation and her caring skills at the material time. In those circumstances, contrary to what the City Court seems to suggest, it could not reasonably be held against her that she had failed to appreciate that repeated legal proceedings could be harmful for the child in the long run (see paragraphs 104 and 21 8 above). 224. In addition, from the City Court ’ s reasoning it transpires that in assessing the first applicant ’ s caring skills it had paid particular regard to X ’ s special care needs, seen in the light of his vulnerability. However, whereas X ’ s vulnerability had formed a central reason for the initial decision to place him in foster care (see, for instance, paragraphs 31 and 42 above), the City Court ’ s judgment contained no information on how that vulnerability could have continued despite the fact that he had lived in foster care since the age of three weeks. It also contained barely any analysis of the nature of his vulnerability, beyond a brief description by experts that X was easily stressed and needed a lot of quiet, security and support, and stating his resistance to and resignation toward having contact with the first applicant, notably when faced with her emotional outbursts (see paragraphs 101 to 102 above). In the view of the Court, having regard to the seriousness of the interests at stake, it was incumbent on the competent authorities to assess X ’ s vulnerability in more detail in the proceedings under review. 225. Against this background, taking particular account of the limited evidence that could be drawn from the contact sessions that had been implemented (see paragraph 22 1 above), in conjunction with the failure – notwithstanding the first applicant ’ s new family situation – to order a fresh expert examination into her capacity to provide proper care and the central importance of this factor in the City Court ’ s assessment (see paragraphs 22 2 - 3 above) and also of the lack of reasoning with regard to X ’ s continued vulnerability (see paragraph 22 4 above), the Court does not consider that the decision -making process leading to the impugned decision of 22 February 2012 was conducted so as to ensure that all views and interests of the applicants were duly taken into account. It is thus not satisfied that the said procedure was accompanied by safeguards that were commensurate with the gravity of the interference and the seriousness of the interests at stake. 226. In the light of the above factors, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of both applicants. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 227. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 228. The applicants each claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage. 229. The Government asked the Court, in the event of a finding of a violation, to afford just satisfaction within the limits of Article 41 of the Convention. 230. The Court considers that awarding damages to the first applicant is appropriate in this case, having regard to the anguish and distress that she must have experienced as a result of the procedures relating to her claim to have X returned and the child welfare services ’ application to have her parental responsibilities for X withdrawn and his adoption authorised. It awards the first applicant EUR 2 5,000 under this head. In respect of X, having regard to his age at the relevant time and to the fact that he did not experience the procedures in question in the same way as the first applicant, the Court finds that a finding of violation can be regarded as sufficient just satisfaction. B. Costs and expenses 231. The applicants also claimed EUR 50,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic authorities and the Chamber and EUR 9,564 for those incurred before the Grand Chamber. 232. The Government asked the Court, in the event of a violation, to afford just satisfaction within the limits of Article 41 of the Convention. 233. According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. 234. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and before the Chamber, since the applicants have not shown that these expenses were actually incurred. As to the costs and expenses before the Grand Chamber, the Court observes that apart from travel expenses, the claim is submitted with reference to a contingency (no-win no-fee) arrangement, according to which the first applicant is obliged to pay counsel EUR 9,000 in the event of “success before the European Court of Human Rights”. Agreements of this nature – giving rise to obligations solely between lawyer and client – cannot bind the Court, which must assess the level of costs and expenses to be awarded with reference not only to whether the costs are actually incurred but also to whether they have been reasonably incurred (see, for example, Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § 55, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI). Accordingly, the Court must as a basis for its assessment examine the other information provided by the applicants in support of their claim. In accordance with Rule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Court, itemised particulars of all claims must be submitted, failing which the Court may reject the claim in whole or in part (see, inter alia, A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, § 281, ECHR 2010). In the instant case, the Court, taking into account that the claim has not been contested, considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 9, 35 0 for the proceedings before the Grand Chamber. In the circumstances, it is appropriate to award this compensation to the first applicant only. C. Default interest 235. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Grand Chamber held that there had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention in respect of both applicants. It found in particular that the main reason for the Norwegian authorities’ actions had been the mother’s inability to care properly for her son, in particular in view of his special needs as a vulnerable child. However, that reasoning had been based on limited evidence as the contact sessions between mother and son after his placement in foster care had been few and far between and the psychologists’ reports out-dated. In addition, a review of his vulnerability had contained barely any analysis and no explanation as to how he could continue to be vulnerable despite having been in care since he was three weeks’ old. Overall, the domestic authorities had not in the present case attempted to carry out a genuine balancing exercise between the interests of the child and his biological family or taken into consideration developments in the mother’s family life, namely she had in the meantime married and had a second child.