A Theory of External Wars and European Parliaments
Brenton Kenkel|Jack Paine
Abstract The development of parliamentary constraints on the executive was critical in Western European political history. Previous scholarship identifies external wars as a key factor, but with varying effects. Sometimes, willing monarchs granted rights return for revenues to fight wars. Yet at other times, war threats empowered rulers over elites or caused states fragment. We analyze formal model understand how can either stimulate undermine prospects contractual relationship between ruler and elite actors. recover standard intuition that make more grant revenue. Our insight is also affect bargaining position elites. A previously unrecognized tension yields our new findings: stronger outsider increase pressure fund accept constraints—but not both simultaneously. Elites immobile wealth depend security. War undercut their credibility refuse funding an unconstrained ruler. By contrast, mobile viable exit option unwilling hopeless effort. Only under circumscribed conditions do align three needed parliament arise equilibrium: willingness, credibility, willingness. apply theory posit strategic foundations waves reversals historical parliaments.
International Organization