Rethinking Domestic Arrangements in the Origins of the Modern European State
Guzmán Castro
A Comment on: “Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval Early Europe” by Thomas Ertman (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, 350 pp.) Understanding origins modern state –and different forms these political units eventually took- is a central enterprise discipline science. Relevant not only as necessary first step development several fields inside science ( e.g.  how can we talk an international, or better inter-state system, if do know where this concept “inter-state” comes from?) but also for contemporaneity state-building 21st century. Pivotal it is, literature still has too many open-ended pathways more to discover. It scenario that Ertman’s  Birth Leviathan  appears very welcome contribution study Modern State. The problem poses entirely new. In his own words: “Why had some states developed constitutionalist direction during formative centuries European state-building, while others become absolutist? And why military pressures driven construct effective, proto-modern bureaucracies, remained wedded administrative methods seemed highly dysfunctional?” (p. xi). resemblance questions which, take well-known example, Charles Tilly been working on long time strong. (1) Notwithstanding, three features stand out the  : a) type  of intra- changes author discusses along extended process (the frame is  circa  the fall Roman Empire French Revolution), b) complexity theory proposed, c) impressive empirical research undertaken support theory. As Ertman’s quote above suggests, goal book explain an  absolutist  regime came up with a  constitutional system. Moreover, reaching Max Weber’s thought, provides answer diversity (divergence??) paths infrastructure –that is: ended modern  bureaucratic  administration remained, their detriment, with  patrimonial  systems. Thus four variables define typology presented: absolutism (France Spain), constitutionalism (Great Britain), (Germany), (Poland Hungary). There are two sets dependent variables. The  regime  on one side –  i.e. constitutionalism- respond differences strength representative institutions.  Grosso modo , polities situated those territories characterized large-scale mostly unsuccessful experiments install homogeneous regimes Dark Ages will be prone regime. (2) On other hand, periphery historical processes could “begin from zero” thus were develop strong institutions constrained royal power. variable concerning  state-infrastructure . This form patrimonialism bureaucracy. core explanatory independent would involved early conflict (3) –“early” being defined pre-1450- tended build infrastructures “outmoded even dysfunctional” institutional arrangements (most commonly office-holding grant functions, such taxing, private hands). contrary, latecomers war able path reasons: they benefit know-how learn errors which expansion state-authority time, exponential increase supply personnel professionally trained run affairs. (4) encounters scheme cannot its cases: bureaucratic-constitutionalism constitutional-paternalism. Why did Great Britain follow given was clear case state-builder purposes? Hungary Poland, cases war, administrations? explanation anomaly rests existence  influenced infrastructure. Britain, redirecting (against attempts interest groups impose patrimonialism), acting agent administration. Let me offer final comments (in unjustly oversimplified manner) reading.  turns rigorous intensely (with descriptions might dense instances) researched study. His comprehension subtleties Europe certainly surpass most work reader seen literature. While analyzed role coercion, capital trying same outcome  -i.e. nation-state- goes much deeper. inclusion analysis domestic structures particularly welcome. words, saw towards convergence nation-state, disentangles leads formation critically types states. divergence becomes relevant when reflects work, since nation form, stark –especially infrastructure- continue countries studied. (5) Some thoughts, have justice, irresponsibly thrown further consideration: seems focus resource extraction (e.g. taxing) without taking seriously pool resources each territory had. consideration issue –for example benefiting Tilly’s hypothesis importance cities centers interplay governments- good idea (Was King Madrid than Ghent?) What real war? measures effectiveness administration fighting performance. But, losing let’s say Jena, valid yardstick efficient inefficient administrations, Jena things play (Napoleon’s mighty army)? Is acceptable flexible theoretical model? Are modified fit cases, incurring grave methodological problem? general, how heavy costs parsimony detailed complex study? any case,   is essential anyone understand unit international relations from, institution differed, –as tells us- form. interested should save engage dialogue his  “What accounts great variation over space kinds prevailed A.D. 990, converge variants national state? directions change so similar different?” Tilly, Charles, “Cities Europe, 1000-1800”;  Theory Society Vol. 18, No. 5, Special Issue Cities 1000-1800 (September, 1989, p.565). Nevertheless, there important distinction between discussed at end essay. completely though, least reader, logical hypothesis. post-Dark failed systems Carolingian Empire) generated marked decentralization landscape viable solution Crowns try severe centralization aristocratic landlords? Or pattern landlord aristocracy followed compatible bicameral organizations (typical regimes)? both? troublesome defines variance “a ruler who relatively (constitutionalism) unconstrained (absolutism)” 19). Here wisely sticks maxim “War made war.”  phenomenon linked proliferation social institution. remarks book: “…patrimonial nagging long-term consequences. Despite reforms 19th century, patron-client relations, lack boundaries politics administration, redistribution public funds insiders remain serious Spain, Portugal, France, Italy…” p. 322. * Ph.D. Student Department Political Science Pennsylvania. Profesor Depto. Estudios Internacionales. FACS - Universidad ORT Uruguay.  MA en Internacionales, Torcuato Di Tella E-mail:  gcastro@sas.upenn.edu
Letras Internacionales