Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma
Kenneth W. Abbott|Philipp Genschel|Duncan Snidal|Bernhard Zangl
Abstract Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But creates more fundamental power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult control because policy benefits they create (or trouble cause) give them leverage. Conversely, tight governor constrains The thus faces dilemma: emphasizing limits intermediary competence and risks failure; failure. This “governor's dilemma” helps explain puzzling features governance: why not limited principal–agent delegation but takes multiple forms; governors choose forms that appear counterproductive in perspective; arrangements frequently unstable.
Regulation & Governance|Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford)