Military presence and political support
III. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A. The laws of the Azerbaijan SSR 88. The laws relevant to the establishment of the applicants ’ right to property were the 1978 Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR and its 1970 Land Code and 1983 Housing Code. 1. The 1978 Constitution 89. The relevant provisions of the Constitution stated as follows. Article 13 “The basis of the personal property of citizens of the Azerbaijan SSR is their earned income. Personal property may include household items, items of personal consumption, convenience and utility, a house, and earned savings. The personal property of citizens and the right to inherit it are protected by the State. Citizens may be provided with plots of land as prescribed by law for subsidiary farming (including the keeping of livestock and poultry), gardening and the construction of individual housing. Citizens are required to use their land rationally. State and collective farms provide assistance to citizens for their smallholdings. Personal property or property to which they have a right of use may not be used to make unearned income to the detriment of public interest.” 2. The 1970 Land Code 90. The relevant provisions of the Land Code stated as follows. Article 4 State (people ’ s) ownership of land “In accordance with the USSR Constitution and the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution, land is owned by the State – it is the common property of all Soviet people. In the USSR land is exclusively owned by the State and is allocated for use only. Actions directly or indirectly violating the State ’ s right of ownership of land are forbidden.” Article 24 Documents certifying the right of use of land “The right of use by collective farms, State farms and others of plots of land shall be certified by a State certificate on the right of use. The form of the certificate shall be determined by the USSR Soviet of Ministers in accordance with the land legislation of the USSR and the union republics. The right of temporary use of land shall be certified by a certificate in the form determined by the Soviet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR.” Article 25 Rules on issuance of the certificates on the right of use of land “The State certificates on the right of indefinite use of land and on the right of temporary use of land shall be issued to collective farms, State farms, other State, cooperative and public institutions, agencies and organisations, as well as to citizens, by the Executive Committee of the Soviet of People ’ s Deputies of the district or city (under the republic ’ s governance) in the territory of which the plot of land to be allocated for use is situated.” Article 27 Use of land for specified purpose “Users of land have a right to and should use the plots of land allocated to them for the purpose for which the plots of land were allocated.” Article 28 Land users ’ rights of use over allocated plots of land “Depending on the designated purpose of an allocated plot of land, land users shall be entitled to the following in accordance with the relevant rules: – to construct residential, industrial and public-amenities buildings as well as other buildings and structures; – to plant agricultural plants, to afforest and to plant fruit, decorative and other trees; – to use harvesting areas, pasture fields and other agricultural lands; – to use widespread natural subsoil resources, peat and bodies of water for economic purposes, as well as other valuable properties of a land. Article 126-1 Right of use of land in case of inheritance of ownership rights to a building “If the ownership of a building located in a village is inherited and if the heirs do not have a right to buy a household plot in accordance with the relevant procedure, a right of use shall be given to them over a plot of land needed for keeping the building, in the size determined by the Soviet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR.” Article 131 Allocation of plots of land to citizens for construction of personal residential flats “Land plots for the construction of single-flat residential buildings to become personal property shall be allocated to citizens who live in populated settlements of the Azerbaijan SSR where construction of personal flats is not prohibited under the legislation in force, on land belonging to cities and urban settlements; on village land not being used by collective farms, State farms or other agricultural enterprises; on land of the State reserve; and on land of the State forest fund that is not included in the greening zones of cities. Land shall be allocated for the mentioned purpose in accordance with the procedure provided under ... this Code. Construction of personal flats in cities and workers ’ settlements shall be carried out on empty areas which do not require expenditure for their use or technical preparation and, as a rule, near railroads and motorways which provide regular passenger communication, in the form of stand-alone residential districts or settlements.” 3. The 1983 Housing Code 91. Article 10.3 of the Housing Code read as follows: “Citizens have the right to a house as personal property in accordance with the legislation of the USSR and the Azerbaijan SSR.” 4. The 1985 Instructions on Rules of Registration of Housing Facilities 92. The 1985 Instructions, in Article 2, listed the documents that served as evidence of title to a residential house. The Instructions were approved by the USSR Central Statistics Department through Order no. 380 of 15 July 1985. Article 2. 1 listed the various types of documents constituting primary evidence of title. Article 2. 2 stated that, if the primary evidence was missing, title could be shown indirectly through the use of other documents, including “ inventory-technical documents where they contain an exact reference to possession by the owner of duly formalised documents certifying his or her right to the residential house”. B. The laws of Azerbaijan 93. Following independence, Azerbaijan enacted, on 9 November 1991, laws concerning property which, for the first time, referred to land as being the object of private ownership. However, detailed rules on the privatisation of land allotted to citizens were only introduced later, by the 1996 Law on land reform. The applicants, having left Lachin in 1992, could not have applied to become owners of the land that they had used. 1. The 1991 Law on property 94. The 1991 Law on property in Azerbaijan came into force on 1 December 1991. It stated, inter alia, the following. Article 21 Objects of proprietary rights of the citizen “1. A citizen may possess: – plots of land; – houses, apartments, country houses, garages, domestic appliances and items for private use; – shares, bonds and other securities; – mass - media facilities; – enterprises and property complexes for the production of goods destined for the consumer, social and cultural markets, with the exception of certain types of property, which, by law, cannot be owned by citizens for reasons of State or public security or due to international obligations. ... 5. A citizen who owns an apartment, residential house, country house, garage or other premises or structures has the right to dispose of this property of his own will: to sell, bequeath, give away, rent or take other action in so far as it is not in contravention of the law.” 2. The 1992 Land Code 95. The new Land Code, which came into force on 31 January 1992, contained the following provisions. Article 10 Private ownership of plots of land “Plots of land shall be allocated for private ownership to Azerbaijani citizens in accordance with requests by the local executive authorities based on decisions of a district or city Soviet of People ’ s Deputies for the purposes mentioned below: ( 1) for persons permanently residing on the territory in order to construct private houses and subsidiary constructions as well as for the establishment of private subsidiary agriculture; ( 2) for farming activities and activities of other organisations involved in the production of agricultural products for sale; ( 3) for the construction of private and collective country houses and private garages within the bounds of cities; ( 4) for construction connected to business activities; ( 5) for traditional ethnic production activities. Under the legislation of Azerbaijan, plots of land may be allocated for private ownership to citizens for other purposes.” Article 11 Conditions for allocation of plots of land for private ownership “For the purposes stipulated in Article 10 of this Code, the right of ownership over a plot of land shall be granted free of charge. Plots of land allocated to citizens for their private houses, country houses and garages before the date of entry into force of this Code shall be transferred into their name. The right of private ownership or lifetime inheritable possession over a plot of land cannot be granted to foreign citizens or to foreign legal entities. A plot of land shall not be returned to the former owners and their heirs. They may obtain a right of ownership over the plot of land on the basis provided for in this Code.” Article 23 Allocation of plots of land “ Plots of land shall be allocated to citizens, enterprises and organisations for their ownership, possession, use or rent by a decision of a district or city Soviet of People ’ s Deputies, pursuant to the land - allocation procedure and in accordance with land - utilisation documents. The designated purpose of a plot of land shall be indicated in the land - allocation certificate. The procedure for lodging and examining a request for the allocation or seizure of a plot of land, including the seizure of a plot of land for State or public needs, shall be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan. Citizens ’ requests for the allocation of plots of land shall be examined within a period of no longer than one month.” Article 30 Documents certifying land - ownership rights, rights of possession and perpetual use of land “The ownership rights to land and rights of possession and perpetual use of land shall be certified by a State certificate issued by a district or city Soviet of People ’ s Deputies. The form of the mentioned State certificate shall be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” Article 31 Formalisation of the right of temporary use of land “A right of temporary use of land, including a right given in accordance with rental terms, shall be documented by means of an agreement and a certificate. These documents shall be registered by a district or city Soviet of People ’ s Deputies and shall be issued to the land user. The form of the agreement and the certificate shall be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” Article 32 Grounds for termination of land - ownership rights, rights of possession and use of land and rights to rent land “The district or city Soviet of People ’ s Deputies which has provided an ownership right over a plot or a part of a plot of land, rights of possession and use of land or a right to rent it shall terminate these rights in the following cases: ( 1) voluntary surrender or alienation of the plot of land by its owner; ( 2) expiry of the period for which the plot of land was provided; ( 3) termination of activities of an enterprise, agency, organisation or a peasant farm; ( 4) use of the land for purposes other than its designated purpose; ( 5) termination of the employment relationship on the basis of which a land allotment had been provided, except for cases provided by law; ( 6) failure to comply with the terms of a rental agreement; ( 7) failure to pay the land tax or a rent prescribed by the legislation or by a land - rental agreement for two consecutive years, without a good reason; ( 8) failure to use, for one year and without a good reason, a plot of land allocated for agricultural production, or failure to use, for two years and without a good reason, a plot of land allocated for non-agricultural production; ( 9) necessity to seize plots of land for State or public needs; ( 10) transfer of the ownership right over buildings or structures or transfer of a right of operational management over them; ( 11) death of the possessor or user. The legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan may provide for other grounds for the termination of an ownership right over a plot of land, rights of possession and use of land or a right to rent it.” IV. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW 96. Article 42 of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (“the 1907 Hague Regulations”), defines belligerent occupation as follows. “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” Accordingly, occupation within the meaning of the 1907 Hague Regulations exists when a State exercises actual authority over the territory, or part of the territory, of an enemy State. [3] The requirement of actual authority is widely considered to be synonymous to that of effective control. Military occupation is considered to exist in a territory, or part of a territory, if the following elements can be demonstrated: the presence of foreign troops, which are in a position to exercise effective control without the consent of the sovereign. According to widespread expert opinion, physical presence of foreign troops is a sine qua non requirement of occupation [4], that is, occupation is not conceivable without “boots on the ground”, therefore forces exercising naval or air control through a naval or air blockade do not suffice [5]. 97. The rules of international humanitarian law do not explicitly address the issue of preventing access to homes or property. However, Article 49 of Convention ( IV ) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949 (“the Fourth Geneva Convention”) regulates issues of forced displacement in or from occupied territories. It provides as follows. “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased. The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated. The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have taken place. The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention applies in occupied territory, while there are no specific rules regarding forced displacement on the territory of a party to the conflict. Nonetheless, the right of displaced persons “to voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement cease to exist” is regarded as a rule of customary international law (see Rule 132 in Customary International Humanitarian Law by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) [6] ) that applies to any kind of territory. V. RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS AND COUNCIL OF EUROPE MATERIAL A. United Nations 98. The UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 28 June 2005, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17, Annex), known as the Pinheiro Principles, are the most complete standards on the issue. The aim of these principles, which are grounded within existing international human rights and humanitarian law, is to provide international standards and practical guidelines to States, UN agencies and the broader international community on how best to address the complex legal and technical issues surrounding housing and property restitution. They provide, inter alia, as follows. 2. The right to housing and property restitution “2.1 All refugees and displaced persons have the right to have restored to them any housing, land and/or property of which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived, or to be compensated for any housing, land and/or property that is factually impossible to restore as determined by an independent, impartial tribunal. 2.2 States shall demonstrably prioritize the right to restitution as the preferred remedy for displacement and as a key element of restorative justice. The right to restitution exists as a distinct right, and is prejudiced neither by the actual return nor non-return of refugees and displaced persons entitled to housing, land and property restitution.” 3. The right to non-discrimination “3.1 Everyone has the right to be protected from discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status. 3.2 States shall ensure that de facto and de jure discrimination on the above grounds is prohibited and that all persons, including refugees and displaced persons, are considered equal before the law.” 12. National procedures, institutions and mechanisms “12.1 States should establish and support equitable, timely, independent, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures, institutions and mechanisms to assess and enforce housing, land and property restitution claims. ... ... 12.5 Where there has been a general breakdown in the rule of law, or where States are unable to implement the procedures, institutions and mechanisms necessary to facilitate the housing, land and property restitution process in a just and timely manner, States should request the technical assistance and cooperation of relevant international agencies in order to establish provisional regimes for providing refugees and displaced persons with the procedures, institutions and mechanisms necessary to ensure effective restitution remedies. 12.6 States should include housing, land and property restitution procedures, institutions and mechanisms in peace agreements and voluntary repatriation agreements. ...” 13. Accessibility of restitution claims procedures “13.1 Everyone who has been arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived of housing, land and/or property should be able to submit a claim for restitution and/or compensation to an independent and impartial body, to have a determination made on their claim and to receive notice of such determination. States should not establish any preconditions for filing a restitution claim. ... 13.5 States should seek to establish restitution claims-processing centres and offices throughout affected areas where potential claimants currently reside. In order to facilitate the greatest access to those affected, it should be possible to submit restitution claims by post or by proxy, as well as in person. ... ... 13.7 States should develop restitution claims forms that are simple and easy to understand ... ... 13.11 States should ensure that adequate legal aid is provided, if possible free of charge ...” 15. Housing, land and property records and documentation “... 15.7 States may, in situations of mass displacement where little documentary evidence exists as to ownership or rights of possession, adopt the conclusive presumption that persons fleeing their homes during a given period marked by violence or disaster have done so for reasons related to violence or disaster and are therefore entitled to housing, land and property restitution. In such cases, administrative and judicial authorities may independently establish the facts related to undocumented restitution claims. ...” 21. Compensation “21.1 All refugees and displaced persons have the right to full and effective compensation as an integral component of the restitution process. Compensation may be monetary or in kind. States shall, in order to comply with the principle of restorative justice, ensure that the remedy of compensation is only used when the remedy of restitution is not factually possible, or when the injured party knowingly and voluntarily accepts compensation in lieu of restitution, or when the terms of a negotiated peace settlement provide for a combination of restitution and compensation. ...” B. Council of Europe 99. Council of Europe bodies have repeatedly addressed issues of the restitution of property to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. The following Resolutions and Recommendations are of particular relevance in the context of the present case. 1. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE ) Resolution 1708 (2010) on solving property issues of refugees and displaced persons 100. The Parliamentary Assembly noted in paragraph 2 that as many as 2.5 million refugees and IDPs faced situations of displacement in Council of Europe member States, in particular in the North and South Caucasus, the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean, and that displacement was often protracted with affected persons being unable to return to or to access their homes and land since the 1990s and earlier. It underlined the importance of restitution as follows. “3. The destruction, occupation or confiscation of abandoned property violate the rights of the individuals concerned, perpetuate displacement and complicate reconciliation and peace-building. Therefore, the restitution of property – that is the restoration of rights and physical possession in favour of displaced former residents – or compensation, are forms of redress necessary for restoring the rights of the individual and the rule of law. 4. The Parliamentary Assembly considers that restitution is the optimal response to the loss of access and rights to housing, land and property because, alone among forms of redress, it facilitates choice between three ‘ durable solutions ’ to displacement: return to one ’ s original home in safety and dignity; local integration at the site of displacement; or resettlement either at some other site within the country or outside its borders.” The Parliamentary Assembly then referred to Council of Europe human rights instruments, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, as well as to the UN Pinheiro Principles, and called on member States to take the following measures. “9. In the light of the above, the Assembly calls on member states to resolve post-conflict housing, land and property issues of refugees and IDPs, taking into account the Pinheiro Principles, the relevant Council of Europe instruments and Recommendation Rec(2006)6 of the Committee of Ministers. 10. Bearing in mind these relevant international standards and the experience of property resolution and compensation programmes carried out in Europe to date, member states are invited to: 10.1. guarantee timely and effective redress for the loss of access and right to housing, land and property abandoned by refugees and IDPs without regard to pending negotiations concerning the resolution of armed conflicts or the status of a particular territory; 10.2. ensure that such redress takes the form of restitution in the form of confirmation of the legal rights of refugees and displaced persons to their property and restoration of their safe physical access to, and possession of, such property. Where restitution is not possible, adequate compensation must be provided, through the confirmation of prior legal rights to property and the provision of money and goods having a reasonable relationship to their market value or other forms of just reparation; 10.3. ensure that refugees and displaced persons who did not have formally recognised rights prior to their displacement, but whose enjoyment of their property was treated as de facto valid by the authorities, are accorded equal and effective access to legal remedies and redress for their dispossession. This is particularly important where the affected persons are socially vulnerable or belong to minority groups; ... 10.5. ensure that the absence from their accommodation of holders of occupancy and tenancy rights who have been forced to abandon their homes shall be deemed justified until the conditions that allow for voluntary return in safety and dignity have been restored; 10.6. provide rapid, accessible and effective procedures for claiming redress. Where displacement and dispossession have taken place in a systematic manner, special adjudicatory bodies should be set up to assess claims. Such bodies should apply expedited procedure that incorporate relaxed evidentiary standards and facilitated procedure. All property types relevant to the residential and livelihood needs of displaced persons should be within their jurisdiction, including homes, agricultural land and business properties; 10.7. secure the independence, impartiality and expertise of adjudicatory bodies including through appropriate rules on their composition that may provide for the inclusion of international members. ...” 2. PACE Resolution 1497 (2006) on refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 101. In this Resolution, the Parliamentary Assembly notably called on Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia “12.1. to focus all their efforts on finding a peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the region with a view to creating conditions for the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of origin, safely and with dignity; ... 12.4. to make the return of the displaced persons a priority and do everything possible in their negotiations so as to enable these people to return in safety even before an overall settlement; ... 12.15. to develop practical co-operation as regards the investigation of the fate of missing persons and to facilitate the return of identity documents and the restitution of property in particular, making use of the experience of handling similar problems in the Balkans.” 3. Recommendation Rec( 2006)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on internally displaced persons 102. The Committee of Ministers recommended notably the following: “8. Internally displaced persons are entitled to the enjoyment of their property and possessions in accordance with human rights law. In particular, internally displaced persons have the right to repossess the property left behind following their displacement. If internally displaced persons are deprived of their property, such deprivation should give rise to adequate compensation; ” THE LAW I. INTRODUCTION 103. By its decision of 14 December 2011, the Court declared the applicants ’ complaints admissible. It also examined the six preliminary objections raised by the Government under Article 35 of the Convention. Three of them – concerning the question whether the matter had already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement, the lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis and the failure to respect the six-month rule – were rejected. The other three objections were joined to the merits and will be examined below in the following order: exhaustion of domestic remedies, the applicants ’ victim status, and the Government ’ s jurisdiction over the territory in question. II. EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES A. The parties ’ submissions 1. The applicants 104. The applicants submitted that the Armenian authorities had prevented them as displaced persons from returning to their homes and that this reflected an acknowledged official policy and, accordingly, an administrative practice. In these circumstances, they did not have access to any domestic remedies. 105. Moreover, there were no remedies known to them – in Armenia or in the “NKR” – that could be effective in respect of their complaints. Allegedly, the lack of domestic remedies was most clearly shown by the international discussions regarding the right of return of internally displaced persons. Constituting one of the major differences between the parties to the ongoing Minsk Group negotiations, this issue remained unresolved. The applicants had not lodged any “applications” to return and questioned whether there was a forum to which such a request could be submitted. Allegedly, a request would in any event be entirely fruitless. Furthermore, given Armenia ’s denial of any involvement in the events relating to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the applicants asserted that it would be contradictory to have expected them to have approached the Armenian authorities. 106. The applicants further maintained that the Government bore the burden of proof to show that a remedy existed and that it was effective both in theory and in practice and, in particular, that it had been successfully used by litigants in a position similar to theirs. They argued that the Government had failed to discharge this burden. More specifically, none of the examples of cases given by the Government in their observations to the Chamber in July 2007 related to the right to return to enjoy properties or private and family life. Only in their July 2012 observations had the Government pointed to some constitutional remedies in Armenia and the “NKR” and claimed that the applicants had always been able to enter the disputed territories, at least for the purpose of exercising their legal rights. Read in conjunction with the Government ’ s previous observations, where these remedies had not been mentioned and where the return of and compensation to displaced persons were conditioned on a comprehensive and final conflict - resolution agreement, the 2012 submissions lacked credibility. Furthermore, they had not contained any examples of redress actually offered to Azerbaijani nationals for breaches of the type of rights referred to in the present case. 2. The Government 107. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as they had not shown that they had taken any steps to protect or restore their rights. In particular, the applicants had not applied to any judicial or administrative body of the Republic of Armenia. Furthermore, maintaining that the territories in question were under the jurisdiction and control of the “NKR”, the Government claimed that the “NKR” had all the judicial and administrative bodies capable of protecting the rights of individuals. The applicants had purportedly been able to obtain visas to both Armenia and the “NKR” to seek legal advice, even free of charge from “public defender” services, and bring restitution or compensation claims against the Armenian army and authorities or the “NKR” before independent and unbiased courts. As far as Armenia was concerned, this opportunity had existed ever since the ratification of the Convention in April 2002. The positions taken in the Minsk Group negotiations concerned the return of all displaced persons and were of no relevance to the situation of individuals who wished to exercise their legal rights. 108. Moreover, the Government argued that the constitutions and other laws in Armenia and the “NKR”, in particular their Land Codes and Civil Codes, protected individuals ’ right to property, provided for the restitution of or compensation for dispossessed land and made no distinction between the rights of nationals and foreigners. 109. In order to show the effectiveness of Armenian remedies for people of Kurdish or Azeri ethnicity, in June 2007 the Government submitted three court cases: one concerned the amnesty granted to a convicted person, allegedly of Azerbaijani nationality, one related to the friendly settlement reached between a Kurdish person and his employer in a dispute regarding unpaid wages, and one concerned the dispute between another Kurdish person and a local Armenian administration over the prolongation of a land - lease contract. Furthermore, the Government submitted three cases examined by “NKR” courts to demonstrate that there were effective judicial remedies in that region: two concerned the criminal convictions of persons of Armenian ethnicity living in the “NKR” and the remaining one concerned an inheritance dispute between two private individuals, allegedly of Armenian ethnicity. 3. The Azerbaijani Government, third-party intervener 110. According to the Azerbaijani Government, the respondent Government had failed to fulfil their obligation to specify which remedies existed in either Armenia or the “NKR” that could be effective in the circumstances, and had further failed to provide any example of a displaced Azerbaijani national having had successful recourse to such claimed, albeit totally unspecified, remedies. In this connection, the Azerbaijani Government asserted that the Land Codes of Armenia and the “NKR” did not provide any rules or mechanisms by virtue of which persons displaced in circumstances similar to the applicants ’ could obtain restitution of or compensation for their dispossessed property. 111. Furthermore, in the light of the general context, there was allegedly no need to exhaust domestic remedies due to administrative practices and special circumstances. Reference was made, inter alia, to the continuing tension and hostility in the region, the application of martial law within Nagorno-Karabakh and the other occupied territories, and the deliberate policy of encouraging Armenian settlers to move into, in particular, the district of Lachin. 112. The Azerbaijani Government further asserted that any remedies that the respondent Government would argue were available before the Armenian courts and organs could not by definition be effective in view of Armenia ’ s declared view that the “NKR” was an independent State within whose jurisdiction and control Lachin was to be found. Moreover, the territorial framework relevant to the “NKR” “ Declaration of Independence” in September 1991 excluded the other areas of Azerbaijan occupied later, including Lachin, over which, accordingly, the “NKR” courts were constitutionally incapable of exercising jurisdiction. B. The Court ’ s assessment 1. Admissibility of additional submissions 113. It should first be noted that, on 20 January 2014 – two weeks after the extended time-limit set by the Court for the submission of additional documentary material – the Government presented several documents, including two judgments which purportedly acknowledged the ownership rights to private houses and the surrounding land situated in the disputed territories of two displaced plaintiffs of Azerbaijani nationality. The judgments had been issued in 2003 and 2005 by the “First Instance Court of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh”. 114. On 22 January 2014 the President of the Court, after consulting the Grand Chamber, decided, in accordance with Rules 38 § 1 and 71 § 1 of the Rules of Court, that the above- mentioned documents should not be included in the case file, because of their late submission. The Government had not given a satisfactory explanation as to why the documents could not have been filed in time. The Court notes, in this connection, that the Government were invited, on 8 June 2006, to submit observations on the case and that they, both then and later in the proceedings, were asked to specifically address the question of the exhaustion of remedies. No mention was made of the 2003 and 2005 judgments on any of these occasions. Consequently, these documents will not be taken into account. 2. General principles on exhaustion of domestic remedies 115. The Court reiterates that it is primordial that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. The Court is concerned with the supervision of the implementation by Contracting States of their obligations under the Convention. It cannot, and must not, usurp the role of Contracting States whose responsibility it is to ensure that the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined therein are respected and protected on a domestic level. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is therefore an indispensable part of the functioning of this system of protection. States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system, and those who wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system (see, among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 65, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ IV). The Court cannot emphasise enough that it is not a court of first instance; it does not have the capacity, nor is it appropriate to its function as an international court, to adjudicate on large numbers of cases which require the finding of basic facts or the calculation of monetary compensation – both of which should, as a matter of principle and effective practice, be the domain of domestic jurisdiction (see Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], nos. 46113/99 and 7 others, § 69, ECHR 2010, and Kazali and Others v. Cyprus (dec.), nos. 49247/08 and 8 others, § 132, 6 March 2012). 116. The Court has set out the general principles pertaining to the exhaustion of domestic remedies in a number of judgments. In Akdivar and Others (cited above ), it held as follows (further case references deleted). “65. The Court recalls that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article [35] of the Convention obliges those seeking to bring their case against the State before an international judicial or arbitral organ to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system. Consequently, States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. The rule is based on the assumption, reflected in Article 13 of the Convention – with which it has close affinity –, that there is an effective remedy available in respect of the alleged breach in the domestic system whether or not the provisions of the Convention are incorporated in national law. In this way, it is an important aspect of the principle that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights ... 66. Under Article [35] normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness ... Article [35] also requires that the complaints intended to be made subsequently at Strasbourg should have been made to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law and, further, that any procedural means that might prevent a breach of the Convention should have been used ... 67. However, there is, as indicated above, no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective. In addition, according to the ‘ generally recognised rules of international law ’ there may be special circumstances which absolve the applicant from the obligation to exhaust the domestic remedies at his disposal ... The rule is also inapplicable where an administrative practice consisting of a repetition of acts incompatible with the Convention and official tolerance by the State authorities has been shown to exist, and is of such a nature as to make proceedings futile or ineffective ... 68. In the area of the exhaustion of domestic remedies there is a distribution of the burden of proof. It is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant ’ s complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success. However, once this burden of proof has been satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from the requirement ... One such reason may be constituted by the national authorities remaining totally passive in the face of serious allegations of misconduct or infliction of harm by State agents, for example where they have failed to undertake investigations or offer assistance. In such circumstances it can be said that the burden of proof shifts once again, so that it becomes incumbent on the respondent Government to show what they have done in response to the scale and seriousness of the matters complained of. 69. The Court would emphasise that the application of the rule must make due allowance for the fact that it is being applied in the context of machinery for the protection of human rights that the Contracting Parties have agreed to set up. Accordingly, it has recognised that Article [35] must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism ... It has further recognised that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; in reviewing whether it has been observed it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of each individual case ... This means amongst other things that it must take realistic account not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the applicants.” 3. Application of these principles to the facts of the case 117. While maintaining that Armenia has no jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh and, in particular, the district of Lachin, the Government claimed that the applicants could have been afforded redress by judicial and administrative bodies in Armenia and the “NKR”. They referred to provisions in the laws of the two entities concerning land disputes, including issues of restitution and compensation in case of someone else ’ s illegal possession. They also presented statements by domestic judges and officials to the effect that the courts of Armenia and the “NKR” are independent and impartial and are ready to adjudicate cases brought by Azerbaijani citizens without discrimination. The applicants and the Azerbaijani Government, for their part, asserted that the laws of Armenia and the “NKR” did not provide any redress for displaced persons who had been dispossessed of their property in circumstances similar to those of the applicants. 118. The Court finds that, for the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies, it need not determine whether Armenia can be considered to have jurisdiction over the area in question and whether such jurisdiction would have an effect on the operation of its domestic remedies on the issues of the restitution of or compensation for property situated in the disputed territories. The reason for this is that the Government have not shown that there is a remedy – in Armenia or in the “NKR” – capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant ’ s complaints. The legal provisions referred to by them are of a general nature and do not address the specific situation of dispossession of property as a result of armed conflict, or in any other way relate to a situation similar to that of the applicants. As regards the domestic judgments submitted by way of example in June 2007 (see paragraph 109 above), none of them relate to claims concerning the loss of homes or property by persons displaced in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 119. It should also be noted that Armenia has denied that its armed forces or other authorities have been involved in the events giving rise to the complaints in the present case, or that Armenia exercises – or has at any point in time exercised – jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories. Given such a denial of involvement or jurisdiction, it would not be reasonable to expect the applicants to bring claims for restitution or compensation before the Armenian courts and authorities. Regard must further be had to the political and general context. As a consequence of the war, virtually all Azerbaijanis have left the disputed territories. No political solution of the conflict has been reached. Rather, the hostile rhetoric between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan appears to have intensified, ceasefire breaches are recurrent and the military build-up in the region has escalated in recent years. In these circumstances, it is not realistic that any possible remedy in the unrecognised “NKR” entity could in practice afford displaced Azerbaijanis effective redress. 120. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the Government have failed to discharge the burden of proving the availability to the applicants of a remedy capable of providing redress in respect of their Convention complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success. The Government ’ s objection of the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies is therefore dismissed. III. THE APPLICANTS ’ VICTIM STATUS A. The parties ’ submissions 1. The applicants 121. The applicants maintained that they had submitted documentation with their application and their subsequent observations in the case that constituted sufficient proof of their identity and of the fact that they owned or had the right to use identifiable property in the territory in question and that they had been residing there when they had had to flee in May 1992. They referred, inter alia, to the technical passports, statements by witnesses and invoices for building materials and building subsidies. As regards the technical passports, the applicants maintained that they, in all details, complied with the formal requirements under the domestic law in force at the material time. They explained that the discrepancies between the statements made in the application form and the specifications contained in the passports were due to the statements given to their representative in difficult circumstances in Baku in early 2005 during a brief meeting. The original statements were made from memory, without access to documents, and it was therefore the information contained in the passports that was correct and should be taken into account. The applicants further asserted that the passports constituted secondary evidence of their possessions. In addition, the sixth applicant had submitted primary evidence in the form of an abstract from the session protocol of the Soviet of People ’ s Deputies of Lachin District of 29 January 1974 that contained the decision to allocate land to him. When they fled, they had not had the time to take all of their papers with them. Furthermore, there had not been a centralised land register at the time from which they could have obtained further documents. 122. The applicants claimed that, under the 1970 Land Code and the 1983 Housing Code of the Azerbaijan SSR, still in force at the time of their flight, a citizen had a right of ownership to his individual house and an inheritable right to use a plot of land in line with the purposes for which it had been allocated. Both rights allegedly constituted possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Moreover, the 1991 Law on property in Azerbaijan made reference to a land plot as the object of individual ownership and thus gave the applicants a legitimate expectation of becoming owners of land. 2. The Government 123. The Government contended that, with the exception of the sixth applicant, the applicants had not submitted any evidence with their application that could prove that they in fact had any property, let alone that the property was located on the territory claimed and that they had owned it at the relevant time. In the Government ’ s view, it was remarkable that, although they all claimed to have fled empty-handed, the technical passports of the other five applicants had later appeared out of nowhere. Furthermore, the statements of friends and neighbours submitted to the Court amounted to no more than hearsay. In respect of all the applicants, the Government maintained that they had failed to prove “beyond reasonable doubt” that they were the persons they claimed to be, that they had resided in the territories specified by them or that they owned the property in question. In particular, the documents provided by them contained numerous contradictions and inaccuracies. For instance, the second applicant had first claimed to have lived in the village of Chirag and had then changed this to Chiragli. Moreover, most of the technical passports submitted as proof of ownership gave different figures with regard to the size of the houses to the figures stated by the applicants themselves. The Government also claimed that a technical passport is a document showing the technical condition of a building and nothing else, unless its origin and provenance is established. 124. The Government further questioned whether the applicants had ever held a right to the alleged properties that had been recognised under the law in force in 1992 or certified by the appropriate authority. In particular, under the socialist system of the USSR before 1991, land was under the exclusive ownership of the State. While the 1991 Law on property recognised the possibility of private ownership, it did not transfer ownership of land occupied by individuals to them. With respect to individual land users and lessees, the legislation set out that their rights were formalised through a certificate, which was registered in a land register kept by the local Soviet of People ’ s Deputies. Thus, no rights to land could be asserted without such a registered certificate. Furthermore, the Azerbaijani 1992 Land Code stipulated that the rights of a user or lessee could be extinguished following a failure to use the land for a period of two years. As the applicants had not returned to the district of Lachin since 1992, the Government presumed that their alleged rights had been terminated before Armenia became subject to the jurisdiction of the Court in 2002. Furthermore, the applicants ’ claimed legitimate expectation to become owners of land was no longer a realistic expectation in 2002. Furthermore, before that date, the applicants ’ alleged property had been allocated to other individuals, with their names recorded on the land register in accordance with the laws of the “NKR”. Thus, the applicants had no “existing possessions” but were merely claimants seeking to have their property restored or to receive compensation. The Government maintained that no domestic legislation or judicial decision existed which gave rise to a legitimate expectation of such restitution or compensation. However, in the same observations, the Government stated that the “NKR” had not adopted any legal act that deprived the applicants of the right to enter the territory of Lachin or of the right to peacefully enjoy their property. 3. The Azerbaijani Government, third-party intervener 125. The Azerbaijani Government pointed out that almost all displaced persons had had to flee their homes in the occupied territories quickly, without having had the time to collect documents. At the material time, it was impossible to obtain property documents as the records had been kept by the local authorities, and their archives had most likely been destroyed. Nevertheless, a technical passport was classified as an “inventory-technical” document that served to indirectly establish the right to an individual house where the original document was missing. This document constituted secondary evidence of title to a house or a plot of land if its text directly referred to documents confirming the property rights. Such a reference was included in the applicants ’ technical passports. Thus, considered together with the witness statements and building invoices submitted, they demonstrated that the applicants owned individual houses and had the right to use the land plots allotted to them. These rights still existed. 126. The Azerbaijani Government further stated that, at the time of the applicants ’ flight, private ownership of individual houses was protected by the laws of the Azerbaijan SSR, as in force at the material time. No private ownership existed, however, in regard to land, which was exclusively owned by the State. All land transactions were prohibited, but plots of land were allotted by decision of the local authority, the Soviet of People ’ s Deputies, to citizens for their use for a definite or indefinite period of time, free of charge. The right of use, which was an inheritable title, was granted for purposes such as individual housing, namely the construction of privately owned houses, as well as pasture, haymaking and farming. Furthermore, the 1991 Law on property in Azerbaijan, while not yet enforceable at the relevant time, had added a legitimate expectation for the applicants to become owners of land. B. The Court ’ s assessment 127. The examination of the issue of the applicants ’ victim status is twofold. First, it must be assessed whether the applicants have submitted sufficient proof of their personal identity and former residence as well as the existence of the assets they allegedly left behind. If so, it needs to be determined whether these assets constitute “possessions” and help create “homes” under the Convention. For the determination of the second issue, the domestic legal classification or significance of these terms is of importance. 1. General principles on assessment of claims relating to property and homes of displaced persons 128. The Court has previously dealt with cases concerning the property and housing rights of persons who have been displaced as a result of an international or internal armed conflict. The issues have arisen in the context of the occupation of northern Cyprus, the actions of the security forces in Turkey and Russia, and in some other conflict situations. 129. The Court examined for the first time the rights of displaced persons to respect for their homes and property in Loizidou v. Turkey ((merits), 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI). The applicant claimed to be the owner of a number of plots of land in northern Cyprus. The Turkish Government did not call into question the validity of the applicant ’ s title, but argued that she had lost ownership of the land by virtue of Article 159 of the 1985 Constitution of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the “TRNC”) which declared all abandoned immovable properties to be the property of the “TRNC”. The Court, having regard to the lack of recognition of the “TRNC” as a State by the international community, did not attribute any legal validity to the provision and considered that the applicant could not be deemed to have lost title to her property as a result of it (§§ 42-47). 130. In a number of cases related to the above-mentioned conflict, the Court has established the applicants ’ “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on the basis of prima facie evidence which the Government failed convincingly to rebut, including copies of original title deeds, registration certificates, purchase contracts and affirmations of ownership issued by the Republic of Cyprus. As explained by the applicant in Solomonides v. Turkey (no. 16161/90, § 31, 20 January 2009), his titles of ownership had been registered at the District Lands Office. However, at the time of the Turkish military intervention he had been forced to flee and had been unable to take with him the title deeds. The Cypriot authorities had reconstructed the Land Books and had issued certificates of affirmation of title. These certificates were the best evidence available in the absence of the original records or documents. It is noteworthy that in Saveriades v. Turkey (no. 16160/90, 22 September 2009) the reasons why the applicant could not submit the original title deeds were specifically taken into account. The applicant argued that he had been forced to leave his premises, where the documents were held, in great haste and had subsequently been unable to return there or otherwise retrieve the title deeds. The Court accepted that the documents submitted by the applicant (such as a sale contract, ownership certificates and a building permit) provided prima facie evidence that he had a title of ownership over the properties in issue, and continued (§ 18): “... As the respondent Government failed to produce convincing evidence in rebuttal, and taking into account the circumstances in which the applicant had been compelled to leave northern Cyprus, the Court considers that he had a ‘ possession ’ within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.” 131. In Doğan and Others v. Turkey (nos. 8803 /02 and 14 others, ECHR 2004-VI) which concerned the forced eviction of villagers in the state-of-emergency region in south-east Turkey and the refusal to let them return for several years, the Government raised the objection that some of the applicants had not submitted title deeds attesting that they had owned property in the village in question. The Court considered that it was not necessary to decide whether or not in the absence of title deeds the applicants had rights of property under domestic law. The question was rather whether the overall economic activities carried out by the applicants constituted “possessions” coming within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Answering the question in the affirmative, it stated as follows (§ 139): “... [T]he Court notes that it is undisputed that the applicants all lived in Boydaş village until 1994. Although they did not have registered property, they either had their own houses constructed on the lands of their ascendants or lived in the houses owned by their fathers and cultivated the land belonging to the latter. The Court further notes that the applicants had unchallenged rights over the common lands in the village, such as the pasture, grazing and the forest land, and that they earned their living from stockbreeding and tree-felling. Accordingly, in the Court ’ s opinion, all these economic resources and the revenue that the applicants derived from them may qualify as ‘ possessions ’ for the purposes of Article 1.” 132. The autonomous meaning of the concept of “possessions” has been proclaimed in many judgments and decisions of the Court. In Öneryıldız v. Turkey ( [GC], no. 48939/99, § 124, ECHR 2004-XII), it was summarised as follows. “The Court reiterates that the concept of ‘ possessions ’ in the first part of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to ownership of physical goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic law: the issue that needs to be examined is whether the circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, may be regarded as having conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected by that provision ... Accordingly, as well as physical goods, certain rights and interests constituting assets may also be regarded as ‘ property rights ’, and thus as ‘ possessions ’ for the purposes of this provision ... The concept of ‘ possessions ’ is not limited to ‘ existing possessions ’ but may also cover assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he has at least a reasonable and ‘ legitimate expectation ’ of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right ...” In that case, the Court considered that a dwelling illegally erected on public land next to a rubbish tip, where the applicant and his family had lived undisturbed, albeit unauthorised, while paying council tax and public - service charges, represented a proprietary interest which, de facto, had been acknowledged by the authorities and was of a sufficient nature to constitute a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 133. The question whether the applicants had substantiated their claim under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has also arisen in a number of cases against Russia where the applicants ’ houses or other property were destroyed or damaged as a result of aerial attacks on the towns where they lived. For instance, in Kerimova and Others v. Russia (nos. 17170/04 and 5 others, § § 29 2 -9 3, 3 May 2011), the Court accepted the claim of ownership by some of the applicants on the basis of extracts from a housing inventory issued by the town administration after the attack which showed that the applicants were the owners of their houses. As regards the applicants who had submitted no proof of title, the Court established their property right on the basis of other evidence, such as a certificate of residence issued by the town administration. The Court also considered it likely that any documents confirming the applicants ’ title to the houses had been destroyed during the attack. 134. In situations where it has been established that the applicant was the owner of a house, the Court has not required further documentary evidence of his or her residence there to show that the house constituted a “home” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. For example, in Orphanides v. Turkey (no. 36705/97, § 39, 20 January 2009), it stated as follows: “The Court notes that the Government failed to produce any evidence capable of casting doubt upon the applicant ’ s statement that, at the time of the Turkish invasion, he was regularly residing in Lapithos and that his house was treated by him and his family as a home.” 135. However, if an applicant does not produce any evidence of title to property or of residence, his complaints are bound to fail (see, for example, Lordos and Others v. Turkey, no. 15973/90, § 50, 2 November 2010, where the Court declared a complaint incompatible ratione materiae in the absence of evidence of ownership; see also the conclusion as to some applicants in Kerimova and Others, cited above ). In several cases the Court has reiterated that the applicants are required to provide sufficient prima facie evidence in support of their complaints. In Damayev v. Russia (no. 36150/04, §§ 108 ‑ 11, 29 May 2012), it considered that an applicant complaining of the destruction of his home should provide at least a brief description of the property in question. Since no documents or detailed claims were submitted, his complaint was found to be unsubstantiated. As further examples of prima facie evidence of ownership of or residence on property, the Court has mentioned documents such as land or property titles, extracts from land or tax registers, documents from the local administration, plans, photographs and maintenance receipts as well as proof of mail deliveries, statements of witnesses or any other relevant evidence (see, for instance, Prokopovich v. Russia, no. 58255/00, § 37, ECHR 2004-XI, and Elsanova v. Russia (dec.), no. 57952/00, 15 November 2005). 136. In sum, the Court ’ s case-law has developed a flexible approach regarding the evidence to be provided by applicants who claim to have lost their property and home in situations of international or internal armed conflict. The Court notes that a similar approach is reflected in Article 15 § 7 of the Pinheiro Principles (see paragraph 98 above). 2. Application of these principles to the facts of the case (a) Proof of identity and place of residence 137. While the applicants, at the time of lodging the present application, did not submit documents showing their identity and place of residence, they did so following the Grand Chamber ’ s request in April 2010. The documents included their and their children ’s birth certificates, marriage certificates, USSR passports, work records and extracts from military - service books (for details, see paragraphs 33-57 above). In the Court ’ s view, these documents demonstrate that all the applicants were born in the district of Lachin and that they lived and worked there, at least for major parts of their lives. Having regard to the applicant ’ s own statements – and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary – they must be deemed to have still lived there with their families at the time when they fled on 17 May 1992. (b) Proof of possessions 138. The applicants claimed that they owned or had protected rights to land, houses and certain moveable property that they were forced to leave behind when they fled. It is not known whether any of the houses are still intact and the claimed moveable property is most certainly no longer in existence. Thus, what remain are mainly the plots of land. 139. Originally, only the sixth applicant submitted a document relating to property, a so-called technical passport. The other applicants presented such evidence only when they replied to the Government ’ s first observations. In addition to technical passports, they all submitted witness statements from former neighbours who affirmed that the applicants owned houses in the respective villages, as well as statements by representatives of an Azerbaijani administration for Lachin. The sixth applicant also presented a decision on land allocation taken by the Lachin District Soviet of People ’ s Deputies as well as invoices for animal feed, building materials and building subsidies. 140. The most significant pieces of evidence supplied by the applicants are the technical passports. Being official documents, they all contain drawings of houses, and state, among other things, their sizes, measurements and the number of rooms. The sizes of the plots of land in question are also indicated. The passports are dated between July 1985 and August 1990 and contain the applicants ’ names. Moreover, it appears that the passports include references to the respective land allocation decisions. 141. Having regard to the submissions of the Azerbaijani Government, the Court considers that the applicants ’ technical passports must be seen as “inventory-technical documents” constituting indirect evidence of title to houses and land which, in addition, conforms with Article 2. 2 of the 1985 Instructions on Rules of Registration of Housing Facilities (see paragraph 92 above). Furthermore, the land - allocation decision supplied by the sixth applicant represents primary evidence under Article 2. 1 of those Instructions. While the Government have contested the probative value of the passports, claiming that they show the technical condition of a building and nothing else, the Court notes that they do not simply contain specifications of the houses in question but also include the applicants ’ names. In these circumstances, they provide such prima facie evidence of title to property that has been accepted by the Court in many previous cases. 142. It is noteworthy that, except for the fifth and sixth applicants, there are discrepancies between the applicants ’ initial descriptions of their houses and the figures contained in the technical passports presented later in the proceedings. For example, the first applicant originally stated that he owned a 250 sq. m house. The technical passport submitted, however, concerns a house of a total area of 408 sq. m and 300 sq. m living area ( and a 60 sq. m storehouse, not previously mentioned). Similarly, the fourth applicant originally claimed that his house had a 165 sq. m area, whereas the house described in the passport measures 448 sq. m in total and has a 223 sq. m living area ( and a 75 sq. m storehouse, not previously mentioned ). The applicants have stated that it is the information contained in the technical passports that is correct and that their original statements were made from memory at a brief meeting with their representative when they did not have access to the documents. The Court can accept the applicants ’ explanation : the discrepancies between their original statements and the technical passports are, in the circumstances, not of the nature to discredit the authenticity of the documents, in particular when the figures initially given by the applicants are compared with the living-area measurements specified in the passports. 143. The applicants have submitted further prima facie evidence in regard to property, including statements by former neighbours. In addition, the documents examined above in relation to the applicants ’ identities and residence, which show that they resided in the district of Lachin, lend support to their property claims. Moreover, while all but the sixth applicant have failed to present title deeds or other primary evidence, regard must be had to the circumstances in which they were compelled to leave the district, abandoning it when it came under military attack. Accordingly, taking into account the totality of evidence presented, the applicants have sufficiently substantiated their claims that they were in possession of houses and land at the time of their flight. (c) Whether the applicants ’ rights fall under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 of the Convention 144. It remains to be determined whether the applicants had – and still have – rights to property which are protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and whether the property, considered together with the other personal circumstances of the applicants, have constituted their homes within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. As has been mentioned above (see paragraph 132), the concept of “possessions” in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning and is not dependent on the formal classification in domestic law. However, when addressing this issue, it should first be established whether domestic law and practice conferred or acknowledged rights which are protected under the Convention. 145. First, it should be noted that, although the land legislation enacted shortly after Azerbaijan ’ s independence acknowledged for the first time the right of private ownership of land, a procedure whereby land could be privatised had not been introduced at the relevant time, that is, in May 1992. In any event, it is undisputed that no application had been made by the applicants to become owners of land. As, moreover, the rights acquired by individuals under the old legislation were not rescinded by the enactment of the 1991/92 property laws, the applicants ’ legal rights to the houses and land that they possessed at the time of their flight must be assessed with reference to the laws of the Azerbaijan SSR. 146. Under the Soviet legal system, citizens had a right to own residential houses, but there was no private ownership of land, which instead was considered State property. For the Azerbaijan SSR (including Nagorno-Karabakh and the district of Lachin and the other surrounding territories now under occupation), these rules were laid down in the 1978 Constitution as well as the 1970 Land Code and the 1983 Housing Code. Article 10.3 of the Housing Code provided for the ownership of houses, and the Land Code, notably Articles 4, 25, 27 and 28, laid down the rules and procedures for the allocation of land to individuals for their use. Consequently, the houses that the applicants inhabited in the district of Lachin were part of their personal property, whereas they only had a “right of use” of the plots of land on which these houses stood. As has already been mentioned (see paragraph 138), the moveable property – livestock, carpets, cars – that the applicants claimed to have possessed (the rights to which were also protected by the laws of the Azerbaijan SSR) is likely to have been destroyed during the military attack on Lachin or in the subsequent years. It is further unclear whether their houses have been destroyed or are still partly or wholly intact. Consequently, it is of crucial importance to examine the significance of the “right of use”. 147. The “right of use” was the only title to land that an individual could acquire. Granted by the local Soviet of People ’ s Deputies, the right could be given for several different purposes, including pasture and farming and – most importantly in the context of the present case – the erection of a house. The beneficiaries were obliged to use the plots of land strictly for the purposes for which they had been allocated. The “right of use” was conferred indefinitely or for a temporary period. Thus, if the individual held an indefinite “right of use” and complied with the purpose specified, he or she could use the land for life. Moreover, the right was inheritable. There is no doubt, therefore, that the “right of use” conferred on the applicants was a strong and protected right which represented a substantive economic interest. While there is no indication that the applicants ’ rights were of a temporary nature, the Court notes, for the sake of completeness, that this conclusion is applicable to both indefinite and temporary “rights of use”. Having regard to the autonomous meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the “right of use” of land thus constituted a “possession” under that provision. This conclusion applies also to the rights held by individuals to residential houses and moveable property. 148. In their observations submitted on 11 July 2012, the Government stated that the applicants ’ rights to land would presumably have been terminated by virtue of Article 32 §§ 1 to 8 of the 1992 Land Code, as they had not returned to their land since May 1992 and had thus failed to use it for two successive years. The Government further claimed that, in any event, the land had been allocated to other individuals in accordance with the laws of the “NKR”. In support of the second claim, they submitted a number of “NKR” land - registry documents from 2000 and 2001. In regard to the Government ’ s first contention, the Court notes that terminating land rights under Article 32 of the 1992 Land Code necessitated a decision to that effect by the local Soviet of People ’ s Deputies and, moreover, required that the failure to use the land was without good reason. The latter can hardly be said to be the case here in view of the military presence in the relevant territories since 1992/93. In these circumstances, the claim, which amounts to no more than speculation, must be rejected. As to the Government ’ s second contention, it is unclear to which land or possessors the submitted land - registry documents refer. Moreover, the claim seems to contradict the statement that the “NKR” had not adopted any legal act that deprived the applicants of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of their property. In any event, this issue has already been examined at the admissibility stage in regard to the Court ’ s jurisdiction ratione temporis following a similar claim by the Government. The claim was rejected on the following grounds ( see Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (dec.), no. 13216/05, § 102, 12 February 2012 ): “At a late stage of the proceedings, the Armenian Government introduced the claim that the authorities of the ‘ NKR ’, in 1998, had enacted a law on privatisation and a Land Code, which had extinguished the land rights of the applicants and other people who had fled the occupied territories. The texts of these laws have not been submitted to the Court. In any event, the Court notes that the ‘ NKR ’ is not recognised as a State under international law by any countries or international organisations. Against this background, the invoked laws cannot be considered legally valid for the purposes of the Convention and the applicants cannot be deemed to have lost their alleged rights to the land in question by virtue of these laws (see Loizidou (merits), cited above, §§ 42-47).” 149. In conclusion, at the time of their leaving the district of Lachin, the applicants held rights to land and houses which constituted “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. There is no indication that those rights have been extinguished since – legitimately or otherwise – whether before or after Armenia ’ s ratification of the Convention. Their proprietary rights are thus still valid. Since the applicants accordingly hold existing possessions, there is no need to examine their claim that they had a “legitimate expectation” to become formal owners of their land following the enactment of the 1992 Land Code. 150. Moreover, having regard to the above conclusion that the applicants lived in the district of Lachin with their families at the time of their flight and earned their livelihood there, their land and houses must also be considered to have constituted their “homes” for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention. 151. The Government ’ s objection concerning the applicants ’ victim status is therefore dismissed. IV. ARMENIA ’S JURISDICTION A. The parties ’ submissions 1. The applicants 152. The applicants submitted that Armenia exercised effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories, in particular the district of Lachin, and that the matters complained of therefore fell within the jurisdiction of Armenia in accordance with Article 1 of the Convention. Alternatively, such jurisdiction derived from Armenia ’ s authority or control over the area in question through its agents operating there. The applicants asserted that the Court ’ s case-law on this issue was settled and referred, inter alia, to Loizidou (cited above), Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004-VII) and Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 55721/07, ECHR 2011). As regards the burden of proof, they maintained that the test was not “beyond reasonable doubt”; instead, in the present case, there was a presumption of fact that Armenia had jurisdiction over the mentioned territories, a presumption that the Government had failed to rebut. 153. The applicants claimed that Armenia ’ s military participation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had been considerable and that the evidence to that effect was overwhelming. They submitted, inter alia, that Armenian conscripts had served in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the above ‑ mentioned 1994 HRW report, Armenian conscripts had been sent to Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding Azerbaijani provinces, and military forces from Armenia had taken part in the fighting in Azerbaijan. The applicants also referred to statements by various political leaders and observers which point towards the involvement of the Armenian army, including the above-mentioned statements by Mr Robert Kocharyan and Mr Vazgen Manukyan (see paragraph 62 above ). 154. The applicants also adduced as evidence of Armenian army involvement in the military actions the capture of a number of its soldiers by Azerbaijani units and the increased Armenian draft requirements at the material time. They further submitted that conscripts of the Armenian army were still sent to serve in Nagorno- Karabakh, that such service entitled the officers and soldiers to higher salaries than if they had served in Armenia, and that conscripts had no choice as to where they would like to be deployed, in Armenia or in Nagorno-Karabakh. In support of this assertion, they referred, inter alia, to several judicial and administrative proceedings that had been taken in Stepanakert against Armenian military personnel and an Armenian conscientious objector. 155. In addition to committing troops to the conflict, Armenia had, according to the applicants, provided material aid to Nagorno-Karabakh. Allegedly, the country supplied as much as 90% of the enclave ’ s budget in the form of interest-free credits. These credits constituted financial assistance which contributed to Armenia ’ s effective control over Nagorno ‑ Karabakh and the surrounding territories. As to the Hayastan All ‑ Armenian Fund, the applicants submitted that it could not be seen as a distinct body independent of the government, as it had been established by presidential decree, its Charter designated the Armenian President as President of the Board of Trustees, and that Board otherwise included several of the highest-ranking representatives of the Armenian authorities, Parliament, Constitutional Court and Central Bank. Furthermore, its mission was to support sustainable development in both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. 156. Moreover, Armenia had provided and continued to provide political support to Nagorno-Karabakh. Numerous key figures in Armenian politics had close ties to and continued to be involved in the political sphere in Nagorno-Karabakh. For example, in August 1993 the Government appointed Mr Serzh Sargsyan, the Minister of Defence of Nagorno-Karabakh, as Minister of Defence of Armenia, and in 1998 Mr Robert Kocharyan became President of Armenia, having previously been the Prime Minister and President of Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, as the “NKR” remained unrecognised by the international community, it was reliant on Armenia for political support and its ability to enter into relations with other States. 157. The applicants further submitted that, in Nagorno-Karabakh, many Armenian laws were applied and the Armenian dram was the main currency in use. Moreover, people from Nagorno-Karabakh were issued with Armenian passports for the purpose of travelling abroad. 2. The Government 158. The Government submitted that Armenia’s jurisdiction did not extend to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories; allegedly, Armenia did not and could not have effective control of or exercise any public power on these territories. In their view, effective control implied detailed direction or control over specific operations of the controlled entity, with the capacity to start and stop them as well as to determine their course. Pointing out that extraterritorial jurisdiction was an exception to the principle that a State had jurisdiction over its own territory, the Government maintained that the burden of proving such control was on the applicants, that the burden of proof should be of a high standard, and that they could not discharge this burden, as evidence rather showed that there was no Armenian influence, let alone control, over the “NKR”. The Government was of the opinion that Al-Skeini (cited above) was not relevant to the present circumstances as that judgment relied on “State agent authority and control” which did not apply to the facts of the present case. Furthermore, the merely supportive role played by Armenia in relation to the “NKR” was fundamentally different from the number of Turkish soldiers involved in northern Cyprus or the size of the Russian military arsenal present in Transdniestria (as established in Loizidou and Ilaşcu and Others, both cited above), and did not, under any reasonable definition, amount to effective control. 159. The Government asserted that Armenia had not participated in the military conflict in question. The attack on Lachin from 17 to 18 May 1992 – as well as the capture of Shusha/Shushi on 9 May – had been conducted by the “NKR” defence force, of which 90% was made up of people from Nagorno ‑ Karabakh. The military actions were actually against the interests of the Government, which was at the time negotiating a ceasefire agreement with the Azerbaijani leaders; a meeting had been held from 8 to 9 May in Tehran. Nonetheless, the capture of these two towns had been deemed necessary by the “NKR” forces in order to stop Azerbaijani war crimes and open up a humanitarian corridor to Armenia. 160. The Government further maintained that Armenia had not taken part in any subsequent military actions either. This was allegedly shown by the fact that there was not a single mention in any international document of Armenian army participation. Instead, these documents talked about “local Armenian forces”. Furthermore, the Armenian authorities had not adopted any legal acts or programmes or taken other official steps to get involved in the military actions, which had been entirely carried out by the “NKR” defence force, established in early 1992 following the enactment of the “NKR” Law on conscription. It had been assisted by the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories as well as volunteers of Armenian origin from various countries. Armenia had only been involved in the war in so far as it had defended itself against Azerbaijani attacks on its territory within the recognised borders of Armenia. However, as Armenia and the “NKR” had a common enemy, their armed forces cooperated in various ways. 161. Armenia did not currently have any military presence in Nagorno ‑ Karabakh and the surrounding territories. No military detachment, unit or body was stationed there. In the district of Lachin there were no military units at all, as Lachin was at a considerable distance from the “NKR” border with Azerbaijan and there was therefore no need to keep units there. It could not be ruled out that some Armenian nationals may have served in the “NKR” defence force on a contractual and voluntary basis. Moreover, according to the 1994 Agreement on Military Cooperation between the Governments of the Republic of Armenia and the “ Republic of Nagorno ‑ Karabakh ” (“the 1994 Military Agreement”), draftees from Armenia, upon their consent, may perform their military service in the “NKR” and vice versa, as well as participate in military exercises organised in the “NKR” or in Armenia. The legal proceedings involving Armenian conscripts who had served in the “NKR” had a simple explanation: under the Agreement, criminal charges against Armenian conscripts were dealt with by the Armenian prosecutors and any such charges against Karabakhi conscripts were dealt with by the “NKR” authorities. However, only a small number of Armenian volunteer conscripts had served in Nagorno-Karabakh where they had moreover been under the direct command of the “NKR” defence force. 162. The Government further submitted that the “NKR”, since its formation, had carried out its political, social and financial policies independently. Armenia had not given any economic help to the “NKR” other than, for several years, providing the “NKR” with long-term loans for the implementation of specific projects, including the rebuilding of schools and other educational institutions and the provision of financial assistance to the families of soldiers killed in action. Such help had been provided by other countries as well. Moreover, the Fund played a great role in the development of the “NKR”. Its main mission was to provide financial assistance to Armenia and the “NKR”, using resources collected by the Armenian diaspora. While there were Armenian representatives on the Board of Trustees, the majority of the Board ’ s members were from the Armenian diaspora and the “NKR”. The Fund ’ s agenda was not set by the government; often the donors themselves decided to which projects their money should go. The only governmental assistance to the Fund was the provision of rent-free offices in a government building in Yerevan. Thus, it was not an instrument of control, but a non-political, charitable organisation, which had provided USD 111 million to the “NKR” for building schools and hospitals, reconstructing roads and villages, assisting with cultural events and subsidising work and education for the poor. Resources were also provided by other funds and international organisations. Charity and international investments in the “NKR” annually accounted for USD 20-30 million and 30-40 million respectively. 163. In the view of the Government, the “NKR” was a sovereign, independent State possessing all the characteristics of an independent State under international law. It exercised control and jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories surrounding it. Only the laws and other legal acts of the “NKR” were applied on these territories, and it was normal for the “NKR” to have borrowed or adopted some laws from Armenia. The “NKR” had its own court system which operated entirely independently. Political elections were held in the “NKR”, and the fact that some individuals had been in high political office in both the “NKR” and Armenia was nothing out of the ordinary in the early days of both countries ’ independence. Armenia ’ s political support was limited to taking part in the settlement negotiations conducted within the framework of the Minsk Group, with a view to regulating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. “NKR” passports were issued to its citizens, who had political rights and civil duties on the basis of their citizenship. Armenian passports had been issued only to some residents of Nagorno-Karabakh so as to enable them to travel abroad. Several currencies, not only the Armenian dram, were used in the “NKR”. 164. The Government also asserted that the only facts relevant for the Court ’ s examination of the jurisdiction issue were those dating from May 1992 (“the causation question”) and post-April 2002 (“the jurisdiction question”). Evidence since 2002 demonstrated that Armenia and the “NKR” were friendly countries, with much in common and with close economic and social links, a military alliance and a shared ethnicity. Armenia had had some influence in so far as it had, from time to time, given financial and other assistance to the “NKR”. Furthermore, as a good neighbour and ally, it had helped to maintain, from its end, the humanitarian corridor in the district of Lachin. However, the Republic of Armenia and the “NKR” were different countries. 3. The Azerbaijani Government, third-party intervener 165. The Azerbaijani Government agreed with the applicants that Armenia exercised effective control of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories, including the Lachin area. They invoked statements by various international and non-governmental organisations and the US Department of State, as well as many political leaders in claiming that, at the beginning of the 1990s, Armenian forces, fighting beside separatist Karabakhi forces, had occupied Nagorno-Karabakh as well as Lachin and the other surrounding territories and that these territories continued to be occupied by Armenia, which had soldiers stationed there. In the latter respect, they referred to Harutyunyan v. Armenia (no. 36549/03, ECHR 2007-III ) and Zalyan, Sargsyan and Serobyan v. Armenia ( ( dec.), nos. 36894/04 and 3521/07, 11 October 2007 ). The “NKR” was not an independent State, as claimed by the respondent Government, but a subordinate local administration surviving by virtue of the military and other support afforded by Armenia. Allegedly, it was not conceivable that the “NKR” defence force would exist in any recognisable form without the extensive support of Armenia, expressed, for example, in weapons, equipment, training and, above all, the constant provision of a highly significant percentage – if not an actual majority – of soldiers based in the occupied territories. 166. The Azerbaijani Government also submitted that the “NKR” could not survive – politically, economically or militarily – without the significant support provided by Armenia. They pointed, inter alia, to the close political links between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia which, moreover, had a strong personal element at the highest level. Furthermore, economic aid provided by Armenia was essential for the “NKR”. The Government referred to the Fund, which allegedly had to be seen as an organ of the Armenian State in relation to the aid given to Nagorno-Karabakh. The Fund had had a significant impact in the “NKR”, not just financially but also socially. Allegedly, it was carried by political will, reinforcing Nagorno-Karabakh ’ s economic dependency on Armenia and further integrating the “NKR” into Armenia. They also referred to the Armenian State loans, which constituted a major part of the “NKR” budget. Moreover, the Azerbaijani Government asserted that individuals residing in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories were holders of Armenian passports. B. The Court ’ s assessment 167. While a State ’ s jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial, the concept of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention is not restricted to the national territory of the High Contracting Parties, and the State ’ s responsibility can be involved because of acts and omissions of their authorities producing effects outside their own territory. Article 1 of the Convention reads as follows: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Convention.” 1. General principles on extraterritorial jurisdiction 168. The Court has recognised the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State when this State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that government. The principles have been set out in several cases, including Ilaşcu and Others (cited above, §§ 311-19), Al-Skeini and Others (cited above, §§ 130-39) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, 19 October 2012 ). The relevant passages of Catan and Others read as follows. “103. The Court has established a number of clear principles in its case-law under Article 1. Thus, as provided by this Article, the engagement undertaken by a Contracting State is confined to ‘ securing ’ ( ‘ reconnaître ’ in the French text) the listed rights and freedoms to persons within its own ‘ jurisdiction ’ (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 86, Series A no. 161, and Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others [GC] (dec.), no. 52207/99, § 66, ECHR 2001-XII). ‘ Jurisdiction ’ under Article 1 is a threshold criterion. The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 311, ECHR 2004-VII, and Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, § 130, 7 July 2011 ). 104. A State ’ s jurisdictional competence under Article 1 is primarily territorial (see Soering, cited above, § 86; Banković and Others, cited above, §§ 61 [and] 67; Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 312; and Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 131). Jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the State ’ s territory ( see Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 312; Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 139, ECHR 2004-II). Conversely, acts of the Contracting States performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 only in exceptional cases ( see Banković and Others, cited above, § 67, and Al-Skeini and Others, cited above § 131). 105. To date, the Court has recognised a number of exceptional circumstances capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Contracting State outside its own territorial boundaries. In each case, the question whether exceptional circumstances exist which require and justify a finding by the Court that the State was exercising jurisdiction extra-territorially must be determined with reference to the particular facts ( see Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 132). 106. One exception to the principle that jurisdiction under Article 1 is limited to a State ’ s own territory occurs when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting State exercises effective control of an area outside that national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control, whether it be exercised directly, through the Contracting State ’ s own armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration ( see Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, § 62, Series A no. 310; Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, § 76, ECHR 2001-IV; Banković and Others, cited above, § 70; Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, §§ 314-16; Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, § 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI; and Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 138). Where the fact of such domination over the territory is established, it is not necessary to determine whether the Contracting State exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the subordinate local administration. The fact that the local administration survives as a result of the Contracting State ’ s military and other support entails that State ’ s responsibility for its policies and actions. The controlling State has the responsibility under Article 1 to secure, within the area under its control, the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which it has ratified. It will be liable for any violations of those rights ( see Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 76-77, and Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 138). 107. It is a question of fact whether a Contracting State exercises effective control over an area outside its own territory. In determining whether effective control exists, the Court will primarily have reference to the strength of the State ’ s military presence in the area (see Loizidou (merits), cited above, §§ 16 and 56, and Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 387). Other indicators may also be relevant, such as the extent to which its military, economic and political support for the local subordinate administration provides it with influence and control over the region (see Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, §§ 388-94, and Al ‑ Skeini and Others, cited above, § 139). ... 115. ... As the summary of the Court ’ s case-law set out above demonstrates, the test for establishing the existence of ‘ jurisdiction ’ under Article 1 of the Convention has never been equated with the test for establishing a State ’ s responsibility for an internationally wrongful act under international law.” 2. Application of these principles to the facts of the case 169. The Court first considers that the situation pertaining in Nagorno - Karabakh and the surrounding territories is not one of Armenian State agents exercising authority and control over individuals abroad, as alternatively argued by the applicants. Instead, the issue to be determined on the facts of the case is whether Armenia exercised and continues to exercise effective control over the mentioned territories and as a result may be held responsible for the alleged violations. As noted by the Court in Catan and Others (cited above, § 107), this assessment will primarily depend on military involvement, but other indicators, such as economic and political support, may also be of relevance. 170. While the applicants used to live in the district of Lachin, the issue of jurisdiction does not concern solely this area. In fact, Lachin is one of the parts of the mentioned territories that is situated farthest away from the Line of Contact with Azerbaijan. The district is sheltered by Nagorno-Karabakh to the east, by the districts of Kelbajar as well as Gubadly and Jebrayil to the north and south and by Armenia to the west. To determine whether Armenia has jurisdiction in the present case, it is thus necessary to assess whether it exercises effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories as a whole. 171. Moreover, although responsibility for an alleged violation cannot be imputed to Armenia on the basis of events that took place before 26 April 2002, the date of its ratification of the Convention, facts relating to earlier events may still be taken into account as indicative of a continuing situation which still persisted after that date. (a) Military involvement 172. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict escalated into a full-scale war in 1992 but had started already some years earlier, with calls for the incorporation of Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia coming from both entities. More significantly, in December 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional Council adopted a Joint Resolution on the reunification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia and, in January 1990, a joint budget was established. It is clear that, since the beginning of the conflict, the Armenian SSR and Armenia have strongly supported the demands for Nagorno-Karabakh ’ s incorporation into Armenia or, alternatively, its independence from Azerbaijan. 173. The material available to the Court does not – and could not be expected to – provide conclusive evidence as to the composition of the armed forces that occupied and secured control of Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven surrounding districts between the outbreak of war in early 1992 and the ceasefire in May 1994. For instance, the UN Security Council Resolutions adopted in 1993, while expressing serious concern at the tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan, referred to invasion and occupation by “local Armenian forces” and urged Armenia to exert its influence on “the Armenians of the Nagorny-Karabakh region” (see paragraph 59 above). Nevertheless, the HRW report ( see paragraph 60 above ) attests to the involvement of the Armenian armed forces at this point in time. Furthermore, the Armenian Minister of Defence from 1992 to 19 93, Mr Vazgen Manukyan, acknowledged this state of affairs ( see paragraph 62 above ). 174. Moreover, in the Court ’ s view, it is hardly conceivable that Nagorno-Karabakh – an entity with a population of less than 150,000 ethnic Armenians – was able, without the substantial military support of Armenia, to set up a defence force in early 1992 that, against the country of Azerbaijan with a population of approximately seven million people, not only established control of the former NKAO but also, before the end of 1993, conquered the whole or major parts of seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts. 175. In any event, Armenia’s military involvement in Nagorno - Karabakh was, in several respects, formalised in June 1994 through the 1994 Military Agreement (see paragraph 74 above). In addition to identifying many military issues on which the two entities would work together, the agreement notably provides that conscripts of Armenia and the “NKR” may do their military service in the other entity. 176. Later reports and statements confirm the participation of Armenia ’ s forces in the conflict. For instance, while not leading to any agreement between the parties, the “package deal” and the “step-by-step” approach drafted within the Minsk Group in 1997 stated that the Armenian armed forces should withdraw to within the borders of Armenia (see paragraph 61 above). Similar demands were made by the UN General Assembly in March 2008 ( see paragraph 67 above ) and by the European Parliament in April 2012 ( see paragraph 70 above ). In January 2005 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, noting the occupation by Armenian forces of “considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan”, reaffirmed that independence and secession of a territory may not be achieved in the wake of “the de facto annexation of such territory to another state” ( see paragraph 64 above ). The International Crisis Group ( ICG ) report of September 2005 concluded, on the basis of statements by Armenian soldiers and officials, that “ [ t ] here is a high degree of integration between the forces of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh” ( see paragraph 65 above ). Indications of service of Armenian soldiers in the “NKR” can also be found in cases before the Court and elsewhere ( see paragraphs 76 - 77 above ). 177. As the Court stated in El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ([GC], no. 39630/09, § 163, ECHR 2012), it will, in principle, treat with caution statements given by government ministers or other high officials, since they would tend to be in favour of the government that they represent or represented. However, statements from high-ranking officials, even former ministers and officials, who have played a central role in the dispute in question are of particular evidentiary value when they acknowledge facts or conduct that place the authorities in an unfavourable light. They may then be construed as a form of admission (see in this context, mutatis mutandis, the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the United States of America) ( Merits ) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, § 64). 178. Accordingly, it is striking to take note of the statements by Armenian representatives which appear to go against the official stance that the Armenian armed forces have not been deployed in the “NKR” or the surrounding territories. The statement by Mr Manukyan, the former Minister of Defence, has already been mentioned (see paragraph 62 above). Of even greater significance is the speech given by the incumbent President of Armenia, Mr Serzh Sargsyan, in January 2013, to leaders of the Ministry of Defence, in which he declared that the goal of Armenian foreign policy was to achieve legal recognition of the victory attained by “our Army” in the Nagorno-Karabakh war ( see paragraph 72 above ). It should be noted as well that the Government in the present case have acknowledged, with reference to the 1994 Military Agreement, that the Armenian army and the “NKR” defence force cooperate in a defence alliance. 179. While Mr Jirayr Sefilyan could not be considered an official representative of Armenia, as a prominent political figure and former military commander who had served during the war, the Court has regard to a statement he gave in an interview in October 2008 : “The whole world knows that the army of the NKR is a part of the armed forces of Armenia” ( see paragraph 68 above ). In contrast, the Court notes that the opinion of Dr Bucur-Marcu ( see paragraph 73 above ) was commissioned by the Government and thus must be treated with caution in the circumstances. 180. The number of Armenian soldiers serving in the “NKR” is in dispute; the Government have stated that they number no more than 1,500 persons while the applicants rely on the figures given by the IISS and the ICG between 2002 and 2005 which indicated that 8,000 or 10,000 Armenian troops are deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh (see paragraphs 63 and 65 above). The Court need not solve this issue as, based on the numerous reports and statements presented above, it finds it established that Armenia, through its military presence and the provision of military equipment and expertise, has been significantly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from an early date. This military support has been – and continues to be – decisive for the conquest of and continued control over the territories in issue, and the evidence, not least the Agreement, convincingly shows that the Armenian armed forces and the “NKR” are highly integrated. (b) Other support 181. The integration of the two entities is further shown by the number of politicians who have assumed the highest offices in Armenia after previously holding similar positions in the “NKR” (see paragraph 78 above). The general political support given to the “NKR” by Armenia is also evident from the statements mentioned above in regard to Armenia ’ s military involvement. 182. The Government have claimed that the “NKR” has its own legislation and its own independent political and judicial bodies. However, its political dependence on Armenia is evident not only from the interchange of prominent politicians, but also from the fact that its residents acquire Armenian passports for travel abroad as the “NKR” is not recognised by any State or international organisation (see paragraph 83 above). In regard to the legislation and the judiciary, there is further evidence of integration. The Government have acknowledged that several laws of the “NKR” have been adopted from Armenian legislation. More importantly, the facts of Zalyan, Sargsyan and Serobyan ( see paragraph 76 above ) show not only the presence of Armenian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh but also the operation of Armenian law - enforcement agents and the exercise of jurisdiction by Armenian courts on that territory. The case of Mr Grigoryan ( see paragraph 77 above ) provides a similar indication. 183. Finally, the financial support given to the “NKR” from or via Armenia is substantial. The ICG reported that, in the 2005 “NKR” budget, only 26.7 % of expenditures were covered by locally collected revenues. An Armenian “inter- State loan” has provided the “NKR” with considerable amounts of money, throughout 2004 and 2005, totalling USD 51 million. According to the ICG, relying on official sources, the loan made up 67.3% of the “NKR” budget in 2001 and 56.9% in 2004. The loan has been in place since 1993, and in 2005, the year of the report, none of the loan had been repaid (see paragraphs 80 - 81 above). 184. Further assistance is provided by the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund which, according to the Government, allocated about USD 111 million to projects in the “NKR” between 1995 and 2012. While the Fund is not a governmental institution and its resources come from individual donations, it is noteworthy that it was established by presidential decree. Furthermore, the Armenian President is the ex officio President of the Board of Trustees, and the Board includes several present and former Presidents and ministers of Armenia and the “NKR”, as well as other prominent officials of Armenia. While these members do not make up a majority, it is clear from the Board ’ s composition that the official representatives of Armenia – together with their “NKR” counterparts – are in a position to greatly influence the Fund ’ s activities. 185. It is true that substantial financial assistance to the “NKR” also comes from other sources, including the US government and direct contributions from the Armenian diaspora. Nevertheless, the figures mentioned above show that the “NKR” would not be able to subsist economically without the substantial support stemming from Armenia. (c) Conclusion 186. All of the above reveals that Armenia, from the early days of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, has had a significant and decisive influence over the “NKR”, that the two entities are highly integrated in virtually all important matters and that this situation persists to this day. In other words, the “NKR” and its administration survive by virtue of the military, political, financial and other support given to it by Armenia which, consequently, exercises effective control over Nagorno ‑ Karabakh and the surrounding territories, including the district of Lachin. The matters complained of therefore come within the jurisdiction of Armenia for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. 187. The Government ’ s objection concerning the jurisdiction of Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories is therefore dismissed. V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 188. The applicants complained that the loss of all control over, as well as of all potential to use, sell, bequeath, mortgage, develop and enjoy, their properties amounted to a continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” A. The parties ’ submissions 1. The applicants 189. The applicants submitted that their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated as a direct result of an exercise in governmental authority on the part of Armenia. They feared that their property had been destroyed or pillaged soon after they had been forced to flee the district of Lachin. Nevertheless, their complaint concerned an interference with all of their property, including land which remained in Lachin and which they still owned or had the right to use. The applicants claimed that they had continuously been denied access to their property, and that this constituted an interference that was far from being in accordance with law. Moreover, whatever the aim of the occupation of Lachin, the total exclusion of the applicants from their property and the possible destruction of it without the payment of compensation could not be seen as proportionate to the achievement of that aim. The applicants did not see any prospect of being permitted to return to the properties or anywhere else in the occupied territories in the foreseeable future. 2. The Government 190. The Government maintained that the applicants had not been prevented from entering the town of Lachin or the surrounding villages; in fact, they had never tried to enter these territories since their alleged flight and had not applied to the Armenian authorities or the “NKR” to have any of their rights protected or restored. As mentioned already in regard to the issue of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, Armenia ’ s position in the Minsk Group negotiations – that the return of displaced persons can be considered only after a final settlement of the status of the “NKR” has been agreed upon – referred to displaced persons as a group and did not concern who could obtain entry visas if they had a legitimate reason to enter the “NKR” or Armenia. Travel to the “NKR” involved no danger, as the only open entry point – the road from Yerevan to Stepanakert – is situated far away from the Line of Contact. The Government further asserted that the capture of Lachin – as well as Shusha /Shushi – was a lawful act of self-defence against war crimes committed by Azerbaijan, in particular military attacks on Stepanakert. It was necessary to create a “humanitarian corridor” to Armenia, as large numbers of people in Nagorno-Karabakh were killed or in danger of starving to death. Reiterating that the Republic of Armenia bore no responsibility for the actions alleged by the applicants, they submitted that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 3. The Azerbaijani Government, third-party intervener 191. The Azerbaijani Government submitted that the applicants had not been expelled from the occupied territories in question by any legal act but had been forced to flee by virtue of the activities of the Armenian military forces. They were still physically prevented from entering the territories and enjoying their possessions, through the deployment of Armenian troops and land mines on the Line of Contact, while Armenians were being offered incentives to settle in the territories. This state of affairs was further shown by Armenia ’ s position in the Minsk Group negotiations on displaced persons returning home. Allegedly, the level and strength of Armenian sustenance of the subordinate local administration had not decreased but rather intensified over the years. The Azerbaijani Government therefore contended that Armenia was responsible for a continuing violation of the applicants ’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. B. The Court ’ s assessment 192. The Court first refers to its above finding (see paragraph 149 above ) that, while it is uncertain whether the applicants ’ houses still stand, they all have existing rights to their plots of land which constitute “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Given that the matters complained of come within the jurisdiction of Armenia (see paragraph 186 above ), the question to be examined is whether Armenia is responsible for a violation of the applicants ’ rights to their possessions. 193. The applicants were forced to leave Lachin when the district came under military attack in May 1992. However, the Court ’ s task is not to scrutinise this event as such, but to determine whether the applicants have been denied access to their property since 26 April 2002, the date on which Armenia ratified the Convention, and whether they have thereby suffered a continuing violation of their rights. Earlier events may still be indicative of such a continuing situation. 194. As has been mentioned above (see paragraphs 11 8 -2 0 ), no effective domestic remedies, whether in Armenia or in the “NKR”, have been identified. Consequently, the applicants have not had access to any legal means whereby they could obtain compensation for loss of property or – more importantly in the present context – whereby they could gain physical access to the places where they used to live and thus to the property and homes left behind. The continuing denial of access is further shown by the Government ’ s assertion, albeit unproven, that the applicants ’ property – and, presumably, the property belonging to other displaced persons – had been allocated by the “NKR” administration to other individuals who had been recorded in the land register. 195. Moreover, twenty years after the ceasefire agreement, people displaced during the conflict have not been able to return to Nagorno ‑ Karabakh and the surrounding territories. The Court notes in this respect the Resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly and the European Parliament (see paragraphs 67 and 69 above). In the Court ’ s view, it is not realistic, let alone possible, in practice for Azerbaijanis to return to these territories in the circumstances which have prevailed throughout this period and which include the continued presence of Armenian and Armenian-backed troops, ceasefire breaches on the Line of Contact, an overall hostile relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan and no prospect of a political solution yet in sight. 196. Consequently, there has been an interference with the applicants ’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in that they have continuously been denied access to their property and have thereby lost control over it and any possibility to use and enjoy it (see Loizidou (merits), cited above, § 63 ). This amounts to an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. 197. The Government submitted that the capture of Lachin and the creation of a land link between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh involved a lawful act of self-defence. The Court takes note of the claims that the district of Lachin was of military - strategic importance and that there was a need to deliver food, medicine and other supplies into Nagorno-Karabakh. However, whether or not these circumstances could constitute a justification for interfering with the individual rights of residents in the area, the capture of Lachin in May 1992 has no direct bearing on the issue under examination which is whether the applicants ’ inability to return there and the consequent continuous denial of access to their property could be seen as justified. 198. Furthermore, the Court does not find that the ongoing negotiations within the Minsk Group on the issues relating to displaced persons provide a legal justification for the interference with the applicants ’ rights. These negotiations do not absolve the Government from taking other measures, especially when negotiations have been pending for such a long time (see, mutatis mutandis, Loizidou (merits), cited above, § 64, and Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, § 188). In that connection the Court refers to Resolution 1708 (2010) on solving property issues of refugees and displaced persons of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which, relying on relevant international standards, calls on member States to “guarantee timely and effective redress for the loss of access and rights to housing, land and property abandoned by refugees and IDPs without regard to pending negotiations concerning the resolution of armed conflicts or the status of a particular territory” (see paragraph 100 above). 199. Guidance as to which measures the Government could and should take in order to protect the applicants ’ property rights can be derived from relevant international standards, in particular from the Pinheiro Principles (see paragraph 98 above) and the above-mentioned Resolution. At the present stage, and pending a comprehensive peace agreement, it would appear particularly important to establish a property - claims mechanism, which should be easily accessible and provide procedures operating with flexible evidentiary standards, allowing the applicants and others in their situation to have their property rights restored and to obtain compensation for the loss of their enjoyment. 200. The Court is fully aware that the Government has had to provide assistance to hundreds of thousands of Armenian refugees and internally displaced persons. However, while the need to provide for such a large group of people requires considerable resources, the protection of this group does not exempt the Government from its obligations towards another group, namely Azerbaijani citizens like the applicants who had to flee during the conflict. In this connection, reference is made to the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 3 of the Pinheiro Principles. Finally, the Court observes that the situation in issue is no longer an emergency situation but has continued to exist over a very lengthy period. 201. In conclusion, as concerns the period under scrutiny, that is, from 26 April 2002, no aim has been indicated which could justify the denial of access of the applicants to their property and the lack of compensation for this interference. Consequently, the Court finds that there has been and continues to be a breach of the applicants ’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for which Armenia is responsible. VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 202. The applicants claimed that their inability to return to the district of Lachin also involved a continuing violation of their right to respect for their homes and private and family life. They relied on Article 8, which reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” A. The parties ’ submissions 1. The applicants 203. The basis for the applicants ’ complaint was much the same as for the one submitted under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: they maintained that the continuing refusal of the Government to allow them to return to the district of Lachin also violated their rights under Article 8 of the Convention. In this respect, they referred to Cyprus v. Turkey (cited above). Distinguishing their case from the situation in Loizidou (cited above), the applicants pointed out that, as opposed to Mrs Loizidou, they had all lived for many years in the Lachin area and had established homes and private and family lives there. There was allegedly no justification under Article 8 § 2 for the interference with their rights. 2. The Government 204. The Government ’ s submissions also essentially mirrored their arguments under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In addition, they maintained that, since the houses and the other property allegedly owned by the applicants had been destroyed in 1992, the applicants could not claim to have had any private or family life or a home in the area in question after that date. To support this assertion, the Government likened the applicants ’ situation to Loizidou ( (merits), cited above ) and referred to the Court ’ s finding in § 66 of the judgment: “[I]t would strain the meaning of the notion ‘ home ’ in Article 8 to extend it to comprise property on which it is planned to build a house for residential purposes. Nor can that term be interpreted to cover an area of a State where one has grown up and where the family has its roots but where one no longer lives.” In any event, the Government argued that the alleged interference was in accordance with the law and was necessary in a democratic society: by providing a “humanitarian corridor” linking the “NKR” with the outside world, control over the district of Lachin served the interests of national security, public safety and the economic well-being of the country. 3. The Azerbaijani Government, third-party intervener 205. The Azerbaijani Government supported the position of the applicants. B. The Court ’ s assessment 206. The notions of “private life”, “family life ” and “home” under Article 8 are, like “possessions” under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, autonomous concepts; their protection does not depend on their classification under domestic law, but on the factual circumstances of the case. As noted above ( see paragraphs 137 and 150), all the applicants were born in the district of Lachin. Until their flight in May 1992 they had lived and worked there all, or for major parts, of their lives. Almost all of them married and had children in the district. Moreover, they earned their livelihood there and their ancestors had lived there. Furthermore, they had built and owned houses in which they lived. It is thus clear that the applicants had long-established lives and homes in the district, and that their situation contrasts with that of Mrs Loizidou in Loizidou (cited above). The applicants have not voluntarily taken up residence anywhere else, but live, out of necessity, as internally displaced persons in Baku and elsewhere. In the circumstances of the case, their forced displacement and involuntary absence from the district of Lachin cannot be considered to have broken their link to the district, notwithstanding the length of time that has passed since their flight. 207. For the same reasons as those presented under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court finds that the denial of access to the applicants ’ homes constitutes an unjustified interference with their right to respect for their private and family lives as well as their homes. 208. Accordingly, the Court concludes that there has been and continues to be a breach of the applicants ’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention and that Armenia is responsible for this breach. VII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION 209. The applicants claimed that no effective remedies had been available to them in respect of their complaints. They relied on Article 13, which reads as follows: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” A. The parties ’ submissions 1. The applicants 210. The applicants maintained that no remedy had been provided to persons displaced from the occupied territories. They asserted that, not being ethnic Armenians, it would have been entirely fruitless for them to seek redress from the authorities of Armenia or the “NKR”. In their view, no remedy existed which was available, in theory and in practice, for their complaints. The lack of domestic remedies became even more evident when regard was had to the fact that the issue of the right of return of internally displaced persons constituted one of the major disagreements between the parties to the ongoing peace process and, accordingly, remained unresolved. 2. The Government 211. The Government claimed that the applicants had had effective administrative and judicial remedies at their disposal, both in Armenia and the “NKR”, which did not differentiate between displaced persons and people of another status. As regards the remedies in the “NKR”, the Government referred to the Court ’ s conclusions in Cyprus v. Turkey (cited above, § 98) and maintained that the remedies of an internationally unrecognised entity should be exhausted unless their inexistence or ineffectiveness could be proved. The Government further referred to the arguments and the examples of cases presented in relation to the issue of exhaustion of the domestic remedies and asserted that the applicants had failed to make use of the available remedies and had not submitted any evidence that the remedies were inexistent or ineffective. 3. The Azerbaijani Government, third-party intervener 212. The Azerbaijani Government essentially agreed with the arguments submitted by the applicants. In addition, referring to Doğan and Others (cited above, § 106), they submitted that Armenia had not only failed to provide an effective remedy but had also failed to conduct an investigation to determine who was responsible for the refusal of access to property and homes. B. The Court ’ s assessment 213. The Court has already found violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 of the Convention in regard to the continuing denial of access to the applicants ’ possessions and homes. Their complaints are therefore “arguable” for the purposes of Article 13 (see, for instance, Doğan and Others (cited above, § 163). 214. The present complaint comprises the same or similar elements as those already dealt with in the context of the objection concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court reiterates its above finding that the Government have failed to discharge the burden of proving the availability to the applicants of a remedy capable of providing redress in respect of their Convention complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success (see paragraph 120 above). For the same reasons, the Court finds that there was no available effective remedy in respect of the denial of access to the applicants ’ possessions and homes in the district of Lachin. 215. Accordingly, the Court concludes that there has been and continues to be a breach of the applicants ’ rights under Article 13 of the Convention and that Armenia is responsible for this breach. VIII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION 216. The applicants claimed that, in relation to the complaints set out above, they had been subjected to discrimination by the Government by virtue of ethnic and religious affiliation. They relied on Article 14, which provides as follows: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” A. The parties ’ submissions 1. The applicants 217. The applicants submitted that, if they had been ethnically Armenian and Christian rather than Azerbaijani Kurds and Muslim, they would not have been forcibly displaced from their homes by the Armenian-backed forces. They referred to the report by Mr David Atkinson and the Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly, according to which “the military action, and the widespread ethnic hostilities which preceded it, led to large-scale ethnic expulsion and the creation of mono ‑ ethnic areas which resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing” (see paragraph 64 above). Alternatively, the applicants submitted that they had been subjected to indirect discrimination by Armenia, since the actions taken by the Armenian military and the Armenian-backed Karabakh forces had disproportionately affected Azerbaijani Kurds, who were individuals belonging to an identifiable group. 2. The Government 218. The Government submitted that no issues arose under Article 14 of the Convention as there were no violations of the other Articles relied on by the applicants. In any event, the applicants had not been subjected to discriminatory treatment, because the military actions in Lachin had been aimed merely at opening a “humanitarian corridor” between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and had not been directed against the residents of the district, whatever their ethnic or religious affiliation. Moreover, Kurds had never been subjected to discrimination in the Republic of Armenia or the “NKR” and the population of approximately 1,500 Kurds living in Armenia at present actively participated in social and political life and enjoyed all rights. 3. The Azerbaijani Government, third-party intervener 219. The Azerbaijani Government contended that the military actions in the “NKR” and the surrounding districts had had the aim of creating a mono-ethnic area. They further submitted that the applicants and other Azerbaijani internally displaced persons were still prevented from returning to their homes and possessions, while Armenians were being offered various incentives (including free housing, money, livestock and tax benefits) to settle in the territory, especially in Lachin. The third-party intervener also stated that the Azerbaijani Kurds are different from the Kurds living in Armenia in that the former are Muslims whereas the latter practise the Yazidi religion. B. The Court ’ s assessment 220. The Court ’ s findings of violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention in the present case relate to a general situation which involves the flight of practically all Azerbaijani citizens, presumably most of them Muslims, from Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories, and their inability to return to these territories. The applicants ’ complaint under Article 14 of the Convention is thus intrinsically linked to the other complaints. Consequently, in view of the violations found under the other provisions, the Court considers that no separate issue arises under Article 14 (see, for instance, Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, § 199; Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, no. 46347/99, § 36, 22 December 2005; and Catan and Others, cited above, § 160). IX. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 221. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 222. The applicants claimed pecuniary damage in amounts varying from 808,950 to 2,093,050 Azerbaijani (new) manats (AZN), totalling – for all six applicants – AZN 8,386,600. This amount corresponds to approximately 7,900,000 euros (EUR). In addition, they claimed EUR 50,000 each in non-pecuniary damage. Finally, the legal costs and expenses, as of 6 October 2013, ran to 41,703.37 pounds sterling. At the Court ’ s hearing on 22 January 2014, the applicants ’ representatives requested, however, that an expert be appointed to give an opinion on the evaluation of the damage incurred by the applicants. 223. The Government opposed all the applicants ’ claims. 224. The Court, having regard to the exceptional nature of the case, finds that the question of the application of Article 41 is not ready for decision. It must accordingly be reserved and the further procedure fixed.
In the applicants’ case, the Court confirmed that Armenia exercised effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories and thus had jurisdiction over the district of Lachin. It noted in particular that numerous reports and public statements, including from members and former members of the Armenian Government, demonstrated that Armenia, through its military presence and by providing military equipment and expertise, had been significantly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from an early date. Armenia’s military support continued to be decisive for the control over the territories in question. Furthermore, it was evident from the facts established in the case that Armenia gave the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” (the “NKR”) substantial political and financial support; its citizens were moreover required to acquire Armenian passports to travel abroad, as the “NKR” was not recognised by any State or international organisation. In conclusion, Armenia and the “NKR” were highly integrated in virtually all important matters and the “NKR” and its administration survived by virtue of the military, political, financial and other support given to it by Armenia. Armenia thus exercised effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories.