Private persons
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 30. Section 7 of the Media Act, which has the title “ Interference with a person ’ s most intimate personal sphere” ( Verletzung des höchst ­ persönlichen Lebens ­ bereiches ), reads as follows: “ (1) If a person ’ s strictly private life is discussed or presented in the media in a manner which is apt to compromise this person in public, the person concerned may claim compensation from the owner of the media for the injury suffered. The amount of compensation shall not exceed EUR 20,000 ... (2) No compensation claim under paragraph 1 exists if 1. the publication at issue is based on a truthful report on a public session of the National Council or the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly, a regional diet or a committee of one of these general representative bodies; 2. the publication is true and has a direct connection to public life; 3. in the circumstances it could have been assumed that the person concerned had agreed to the publication; 4. it is a direct broadcast on radio or television (live programme) and the employees or contractors of the radio or television station have not neglected the principles of journalistic diligence; 5. the information has been published on a retrievable website and the owner of the media or its employees or contractors have not neglected the principles of journalistic diligence. ” 31. Section 7a of the Media Act which has the title “ Protection against divulging a person ’ s identity in special cases ” ( Schutz vor Bekanntgabe der Identität in besonderen Fällen ), reads as follows: “(1) Where publication is made, through any medium, of a name, image or other particulars which are likely to lead to the disclosure to a larger not directly informed circle of people of the identity of a person who 1. has been the victim of an offence punishable by the courts, or 2. is suspected of having committed, or has been convicted of, a punishable offence, and where legitimate interests of that person are thereby injured and there is no predominant public interest in the publication of such details on account of the person ’ s position in society, of some other connection with public life, or of other reasons, the victim shall have a claim against the owner of the medium (publisher) for damages for the injury suffered. The award of damages shall not exceed 20,000 euros; additionally, section 6(1), second sentence, shall apply. (2) Legitimate interests of the victim shall in any event be injured if the publication 1. in the case of subsection (1)1, is such as to give rise to an interference with the victim ’ s strictly private life or to his or her exposure, 2. in the case of subsection (1)2, relates to a juvenile or merely to a lesser indictable offence ( Vergehen ) or may disproportionately prejudice the advancement of the person concerned. (3) No compensation claim under paragraph 1 exists if 1. the publication at issue is based on a truthful report on a public session of the National Council or the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly, a regional diet or a committee of one of these general representative bodies; 2. the publication of the information on the person has been decided officially, in particular for the purposes of criminal justice or public security; 3. the person concerned has agreed to the publication or if the publication is based on information given by that person to the media; 4. it is a direct broadcast on radio or television (live programme) and the employees or contractors of the radio or television station have not neglected the principles of journalistic diligence; 5. the information has been published on a retrievable website and the owner of the media or its employees or contractors have not neglected the principles of journalistic diligence.” 32. Section 6(1) second sentence of the Media Act, to which reference has been made above, reads as follows: “The amount of compensation shall be fixed according to the extent of the publication, its impact and, in particular, the type of media and how broadly it is disseminated; the compensation must not endanger the economic existence of the media owner.” 33. Section 8a of the Media Act which has the title “ Separate compensation proceedings” ( Selbständiges Entschädigungs ­ verfahren ), insofar as relevant, reads as follows: “ In a judgment by which compensation under Section 6, 7, 7b or 7c has been awarded on the basis of a separate compensation request, the court must also order the publication of the judgment if the person concerned so requests so ... ” THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 34. The applicant company complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the judgments of the Austrian courts violated its right to freedom of expression. Article 10 reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 35. The Government contested that argument. A. Admissibility 36. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 37. The Court notes that it is common ground between the parties that the Vienna Regional Court ’ s judgment of 19 October 2004, upheld by the Court of Appeal, which awarded damages to Christian, constituted an interference with the applicant company ’ s right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention. 38. An interference contravenes Article 10 of the Convention unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2, and is “necessary in a democratic society” for achieving such an aim or aims. 39. The Court considers, and this was acknowledged by the parties, that the interference was prescribed by law, namely by sections 7 and 7a of the Media Act. The Court further finds, and this was likewise not disputed between the parties, that the interference served a legitimate aim, namely “the protection of the reputation or rights of others” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 40. The parties ’ argument concentrated on the question whether the interference had been “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 1. The parties ’ submissions 41. The applicant company maintained that the interference with its right to impart information had not been necessary in a democratic society. There was no doubt that the event on which the applicant company had reported had involved questions which were a subject of public importance, namely the conduct of the courts and authorities when enforcing the Family Court ’ s decision to hand Christian over to his mother, and contributed to the public discussion which had been triggered by the questionable conduct of the enforcement officers. 42. In reporting on the matter the press could not, as suggested by the Austrian courts, have done so in a merely neutral and sober way. It was also a corporate necessity to attract the attention of the public by incorporating entertaining components, as otherwise it would be practically impossible to reach the public. Otherwise the press would loose its audience and would no longer be able to fulfil its protection and warning role. In fulfilling this role the press was entitled to resort to exaggeration and provocation in their reporting and this right was not restricted to textual reporting but also extended to images illustrating the articles. It was true that the applicant company had published one picture of Christian which could be considered as showing his suffering and despair while clinging to his brother, but that picture had been published only for the purpose of rousing the public from apathy. The essential question was therefore whether the importance of the events on which the applicant company was reporting justified the publication of pictures which also showed the pain and suffering of the persons concerned by the events. For the above reasons the answer must be in the affirmative. 43. The applicant company also argued that the amount of compensation granted to Christian had been excessive, because the impugned articles had not been published on the front page of the newspaper but merely towards the back, and the main reason for the granting of compensation was the publication of one single picture showing the suffering and despair of Christian, while the other pictures were merely neutral images of him. 44. The Government, while acknowledging the essential role played by the press as a “public watchdog”, asserted that in the present case the interference with the applicant company ’ s freedom of expression had been necessary within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. They argued in particular that the domestic courts had had to weigh the applicant company ’ s interest in imparting information on an issue of public interest against the right to protection of the most intimate sphere of life of the person on whom it reported, which was equally protected by the Convention, namely the right to respect for his or her identity, protected by Article 8 as part of a person ’ s private life. The necessity to carry out such a weighing of interests was laid down in section 7 of the Media Act. 45. The Austrian courts had found that that the articles published by the applicant company constituted an intrusion into the strictly private life of Christian, a minor. In its judgment of 19 October 2004 the Regional Court had explained in detail that even though it was clearly permissible to publish an article on the events surrounding the handing over of Christian to his mother, and the conduct of the courts and authorities in this respect, this did not mean that in doing so the applicant company had the right to reveal the identity of Christian and publish pictures showing him in a state of despair. The disclosure of the identity of Christian was irrelevant for understanding the details of the events of which he had been the victim and this specific detail was also unnecessary in raising public awareness concerning the conduct of the authorities. In such cases the State had a positive obligation to ensure effective protection against breaches of the personal integrity of children, as a particularly vulnerable group. 46. Lastly the Government argued that the amount of compensation awarded to Christian, namely EUR 9 ,000 was not disproportionate, given that this figure was well below the maximum amount of compensation possible, and taking into account the wide dissemination of the information by the applicant company and the influence it had had on public opinion. 2. The Court ’ s assessment (a) General principles 47. According to the Court ’ s well-established case-law, the test of necessity in a democratic society requires the Court to determine whether the interference complained of corresponded to a “pressing social need”, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient (see The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 62, Series A no. 30). In assessing whether such a need exists and what measures should be adopted to deal with it, the national authorities are left a certain margin of appreciation. This power of appreciation is not, however, unlimited but goes hand in hand with a European supervision by the Court, whose task it is to give a final ruling on whether a restriction is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 58, ECHR 1999 ‑ III). 48. An important factor for the Court ’ s determination is the essential function of the press in a democratic society. Although the press must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others or the proper administration of justice, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 59, and as a recent authority, Flinkkilä and Others v. Finland, no. 25576/04, § 73, 6 April 2010 ). By reason of the “duties and responsibilities” inherent in the exercise of freedom of expression, the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists in relation to reporting on issues of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and providing reliable and precise information in accordance with the ethics of journalism (see Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 54, ECHR 1999 ‑ I, and, as a recent authority, Eerikäinen and Others v. Finland, no. 3514/02, § 60, 10 February 2009). 49. Whilst it is true that the methods of objective and balanced reporting may vary considerably and that it is therefore not for this Court, nor for the national courts, to substitute its own views for those of the press as to what technique of reporting should be adopted ( Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 31, Series A no. 298), editorial discretion is not unbounded. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of “public watchdog” (Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, § 59, Series A no. 216; Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, § 63, Series A no. 239; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 62, ECHR 1999-III; and, more recently, Gutiérrez Suárez v. Spain, no. 16023/07, § 25, 1 June 2010). 50. The Court has always stressed the contribution made by photographs or articles in the press to a debate of general interest (see Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 2), no. 21277/05 § 46, 4 June 2009, with further references). However, the publication of photographs and articles the sole purpose of which is to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regarding the details of a public figure ’ s private life cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate of general interest to society despite the person being known to the public. In such conditions freedom of expression calls for a narrower interpretation (see MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, no. 39401/04, § 143, 18 January 2011, and Von Hannover v. Germany, no. 59320/00, § 65-66, ECHR 2004-VI ). Moreover, although freedom of expression also extends to the publication of photographs, this is an area in which the protection of the rights and reputation of others takes on particular importance. Photographs appearing in the tabloid press are often taken in a climate of continual harassment which induces in the person concerned a very strong sense of intrusion into their private life or even of persecution ( see Von Hannover v. Germany, cited above, at § 59, and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, no. 71111/01, § 42, 14 June 2007 ). 51. The subject matter at issue in this case relates, on the one hand, to the right of the press under Article 10 of the Convention to inform the public on matters of public concern regarding ongoing court proceedings and on the manner in which decisions by the courts are enforced and, on the other, to the State ’ s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention to protect the privacy of persons, in particular minors, to whom such proceedings relate. When verifying whether the authorities struck a fair balance between two protected values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each other in this type of case – freedom of expression protected by Article 10 and the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8 – the Court must balance the public interest in the publication of the information and the need to protect private life ( see Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, no. 71111/01, § 43, ECHR 2007-VII ). The balancing of individual interests which may well be contradictory is a difficult matter and Contracting States must have a broad margin of appreciation in this respect since the national authorities are in principle better placed than this Court to assess whether or not there is a “pressing social need” capable of justifying an interference with one of the rights guaranteed by the Convention ( see MGN Limited, cited above, § 142, and Egeland and Hanseid v. Norway, cited above, § 55). (b) Application of these principles to the present case 52. In the present case the applicant company published in its newspaper Kurier, between 29 January 2004 and 1 3 February 2004, three articles about a dispute between parents over custody of their child, Christian. In the custody proceedings the competent courts did not accept to transfer custody of Christian to the father, who had refused to comply with that decision. Various attempts at enforcement were unsuccessful because Christian and his father had gone into hiding, and in January 2004 the competent court ordered that Christian be brought before the court by force. On 26 January 2004 court officers went to the house of Christian ’ s father and tried to seize the child, who cried and resisted. These scenes were again the subject of wide media coverage, notably by the applicant company ’ s newspaper, because they were observed and photographed by several journalists, who had been informed and had hurried to the spot. The applicant company ’ s newspaper reported on this case and the articles published disclosed Christian ’ s identity and details of his family life and of the custody dispute. They were accompanied by photographs of Christian that had not been rendered anonymous and, in particular, one which showed him in a state of pain and despair on the occasion of the intervention of the court officers on 26 January 2004. 53. Thereupon, Christian brought proceedings under the Media Act against the applicant company, claiming compensation in respect of reporting constituting an intrusion into his strictly private life ( section 7 of the Media Act) and reporting on the victim of a crime in a manner rendering that person recognisable by the public (Section 7a of the Media Act). On 19 October 2004 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court found against the applicant company, ordering it to pay compensation and to publish the judgment in its newspaper. On appeal the Court of Appeal found on 21 September 2005 that the reporting at issue had been in breach of the obligation not to interfere with a person ’ s strictly private life, but rejected the other ground for compensation, namely, reporting on the victim of a crime in an identifiable manner, and awarded compensation at EUR 3,000 per Article, altogether EUR 9,000. The Regional Court and the Court of Appeal considered that the reporting at issue had breached Christian ’ s right to respect for his strictly private life, and found that there had existed no predominant public interest in the revealing of his identity and giving details of his family life, his health and his emotional state, or the publishing of photographs taken at the time of the unsuccessful attempt to enforce the court ’ s order to hand him over to his mother showing him in a state of pain and despair. 54. In the Court ’ s view the reasons given by the Regional Court and upheld by the Court of Appeal were undoubtedly “relevant” reasons for the purposes of the necessity test to be applied under Article 10 § 2. It will next examine whether they were also “sufficient”. 55. The Court agrees with the domestic courts that the case concerned a balancing of the applicant company ’ s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 against Christian ’ s right to protection of his strictly private life. In such cases one factor the Court has taken into account is the position of the person concerned by the publication: whether or not he or she was a “public figure” or had otherwise “entered the public scene” (see, for instance, Flinkkilä and Others, cited above, § 83, and Eerikäinen and Others, cited above, § 66). Another important factor is whether the articles or photographs in the press contributed to a debate of general interest (see Flinkkilä and Others, cited above, § 76, and Eerikäinen, cited above, § 66). 56. In the present case, Christian is not a public figure, nor does the Court consider that he has entered the public scene by becoming the victim of a custody dispute between his parents which attracted considerable public attention. 57. The Court further considers that the articles at issue dealt with a matter of public concern, namely the appropriate enforcement of custody decisions and whether and to what extent force may or should be used in this context. Such a matter could, and in the present case did, give rise to a public debate. However, given that neither Christian himself nor his parents were public figures or had previously entered the public sphere, it cannot be considered that the disclosure of his identity was essential for understanding the particulars of the case (see “Wirtschafts-Trend” Zeitschriften-Verlags ­ gesellschaft mbH (no. 2) v. Austria (dec.), no. 6274 6 /00, 14 November 2002). In this connection, the Court notes that it was acceptable for the applicant company to report on all relevant details concerning the case of Christian, in particular as regards the problematic attempt to enforce the decision taken in the custody proceedings by the court officers on 26 January 2004, but not to reveal the identity of Christian while publishing the most intimate details about him, or publish a picture of him from which he could be recognised. 58. The applicant company also argued that it had been necessary to publish the picture of Christian showing his suffering and despair while clinging to his brother for the purpose of rousing the public from apathy and attracting their attention, as otherwise the press would not have been able to fulfil its protection and warning role. However, the Court has found in the past that the publication of photographs and articles the sole purpose of which is to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regarding the details of a public figure ’ s private life cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate of general interest to society despite the person being known to the public. In such conditions freedom of expression calls for a narrower interpretation (see MGN Limited, cited above, § 143, with further references). The Court considers that such considerations also apply to persons, like Christian, who are not public figures. 59. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the preservation of the most intimate sphere of life of a juvenile who had become the victim of a custody dispute and had not himself stepped into the public sphere deserved particular protection on account of his or her vulnerable position. 60. Lastly the Court considers that the interference with the applicant company ’ s right to impart information was proportionate. The applicant company was not subject to a fine imposed in criminal proceedings but was ordered to pay compensation for the injury caused to the person with whose right to respect for his strictly private life it had interfered. The amount of compensation, EUR 9,000, relates to three published articles. The amounts appear reasonable taking into account the length of the articles, their contents, which, on account of the details given and the photographs published, constituted a serious interference given the vulnerable situation of Christian as the victim of the custody dispute and the particularly wide circulation of the applicant company ’ s media. 61. In sum, the Court finds that in awarding compensation for the interference with Christian ’ s strictly private life by the applicant company, the respondent State acted within its margin of appreciation in assessing the need to protect his privacy. It is satisfied that the restriction on the applicant company ’ s right to freedom of expression resulting from the judgments of the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal was supported by reasons that were relevant and sufficient, and was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursed. 62. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention. It was true that the articles had dealt with a matter of public concern. However, given that neither the child nor his parents were public figures or had previously entered the public sphere, it had not been essential for understanding the case to disclose his identity, reveal most intimate details of his life or publish a picture from which he could be recognised. The Court was not convinced by the applicants’ arguments that it had been necessary to publish a picture showing the child’s suffering in order to draw public attention to the issue or to ensure the credibility of the story. Lastly, the interference with the applicants’ rights had been proportionate to the aims pursued. They had not been fined in criminal proceedings but had simply been ordered to pay compensation to the child for the injury caused due to interference with his right to respect for his strictly private life.