Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference
Alexander Cooley
Pre-Ottoman and OttomanJANE BURBANK FREDRICK COOPER, Empires in World History: Power the Politics of Difference. (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2010), Pp. 528, $ 24.95 paperREVIEWED BY ALEXANDER COOLEY, Department Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, NY; email: acooley@barnard.eduJane Burbank Frederick Cooper York have authored an extraordinary compelling account comparative imperial governance interactions. Rather than produce a definitive or comprehensive major global empires, History focuses with great care precision on identifying internal process rule, administration, identity formation, bargaining, political legitimation strategies that made empires such durable recurring forms organization throughout world history.From outset, authors distance themselves from explicitly normative understanding dynamics, opting instead for analytical study bureaucratic rule. This move alone makes book as valuable to sociologists scientists interested organizational though historians might complain much cultural nuance context is lost through these simplifying choices. Yet, theoretical approach clearly pays off sheer scope book's inquiry explanatory power its insights.Moreover, de-emphasizing empire category does not lessen importance work how particular modes governmentality institutionalized control, domination repression. In fact, Cooper's focus empire-states pinpoints difference, citizenship hierarchy were managed across different cultures eras. As note their chapter 6 maritime rise slave trade, [d]iplomacy law focused regulating relationships among equivalent states but gave legitimacy order highly unequal world. If always implied governing people differently, Americas brought out explicit debates about what politics difference should be (p. 184).Of topics, most important careful analysis role mediators local elites each project, especially recruitment, status monitoring by center. All faced acute problem actions loyalty designated rulers, social science literature principal-agent problems. reveal array solutions structured vertical connections between agents, subjects 14), carefully uncovering logics, occasional pathologies, mechanisms.Analytically, examples are varied they fascinating. Rome offered incentives, including citizenship, traders rapid promotion assimilation into rules-based order, while Chinese Qin laws judicial matters located exclusively administrative apparatus, intentionally divorced nobles. The extreme example accommodation was decentralized Carolingian empire, under which multiple hierarchies allegiance hang together …
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