Parental authority, child custody and access rights
THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLEs 8 and 9 OF THE CONVENTION and article 2 of protocol no. 1 to the convention 83. The applicant initially complained that the withdrawal of her parental responsibility in respect of her son, X, and the authorisation granted to his foster parents to adopt him, had violated her right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, which provides: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 84. Furthermore, the applicant complained that the above measures had entailed a violation of her right to freedom of religion as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention, which provides: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 85. In addition, in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, the applicant relied on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which provides: “No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.” The Chamber judgment 86. The Chamber, referring to fact that the Court was the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considered that the applicant’s submissions relating to her and X’s cultural and religious background, within the particular context of the case, also fell to be examined under Article 8. It went on to declare the complaint under Article 8 admissible. 87. With regard to the merits, the Chamber stated that the general principles applicable to cases involving child welfare measures, such as those at issue, were well-established in the Court’s case-law and had recently been set out extensively in the case of Strand Lobben and Others, cited above, §§ 202-213. In applying those principles to the case, it noted that in the domestic proceedings the applicant had not applied for the care order to be lifted and accordingly to be reunited with X; she had only requested that her parental responsibility in respect of X not be removed and that consent to his adoption be refused. Furthermore, although the applicant had not appealed against the District Court’s judgment or even applied to the Court when the care order was originally issued, the Chamber went on to find that the decisions on contact rights taken in the course of those proceedings meant that there had only been minimal contact between the applicant and X from the very outset, contrary to the principle under Article 8 that the contact regime ought to guard, strengthen and develop family ties. That being the case, the Chamber had difficulties in considering that the domestic authorities could be said to have taken any real measures to facilitate family reunification before deciding to approve X’s adoption. 88. The Chamber also considered that the High Court had provided limited grounds for the findings in respect of the nature and causes of X’s reactions to contact with the applicant, to which it had attached importance when deciding on the adoption. Adding to the other specific reasons that militated in favour of maintaining the possibility of some contact between X and the applicant, particularly those relating to their cultural and religious background, the above considerations led the Chamber to conclude that in the course of the case culminating in X’s adoption, insufficient weight had been attached to the aim that the applicant and X enjoy family life. Emphasising the gravity of the interference and the seriousness of the interests at stake, the Chamber did not consider that the decision-making process leading to the impugned decision to withdraw the applicant’s parental responsibility in respect of X and to authorise his adoption had been conducted in such a manner as to ensure that all of the applicant’s views and interests were duly taken into account. The Chamber concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The parties’ submissionsThe applicant The applicant The applicant 89. The applicant maintained that the question as to whether Article 8 of the Convention had been violated was a bygone conclusion following the Chamber’s judgment. The applicant had not requested referral to the Grand Chamber with reference to that provision, and the respondent Government had not requested referral. They should therefore be estopped from arguing that there had been no violation of Article 8. Moreover, in the applicant’s view there had plainly been a violation of that provision. She argued that the foster placement in the instant case had put even greater strain on the bond between the biological mother and the child than in the case of Strand Lobben and Others, cited at paragraph 62 above, since X, in contrast to the child involved in that case, had been cut off from his cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious roots. 90. The visits that had been carried out during X’s foster care had taken place under supervision and had not given the applicant and X enough space to develop a family bond. After a while the foster parents had stopped calling the applicant “mum”. 91. In the applicant’s view, Article 8 should be interpreted in the light of Article 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. Questions regarding violations of freedom of religion should, however, be kept separate from Article 8 and the issue arising under Article 9 merited its own discussion. For a parent to raise a child in accordance with his or her religion or belief was a manifestation of that religion or belief, and this practice was at the core of the perception of what religious freedom is; it was also universal to all religions and belief systems. 92. The applicant submitted that, contrary to section 4-15 of the Child Welfare Act, no attempts had been made to find a foster home that had matched her cultural and religious background. There had therefore been a breach of the lawfulness requirement in Article 9 of the Convention; reference was also made to Article 7. The child should have been placed in a Muslim foster family with Somali roots or, if not possible, at least a Muslim family. In her observations before the Grand Chamber, the applicant submitted that it was not correct to assert that the authorities had made efforts to facilitate such a placement. In her subsequent pleadings she argued that she had been unaware of and not involved in any efforts that had been made. She also argued that, by setting the adoption in motion, the child welfare services had made a decision that had also violated the child’s rights, as they had permitted indoctrination of the child away from his religion, in contravention of Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Furthermore, the foster family had not been sufficiently informed by Norwegian authorities about how to respect and take account of the foster child’s religious identity and their duty not to convert the child to their religion. 93. Furthermore, nothing even approaching such sound and weighty considerations as were required by the Court’s case-law in order to justify the severing of family ties had been proffered by the domestic authorities in the instant case. All the ties to the applicant’s religion had been severed through the adoption, because the foster family had wished to baptise the child and had done so following the adoption. Furthermore, conversion to another religion was considered to be apostasy in Islam and a crime under Sharia law. Moreover, following the adoption, the child’s name had been changed. Naming a child was a parent’s prerogative and a name was often a bearer of familial, cultural and religious tradition. In the present case, there had been an especially strong religious connotation to his name and the name change had been directly related to the adoptive parents’ religion. The name change in itself therefore fell within the scope of Article 9 of the Convention in this case. 94. The applicant argued that, throughout her whole case, she had been vocal about her religious identity and her specific wishes for a religious upbringing for the child. Placing the child with the particular family at issue had not been done in the pursuit of a legitimate aim; the legitimate aim would have been to reunite the child with the applicant. The violation of Article 9 of the Convention was not something that occurred at the specific time of adoption; it had first occurred when the child was placed with his foster family and was continuous throughout the duration of the placement. 95. The applicant maintained that Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 applied to the facts of her case. It was clear from the Court’s case-law that the placement of a child in public care did not cause the parents to lose all their rights under that provision. 96. In the applicant’s view, Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 interacted and had to be interpreted in the light of Article 14 of the Convention. A “religiously neutral” policy of child placements systematically benefitted religious majorities, as children belonging to such groups would be more likely to be placed with someone of the same religion than those belonging to minorities. The case also involved a child who had been christened into a missionary church outside the religious mainstream whose activities could be described by the majority as indoctrination, and natural parents belonging to the Christian majority could also have objected to fostering and adoption on those grounds. 97. In the applicant’s opinion, the Court should attach great weight to the measures that predated the acts brought before it, as the manner in which they had been made had paved the way for the subsequent adoption. She asserted that, by not considering her rights under Article 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, the Norwegian authorities had not fulfilled their duty as the primary guarantors of Convention rights, as required by Article 1 of the Convention. 98. Before the Grand Chamber, the applicant asked that the Court make a statement regarding indicative measures under Article 46 of the Convention. She submitted in that context that the domestic procedural law provided for reopening of judgments in which the Convention had been misapplied. The Government 99. The Government argued that the Chamber had correctly subsumed the case’s cultural and religious aspects under Article 8 of the Convention. The complaint related to the applicant’s own sentiments in respect of her son’s upbringing, which were suitably encompassed by the interests of parents, integral to the proportionality assessment under the second paragraph of that provision. They also pointed out that Article 8 protects the parent’s “private life”, which included, among other things, individual ethnicity as well as the relationship between parent and child. 100. Based on the criteria set out by the Court in the case of Strand Lobben and Others, cited above, the Government argued that there had been no violation of Article 8 in the instant case. The Chamber had built on its own assessment of evidence and had failed to refer to relevant facts; in so doing, it had departed from the Court’s subsidiary and procedural role. The Chamber had, among other things, made no reference to the efforts made by the domestic authorities to enable the applicant to maintain her relationship with her child, nor to the efforts made by those authorities prior to the emergency decision. 101. In that context, the Government pointed out that in the period which had elapsed from the point at which X was placed in an emergency care home (that is, at the turn of September and October 2010) until the municipal child welfare office applied for foster parent adoption (on 11 September 2013), and then again until his adoption was confirmed in 2015, several assistance measures were adopted. These included the initial and comprehensive follow-up from two asylum centres, before arrangements were made for the applicant to live in a house with professionals who had been contracted by the municipality to help, assist and guide the applicant, with whom her son was then residing. From January 2011 the applicant had stayed for two years in a shared house for single minor asylum seekers, where she had been supported day and night by therapists. In January 2013 she had moved into a flat in shared accommodation, where staff had monitored her regularly. She had received continuous training in everyday activities and been given considerable medical and educational assistance. While all these measures had been conducive to aiding the applicant in maturing, becoming independent and being able to act as a responsible adult who could resume looking after her child, the applicant had shown no improvement in her caring skills. At the same time X had had extraordinary needs. 102. The domestic authorities’ decisions showed that there had been exceptional circumstances behind the decision to deprive her of parental responsibility and to consent to adoption and that these measures had been justified, since they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests. 103. The Government submitted that, in the circumstances of the instant case, no separate issues arose in respect of either Article 9 of the Convention or Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. As to Article 9 in general, they were however prepared to assume that making choices motivated by religion on behalf of one’s child might amount to a religious “manifestation” under that provision. They further stated that regardless of whether the case was assessed through the lens of negative or positive obligations under Article 9, a balancing of the different interests at stake had to be carried out. 104. The child welfare services had tried to accommodate the applicant’s wish that her son be placed in a Somali and Muslim foster home. They had contacted a cousin of the applicant, a Somali couple, as well as an Afghan Muslim family, but without success. Despite efforts over many years to recruit Muslim foster parents in Norway, it remained difficult to find such homes. The child welfare services had thus had due regard to the applicant’s wishes and had made the efforts that could be reasonably expected of them to find a Muslim foster home, but when the search for such a home proved unsuccessful, X’s interests in obtaining a rapid placement overrode the applicant’s interests. 105. During the foster home placement, the child welfare services had assessed cultural and religious aspects of the foster home stay as part of their supervision of the foster home. The child welfare services had been aware of, and sensitive to, the importance of preserving the child’s cultural and religious background in order to safeguard the goal of a future reunification. X’s foster parents had also participated in a training course which emphasised the importance of preserving this background. 106. The Government accepted that the subsequent adoption had interfered with the applicant’s right to manifest her religion, notwithstanding the fact that some of her freedom of religion in that respect had already been removed by virtue of the care order. The decision to consent to adoption had however been based on what was in X’s best interests. The religious and cultural aspects of the case had been extensively discussed and a balanced and well-founded assessment, in which the applicant’s interests had been weighed against X’s interest in remaining with the family with which he had lived for more than three years, had been made by the High Court. The High Court had heard and relied on the witness statements of two experts in Islam regarding the placement of a Muslim boy with Christian foster parents and had had considerable and detailed regard to the applicant’s and the boy’s interests in having their faith respected. The margin of appreciation had not been exceeded. 107. While the Government were principally of the view that no separate questions arose either under Article 9 of the Convention or under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, they argued, in the alternative, that Article 9 was more suitable than Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, as the functions assumed by the respondent State in this case fell outside the scope of “education” and “teaching” in the sense of the latter provision. 108. The Government stated that most decisions under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 had concerned activities in schools and other educational institutions. By removing X from his biological parent and placing him with foster parents, the State had conceivably and in a certain manner interfered with his “teaching”, but this was “teaching” taking place in a family environment and significantly different from the “teaching” taking place in State schools in so far as this concerned its content, context and purpose. 109. The principles developed under Article 2 of the Protocol were not well suited to addressing the issues at stake. In the Government’s view, those principles reflected the balancing of interests required in an educational institution in the light of the school’s function as an arena of integration, pluralism and knowledge transmission. The balancing of interests in a case such as the present one was different; the interests of the individual child played a predominant role and the balancing of interests between different religious groups was of less importance. The Government added that while education was generally examined from the angle of that provision, this had not excluded the Court from reviewing cases relating to education under Article 9. Third parties (a) The Government of Denmark 110. The Danish Government focused its intervention on the general principles guiding deprivation of parental responsibility and adoption without parental consent. In essence, they argued that the Court should – in line with the principle of subsidiarity – not substitute its own substantive balancing of interests for that of the national authorities but rather review the national authorities’ decision-making process in such cases. Moreover, the Danish Government argued that the Court should confirm the best interests of the child as the primary consideration in cases relating to child welfare, such as adoption cases. 111. In the Danish Government’s view, the Chamber had conducted a substantive scrutiny of the national decisions and, in its assessment, indicated a move towards attaching increased weight to the interests of the parents and, in consequence, had decreased the weight that was to be attached to the best interests of the child. 112. With regard to the issue of the choice of foster home, the Danish Government found that the best interests of the child should be the guiding factor. When choosing a foster family, the authorities should have regard for the child’s needs and life situation, including the child’s cultural and religious background and needs. Sometimes, however, it would not be possible to find a family with a similar cultural and religious background to that of the child and his or her parents, notably owing to a lack of foster families with such backgrounds. When necessary and in the best interests of the child to be removed from his or her parents, this should not prevent the child being placed with a foster family even if they were of a different cultural and religious background. (b) The Government of the Czech Republic 113. The Czech Government stressed that, when assessing the compliance of State authorities with their obligations under Article 8 of the Convention, it was necessary to take due account of the situation of all members of the family, as that provision guaranteed protection to the whole family. Moreover, they stressed that there was a broad consensus that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests must be paramount. The “best interests” principle was however not designed to be a kind of a “trump card” and the paramountcy of the child’s interests did not mean that the Contracting States should give up on the biological parents’ right to family life. 114. On the topic of contact between the biological parents and their child in public care and other measures to reunite the family, the Czech Government pointed out that, under Article 9 § 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the child had the right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except when this was contrary to his or her best interests. Moreover, they emphasised the positive duties inherent in Article 8 of the Convention and that it was highly important to maintain contact between biological parents and the child during the latter’s placement in care, as the regime of contact ought to guard, strengthen and develop family ties. 115. With respect to adoption, the Czech Government stated that the crucial question was whether, in cases where the biological parents wished to participate in their child’s upbringing and/or to exercise their contact rights (if allowed), adoption and other restrictions or a ban on contact rights were in compliance with Article 8 of the Convention. It further stated in this regard, among other points, that the extent of the child’s relationship with the biological parent could be a crucial factor. This led to the question of allowing for sufficient contact rights and of preserving the bond with the biological family while the child was in foster care. 116. The Czech Government emphasised the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on “Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children” and noted that, according to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the State party should take measures, including adequate training of personnel, necessary to ensure that children belonging to an indigenous or national minority group who are placed in alternative care learn about, and maintain their connection to, their native culture. 117. Furthermore, they stated that, when deciding about out-of-home placement, or even adoption, the authorities must have due regard also to the wishes of the biological parents to have their children placed with foster or adoptive parents that will comply with their religious beliefs. When choosing a suitable adopter, the authorities should therefore take due account of the understanding by prospective adopters of developmental and behavioural issues, issues surrounding the cultural, spiritual or religious needs of the child, the importance of providing information to the child about his background, and issues of racism and its effects. 118. The Czech Government also pointed out that information about the child’s origin was critical to the ability of a child from a minority group or of indigenous origin to exercise the right to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practice his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language under Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In this context, the Committee on the Rights of the Child had recommended that States parties ensure the right of adopted children, as far as possible, to maintain one of their original first names. (c) The Government of Turkey 119. The Government of Turkey maintained that the Court recognised that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care. However, a stricter scrutiny was called for both of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by those authorities on parental rights and access, and of any legal safeguards designed to secure effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life. 120. Furthermore, the Government of Turkey submitted that, according to the Court’s case-law and international practices, removal and placement of children with long-term foster families and prospective adoptive parents should be used only in exceptional cases and as a last resort, after all other options are exhausted, as these measures are often irreversible, especially in respect of children aged 0-6. In the instant case, it was not clear whether there had been exceptional circumstances such as a history of violence, ill ‑ treatment or drug or alcohol addiction that would prevent the mother from providing parental care to her own child permanently and would have justified the authorities’ severe measures, which led to the severing of mother-child ties. It was not sufficiently proved that the child welfare services had exhausted other options prior to removing the applicant’s child and placing him with a prospective adoptive family. The Government of Turkey also drew the Court’s attention to the vulnerable condition of the applicant and her son and argued that by the very act of imposing a very restrictive contact regime, the authorities had failed in their positive duty to take measures to facilitate the applicant’s and her child’s continued enjoyment of a family life. 121. The Government of Turkey maintained that it was unclear whether the national authorities had conducted a thorough assessment when choosing the foster parents and exhausted all other available options before placing the child in foster care with foster parents of a different religion. They also stated that it was unknown which steps, if any, had been taken by the child welfare services with regard to the applicant’s concerns that the foster parents actively indoctrinated her child into their faith without any consideration for the fact that he was of the Muslim faith and that the applicant, as the child’s mother, wished to bring him up as a Muslim, following the cultural and religious identity of his roots. 122. Moreover, the Government of Turkey noted that, following his adoption, the child had been baptised and given a Christian name, and argued that the authorities’ decisions had resulted in the child’s religious conversion into the Christian faith, in violation of the applicant’s and her son’s right to freedom of religion under Article 9 of the Convention. They stated in this context that the fact that the child had been baptised and given a Christian name implicitly implied the argument that the child would not have been able to integrate into his adoptive family without surrendering the cultural and religious identity into which he had been born. Lastly, they stated that it would be beneficial in the instant case if the Court could examine, in conjunction with the other provisions, whether there had been a violation of the prohibition of discrimination set out in Article 14. 123. The Government of Turkey were of the opinion that the child’s religious, cultural, ethnic and linguistic background had not been taken into consideration in the decisions of the child welfare services and the Norwegian courts’ judgments concerning the placement of the applicant’s child. This constituted an interference with the applicant’s rights, not only under Article 8, but also under Article 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, as well as under Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with these provisions. The authorities’ conduct had violated the applicant’s right to raise and educate her child in conformity with her own religious beliefs and convictions. (d) The AIRE Centre 124. The AIRE Centre focused on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. In that context, it drew the Court’s attention, among other points, to the fact that the rights set out in that Convention applied to all children under the age of 18, including teenage mothers. In the context of teenage mother asylum seekers, that Convention required a guardian to be appointed for the young mothers as well as for their babies, in order to ensure that all their needs, including their needs as mothers, were properly met. The AIRE Centre also emphasised that the principle of the paramountcy of the child’s best interests applied equally to the best interests of babies and to the best interests of their mothers if their mothers were also children. 125. The AIRE Centre also emphasised issues relating to the child’s participation in the decision-making process if it involves children who are able to form own opinions and stated, inter alia, that for domestic proceedings to comply with the procedural requirements of Article 8 of the Convention, the child had to have participated, either directly or indirectly, in the child protection or adoption proceedings. The same applied to proceedings before this Court, meaning that in order to meet the requirements of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the child’s views had to be heard by the European Court of Human Rights. 126. In their submissions, the AIRE Centre also discussed different forms of alternative care and adoption with regard to the aspect of religious matters. Furthermore, it stated that it was essential to be aware that adoption was not permitted in Islam and that the Koran forbade it. Children who had lost the care of their birth parents were provided in Islam with new homes through the institution of Kafalah. Kafalah placed very exacting religious obligations on the kefils (the new parents) and was often carried out through judicial proceedings. 127. With regard to issues relating to the child and religion, the AIRE Centre’s submissions primarily dealt with the United Nation Convention on the Rights of the Child. It stated, among other things, that in most branches of the Christian religion a child did not “acquire” Christianity at birth, but only through baptism. In Islam and Judaism, a child born to a Muslim or a (qualifying) Jewish parent acquired that religion at birth, similarly to the situation in many States where citizenship was acquired at birth. In the Islamic world, apostasy was in many places regarded as a crime, but in all Islamic countries it was socially frowned on. Very serious and explicit consideration had therefore to be given to whether and why it was in the best interests of any Muslim child of Muslim heritage to be forcibly converted to Christianity. This was a quite distinct issue from whether it was appropriate to place a Muslim child within a Christian foster family, which could be an acceptable solution where forced conversion was not an issue and where there were no other suitable family members available to take on this role. (e) X’s adoptive parents 128. X’s adoptive parents focused on the fact that the Court had established in its case-law that relationships amounting to “private or family life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention were not exclusive to biological parental relationships. With regard to family life with foster parents, the Court’s judgment in the case of Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy (no. 16318/07, §§ 44-52, 27 April 2010) in particular laid down the relevant guidelines. The adoptive parents also emphasised that on the basis of the Court’s case-law due regard should be had to other close personal ties that had formed while the child had been in foster care, for instance with siblings. 129. Furthermore, the adoptive parents emphasised the paramountcy of the child’s best interests in cases such as the present one, and submitted that in the continuation of these two aspects of the Court’s case-law – the strength of the family ties between child and foster parents, and the paramountcy of the principle of the child’s best interests – the Grand Chamber should seek to combine them in the application of Article 8 in the present case. In this respect Moretti and Benedetti, cited above, was particularly relevant to the Court, as an example of the complex reality of situations where several interests – interests originating in family ties that were protected under the Convention – came into conflict with each other and pulled in different directions. The Court’s assessmentScope of the case before the Grand Chamber Scope of the case before the Grand Chamber Scope of the case before the Grand Chamber 130. The Court reiterates that the content and scope of the “case” referred to the Grand Chamber are delimited by the Chamber’s decision on admissibility. This means that the Grand Chamber cannot examine those parts of the application which have been declared inadmissible by the Chamber (see, for example, Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], nos. 10211/12 and 27505/14, § 100, 4 December 2018). In the present case, the Grand Chamber notes that the Chamber declared admissible the complaint lodged by the applicant (see paragraph 3 above), which concerned the deprivation of parental responsibility and the authorisation for the adoption of her son, X, first decided by the County Social Welfare Board on 21 March 2014 and then upheld on appeal (see, inter alia, paragraphs 14-30, 34 and 36 of the Chamber’s judgment). 131. The Grand Chamber observes that X was taken into emergency foster care in 2010 (see paragraph 17 above) and into ordinary foster care following the County Social Welfare Board’s decision of 10 December 2010 (see paragraph 20 above). In the same decision the first applicant was granted contact rights amounting to four short contact sessions, under supervision, per year (see paragraph 22 above). She appealed against that decision, which was ultimately upheld by the District Court in its judgment of 6 September 2011, increasing her contact rights to one hour, six times per year (see paragraph 29 above). As the applicant did not avail herself of the possibility of lodging an appeal, the District Court’s judgment became final on the expiry of the time‑limit for doing so. 132. The above proceedings from 2010 to 2011 did not form part of the applicant’s application in so far as it was declared admissible by the Chamber and the Court does not have jurisdiction to review their compatibility with Article 8 of the Convention. The same applies to the decisions imposing limitations on the applicant’s right to contact with X, predating the adoption proceedings, which started in 2013 (see paragraph 32 above). 133. Nonetheless, in its review of the proceedings relating to the County Social Welfare Board’s decision of 21 March 2014 and the decisions taken on appeal against that decision, notably the District Court’s judgment of 21 November 2014, the High Court’s judgment of 27 May 2015 and the Supreme Court’s Appeals Leave Committee’s decision of 23 September 2015, the Court will have to put those proceedings and decisions in context, which inevitably means that it must to some degree have regard to the preceding proceedings and decisions (see, similarly, Strand Lobben and Others, cited above, § 148). Indeed, as recognised by the Norwegian Supreme Court (see paragraphs 62-66 above), it is relevant in a case such as the present one whether the competent domestic authorities have considered from the very outset all the relevant requirements of Article 8 of the Convention, as reflected in domestic law and other international instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see M.L. v. Norway, no. 64639/16, § 98, 22 December 2020). Legal characterisation of the applicant’s complaint 134. A principal reason for the applicant’s request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber was the Chamber’s decision that all of her arguments fell to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention, rather than, in part under Article 9, as she had submitted (see paragraph 34 of the Chamber’s judgment). 135. The Court observes in that connection that the applicant’s complaints lodged with the Court under Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention concern the same measures, notably the withdrawal of her parental responsibility in respect of X and the authorisation for X’s adoption by his foster parents. This is also valid with regard to her additional arguments, made for the first time before the Grand Chamber, in relation to Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It also observes that X himself is not an applicant before the Court. 136. In this connection, the Court reiterates that a complaint consists of two elements: factual allegations and legal arguments. By virtue of the jura novit curia principle the Court is not bound by the legal grounds adduced by the applicant under the Convention and the Protocols thereto and has the power to decide on the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a complaint by examining it under Articles or provisions of the Convention that are different from those relied upon by the applicant (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 126, 20 March 2018). 137. While the type of measures under consideration in this case is one which, according to the Court’s case-law, is invariably considered under Article 8 of the Convention, the question arises as to whether and to what extent the applicant’s complaint attracts the application of Article 9 of the Convention and/or Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. 138. Turning to the latter provision first, the Court reiterates that the Convention institutions have on certain occasions been called upon to examine complaints formulated under this provision, in addition to the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention, in regard to the choice of foster home. It is noteworthy that in Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 24 March 1988, § 95, Series A no. 130, the former European Commission of Human Rights stated in paragraph 183 of its report adopted on 2 December 1986: “A decision to take a child into care is of a different character from adoption or the removal of custody. A care order does not mean that the right to custody is removed from the parents. But it implies that the public authorities take over the responsibility for the actual care of the child for a period which is not normally fixed in advance. A care order is however of a temporary nature and the aim is that eventually the children should return to their parents. In the Commission’s opinion the right of the parents under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 is not removed as a result of a care order. However, since such an order temporarily transfers certain parental rights to the public authorities it is inevitable that the contents of the parents’ rights in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 must be reduced accordingly. On the other hand, the responsible authorities must, in the exercise of their rights under a care order, have due regard to the parents’ right under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.” 139. The Court, finding the complaint unsubstantiated, agreed with the Commission in that no violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 had been established (see Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), cited above). The Commission similarly reached a negative conclusion in Tennenbaum v. Sweden (dec.) no. 16031/90, 3 May 1993), as it had many years earlier in regard to an adoption measure in X v. the United Kingdom (no. 7626/76, 11 July 1977). However, apparently because of the secondary importance of the matter and slender basis for the complaints, the Convention institutions have not elucidated the reach of this provision beyond affirming that the authorities must have due regard to the parents’ right under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. It appears that most cases examined under this provision and the principles developed in the Court’s case-law concern the obligations of the State in relation to institutionalised education and teaching, as pointed out by the respondent State. The Court further observes that, whilst Article 2 of the Protocol is a lex specialis in relation to Article 9 of the Convention (see, for example, Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], no. 15472/02, § 54, ECHR 2007 ‑ III; and Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 30814/06, § 59, ECHR 2011 (extracts)), the applicant relied only on the latter provision in her initial application to the Court as declared admissible by the Chamber. In these circumstances, the Grand Chamber will not review the matter with reference to Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. 140. Turning then to Article 9, which the applicant did invoke in her original application, the Court recognises that her views attained the “level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance” so as to fall within the scope of the guarantees embodied in this provision (see, among other authorities, İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], no. 62649/10, § 68, 26 April 2016). The Court also considers that for a parent to bring his or her child up in line with one’s own religious or philosophical convictions may be regarded as a way to “manifest his religion or belief, in ... teaching, practice and observance” (emphasis added here). It is clear that when the child lives with his or her biological parent, the latter may exercise Article 9 rights in everyday life through the manner of enjoyment of his or her Article 8 rights. To some degree he or she may also be able to continue doing so where the child has been compulsorily taken into public care, for example through the manner of assuming parental responsibilities or contact rights aimed at facilitating reunion. The compulsory taking into care of a child inevitably entails limitations on the freedom of the biological parent to manifest his or her religious or other philosophical convictions in his or her own upbringing of the child. However, for the reasons stated below the Court does not find it necessary in the instant case to determine the scope of Article 9 and its applicability to the matters complained of. 141. In the Court’s view, the applicant’s complaint relating to the adverse effect of the choice of foster home in regard to her wish that X be brought up in line with her Muslim faith may be examined as an integral part of her complaint concerning her right to respect for her family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, interpreted and applied in the light of Article 9, rather than as a separate issue of alleged failures to comply with the rights protected by the latter provision. 142. Against this background, the Court considers it appropriate to centre its examination of the present case on the compatibility of the impugned measures with the applicant’s right to respect for family life under Article 8, which has however to be interpreted and applied in the light of Article 9 of the Convention. This is an approach that it has followed in a number of cases in which it has found the complaint to be most appropriately characterised with reference to one Article, while acknowledging that the subject matter also touches upon interests protected by other Articles of the Convention and Protocols (see, for example, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 7 December 1976, § 52, Series A no. 23; and Folgerø and Others, cited above, § 100, where the Court held that the two sentences of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 must be read not only in the light of each other but also, in particular, of Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention; see also Lautsi and Others, cited above) and the approach adopted in a number of cases to interpret Article 11 in the light of Articles 9 and/or 10 (see, for example, Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 13 August 1981, § 57, Series A no. 44; Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, § 41, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4 others, § 102, 15 November 2018) or the other way round (see Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06 and 3 others, §§ 53 et seq ., ECHR 2011); or Article 9 in the light of Article 11 (see İzzettin Doğan and Others, cited above, § 93). Compliance with Article 8 143. It is not disputed between the parties, and the Court finds it unequivocally established, that the measures decided in the proceedings complained of, namely the withdrawal of the applicant’s parental responsibility in respect of X and the authorisation for X’s adoption, entailed an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life, as guaranteed by paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Convention. Moreover, the Court sees no reason to question that the measures were in accordance with the law, namely the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 61 above), and pursued legitimate aims under paragraph 2 of Article 8, namely the protection of X’s “health and morals” and his “rights”. It remains to be considered whether the disputed measures were “necessary in a democratic society” for the pursuit of these legitimate aims, including whether the domestic authorities had due regard to the applicant’s interests protected by the Article 9 freedom. 144. This approach is not only consistent with promoting internal consistence and harmony (see Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 48, ECHR 2005-X) with that referred to in paragraph 142 above concerning Article 8 in relation to Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. It is also consonant with the standard expressed in various forms in the domestic laws of the great majority of Convention States and reflected in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, notably its Article 20(3), whereby due regard shall be paid, inter alia, to the child’s religious, ethnic and cultural background (see paragraphs 73, 81 and 82 above). (a) General principles 145. The general principles relevant to child welfare measures were set out in the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Strand Lobben and Others, cited above, §§ 202-213 (see also, inter alia, K.O. and V.M. v. Norway, no. 64808/16, §§ 59-60, 19 November 2019; A.S. v. Norway, no. 60371/15, §§ 59-61, 17 December 2019; Cînța v. Romania, no. 3891/19, § 26, 18 February 2020; Y.I. v. Russia, no. 68868/14, §§ 75-78, 25 February 2020; Hernehult v. Norway, no. 14652/16, §§ 61-63, 10 March 2020; Pedersen and Others v. Norway, no. 39710/15, §§ 60-62, 10 March 2020; and M.L. v. Norway, cited above, §§ 77-81). While bearing in mind the scope of the case as delimited in paragraphs 130-133 above, and also that the crux of the matter concerns the deprivation of parental responsibility and authorisation to adoption described in paragraphs 32-58 above, in assessing whether these measures were “necessary in a democratic society” the Court will have regard to the following principles: “203. In determining whether the latter condition was fulfilled, the Court will consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify that measure were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (see, among many other authorities, Paradiso and Campanelli, cited above, § 179). The notion of necessity further implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, regard being had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the relevant competing interests (ibid., § 181). 204. In so far as the family life of a child is concerned, the Court reiterates that there is a broad consensus, including in international law, in support of the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests are of paramount importance (see, among other authorities, Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, § 135, ECHR 2010). Indeed, the Court has emphasised that in cases involving the care of children and contact restrictions, the child’s interests must come before all other considerations (see Jovanovic, cited above, § 77, and Gnahoré v. France, no. 40031/98, § 59, ECHR 2000‑IX). 205. At the same time, it should be noted that regard for family unity and for family reunification in the event of separation are inherent considerations in the right to respect for family life under Article 8. Accordingly, in the case of imposition of public care restricting family life, a positive duty lies on the authorities to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible (see K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 178). 206. In instances where the respective interests of a child and those of the parents come into conflict, Article 8 requires that the domestic authorities should strike a fair balance between those interests and that, in the balancing process, particular importance should be attached to the best interests of the child which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override those of the parents (see, for instance, Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], no. 31871/96, § 64, ECHR 2003‑VIII (extracts), and the references therein). 207. Generally, the best interests of the child dictate, on the one hand, that the child’s ties with its family must be maintained, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit, since severing those ties means cutting a child off from its roots. It follows that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, if and when appropriate, to “rebuild” the family (see Gnahoré, cited above, § 59). On the other hand, it is clearly also in the child’s interest to ensure its development in a sound environment, and a parent cannot be entitled under Article 8 to have such measures taken as would harm the child’s health and development (see, among many other authorities, Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 136; Elsholz v. Germany [GC], no. 25735/94, § 50, ECHR 2000-VIII; and Maršálek v. the Czech Republic, no. 8153/04, § 71, 4 April 2006). An important international consensus exists to the effect that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child (see Article 9 § 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, recited in paragraph 134 above). In addition, it is incumbent on the Contracting States to put in place practical and effective procedural safeguards for the protection of the best interests of the child and to ensure their implementation (see the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration, paragraphs 85 and 87, quoted at paragraph 136 above). 208. Another guiding principle is that a care order should be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit, and that any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child (see, for instance, Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 24 March 1988, § 81, Series A no. 130). The above-mentioned positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible will begin to weigh on the competent authorities with progressively increasing force as from the commencement of the period of care, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to consider the best interests of the child (see, for example, K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 178). In this type of case the adequacy of a measure is to be judged by the swiftness of its implementation, as the passage of time can have irremediable consequences for relations between the child and the parent with whom it does not live (see, inter alia, S.H. v. Italy, no. 52557/14, § 42, 13 October 2015). Thus, where the authorities are responsible for a situation of family breakdown because they have failed in their above-mentioned obligation, they may not base a decision to authorise adoption on the grounds of the absence of bonds between the parents and the child (see Pontes v. Portugal, no. 19554/09, §§ 92 and 99, 10 April 2012). Furthermore, the ties between members of a family and the prospects of their successful reunification will perforce be weakened if impediments are placed in the way of their having easy and regular access to each other (see Scozzari and Giunta, cited above, § 174; and Olsson (no. 1), cited above, § 81). However, when a considerable period of time has passed since the child was originally taken into public care, the interest of a child not to have his or her de facto family situation changed again may override the interests of the parents to have their family reunited (see K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 155). 209. As regards replacing a foster home arrangement with a more far-reaching measure such as deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption, with the consequence that the applicants’ legal ties with the child are definitively severed, it is to be reiterated that “such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests” (see, for example, Johansen, cited above, § 78, and Aune, cited above, § 66). It is in the very nature of adoption that no real prospects for rehabilitation or family reunification exist and that it is instead in the child’s best interests that he or she be placed permanently in a new family (see R. and H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 35348/06, § 88, 31 May 2011). 210. In determining whether the reasons for the impugned measures were relevant and sufficient for the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court will have regard to the fact that perceptions as to the appropriateness of intervention by public authorities in the care of children vary from one Contracting State to another, depending on such factors as traditions relating to the role of the family and to State intervention in family affairs and the availability of resources for public measures in this particular area. However, consideration of what is in the best interests of the child is in every case of crucial importance. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the national authorities have the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned, often at the very stage when care measures are being envisaged or immediately after their implementation. It follows from these considerations that the Court’s task is not to substitute itself for the domestic authorities in the exercise of their responsibilities for the regulation of the care of children and the rights of parents whose children have been taken into public care, but rather to review under the Convention the decisions taken by those authorities in the exercise of their power of appreciation (see, for example, K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 154; and Johansen, cited above, § 64). 211. The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake, such as, on the one hand, the importance of protecting a child in a situation which is assessed as seriously threatening his or her health or development and, on the other hand, the aim to reunite the family as soon as circumstances permit. The Court thus recognises that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care (see, for example, K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 155; and Johansen, cited above, § 64). However, this margin is not unfettered. For example, the Court has in certain instances attached weight to whether the authorities, before taking a child into public care, had first attempted to take less drastic measures, such as supportive or preventive ones, and whether these had proved unsuccessful (see, for example, Olsson (no. 1), cited above, §§ 72-74; R.M.S. v. Spain, no. 28775/12, § 86, 18 June 2013, § 86; and Kutzner v. Germany, no. 46544/99, § 75, ECHR 2002‑I). A stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by the authorities on parental rights of access, and of any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life. Such further limitations entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young child are effectively curtailed (see K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, ibid., and Johansen, cited above, ibid.). 212. In cases relating to public-care measures, the Court will further have regard to the authorities’ decision-making process, to determine whether it has been conducted such as to secure that the views and interests of the natural parents are made known to and duly taken into account by the authorities and that they are able to exercise in due time any remedies available to them (see, for instance, W. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, § 63, Series A no. 121, and Elsholz, cited above, § 52). What has to be determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests and have been able fully to present their case (see, for example, W. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 64; T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28945/95, § 72, ECHR 2001‑V (extracts); Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 139; and Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 4547/10, § 138, 13 March 2012). ... 213. Whether the decision-making process sufficiently protected a parent’s interests depends on the particular circumstances of each case (see, for example, Sommerfeld, cited above, § 68). ...” (b) Application of those principles to the present case 146. Turning to the concrete examination of the necessity of the impugned measures, the Court observes that the High Court decided that X’s foster care should be replaced with adoption after having held a hearing over two days, which the applicant attended together with her counsel. Eight witnesses gave evidence, of whom four, including psychologists S.H.G. and K.P., gave expert testimony. The High Court’s bench comprised three professional judges, one psychologist and one lay person (see paragraph 43 above). Similarly, extensive proceedings were conducted by the County Social Welfare Board and the District Court (see paragraphs 34 and 40 above). 147. The Court further notes that, in its decision to replace X’s foster care with adoption, contrary to his biological mother’s wishes, the High Court essentially relied on the following reasons: X had lived in his foster home for four and a half years; he had reacted negatively to contact with the applicant; he had become attached to his foster parents; and he was a vulnerable child in need of stability (see, in particular, paragraphs 44-50 above). Furthermore, adoption – in contrast to continued foster care – would rule out the possibility for the applicant to request X’s return to her in the future and also remove the potential for conflicts between her and the foster parents relating to differences in their cultural and religious views (see, in particular, paragraph 56 above). 148. The Court observes moreover that the High Court accepted the applicant’s view at the relevant time that continued foster care would be in X’s best interests. Thus, it appears to the Court that at the time of the impugned proceedings the applicant’s interest in avoiding adoption primarily stemmed from the final and definitive nature of the measure. Since the foster parents did not wish a so-called “open adoption”, an arrangement which included post-adoption contact visits (see paragraph 51 above), adoption would have as a consequence the loss, de facto and de jure, for the applicant of any right to future contact with her child. Moreover, the applicant’s interests in X’s foster care being continued, rather than being transformed into adoption, was due to the expressed likelihood that the latter measure would lead to her son’s religious conversion, contrary to her own wishes. 149. The Court reiterates that an adoption will as a rule entail the severance of family ties to a degree that, according to its case-law, is permissible only in very exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests (see Strand Lobben and Others, §§ 206 and 207, quoted at paragraph 145 above). That is so since it is in the very nature of adoption that no real prospects of rehabilitation or family reunification exist and that it is instead in the child’s best interests that he or she be placed permanently in a new family (ibid., § 209). Given the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake, a stricter scrutiny is necessarily called for in respect of such decisions (ibid., §§ 209 and 211). 150. Against this background, it should be emphasised that, regardless of the applicant’s acceptance during the adoption proceedings that X’s foster care could continue, and irrespective of whether the domestic authorities were justified in considering long-term foster care for X were he not to be adopted, she and her son retained a right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the Convention. The fact that the applicant did not apply for family reunification did not dispense the authorities from their general obligation to consider the best interests of X in maintaining family ties with the applicant, to preserve their personal relations and, by implication, to provide for a possibility for them to have contact with one another in so far as reasonably feasible and compatible with X’s best interests (see Strand Lobben and Others, § 207, quoted at paragraph 145 above). The foregoing is a central consideration in the Court’s examination of whether the domestic authorities provided relevant and sufficient reasons to show that the circumstances of the case were so exceptional as to justify a complete and definite severance of the ties between X and the applicant and were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests and also whether, in so deciding, they struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. 151. Moreover, the Court is fully conscious of the primordial interest of the child in the decision-making process. However, the process leading to the withdrawal of parental responsibility and consent to adoption shows that the domestic authorities did not attempt to perform a genuine balancing exercise between the interests of the child and those of his biological family, but focused on the child’s interests instead of trying to combine both sets of interests, and moreover did not seriously contemplate any possibility of the child’s retaining contact with his biological family (see, similarly, Strand Lobben and Others, cited above, § 220). In this context, the Court is not persuaded that the competent domestic authorities duly considered the potential significance of the fact that the applicant had not applied to have the care order lifted, but merely opposed adoption on the grounds that she wished to maintain a right of contact with her child (see paragraph 43 above). In this regard, given that the High Court’s decision was largely premised on an assessment of X’s attachment to his foster home, the factual basis on which it relied in making that assessment appears to disclose shortcomings in the decision-making process. 152. In this respect the Court observes that the issue of contact between the applicant and X, and especially X’s reactions to the contact sessions that had been conducted since his placement in care, played a central role in the question before the High Court. In that connection, the Court takes particular note that the decision under consideration was taken in a context where there had in fact been very little contact between the applicant and her son from the outset following his placement. On 10 December 2010, when the care order was issued, the County Social Welfare Board decided to grant the applicant contact rights for two hours, four times per year, and the District Court in its judgment of 6 September 2011 put in place a regime with contact rights for one hour, six times per year (see paragraphs 22 and 29 above). Between 2013 and the High Court’s decision, X had apparently met the applicant only twice (see paragraph 49 above). The Court considers that that sparse contact between the applicant and X after the care order was issued had provided limited evidence from which to draw clear conclusions about whether it would be in X’s best interests, as these appeared in 2015 when the impugned decision was taken, that the applicant be given no right to future contact with him (see, mutatis mutandis, Strand Lobben and Others, cited above, § 221). 153. Moreover, the Court notes that the reasons set out in the High Court’s decision focused essentially on the potential effects of removing X from his foster parents and returning him to the applicant, rather than on the grounds for terminating all contact between X and the applicant. In this respect, the High Court appears to have given more importance to the foster parents’ opposition to “open adoption” than to the applicant’s interest in the possibility of a continued family life with her child through contact with him. 154. Furthermore, the Court has reservations regarding the emphasis placed by the High Court on the need to pre-empt the applicant from resorting at some future point to legal remedies to contest the care order or the arrangements for visiting rights. Although there might indeed be instances when, owing to the particular circumstances of a case, repeated legal proceedings may harm the child concerned and must therefore be taken into account, a biological parent’s exercise of judicial remedies cannot automatically count as a factor in favour of adoption (see Strand Lobben and Others, cited above, §§ 212 and 223). The Court notes in this regard that biological parents’ procedural rights, including their right to have access to proceedings in order to have a care order lifted or restrictions on contact with their child relaxed, form an integral part of their right to respect for their family life afforded by Article 8 of the Convention (see, for example, M.L. v. Norway, cited above, § 95). 155. As to the particular aspect of the case which turns upon the applicant’s Muslim faith and her wish that X be brought up in accordance with her religious beliefs and background, it should be noted that the High Court acknowledged that the interest in ensuring X’s attachment to the foster home environment had to be balanced against other weighty considerations. The latter related not only to the fact, referred to above, that the adoptive parents had been unwilling to apply for an open adoption, but also to aspects relating to ethnicity, culture and religion, and religious conversion, particularly in the light of the differences between the applicant’s and the prospective adoptive parents’ religious faiths (see paragraph 51 above). 156. In this connection, the High Court took evidence from two expert witnesses who provided information about obstacles to adoption in Islam; one of these experts had emphasised that each case had to be assessed on the basis of the child’s needs (see paragraph 52 above). 157. Furthermore, on examining sources of international law, the High Court did not find that it could be inferred from these that the adoption of a child of a Muslim background in Norway was prohibited. The Court takes particular note of the High Court’s reliance on Article 20(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, affirming that when possible solutions, including adoption, were assessed, “due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background” (see paragraph 53 above), in other words on a standard that in substance corresponds to and is in compliance with the requirements of the Convention (see paragraphs 143 ‑ 144 above). 158. The High Court also examined how the applicant would perceive adoption in view of her religious values (see paragraph 55 above). It also commented on the choice of foster home in the case, and presumed in that context that there had been no foster parents available who had a cultural background more similar to that of the applicant. It noted that it was known that there was a serious shortage of foster parents from minority backgrounds and that, regardless of how the choice of foster home was otherwise evaluated, the initial placement had a bearing on the assessment of what was in X’s best interests at the time of its judgment (see paragraph 54 above). Furthermore, the High Court looked into what could be considered as X’s own values at the time of the possible adoption, in the light of his upbringing by his foster parents (see paragraph 55 above). It further noted that the religious differences in question could also create difficulties with regard to continuing the foster home arrangement, before it effectively concluded that decisive importance ought to be attached to how adoption would create clarity, strengthen the development of X’s identity, and make him an equal member of the family with which he lived (see paragraph 56 above). 159. The Court restates that its jurisdiction in the present instance is limited to the proceedings in 2013-2015 (see paragraphs 130-133 above). It follows that the decision in which X’s foster home was chosen in 2010 falls outside its jurisdiction. However, as it transpires from the High Court’s reasoning, referred to in the preceding paragraph, the choice of foster home made in 2010 was a relevant consideration for its 2015 assessment of the issue of deprivation of parental responsibility and authorisation for adoption, in that the initial placement had a significant bearing on what was considered to be in X’s best interests at the time of its judgment. 160. In the proceedings before the Court, the respondent Government adduced materials showing that the domestic authorities had at the time made efforts to find a foster home which matched the applicant’s interests (see paragraphs 16 to 18 above). After the care order had been issued, the applicant was informed that it had not been possible to find a Somali home (see paragraph 27 above), and in the course of her appeal against the care order, she dropped the alternative claim for X to be placed in a Somali or Muslim foster home (see paragraph 28 above). 161. The Court notes that the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention, as interpreted in the light of Article 9, could be complied with not only by ultimately finding a foster home which corresponded to her cultural and religious background. It refers to the assessments of the domestic courts of the various interests that have to be taken into account throughout the whole process in cases of this nature where the child’s best interest must remain paramount (see, in particular, paragraphs 23-26, 36-37 and 51-56 above) and to the relatively broad agreement in international law that domestic authorities in circumstances such as those in the present case are bound by an obligation of means, not one of result (see paragraphs 80 ­ -82 above). Nor can the Court question the fact that, on the basis of the information available, the actions of the authorities included efforts, which ultimately proved unsuccessful, to find a foster home for X at the outset that was more suitable from this perspective (see paragraph 17 above). However, the Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber (see paragraph 64 of the Chamber judgment) that the arrangements made thereafter as to the applicant’s ability to have regular contact with her child (see paragraph 152 above), culminating in the decision to allow for X’s adoption (see paragraphs 44-56 above) failed to take due account of the applicant’s interest in allowing X to retain at least some ties to his cultural and religious origins. 162. Having regard to all of the above considerations, the Court is not satisfied that in depriving the applicant of her parental responsibility in respect of X and authorising his adoption by the foster parents, the domestic authorities attached sufficient weight to the applicant’s right to respect for family life, in particular to the mother and child’s mutual interest in maintaining their family ties and personal relations and hence the possibility for them to maintain contact. The reasons advanced in support of the decision were not sufficient to demonstrate that the circumstances of the case were so exceptional as to justify a complete and definite severance of the ties between X and the applicant, or that the decision to that effect was motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to X’s best interests. Emphasising the gravity of the interference and the seriousness of the interests at stake, the Court also considers that the decision-making process leading to the applicant’s ties with X being definitively cut off, was not conducted in such a way as to ensure that all of her views and interests were duly taken into account. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8. APPLICATION OF ARTICLEs 41 and 46 OF THE CONVENTIONArticle 41 of the Convention Article 41 of the Convention Article 41 of the Convention 163. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” Damage 164. Before the Grand Chamber, the applicant claimed compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage but did not specify any amount. 165. The Government made no specific remarks to the claim. 166. The Court observes that the applicant did not make any claims for just satisfaction in her reply of 23 March 2017 to the Court’s letter of 9 February 2017, or in any other manner within the deadline set by the Court in that letter. Nor did she make any such claim at any other point during the ordinary proceedings before the Chamber. The Court also observes that in the applicant’s request of 17 March 2020 for revision of the Chamber’s judgment in order to include an award in respect of just satisfaction, she stated that her failure to file a claim in respect of just satisfaction had been owing only to an oversight. 167. Under Rule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Court an applicant must submit itemised particulars of all claims, together with any relevant supporting documents, within the time-limit fixed for the submission of the applicant’s observations on the merits. If the applicant fails to comply with these requirements, the Court may reject the claim in whole or in part (Rule 60 § 3). In its above letter to the applicant dated 9 February 2017, the Court drew her attention to these matters. 168. Moreover, the Court’s practice in cases referred under Article 43 of the Convention has been generally that the just satisfaction claim remains the same as that originally submitted before the Chamber, an applicant only being allowed at this stage to submit claims for costs and expenses incurred in relation to the proceedings before the Grand Chamber (see Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no. 35589/08, § 63, 30 March 2017). 169. Indeed, in Nagmetov, cited above, the Court adopted an approach to be applied in exceptional situations in order to decide on whether the Court should make an award of just satisfaction. It held that it was first necessary to ascertain that a number of prerequisites had been met, before weighing the compelling considerations in favour of making an award, in the absence of a properly made “claim” for just satisfaction. 170. In the instant case, however, the case file discloses no explicit wish from the applicant to file a claim for just satisfaction in the ordinary proceedings before the Chamber (contrast Nagmetov, cited above, § 85). Having regard to Rule 60, it therefore makes no award in respect of non-pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention. Costs and expenses 171. The applicant did claim a total of 383,906.25 Norwegian kroner (NOK), approximately 37,650 euros (EUR), for the costs and expenses incurred before the Grand Chamber. 172. The costs and expenses related to her counsel having worked for 30 hours on the request for referral to the Grand Chamber, drafting the applicant’s memorial before the Grand Chamber, and researching the case documents in that connection. Furthermore, the applicant’s counsel had worked for 35 hours on reviewing the Government’s memorial and preparing the draft for her oral pleadings before the Grand Chamber. Requesting NOK 2,500 per hour, compensation for counsel’s work thus amounted to NOK 162,500, approximately EUR 16,000. 173. Furthermore, the applicant’s costs and expenses included her adviser Mr Henriksen having worked 10 hours with research into aspects of facts, Norwegian law and the Court’s case-law, as well as doctrine, and contributing to drafting the applicant’s memorial. He had also worked for 15 hours on reviewing the Government’s memorial and reviewing and contributing to counsel’s draft for the oral pleading, and he had attended the Grand Chamber’s hearing via videoconferencing technology. Requesting NOK 2,500 per hour, compensation for Mr Henriksen’s work thus amounted to NOK 62,500, approximately EUR 6,100. 174. In addition, the applicant had engaged as advisers Mr Andenæs and Mr Bjørge, who had each spent 10 hours researching the Court’s case-law and the doctrine, and on reviewing and contributing to the draft of the applicant’s memorial before the Grand Chamber. Moreover, Mr Andenæs and Mr Bjørge had each spent 10 hours reviewing the Government’s memorial, reviewing and contributing to counsel’s draft for her oral pleadings, and attending the Court’s hearing via videoconferencing technology. Requesting NOK 2,500 per hour, compensation to Mr Andenæs and Mr Bjørge thus amounted to NOK 100,000, approximately EUR 9,800. 175. Moreover, the applicant had incurred translation expenses of NOK 27,281.25 when she filed her memorial before the Grand Chamber, and an additional NOK 10,875 before the hearing, amounting to NOK 38,156.25, approximately EUR 3,700. She had also engaged a sound technician to be present for the hearing before the Grand Chamber and the corresponding testing sessions, which amounted to NOK 8,750, approximately EUR 850. She also sought reimbursement of the expenses incurred by renting the premises from where the applicant and her counsel had participated in the Court’s hearing by way of videoconferencing technology, amounting to NOK 12,000, approximately EUR 1,200. Expenses for the applicant’s own travel and accommodation, as well as the premises for the hearing, were covered by the Council of Europe’s legal aid scheme. 176. The Government did not make any submissions in respect of the applicant’s claim for costs and expenses. 177. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 30,000 covering costs for the proceedings before the Grand Chamber. Default interest 178. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. Article 46 of the Convention 179. In her pleadings before the Grand Chamber, the applicant argued, for the first time in the course of the proceedings before the Court, that the Court should indicate individual measures under Article 46 of the Convention. Without clearly specifying what measures she envisioned, she referred in particular to the possibility of ordering a reopening of the adoption proceedings. 180. The Court reiterates that under Article 46 of the Convention the Contracting Parties have undertaken to abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case to which they are parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. It follows, inter alia, that a judgment in which the Court finds a breach of the Convention or the Protocols thereto imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress as far as possible the effects (see, among other authorities, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, § 311, 1 December 2020). 181. The Court further notes that its judgments are essentially declaratory in nature and that, in general, it is primarily for the State concerned to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used in its domestic legal order in order to discharge its obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions and spirit of the Court’s judgment. However, in certain special circumstances the Court has found it useful to indicate to a respondent State the type of measures that might be taken to put an end to the situation – often a systemic one – which has given rise to the finding of a violation (ibid., § 312). 182. As to the applicant’s request in the instant case, the Court firstly notes that in a case of this type, in general the best interests of the child must be a paramount consideration also when it is to consider indication of any individual measures to be taken under Article 46 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Haddad v. Spain, no. 16572/17, § 79, 18 June 2019; and Omorefe v. Spain, no. 69339/16, § 70, 23 June 2020). 183. The Court notes that X and his adoptive parents currently enjoy family life together, and that individual measures could ultimately entail an interference with their respect for that family life. It follows that facts and circumstances relevant to Article 46 of the Convention could raise new issues which are not addressed by the present judgment on the merits (see, mutatis mutandis, Johansen v. Norway (dec.), no. 12750/02, 10 October 2002). 184. Furthermore, although the applicant did not request any measure of a more general character, the Court observes that, in so far as there might be a certain systemic issue in question, the respondent Government have shown that they are making efforts to implement the judgments rendered by the Court concerning various types of child welfare measures in which violations of Article 8 have been found (see, for example, paragraphs 62-66 above). It also observes that the respondent State is in the process of enacting new legislation (see paragraph 67 above). 185. For the above reasons, the Court does not find that any measures are to be indicated under Article 46 of the Convention.
The Grand Chamber decided to examine the applicant’s wish to have her son brought up in line with her Muslim faith as an integral part of her complaint under Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention, as interpreted and applied in the light of Article 9 (freedom of religion) of the Convention. In the present case, it held that there had been a violation of Article 8. The Court pointed out, in particular, that various interests had been taken into account when placing the applicant’s son in care, not just whether the foster home would correspond to the mother’s cultural and religious background, and that that had complied with her rights. However, the ensuing contact arrangements between mother and son, which had been very limited and had culminated in adoption, had failed to take account of the mother’s interest in allowing her son to retain at least some ties to his cultural and religious origins. Indeed, there had been shortcomings in the overall decision-making process leading to the adoption, which had not given sufficient weight to the mother and child’s mutual interest in maintaining ties.