Succession Rules and Leadership Rents
Kai A. Konrad|Stergios Skaperdas
Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect power of leaders relative as well resources expended on possible struggles. compare two regimes leadership succession: conclave regime and divide-et-impera regime, which differ with respect role previous leader once new takes power. The rent is higher, receive a lower compensation in have fight harder avoid grim outcome loss. A leader, then, would like induce even when every supporter has veto over her leadership.
Journal of Conflict Resolution|RePEc: Research Papers in Economics|Econstor (Econstor)|Social Science Open Access Repository (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences)|Social Science Open Access Repository (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences)|CiteSeer X (The Pennsylvania State University)