Journalists and publishing companies
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. Relevant constitutional provisions 44. Article 14 of the Constitution provides as follows: “The Republic of Poland shall ensure freedom of the press and other means of social communication.” Article 31 § 3 of the Constitution, which lays down a general prohibition on disproportionate limitations on constitutional rights and freedoms (the principle of proportionality), provides: “Any limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed only by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic State for the protection of its security or public order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms and rights of other persons. Such limitations shall not violate the essence of freedoms and rights.” Article 54 § 1 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression. It states, in so far as relevant: “Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom to express opinions and to acquire and to disseminate information.” B. The Civil Code 45. Article 23 of the Civil Code contains a non-exhaustive list of “ personal rights” ( dobra osobiste ). This provision states: “The personal rights of an individual, such as, in particular, health, liberty, honour, freedom of conscience, name or pseudonym, image, secrecy of correspondence, inviolability of the home, scientific or artistic work, [as well as] inventions and improvements, shall be protected by the civil law regardless of the protection laid down in other legal provisions.” Article 24 § 1 of the Civil Code provides: “A person whose personal rights are at risk [of infringement] by a third party may seek an injunction, unless the activity [complained of] is not unlawful. In the event of infringement [the person concerned] may also require the party who caused the infringement to take the necessary steps to remove the consequences of the infringement ... In compliance with the principles of this Code [the person concerned] may also seek pecuniary compensation or may ask the court to award an adequate sum for the benefit of a specific public interest.” C. The Press Act 46. In accordance with section 12 § 1 (1) of the Press Act a journalist is under the duty to act with particular diligence in gathering and using the information, and, in particular, to verify the truthfulness of obtained information. THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 47. The applicants complained that the judgments given in their case had interfered with their right to freedom of expression and that the interference could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. They relied on Article 10 of the Convention which reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” A. Admissibility 48. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. The applicants ’ submissions 49. The applicants averred that their article concerned a matter of public interest. They were informed by a very reliable source, namely the chief executive of the Polish branch of one of the world largest pharmaceutical companies that the company had received a proposal to arrange the placement of its drug on the list of refunded drugs in exchange for a bribe. A.F. had asserted that the proposal had been made by W.D., the Head of the Private Office of the Minister of Health. The applicants emphasised that W.D., a Government official had decided to conduct official talks with the representatives of an international pharmaceutical company not in his office but in town. During the meeting W.D. had introduced himself as a Ministry official and handed his business card. 50. Before writing their article, the applicants had spoken with A.F., the chief executive and H.M.N., the finance director of the company who had participated in the meetings. They had also obtained a written statement from the Minister of Health. In their view, the information at their disposal before the publication of the article had been sufficiently reliable to reach the conclusion presented in it. 51. The applicants asserted that the discontinuation of the investigation against W.D. for lack of evidence to support the charge was not a decisive factor and did not point to the lack of diligence on their part. Their article was published on 12 May 2003 and on 17 March 2004 the Warsaw Appellate Prosecutor charged W.D. with bribery and procurement fraud. The prosecutor imposed preventive measures on W.D., namely a ban on leaving the country and ordered him to put up a bail. The criminal proceedings against W.D. lasted nearly three years and the charges were serious enough to justify the imposition of preventive measures. The discontinuation of the investigation against a politician which took place after the publication did not demonstrate that the journalist who had levelled certain allegations had published false information for which s/he should be sanctioned. The obligation incumbent on journalist could not be interpreted as a simple obligation to publish only “true” information. It should be borne in mind that journalists had only limited resources at their disposal. The press fulfilled an essential role in a democratic society and had a duty to impart information on all matters of public interest. 52. The applicants disagreed with the argument that their failure to seek information from Ł .Z. had amounted to lack of due diligence on their part. They underlined that their source of information was the chief executive of a pharmaceutical company and that his information had been confirmed by H.M.N., a participant to the meeting. They had further obtained statements from W.D. and B.O. and spoken to some members of parliament. They did not speak to Ł.Z. because they had suspicion that he had acted for both parties (the pharmaceutical company and W.D.) and thus could not be treated as a reliable source. Moreover, he was not an active participant in the meetings. Ł.Z. was an employee of the company who presented summary information concerning the meetings to the chief executive and it was clear to the applicants that A.F. was the most competent person to provide them with information. 53. The applicants also submitted that the impugned statements in the article, which they accurately reported, had been made by the chief executive and not by the journalists themselves. The applicants had not made any corruption allegations against W.D. but only referred the statement of the chief executive. In this respect they relied on the judgment Thoma v Luxembourg. In the applicants ’ view, the interference complained of was not necessary in democratic society and the authorities did not give relevant and sufficient reasons to justify it. 2. The Government ’ s submissions 54. The Government maintained that the interference with the applicants ’ right to freedom of expression was in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention. It was prescribed by law ( Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code) and pursued the legitimate aim of protection of the reputation or the rights of others. 55. With regard to the necessity for the interference, the Government submitted that the allegations made by the applicants against W.D. were factual statements. They referred, inter alia, to the following passages from the article: “ the pharmaceutical company claims that the Head of the Private Office of the Minister of Health demanded a large bribe ” and “ W.D., the Head of the Private Office of M. Ł ., demanded a multi-million dollar bribe, offering assistance in placing drugs on the list of refunded drugs – claims the foreign pharmaceutical company ”. The assessment of the above statements should be conducted in terms of their truthfulness. With regard to the factual statements, the requirement for the journalists to prove that the allegation was substantially true was not contrary to the Convention. The Government recalled that the Warsaw Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court found that the testimonies of witnesses Ł .Z., B.O. and H.M.N. had not confirmed that the allegations made by the applicants had been true. 56. The Government submitted that the allegation made by the applicants had been of a very serious nature as it concerned the corruption offer made by a prominent State official. Such an act constituted a crime under Article 228 § 1 of the CC punishable by up to eight years ’ imprisonment. However, the applicants did not act with due diligence and failed to comply with the ordinary journalistic obligation to verify this factual allegation. 57. First of all, the applicants did not collect sufficiently accurate and reliable information and did not consult with all the relevant sources which were available to them. Mainly, they had failed to question Ł .Z. who had been one of only four participants to the meetings at which the alleged corruption proposals had been made. Ł.Z. had been serving as an interpreter between W.D. and B.O who spoke only Polish and H.M.N. who spoke English. They also failed to observe due diligence in their assessment of A.F. ’ s statements despite the fact that he had not participated in the meetings and relied on the information provided by Ł.Z. and H.M.N. The applicants did not question the fact that A.F. had not wanted them to speak to Ł.Z. 58. Secondly, with regard to the applicant ’ s assertion that at the time of publication it was impossible for them to verify the truthfulness of the allegations, the Government stressed that the domestic courts had examined this issue and found that the information at the applicants ’ disposal had been insufficient to make the allegation of corruption. The Supreme Court stated that it was obvious that the applicants had not had the same resources as the authorities; however they had been obliged to act with requisite diligence in order to rebut the unlawfulness of their allegations. It further noted that “when the circumstances indicated a higher probability of inaccuracy in the submissions of persons who were the source of information for the journalist, a particularly meticulous verification of the truthfulness of the allegations was necessary”. 59. The Government further maintained that the domestic courts had given relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions. The sanctions imposed on the applicants were proportionate as they had been held liable only under the civil law. The applicants were ordered to publish an apology and to pay the costs of the claimant and the court fees. They did not have to pay compensation. In the Government ’ s view, the domestic courts struck a fair balance between the restriction of the applicants ’ freedom of expression and the protection of W.D. ’ s reputation. 3. The Court ’ s assessment 60. It was common ground between the parties that the domestic courts ’ decisions complained of by the applicants amounted to “interference” with the exercise of their right to freedom of expression. The Court also finds that the interference complained of was prescribed by law, namely Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code, and pursued the legitimate aim referred to in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, namely “the protection of the reputation or rights of others”. 61. It remains to be established whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. This determination must be based on the following general principles emerging from the Court ’ s case ‑ law (see, among other authorities, Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, §§ 88 ‑ 91, ECHR 2004 ‑ XI, with further references): (a) The test of “necessity in a democratic society” requires the Court to determine whether the interference corresponded to a pressing social need. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those delivered by independent courts. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10. (b) The Court ’ s task in exercising its supervisory function is not to take the place of the competent domestic courts but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they have taken pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully or in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole, including the content of the statements held against the applicant and the context in which he or she has made them. (c) In particular, the Court must determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the interference were relevant and sufficient and whether the measure taken was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities, basing themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts, applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10. (d) The Court must also ascertain whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance between the protection of freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 and the protection of the reputation of those against whom allegations have been made, a right which, as an aspect of private life, is protected by Article 8 of the Convention. 62. However, Article 10 of the Convention does not guarantee wholly unrestricted freedom of expression even with respect to press coverage of matters of serious public concern and relating to politicians or public officials. Under the terms of its second paragraph, the exercise of this freedom carries with it “duties and responsibilities”, which also apply to the press. These “duties and responsibilities” are liable to assume significance when there is a question of attacking the reputation of a named individual and infringing the “rights of others”. By reason of the “duties and responsibilities” inherent in the exercise of the freedom of expression, the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists in relation to reporting on issues of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism (see, among other authorities, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 65, ECHR 1999 ‑ III; Kasabova v. Bulgaria, no. 22385/03, § 63, 19 April 2011). 63. In previous cases, when the Court has been called upon to decide whether to exempt newspapers from their ordinary obligation to verify factual statements that are defamatory of private individuals, it has taken into account various factors, particularly the nature and degree of the defamation and the extent to which the newspaper could have reasonably regarded its sources as reliable with regard to the allegations ( Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 66). These factors, in turn, require consideration of other elements such as the authority of the source ( Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above), whether the newspaper had conducted a reasonable amount of research before publication ( Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 26 April 1995, § 37, Series A no. 313), whether the newspaper presented the story in a reasonably balanced manner ( Bergens Tidende and Others v. Norway, no. 26132/95, § 57, ECHR 2000 ‑ IV) and whether the newspaper gave the persons defamed the opportunity to defend themselves ( Bergens Tidende and Others, cited above, § 58). Hence, the nature of such an exemption from the ordinary requirement of verification of defamatory statements of fact is such that, in order to apply it in a manner consistent with the case-law of this Court, the domestic courts have to take into account the particular circumstances of the case under consideration. If the national courts apply an overly rigorous approach to the assessment of journalists ’ professional conduct, the latter could be unduly deterred from discharging their function of keeping the public informed. The courts must therefore take into account the likely impact of their rulings not only on the individual cases before them but also on the media in general (see Kasabova, cited above, § 55 and Yordanova and Toshev v. Bulgaria, no. 5126/05, § 48, 2 October 2012 ). 64. An additional factor of particular importance in the present case is the vital role of “public watchdog” which the press performs in a democratic society. Although it must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities ‑ information and ideas on political issues and on other matters of general interest (ibid., § 93, with further references). The Court must apply the most careful scrutiny when the sanctions imposed by a national authority are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in debates over matters of legitimate public concern (see, among other authorities, Tønsbergs Blad A.S. and Haukom v. Norway, no. 510/04, § 88, ECHR 2007 ‑ III). 65. The matters discussed in the applicants ’ article concerned issues of public interest, namely allegations of improper conduct of W.D., a high ‑ ranking official of the Ministry of Health. The article described W.D. ’ s involvement in the negotiations with the representatives of a pharmaceutical company where he had allegedly requested a financial advantage. The wider context of the article dealt with the issue of irregularities in the process related to placement of drugs on the list of refunded drugs. 66. At the material time W.D. held the position of the Head of the Private Office of the Minister of Health. Appointment to and dismissal from this position depended entirely on the discretion of the Minister. It further appears from the article that W.D. was a member of the regional branch of the Alliance of the Democratic Left and a close associate of the Minister of Health M. Ł. The limits of acceptable criticism are wider with regard to a person holding a public office than with regard to a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his words and deeds by journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance (see, among other authorities, Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, § 42, Series A no. 103; Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, § 80, ECHR 2004 ‑ XI; Mamère v. France, no. 12697/03, § 27, ECHR 2006 ‑ XIII). 67. In the present case the Court of Appeal found that the applicants had infringed the personal rights of W.D. by having alleged that he had offered to a pharmaceutical company to place its drug on the list of refunded drugs in return for a significant bribe. The Supreme Court confirmed the Court of Appeal ’ s judgment. 68. The domestic courts ’ analysis focused on the issue of special diligence required of journalist in order to rebut the presumption of unlawfulness of the infringement of personal rights. They referred to the case-law of the Supreme Court which held that in order to rebut the above presumption of unlawfulness it was sufficient to establish that a journalist had acted with requisite diligence and that s/he was not required to demonstrate the truthfulness of the allegations raised (see paragraph 32 above). In the instant case, the first-instance court (the Regional Court) found that the applicants had shown sufficient diligence in the preparation of their article, while the two higher courts reached the opposite conclusion. 69. The Court recalls that in situations where on the one hand a statement of fact is made and insufficient evidence is adduced to prove it, and on the other the journalist is discussing an issue of genuine public interest, verifying whether the journalist has acted professionally and in good faith becomes paramount (see Flux v. Moldova (no. 7), no. 25367/05, § 41, 24 November 2009; Kasabova, cited above, § 63 in fine; Ziembiński v. Poland, no. 46712/06, § 53, 24 July 2012; and Yordanova and Toshev, cited above, § 55). 70. The Court of Appeal considered that the applicants had not acted professionally because their allegations against W.D. had not been sufficiently researched. It reproached the applicants essentially for their failure to speak to Ł .Z. who had been one of the four participants at the meetings and the one who had served as an interpreter. It emphasised that the journalists relied on the story of A.F. (the chief executive) while his knowledge had been based on account of the meetings given by Ł.Z. and H.M.N. and that the journalists should have confronted the story put to them by A.F. with the version of Ł.Z. The Court of Appeal found that A.F. ’ s story was not credible because he had apparently not wished that the journalist speak to Ł.Z. However, it appears that the journalists themselves did not consider Ł.Z. as trustworthy source suspecting him of double loyalty and because he was not an active participant at the meetings. They relied on the story of the chief executive corroborated by H.M.N. 71. The Court of Appeal focused its assessment of journalistic diligence on one element without paying regard to other aspects of the journalists ’ professionalism and the overall context in which the business meetings with the participation of W.D. took place. It is true that A.F. broke the story to the journalists. However, they undertook to verify the story meticulously. Firstly, they considered his account credible because A.F. pledged to repeat it in the court if necessary and because it was consistent with the account of H.M.N., one of the representatives of the company at the meetings. Secondly, they contacted the Minister of Health and spoke to two other major protagonists of the story, namely B.O. and W.D. The journalists ’ impression of the credibility of the story was reinforced by inconsistent accounts given by W.D. (see paragraph 11 above). Thirdly, the journalists spoke to A.N., the Deputy Minister of Health in charge of the drugs policy at the relevant time who had given a very critical opinion of W.D. ’ s involvement in the meetings. The statements of the Deputy Minister supported the applicants ’ thesis that W.D. acted improperly in mixing his official position with business ventures. Fourthly, the Court of Appeal entirely omitted to note the fact of W.D. ’ s presence at the private meetings between two companies where he had taken part in the negotiations having introduced himself as a high-ranking Government official. The Court agrees with the Regional Court that this fact, bordering on a conflict of interest, lends credibility to A.F. ’ s account. 72. The extent to which the applicants could have reasonably regarded the impugned information provided by the representatives of pharmaceutical company as reliable must be determined in the light of the situation at the time of the preparation of the article, rather than with the benefit of hindsight (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, §§ 66 in fine and 72; and Kasabova, cited above, § 67). In this respect it should be noted that the domestic courts refrained from assessing the diligence of the two journalists from the perspective of the information available at the time of preparation of the article. 73. Furthermore, it should be noted that the allegations raised in the article resulted in the opening of the criminal investigation into the matter and the charges of bribery being laid against W.D. Although the investigation was eventually discontinued for lack of sufficient evidence, the mere length of it (more than three and a half years of proceedings) and the significant amount of evidence examined by the prosecutor would indicate that the allegations could not have been ignored (see paragraphs 42 ‑ 43 above). 74. The Court further notes that the Court of Appeal found, relying essentially on one sentence from the testimony of H.M.N., that there had been no correlation between the project concerning the network of osteoporosis clinics and the placement of the drug on the list (see paragraph 35 above). At the same time it was undisputed that the parties to the meetings discussed the financial involvement of M. S. D. in the project in the region of 1-1.5 USD million and that the project collapsed when the M. S. D. refused to transfer this amount to an unspecified bank account. In addition, three out of four participants (Ł.Z., W.D. and H.M.N.) testified that they discussed the issue of placement of the M. S. D. ’ s drug on the list of refunded drugs. 75. Having regard to the above elements and the overall content of the impugned publication, the Court considers that the applicants complied with the tenets of responsible journalism. The research done by the applicants before the publication of their allegations was in good faith and complied with the ordinary journalistic obligation to verify the facts from reliable sources (compare and contrast, Rumyana Ivanova v. Bulgaria, no. 36207/03, § § 64- 65, 14 February 2008; Kania and Kittel v. Poland, no. 35105/04, § § 45-46, 21 June 2011 ). The Court is of the view that the allegations against W.D. were underpinned by a sufficient factual basis. It should also be noted that the content and the tone of the article was on the whole fairly balanced. The applicants, having approached a number of sources, gave as objective picture as possible of W.D. and offered him to present his version of the relevant events and to comment on the allegations raised. W.D. ’ s version of events was presented in the article. 76. In assessing the necessity of the interference, it is also important to examine the way in which the domestic courts dealt with the case, and in particular whether they applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 of the Convention. In the instant case, the domestic courts did not take into account the status of W.D. and the wider limits of permissible criticism applicable to politicians or public officials. Similarly, they omitted to consider the fact that the allegations of corruption had emanated from the pharmaceutical company and had been reported as such by the applicants. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court appear to have been unconcerned by the fact that one of the top officials in the Ministry of Health took part in the negotiations between two private companies on their joint business venture in which the public authorities had no involvement. Nor did they appreciate that the subject-matter of the publication concerned issues of public interest or the role of the press as a “public watchdog”. In consequence, the judicial authorities did not carry out a careful balancing exercise between the right to impart information and protection of the reputation or rights of others ( compare and contrast, Keller v. Hungary (dec.), no. 33352/02, 4 April 2006; Kwiecień v. Poland, no. 51744/99, § 52, 9 January 2007; Błaja News sp. Z o. o. v. Poland, no. 59545/10, § 64, 26 November 2013). 77. It follows that the reasons relied on by the respondent State to justify the interference with the applicants ’ right to freedom of expression, although relevant, are not sufficient to show that that interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. 78. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 79. The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Warsaw Court of Appeal had lacked impartiality, as one of the judges of this court was W.D. ’ s brother-in-law and W.D. ’ s mother-in-law had previously served as the President of this court. The applicants also indicated that W.D. ’ s father-in-law was a former judge of the Supreme Court. 80. The Court notes, however, that the applicants did not raise this complaint in the course of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal or later on in their cassation appeal to the Supreme Court. It follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 81. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 82. The first applicant, Mr Andrzej Stankiewicz and the second applicant, Ms Małgorzata Solecka each claimed EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. They submitted that the national courts ’ decisions in their case had resulted in adverse publicity, loss of professional reliability and reputation as well as emotional strain. 83. The Government argued that the applicants had been held liable only under the civil law for infringement of W.D. ’ s personal rights. They maintained that the claims were exorbitant and unsubstantiated. 84. The Court accepts that the first and second applicants suffered non ‑ pecuniary damage – such as distress and frustration – which is not sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation of the Convention. Having regard to the nature of the breach and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the first and the second applicants each EUR 5,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage. 85. The third applicant, Presspublica sp. z o. o. sought, under the head of costs and expenses, reimbursement of the court fees in the amount of EUR 1,100 and of the legal costs of W.D. in the amount of EUR 1,550 which the applicants were jointly ordered to pay by the Court of Appeal. It submitted that all costs related to the proceedings were borne by the Presspublica sp. z o. o. 86. The Government commented that the applicants did not make a claim in respect of pecuniary damage. 87. The Court, however, notes that the third applicant is in principle entitled to recover any sums that it has paid in fees and costs to W.D., by reason of their direct link with the Court of Appeal ’ s judgment which the Court found to be in breach of its right to freedom of expression (see Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, § 50, Series A no. 103; Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft v. Austria, no. 39394/98, § 50, ECHR 2003 ‑ XI; and Yordanova and Toshev, cited above, § 78 ). The claim made by the third applicant clearly falls under the heading of pecuniary damage resulting from a breach of the Convention, not costs and expenses. Having regard to the above, the Court awards the third applicant EUR 2,650 in respect of pecuniary damage. B. Costs and expenses 88. The costs and expenses related to the domestic proceedings and the proceedings before the Court were borne exclusively by the third applicant, Presspublica sp. z o. o. The third applicant claimed a total of EUR 8,387.50 for legal fees incurred before the domestic courts and those incurred before the Court, producing relevant invoices. 89. The Government submitted that only the costs actually incurred in the preparation and defense of the applicants ’ case before the Court and not before the domestic courts can be taken into consideration. 90. According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Furthermore, an applicant is entitled to an award in respect of the costs and expenses incurred by him/her at domestic level to prevent the breach found by the Court or to obtain redress therefor (see, among other authorities, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium (Article 50), 18 October 1982, § 17, Series A no. 54). In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the third applicant EUR 6, 000 plus any tax that may be chargeable to it, in respect of its legal costs in both domestic and Strasbourg proceedings. C. Default interest 91. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention, finding in particular that the Polish judicial authorities had not carried out a careful balancing exercise between the right to impart information and protection of the reputation or rights of others. The reasons relied on by Poland to justify the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression, although relevant, were not sufficient to show that that interference was necessary in a democratic society.