title: Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality
author: Robert B. Brandom
description: Just as Kant managed to recast a good bit of the history of philosophy as a struggle between rationalism and empiricism (thus leading to his synthesis of the two), Brandom has recast a substantial portion of modern philosophy as a struggle over the consequences of inferentialist approaches. The way he shows that there is a coherent line to he traced from Leibniz to Spinoza to Kant to Hegel to Frege to Heidegger to Wittgenstein to Sellars is brilliant; it will quite naturally also he controversial (in all the best senses). This is one of those books that will force even the people who disagree most with him to have to take his position all the more seriously. If nothing else, this shows that the usual ways of drawing the (by now tired) "continental/analytic" distinctions are in serious need of rethinking. Brandom's is an original voice. Brandom's work, obviously analytical in orientation, also claims to take its inspirations from figures normally shunned in analytic circles. This makes him a key figure in the effort to "overcome" the dichotomy. (Terry Pinkard <i>Northwestern University</i>)
zlib_text: Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and
  Brentano’s Accounts of Intentionality
  Dermot Moran
  University College Dublin
  Inspired by Aristotle, Franz Brentano revived the concept of intentionality to
  characterize the domain of mental phenomena studied by descriptive psychology.
  Edmund Husserl, while discarding much of Brentano’s conceptual framework and
  presuppositions, located intentionality at the core of his science of pure consciousness
  (phenomenology). Martin Heidegger, Husserl’s assistant from 1919 to 1923, dropped
  all reference to intentionality and consciousness in Being and Time (1927), and so
  appeared to break sharply with his avowed mentors, Brentano and Husserl. Some
  recent commentators have sided with Heidegger and have endorsed his critique of
  Husserl and Brentano as still caught up in epistemological, representationalist
  approaches to intentionality. I argue that Heidegger is developing Husserl, focusing in
  particular on the ontological dimension of intentionality, not reversi