Conditions of detention and domestic remedies
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 62. According to Article 51 §§ 2 and 3 of the Penitentiary Code, a prisoner’s correspondence may be controlled if this is required by reasons of security or if there is a risk of commission of especially serious crimes or a need to establish whether such crimes have been committed. THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 63. The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in Koridallos Prison amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. Before the Court his complaints focus on the conditions in the segregation unit of the Delta wing of the prison. The applicant relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which is worded as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 64. The applicant submitted that he never asked to be placed in the segregation unit. The prison administration decided to put him there on his arrival in Koridallos Prison. One week later, he was given the possibility of going to the Delta wing proper but he did not agree because he wanted to keep away from drugs. The applicant alleged that the conditions in the segregation unit had not improved significantly between his detention there and the delegates’ visit. He complained in particular that he had to spend a considerable part of each day confined to his bed in a cell with no ventilation and no window. He further complained that the prison administration did not provide inmates with sheets, pillows, toilet paper and toiletries. Although indigent prisoners like the applicant could address themselves to the prison’s welfare office, it was admitted that their needs could not always be met. The fact that he could have obtained toiletries and toilet paper from his co-detainees does not absolve the respondent State from responsibility under the Convention. The applicant submitted that he ended up sleeping on a blanket with no sheets or pillow during the hottest period of the year. He also complained that he had to use the toilet in the presence of another inmate and be present while the toilet was being used by his cell-mate. The applicant claimed that he felt humiliated and distressed and that the conditions of his detention had had adverse physical and mental effects on him. 65. The Government first submitted that the applicant asked to be detained in the segregation unit. The prison authorities wanted to satisfy his request. However, because there were no cells available, he had to share a cell with another inmate. As a result, the problem with the toilet arose. The applicant could have moved to another part of the prison at any time if he so wished. It appears that the applicant never asked for such a transfer because, in the meantime, he had developed a friendly relationship with his cell-mate, Mr Papadimitriou. The special character of their relationship is also shown by the fact that they continued sharing a cell when they were both moved to the Alpha wing two months after the applicant’s arrest. 66. Moreover, the Government disputed that the treatment complained of had attained the minimum level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3. They stressed that the conditions of detention complained of in no way denoted contempt or lack of respect for the applicant as a person. On the contrary, the prison authorities tried to alleviate the situation by allowing the applicant extra telephone calls. The applicant himself accepted that he was never left dirty while in the segregation unit. He could take a shower and had frequent contact with the prison psychiatrist. According to the Government, there was no evidence that the conditions of his detention had caused the applicant injury or any physical or mental suffering. 67. The Court recalls that, according to its case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, § 162). 68. Furthermore, in considering whether a treatment is “degrading” within the meaning of Article 3, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3 (see Raninen v. Finland, judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1997 ‑ VIII, pp. 2821-22, § 55). 69. As regards the present case, the Court notes in the first place that, contrary to what the Government argue, the applicant was not placed in the segregation unit because he had so wanted himself. According to the testimony of Ms Fragathula, this was a measure decided by the prison governor and the chief warden and related to the applicant’s medical condition, more specifically to the fact that he had been suffering from withdrawal symptoms. According to the same witness, once the applicant became acquainted with the conditions of detention in the segregation unit, he asked for a transfer. He was then offered the possibility of going to the Delta wing, where drug addicts were being detained. Although Ms Fragathula would not expressly admit that there were drugs in the Delta wing, she stated that the “wing was problematic for someone who wanted to free himself from drugs”. The Court considers that this implies that there were drugs illegally circulating in the Delta wing, a cause for serious concern. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant cannot be blamed for refusing to be moved from the segregation unit. The Court, therefore, considers that the applicant did not in any way consent to being detained in the segregation unit of the Delta wing. 70. Concerning the conditions of detention in the segregation unit, the Court has had regard to the Commission’s delegates’ findings and especially their findings concerning the size, lighting and ventilation of the applicant’s cell, that is, elements which would not have changed between the time of the applicant’s detention there and the delegates’ visit. As regards ventilation, the Court notes that the delegates’ findings do not correspond fully with those of the CPT, which visited Koridallos Prison in 1993 and submitted its report in 1994. However, the CPT’s inspection took place in March, whereas the delegates went to Koridallos Prison in June, a period of the year when the climatic conditions are closer to those of the period of which the applicant complains. Furthermore, the Court takes into account the fact that the delegates investigated the applicant’s complaints in depth, giving special attention, during their inspection, to the conditions in the very place where the applicant had been detained. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the findings of the Commission’s delegates are reliable. 71. The Court notes that the applicant accepts that the cell door was open during the day, when he could circulate freely in the segregation unit. Although the unit and its exercise yard were small, the limited possibility of movement enjoyed by the applicant must have given him some form of relief. 72. Nevertheless, the Court recalls that the applicant had to spend at least part of the evening and the entire night in his cell. Although the cell was designed for one person, the applicant had to share it with another inmate. This is one aspect in which the applicant’s situation differed from the situation reviewed by the CPT in its 1994 report. Sharing the cell with another inmate meant that, for the best part of the period when the cell door was locked, the applicant was confined to his bed. Moreover, there was no ventilation in the cell, there being no opening other than a peephole in the door. The Court also notes that, during their visit to Koridallos, the delegates found that the cells in the segregation unit were exceedingly hot, although it was only June, a month when temperatures do not normally reach their peak in Greece. It is true that the delegates’ visit took place in the afternoon, when the applicant would not normally be locked up in his cell. However, the Court recalls that the applicant was placed in the segregation unit during a period of the year when temperatures have the tendency to rise considerably in Greece, even in the evening and often at night. This was confirmed by Mr Papadimitriou, an inmate who shared the cell with the applicant and who testified that the latter was significantly physically affected by the heat and the lack of ventilation in the cell. 73. The Court also recalls that in the evening and at night when the cell door was locked the applicant had to use the Asian-type toilet in his cell. The toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell by a screen and the applicant was not the cell’s only occupant. 74. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that in the present case there is no evidence that there was a positive intention of humiliating or debasing the applicant. However, the Court notes that, although the question whether the purpose of the treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of violation of Article 3 (see V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, § 71, ECHR 1999-IX). 75. Indeed, in the present case, the fact remains that the competent authorities took no steps to improve the objectively unacceptable conditions of the applicant’s detention. In the Court’s view, this omission denotes lack of respect for the applicant. The Court takes into account, in particular, that, for at least two months, the applicant had to spend a considerable part of each 24-hour period practically confined to his bed in a cell with no ventilation and no window, which would at times become unbearably hot. He also had to use the toilet in the presence of another inmate and be present while the toilet was being used by his cell-mate. The Court is not convinced by the Government’s allegation that these conditions did not affect the applicant in a manner incompatible with Article 3. On the contrary, the Court is of the opinion that the prison conditions complained of diminished the applicant’s human dignity and aroused in him feelings of anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him and possibly breaking his physical or moral resistance. In sum, the Court considers that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the segregation unit of the Delta wing of Koridallos Prison amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. There has thus been a breach of this provision. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 2 OF THE CONVENTION 76. The applicant complained that, despite the fact that he was a remand prisoner, he was subjected to the same regime as convicts. He argued that the failure of the Koridallos Prison authorities to provide for a special regime for remand prisoners amounts to a violation of the presumption of innocence. He relied on Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” 77. The Government submitted that Article 6 § 2 could not be interpreted in this manner. 78. The Court recalls that the Convention contains no Article providing for separate treatment for convicted and accused persons in prisons. It cannot be said that Article 6 § 2 has been violated on the grounds adduced by the applicant. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 79. The applicant complained that letters sent to him by the Commission’s Secretariat were opened by the Koridallos Prison administration and not always in his presence. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which provides as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 80. The Government submitted that letters addressed to prisoners are always opened in front of them because this is required by law and is necessary to prevent criminal offences, such as the smuggling of drugs into the prison. Letters addressed to prisoners by the Convention organs cannot be exempted because the Commission’s or the Court’s envelopes can be forged by criminals. 81. The Court considers that it has not been established that letters from the Commission to the applicant were opened in his absence. However, the Government accept that letters from the Convention organs are always opened in front of the prisoner concerned. It follows that the letters that the Commission addressed to the applicant were also opened. There was, therefore, an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his correspondence under Article 8 of the Convention which can be justified only if the conditions of the second paragraph of the provision are met. 82. In particular, if it is not to contravene Article 8 § 2, such interference must be “in accordance with the law”, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve that aim (see Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, p. 32 § 84, and Petra v. Romania, judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VII, p. 2853, § 36). 83. The interference had a legal basis, namely Article 51 §§ 2 and 3 of the Penitentiary Code, and the Court is satisfied that it pursued the legitimate aim of “the prevention of disorder or crime”. 84. As regards the necessity of the interference, the Court finds no compelling reasons for the monitoring of the relevant correspondence, whose confidentiality it was important to respect (see Campbell v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1992, Series A no. 233, p. 22, § 62). Although the Government have alluded in general to the possibility of the Commission’s envelopes being forged in order to smuggle prohibited material into the prison, the Court considers, as the Convention organs have done on previous occasions, that this risk is so negligible that it must be discounted (ibid.). Accordingly, the interference complained of was not necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 § 2. There has consequently been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 85. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 86. The applicant claimed 42,000,000 drachmas (GRD) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He maintained that the violations of the Convention in his case, which had entailed serious intrusion into his physical and mental integrity, had caused him to suffer a substantial degree of anxiety and distress. 87. The Government considered that the finding of a violation of the Convention would constitute adequate satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. In any event, the Government considered that the amount claimed was too high and that a sum of GRD 2,000,000 would be reasonable. 88. The Court, bearing in mind its findings above with regard to the applicant’s complaints, considers that he suffered some non-pecuniary damage as a result of his detention which cannot be compensated solely by the finding of a violation. Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant GRD 5,000,000 under this head. B. Default interest 89. According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of interest applicable in Greece at the date of adoption of the present judgment is 6% per annum.
The European Court of Human Rights held that there had been a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights, finding that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the segregation unit of the Delta wing of the Koridallos prison had amounted to degrading treatment. It took particularly into account that, for at least two months, the applicant had to spend a considerable part of each 24-hour period practically confined to his bed in a cell, with no ventilation and no window, which would at times become unbearably hot. He also had to use the toilet in the presence of another inmate and be present while the toilet was being used by his cellmate. The Court was of the opinion that the prison conditions complained of had diminished the applicant’s human dignity and given rise in him to feelings of anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him and possibly breaking his physical or moral resistance.