Police brutality
THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION 36. The applicant complained that he had been subjected to treatment prohibited under Article 3 of the Convention and that his allegations to that effect had not been properly investigated, contrary to the requirements of that provision and Article 13 of the Convention. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 13 provides that: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” A. Admissibility 37. As to the Article 3 complaints, the Government objected that the applicant had failed to meet the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, in that he had not properly pursued his assertions at the domestic level and had failed to claim damages from the State under the Police Corps Act and the State Liability Act in relation to the treatment suffered at hands of State agents. Consequently, they considered the Article 13 complaint manifestly ill-founded. 38. The applicant disagreed. 39. The Court considers that, on the specific facts of the present case, the Government ’ s non-exhaustion objection in relation to the applicant ’ s Article 3 complaints raises issues which are closely related to the merits of these complaints and the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. 40. Accordingly, the Court finds that the complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention should be examined together and that the Government ’ s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies should be joined to the merits of the Article 3 complaints. 41. Other than that, the Court notes that the relevant part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. Substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention (a) Parties ’ arguments 42. The applicant alleged that he had been beaten, denied food and water, subjected to psychological pressure and racially discriminated against during his detention on 18 and 19 December 2010. 43. The Government contested the applicant ’ s allegations as to the extent of his injury, the conditions of his detention and the treatment to which he had been subjected while detained. In particular, they pointed out that, on the evidence available, the applicant had only had a swollen and bruised left cheek, which he had attributed to a slap in the face (see paragraph 2 3 above ), which was in contradiction of his allegations at the domestic level ( see, for example, paragraph 2 6 above ). In the Government ’ s submission, the applicant ’ s injury was caused by the measures used to overcome his resistance during his arrest, which measures had been lawful and legitimate. Moreover, the Government considered it incongruous on the one hand, that the applicant would have been beaten with a view to pressing him into confessing, as he alleged, and on the other hand, that having not confessed, his version would have been promptly accepted by the investigator. The Government also contended that the officers at the county police station would not have had any reason to pressure him into confessing since shortly after his arrest it had become clear that the case fell outside the jurisdiction of the police and within the jurisdiction of the investigating authorities. Therefore, the police officers had merely held the applicant in custody and had played no role in the investigation of the case. In addition, the Government submitted that, contrary to his allegations, the applicant had been served dinner on 19 December 2010, although it was not possible to establish whether he had been served any breakfast and lunch on that day. In their submission, he had had access to drinking water on both 18 and 19 December 2010 ( see paragraphs 1 1 and 1 6 above). The Government acknowledged that, in view of the lapse of time, it was not possible to establish at what time on 18 December 2010 the applicant ’ s legal guardians had been notified of his arrest but it was known that his mother had been present during his questioning before the investigator on 19 December 2010. The Government submitted that the applicant, who was a healthy young man, had been detained for less than twenty-four hours and, on his release, had a swollen cheek with no lasting consequences on his health. In their view, the applicant ’ s treatment had not attained the minimum level of severity to fall within the purview of Article 3 of the Convention. 44. In reply, the applicant disagreed and reiterated his complaints. In particular, he resolutely denied any resistance to his arrest, the use by the police of any measures of restraint and, accordingly, any injury resulting from the use of any such measures. In his view, the reports on the use and the lawfulness of the use of measures of restraint during his arrest had been fabricated later to provide an explanation for his injuries. In addition, the applicant contended that the measures allegedly used against him for “holding and grabbing ” him did not normally leave marks such as those observed on his cheek by a doctor. Moreover, the applicant pointed out that he had been served dinner the day following the day of his arrest whereas the applicable rules required food to be served to any person detained for more than six hours. Emphasising that he was of Romani origin and that he had still been a minor at the time of his detention, the applicant considered that he had shown beyond all reasonable doubt that he had been subjected to treatment reaching the threshold required for a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. (b) The Court ’ s assessment 45. The Court has recently summarised the applicable case-law principles in its judgment in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no. 23380/09, §§ 81 ‑ 90, ECHR 2015). 46. The core of the present case appears to be the applicant ’ s allegation that, while at the county police station, and in combination with other factors, he was slapped in the face by the police officers questioning him. 47. The Court reiterates that such treatment has been found to fall within the ambit of Article 3 (see Bouyid, cited above, §§ 100-12). It remains open, however, on the facts of the present case, whether the applicant was in fact slapped in the face in the circumstances he alleges. 48. There is no dispute between the parties that the applicant was detained and that shortly after his release he was found by a doctor to have a slightly swollen cheek. At the same time, there is no indication that he had had a swollen cheek before his arrest. Nor has it been alleged or otherwise indicated that the swollen cheek was self ‑ inflicted or that the ill-treatment causing his swollen cheek was inflicted between his release and his examination by a doctor. 49. It can therefore be concluded that the applicant ’ s swollen cheek was the result of measures taken against him by agents of the State between his arrest and release. 50. The contention between the parties is as to precisely how the applicant ’ s condition came about. The Government on their part cited as the cause of his injury the measures used by the police for “ holding and grabbing ” him in order to overcome his resistance to arrest. The applicant, on the other hand, resolutely denied any such proposition and insisted that the police officers had deliberately slapped him in the face during his questioning. 51. The Court observes that the controversy between the parties as to the cause of the applicant ’ s swollen cheek arose already at national level and that it continues before it with reference to certain arguments or pieces of evidence that do not appear to have been advanced and addressed expressly at the domestic level. It finds that, as such, the matter appears to fall primarily to be examined under the procedural head of Article 3 of the Convention. 52. At any rate, the Court reiterates that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact where this is not made unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883/95, 4 April 2000). 53. In assessing the credibility of the applicant ’ s factual assertions, the Court finds it appropriate to scrutinise first of all the existing medical evidence concerning the applicant ’ s condition following his release from custody. The medical report of 19 December 2010 summarises his allegations as to the cause of his condition so that “he had been beaten by police officers the day before” and that he “had received a slap on the right cheek”. In terms of findings, the doctor observed that there was no haematoma, that the cheek was bruised, sensitive and slightly swollen, and that the injury was slight, with recovery time below seven days (see paragraph 23 above). 54. The Court observes in particular that the doctor ’ s findings do not contain any further details as to the location, size and shape of the applicant ’ s injury and contain no elements, such as a state of shock (see, a contrario, Bouyid, cited above, §§ 12 and 93), fatigue, dehydration or anything else to corroborate his allegations. 55. Moreover, they contain nothing as regards the cause of the applicant ’ s injury. In particular, the Court notes that there is no indication in the doctor ’ s conclusions or otherwise that it could only have been caused by a slap in the face as alleged by the applicant or, conversely, that it could not have been caused by the means referred to by the Government. 56. In addition, the Court cannot but note certain inconsistencies in the applicant ’ s submissions as noted by the doctor and made to the domestic authorities and before the Court. In particular, the medical report indicates that the applicant alleged that he had received a slap on the “right half of a cheek”, while the doctor ’ s finding of a bruise refers to a “cheek on the left”. Moreover, the applicant ’ s allegation that he had been beaten for three hours in the face and on the head, as a result of which he had bruises (see paragraph 26 above ), and that he was slapped and punched in the head (see paragraphs 11 and 22 above) is contradicted by his allegations as recorded by his doctor that he had been slapped in the face and the finding of that doctor that there were no haematoma (see paragraph 23 above). 57. The Court further notes that the Government have furnished an alternative explanation for the applicant ’ s condition and have submitted documentary evidence for a part of their explanation, in particular as to the alleged use of physical force to overcome the applicant ’ s alleged resistance during his arrest. The applicant, for his part, disputed the Government ’ s version and submitted that the reports on the use and the lawfulness of the use of measures of restraint during his arrest had been fabricated later to provide an explanation for his injuries. In that regard, however, the Court notes that the documentation produced by the Government appears to be detailed and systematic while the applicant ’ s contention has been general in terms and without any evidence in its support. 58. Furthermore, the Court observes that, although the applicant ’ s alleged ill-treatment took place during his detention between 18 and 19 December 2016, he lodged an official complaint in that respect only after seventeen days, on 5 January 2011. In so far as he alleged that complaints on his behalf had been made earlier by his mother, the Court observes that he has offered nothing to support such allegations and that the Government ’ s claim that there is no trace of any such complaints has gone unanswered by the applicant. In addition, the Court notes that the applicant has produced no other elements to support his version of the impugned events such as, for example, a statement from his co-accused. 59. Thus, in view of all the circumstances, the Court considers that the explanation offered by the Government of the events underlying the applicant ’ s allegations is a plausible. Accordingly, it finds that it has not been established that the applicant was actually exposed to slapping in the face during his preliminary questioning at the county police station. 60. It therefore cannot be concluded that the applicant was exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. This finding is not altered by other aspects of the case, which the Court finds auxiliary to the principal aspect set out above and which have either not been established on the facts (denial of liquid, psychological pressure) or did not attain the requisite threshold for the legal protection under Article 3 of the Convention to be engaged (to some extent denial of food). 61. As to the alleged discriminatory nature of the applicant ’ s treatment, the Court notes that it was complained of in very vague and general terms. It considers that, given the specific circumstances of the present case, such allegations may be of relevance under the procedural head of Article 3 of the Convention rather than under its substantive head. 62. In these circumstances, the there is no need to determine the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies attached to the merits of the complaint under the substantive head of Article 3. This concerns in particular the possibility of claiming damages from the State under the Police Corps Act and the State Liability Act. 63. In sum, there has been no violation of the substantive head of Article 3 of the Convention in the present case. 2. Procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention (a) Parties ’ arguments 64. The applicant complained that the authorities concerned had failed to carry out on their own initiative an effective, independent and prompt investigation into his credible assertion that he had been subjected to treatment that was incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention. 65. By way of reply, the Government objected that the applicant had failed to pursue his Article 3 complaints properly, in particular by raising them during his questioning on 19 December 2010 and in his interlocutory appeal of 21 December 2010 against his charges. Likewise, no mention of any ill ‑ treatment had been made by his mother when she appeared before the investigator on 20 December 2010. 66. In addition, the Government recapitulated the course of the investigation into the applicant ’ s criminal complaint. They pointed out that he had officially complained of ill-treatment for the first time two weeks after his release. The ensuing investigation had involved the examination of the entire case-file concerning the robbery of which he had then stood accused, the police records pertaining to his detention, medical reports, and oral evidence from all those concerned. In addition, the applicant ’ s allegations had not only been examined by the CIS but also, following his interlocutory appeals, by three levels of the PPS. The former was structurally and hierarchically separate from the Police Corps and was directly answerable to the Minister of the Interior, while the latter was a separate structure responsible for, inter alia, supervision of the investigation authorities. In sum, the Government considered that the impugned investigation had been extensive, prompt, effective and independent. In the course of it, the authorities had properly examined all of the applicant ’ s arguments. 67. The applicant disagreed and reiterated his complaints. In particular, he contended that his allegation of having been submitted to treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention had been credible, inter alia, in view of the fact that he had been detained at the county police station in an irregular fashion for thirteen hours, and the ensuing investigation into his allegation had been neither effective nor institutionally independent. In addition, he submitted that he had had asserted his rights by lodging a criminal complaint and by pursuing the remedy available in that respect and emphasised that the authorities had failed to pursue the investigation on their own initiative, despite his mother having complained about his ill ‑ treatment in person to the head of the county police station and by telephone to the CIS. 68. In a further reply, the Government submitted that the only persons authorised to receive complaints in matters such as those obtaining in the present case were the heads of the county police and of the district police. Neither of them had had any records or recollections of having received a complaint from the applicant ’ s mother, and there had been no mention of a visit or any communication from her in the respective police records (see paragraph 2 1 above). In addition, relying on the findings of the Constitutional Court in its decision of 10 April 2012 (see paragraph 3 1 above), the Government contended that the applicant had had no legal right to have a third person criminally prosecuted. His right to lodge a criminal complaint had merely implied that he had the right “to have the complaint dealt with by a body authorised to do so”, and it had been treated accordingly. (b) The Court ’ s assessment ( i) Whether the allegation of treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention was credible 69. The Court reiterates that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State ’ s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see, for example, El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09, § 182, ECHR 2012, with further references). The next stage in the Court ’ s analysis of the applicant ’ s complaint is an assessment of whether his allegations of ill ‑ treatment at the national level can be considered as credible. 70. To that end, the Court observes that, according to the applicant, his grievances were first raised at the domestic level by his mother in the days following his release and that the authorities failed to act upon them proactively. However, as submitted by the Government and not opposed by the applicant, there appears to be no record of any such submissions having been made by his mother. In addition, the Court notes that the applicant himself has not substantiated his allegations that a complaint was lodged on his behalf by his mother. In these circumstances, the Court cannot but conclude that the applicant ’ s allegations that a complaint was made by his mother and not acted upon by the authorities have not been made out. 71. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that an official complaint was made on the applicant ’ s behalf on 5 January 2011. In it, those allegedly responsible for his treatment were identified in some detail, the nature of the treatment allegedly inflicted on him was described, and a medical certificate attesting to his condition was submitted in evidence. The Court is of the opinion that, in assessing the credibility of the applicant ’ s allegations, it must take into account that the applicant was a minor and that there were misgivings as to the regularity of his detention and as to whether his legal guardians had properly been notified of his custody, especially as all of those factors must have been known to the authorities at the relevant time. 72. All in all, the Court has no difficulty in accepting that the applicant ’ s allegations of ill-treatment contrary to the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention were sufficiently credible to give rise to an obligation on the part of the authorities to investigate them in compliance with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. This conclusion is independent of whether or not the alleged ill-treatment has ultimately been made out before the Court because, in the event of ill-treatment of a person deprived of liberty at the hands of his or her captors, it is precisely the lack of a proper investigation that often makes the ill-treatment impossible to prove. ( ii) Whether the investigation was compatible with Article 3 of the Convention 73. The Court has summarised the applicable general principles in its Bouyid judgment (cited above, §§ 114-23) as follows: - The essential purpose of an investigation required for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws prohibiting torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in cases involving State agents or bodies, and to ensure their accountability for ill-treatment occurring under their responsibility. - Generally speaking, for an investigation to be effective, the institutions and persons responsible for carrying it out must be independent from those targeted by it. This means not only a lack of any hierarchical or institutional connection but also practical independence. - Whatever mode is employed, the authorities must act of their own motion. In addition, in order to be effective the investigation must be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. It should also be broad enough to permit the investigating authorities to take into consideration not only the actions of the State agents who directly used force but also all the surrounding circumstances. - Although this is not an obligation of results to be achieved but of means to be employed, any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of the required standard of effectiveness. - A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. While there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by the authorities in investigating allegations of ill-treatment may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts. - The victim should be able to participate effectively in the investigation. - Lastly, the investigation must be thorough, which means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation. 74. On the facts of the present case, in response to the applicant ’ s criminal complaint, the authorities interviewed him and his associates, as well as the investigator and the two police officers under suspicion. In addition, they examined the case file concerning the investigation into the alleged robbery and other documentary material. 75. Although the applicant ’ s interlocutory appeals against the decision to dismiss his criminal complaint and his constitutional complaint in this matter were subsequently examined by the PPS at three levels and ultimately by the Constitutional Court, there is no indication that any additional evidence was taken and examined at those levels or that those examinations constituted more than a review and ultimate endorsement of the position taken by the CIS. 76. The authorities ’ reasoning as regards the part of the applicant ’ s complaint concerning the alleged beating at the police station may be summarised as follows: the applicant had not raised any complaint of ill ‑ treatment in his interview with the investigator on 19 December 2010 or in his interlocutory appeal against his charge; his allegations of sustained beating did not correspond to his submission to the doctor or to the latter ’ s findings in the medical report of 19 December 2010; there was no indication of any ill-treatment in the investigation file concerning the alleged robbery, and the applicant ’ s injury could have been inflicted in the course of his arrest; and the police officers in question would not have had a motive for beating him into confessing as they were not investigating the alleged robbery but were merely guarding him. 77. As regards those findings, the Court observes at the outset that, rather than investigating the applicant ’ s allegations on their own initiative, the authorities appear to have shifted the burden of pursuing his claims to him. In particular, one of the reasons why the applicant ’ s criminal complaint in relation to the alleged beating at the police station was dismissed was that he had failed to raise that complaint before in his interview with the investigator (see paragraph 26 above). Moreover, they did so retrospectively, referring the applicant to the proceedings against him, without there being any apparent logic for such a proposed course of action. By a similar token, the Court finds it difficult to follow the argument that no mention of any ill-treatment of the applicant was found in the investigation file concerning the robbery imputed to him at that time. 78. As to the Government ’ s contention, made in reliance on these findings, that the applicant failed to pursue his Article 3 claims properly, the Court notes that it appears directly to contradict an essential attribute of the protection under the Convention in relation to credible assertions of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention that the authorities must act of their own motion. The applicant undoubtedly submitted his claims to the authorities in his criminal complaint of 5 January 2011 and he lodged and pursued all the way to the Constitutional Court any remedy available to him along that avenue. 79. The Court further notes that no steps appear to have been taken with a view to eliminating the inconsistencies in the versions as to the cause of the applicant ’ s swollen cheek. The authorities could have taken measures to examine the other person who, in the applicant ’ s submission, had been present at the county police station during his questioning; cross-examined the officers involved, whom the applicant could not identify but considered that he would be able to recognise; held a face-to-face interview with the applicant and those officers; and questioned the doctor who had treated the applicant shortly after his release. 80. In addition, the Court notes that the remaining part of the applicant ’ s criminal complaint, namely that concerned with the alleged failure to notify his legal guardians of his arrest and detention, to provide him with food and water during his detention, and to hear him immediately after his arrest, was dismissed without any explanation at all, the district police limiting themselves to concluding that, “in the investigation of the given matter, no error was committed by the investigative organs”. The Court also notes that the relevant part of the applicant ’ s subsequent constitutional complaint appears to have been completely overlooked by the Constitutional Court. 81. The Court considers that these elements, coupled with the sensitive nature of the situation related to Roma in Slovakia at the relevant time (see paragraph 32 above and Koky and Others, cited above, § 239 ), are sufficient for it to conclude that the authorities have not done all that could have been reasonably expected of them to investigate the applicant ’ s allegations of ill ‑ treatment and, as the case may be, to draw consequences. 82. In view of the above findings, the Court dismisses the relevant part of the Government ’ s non-exhaustion objection and concludes that there has been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention. 83. At the same time, in view of this conclusion, it does not find it necessary to examine on the merits the remaining aspects of the applicant ’ s complaints under the procedural limb of Article 3 or his complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION 84. Lastly, relying on Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained that his ethnic origin had been a decisive factor in the ill - treatment he had suffered during his detention, as well as in the failure of the authorities to conduct a proper investigation into it. Article 14 of the Convention provides that: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” 85. In support of his complaint, the applicant referred to various international reports and other texts, and submitted that discrimination against Roma in Slovakia was pervasive in all aspects of their lives and included attacks by police officers and the general population against Roma and a lack of investigation into such attacks. 86. In reply, the Government objected that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and considered that, in any event, the complaint was manifestly ill ‑ founded. They supported the first part of their submission by reasoning similar to that advanced in respect of their non-exhaustion objection in relation to the applicant ’ s Article 3 complaints. As to the remainder of their submission, they considered that there was no indication that the applicant had been in a worse situation than anybody else on account of his origin. In the absence of any such indication, there had been no reason for the authorities to examine separately possible racist motives on the part of the police officers involved in the applicant ’ s case. 87. The applicant responded by submitting that his racial origin had been a decisive factor in the treatment he had received during his detention and in the subsequent investigation into it. In his view, the authorities had had at their disposal indications that a racist motive could have played a role in his treatment and it had been up to them to unmask it and produce evidence in that regard, which in his view they had failed to do. 88. In a further reply, the Government emphasised that the applicant and his associates had been arrested after the victim of the robbery had identified them as having been involved in it, that their detention had had to do exclusively with their prosecution for the robbery, and that they had all been released immediately after the necessary depositions had been taken by the investigator. That entire process had been strictly free of any racist motives. 89. The Court observes first of all that the Government have raised an objection under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. It considers, however, that it is not necessary to make a separate ruling on it because the complaint is in any event inadmissible on other grounds, as laid out below. 90. The Court ’ s case-law on Article 14 establishes that discrimination means treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations. Racist violence is a particular affront to human dignity and, in view of its perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction. It is for this reason that the authorities must use all available means to combat racism and racist violence, thereby reinforcing democracy ’ s vision of a society in which diversity is not perceived as a threat but as a source of its enrichment (see Stoica v. Romania, no. 42722/02, § 117, 4 March 2008, with further references). 91. The Court also reiterates that, in certain cases of alleged discrimination, it may require the respondent Government to disprove an arguable allegation of discrimination and, if they fail to do so, find a violation of Article 14 of the Convention on that basis (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 157, ECHR 2005 ‑ VII). 92. Returning to the facts of the present case, the applicant submitted in his interlocutory appeal against the decision of 9 March 2011 that a “ racist motive was not excluded”. In that submission, he invoked Article 3 of the Convention, but not Article 14 or its domestic equivalents. Thereafter, the applicant complained of discrimination in his constitutional complaint, referring to his Romani origin and submitting that there had been many known incidents of police violence against the Roma in the course of arrest and detention in Slovakia. His discrimination complaint before the Court is couched in similar terms. 93. The Court is aware of the seriousness of the applicant ’ s allegations and, as it has already noted above (see paragraph 32 ), of the sensitive nature of the situation related to Roma in Slovakia at the relevant time. However, when exercising its jurisdiction under Article 34 of the Convention, it has to confine itself, as far as possible, to the examination of the concrete case before it. Its task is not to review domestic law and practice in abstracto, but to determine whether the manner in which they were applied to or affected the applicant gave rise to a violation of the Convention ( see DRAFT – OVA a.s. v. Slovakia, no. 72493/10, § 65, 9 June 2015, with further references ). 94. From that perspective, the Court notes the vagueness and general nature of the applicant ’ s allegations, both domestically and before this Court. It observes in particular that they comprise no individual elements imputable to the officers involved in the applicant ’ s case or in any other way linked to its specific circumstances. The Court is of the view that, therefore, the present case must be distinguished from those in which the burden of proof as regards the presence or absence of a racist motive on the part of the authorities in an Article 3 context has been shifted to the respondent Government (contrast Makhashevy v. Russia, no. 20546/07, § § 176-79, 31 July 2012; Stoica, cited above, §§ 128-32; and Nachova and Others, cited above, §§ 163-66). Thus, the authorities cannot be said to have had before them information that was sufficient to bring into play their obligation to investigate on their own initiative possible racist motives on the part of the officers involved ( see Mižigárová, cited above, § § 122 and 123 ). 95. In sum, the Court finds that the applicant has failed to make a prima facie case that his treatment during his detention and the subsequent investigation into it was discriminatory. It follows that the remainder of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 96. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 97. The applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage. 98. The Government contested the claim for being overstated. 99. The Court accepts that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage. Having regard to all the circumstances, it awards him EUR 1, 500, plus any tax that may be chargeable, under that head. B. Costs and expenses 100. The applicant also claimed EUR 648.28 for legal fees incurred before the domestic authorities, EUR 4,600 for legal fees incurred before the Court, and EUR 322 for administrative expenses incurred both domestically and before the Court. In support of this claim, he submitted a conditional fee agreement with his lawyer and a pro-forma invoice from her itemising the fees and expenses incurred. 101. The Government requested that the claim be determined in accordance with the Court ’ s case-law. 102. According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In addition, the Court has found that conditional fee agreements may show, if they are legally enforceable, that the sums claimed are actually payable by the applicant and that it must, as always, assess whether they were reasonably incurred ( see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § § 54 and 55, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI, with further references ). 103. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 3,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, covering costs under all heads. C. Default interest 104. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) of the Convention as concerned the applicant’s allegation of having been slapped in police custody, and that there had been a violation of Article 3 as concerned his complaint about the inadequate investigation into his allegation of  ill-treatment. As concerned the merits of the applicant’s allegation that he had been slapped by the police officers who had questioned him, the Court noted several elements casting doubt on his submissions and considered it plausible, as advanced by the Slovakian Government, that his injury – a swollen cheek – could have been caused while resisting arrest (as documented). However, as to the investigation into the alleged slapping, rather than investigating the applicant’s allegations on their own initiative, the authorities seemed to have shifted the burden of pursuing his claims to the applicant himself. Nor had the authorities apparently taken any steps to eliminate the inconsistencies in the different versions as to the cause of the applicant’s swollen cheek, to question or cross-examine certain witnesses, including the accused police officers and the doctor who had treated the applicant on his release, or to hold a face-to-face interview between him and those officers. Indeed, bearing in mind the sensitive nature of the situation concerning Roma in Slovakia at the time, the Court concluded that the authorities had not done all that could have been reasonably expected of them to investigate the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment.