TEXT: © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  CAMPAIGN 286
  CATALAUNIAN FIELDS 
  AD 451
  Rome’s last great battle
  SIMON MACDOWALL 
  ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS  
  Series editor Marcus Cowper
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  CONTENTS
  ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN 
  4 
  Introduction n The Huns and Goths n Roman Gaul n Causes of war
  CHRONOLOGY 
  13 
  OPPOSING COMMANDERS 
  16 
  The Romans and their allies n The Huns and their allies
  OPPOSING FORCES 
  29 
  Numbers n Aetius’ army n Attila’s army
  THE CAMPAIGN 
  41 
  Virgins, bishops and saints n The siege of Orléans n Attila’s retreat from Orléans
  THE BATTLE 
  55 
  The battlefield n The opening moves n Deployment for battle n The clash of battle lines n  
  Turning the tide n The day after
  AFTERMATH 
  88 
  THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 
  92 
  BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING 
  93 
  INDEX 
  95 
   
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  4
  INTRODUCTION
  On 20 June ad 451 a formidable invasion of Huns and Germans was defeated 
  by an alliance of Romans, Alans, Goths and other Germans in a battle that 
  took place on the plains of Champagne in France, known then as the 
  Catalaunian Fields. The battle (more commonly and erroneously known as 
  the Battle of Châlons) arguably changed the course of European history. It 
  was included in Sir Edward Creasy’s The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the 
  World (1851) and, as Sir Edward Gibbon so eloquently put it, ‘All the nations 
  from the Volga to the Atlantic’ took part.
  For such an important battle, very little is known about it for certain. 
  There is virtually no hard archaeological evidence and contemporary literary 
  sources are patchy. The main primary description of the battle comes from 
  Jordanes who, as a Gothic propagandist, glorified the Gothic actions in the 
  battle (on both sides) and virtually ignored the parts played by other 
  nationalities. The contemporary Greek historian Priscus actually met Attila 
  but only fragments of his histories survive. These along 
  with brief passages from the 5th-century Gallo-Roman 
  aristocrat Sidonius Apollinaris, supplemented by the lives 
  of early Christian saints, Gregory of Tours and various 
  chroniclers are all we have to go on. Therefore, any 
  reconstruction of the battle is a difficult task and must at 
  times fall back on conjecture.
  The Catalaunian Fields encompass the general area of 
  modern Champagne between Châlons-en-Champagne 
  and Troyes. We do not know for certain where the battle 
  took place but one ancient source places it on the Campus 
  Mauriacus, 7km from Troyes and 80km south of Châlons-
  en-Champagne. We know the nations involved but not 
  their exact proportion or numbers; nor do we know much 
  about what actually happened on the battlefield beyond 
  the few tantalising snippets Jordanes has left us. That said, 
  by pulling together the little bits of hard evidence 
  combined with a detailed analysis of the possible 
  battlefield sites, we can make some sense of what happened 
  on that mid-summer day when the fate of Western Europe 
  was decided.
  ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
  This impressive 3rd-century 
  hoard of Roman coins, now at 
  the Musée Saint-Loup, was 
  found near Troyes and was 
  probably hidden by a wealthy 
  Roman as he fled an invading 
  army.
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  5
  THE HUNS AND GOTHS
  The Huns exploded into the Roman world in the mid-4th century. Their 
  origin has been debated by historians over the centuries. Little is really 
  known for certain about their early history other than the fact that they 
  emerged from the Eurasian steppes and drove the Alans and Germans 
  westward to seek refuge in the Roman Empire.
  The Huns, as Ammianus Marcellinus, a 4th-century Roman officer, 
  described, ‘were the original cause of all the destruction and various calamities 
  which the fury of Mars roused up, throwing everything into confusion by his 
  usual ruinous violence … This active and indomitable race, being excited by 
  an unrestrainable desire of plundering the possessions of others, went on 
  ravaging and slaughtering all the nations in their neighbourhood till they 
  reached the Alans’. Ammianus goes on to say how the Huns conquered the 
  Alans and then kept pushing westwards. They defeated the Goths and sent 
  thousands of refugees across the Danube to seek safety inside Roman territory.
  The calamitous defeat of the Romans at the hands of the Goths is 
  described in my previous Osprey Campaign book Adrianople AD 378. The 
  descendants of the Gothic victors at Adrianople sacked Rome in 410 and in 
  418 were given land to settle in south-western France in exchange for waging 
  war on the Vandals and Suebi who had occupied much of Spain. By 451 this 
  branch of Goths had established a kingdom based around modern Toulouse. 
  They were now often called ‘Visigoths’ to distinguish them from the eastern 
  Goths (Ostrogoths) who remained beyond the Roman frontier and were 
  under Hun dominion.
  After subjugating the other barbarian tribes beyond the Danube, the 
  Huns settled down on the Hungarian plain. They provided troops to support 
  the West Romans while raiding the East and 
  exacting extortionate tributes from Constantinople. 
  By the mid-5th century the Hun empire, centred on 
  modern Hungary, stretched back onto the eastern 
  steppes and forward to the Rhine. They had 
  subjugated or absorbed the Germanic, Sarmatian 
  and Slavic populations of the region and were 
  having a major impact on Roman politics and 
  military capability. Not least of this was their value 
  as allies and mercenaries in the West Roman army 
  under the command of Flavius Aetius.
  In 433 Aetius’ friend and ally Rua, King of the 
  Huns, died. He was succeeded by his nephews 
  Bleda and Attila. When Attila murdered his brother 
  and ruled alone, things began to change for the 
  Romans. He prohibited Huns from serving Rome, 
  which must have been a great blow to Aetius as 
  they had formed the backbone of his armies for the 
  past 20 years. In two campaigns against the Eastern 
  Empire (441–42 and 447) the Huns devastated the 
  Balkans and exacted an enormous tribute from 
  Constantinople. By 448 the Eastern Empire was 
  paying the Huns 6,000 pounds of gold per annum 
  and had agreed to abandon much of the lower 
  The soldiers on the base of the 
  Obelisk of Theodosius in the 
  Hippodrome of Constantinople 
  are probably depictions of late 
  4th-century Goths in Roman 
  service. Their long hair, neck 
  torques and lack of beards set 
  them apart from the short-
  haired, bearded Romans. 
  Interesting details include the 
  fact that the bosses are off-
  centre and that the bottom of 
  the shields seem to taper 
  slightly. This may indicate a 
  very early prototype of a ‘kite 
  shield’ suitable for mounted 
  action.
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  6
  Danube frontier as a buffer wasteland. Callinicus, who 
  lived in Thrace at the time and would have experienced the 
  Hun invasion first hand, describes the horror in his Life of 
  Saint Hypatius: ‘The barbarian nation of the Huns … 
  became so great that more than a hundred cities were 
  captured and Constantinople almost came into danger and 
  most men fled from it … And there were so many murders 
  and blood-lettings that the dead could not be numbered. 
  Ay, for they took captive the churches and monasteries and 
  slew the monks and maidens in great numbers.’
  With the East Roman frontier laid to waste and her 
  cities looted, Attila began to look elsewhere for a new 
  source of wealth and prestige. His eyes turned to the West.
  ROMAN GAUL
  The Roman Empire had been divided into two halves since 
  the 3rd century. By the 5th century, the Eastern Empire, 
  ruled from Constantinople (modern Istanbul) and the 
  Western Empire, ruled from Ravenna (Rome having been long abandoned as 
  capital), were two often competing entities. Although both halves of the 
  empire saw themselves as Roman and superior to the Hun and German 
  barbarians, they tended to look to their own preservation first. Neither would 
  hesitate from shifting a barbarian threat to the other half of the empire or 
  even encouraging it if such action might preserve their own territorial integrity.
  By the mid-5th century, Gaul (modern France and Belgium) was in a state 
  of continuous turmoil. The frontiers had broken down: Vandals, Suebi, Alans, 
  Franks, Alamanni, Visigoths and Burgundians had either overrun the country, 
  seized parts of it for themselves, or had been given land to settle in return for 
  military service in the Roman army. The native Gallo-Romans, harshly 
  treated and taxed to the limit, had either fled to the protection of the great 
  landowners – entering into voluntary serfdom – or had risen in revolt.
  This female Hun skull has been 
  artificially deformed by binding 
  the head when a child. The 
  Huns, Alans and many of the 
  German tribes that fought for 
  Attila followed this practice. It 
  may have indicated high social 
  status. (Hungarian National 
  Museum)
  A Frankish warrior buried with 
  his weapons, including 
  francisca, spear and sword. 
  Franks fought in both Aetius’ 
  and Attila’s armies. This 
  skeleton now resides at the 
  Musée des Temps Barbares.
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  7
  N
  Bay of Biscay
  English Channel
  Cologne
  Trier
  Worms
  Paris
  Troyes
  Sens
  Tours
  Bordeaux
  Toulouse
  Milan
  Vienne
  Po
  Arles
  Lyon
  Châlons-en-
  Champagne
  Reims
  Strasbourg
  Metz
  Narbonne
  Saône
  Rhône
  Rhine
  Main
  Moselle
  Neckar
  Garonne
  Loire
  Seine
  Marne
  Meuse
  Visigoths
  Franks
  Burgundians
  Bacaudae
  435
  –37
   an
  d 4
  47
  439
  428
  426
  436
  435
  –36 
  and 4
  37
  Mediterranean Sea
  Orléans
  200 miles
  200km
  0
  0
  Visigoth offensives
  Roman offensives
  For more than 20 years Aetius was constantly on campaign in Gaul, fighting against the Bacaudae, Franks, Burgundians and 
  Visigoths in order to keep Gaul secure.
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  8
  In the midst of this confusion, the patrician Flavius Aetius took power 
  with the backing of the Huns, with whom he had been a hostage as a child. 
  In the 420s, with a formidable contingent of Hun mercenaries at his back, 
  Aetius built up a power base in Gaul. He waged successful campaigns against 
  the Franks and Visigoths and by 433 had defeated his main rival Count 
  Boniface to become Comes et Magister Utriusque Militiae of the Western 
  Empire – holding supreme military power.
  Apart from dealing with the intrigues of the Roman court, the preservation 
  of Roman Gaul was the keystone of Aetius’ policy. At this time the Visigoths 
  were expanding their power in the south-west; the Franks and Burgundians 
  had spilled over the Rhine frontier and there had been serious peasant 
  uprisings. An outlaw haven was established in Armorica (modern Brittany) 
  by the Bacaudae. These were a collection of escaped slaves, peasants, army 
  deserters and anyone wishing to escape the crushing burden of taxes. Under 
  their leader Tibatto they had even begun minting their own coins and resisted 
  any attempts by the imperial authorities to bring them back under control.
  Aetius relied almost exclusively on the Huns to provide the troops he 
  needed to subdue Gaul. Sidonius Apollinaris tells the tale of Avitus, the former 
  magister militum (master of soldiers) defending his estates from pillaging Huns 
  in the army of Litorius, Aetius’ subordinate fighting the Goths in the 430s:
  Thus [Avitus] spoke and bounded forth into the midst of the plain; and the 
  barbarous foe likewise came. When first they approached, breast to breast and 
  face to face, the one shook with anger, the other with fear. Now the general 
  throng stands in suspense, with prayers on this side or that, and as blow follows 
  blow they hang in the issue. But when the first bout, the second, the third have 
  been fought, lo! the upraised spear comes and pierces the man of blood [the 
  Hun]; his breast was transfixed and his corselet twice split, giving way even 
  where it covered the back and as the blood came throbbing through the two 
  gaps the separate wounds took away the life that each of them 
  might claim.
  The image of a former Roman general fighting a duel against 
  a Hun in Roman service perfectly captures the confused 
  loyalties of 5th-century Gaul. Many Romans had become 
  enemies of the state by joining the Bacaudae to escape the 
  heavy hand of taxation. Roman armies were made up of Huns 
  or Alans while the Goths and Franks were settling down as 
  overlords of south-western and northern Gaul respectively.
  Over the 430s, with the Huns as his allies, Aetius checked 
  the advances of the Franks, relieved the Visigoth siege of 
  Arles and recovered Narbonne from them at a price of 
  acknowledging their independence from Roman rule. In 437 
  he broke the power of the Burgundians and two years later 
  he captured Tibatto and temporarily suppressed the Bacaudae 
  rebellion. To help stop further advances by the Visigoths and 
  to keep the Bacaudae of Armorica in check he set up a colony 
  of Alans (a Sarmatian people) near Orléans. By the 440s, 
  thanks to Aetius’ efforts, Gaul was relatively stable despite 
  continued Bacaudic uprisings. However, storm clouds were 
  gathering in the East.
  A Spanish re-enactor equipped 
  as a 5th-century Roman 
  infantryman. Such men would 
  have formed the backbone of 
  Aetius’ native Roman forces. 
  (Javier Gómez Valero)
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  9
  CAUSES OF WAR
  The reasons why the Huns suddenly turned against the West Romans, with 
  whom they had long been allies, are complex and convoluted. A wide variety 
  of causes, some quite trivial, sparked off the conflict.
  First of these was the accession of the new Eastern emperor Marcian in 
  450. He adopted a stronger policy towards the Huns than his predecessor 
  Theodosius II. Marcian put a stop to the ruinous extortion extracted by the 
  Huns in exchange for keeping the peace. Perhaps Attila’s most obvious 
  response would have been to renew war against the Eastern Empire, but 
  what would this have achieved? There was probably not a copper plate 
  worth having anywhere in the Balkans that had not already been looted. Yet 
  safe behind the walls of Constantinople the true riches of the East were 
  beyond Attila’s grasp. He could have sought to occupy land in the Balkans 
  as the Goths had done in the previous century, but after so many decades of 
  continuous warfare the land was probably not worth holding.
  Gaul, on the other hand, was still in contention. The Visigoths under 
  Theodoric had carved out a kingdom in the south-west, based around 
  modern Toulouse. The Franks had land along the lower Rhine frontier, the 
  Alamanni were spilling over the upper Rhine and the Burgundians had been 
  given land in what we now call Burgundy. Alans had been settled near 
  Orléans, a band of Saxons had established itself nearby on the Loire, British 
  refugees were moving into Brittany to join the Bacaudae and yet the Huns, 
  who had been such faithful allies of the West Romans, still had no land 
  within the empire to show for their loyalty. From Attila’s point of view a 
  campaign in Gaul in which he might supplant one or another of the various 
  petty rival kingdoms surely seemed a more profitable enterprise than once 
  again descending on the Balkans.
  A possible claim to a legitimate holding for Attila within the Western 
  Empire came from a rather unlikely source. Justa Grata Honoria, the sister 
  of the Western emperor Valentinian III, became involved in a love scandal at 
  court. Her lover, Eugenius, was executed and Honoria was set to be married 
  off to a rather dull Roman senator to keep her from causing more trouble. 
  In 450 Honoria appealed to Attila for help as her champion, sending him her 
  ring as a token. Attila took this as a promise of marriage and demanded half 
  The massive walls of 
  Constantinople kept the East 
  Roman capital safe from several 
  Hun incursions.
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  10
  of the Western Empire as a dowry. In moving against the West, he could do 
  so not simply as an invader but as someone claiming his right as the emperor’s 
  future brother-in-law.
  Meanwhile the Franks, who had spilled over the lower Rhine frontier, 
  were fighting amongst themselves over leadership following the death of 
  Chlodio at the end of the 440s. According to Priscus, Chlodio’s eldest son 
  sought assistance from Attila to claim his inheritance. A younger brother 
  sought help from Aetius who had adopted him as a son during an earlier 
  Frankish embassy to Rome.
  If these were not enough reasons to consider an invasion of Gaul, the 
  Vandals in Africa were encouraging the Huns to move against the Visigoths. 
  According to Jordanes:
  When Gaiseric, king of the Vandals, learned that Attila’s mind was bent on the 
  devastation of the world, he incited him by many gifts to make war on the 
  Visigoths, for he was afraid that Theodoric, king of the Visigoths, would 
  avenge the injury done to his daughter. She had been joined in wedlock with 
  Huneric, Gaiseric’s son, and at first was happy in this union. But afterwards 
  he was cruel even to his own children, and because of the mere suspicion that 
  she was attempting to poison him, he cut off her nose and mutilated her ears. 
  He sent her back to her father in Gaul thus despoiled of her natural charms. 
  So the wretched girl presented a pitiable aspect ever after, and the cruelty 
  which would stir even strangers still more surely incited her father to 
  vengeance.
  Concerned that Theodoric would lead the Visigoths against him to avenge 
  his daughter’s honour, Gaiseric sought an alliance with the Huns. He probably 
  hoped that if the Huns threatened the Visigoths, the latter would be in no 
  position to wage war on him. From Attila’s point of view he possibly saw a 
  great opportunity to supplant the Visigoths in southern Gaul while 
  establishing a client kingdom of Franks in the north by supporting the eldest 
  of Chlodio’s sons. With Honoria as his wife he could have taken over the 
  territories occupied by Aetius’ enemies and continued the previous Hun 
  policy of supporting the West with the added benefit of land within the 
  empire and a direct connection to the throne. Priscus comments:
  Attila was of two minds and at a loss which he should attack first [the East or 
  West Roman empires]. But it seemed better to him to enter on the greater war 
  and to march against the West, since his fight there would not be only against 
  the Italians but also against the Goths and Franks. Against the Italians so as 
  to seize Honoria along with her money, and against the Goths in order to earn 
  the gratitude of Gaiseric, the Vandal King. Attila’s excuse for war against the 
  Franks was the death of their king and the disagreement of his children over 
  the rule.
  In order to keep the loyalty of his many followers and subject tribes Attila 
  needed to distribute wealth and honour. With an end to the tribute from the 
  Eastern Empire he could not afford to accept the status quo. He had to go to 
  war and the most profitable target was Gaul.
  With all this happening, what then was Aetius thinking? When Attila 
  made his move, it seems as though Aetius was caught off guard. Quite 
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  11
  500 miles
  500km
  0
  0
  PERSIAN
  EMPIRE
  E A S T  R O M A N  E M P I R E
  WEST ROMAN EMPIRE
  EMPIRE OF ATTILA
  Alans
  Gepids
  Huns
  Rugians
  Alamanni
  Thuringians
  Ostrogoths
  Heruls
  Constantinople
  Marcianople
  Adrianople
  Beroea
  Antioch
  Trier
  Reims
  Metz
  Paris
  Orléans
  Armorica
  Alans
  Burgundians
  Suebi
  Franks
  Saxons      
  Saxons      
  Moors
  Angles
  Jutes
  Bordeaux
  Visigoths
  Toulouse
  Barcelona
  Cartagena
  Narbonne
  Arles
  Milan
  Rome
  Athens
  Carthage
  Ravenna
  Aquileia
  Sirmium
  Naissus
  Sardica
  Attila’s capital
  Troyes
  Alexandria
  Vandals
  Mediterranean Sea
  By the mid-5th century ad a number of barbarian tribes had been granted land to settle inside the Roman Empire in return for 
  military service. Meanwhile the Huns under Attila ruled over a huge empire stretching from the Rhine to beyond the Black Sea.
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  12
  possibly he had assumed that if the Eastern Empire decided to end the tribute 
  then the Huns would naturally have renewed war against them. Only two 
  years before Attila’s invasion, Priscus records meeting ‘Constantius, an Italian 
  whom Aetius had sent to Attila to be that monarch’s private secretary.’ This 
  shows that Aetius still saw Attila as a potential friend and ally.
  Attila probably assumed that the West Romans would prefer his presence 
  in Gaul to that of the Visigoths, who had long been Roman enemies. Similarly 
  Aetius likely assumed that Huns, who had always been his friends and allies, 
  would never turn against him. Both assumptions proved to be untrue.
  When Attila made his move in the spring of 451, Aetius was in Italy. Gaul 
  was more or less undefended. Whatever remained of the Roman forces in 
  Gaul had been run down or ignored for a generation. For more than 20 years 
  Aetius had relied on Huns and Alans to secure his authority against the 
  Visigoths, Franks, Burgundians and Bacaudae. With the Huns suddenly his 
  opponents, Aetius had to turn to the Visigoths for support.
  If Attila had calculated that the West Romans would rather have had 
  Huns settled in Gaul in place of the Visigoths, why then did Aetius join up 
  with his former enemies to oppose his former Hun allies?
  There is no simple answer to this question but a sudden attack against his 
  power base probably left Aetius no choice. Attila did not approach him first 
  with a proposition to take on the Visigoths in the name of Rome. Rather he 
  had demanded an impossible dowry for Honoria’s hand in marriage. If Aetius 
  had simply stood aside and allowed Attila to take what he wanted, his own 
  power would have been fatally weakened. Gaul was in effect Aetius’ kingdom 
  and he had to defend it even if he may have secretly wished to have the Huns 
  supporting him rather than the Visigoths.
  The problem for Aetius was that he had very few troops. While Attila 
  could call on all the Huns and their many subject German tribes for support, 
  Aetius had nothing to match him. Until now the mainstay of all Aetius’ 
  armies had been his Hun allies. With the Huns now his enemies and the 
  Gallo-Roman garrisons run down, ignored, or gone over to the Bacaudae, 
  Aetius had no choice but to turn to the Visigoths for help.
  Aetius called on Avitus to help him convince the Visigoths that they would 
  be better off by throwing their lot in with the Romans rather than simply 
  defending their territory:
  ‘Your influence alone is a barrier-wall to the Gothic people; ever hostile to us, 
  they grant peace to you. Go, display the victorious eagles; bring it to pass, O 
  noble hero, that the Huns, whose flight afore time shook us, shall by a second 
  defeat be made to do me service.’ Thus [Aetius] spoke and Avitus consenting 
  changed his prayer into hope. Straightway he rouses up the Gothic fury that 
  was his willing slave. Rushing to enrol their names the skin-clad warriors 
  began to march behind the Roman trumpets. (Sidonius Apollinaris)
  The stage was set. Attila, supported by his subject German tribes, marched 
  east towards the Rhine in the spring of 451. Aetius, having secured an alliance 
  with the Visigoths, moved north to stop him.
   
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  13
  CHRONOLOGY
  370s
  The Huns move west defeating the Alans and the Goths.
  376
  Fleeing the Huns, some Goths seek refuge in the East 
  Roman Empire.
  378
  9 August 
  The East Roman army is crushed by the Goths at the 
  Battle of Adrianople. 
  382
  The Goths are given land to settle in Moesia in return for 
  providing troops for the East Roman army.
  395
  The Goths, led by Alaric, rise in revolt after the death of 
  the Emperor Theodosius I.
  406–07
  Vandals, Alans and Suebi cross the Rhine in mid-winter. 
  They overrun Gaul and eventually move into Spain.
  408
  Theodosius II becomes East Roman Emperor.
  410
  Alaric’s Goths sack Rome.
  418
  The Goths are granted land in south-western France, 
  centred on Toulouse, in exchange for military action 
  against the Vandals, Alans and Suebi in Spain and the 
  Bacaudae in Armorica. Theodoric becomes king.
  422
  Hun raids into Thrace are bought off with a tribute from 
  the Eastern Empire.
  423
  Death of the Western emperor Honorius.
  423–25
  Joannes usurps the West Roman throne.
  424
  Joannes sends Aetius on a mission to the Huns to gain 
  military support.
  425
  Joannes is overthrown by an East Roman army led by 
  Aspar. The infant Valentinian III becomes Emperor of 
  the West with his mother Galla Placidia as regent. Three 
  days after Joannes’ death Aetius returns with an army of 
  Huns. Galla Placidia buys him off by appointing him as 
  the regional commander of Gaul (magister militum per 
  Gallias).
  426–30
  Aetius campaigns against the Visigoths and Franks in 
  Gaul.
  429
  Vandals under Gaiseric cross from Spain to Africa.
  430
  Aetius assassinates Felix, the magister militum.
  432
  Boniface defeats Aetius at the Battle of Rimini but is 
  mortally wounded. Aetius seeks refuge with the Huns.
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  14
  433
  Rua, King of the Huns, dies and is succeeded by Attila 
  and Bleda. Aetius, returning with Hun support, is given 
  supreme military power in the West as Comes et Magister 
  Utriusque Militiae.
  435
  Treaty of Margus with the Eastern Empire gives the Huns 
  trading rights and an annual tribute of 700 pounds of 
  gold.
  435–37
  Aetius campaigns against the Bacaudae of Armorica and 
  captures their leader Tibatto, who later escapes.
  436
  Aetius attacks and defeats the Burgundians at Worms.
  437
  Hun allies in Aetius’ service destroy the Burgundian 
  kingdom on the Rhine.
  435–39
  Renewed conflict between the Romans and Visigoths ends 
  in stalemate.
  439
  Carthage falls to the Vandals.
  440
  An East Roman expedition sails to recapture Carthage. 
  The Persians invade Roman Armenia. Taking advantage 
  of this, the Huns raid across the Danube.
  441–43
  The East Roman expedition to Carthage is recalled having 
  accomplished nothing. The Huns devastate the Balkans, 
  capturing many cities and defeating two East Roman 
  armies. Constantinople is only saved by the strength of its 
  walls.
  442
  The Vandal Huneric mutilates his wife, the daughter of 
  King Theodoric, creating a feud between the Vandals and 
  Visigoths.
  443
  The Eastern Emperor Theodosius II sues for peace and 
  agrees to increase the annual tribute to 6,000 pounds of 
  gold in exchange for an uneasy truce.
  441–43
  West Roman campaign against the Bacaudae in Spain.
  442
  A group of Alans led by Goar is given land near Orléans 
  to keep the Bacaudae of Armorica in check. Goar is later 
  succeeded by Sangiban.
  443
  The surviving Burgundians are resettled in Savoy in 
  exchange for military service in the West Roman army.
  445
  Bleda dies, probably murdered by Attila, who now 
  becomes sole ruler of the Huns.
  447
  Attila invades the East Roman Empire and defeats 
  Arnegisclus at the Battle of Utus River. The Huns 
  once again lay waste to the Balkans. The walls of 
  Constantinople are seriously damaged by an earthquake 
  and the city is ravaged by plague. The Consul Constantius 
  rebuilds the walls and a hasty defence is organised by 
  Zeno, commanding Isaurian auxiliaries.
  447–49
  Renewed Bacaudic uprisings in Armorica and Spain.
  448
  A new peace treaty is concluded between the Huns 
  and the Eastern Empire in which the Romans agree to 
  abandon much of the Danube frontier.
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  450
  Honoria appeals to Attila for support. Theodosius II dies 
  and is succeeded by Marcian as Emperor of the East.
  451
  Attila invades Gaul and is defeated by Aetius and 
  Theodoric at Catalaunian Fields. Thorismund succeeds his 
  father as King of the Visigoths.
  452
  Attila invades Italy.
  453
  Death of Attila. Theodoric II kills his elder brother 
  Thorismund to take the Visigoth throne.
  454
  The Huns are defeated at the Battle of Nedao by a 
  coalition of Germans led by Ardaric, King of the Gepids. 
  Aetius is murdered by Valentinian III.
  455
  Valentinian is murdered by Aetius’ former guards. The 
  Vandals sack Rome.
  475
  Orestes, Attila’s former secretary, makes his son Romulus 
  West Roman Emperor.
  476
  Odoacer overthrows Romulus and becomes King of Italy.
   
  By the mid-5th century, the Roman defences of the Rhine frontier had been largely replaced by settlements of Franks, Burgundians and 
  Alamanni who held land in exchange for military service. This reconstructed village at the Musée des Temps Barbares would have been 
  typical of such settlements.
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  THE ROMANS AND THEIR ALLIES
  Flavius Aetius (391–454) spent his childhood as a hostage of both the Goths 
  and the Huns. He developed a close relationship with the latter and relied on 
  them for support in a series of civil wars from which he emerged as the most 
  powerful man in the Western Empire. He set himself the task of establishing 
  a power base in Gaul, defending it from internal and external threats at the 
  expense of all other regions of the Western Empire.
  Aetius was born at Silistra in Moesia on the lower Danube. 
  Aetius’ mother was a wealthy Italian noblewoman and his 
  father, Gaudentius, a prominent general of barbarian origin 
  who rose to the rank of master of cavalry (magister equitum).
  A description of Aetius has survived. Although it is the 
  work of a panegyrist that exaggerates Aetius’ good points, it 
  may give us some idea of what the man was like:
  The graceful figure of Aetius was not above the middle stature 
  … he excelled in the martial exercises of managing a horse, 
  drawing a bow and darting the javelin. He could patiently endure 
  the want of food or sleep and his mind and body were alike 
  capable of the most labourious efforts. He possessed the genuine 
  courage that can despise not only dangers but injuries.
  It is perhaps a comment on the changing nature of Roman 
  warfare that the military qualities first mentioned are those of 
  a horseman and archer. Clearly Aetius learned many of his 
  skills as a warrior from the Huns.
  When the Emperor Honorius died in 423, Aetius raised an 
  army of Huns (allegedly and improbably 60,000 of them) to 
  support the pretender Joannes. By the time Aetius arrived in 
  Italy, Joannes had been deposed and the 7-year-old Valentinian 
  was on the throne with his mother Galla Placidia the power 
  behind it. A general with an army of Huns at his back was still 
  a force to be reckoned with, so Galla Placidia bought Aetius 
  off with a command in Gaul and gold for his Hun followers.
  With the support of the Huns, Aetius built up his power 
  in Gaul. In 430 he assassinated Felix the master of soldiers 
  OPPOSING COMMANDERS
  An ivory diptych which possibly 
  shows Aetius. If so this is the 
  only representation of the ‘last 
  of the Romans’. (Musée du 
  Berry, Bourges)
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  17
  (magister militum) and assumed his place. However Galla Placidia gave the 
  position to Boniface the count of Africa (comes africae). When Aetius 
  refused to give up the post, conflict broke out. Aetius lost the initial battle 
  at Rimini in 432 and was forced to flee to the Huns. Boniface, however, was 
  mortally wounded (or died of disease according to another source) and the 
  following year Aetius returned with another Hun army at his back to assume 
  supreme power.
  For the next 18 years Aetius concentrated on defending Gaul, waging 
  successful campaigns against the Franks, Visigoths, Burgundians and 
  Bacaudae. To stop further advances by the Visigoths and to pacify the 
  Bacaudae of Armorica he established a military colony of Alans around 
  Orléans. He used the Huns to ruthlessly break the power of the Burgundians 
  on the middle Rhine and resettled the survivors in Savoy. The destruction of 
  the Burgundian kingdom of Worms by the Huns became the subject of heroic 
  legends that formed the base of the Nibelungenlied and Wagner’s Ring Cycle. 
  This event is recounted in the chronicle of Prosper: ‘Aetius crushed in battle 
  Gundicharius, the king of the Burgundians living within Gaul, and gave him 
  the peace he asked for. But Gundicharius did not enjoy 
  that peace for long, since the Huns utterly destroyed 
  him and his people.’
  Aetius made no attempt to recover Britain, Spain or 
  Africa. He treated Gaul almost as his personal fiefdom 
  and spent all his efforts to keep it secure. When Attila 
  invaded Gaul in 451, Aetius was faced with a nearly 
  insurmountable problem. The men who had been the 
  backbone of his armies for over 20 years were now his 
  opponents. If he lost Gaul, he would lose everything, 
  and he had to turn to his former enemies for help. The 
  coalition that he was able to cobble together to stop 
  Attila was very much a marriage of convenience. He 
  had no desire to see the Visigoths or Franks become 
  even more powerful but he had no choice except to 
  seek their help. He would strive to ensure that once the 
  battle was won, he would do what he could to prevent 
  them from exploiting any victory. He had to stop Attila 
  but he probably did not want Hun power to be 
  completely broken. They provided a useful counter to 
  the Visigoths and no doubt he hoped to be able to draw 
  on their support again once Gaul was safe.
  Probably Aetius cut a deal with the Bacaudae and 
  recent British immigrants to Armorica, offering them 
  freedom from imperial authority in exchange for their 
  support. His campaigns against them in the 430s and 
  440s had taken a great deal of effort with little to show 
  for it. Giving them independence was possibly little 
  more than a recognition of the status quo.
  Aetius’ strategy, therefore, was to stop Attila but to 
  ensure that in doing so he was still the most powerful 
  warlord in Gaul. He would need to use allies to help 
  him do this but he had no intention of letting them 
  profit too much by their support.
  This wood carving, from Monza 
  Cathedral, is of the 4th-century 
  general Stilicho. It is often 
  erroneously said to depict 
  Aetius.
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  THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BURGUNDIANS (PP. 18–19)
  In the 430s Aetius relied almost exclusively on his Hun allies to 
  secure his control of Gaul. They fought for him against the 
  Visigoths, Franks, Bacaudae and most famously the Burgundians. 
  This scene captures the moment when Huns in Roman service 
  destroyed the Burgundian kingdom on the Rhine, near modern 
  Worms – an event which became the subject of heroic legends 
  that formed the base of the Nibelungenlied and Wagner’s operatic 
  Ring Cycle.
  Weakened by his wounds, the Burgundian King Gundicharius 
  (1) is barely able to lift his sword to fend off a new attack by 
  mounted Hun warriors. His retainers are rushing to his rescue but 
  his life and his kingdom are doomed. The king is magnificently 
  equipped in the height of Germanic style with mail, gilded 
  spangenhelm and a fine pattern welded sword. Although lacking 
  mail, Gundicharius’ retainers (2) are also well equipped. Their 
  highly decorated, loose over-tunics are typical of the Western 
  Germanic warrior elite.
  Although famously horse archers, the Huns were perfectly 
  happy closing to hand-to-hand combat. This Hun (3) has put his 
  bow aside and is galloping in for the kill with his spear. The high-
  fronted saddle and horse trappings are of Asiatic origin while his 
  clothing is Roman. His lamellar armour also probably comes from 
  the East rather than a Western armoury, but his helmet is Roman 
  and has been personalised with the addition of a marmot tail.
  Having access to Roman armouries this man (4) is almost 
  entirely kitted out in Roman style and apart from his bow there is 
  little to distinguish him from a regular Roman cavalryman. To aid 
  rapid shooting he holds a number of arrows in his left hand 
  against the front of his bow.
  The dead Burgundian warrior (5) was unable to use his 
  francisca, or throwing axe, before succumbing to the Hun arrows. 
  His short sword, known as a seax or scramasax, lies on the ground 
  beside him.
  1
  2
  3
  4
  5
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  Flavius Placidius Valentinianus Augustus (419–55) – Valentinian III – 
  became Western Roman emperor as a child. His mother Galla Placidia ran 
  the empire as his regent until 437. By the time he had reached his majority, 
  the affairs of state were well and truly in the hands of others, first his mother 
  and then Aetius. He was an emperor in name only and although he was 
  technically the ultimate power in the land, he had little opportunity to 
  exercise it. Valentinian must have resented Aetius’ power and perhaps this is 
  one reason why he gave Aetius such little support from Italy when the Huns 
  invaded Gaul. When Attila invaded Italy in 452, Valentinian apparently 
  sidelined Aetius. Two years later he killed Aetius with his own hands, only to 
  be murdered in turn the following year by two of Aetius’ personal retainers.
  Flavius Maccilius Eparchius Avitus (c.385–456) was a Gallo-Roman 
  aristocrat and son-in-law of Sidonius Apollinaris, whose writings are an 
  important source for the goings on of the time. Avitus and his family had 
  good relations with the Visigoths and it was primarily due to Avitus’ influence 
  that the Visigoths were persuaded to join an active alliance 
  against Attila. He served as magister militum under 
  Aetius in the 430s but apparently retired in the 
  440s. It is possible that he served on the field with 
  Aetius and Theodoric in 451 but, as Sidonius 
  Apollinaris does not mention this, it is more likely 
  that he stayed home and sent one of his protégés 
  instead. Four years after the battle Avitus was 
  active again, filling the vacuum resulting from 
  Aeitus’ murder. He was proclaimed Western 
  emperor by the Visigoths in 455 and reigned for 
  three years.
  It is doubtful that Avitus had his eye on the 
  purple when he supported Aetius in 451. His 
  strategy was to preserve his estates in southern 
  Gaul and he saw the Visigoths as the key to 
  this. Although a Roman, and briefly West 
  Roman emperor, it is probably more realistic 
  to see him as a trusted advisor to the Visigoths 
  rather than a close ally of Aetius.
  Flavius Marcianus Augustus (392–457) – 
  Marcian – became East Roman emperor in 
  450. He was an Illyrian of humble origins, 
  son of a soldier; he was a prominent soldier 
  himself, and fought against the Persians, 
  Vandals and Huns. On ascension he 
  immediately adopted a more aggressive 
  policy against the Huns. His predecessor, 
  Theodosius II, had bought off the Huns with 
  a huge tribute and Marcian put a stop to this. 
  Rather than igniting a new war with the Huns 
  the immediate effect was to cause Attila to 
  look to the West as a new untapped source of 
  wealth. Marcian’s strategy was to revive the 
  strength of the Eastern Empire even if this 
  meant leaving the West to its fate.
  This diptych, now in the 
  Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, is 
  thought to show Felix, who was 
  assassinated by Aetius in 430. 
  (Sailko)
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  Theodoric I, King of the Visigoths (418–
  51), established a vibrant kingdom in 
  south-western France based around 
  modern Toulouse. He was an illegitimate 
  son of Alaric and had been born within the 
  Roman Empire. He was not, therefore, a 
  barbarian invader but rather someone who 
  strove to meld Roman and Gothic cultures 
  while taking every opportunity to exploit 
  Roman weakness to expand his own 
  kingdom. For most of his reign he was in 
  conflict with Aetius as he pushed the 
  boundaries of the treaties he had concluded 
  with the imperial authorities. Attila’s 
  invasion of Gaul threatened his position as 
  much as that of Aetius. He might, however, 
  have decided to remain at home and simply 
  defend his territory but was persuaded to 
  actively join the Roman cause through the 
  influence of Avitus. The alliance he formed with Aetius was never going to 
  survive the defeat of the Huns. Theodoric was killed in the Battle of the 
  Catalaunian Fields.
  Thorismund was Theodoric’s eldest son. According to Jordanes, Theodoric 
  ‘sent home four of his sons, namely Friderich and Eurich, Retemer and 
  Mimnerith, taking with him only the two elder sons, Thorismund and 
  Theodoric, as partners of his toil.’ Thorismund played a key role in the battle. 
  He led an advance force that contested some high ground early in the 
  engagement and then headed a decisive charge into the flank of the Huns and 
  Ostrogoths, effectively winning the day. He was proclaimed king on the 
  battlefield following his father’s death.
  There was no love lost between the sons of Theodoric I. When the battle 
  was over, Thorismund hurried back to his capital at Toulouse to secure his 
  crown against a possible coup by his younger brothers. As it was, Thorismund 
  only reigned for two years before being murdered and supplanted by his 
  younger brother Theodoric.
  Theodoric II, Thorismund’s younger brother, was also present at the 
  battle but his actions are not recorded. Presumably he played a subordinate 
  role, probably fighting alongside his father in the main Visigoth line. He 
  became king of the Visigoths after murdering Thorismund in 453, ruling until 
  466, when he in turn was murdered by his younger brother Eurich.
  Sidonius Apollinaris wrote a detailed description of Theodoric II after he 
  became king:
  He is well set up, in height above the average man, but below the giant. His 
  head is round, with curled hair retreating somewhat from brow to crown … 
  The eyebrows are bushy and arched; when the lids droop, the lashes reach 
  almost half-way down the cheeks. The upper ears are buried under overlying 
  locks, after the fashion of his race … his barber is assiduous in eradicating the 
  rich growth on the lower part of the face…
  Before daybreak he goes with a very small suite to attend the service of his 
  priests. He prays with assiduity, but, if I may speak in confidence, one may 
  A silver dish in the Real 
  Academia de la Historia, 
  Madrid, shows the Emperor 
  Theodosius I. His guardsmen, 
  with their long hair, neck 
  torques and clean-shaven faces, 
  bear a close resemblance to 
  those on the Theodosius 
  Obelisk and are probably 
  Goths. (Manuel de Corselas)
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  23
  suspect more of habit than conviction in 
  this piety. Administrative duties of the 
  kingdom take up the rest of the morning. 
  Armed nobles stand about the royal seat; 
  the mass of guards in their garb of skins are 
  admitted that they may be within call, but 
  kept at the threshold for quiet’s sake.
  It is interesting to note the passage about 
  Theodoric being clean-shaven. Despite 
  popular images of bearded barbarians and 
  clean-shaven Romans, contemporary 
  depictions (coins and monuments) usually 
  show Goths as clean-shaven and Romans 
  with short beards.
  Sangiban – the leader of the Alans – 
  played a duplicitous game, but eventually 
  came over to Aetius’ side. As Attila advanced west, Sangiban was ‘smitten 
  with fear of what might come to pass, had promised to surrender to Attila, 
  and to give into his keeping Aurelianum [Orléans], a city of Gaul wherein he 
  dwelt’ (Jordanes). Aetius and Theodoric got to Orléans first and, to continue 
  Jordanes’ narrative, ‘kept watch over the suspected Sangiban, placing him 
  with his tribe in the midst of their auxiliaries.’
  It is unclear whether Sangiban was actively supporting Attila at the onset 
  of the campaign or rather had decided to hand over Orléans because he 
  could not have hoped to defend his lands against a much larger army. Either 
  way, Sangiban’s strategy was to try to end up on the winning side and 
  therefore retain his lands in western France. According to Jordanes, Aetius 
  deployed the Alans in the centre of the army in order to keep a close eye on 
  them. Sangiban’s fate after the battle is unknown.
  Merovech (or Meroveus), the semi-legendary Frank who gave his name 
  to the Merovingian dynasty, may have been the leader of the Franks who 
  sided with Aetius. The case for this seems to have been made by French 
  scholars in the early 18th century and was taken up by Sir Edward Gibbon. 
  There are, however, no primary sources to back it up.
  Very little is known about Merovech. According to Gregory of Tours: 
  ‘some say that Merovech, the father of Childeric, was descended from 
  Chlodio.’ The Chronicle of Fredegar relates a legend in which Merovech 
  is conceived when Chlodio’s wife goes swimming and meets a sea 
  monster, ‘the beast of Neptune which resembles a Quinotaur.’
  Priscus writes: ‘Attila’s excuse for war against the Franks 
  was the death of their king and the disagreement of his 
  children over the rule, the elder who decided to bring 
  Attila in as his ally, and the younger, Aetius. I saw 
  this boy when he was at Rome on an embassy, a lad 
  without down on his cheeks as yet and with fair 
  hair so long that it poured down his shoulders. 
  Aetius had made him his adopted son.’
  Chlodio died just before Attila’s invasion so 
  Priscus’ unnamed Frankish princes could have been his 
  sons and one of them could have been Merovech. We will 
  The Hornhausen relief, now in 
  the Landesmuseum für 
  Vorgeschichte, Halle, is a rare 
  depiction of a mounted 
  Germanic warrior. Although 
  from a later period, such men 
  fought both for Aetius and 
  Attila.
  The ring of Childeric, King of 
  the Franks, who may have been 
  the son of the Frankish prince 
  who supported Aetius at the 
  Battle of Campus Mauriacus.  
  (© Ashmolean Museum)
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  24
  never know for certain. The strategy of the prince who led the Frankish 
  contingent in Aetius’ army was to secure undisputed leadership of the Franks 
  by defeating his brother and then with Roman support consolidate his kingdom. 
  Even if Merovech had not been at Aetius’ side, his son Childeric, who became 
  king around 458, would have become the undisputed leader of the Franks.
  THE HUNS AND THEIR ALLIES
  The rise to power of Attila, King of the Huns (434–53), is concisely 
  documented by Jordanes:
  Now this Attila was the son of Mundiuch [or Mundzuk], and Mundiuch’s 
  brothers were Octar and Rua [or Rugila] who are said to have ruled before 
  Attila, though not over quite so many tribes as he. After their death he 
  succeeded to the throne of the Huns, together with his brother Bleda. In order 
  that he might first be equal to the expedition he was preparing, he sought to 
  increase his strength by murder. Thus he proceeded from the destruction of his 
  own kindred to the menace of all others. But though he increased his power 
  by this shameful means, yet by the balance of justice he received the hideous 
  consequences of his own cruelty. Now when his brother Bleda, who ruled over 
  a great part of the Huns, had been slain by his treachery, Attila united all the 
  people under his own rule.
  For most of the early part of his reign, Attila maintained good relations with 
  Aetius and the West while building up his power and prestige primarily at the 
  expense of the Eastern Empire. He and Bleda succeeded Rua in 434, inheriting 
  an empire centred on the Hungarian plain extending from the Danube to the 
  Eurasian steppes. In that year the Huns concluded a successful treaty with 
  the East Roman Empire in which they extracted an annual tribute, received 
  trading rights and an agreement that the Romans would return all fugitives 
  who sought refuge in imperial territory.
  There are almost no 
  contemporary depictions of 
  Huns. This coin, however, is 
  believed to depict a Hun ruler 
  in the Far East who would have 
  been a contemporary of Attila. 
  The shape of his head shows 
  the effect of skull deformation. 
  (© British Museum)
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  25
  The Greek historian Priscus visited Attila’s encampment in 448 on a 
  diplomatic mission. He describes arriving ‘at a large village, where Attila’s 
  house was said to be more splendid than his residences in other places. It was 
  made of polished boards, and surrounded with a wooden enclosure, designed, 
  not for protection, but for appearance’. Yet Attila seemed to have taken pains 
  to portray himself as a man who shunned luxury:
  A luxurious meal, served on silver plate, had been made ready for us and the 
  barbarian guests, but Attila ate nothing but meat on a wooden trencher. In 
  everything else, too, he showed himself temperate; his cup was of wood, while 
  to the guests were given goblets of gold and silver. His dress, too, was quite 
  simple, affecting only to be clean. The sword he carried at his side, the latchets 
  of his Scythian shoes, the bridle of his horse were not adorned, like those of 
  the other Scythians, with gold or gems or anything costly. (Priscus)
  Much of Priscus’ account of his embassy to Attila survives, providing a 
  fascinating insight into the world of the Huns. Priscus’ physical description 
  of Attila is preserved by Jordanes:
  He was haughty in his walk, rolling his eyes hither and thither, so that the 
  power of his proud spirit appeared in the movement of his body. He was 
  indeed a lover of war, yet restrained in action, mighty in counsel, gracious to 
  suppliants and lenient to those who were once received into his protection. He 
  was short of stature, with a broad chest and a large head; his eyes were small, 
  his beard thin and sprinkled with grey; and he had a flat nose and a swarthy 
  complexion, showing the evidences of his origin.
  Ruling over a polyglot empire of subject and allied tribes, Attila’s power 
  rested on his ability to reward his followers with increasing amounts of 
  wealth and glory. To this end he reopened hostilities with the Eastern 
  Empire in 440. After laying waste to the Balkan frontier provinces, 
  defeating several Roman armies and only being checked by the walls of 
  Constantinople, he concluded yet another peace treaty which increased the 
  tribute paid to him.
  When the Emperor Theodosius II died in 450 and his successor Marcian 
  refused to pay the tribute, Attila had two choices: go to war against the 
  Eastern Empire again, or find another source of wealth. His decision to turn 
  against the Western Empire was in part prompted by the knowledge that 
  there was probably little more he could extract from the East. It must also 
  have rankled that while the Visigoths, Vandals, Franks, Alans and Burgundians 
  all had land within Roman territory and were able to enjoy all that Roman 
  civilisation could offer, the Huns were excluded. Despite years of faithful 
  service to the Western Empire and many successful campaigns against the 
  East, the Huns were still kept beyond the frontiers.
  Attila invaded Gaul with the intent of wresting significant concessions 
  from the Western Empire. This may have included winning good land to 
  settle within her borders and being accepted as pre-eminent amongst Rome’s 
  nominal allies. To this end he was probably going to war against the Visigoths 
  and Franks as much or more than going to war against the Romans. For 
  more than 20 years the Huns had propped up Aetius against the Visigoths, 
  Franks, Burgundians, Bacaudae and rival Roman warlords. Was it too much 
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  26
  150 miles
  150km
  0
  0
  N
  Constantinople
  Perinthus
  Adrianople
  Cabyle
  Beroea
  Philippopolis
  Ulpia Oescus
  Serdica
  Naissus
  Morava
  Singidunum
  (Belgrade)
  Margum
  Sirmium
  Mursa
  Cibalae
  Viminacium
  Mures
  Tisza
  Tamis
  Marcianople
  Novae
  Dorostorum
  Drava
  Nicopolis
  Pruth
  Siret
  Danube
  Sava
  Danube
  Vit
  (Utus)
  Dibaltum
  Thessalonica
  Pella
  Dyrrachium
  D A C I A
  H U N  T E R R I T O R Y
  D A L M AT I A
  M O E S I A
  T H R A C E
  Tundzha
  Maritsa
  campaign of 447
  campaign of 441–42
  Black Sea
  Battle of Utus River
  Throughout the 440s the Huns raided the Eastern Empire, defeated a Roman army at the Battle of Utus River and extracted a 
  huge tribute from Constantinople.
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  27
  to expect that a show of strength would force the Western Empire to accept 
  terms and give him land in Gaul at the expense of the other barbarian kingdoms?
  With the benefit of hindsight we can see that Attila miscalculated. Yet 
  how could he have foreseen the unlikely alliance between Aetius and his 
  arch-enemies the Visigoths? When he crossed the Rhine in the spring of 451, 
  Attila probably assumed that Aetius would have been forced to come to 
  terms, possibly letting the Huns take over lands previously occupied by his 
  enemies. The Romano-Visigoth alliance put paid to this and forced Attila to 
  fight a battle he did not want to fight. He could not avoid the battle. To do 
  so would have seriously weakened his authority and encouraged others to 
  challenge him.
  Other Hun commanders
  We do not know anything of the other Hun leaders who may have held 
  commands on the Catalaunian Fields. Three of Attila’s sons, Ellac (the eldest), 
  Dengizic (or Dintzic) and Ernac, vied for power after their father’s death and 
  may have been present at the battle. When Priscus visited Attila a couple of 
  years earlier, he says that Onegesius was his principal lieutenant. Therefore 
  Onegesius could have held a command in the battle, although it is just as 
  likely that he was left behind to keep an eye on the home front.
  From Priscus’ description it seems as though Attila may have had a soft spot 
  for his youngest son Ernac, while the elder brothers were cowed by their father:
  Onegesius sat on a chair on the right of Attila’s couch, and beyond Onegesius 
  sat two of Attila’s sons; his eldest son sat, not near him but at the extreme end, 
  with his eyes fixed on the ground in shy respect for his father … Attila, 
  however, remained immovable and of unchanging countenance nor by word 
  or act did he betray anything approaching a smile except at the entry of Ernac, 
  his youngest son, whom he pulled by the cheek, and gazed on with a calm look 
  of satisfaction.
  Ardaric, King of the Gepids, commanded the prestigious right wing at the 
  Catalaunian Fields. Ardaric was perhaps Attila’s most trusted ally: ‘The 
  renowned king of the Gepids, Ardaric, was there also with a countless host, 
  and because of his great loyalty to Attila, he shared his plans. For Attila, 
  comparing them in his wisdom, prized him and Valamir, King of the 
  Ostrogoths above all the other chieftains’ (Jordanes).
  The Gepids were an East Germanic tribe related to the Goths. When 
  Attila died, Ardaric led a revolt against his sons, defeating the Huns at the 
  Battle of Nedao in 454 and breaking their power forever. As a result some 
  have assumed that Ardaric and the Gepids were not fully behind Attila in 
  451. Jordanes reinforces this idea in his description of the revolt:
  Ardaric, king of the Gepids … became enraged 
  because so many nations were being treated like 
  slaves of the basest condition, and was the first 
  to rise against the sons of Attila. Good fortune 
  attended him, and he effaced the disgrace of 
  servitude that rested upon him. For by his revolt 
  he freed not only his own tribe, but all the others 
  who were equally oppressed.
  This ring from the treasure of 
  Pouan at the Musée Saint-Loup, 
  Troyes, may have belonged to 
  one of Attila’s followers. Who 
  Heva was remains a mystery.
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  28
  In the 5th century loyalty was a 
  very personal matter and not 
  necessarily based on nationality or 
  race. Ardaric could easily have 
  been Attila’s most trusted subject 
  even though he was not a Hun. On 
  Attila’s death Ardaric would not 
  have had any obligation to carry 
  such loyalty over to his sons. 
  Bickering over their inheritance 
  and treating their allies with a 
  high hand probably alienated 
  Attila’s sons from their subjects 
  and does not necessarily mean that 
  Ardaric felt the same way about 
  the father. In all probability 
  Ardaric and the Gepids fully 
  supported Attila because they 
  believed he would lead them to 
  victory and bring them honour 
  and a share of the spoils.
  The 
  Ostrogoth 
  brothers 
  Valamir, Thiudimir and Vidimir 
  (there are other variations on the 
  spelling) commanded Attila’s left 
  wing. Valamir was the senior but it 
  seems as though the younger 
  brothers had a degree of 
  autonomy:
  Valamir ascended the throne after 
  his parents, though the Huns as 
  yet held the power over the Goths 
  in general as among other nations. It was pleasant to behold the concord of 
  these three brothers; for the admirable Thiudimir served as a soldier for the 
  empire of his brother Valamir, and Valamir bade honours be given him, while 
  Vidimir was eager to serve them both. Thus regarding one another with 
  common affection, not one was wholly deprived of the kingdom which two 
  of them held in mutual peace.
  As it was with Ardaric, loyalty of the Ostrogoth brothers was first to Attila: 
  ‘They ruled in such a way that they respected the dominion of Attila, King of 
  the Huns. Indeed they could not have refused to fight against their kinsmen 
  the Visigoths, and they must even have committed patricide at their lord’s 
  command.’ Jordanes goes on to say that Valamir was a good keeper of 
  secrets; ‘bland of speech and skilled in wiles … Attila might well feel sure that 
  they would fight against the Visigoths, their kinsmen.’
  We have no idea how the brothers divided up the leadership of the 
  Ostrogoths at the battle in 451. In all likelihood Valamir had overall 
  command of the left wing with the younger brothers and possibly other lesser 
  Germanic leaders commanding their own followers.
  This gilded helmet from Deurne 
  in the Netherlands is inscribed 
  as originally belonging to a 
  Roman cavalryman of the 
  Equites Stablesiani. (Michiel)
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  29
   
  OPPOSING FORCES
  NUMBERS
  The army Attila led through Germany and into France was probably quite 
  large for the time. Jordanes reports that it was half a million men strong and 
  asserts that there were 165,000 casualties on both sides. Such numbers are 
  impossible. It took a great deal of logistical effort to keep even tens of 
  thousands of men and horses fed and supplied on campaign and for that 
  reason it was rare for armies of this period to exceed 20,000. Larger armies, 
  like the one the Roman emperor Julian had led into Persia nearly a century 
  before, required careful pre-positioning of fodder and supplies.
  The actual manpower that could be raised by some of the 5th-century 
  barbarian tribes was nowhere near as great as many fearful Roman writers 
  recounted. The only reasonably reliable numbers we have for a non-Roman 
  army of the period is that of the Vandals who crossed into Africa in AD 429 
  with 80,000 people. This would give around 10,000 to 15,000 fit and able 
  fighting men. The Huns probably could raise more than that but even so the 
  problems of logistics remained.
  Although composed of many contingents it is reasonable to assume that 
  Attila’s army contained tens rather than hundreds of thousands of men. This 
  was an invasion force, not a migration, and only the most able warriors 
  would have taken part, leaving others to guard the homelands. In the case of 
  the smaller Germanic contingents it is quite likely that each may have been 
  in the hundreds or low thousands.
  As to the Romans, we have no more certainty than we do for the Huns. 
  Jordanes says that Aetius ‘assembled warriors from everywhere to meet them 
  Although Aetius’ Romans 
  probably met Hun and Gepid 
  charges with a shieldwall of 
  spears, they would shower their 
  enemies with javelins and light 
  darts before the main clash, as 
  demonstrated by these Spanish 
  re-enactors representing the 
  Legio Septimani Seniores. 
  (Javier Gómez Valero)
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  30
  (the Huns) on equal terms’. Probably Aetius’ 
  combined force outnumbered the Huns 
  slightly. Attila, who had been perfectly happy 
  to take aggressive action in the past, acted 
  quite defensively as soon as the combined 
  Romano-Visigoth army came close which 
  may indicate that they outnumbered him.
  We cannot know the exact numbers of 
  each army but a likely and realistic estimate 
  would be something in the region of 20,000–
  40,000 on each side. As long as Attila’s army 
  operated over a large area, kept on the move 
  and looted towns and cities (as it did), supply 
  would not have been an insurmountable 
  problem in late spring/early summer.
  AETIUS’ ARMY
  When Attila crossed the Rhine in the spring of 451, Aetius was in Italy; the 
  latter moved immediately towards Gaul. According to Sidonius Apollinaris, 
  Aetius crossed the Alps leading only ‘a thin meagre force of auxiliaries 
  without regular troops’.
  It is unclear why more troops from the Italian field army were not 
  released. Quite possibly the emperor did not want to leave Italy undefended, 
  or he did not trust Aetius to have command of too many Roman troops in 
  case he was tempted to stage a coup. There was a famine raging in Italy at 
  that time, which may also have reduced the army’s strength and capability.
  It is likely that the auxiliaries accompanying Aetius from Italy were not 
  second-rate troops but rather units of auxilia palatina, infantry who were 
  capable of standing firm in line of battle as well as conducting more mobile 
  operations. In status and training they were superior to many of the older 
  Dice games were a popular 
  diversion for soldiers in the 
  ancient world. Most dice were 
  six-sided, making this twelve-
  sided Roman die, now in the 
  Musée Saint-Loup, rather 
  unique.
  These re-enactors from the 
  group Cohors Prima Gallica are 
  equipped as 5th-century 
  Roman infantry. They 
  demonstrate the tight 
  shieldwall formation that 
  would have been adopted to 
  repulse a cavalry charge. (Javier 
  Gómez Valero)
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  31
  legions and tended to form the backbone of most later West Roman armies. 
  Another interpretation of Sidonius’ comment is that the ‘auxiliaries’ were 
  barbarian allies rather than regular soldiers. Like all generals of the time 
  Aetius would have had at least several hundred bucellarii, soldiers who owed 
  their loyalty to the leader directly rather than being part of the regular army. 
  As Aetius had relied almost exclusively on Huns for his support in the past, 
  it is most likely that individual Huns made up the majority of his private 
  bodyguard. Although Aetius was now in conflict with Attila, this would not 
  have necessarily changed the personal loyalty of his Hun bucellarii.
  Although the men following Aetius into Gaul would have been good 
  troops, there were clearly very few of them, perhaps only a thousand or so 
  and probably a mix of cavalry and infantry. Certainly there were not enough 
  of them to stop Attila by themselves.
  Hasty diplomatic actions persuaded the Visigoth king Theodoric to join 
  in an alliance rather than to stay put in southern France to defend his 
  territory. The Visigoths were the descendants of the men who had destroyed 
  the East Roman army at Adrianople in 378 and who had sacked Rome in 
  410. By this time they had settled down as a warrior aristocracy over the 
  native Gallo-Romans in Aquitaine. They had had access to Roman weapons 
  factories (fabricae) for several generations and therefore would have been 
  very well equipped compared to other Germanic peoples.
  In the 4th century most Goths fought on foot. By 451 many warriors 
  would have been able to afford horses and they were perfectly happy fighting 
  either mounted or dismounted. On horseback they apparently followed 
  Roman practice. They might use skirmish tactics, riding up to their opponents 
  and showering them with javelins or, if 
  their enemy seemed weaker, charge home 
  with spear and sword. On the defensive 
  the mounted troops would dismount and 
  join the infantry in a shieldwall to fend 
  off attack.
  The Visigoths formed a substantial 
  proportion of Aetius’ army at the 
  Catalaunian Fields. In reading Jordanes’ 
  account we could be forgiven for thinking 
  that they managed to defeat Attila single-
  handedly. We have no way of knowing 
  how many of them may have been 
  present but it is not unreasonable to 
  assume that they formed something like 
  a third of the total force.
  Having linked up with the Visigoths, 
  Aetius then went about gathering up 
  whatever other forces he could raise in 
  Gaul. According to Jordanes: ‘He 
  assembled warriors from everywhere to 
  meet [the Huns] on equal terms. Now 
  these were his auxiliaries: Franks, 
  Sarmatians, Armoricans, Liticians, 
  Burgundians, 
  Saxons, 
  Riparians, 
  Olibriones [once Roman soldiers and 
  Archery, whether on horse or 
  foot, had become an 
  increasingly important factor in 
  5th-century warfare. These are 
  examples of migration-period 
  arrows from the Musée des 
  Temps Barbares.
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  32
  now the flower of the allied forces], and some other Celtic or German tribes.’ 
  Interestingly, no mention is made of any Roman troops raised in France. 
  Were there any? The modern historian Hugh Elton maintains that the allies 
  only contributed small contingents and that Aetius’ army was mostly made 
  up of regular Roman soldiers. Elton does not however deploy any convincing 
  evidence to support this assertion and the scant contemporary descriptions 
  of the battle indicate that Aetius had very few regular Roman troops.
  According to the Notitia Dignitatum, a list of Roman offices and units in 
  the early 5th century, the field army of the Magister Equitum Intra Gallias 
  contained 12 vexillations of cavalry (300 men each), 10 legions (1,000 men 
  each), 15 auxilia palatina (500 men each) and 10 pseudocomitatenses (units 
  brought in from frontier garrisons of unknown strength but probably 
  somewhere between 500 and 1,000 men). On paper this should have 
  provided at least 25,000 men. Furthermore there were significant numbers 
  of troops listed as guarding the Rhine frontier. What had happened to them?
  The Rhine frontier had collapsed following the migration of the Vandals, 
  Alans and Suebi in 407 and had largely been replaced by settlements of 
  Franks, Alamanni and Burgundians on the west bank of the Rhine. 
  Throughout the 430s and 440s Aetius had relied on Hun and Alan allies 
  rather than the Gallic field army to deal with his enemies and it is quite 
  probable that some of the native 
  Gallo-Roman soldiers either joined or 
  were sympathetic to the Bacaudae. By 
  451 the Roman army in Gaul had 
  probably been reduced both in 
  numbers and quality to render it 
  almost useless as a field force. 
  Certainly the ease with which Attila 
  captured many Gallic towns with very 
  little resistance is evidence of the 
  paucity of quality troops that could 
  have resisted him. That said, there 
  must have been at least some half-
  decent Roman soldiers available in 
  Gaul to swell the numbers of Romans 
  Aetius had brought with him from 
  Italy. Possibly the Riparians in 
  Jordanes’ description could have been 
  riparenses; these were Roman militia, 
  descended from the old legions, who 
  defended river frontiers.
  Most Roman troops would have 
  been close-order infantry armed with 
  large oval or round shields, swords 
  and 
  spears. The 
  latter 
  were 
  supplemented with javelins and darts. 
  Vegetius, writing at the end of the 4th 
  century, claimed that Roman infantry 
  had abandoned armour. Although 
  there could have been a lightening of 
  equipment and some units may have 
  These East Roman soldiers from 
  fragments of the lost Column of 
  Theodosius wear single bowl, 
  plumed, attic-style helmets 
  which are typical of 
  monumental depictions of 
  eastern troops. No examples 
  have been found by 
  archaeology; they contrast to 
  those in the West and along the 
  Danube frontier which have a 
  multi-part construction. Some 
  historians think that these may 
  hark back to classical Greek 
  helmets but the styles are 
  sufficiently different to shed 
  some doubt on this.
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  33
  suffered from neglect, there 
  is plenty of evidence to 
  show that helmets and body 
  armour continued to be 
  worn. These heavy infantry 
  would have been supported 
  by a small number of foot 
  archers who generally 
  formed the rear ranks, firing 
  overhead. The percentage of 
  cavalry listed in the Notitia 
  Dignitatum for the Gallic 
  field army was relatively 
  low (around 10 per cent) 
  but it is reasonable to 
  assume that some Roman 
  cavalry would have been 
  present. Like the Visigoths they would have been spear- and javelin-armed, 
  capable of close combat as well as limited skirmishing.
  When Jordanes speaks of ‘Sarmatians’ he is probably referring to the Alans 
  led by Sangiban as the Alans were a Sarmatian people. In a later passage 
  Jordanes speaks of the Alans ‘drawing up a battle-line of heavy armed’. This 
  is confirmed by a reference to the Alans in the life of St Germanus where again 
  they are described as ‘armoured cavalry’. Writing in the previous century, 
  Ammianus Marcellinus contradicts this, implying that the Alans were lighter 
  cavalry: ‘The Alans are men of great stature and beauty. Their hair is somewhat 
  yellow, their eyes are terribly fierce; the lightness of their armour renders them 
  rapid in their movements, and they are in every respect equal to the Huns, 
  only more civilised in their food and their manner of life.’
  Although many Alans were probably originally light 
  horse archers, a large proportion may have been lance-
  armed cavalry similar to the heavily armoured Sarmatians 
  depicted on Trajan’s column. As they had been in Roman 
  service for a generation since Ammianus’ time, they 
  would have had access to weapons and equipment from 
  Roman fabricae. Horse armour was used by the 
  Sarmatians centuries before and it is not impossible that 
  some of Sangiban’s elite followers may have ridden 
  armoured horses. At the Catalaunian Fields the Alans 
  formed a distinct contingent in the centre of the line, 
  indicating a status as allies rather than subordinates.
  The Franks in Jordanes’ description would have been 
  the supporters of the prince who had turned to the 
  Romans rather than the Huns for help. It is also possible 
  that Jordanes’ Riparians refer to a branch of the tribe who 
  later came to be known as the Ripuarian Franks. The 
  Franks were famously foot warriors who preferred to 
  charge in dense columns throwing their axes and heavy 
  javelins before contact and then closing in with hand-to-
  hand weapons. On the defensive they would form a 
  shieldwall like other Germanic foot warriors. Agathias 
  For warriors on foot the 
  protruding central iron or 
  bronze boss of their shield was 
  an offensive weapon. These are 
  examples of Frankish weapons 
  now in the Musée Saint-Loup, 
  Troyes.
  A depiction of a 5th-century 
  horse archer from a floor 
  mosaic in the Imperial Palace at 
  Constantinople, now the 
  Mosaic Museum Istanbul.
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  34
  describes Franks a century later forming a shieldwall 
  when facing enemy cavalry: ‘They closed ranks and 
  drew themselves up into a compact formation which, 
  though not deep, was nevertheless a solid mass of 
  shields regularly flanked by the converging wings 
  of cavalry.’
  The Armoricans (from modern Brittany) were 
  either Bacaudae, recent immigrants from Britain or 
  a combination of both. The Armorican Bacaudae 
  had been one of Aetius’ chief opponents in previous 
  years and possibly they had made a deal with him 
  to provide a contingent in exchange for being left 
  alone to manage their own affairs. Some may have 
  been mounted warriors similar in arms, equipment 
  and tactics to the Visigoths and Romans with their 
  arms being a combination of booty and 
  local manufacture.
  Burgundians, settled in Gaul, were the survivors 
  of Aetius’ earlier campaign against them and while 
  they had no more cause than the Visigoths or 
  Armoricans to support him, their defeat had come at 
  the hands of the Huns and perhaps they chose the lesser of two evils. The 
  Burgundians most likely fought on foot in a tight shieldwall. The same would 
  have been the case for the Saxons, a band of whom may have been given land 
  to settle north of the Loire. For the Burgundians, the Battle of Campus 
  Mauriacus (the Catalaunian Fields) was so memorable that the Lex 
  Burgundionum (Burgundian law) stated that ‘All cases which involve 
  Burgundians and which were not completed before the Mauriacian fight 
  [pugna Mauriacensis] are declared dismissed.’
  The Liticians and Olibriones mentioned by Jordanes are a puzzle. Possibly 
  the Liticians could have been laeti, German and Sarmatian military colonists 
  given land in Gaul in return for military service. It is also likely that Aetius’ 
  army would have been augmented by the bucellarii of the powerful Gallic 
  landowners. Perhaps these could be Jordanes’ enigmatic ‘Olibriones’, 
  especially as Jordanes says that they were previously Roman soldiers. On the 
  other hand this could equally be another description of Roman deserters 
  amongst the Bacaudae.
  Most of these contingents were foederati, men from a variety of nations 
  who had been given land or pay in return for service in the Roman army. 
  They fought in their native style but were technically part of the Roman army 
  rather than independent allies. They would have been equipped largely from 
  Roman arms factories and may have been almost indistinguishable in 
  appearance from more regular Roman troops.
  Aetius’ order of battle
  Given the paucity of accurate sources, any attempt to construct a detailed 
  order of battle has to be speculative. What follows is a ‘best guess’ rather 
  than something which should be interpreted as definitive.
  The Visigoth contingent comprised 10,000–15,000 men in two 
  commands. The main one, under King Theodoric, held a defensive position, 
  probably dismounted, on the right wing. These would have been a 
  A Frankish belt buckle now in 
  the Musée des Temps Barbares 
  showing a mix of pagan and 
  Christian influences. It probably 
  post-dates the battle but shows 
  the blending of Roman and 
  Germanic cultures.
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  35
  combination of dismounted nobles and other foot, probably supported by a 
  small number of foot archers. A flanking force under Thorismund most likely 
  remained mounted and may have had some light infantry support.
  The Alan contingent totalled some 1,000–3,000 men. A combination of 
  horse archers and heavy lance-armed cavalry deployed in the centre of the 
  line, and was commanded by Sangiban. They would have been well equipped 
  as they had been settled in Roman territory for some time, but with low 
  morale as their heart was not in the fight.
  The Roman contingent consisted of 10,000–20,000 men. Deployed on 
  the left, the Roman forces comprised several contingents: a small number of 
  high-quality troops brought by Aetius from Italy; the remnants of the Gallic 
  field army supplemented by laeti and riparenses; Franks; Armoricans; Saxons; 
  and Burgundians. Most would have been infantry fighting in close order and 
  supported by foot archers. A small number, probably held in reserve, may 
  have been cavalry. Aetius had overall command and we do not know who his 
  subordinate commanders were.
  These re-enactors, from the 
  Legio Prima Germanica group, 
  are equipped as typical late 
  Roman cavalry. The same 
  equipment would have been 
  worn by the Visigoths. (Javier 
  Gómez Valero)
  This depiction of a horseman 
  from Carthage may well depict 
  an Alan who joined the Vandals 
  in their invasion of Gaul, Spain 
  and then Africa. The tamga 
  brand on the horse’s rear is 
  thought to be representative of 
  the Sarmatians and the Alans 
  were a Sarmatian people. (© 
  British Museum)
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  36
  ATTILA’S ARMY
  According to Sidonius Apollinaris:
  Suddenly the barbarian world, rent by a mighty upheaval, poured the whole 
  north into Gaul. After the warlike Rugian comes the fierce Gepid, with the 
  Gelonian close by; the Burgundian urges on the Scirian; forward rush the Hun, 
  the Bellontonian, the Neurian, the Bastarnae, the Thuringian, the Bucteran and 
  the Frank, whose land is washed by the sedgy waters of the Neckar.
  There is a huge amount of poetic licence in this description as many of the 
  tribes Sidonius mentions had disappeared centuries before and some are 
  actually fictitious. However, large numbers of Germanic subject and allied 
  contingents did march with the Huns.
  This Egyptian ivory, now in the 
  Rheinisches Landesmuseum 
  Trier, shows late Roman horse 
  archers armed and equipped as 
  described by the 6th-century 
  writer Procopius. Under the 
  influence of the Huns and 
  Persians, the horse archer 
  became the mainstay of Roman 
  armies shortly after the Battle 
  of Campus Mauriacus.
  Franks fought on both sides at 
  the Battle of Campus 
  Mauriacus. They were 
  renowned for their axes 
  (franciscae) which they threw at 
  their enemies just before 
  combat. These examples are 
  from the Musée Saint-Loup, 
  Troyes.
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  37
  We know one party of the Franks involved in the dynastic dispute had 
  appealed to Attila and so a Frankish contingent is fairly certain. There were 
  also some Burgundians still living to the east of the Rhine and they may have 
  been forced or persuaded to join. The same may have been true of the 
  Alamanni. Although not mentioned in any sources, a number of 5th-century 
  Alamannic graves show that they had adopted the practice of skull 
  deformation from the Huns so a contribution of troops is not unlikely.
  Of the other contingents mentioned by Sidonius, the Gepids under Ardaric 
  held the right wing. Rugians, Thuringians and Scirians were East German 
  tribes who lived under Hun overlordship so their inclusion in Attila’s army 
  is probable. It is also quite likely that a contingent of Heruls, who at that time 
  were living near the Black Sea, may also have been present. Interestingly 
  Sidonius does not mention the Ostrogoths, although they are conspicuous in 
  Jordanes’ account of the battle, forming the left wing.
  The Huns were famously mounted archers, armed with powerful 
  composite bows and skilled at loosing off a swarm of arrows while avoiding 
  contact until their enemy had been worn down or had lost cohesion. However, 
  they were also quite prepared to charge in to close combat so it would be a 
  mistake to think of them as purely light cavalry skirmishers.
  The 4th-century Roman officer Ammianus Marcellinus gives an excellent 
  description of their fighting methods:
  They enter the battle drawn up in wedge-shaped masses, while their medley of 
  voices makes a savage noise. And as they are lightly equipped for swift motion, 
  and unexpected in action, they purposely divide suddenly into scattered bands 
  and attack, rushing about in disorder here and there, dealing terrific slaughter 
  … then they gallop over the intervening spaces and fight hand-to-hand with 
  swords, regardless of their own lives; and while the enemy are guarding against 
  wounds from the sabre-thrusts, they throw strips of cloth plaited into nooses 
  over their opponents and so entangle them that they fetter their limbs and take 
  from them the power of riding or walking.
  Such tactics gave the Huns an almost unbroken string of success 
  against their Roman and Germanic opponents who had no 
  answer to the effect of massed horse archery followed up with 
  aggressive charges. The physical and psychological effect of a 
  whirlwind of men galloping up, firing arrows, then swerving 
  away only to be replaced by others, would have been devastating 
  to men unused to such tactics.
  Lajos Kassai, a modern Hungarian horse archery expert, has 
  taught himself to fire 6 arrows in 10 seconds at the gallop with 
  incredible accuracy. Imagine this multiplied many times over. A 
  unit of 1,000 men could gallop towards the enemy at a speed of 
  around 30–40km/h; open fire at 150m; shoot again at 100m; 
  split right and left at around 40–50m to ride parallel to the line, 
  firing once or twice more before turning away and shooting to 
  the rear. In the space of only a few seconds they could easily have 
  loosed off 5,000–6,000 aimed arrows on a relatively narrow 
  front. The impact would have been devastating. It would have 
  pinned their opponents behind their shields making them an 
  ideal target for a well-timed charge before they could recover.
  An elaborate Visigoth horse bit 
  from Spain. Although it post-
  dates the Battle of Campus 
  Mauriacus, such bits may have 
  been in use earlier. (Javier 
  Gómez Valero)
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  38
  Like the English longbowmen many centuries later, this would have 
  required a great deal of training. It took Lajos four years to teach himself to 
  fire so fast and accurately, but then every Hun boy would have been training 
  from the moment he was born and had the added benefit of many mentors 
  to help him. It is perhaps no wonder that the Huns had been held in such 
  high regard by Aetius and that in the years that followed the Romans 
  developed a horse archer-based army.
  In contrast to the Huns, the various Germanic subjects favoured hand-to-
  hand combat, either on horse or foot. Those Germans who had been living 
  out on the steppes for a long time were more likely to have fought mounted. 
  A modern Hungarian horse 
  archer demonstrates the way 
  Hun horse archers would have 
  fought. Lajos Kassai has shown 
  how it is possible to fire six 
  arrows in ten seconds at the 
  gallop with incredible accuracy. 
  (Csanády)
  These belt buckles from the 
  mid-5th century Pouan treasure 
  found near the Catalaunian 
  Plains battlefield show the 
  craftsmanship that went into 
  the panoply of a 5th-century 
  warrior.
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  39
  These would have included the Ostrogoths, 
  Gepids, Heruls and possibly the Scirians. Their 
  tactics are described in the Strategikon, a 6th-
  century East Roman military manual: ‘They 
  lean forward, cover their heads and part of 
  their horses’ necks with their shields, hold their 
  lances high as their shoulders.’ Unlike the 
  Visigoths, who used a combination of skirmish 
  and shock tactics when mounted, some of these 
  eastern Germans may have adopted the use of 
  very long two-handed lances from the 
  Sarmatians for shock action only.
  Those Germans living further west, such as 
  the 
  Franks, 
  Burgundians, 
  Alamanni, 
  Thuringians and Rugians, probably fought 
  mostly on foot. Depending on the circumstances 
  they might either charge in dense columns or 
  form a tight shieldwall if fighting defensively.
  Both the Huns and the Germans had been 
  living in close contact with the Romans for 
  several generations and in recent years the Huns had won significant victories 
  over the East Romans. By 451 most of them would have worn Roman 
  clothing and equipment and supplemented their native weapons with those 
  they had appropriated from the Romans. The popular mental image of Huns 
  in furs and skins with Mongolian style head dress is probably quite wrong 
  for the men who followed Attila. It is far more likely that they wore Roman-
  style clothing with helmets and armour looted from the battlefield or 
  acquired from the vast sums paid to them as tribute from Constantinople.
  The passage previously quoted, describing the encounter between Avitus 
  and Huns in the service of Litorius, says that the Hun’s body 
  armour was split open. In another passage Sidonius 
  mentions how the Huns practiced skull 
  deformation by binding the heads of children so 
  that they grew into an elongated shape. He 
  misinterprets this as being done so that 
  young men would better fit a helmet with 
  a nose guard: ‘The nostrils, while soft 
  are blunted by an encircling band, to 
  proven the nose from growing outward 
  between the cheekbones, that thus 
  they make room for helmets’ (Sidonius 
  Apollinaris, panegyric on Avitus). This 
  is wrong as it was the forehead that 
  was constricted and several female 
  Hun skulls have been found that had 
  been deformed in the same way. 
  However, it is an indication that men such 
  as Sidonius, who were familiar with the 
  Huns, expected them to wear helmets – most 
  probably of segmented ‘Spangenhelm’ style 
  with nose and cheek guards.
  This 5th-century horse ornament 
  may depict a Hun warrior.
  This silver dish from Isola Rizza 
  probably shows a 6th-century 
  East Roman soldier riding down 
  a Lombard. Many men in both 
  Aetius’ and Attila’s army would 
  have looked quite similar. 
  (James Steakley)
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  40
  Not all Attila’s followers would have been armoured. The Heruls, who 
  had little contact with Rome at this time, were noted by Jordanes as being 
  ‘lightly armed’. A century later Procopius said that they ‘have neither helmet 
  nor corselet nor any other protective armour except a shield and a 
  thick jacket.’
  Attila’s order of battle
  As with Aetius’ army, a detailed breakdown of Attila’s forces is impossible. 
  Even the rough proportion of each contingent has to be guessed at. None of 
  the sources give any indication of where the smaller Germanic tribes formed 
  up. They could have been split between the wings, or possibly those on foot 
  formed a second line for the cavalry to rally back on.
  The Ostrogoth contingent comprised 5,000–10,000 men. Holding the left 
  flank, the Ostrogoths were probably under Valamir’s overall command. They 
  were primarily mounted troops favouring shock tactics, probably supported 
  by a number of foot archers and other foot warriors including some of those 
  from the smaller allied contingents.
  The Hun contingent consisted of 10,000–15,000 men, all of whom would 
  have been well-equipped horse archers capable and willing to fight hand-to-
  hand as well as shoot from a distance. Most would probably have worn some 
  body armour. The majority were deployed in the centre of the line but a 
  covering force contested the high ground with the Visigoths as a prelude to 
  the main battle. Attila had overall command and most likely his sons Ellac, 
  Dengizic and Ernac would have held subordinate commands.
  The Gepid contingent totalled 5,000–10,000 men. Ardaric, King of the 
  Gepids, formed the right wing. In all likelihood he commanded a number of 
  other Germanic allies as well as his own men. The Gepids were probably 
  mostly mounted warriors similar to the Ostrogoths while the Franks and 
  others fought on foot.
  Neck rings like this gold 
  example from the Pouan 
  treasure were the mark of a 
  warrior. They were worn by 
  Celtic warriors fighting Julius 
  Caesar and continued to be 
  worn in the 5th century AD by 
  Germans fighting both for and 
  against Rome.
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  41
  Attila crossed the Rhine in the spring of 451. He had a large army at his back 
  and keeping it fed and watered would have been a monumental task. To do 
  so he had to keep on the move, probably splitting his force into smaller bands 
  to make foraging easier and then congregating to threaten a town and 
  hopefully forcing it to open its gates and its granaries.
  Food and water were not his only considerations. Attila’s polyglot army 
  followed him because they believed he would lead them to victory and riches. 
  His supporters would start to melt away if they found themselves on a long 
  drawn-out campaign on short rations and with no loot. Therefore Attila had 
  to balance the benefits to be gained by capturing a town against the dangers 
  of becoming bogged down in a long siege.
   
  THE CAMPAIGN
  The massive, well-preserved 
  late Roman walls of Sens were 
  not breached by Attila, even 
  though he passed the town on 
  his way to Orléans and on his 
  retreat back.
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  42
  200 miles
  200km
  0
  0
  N
  Bay of Biscay
  English Channel
  Cologne
  Trier
  Worms
  Paris
  Troyes
  Sens
  Tours
  Bordeaux
  Toulouse
  Milan
  Vienne
  Po
  Arles
  Lyon
  Reims
  Strasbourg
  Metz
  Narbonne
  Saône
  Rhône
  Rhine
  Main
  Moselle
  Neckar
  Garonne
  Loire
  Seine
  Marne
  Meuse
  Mediterranean Sea
  Aetius
  Theodoric
  Attila
  Orléans
  Châlons-en-
  Champagne
  Attila’s invasion of Gaul. The exact route taken by Attila is not known beyond the fact that he took Metz in April and was at 
  Orléans by June. The arrows show the central axis of his march. Most probably his forces split up and foraged widely over the 
  countryside. It is also not certain whether Aetius and Theodoric joined forces before marching on Orléans or whether they moved 
  independently, as shown on this map.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  43
  VIRGINS, BISHOPS AND SAINTS
  The Huns captured and sacked Metz on 7 April 451. What they did then is 
  far from clear. Gregory of Tours tells us that ‘Attila king of the Huns went 
  forth from Metz and crushed many cities of the Gauls’. The Chronicle of 
  Hydatius states: ‘The tribe of the Huns broke the peace treaty, pillaged the 
  province of Gaul, and sacked a vast number of cities.’ Which cities they 
  actually sacked or tried to sack is shrouded in early Christian legend with 
  various saints either being given credit for saving their cities from the ravages 
  of the Huns or becoming martyrs. Rheims, Mainz, Strasbourg, Cologne, 
  Worms and Trier are all said to have fallen to Attila, which may or may not 
  have been the case.
  Perhaps the most famous of these Christian legends is the story of St 
  Geneviève. In a striking parallel to the later legends of Jeanne d’Arc, 
  Geneviève was a peasant girl who had frequent visions of heavenly saints and 
  angels and went on to save Paris (although not all of France), first from the 
  Huns and later the Franks. Under the patronage of Germanus, Bishop of 
  Auxerre, she moved to Paris and dedicated herself to God. This pious woman 
  is said to have urged the people to stay and resist rather than abandoning the 
  city to the Huns. As the legend goes, Geneviève told the frightened Parisians 
  that if they kept their faith, fasted, prayed and did penance, the city would 
  be protected by God and their lives would be spared. Naturally there were 
  some doubters and several citizens turned against her. However, Geneviève 
  was supported by Germanus’ archdeacon, who may have been sent from 
  Italy to help calm things. If true, this shows that panic had been spreading 
  long before Attila crossed the Rhine and the religious as well as temporal 
  authorities at Ravenna took action to shore up Gaul’s defences.
  The route from Orléans to 
  Troyes is characterised by hilly, 
  wooded terrain which would 
  not have been suitable for 
  Attila’s cavalry-based army. 
  Therefore he fell back to the 
  open fields of Champagne then 
  known as the Catalaunian 
  Fields. The terrain offered 
  plenty of opportunities for 
  delaying actions by Attila’s 
  Gepid rearguard.
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  44
  One version of the story has it that as Attila approached Paris, Geneviève 
  led a group of women outside the walls of the city to pray for deliverance. 
  Attila was so impressed that he did not attack. It may be that Geneviève’s 
  actions did prevent an exodus from the city and possibly Attila would have 
  taken Paris if it had been abandoned. It is just as likely, however, that he had 
  already decided to bypass Paris to move against Orléans.
  All we know for certain is that from April to June 451 Attila’s army cut a 
  swathe through northern France from Metz to Orléans. They probably 
  operated over a very wide area in relatively small bands to ease problems of 
  supply and forage. Without any decent standing Roman forces to oppose them, 
  they would have been able to move through the countryside more or less at 
  will with logistics dictating their movements as much or more than tactical 
  considerations. Capturing a city would have given the Huns loot, slaves and 
  supplies but they could not afford protracted siege operations. They would 
  have depended on fear to open city gates, offering to spare the inhabitants from 
  the horrors of a sack in exchange for food, supplies and shelter. If the gates 
  remained closed, the Huns may have tried an assault provided that they 
  thought their chances were good, otherwise they would bypass and move on.
  The inability of barbarians to conduct a siege is well known but probably 
  over-exaggerated. Attila had many Greek and Roman advisors and certainly 
  there were engineers amongst them who could oversee the building of siege 
  engines. The Huns had successfully besieged and captured many cities in the 
  Eastern Empire in the 440s so it was not technical inability that might prevent 
  a successful siege of a Gallic city in 451. What Attila could not afford was to get 
  bogged down at a single place for any length of time when the logistical 
  problems of keeping and feeding a large army would have become insurmountable.
  Ideally Attila wanted to reward his followers with loot while creating such 
  a nuisance that Aetius would have no choice other than to sue for peace. In 
  the worst case he would force the Romans to offer battle, defeat them as he 
  had done so often in the East and then extract terms. What he had not counted 
  on was a formidable Romano-Visigoth alliance that could stand up to him.
  By the 5th century most Roman 
  soldiers resembled a part-time 
  militia. They tended their plots 
  of land and would fight to 
  defend their locality if called 
  on. However, the mobile field 
  forces were increasingly made 
  up of Germans, Alans and Huns. 
  (Javier Gómez Valero)
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  45
  The Romans needed time to put this 
  alliance together and forge an army capable 
  of stopping Attila. To do this they 
  encouraged the inhabitants of the walled 
  cities to hold firm and bar their gates to the 
  enemy thus denying them much needed 
  supplies. It seems as though this task fell 
  primarily to the ecclesiastical authorities.
  There is no shortage of stories of saintly 
  bishops shoring up the resolve of their 
  congregations to resist Attila. Some were 
  successful and others became martyrs. 
  Bishop Nicasius of Reims was allegedly 
  killed and the city pillaged. According to 
  legend the bishop’s sister Eutropia, a pious virgin, stood up to the Huns and 
  scratched out Attila’s eyes before being killed herself as she sought refuge in 
  a church. However, another version of the story has Nicasius being killed by 
  the Vandals in 407 and yet another has him dying of smallpox. Many such 
  stories mix up previous events with Attila’s invasion. Amongst these are the 
  stories of St Servatius of Tongeren and St Diogenes of Arras, both of whom 
  had been dead for some time, making their intervention against Attila highly 
  improbable despite their sanctity!
  The legend of St Ursula is probably one of the most fanciful stories to 
  emerge from Attila’s invasion of Gaul. Here Ursula, a virtuous British 
  princess, travels to Cologne to be married. She is accompanied by 11 virgin 
  handmaidens (later expanded in the middle ages to 11,000) and all are killed 
  when the Huns destroy the city. Despite a late Roman inscription on the 
  Church of St Ursula in Cologne and the medieval discovery of the bones of 
  several children which came to be revered as the relics of the 11,000 virgins, 
  there is probably little truth to the story. Most of the details were invented in 
  the Middle Ages, and another version of the St Ursula legend places the 
  events a century or more beforehand. There is indeed some doubt as to 
  whether or not Cologne was even attacked by Attila in 451.
  The Roman road from Sens to 
  Troyes follows the River Vanne, 
  which would have provided an 
  ample source of water for both 
  Attila’s and Aetius’ armies.
  The hilt and scabbard of the 
  long sword from the treasure of 
  Pouan at the Musée Saint-Loup, 
  Troyes. Such weapons would 
  have been carried by notable 
  men on both sides of the 
  conflict.
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  46
  On the other hand, St Lupus, the Bishop of Troyes 
  (Tricassium), was real and his actions probably had a 
  significant impact on the battle. According to legend, 
  Lupus confronted Attila outside the walls of Troyes. 
  Dressed in his full regalia he asked Attila who he was. 
  Attila is famously said to have replied that he was the 
  ‘scourge of God’ (fagellum dei), an epithet which has 
  stayed with him to this day bringing vivid images of 
  barbaric savagery to modern minds. The ancients, 
  however, saw it somewhat differently. The horror of 
  invasion was widely interpreted by the early Church as 
  God’s punishment for their sins. If a city was sacked, it 
  was God’s righteous wrath; if it was spared, it was due to 
  the timely intervention of a saint. In response to Attila, 
  Bishop Lupus is supposed to have responded that if the 
  Hun was ‘the scourge of God and the hammer with which 
  Providence smites the earth’, then he should do only God’s 
  will. Attila is supposed to have been so impressed that he 
  spared the city.
  Local folklore in Troyes has Lupus confronting and 
  slaying a dragon which had been devastating the region 
  and killing many children. For over a millennium this was 
  celebrated each year when the dragon of the chair salée 
  (salted flesh) was paraded through the city. The origins of the festival are 
  variously explained either as St Lupus defeating the Pelagian heresy or defeating 
  Attila. The festival was banned in 1727 but it has been revived in modern times.
  What probably happened is that Lupus offered Attila a deal, providing 
  supplies and pasture in exchange for sparing the city. Troyes lies on the Seine 
  at the junction of two important Roman roads. One is the Via Agrippa from 
  Lyon to Boulogne, the other road runs from Le Havre to Troyes by way of 
  Paris and Sens. If Attila had indeed sacked Reims and then intended to move 
  on to Orléans, his best route would have been to cut south through the open 
  Catalaunian Fields (modern Champagne) towards Troyes and then head west 
  along the road that passed through Sens and on to Orléans. This route would 
  have provided ample grazing for Attila’s many horses with the Seine and its 
  tributaries giving them a vital water supply. By securing Troyes and the 
  surrounding region as a neutral if not friendly refuge, Attila would have been 
  able to concentrate his forces, rest, recoup and resupply for a push on 
  Orléans. A deal which gave him this without a siege would have been worth 
  taking. For Lupus, giving up some of the city’s wealth in exchange for sparing 
  it from the horrors of a sack would have made him seem like a saviour to the 
  terrified inhabitants.
  What we do not know for certain is whether the encounter between Attila 
  and Lupus happened en route to Orléans, or on the way back. According to 
  the Lives of the Saints, Attila took Lupus back with him across the Rhine as 
  a hostage after the battle. Later when he returned Lupus went into exile, 
  possibly as a result of suspicion falling on him for collaboration with Attila. 
  This, combined with the fact that Troyes would have made a very good 
  stopping point on the route, leads to the conclusion that Attila made his deal 
  with Lupus on the way to Orléans. He may even have established a supply 
  base at Troyes before moving westward.
  The source of the Vanne at the 
  modern hamlet of Fontvannes. 
  This is the last water source 
  before reaching the Seine 
  above Troyes.
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  47
  Although it is a fairly straight line on the map from Metz to Orléans by 
  way of Troyes, tracing the exact route the Huns took from April to June 451 
  is impossible. It is most likely that there were several routes with small bands 
  moving more or less independently, ravaging the countryside, capturing what 
  towns they could and then moving on.
  THE SIEGE OF ORLÉANS
  In early June 451, Attila concentrated his forces on Orléans. This may have 
  been at the invitation of Sangiban, the Alan leader, who had promised to turn 
  the city over to him. On the other hand it may have simply been part of a 
  plan to cut Gaul in half from the Rhine to the Atlantic and Sangiban thought 
  that by helping the Huns he would be joining the winning side. What actually 
  happened at Orléans is not entirely clear. If we are to believe the stories of 
  the saints then Attila besieged the city but failed to capture it due to divine 
  intervention.
  Gregory of Tours recounts that Attila ‘attacked Orléans and strove to take 
  it by the mighty hammering of battering rams.’ According to the legend of the 
  Bishop Anianus of Orléans, the Huns deployed siege engines and battering rams 
  against the city, although they were delayed for several days due to unseasonable 
  weather. Bishop Anianus prayed as the garrison was driven from the walls and 
  the gates began to give way. Just as all seemed lost, the good bishop sent an 
  attendant to the walls to see if he could see anything. Twice the messenger 
  reported back that there was nothing to be seen. On the symbolic third time 
  ‘like the messenger of Elijah’ he saw a cloud of dust in the distance. Just as the 
  Huns were beginning to force a breach, with the women wailing and the hapless 
  inhabitants cowering in anticipation of ‘terrible chastisement’, the army of 
  Goths and Romans came into view and Attila was forced to break off the siege.
  The flat ground by source of 
  the Vanne was the probable 
  campsite of Aetius’ army the 
  night before the battle. No 
  doubt Attila would have used 
  the same spot a day or two 
  before.
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  48
  This version of events is disputed by the historian J. B. Bury, who believes 
  that Aetius and Theodoric reached Orléans before Attila and therefore no 
  siege took place. The narrative of Jordanes says as much: ‘Sangiban, king of 
  the Alans, smitten with fear of what might come to pass, had promised to 
  surrender to Attila, and to give into his keeping Aureliani [Orléans], a city of 
  Gaul wherein he dwelt. When Theodoric and Aetius learned of this, they cast 
  up great earthworks around that city before Attila’s arrival and kept watch 
  over the suspected Sangiban.’
  Bishop Anianus probably did much to keep up the hopes and spirits of 
  the alarmed inhabitants in the knowledge that Aetius and Theodoric were on 
  their way. The arrival of the allies in time to save the city could easily be 
  interpreted as an answer to his prayers. Not letting reality stand in the way 
  of a good story, it probably did the Church no harm to magnify the danger 
  and augment the services of the saintly bishop by representing the enemy as 
  already battering down the gates. In one account we are told that Anianus 
  actually travelled to Arles to meet with Aetius and help plan the campaign 
  before Attila’s move on Orléans.
  Either way, Attila fell back from Orléans, probably in early June. It may 
  be that he had attempted a siege and was forced to lift it on Aetius’ arrival, 
  but it is more likely that he got there only to find Aetius and Theodoric 
  already in place with Sangiban having switched sides. Whatever the case, 
  Attila had three choices: fight at Orléans, fall back to make a stand elsewhere, 
  or withdraw altogether. In reality the last choice was not an option. Having 
  gathered and led a huge army into the Western Empire with promises of land, 
  booty and honour, Attila could not possibly now turn back simply because 
  the combined Roman-Gothic foes that opposed him were stronger than he 
  may have anticipated. His strength rested on the belief that he would bring 
  his followers wealth, victory and honour. To give up now would destroy the 
  myth of invincibility and fracture his power base.
  This reconstruction of 3rd-
  century Troyes shows what the 
  town would have looked like at 
  the time of the battle.
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  49
  A fight at Orléans would have favoured the Roman-Visigoths rather 
  than the Huns. If we believe Jordanes, Aetius had entrenched positions 
  around the city. The Romans and Goths had good, well-equipped infantry 
  while the strength of the Huns and their allies was in mounted action, 
  which required open terrain with room to manoeuvre. Attila had 
  knowledge of the ground that he had crossed to reach Orléans and he 
  would certainly have been aware that the flat open region of modern 
  Champagne, or the Catalaunian Fields as Jordanes calls it, would favour 
  his army over that of his opponents. Therefore he withdrew from Orléans 
  and fell back on Troyes.
  There is some evidence to suggest that Attila was quite unsettled by 
  finding himself suddenly opposed by a combined Romano-Visigoth alliance 
  and faced with an army that possibly outnumbered his own. Jordanes 
  recounts: ‘Attila, king of the Huns, was taken aback by this event and lost 
  confidence in his own troops, so that he feared to begin the conflict.’ This is 
  probably an over-exaggeration made with the benefit of hindsight and to 
  stress a moral ascendancy of the Goths over the Huns. With Sangiban’s 
  anticipated support, Attila had expected Orléans would have fallen to him 
  without a fight. Now that this was not possible, he had no choice but to fight 
  Aetius and Theodoric, but he wanted to do this on ground of his own choosing.
  It is likely that Aetius gathered in further reinforcements before following 
  up Attila’s withdrawal. There is a possibility that the Franks supporting 
  Aetius were already a band in exile serving with the Roman army and could 
  possibly have marched with him from Italy. Otherwise it is hard to conceive 
  that they would have cut across Attila’s lines to join with the Visigoths in 
  southern France before Aetius reached Orléans. The Saxons may have been 
  settled in the Loire Valley and it is unlikely that they would have committed 
  to Aetius’ cause unless he was in the vicinity and looking like he might win. 
  Sangiban’s Alans had been given land around Orléans to keep the Armorican 
  The ground to the east of 
  Troyes is wide open and 
  perfectly flat – the perfect place 
  for Attila to offer battle.
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  50
  Bacaudae in check and Orléans was the gateway to Bacaudae territory. Only 
  Aetius’ presence and a promise of autonomy would have persuaded the 
  Armoricans to join the fight. There is no possibility that any them would 
  have been part of Aetius’ army before his arrival there. The other known 
  Roman allies were the Burgundians of Savoy. Given their more southerly 
  location it is possible that they had already joined Aetius at Arles rather than 
  linking up with him at Orléans.
  It is about 200km from Troyes to Orléans. According to Vegetius, a 
  Roman army ‘should march with the common military step twenty miles in 
  five summer-hours, and with the full step, which is quicker, twenty-four miles 
  in the same number of hours.’ Assuming Attila’s mostly mounted force could 
  accomplish the same, this is less than a two-week march, even if encumbered 
  with loot and having to forage along the way. If Attila had stopped to gather 
  his forces at Troyes before pushing on to Orléans, he would not have started 
  that march if he knew that Aetius and Theodoric were already there. 
  Therefore Aetius could not have arrived at Orléans more than a few days 
  before Attila. If so, he probably had to wait a while longer to gather in his 
  new allies rather than following immediately with all his forces as the Huns 
  fell back.
  ATTILA’S RETREAT FROM ORLÉANS
  Disengaging from a well-formed enemy and withdrawing over difficult 
  terrain is a tricky business at the best of times. Yet this is what Attila had to 
  do if he wanted to fight on ground of his choosing. The route from Orléans 
  back to the open plains of Champagne passes through what are now known 
  as the Forêt d’Orléans and the Forêt d’Othe – hilly wild territory with little 
  room to manoeuvre and few choices for alternative passages. Attila would 
  have had the added challenge of keeping his army’s morale up, no doubt by 
  reminding them of the favourable terrain around Troyes, promising to make 
  a stand there and assuring them that victory was certain.
  As he had passed through Champagne before moving to Orléans, Attila 
  knew that the flat open ground there favoured his army over the Romano-
  Visigoths. The Catalaunian Fields, as Champagne was then known, took its 
  name from Duro Catalaunum (modern Châlons-en-Champagne). It is an 
  This is the view from the ridge 
  of Montgueux looking east 
  towards the Seine where a line 
  of trees in the distance mark its 
  passage. This is the view Aetius 
  would have had as he reached 
  the heights on the morning of 
  20 June 451.
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  51
  area which, as Jordanes explained, ‘extended in length one hundred leagues, 
  as the Gauls express it, and seventy in width.’ There Attila’s cavalry would 
  have room to manoeuvre and his horse archers could wreak havoc on his less 
  mobile opponents.
  To get there Attila really had only one option: the Roman road that runs 
  parallel to the River Vanne, passing by Sens (Senones) and then on to Troyes. 
  His main axis of retreat must have been along that road. The Vanne would have 
  N
  20 miles
  20km
  0
  0
  Engagement between
  Attila’s Gepids and
  Aetius’ Franks
  Attila’s
  probable camp
  19 June
  Aetius’
  probable camp
  19 June
  Troyes
  (Tricassium)
  Orléans (Aurelianum)
  Ad Fines
  Aquae Segetae
  Le Mée-sur-Seine (Metlosedum)
  Pont-sur-Yonne
  (Pontum)
  Sens
  (Senones)
  Auxerre (Autessiodorum)
  Forêt d’Othe
  Forêt d’Orléans
  Attila’s retreat from Orléans. Attila’s options would have been limited as he fell back from the close terrain around Orléans to the 
  open plains by Troyes. Although his infantry may have been able to make their way cross-country through the Forêt d’Orléans, 
  his baggage would have kept to the road. It is possible that Aetius had to delay a few days at Orléans to gather in more allies 
  before following up with his main force.
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  52
  given him a good source of water and the Roman road would have allowed the 
  passage of his wagons. Where he could, Attila probably split his forces to move 
  on as wide an area as possible to avoid a long snaking convoy that could be 
  easily held up and be vulnerable to attack, and to make foraging less difficult.
  By the time they reached Sens, the dense terrain of the Forêt d’Othe would 
  have forced the Huns to keep to the single road running parallel to the River 
  Vanne. In stark contrast to the flat, open farmland between Troyes and 
  Châlons-en-Champagne, the modern Route Nationale D660, which follows 
  the old Roman road, winds its way through hills and forest. The impressive 
  Roman walls of Sens still stand today and there is no indication that they were 
  ever breached by Attila. Time would have been of the essence and even if Sens 
  could have afforded him a welcome source of supplies, Attila could not have 
  spared the time even to intimidate the inhabitants to open the gates to him.
  Attila was able to make a clean break from Orléans. Aetius no doubt sent 
  troops after him to harass his retreat but if the Romans had to wait to gather 
  in their new allies, they would not have been able to follow up immediately 
  with their entire army in hot pursuit. However, Attila’s retreat was not 
  entirely unhindered. Our sources tell us that there was an engagement 
  between the Gepids of Attila’s rearguard and the Franks of Aetius’ vanguard, 
  which resulted in an unlikely 15,000 casualties. According to Jordanes this 
  engagement took place the day before the main battle. We do not know 
  where this engagement took place or even if it was the only one on the retreat 
  from Orléans. There are plenty of wooded, hilly ridges from Sens to Troyes 
  where Attila could easily have deployed a delaying force to hinder pursuit 
  and where the close terrain would have lent itself to success. The Gepids were 
  probably mounted but, like most Germanic warriors, were perfectly happy 
  Attila would have camped 
  somewhere along the River 
  Seine to the north of Troyes, 
  where he could have 
  established an easily defensible 
  camp with ample water and 
  forage.
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  53
  dismounting to fight on foot when the situation demanded. They could have 
  set up a shieldwall, perhaps supported by archers, and inflicted long delays 
  on Aetius’ Franks before mounting up again and pulling back to establish a 
  new defensive position. Such rearguard actions would have bought valuable 
  time for Attila. They would have created enough separation between his main 
  army and that of Aetius so that he would not be caught in the close terrain 
  of the Forêt d’Othe before reaching the open plains around Troyes.
  Less than a day’s march from Troyes would have found Attila at the 
  modern hamlet of Fontvannes, the source of the River Vanne. This was the 
  last place he could have camped with a good supply of water before pushing 
  on to the Seine. From here he had two routes open to him. He could either 
  go directly east along the Roman road to Troyes or cut across the hills 
  through a valley that would bypass Troyes and meet up with the Seine just 
  to the north of the city. In all probability his large army would have taken all 
  available routes.
  The Life of Saint Lupus leads us to understand that Attila retired by 
  several roads at once before converging on Troyes. No doubt some of his 
  troops branched off to the north-east heading in a direct line to the River 
  Seine just to the north of Troyes. Here they could have established a camp 
  with an excellent water source, plenty of grazing for their horses and food 
  supplies from the city on the assumption that Bishop Lupus was living up to 
  his agreement. Others, especially the 
  baggage train, would have kept to the 
  Roman road until they reached the outskirts 
  of Troyes and then moved around the city 
  to rejoin the others.
  The most likely spot for Attila’s camp is 
  somewhere near the modern village of 
  Saint-Lyé just to the north of Troyes. Here 
  there was plenty of space for his wagons to 
  form a large laager on the banks of the 
  Seine with 7km of flat open plains to his 
  front extending as far as the eye could see 
  to the left and right. This would give him 
  advance warning of any enemy approach, 
  time to deploy and wide open spaces for 
  manoeuvre. There is also evidence of an 
  ancient bridge that crossed the Seine at this 
  point, giving an additional avenue of escape 
  if things went badly.
  Aetius would have been following up 
  Attila’s retreat as hard and fast as he could. 
  His advance elements would have been 
  harassing the Hun rearguard while the bulk 
  of the army followed up behind. The 
  Romano-Visigoths would have suffered less 
  from logistical problems than the Huns. 
  They would have been able to resupply at 
  Sens as well as at Orléans and although the 
  Roman commissariat was not what it had 
  been in previous centuries, Aetius’ army 
  The insignia of the Magistri 
  Equitum showing the shield 
  patterns of the senior Roman 
  units at the outset of the 5th 
  century. In theory they should 
  have been available to Aetius to 
  call on to defend Gaul. In reality 
  many or most of these units 
  were probably so run down as 
  to be nearly useless in an 
  offensive campaign. (Bodleian 
  Library, Oxford)
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  54
  had not been living off the land for the past three months like Attila’s.
  It is impossible to say how many days’ march Aetius’ main body was 
  behind Attila’s. Even if he had paused for a while at Orléans to gather more 
  allies, Aetius’ advance guard was certainly hard on Attila’s heels given the 
  engagement between his Franks and Attila’s Gepids along the route. However 
  close he may have been, Aetius would have had to stop for at least a day to 
  gather his forces together and issue orders for the attack. An army of around 
  20,000–40,000 men, compelled by difficult terrain to follow a single road, 
  would have taken a long time to gather together. The column would have 
  been at least 10km long, probably longer taking into account gaps between 
  contingents and space for baggage wagons. Therefore as the first men were 
  arriving at the new location, the rearguard would barely have 
  set off from their previous night’s camp.
  The only possible place short of Troyes where Aetius 
  could have gathered his army together was at 
  Fontvannes. Here there was sufficient space, water and 
  forage. Further back the terrain was too close to gather 
  a large army and further forward there was plenty of 
  space but no water until the Seine where Attila was 
  already waiting for him.
  It is just over 8km from Fontvannes to high ground 
  overlooking the plains around Troyes. Jordanes tells us 
  that the battle started at the ‘ninth hour of the day’. He 
  goes on to explain that this was a late start as Attila was 
  fearful of the result and hoped that ‘impending darkness 
  might come to his aid if the outcome should be 
  disastrous.’ This most probably means nine hours after 
  dawn, or about one in the afternoon rather than nine 
  in the morning. This late start is more easily 
  accounted for by the time it would have taken 
  Aetius to move his army from Fontvannes to a 
  position overlooking Attila’s lines above the 
  modern village of Grange-l’Evêque rather than 
  insecurity on Attila’s part. Setting off at dawn, 
  Aetius and Theodoric could have reached the 
  heights above the modern hamlet of Grange-
  l’Evêque, 7km from Attila’s camp on the banks of 
  the Seine, and deployed their army ready for battle 
  shortly after noon.
  Attila’s light cavalry scouts would have been 
  shadowing Aetius’ movements. As soon as he was 
  aware that Aetius was deploying for battle, Attila 
  would have marshalled his host in the wide 
  open plains around Troyes and prepared to 
  meet the enemy.
   
  This 5th-century wood carving 
  from Egypt, now in the 
  Museum für Byzantinische 
  Kunst, Berlin, shows late Roman 
  soldiers defending a city from 
  marauding tribesmen. 
  Although the garrisons of Gallic 
  cities had been run down, if the 
  defenders held their nerve they 
  could keep the Huns at bay, as 
  the latter could not afford to 
  get bogged down in a long 
  siege.
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  55
  THE BATTLEFIELD
  ‘The armies met … in the Catalaunian Fields. The battlefield was a plain 
  rising by a sharp slope to a ridge, which both armies sought to gain; for 
  advantage of position is a great help’ (Jordanes). This is the most detailed 
  description we have of the battlefield. It is not much to go on and, to quote 
  the modern historian Arther Ferrill, searching for the exact location has ‘been 
  a favourite occupation of retired colonels for many years’.
  The clash between Aetius and Attila is commonly called the ‘Battle of 
  Châlons’. This results from Jordanes saying that it took place in the 
  Catalaunian Fields. The modern city of Châlons-en-Champagne was called 
  Duro Catalaunum in Roman times. The Catalaunian Fields must, therefore, 
  take its name from Châlons-en-Champagne. However, earlier in his account 
  Jordanes says that the armies met ‘in the Catalaunian Fields, which are also 
  called Mauriacian, extending in length 100 leagues, as the Gauls express it, 
  and 70 in width. Now a Gallic league measures a distance of 1,500 paces.’ 
  So Jordanes’ description is generic rather than specific. An area 150,000 
  paces long and 105,000 wide is hardly a pinpoint location. Rather it is an 
  area that equates to the plains of modern Champagne with Châlons-en-
  Champagne at the northern end and Troyes about 80km further south.
  THE BATTLE
  As Aetius neared the heights 
  above the Catalaunian Fields, 
  he would have seen the ridge 
  off to his right which was 
  probably occupied by 
  rearguard detachments of 
  Attila’s army. Therefore he 
  tasked Thorismund to drive  
  off the enemy, possibly 
  accompanying the Goths 
  himself.
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  56
  Jordanes gives the alternate name of Mauriacus or Maurica, which is also 
  used by Gregory of Tours and other Gallic chroniclers. The unknown 
  continuator of the Chronicle of Prosper is quite specific about where this is: 
  ‘The battle takes place five miles [8km] from Troyes at a place called Maurica 
  in Champagne.’ For five miles the ground to the west of Troyes is absolutely 
  flat but then it rises up to a sharp ridge now called Montgueux. This is just 
  as Jordanes describes the battlefield.
  Writing in the Revue Historique in 1885, M. Girard observed that in his 
  day the area around Montgueux was known as ‘les Maures’ and that there 
  was a road running north-west from Troyes known as the ‘Voie des Maures’. 
  Even today modern French maps name the flat farmland between Montgueux 
  and Troyes as ‘les Maurattes’. There are further indications that long 
  forgotten memories of the battle still exist in modern place names. The area 
  just at the foot of the ridge is called ‘l’Enfer’ or ‘hell’. If the ridge of Montgueux 
  is indeed the ridge from which Thorismund’s Visigoths charged down into 
  the flank of Attila’s army, then ‘hell’ would be an appropriate name. Jordanes 
  says that a brook ‘flowing between low banks through the plain was greatly 
  increased by blood from the wounds of the slain. It was not flooded by 
  showers, as brooks usually rise, but was swollen by a strange stream and 
  turned into a torrent by the increase of blood.’ There is indeed a small stream 
  running towards Troyes from the west and the area surrounding it, now an 
  industrial estate, is today called ‘la Rivière de Corps’ (the river of bodies).
  Is there any possibility, however, that the battle could have taken place 
  near Châlons-en-Champagne and therefore be legitimately called the Battle 
  of Châlons?
  The area to the south of Châlons-en-Champagne is open and relatively 
  flat, although there are more undulations than the perfectly flat plain to the 
  west of Troyes. It would have been suitable for Attila’s cavalry but not quite 
  as good as the latter. Just over 30km south-west of Châlons-en-Champagne 
  there is indeed a prominent piece of high ground near the modern town of 
  Vertus. It is known today as Le Mont Aimé and it completely dominates the 
  plains below. Unlike Montgueux 
  near Troyes, it is a high hill rather 
  than a ridge and its slopes are very 
  steep. Troops on the heights of 
  Mont Aimé would have had to pick 
  their way carefully down the sides 
  of the hill and could not have 
  charged down with anything like 
  the impact that Thorismund could 
  have done on the relatively gentle 
  slope of the Montgueux ridge. 
  There are remnants of medieval 
  fortifications at the top of Mont 
  Aimé, built on top of Carolingian 
  works which in turn are renovations 
  of Roman defences. If this was a 
  known fortified site then we might 
  have expected at least one ancient 
  historian to mention it by name, 
  but this is not the case.
  This stele, now in the 
  Hermitage Museum, St 
  Petersburg, is thought to 
  represent an Alan. Such men 
  fought under Sangiban in the 
  centre of the Romano-Visigoth 
  array.
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  57
  The strategic situation also argues against the battle taking place close to 
  Châlons-en-Champagne. To reach the latter on his retreat from Orléans, 
  Attila would have had to first fall back on Troyes and then head north along 
  the eastern bank of the Seine for another 80km. Why would he have done 
  this when the terrain around Troyes was so perfectly suited for open cavalry 
  action and he had an agreement with Bishop Lupus to supply him?
  What then of archaeological evidence? Unfortunately there is very little. 
  The only significant discovery is the ‘treasure of Pouan’. Uncovered in 1842, 
  this magnificent find is now displayed in the Musée Saint-Loup at Troyes. It 
  consists of two swords and various pieces of gold jewellery including a signet 
  ring engraved with the name Heva. Dated to the second half of the 5th 
  century the decoration of the swords are of Western origin while other items 
  show Danubian influences. Initially it was thought that these may have been 
  the grave goods of King Theodoric but this is now generally discounted. It is 
  unlikely that the Visigoths would have buried their king near the battlefield 
  rather than taking the body back to Toulouse. Possibly, given the mixed 
  Western and Eastern origins of the artefacts, the treasure of Pouan could 
  have come from the grave of one of Attila’s notable followers. Pouan is just 
  40km to the north-east of the probable battlefield and could well have been 
  on the route of Attila’s withdrawal. On the other hand some archaeologists 
  argue that the items are from a few years after the battle and may have 
  nothing to do with it at all. However, such a significant find from about the 
  right time and so close to the battlefield does give pause for thought.
  One other possible site for the battle given by modern historians is near the 
  village of Méry-sur-Seine, 30km north-west of Troyes. This is because of the 
  proximity to Pouan and the possibility that the name Méry could be derived 
  from ‘Mauriacus’. However, the terrain there is not an open plain and there are 
  no features that conform to any descriptions of the battle.
  There can be little doubt that the battle took place five Roman miles west 
  of Troyes just as the Gallic chronicler said it did. The Battle of Campus 
  Mauriacus, if not the Battle of Troyes, is probably the most accurate term for 
  the encounter at the Catalaunian Fields in 451. The ridge described by 
  Jordanes is the ridge of Montgueux and Attila was probably camped on the 
  banks of the Seine to the north of Troyes at Saint-Lyé. Aetius followed his 
  retreat from Orléans closely, camped overnight at the source of the Vanne 
  and then moved into position on the heights above the modern hamlet of 
  Grange-l’Evêque, seizing the ridge of Montgueux and offering battle on the 
  plains below.
  This is a view of the Montgueux 
  ridge from the south from the 
  Roman road leading to Troyes. 
  It is much steeper on this side, 
  and although Aetius could have 
  skirted it here and then swung 
  up to the north, the terrain 
  does not accord with Jordanes’ 
  description of the battle.
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  58
  THE OPENING MOVES
  From Fontvannes it is just over 8km to the summit of the heights overlooking 
  the plains to the east. The ground rises relatively gently towards the north-
  east before dropping off fairly sharply to the flat beyond Grange-l’Evêque. 
  There are two good routes leading up the high ground to the left of the 
  Montgueux ridge. These would have allowed Aetius to advance in two 
  columns about 1km apart. Leaving at dawn, Aetius’ lead elements could have 
  been above Grange-l’Evêque by around 8 a.m. From here the Romano-
  Visigoths had a perfect overview of the Campus Mauriacus all the way to the 
  Seine. Aetius and Theodoric would have been able to see Attila’s camp and 
  observe their enemy’s movements.
  Aetius had an alternative route open to him. He could have sent some or 
  all of his forces directly east along the Roman road towards Troyes, skirting 
  the Montgueux ridge to the south and then just before reaching Troyes 
  swung north to face Attila to the west of the town. The main problem with 
  this is that the slope of the ridge on the southern side is very steep, placing 
  any troops he might have sent to contest the ridge at a severe disadvantage. 
  We cannot know for certain but on balance of probabilities it is much more 
  likely that Aetius would have chosen the route to the north-east of the ridge 
  which gave him a relatively easy approach to the high ground and the 
  opportunity to observe his enemy’s deployment before descending to the 
  plains to offer battle.
  It is highly unlikely that Attila would have simply sat back and waited. 
  No doubt his mobile horse archers would have been observing Aetius’ 
  movements and shadowing his approach, 
  sending word back to Attila to give him 
  plenty of time to deploy.
  According to Jordanes the battle 
  began with a fight to take the Montgueux 
  ridge. He says that ‘the Huns with their 
  forces seized the right side, the Romans, 
  the Visigoths and their allies the left, and 
  then began a struggle for the yet untaken 
  crest.’ This is not overly helpful as right 
  or left varies according to one’s 
  perspective. It is reasonable to assume 
  that Jordanes would have taken Aetius’ 
  perspective rather than Attila’s. If this is 
  the case, and if Aetius did indeed advance 
  along the two routes to the north-west of 
  the Montgueux ridge, then to take the 
  ridge he would have had to send the 
  forces on his right flank to advance up 
  the left side. This also fits with Aetius’ 
  battle deployment, which has the 
  Visigoths on his right flank. The force 
  which contested command of the ridge 
  with the Huns was led by Aetius and 
  Thorismund and therefore must have 
  been primarily or exclusively Visigoths.
  This magnificent 4th-century 
  Roman helmet from the 
  Danube frontier would have 
  been worn by a leader of the 
  highest rank. Such helmets 
  would have been prized by 
  Huns, Goths and others who 
  equipped themselves from 
  Roman arsenals. (Jebulon 
  Muzej Vojvodine, Novi Sad)
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  59
  River Seine
  Troyes
  Grange-
  l’Évêque
  Les Maurattes
  l’Enfer
   Hun covering force
  Hun reinforcements
  Aetius’
  camp
  Fontvannes
  Attila’s
  camp
  Rivière-de-Corps
  1.  Thorismund leads the Visigoth advance 
  guard to drive off the Hun covering force. 
  2.  Attila sends reinforcements to cover the 
  withdrawal of his covering force. 
  3.  Aetius, Sangiban and Theodoric deploy 
  their forces on the plains between Les 
  Régales and the Montgueux ridge.
  4.  Attila deploys his army to attack. 
  2
  3
  1
  4
  Les Régales
  Montgueux ridge
  Roman and
  allied cavalry
  Roman and
  allied cavalry
  Alan cavalry
  Visigoth light
  infantry
  Visigoth
  light infantry
  Aetius
  Thorismund
  Roman and
  allied foot
  Visigoth foot
  Mounted Visigoths
  N
  1 mile
  1km
  0
  0
  The situation in the morning of 20 June 451. Aetius and Theodoric advance north-west along two parallel routes to seize the high 
  ground above the modern village of Grange-l’Évêque. Thorismund engages the Hun covering force and drives them from the 
  Montgueux ridge.
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  60
  Jordanes’ description of the battle makes it seem 
  as if Attila only decided to fight for the high ground 
  as an afterthought: ‘Attila sent his men to take the 
  summit of the mountain, but was outstripped by 
  Thorismund and Aetius, who in their effort to gain 
  the top of the hill reached higher ground and through 
  this advantage of position easily routed the Huns as 
  they came up.’ This is highly unlikely. The Hun 
  covering force would have fallen back as Aetius’ 
  army moved forward. As the Romano-Visigoths 
  passed to the north-west of the ridge, it is most likely 
  that the Huns would have pulled back to the summit 
  to observe their enemy’s movements. Aetius would 
  not have wanted to leave them there and so he 
  probably tasked Thorismund with taking the summit 
  while the rest of the army continued their march.
  The fight for the ridge was clearly a prelude to 
  the main battle. It may have been nothing more than 
  Thorismund chasing off a small detachment of Hun 
  scouts, although it is conceivable that Attila 
  reinforced them. If Attila did send reinforcements to 
  contest the ridge then it could explain Jordanes’ 
  statement that Aetius and Thorismund reached the 
  summit first. The eastern slope is relatively steep, 
  while the western slope is gentle. Thorismund would 
  have had little difficulty getting to the top while any Hun reinforcements 
  would have had to pick their way carefully along the re-entrants to gain 
  the heights.
  It is not possible that Attila had any intention of forcing a decisive 
  engagement to take the high ground. If he had wanted to fight over hilly, 
  difficult terrain, he could have done so closer to Orléans. His army was 
  suited to a battle on flat, open ground and that is why he had fallen back on 
  Troyes. If Attila did indeed send reinforcements up the ridge, his intention 
  The treasure of Pouan now in the 
  Musée Saint-Loup, Troyes. Found 
  to the north of the battlefield in 
  the 19th century, it was once 
  thought that these may have 
  been the burial goods of King 
  Theodoric. However, it is more 
  likely that they belonged to one 
  of Attila’s notable followers 
  interred on the withdrawal.
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  61
  could only have been to disrupt Aetius’ movements, make his opponent’s life 
  more difficult and give himself more time to deploy as he wished. Despite 
  Jordanes claim that Attila’s army was ‘thrown into confusion’ by Thorismund’s 
  success in taking the high ground, the outcome of the fight was inevitable.
  What probably happened was that Thorismund led a detachment of 
  Visigoths from the right wing of the army to move up the left slope of the 
  ridge and drive off the Hun covering force. Possibly Aetius 
  accompanied him.
  Most of the Visigoths would have been mounted but they may have been 
  accompanied by some light infantry. As the Visigoths approached, the Huns 
  would have kept their distance, probably splitting up into small groups and 
  harassing their enemy with arrows and then withdrawing out of harm’s way. 
  The slopes of the ridge are broken up with several scrubby re-entrants. Very 
  soon the Huns would have run out of space and been at risk to Visigoth light 
  infantry, who could have winkled their way through dead ground and come 
  up behind them. After a few volleys of arrows the Huns on the ridge would 
  have had to either engage their enemy in hand-to-hand combat or pull back 
  off the heights to rejoin their main army. If Attila did send reinforcements up 
  the hill, it is most likely that they would have been sent to help his covering 
  force achieve a clean break rather than a concerted effort to keep control of 
  the summit. He wanted to fight on the flat and the battle for the ridge was 
  merely a delaying action.
  DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE
  Assuming Aetius’ vanguard had reached the high ground above the modern 
  village of Grange-l’Evêque by about 8 a.m., the fight for the summit of 
  Montgueux must have taken place sometime after that. Probably by 11 a.m. 
  Thorismund would have been in command of the heights and the Hun 
  covering force had withdrawn to rejoin their main army. Meanwhile Aetius, 
  Sangiban and Theodoric would be leading the rest of the army down onto 
  the plains to deploy for battle.
  This is the view looking south 
  from the centre of Aetius’ line 
  to the ridge of Montgueux.
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  62
  INITIAL DEPLOYMENT, MIDDAY 20 JUNE
  Following the skirmish to seize the ridge, the two armies have deployed for battle. Aetius and Theodoric 
  have descended from the heights and adopted a defensive position to await Attila’s attack. Thorismund is 
  still on the ridge out of sight from Attila’s lines.
  1
  4
  EVENTS
  1. Having driven off the Hun scouts, Thorismund’s men remain out of sight behind the 
  crest of the ridge. 
  2. Attila’s Huns would probably have deployed in several lines in order to attack the 
  enemy with successive waves of horse archers. 
  3. We do not know where many of the Germanic allies were deployed; possibly they 
  formed a second line to give the Ostrogoth and Gepid cavalry steady infantry to rally 
  back on. 
  4. Theodoric may have kept a small mounted reserve – he is recorded as riding up and 
  down the line to steady his troops. Many of his warriors would have ridden to battle 
  and then dismounted to fight on foot.  
  5. Faced with a primarily cavalry enemy, Aetius probably kept his mounted troops 
  behind his infantry ready to counter-attack. 
  C
  H
  2
  3
  4
  6
  7
  ROMANO-VISIGOTHS (RED)
  1. Aetius 
  2. Sangiban 
  3. Theodoric 
  4. Thorismund 
  5. Visigoth foot 
  6. Visigoth cavalry 
  7. Visigoth skirmishers 
  8. Alan cavalry 
  9. Roman and allied foot 
  10. Roman and allied cavalry 
  8
  8
  8
  5
  5
  5
  6
  6
  6
  7
  H
  F
  F
  THEODORIC
  X X X
  AETIUS
  X X X
  3
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  63
  2
  3
  5
  Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km (0.62 miles)
  ATTILA
  X X X X
  A
  B
  D
  F
  1
  9
  0
  ATTILA’S ARMY (BLUE)
  A. Ardaric 
  B. Attila 
  C. Valamir 
  D. Gepids 
  E. Franks 
  F. Other Germanic foot 
  G. Huns 
  H. Ostrogoths 
  10
  9
  9
  9
  9
  9
  G
  G
  G
  G
  G
  G
  G
  E
  F
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  64
  Aetius would have been in a stronger tactical position had he remained on 
  the high ground rather than descending to the plains below. However, he 
  needed a decisive battle. If he had remained on the heights, Attila could simply 
  have refused battle and stayed in his well-supplied camp on the Seine leaving 
  Aetius stuck on a hill with no water source. Furthermore, Aetius’ unlikely 
  conglomeration of allies would have begun to drift away if the campaign 
  became bogged down into a war of attrition. The position Aetius chose was, 
  therefore, strong but not so strong as to tempt Attila to refuse or delay battle.
  One of the greatest problems facing a mobile horse-archer enemy is 
  protecting the flanks and rear of the army. If Aetius had advanced out into 
  the middle of the plain then Attila’s more numerous and more mobile cavalry 
  could have encircled him. Therefore it is probable that Aetius deployed with 
  his right flank protected by the ridge of Montgueux, now occupied by 
  Thorismund’s Visigoths. To his rear was the high ground he had just passed 
  over and a wooded spur, known today as Les Régales, extended out into the 
  plains to effectively protect his left flank. There was no practical way for 
  Attila to get around his flanks or rear and if things went badly Aetius could 
  withdraw back up onto the high ground where pursuit would be more difficult.
  Theodoric and the Visigoths held the right wing. Although many of them 
  would have ridden into battle, it is quite likely that most or all would have 
  dismounted to form a shieldwall in order to be less vulnerable to Hun archery. 
  Thorismund’s contingent probably remained on the heights of the Montgueux 
  ridge, still mounted in order to be able to quickly move down and influence 
  the battle at a critical moment. Looking up from the plains below it is possible 
  to see the edge of the crest, but the slope of the ridge is such that any troops 
  just a few metres back cannot be seen. Once he had lost the fight for the hill, 
  Attila could not have known whether or not some enemy were still there.
  Aetius placed Sangiban’s Alans in the centre, ‘thus contriving with military 
  caution to surround by a host of faithful troops the man in whose loyalty 
  they had little confidence. For one who has difficulties placed in the way of 
  his flight readily submits to the necessity of fighting’ (Jordanes). The left wing 
  was held by the Romans, presumably also including the other smaller 
  This silvered helmet now in the 
  Germanisches Nationalmuseu, 
  Nuremberg, is a fine example of 
  what is thought to be a typical 
  late Roman infantry helmet. It is 
  characterised by a two-part 
  bowl held together by a central 
  ridge, often with a metal or 
  horsehair plume attached. The 
  original would have had cheek 
  guards. The nose guard is 
  relatively unusual for this 
  helmet style. (Wolfgang 
  Sauber)
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  65
  contingents such as the Franks, Burgundians, Saxons and Armoricans. We 
  have no details as to how they were deployed but probably, like the Visigoths, 
  the majority formed a shieldwall supported by foot archers, perhaps with a 
  mounted contingent held back in reserve ready to intervene in case the enemy 
  broke through or to exploit success.
  Attila had plenty of time to move out from his camp and marshal his 
  forces while his covering force was delaying Aetius on the heights of 
  Montgueux. He had never been defeated in battle and he was in a position 
  of his own choosing, even if Aetius’ deployment dictated a frontal assault. 
  His army was rested and well supplied, thanks to the Bishop of Troyes, and 
  he should have been feeling quite confident.
  Jordanes, however, paints a very different picture:
  Then Attila, king of the Huns, was taken aback by [the retreat from Orléans] 
  and lost confidence in his own troops, so that he feared to begin the conflict. 
  While he was meditating on flight; a greater calamity than death itself; he 
  decided to inquire into the future through soothsayers. So, as was their 
  custom, they examined the entrails of cattle and certain streaks in bones that 
  had been scraped, and foretold disaster to the Huns. Yet as a slight consolation 
  they prophesied that the chief commander of the foe they were to meet should 
  fall and mar by his death the rest of the victory and the triumph. Now Attila 
  deemed the death of Aetius a thing to be desired even at the cost of his own 
  life, for Aetius stood in the way of his plans. So although he was disturbed by 
  this prophecy, yet inasmuch as he was a man who sought counsel of omens in 
  all warfare, he began the battle with anxious heart.
  The area at the foot of the 
  Montgueux ridge is marked on 
  modern French maps as ‘l’Enfer’ 
  or ‘hell’. This is the slope where 
  Thorismund’s Goths would 
  have charged down onto the 
  left flank of Attila’s line.
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  66
  Writing after the event much of this is probably hindsight on Jordanes’ part 
  laced with a fair amount of dramatic licence. He would have been in no 
  position to understand Attila’s mind. It may be true that the king of the Huns 
  had not counted on an alliance between Aetius and Theodoric nor on being 
  rebuffed from the gates of Orléans, but Attila had no reason to suppose that 
  he might lose the battle on the Mauriacian Plains outside Troyes. As it turned 
  out it was Theodoric who fell in battle not Aetius, but again the whole 
  passage was written well after the events were known.
  Jordanes goes on to describe Attila’s deployment:
  The battle line of the Huns was arranged so that Attila and his bravest 
  followers were stationed in the centre. In arranging them thus the king had 
  chiefly his own safety in view, since by his position in the very midst of his race 
  he would be kept out of the way of threatening danger. The innumerable 
  peoples of the divers tribes, which he had subjected to his sway, formed the 
  wings.
  The Ostrogoths held Attila’s left wing and the Gepids the right. We have no 
  idea how the other minor contingents were arrayed. ‘Now the rest of the crowd 
  of kings (if we may call them so) and the leaders of various nations hung upon 
  Attila’s nod like slaves, and when he gave a sign even by a glance, without a 
  murmur each stood forth in fear and trembling and did as he was bid.’
  The Franks, Burgundians, Thuringians, Alamanni, Rugians, Heruls and 
  other smaller contingents were possibly split between the Ostrogoth and 
  Gepid wings but if so we have no indication in what proportion nor on 
  which wing they may have been stationed. None of our sources make any 
  mention of their parts in the battle. Probably the vast majority of Attila’s 
  allies would have been mounted and some of the German contingents who 
  traditionally fought on foot may have formed a second line for the cavalry 
  to rally back on.
  The view from the left of Attila’s 
  line looking towards the 
  position where Theodoric’s 
  Visigoths would have been 
  stationed. The ridge of 
  Montgueux is on the left, where 
  Thorismund’s men could have 
  easily been concealed.
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  Jordanes claims that Attila’s army was thrown into confusion by losing 
  the fight for command of the heights of Montgueux. As a result Attila felt the 
  need to give a speech of encouragement to his troops before the general 
  engagement began. As with much of Jordanes’ account we should not take 
  this too literally but it does indicate that the battle for the hill was a prelude 
  to the main action. The speech, of course, is a dramatic device but the words 
  Jordanes invented (or copied from another source) do give some indication 
  of the tactical considerations and possible attitudes:
  Here you stand, after conquering mighty nations and subduing the world. I 
  therefore think it foolish for me to goad you with words, as though you were 
  men who had not been proved in action. Let a new leader or an untried army 
  resort to that. It is not right for me to say anything common, nor ought you 
  to listen. For what is war but your usual custom? Or what is sweeter for a 
  brave man than to seek revenge with his own hand? It is a right of nature to 
  glut the soul with vengeance. Let us then attack the foe eagerly; for they are 
  ever the bolder who make the attack. Despise this union of discordant races! 
  To defend oneself by alliance is proof of cowardice.
  See, even before our attack they are smitten with terror. They seek the heights, 
  they seize the hills and, repenting too late, clamour for protection against battle 
  in the open fields. You know how slight a matter the Roman attack is. While they 
  are still gathering in order and forming in one line with locked shields, they are 
  checked, I will not say by the first wound, but even by the dust of battle.
  Then on to the fray with stout hearts, as is your wont. Despise their battle 
  line. Attack the Alans, smite the Visigoths! Seek swift victory in that spot 
  where the battle rages. For when the sinews are cut the limbs soon relax, nor 
  can a body stand when you have taken away the bones. Let your courage rise 
  and your own fury burst forth! Now show your cunning, Huns, now your 
  deeds of arms! Let the wounded exact in return the death of his foe; let the 
  unwounded revel in slaughter of the enemy.
  This is the view from the centre 
  of Attila’s lines looking towards 
  the modern village of Grange 
  l’Évêque. Nestled into the high 
  ground behind him, Aetius’ 
  right flank was protected by the 
  Montgueux ridge, and his left 
  by the wooded high ground 
  now known as Les Regales.
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  68
  No spear shall harm those who are sure to live; and those who are sure to 
  die. Fate overtakes even in peace. And finally, why should Fortune have made 
  the Huns victorious over so many nations, unless it were to prepare them for 
  the joy of this conflict … Even a mass of federated nations could not endure 
  the sight of the Huns. I am not deceived in the issue: here is the field so many 
  victories have promised us. I shall hurl the first spear at the foe. If any can 
  stand at rest while Attila fights, he is a dead man.
  It is interesting that the words Jordanes puts into Attila’s mouth emphasise 
  the locked shields of the Romano-Visigoth line and the defensive position 
  they adopted. He also stresses the point that Aetius and Theodoric kept to 
  the heights rather than advancing all the way out into the open plains. It is 
  not much to go on but it does seem to confirm Aetius’ deployment being 
  tucked into the hills and probably centred on the modern village of Grange-
  l’Evêque with the ridge of Montgueux protecting his right and Les Régales 
  protecting his left. Aetius may have taken the strategic initiative by forcing 
  Attila back from Orléans but once in position he set up a defensive array, 
  enticing Attila to attack him.
  THE CLASH OF BATTLE LINES
  Unfortunately the details we have of the actual combat are very sketchy. 
  Again we have to depend almost exclusively on Jordanes. His account only 
  describes the action on the Visigoth wing and almost completely ignores 
  everyone else. Therefore any reconstruction must fall back on conjecture 
  based on what we know about the fighting methods of the troops involved.
  From the top to the Montgueux 
  ridge Thorismund would have 
  had this clear view of the plains 
  below. It would have been 
  relatively easy for him to 
  remain concealed behind the 
  crest of the ridge until the 
  opportune moment to charge 
  into the left flank of Attila’s 
  army.
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  69
  Although Jordanes says that Attila positioned himself in the middle of his 
  battle array due to safety considerations, it is far more likely that this was 
  done with the intent of breaking through in the centre. Due to the high, 
  rough ground on both flanks he could not hope to envelop his enemy. He 
  would have seen that Aetius had put his weakest troops, the Alans, in the 
  centre and had time to readjust his deployment to take advantage of this. He 
  probably hoped that the Ostrogoths on the left and the Gepids on the right 
  would be able to pin the Visigoths and Romans respectively, giving the Huns 
  time to break the Alans, separate the two main enemy contingents and then 
  turn out on them.
  The Alan contingent was relatively small so the Huns in the centre would 
  have overlapped the opposing Roman and Visigoth wings. This would have 
  allowed Attila to support the Ostrogoth and Gepid attacks with his horse 
  archers, weakening and disrupting the enemy line and making it more 
  vulnerable to a charge. It is rare for a mounted charge to succeed against 
  determined infantry. If, however, the latter are weakened by archery, causing 
  the integrity of the line to break up, then a frontal cavalry charge can 
  possibly succeed.
  The Huns would have attacked in a succession of wedge-shaped bands to 
  maximise the effect of their archery. Ammianus says that ‘they purposely 
  divide suddenly into scattered bands and attack, rushing about in disorder 
  here and there, dealing terrific slaughter.’ This is maybe what it seemed like 
  to a Roman observer but effective horse-archer tactics would have required 
  a great deal of training, teamwork, coordination and control. What 
  Ammianus calls ‘rushing about in disorder’ would have been anything but 
  that. Each man would have to keep his place, maintain sufficient spacing to 
  allow for turns and follow closely the signals given by the horsetail standard 
  of his leader.
  Lajos Kassai’s modern horse-archery experiments have shown how it is 
  possible to cover a 90m course in under seven seconds, firing three accurate 
  arrows in the process. Each horse archer holds a bunch of arrows in his left 
  hand against his bow and fires in rapid succession. The first shots are on the 
  ride towards the enemy, the next as the unit splits right and left, shooting to 
  the side, and the final ‘Parthian shot’ to the rear as the men gallop back 
  towards their own lines.
  The physical and psychological impact on the Romans and Visigoths 
  cowering behind their shields must have been immense. The initial wedge 
  formation would have concentrated a storm of arrows on a relatively narrow 
  front. The men who suffered this would then have to stand firm as a fierce-
  looking bunch of men galloped towards them with ill intent. Then suddenly 
  the Huns would break right and left and wheel back towards their own lines 
  loosing two more arrow storms in the process. Giving the target no respite, 
  a second line would be advancing forward in the same way while the first 
  line peeled back. The Huns could keep this up for hours, attacking in 
  successive waves until gaps began to appear in the shield wall and an 
  opportunity was presented for hand-to-hand combat.
  The Romans and Visigoths would have been supported by archers firing 
  over the heads of the spearmen and most of the spearmen also had javelins 
  or darts. Even though the volume of missiles would have been nothing like 
  what the Huns could deliver, they were not entirely hapless victims. Protected 
  by large oval shields the impact of the Huns’ charges would have been mostly 
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  THE HUN ATTACK (PP. 70–71)
  In wedge formation the Huns have loosed an arrow storm against 
  the defending Romans, and now the lead men break right and left 
  to ride along the Roman front shooting more arrows at close 
  range. They will keep this up with a succession of charges until the 
  enemy shieldwall begins to waver, at which point they will close 
  in with spears and swords. The psychological impact of the 
  charging horsemen and arrow storm would have been immense, 
  but protected by their large oval shields the Romans will only 
  suffer a few casualties as long as they hold their nerve.
  Seeing the rear ranks beginning to waver, the Roman officer 
  (1) is encouraging his men, reminding them that as long as they 
  hold their formation they will be able to withstand the Huns. His 
  shield pattern identifies the unit as the Batavi Iuniores. We do not 
  know which units were present at the battle but this unit is listed 
  in the Notitia Dignitatum as part of the Gallic field army in the 
  early 5th century.
  Armed with light javelins and darts in addition to their spears, 
  the Roman infantry (2) are able to give some response to the 
  Huns even when it does not come to close combat. The darts, 
  called martiobarbuli, are held in a clip behind the shields. No 
  doubt there would be a rank of archers behind the heavy infantry 
  who would be firing overhead.
  The Huns (3) are well armed with Roman armour and weapons 
  supplementing their native equipment. The formidable composite 
  bow, however, remains their primary weapon and the addition of 
  Roman armour is no impediment to their mobility. Several men 
  have spears slung from their backs and lassos from their saddles, 
  which they would use when it came to close combat.
  1
  2
  3
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  73
  psychological. As long as the shieldwall held its nerve, with men from the 
  rear ranks moving up to replace casualties, they could endure. This seems to 
  be what happened.
  Hand to hand they clashed in battle, and the fight grew fierce, confused, 
  monstrous, unrelenting – a fight whose like no ancient time has ever recorded. 
  There such deeds were done that a brave man who missed this marvellous 
  spectacle could not hope to see anything so wonderful all his life long. For, if 
  we may believe our elders, a brook flowing between low banks through the 
  plain was greatly increased by blood from the wounds of the slain. It was not 
  flooded by showers, as brooks usually rise, but was swollen by a strange 
  stream and turned into a torrent by the increase of blood. Those whose 
  wounds drove them to slake their parching thirst drank water mingled with 
  gore. In their wretched plight they were forced to drink what they thought was 
  the blood they had poured from their own wounds. (Jordanes)
  The fight in the centre would have been slightly different. The Alans had no 
  tradition of fighting on foot and many of them would have been armed and 
  equipped in a similar manner to the Huns. Rather than presenting a solid 
  shieldwall, the Alan horse archers would have responded in kind, exchanging 
  arrows with the Huns with bands from both sides becoming intermingled as 
  they rode through and around each other. The Alans, however, were not 
  entirely devoted to Aetius’ cause and it seems as though the Huns had the 
  better of them. Jordanes says that the Visigoths became separated from the 
  Alans, probably as the latter began to fall back.
  This is the position at the 
  extreme left of Attila’s line. Just 
  behind the crest of the ridge 
  Thorismund’s Visigoths would 
  have been waiting for the 
  opportune moment to crash 
  into the left flank of Attila’s 
  army.
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  74
  THE TURNING POINT, LATE AFTERNOON 20 JUNE
  The Huns have broken through in the centre, driving the Alans back and separating the Visigoth and Roman 
  wings. King Theodoric is killed as he rallies his men and at this critical moment Thorismund charges down 
  the ridge into the enemy flank.
  1
  2
  3
  4
  EVENTS
  1. Sangiban’s Alans are driven back by the Huns in the centre. 
  2. The Huns turn in on the flanks of the Romans and Visigoths. King Theodoric is killed 
  when he rides up to rally his men as the Visigoth line begins to waiver.  
  3. Roman and allied cavalry reserves move up to plug the gap created by the 
  retreating Alans.  
  4. Thorismund leads his men down the ridge and into the flank of the Ostrogoths.  
  5. The Roman and allied foot manage to hold successive charges by Ardaric’s 
  Germanic warriors. 
  C
  H
  1
  2
  3
  6
  10
  ROMANO-VISIGOTHS (RED)
  1. Aetius 
  2. Sangiban 
  3. Theodoric 
  4. Thorismund 
  5. Visigoth foot 
  6. Visigoth cavalry 
  7. Visigoth skirmishers 
  8. Alan cavalry 
  9. Roman and allied foot 
  10. Roman and allied cavalry 
  10
  9
  8
  8
  8
  5
  5
  5
  6
  6
  7
  H
  F
  F
  G
  G
  G
  G
  G
  THEODORIC
  X X X
  AETIUS
  X X X
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  75
  5
  Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km (0.62 miles)
  ATTILA
  X X X X
  A
  B
  D
  F
  7
  9
  ATTILA’S ARMY (BLUE)
  A. Ardaric 
  B. Attila 
  C. Valamir 
  D. Gepids 
  E. Franks 
  F. Other Germanic foot 
  G. Huns 
  H. Ostrogoths 
  9
  9
  9
  G
  G
  E
  F
  F
  G
  7
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  76
  The left flank of the Visigoths suffered from Hun archery and was in 
  danger of being outflanked as the Alans retired. Meanwhile, the main part of 
  their line had to face a succession of charges from their Ostrogoth cousins. 
  Here shock action rather than archery would have been the order of the day. 
  Armed with lances and javelins the Ostrogoths would have ridden towards 
  the Visigoth line, hoping to break it by sheer force. If the men in the shieldwall 
  held their nerve, presenting an unbroken line of spears and shields and 
  closing any gaps as soon as they appeared, the horsemen would have been 
  unable to break through. They may have exchanged a few blows with the 
  front ranks of the infantry but then would have been forced to wheel back 
  and rally for a second charge.
  Presumably (because we have no source which gives any information of 
  the action on that wing), a similar situation was occurring on Aetius’ left 
  wing where the Romans, Franks, Burgundians, Saxons and Armoricans faced 
  Ardaric’s Gepids and others. Here some of the combat may have been 
  between infantry forces as many of Attila’s other Germanic allies preferred 
  to fight on foot.
  A clash of two opposing infantry formations would have been more 
  deliberate than the mounted actions. As Attila’s Germanic foot advanced on 
  Aetius’ Romans and Germans, both sides would try to intimidate the other 
  by clashing their spears on their shields and raising the barritus war cry: ‘a 
  shout which they raise when a fight is actually at boiling point; it begins with 
  a low murmur and gradually increases in volume until it resounds like the 
  sea dashing against a cliff’ (Ammianus Marcellinus).
  The view from Mont Aimé to 
  the south-west of modern 
  Châlons. There is a remote 
  possibility that the battle could 
  have taken place here as there 
  is high ground dominating a 
  plain. However, to reach 
  Châlons Attila would have had 
  to give up a far more favourable 
  battlefield at Troyes.
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  77
  Arrows from the rear of the Roman ranks would have rained down on 
  the heads of their enemies as they came into range and then, as the lines 
  closed, a more deadly exchange of missiles would have occurred. Franks 
  would have hurled their franciscae (throwing axes) and angons (heavy 
  javelins) while the Romans would have unleashed a volley of javelins and 
  light darts. Then the lines would have clashed in close combat; the men in the 
  front ranks thrusting their shields into the faces of their enemy while seeking 
  an opportunity to stab with swords and spears. Meanwhile the rear ranks 
  would continue to shower their opponents with javelins and arrows. The 
  combat would have swayed back and forth in a deadly, drawn-out scrum.
  We do not know what was happening on Aetius’ left but it is clear that 
  the Visigoths on the right were under immense pressure. King Theodoric rode 
  up and down the line to steady his men and keep the shieldwall intact as they 
  faced the Ostrogoths while the Huns began to threaten their left flank. As he 
  was doing so, disaster struck:
  While riding by to encourage his army, Theodoric was thrown from his horse 
  and trampled under foot by his own men, thus ending his days at a ripe old 
  age. But others say he was slain by the spear of Andag of the host of the 
  Ostrogoths. (Jordanes)
  However Theodoric’s life ended, his death might easily have caused his 
  followers to break. They had been under terrible pressure. Nerves would 
  have been strained almost beyond human endurance and the death of their 
  king could have ended it. Assuming the Alans had already pulled back from 
  the line, if the Visigoths then broke, it would have been all over for Aetius.
  At that moment, however, Thorismund intervened to save the day.
  TURNING THE TIDE
  Jordanes tells us that, after being separated from the Alans and after the 
  death of Theodoric, the Visigoths ‘fell upon the horde of the Huns and nearly 
  slew Attila. But he prudently took flight and straightway shut himself and his 
  companions within the barriers of the camp, which he had fortified with 
  wagons’.
  Jordanes does not say who led this Visigoth charge but it could only have 
  been Thorismund. If the shieldwall of men on foot surged forward after their 
  enemies to avenge their king, the line would have broken up and the mounted 
  Huns and Ostrogoths would have been able to cut through them with relative 
  ease just like the Normans did to Harold’s men at Hastings.
  In the following passage Jordanes adds: ‘Thorismund, the son of King 
  Theodoric, who with Aetius had seized the hill and repulsed the enemy from 
  the higher ground, came unwittingly to the wagons of the enemy in the 
  darkness of night.’ This could confirm that it was Thorismund who led the 
  charge and then the pursuit. Rather bizarrely Jordanes says that as he reached 
  Attila’s wagons, Thorismund thought he was back at his own lines. Unless he 
  had a most unfortunate sense of direction, it is scarcely believable that 
  Thorismund could have mistaken a ride of several kilometres over flat 
  ground towards the Seine for pulling back towards the high ground over 
  which he had marched earlier in the day.
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  THE VISIGOTHS PREPARE TO CHARGE (PP. 78–79)
  After chasing the Huns off the high ground dominating the plain 
  below, Thorismund’s Visigoths have held back out of sight behind 
  the crest of the ridge. Now that Attila’s army has become 
  decisively engaged, Thorismund gathers his men to charge down 
  onto the enemy flank.
  Having ridden out in front of his men, Thorismund (1) gives the 
  signal to begin the attack. His shield pattern and clothing colours 
  are conjectural but green and red were apparently a favoured 
  Gothic colour combination. The entwined serpents on his shield 
  are similar to designs carried by Germanic cavalry serving in the 
  Roman army.
  The Gothic cavalrymen (2) would have been born within the 
  Roman Empire and had had access to Roman arms and expertise 
  for several generations. They are thus very well equipped. 
  Primarily armed with spears, they also have good swords and 
  several of them have light javelins in a case slung from the horns 
  of their saddles. They and Thorismund are clean shaven, as was 
  the Visigoth fashion at the time.
  On the plains below, the left flank of Attila’s army (3) is 
  composed of Ostrogoths and other Germans. They will bear the 
  brunt of Thorismund’s initial charge. In the centre of the battlefield 
  the Huns, attacking in a succession of wedge-shaped formations 
  (4), are making headway against Sangiban’s Alans and threatening 
  the flanks of the Visigoths and Romans on either side. In the far 
  distance, about 7km behind the lines, Attila’s camp is spread out 
  along the banks of the Seine (5).
  1
  2
  3
  4
  5
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  81
  From the Hun lines, looking up towards the ridge of Montgueux, it is 
  impossible to see anything beyond the crest. It would have been perfectly 
  easy for Thorismund to remain concealed with a fairly large body of men and 
  wait for the right moment to charge down onto the flank of his enemies while 
  they were engaged against his father and brother’s shieldwall. The flat ground 
  at the foot of the ridge to the north-west is known today as ‘l’Enfer’ or ‘hell’. 
  This place would have been at the extreme left of Attila’s line and it is aptly 
  named if it was here that Thorismund charged into the enemy flank.
  If the main engagement started some time in the early afternoon and 
  Thorismund’s pursuit brought him to the Hun camp after darkness in mid-
  summer, a great deal must have happened that is not fully explained by 
  Jordanes’ short description. It is unlikely Thorismund would have held back 
  out of the battle for hours. Most probably he would have waited for the 
  initial feints and skirmishes to end, timing his intervention to coincide with 
  the lines becoming decisively engaged. From the top of the ridge, concealed 
  in cover, Thorismund could easily have observed the entire battlefield below. 
  Possibly he saw his father fall and that may have spurred him into the attack. 
  On the other hand, as Jordanes’ chronology is far from clear, Thorismund’s 
  intervention may have been much earlier.
  These Hun horse trappings 
  found in south-western Russia 
  are of gold, decorated with 
  gemstones. The large piece is 
  an ornamental chamfron, the 
  two thin strips are bridle 
  mounts and the tube is the 
  handle of a riding whip. 
  (Walters Art Museum)
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  82
  It is more than likely that Thorismund’s men remained mounted. The 
  slope of the ridge descends relatively gently to the plains below on the north-
  eastern side. It would have given momentum to men charging down it 
  without making such a move too difficult or disruptive even if on horseback. 
  As Thorismund later led the pursuit as far as the Hun wagon laager, around 
  7km to the east, he must have been mounted to have been able to do so.
  A surprise mounted charge into the flank of enemy engaged to their front 
  would have had a devastating impact. Jordanes implies that it was then all over 
  rather quickly, with the Huns retreating immediately to the safety of their 
  fortified camp. Rather surprisingly Jordanes does not mention the Ostrogoths 
  again after their possible role in killing King Theodoric. Surely it would have 
  been the Ostrogoths on the left of the line who would have felt the initial 
  impact of Thorismund’s charge and who would have been the first to break. 
  As a Gothic propagandist it was, however, Jordanes’ job to glorify the deeds of 
  the Goths on both sides and so it is perhaps not so strange that he does not say 
  anything about the Ostrogoths being defeated. Far better to have the Visigoths 
  fall on the Huns and to speak only of the Huns in the context of defeat.
  If it is unlikely that Thorismund remained on the hill for hours, and if it 
  is true what Jordanes says about pursuit carrying on until after dark then the 
  retreat of Attila’s army must have been a gradual withdrawal rather than an 
  instant rout. The combat seems to have become very confused with the battle 
  lines breaking up and bands of men becoming separated from their comrades 
  and intermingled with those of the enemy.
   ‘Aetius also became separated from his men in the confusion of night and 
  wandered about in the midst of the enemy. Fearing disaster had happened, 
  he went about in search of the Goths. At last he reached the camp of his allies 
  and passed the remainder of the night in the protection of their shields.’ This 
  passage from Jordanes gives some indication of just how confused the battle 
  had become. If it is true that Aetius ended up in the Visigoth lines at nightfall 
  then it may indicate that the left wing also had success against the Gepids, 
  freeing him up to lead the Roman cavalry reserve in pursuit, joining up with 
  Thorismund in the centre.
  Opposite Mont Aimé there is a 
  steep ridge, which could 
  possibly be the ridge that 
  Jordanes tells of. However, the 
  slope is very steep and would 
  not be conducive to a mounted 
  charge into the flank of Attila’s 
  line.
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  83
  It is quite impossible to reconstruct the final stages of 
  the battle. Probably Thorismund’s charge was decisive 
  and turned the tide against Attila but we cannot know 
  this for certain. Possibly the Romans succeeded in 
  holding against Ardaric’s wing and some of them, led by 
  Aetius, were freed to turn their attention against the 
  Huns in the centre. If the Huns had moved into the gap 
  created by the retreating Alans then they were in danger 
  of being cut off and surrounded as their enemies moved 
  in on the wings. A retreat, therefore, was Attila’s 
  only option.
  The fighting raged on over the entire plains as the 
  Huns fell back to their wagon laager. Some bands of 
  horse archers would have covered the retreat, holding up 
  the pursuers then withdrawing behind their supports 
  who in turn would cover their move. They had plenty of 
  space to do this as the ground was flat and open for 7km 
  to the rear and many more in both directions to the 
  flanks. Evidence for an orderly withdrawal rather than a 
  rout is hinted at in Jordanes’ description of intense 
  combat right up to the Hun wagons: ‘As [Thorismund] 
  was fighting bravely, someone wounded him in the head 
  and dragged him from his horse. Then he was rescued by 
  the watchful care of his followers and withdrew from the fierce conflict.’
  Full darkness, which would have come after 10 p.m. on 20 June, put an 
  end to the fighting. Attila was defeated but his army was not destroyed. 
  ‘Attila shut himself and his companions within the barriers of the camp, 
  which he had fortified with wagons. A frail defence indeed; yet there they 
  sought refuge for their lives, whom but a little while before no walls of earth 
  could withstand’ (Jordanes). The Romans and Visigoths camped on the field, 
  apparently quite close to the Huns as on the following day we learn that a 
  shower of arrows from the Roman camp was able to keep the Huns at bay.
  This 4th-century painting 
  shows a late Roman soldier 
  wearing wrist-length mail, a 
  metal crested helmet and 
  carrying two javelins behind a 
  round or oval shield.
  This is the view from the centre 
  of Aetius’ line. The high ground 
  in the distance is to the east of 
  the Seine, where Attila had his 
  camp.
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  84
  THE PURSUIT, EVENING 20 JUNE
  Attila’s left flank crumbles and he orders a retreat back to his camp. It is a fighting withdrawal rather than a 
  rout, and fierce combat continues until darkness puts an end to it.
  EVENTS
  1. Hun horse archers closest to the enemy fall back behind supports, shooting as they 
  withdraw. 
  2. German warriors on foot may have provided stable points for the horse archers to 
  move through. 
  3. Many of the Visigoths who fought on foot during the battle would have mounted 
  up to join in the pursuit.  
  4. A second line of horse archers moves up to inflict further delay on the pursuers.  
  5. Having made a clean break from the enemy individual groups of men make their 
  own way back to the camp.  
  6. Romans and Visigoths on foot follow up behind the cavalry. 
  ROMANO-VISIGOTHS (RED)
  1. Aetius 
  2. Thorismund 
  3. Roman and allied cavalry  
  4. Visigoth mounted warriors  
  5. Visigoth foot warriors 
  6. Roman and allied infantry 
  AETIUS
  X X X
  5
  5
  6
  THORISMUND
  X X X
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  85
  Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km (0.62 miles)
  ATTILA
  X X X X
  ATTILA’S ARMY (BLUE)
  A. Attila 
  B. Huns 
  C. Germanic foot warriors 
  D. Small bands of men 
  withdrawing to the camp 
  A
  B
  D
  1
  2
  3
  4
  6
  6
  6
  6
  6
  4
  4
  4
  3
  3
  B
  B
  B
  B
  B
  B
  C
  C
  C
  C
  1
  2
  3
  4
  5
  2
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  86
  THE DAY AFTER
  At dawn on the following day, when the Romans saw the fields were piled high 
  with bodies and that the Huns did not venture forth, they thought the victory 
  was theirs, but knew that Attila would not flee from the battle unless overwhelmed 
  by a great disaster. Yet he did nothing cowardly, like one that is overcome, but 
  with clash of arms sounded the trumpets and threatened an attack. He was like 
  a lion pierced by hunting spears, who paces to and fro before the mouth of his 
  den and dares not spring, but ceases not to terrify the neighbourhood by his 
  roaring. Even so this warlike king at bay terrified his conquerors. (Jordanes)
  The victorious allied leaders got together to discuss what to do next and 
  decided to lay siege to Attila’s camp. Although the camp was well sited, it 
  was now cut off from supplies while Aetius’ army would have been able to 
  re-provision from Troyes and the surrounding countryside.
  ‘It was said that [Attila] remained supremely brave even in this extremity 
  and had heaped up a funeral pyre of horse trappings, so that if the enemy 
  should attack him, he was determined to cast himself into the flames, that 
  none might have the joy of wounding him and that the lord of so many races 
  might not fall into the hands of his foes’ (Jordanes). Hun saddles were made 
  of wood, like those still used by their descendants in central Asia today, so a 
  pyre of horse furniture would have been feasible.
  But it did not come to this. The Visigoths recovered the body of their 
  fallen king and ‘bore forth the royal majesty with sounding arms, and valiant 
  Thorismund, as befitted a son, honoured the glorious spirit of his dear father 
  by following his remains’ (Jordanes). After this Thorismund was eager to 
  avenge his father and proposed an assault on the Hun camp. Aetius dissuaded 
  him in what has become one of the many mysteries of the battle.
  Having Attila at his mercy, surely it would be logical for Aetius to finish the 
  job and destroy his enemy completely. However, Aetius had been a friend of 
  the Huns and an enemy of the Visigoths for many years. Quite possibly Aetius 
  hoped that by not destroying the Huns they could continue to provide a useful 
  balance of power to the Visigoths. This is certainly what Jordanes thought:
  Aetius feared that if the Huns were totally 
  destroyed by the Goths, the Roman 
  Empire would be overwhelmed, 
  and 
  urgently 
  advised 
  [Thorismund] to return to his 
  own dominions to take up 
  the rule which his father 
  had left. Otherwise his 
  brothers might seize 
  t h e i r  
  f a t h e r ’s 
  possessions and obtain 
  the power over the 
  Visigoths. In this case 
  Thorismund would 
  have to fight fiercely 
  and, what is worse, 
  disastrously with his 
  A silver dish depicting the 
  Emperor Valentinian I with 
  guardsmen wearing helmets 
  with tall feathered plumes. The 
  shield designs are very similar 
  to those shown in the Notitia 
  Dignitatum.
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  87
  own countrymen. Thorismund accepted the advice without perceiving its double 
  meaning, but followed it with an eye toward his own advantage. So he left the 
  Huns and returned to Gaul. Thus while human frailty rushes into suspicion, it 
  often loses an opportunity of doing great things. (Jordanes)
  Gregory of Tours says much the same happened with Aetius’ Frankish allies:
  When the battle was finished, Aetius said to Thorismund: ‘Make haste and 
  return swiftly to your native land, for fear you lose your father’s kingdom 
  because of your brother.’ The latter, on hearing this, departed speedily with the 
  intention of anticipating his brother, and seizing his father’s throne first. At the 
  same time Aetius, by a stratagem, caused the king of the Franks to flee. When 
  they had gone, Aetius took the spoils of the battle and 
  returned victoriously to his country with much booty.
  These stories may or may not be true. Thorismund’s 
  position was precarious as later history proved: he was 
  killed by his younger brother Theodoric II, who in turn 
  was assassinated later by another brother Eurich. So the 
  heir apparent had every reason to depart the field quickly 
  and get back to Toulouse to secure his throne. It is even 
  possible that the Goths and Franks departed against 
  Aetius’ wishes and the above stories were invented to add 
  greater nobility to their tales.
  There is, however, one other version of events 
  recounted in the Chronicle of Fredegar (a 7th-century 
  history of the Franks). Here we are told that Aetius 
  promised the Huns and Goths half of Gaul each for 
  defending it against the other. Then he extorted 10,000 
  gold solidi from both of them. Fredegar asserts that, 
  rather than letting the Huns go, Aetius with Romans 
  and Franks pursued them into Thuringia.
  Whatever the truth of the matter, Attila seems to 
  have been able to withdraw from the field in relatively 
  good order and make it back across the Rhine to his 
  heartland in Pannonia.
  This is the view from Attila’s line 
  looking towards the centre of 
  Aetius’ position.
  Most warriors on both sides 
  would have worn 
  spangenhelm-style helmets like 
  this gilded example from 
  Krefeld-Gellep. There are 
  indications that it probably had 
  a mail neck guard. Probably the 
  rank and file would have had to 
  make do with less elaborate 
  versions.
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  88
  So was the Catalaunian Fields really one of the decisive battles of the Western 
  world? As befitting their era, 18th- and 19th-century historians tended to see 
  it as the last stand of empire and a triumph of Christendom over rampaging 
  barbarous heathens. In The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World (1851) Sir 
  Edward Creasy wrote: ‘the battle not only rescued for a time from destruction 
  the old age of Rome, but preserved for centuries of power and glory the 
  Germanic element in the civilisation of modern Europe.’
  In a more cynical age modern writers tend to downplay it. Typical of this 
  view is J. B. Bury’s assessment: ‘The Battle of Maurica was a battle of nations, 
  but its significance has been enormously exaggerated in conventional history. 
  It cannot in any reasonable sense be designated as one of the critical battles 
  of the world … The danger did not mean so much as has been commonly 
  assumed. If Attila had been victorious … there is no reason to suppose that 
  the course of history would have been seriously altered.’
  AFTERMATH
  These magnificent grave goods 
  now in the Burg Lin Museum, 
  Krefeld, are the panoply of a 
  wealthy Frankish chieftain. 
  Although the Franks are famed 
  for fighting primarily on foot, 
  the treasure includes gold and 
  garnet horse furniture.
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  89
  The truth probably lies somewhere between these two extremes. We 
  cannot know what might have happened had Attila won. Quite possibly 
  much would have been destroyed which ended up being preserved. Equally 
  possibly Attila may have come to some arrangement with Ravenna and 
  established a kingdom for himself within the Western Empire. Had this been 
  the case, he may well have settled down to rule it in much the same way as 
  the Franks did after their later conquest of Gaul. The Huns, however, had far 
  less respect for Graeco-Roman civilisation than most of the other barbarian 
  invaders and had they been able to carve out a kingdom in France then the 
  course of European history surely would have changed significantly.
  Aetius’ achievement was considerable. If nothing else his success after 
  being dealt a very poor hand is a tribute to his leadership, diplomatic, 
  strategic and tactical skills. As such he deserves to be remembered as one of 
  the greatest leaders of late antiquity. However admirable his achievement, the 
  truth of the matter was that Attila suffered a setback but was not 
  entirely defeated.
  Many historians have criticised Aetius for not destroying Attila’s army 
  when he had the chance. After taking heavy casualties, and facing an 
  inevitable break-up of the temporary alliance, he probably had no choice. 
  Even if he was not motivated by a strategic desire to keep the Huns as a 
  counterbalance to the rising Visigoth power, he was probably wise to give his 
  enemy a line of retreat rather than force another costly engagement.
  Attila may have lost the opportunity to carve out a kingdom in Gaul but 
  his power was still immense and his ambition not yet curbed. The following 
  year he invaded Italy, sacked Aquileia, Milan and Pavia, then laid waste to 
  the countryside around. One of the consequences of this was the founding of 
  Venice by people fleeing the Huns and seeking refuge in the marshes and 
  When he realised that victory 
  was no longer possible, Attila 
  withdrew his forces to his 
  fortified camp on the backs of 
  the Seine. Here his rear would 
  have been secured by the fast 
  flowing river, giving his army 
  ample water, while his front 
  and flanks would have been 
  protected by a barricade of 
  wagons.
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  90
  lagoons. According to Priscus, Attila wanted to march on Rome but was 
  persuaded against it to avoid tempting fate. Alaric the Goth had sacked 
  Rome in 410 and died very shortly afterwards. The superstitious Attila 
  apparently did not want the same thing happening to him.
  Having amassed no small amount of loot, Attila withdrew from Italy later 
  in the year. Why he did so is not clear. Much of the credit is given to Pope 
  Leo who travelled with an embassy from the emperor Valentinian and met 
  Attila at his camp on the shores of Lake Garda. As Jordanes relates: ‘Then 
  Attila quickly put aside his usual fury, turned back on the way he had 
  advanced from beyond the Danube and departed with the promise of peace. 
  But above all he declared and avowed with threats that he would bring worse 
  things upon Italy, unless they sent him Honoria, the sister of the emperor 
  Valentinian and daughter of Augusta Placidia, with her due share of the 
  royal wealth.’
  Another more prosaic explanation is that Attila’s army was suffering from 
  plague and famine while the Eastern emperor Marcian had sent troops to 
  help the West. According to the Chronicle of Hydatius: ‘The Huns, who had 
  been plundering Italy and who had also stormed a number of cities, were 
  victims of divine punishment, being visited with heaven-sent disasters: famine 
  and some kind of disaster. In addition, they were slaughtered by auxiliaries 
  sent by the Emperor Marcian and led by Aetius [confusingly, an East Roman 
  of the same name, not the victor of the Catalaunian Fields]’.
  Clearly matters were not settled and although Attila left Italy, he did so 
  with a promise to return if his demands were not met. What finally put an 
  end to the Hun threat was the death of the great man himself the 
  following year.
  According to Jordanes, quoting Priscus, this happened at a feast to 
  celebrate his marriage to a new wife called Ildico:
  [Attila] had given himself up to excessive joy at his wedding, and as he lay on 
  his back, heavy with wine and sleep, a rush of superfluous blood, which would 
  ordinarily have flowed from his nose, streamed in deadly course down his 
  throat and killed him, since it was hindered in the usual passages. Thus did 
  drunkenness put a disgraceful end to a king renowned in war. On the following 
  day, when a great part of the morning was spent, the royal attendants 
  suspected some ill and, after a great uproar, broke in the doors. There they 
  found the death of Attila accomplished by an effusion of blood, without any 
  wound, and the girl with downcast face weeping beneath her veil.
  This story may or may not be true. Some historians have postulated that this 
  death was a deliberate assassination, possibly instigated by the Eastern emperor 
  or possibly by the Burgundians as revenge for their defeat by the Huns in 437. 
  In the latter version, recounted in Norse sagas, Attila was killed by his wife 
  Gudrun. In any case the Hun empire fell apart after Attila’s death. His sons 
  vied for control and the Germanic subjects rose in revolt. Led by Ardaric, 
  Attila’s right-hand man at the Catalaunian Fields, the Gepids and many other 
  German tribes defeated the Huns at the Battle of Nedao in Pannonia in 454:
  There an encounter took place between the various nations Attila had held 
  under his sway … Being deprived of their head, they madly strove against each 
  other. They never found their equals ranged against them without harming 
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  91
  each other by wounds mutually given. And so the bravest nations tore 
  themselves to pieces. For then, I think, must have occurred a most remarkable 
  spectacle, where one might see the Goths fighting with lances, the Gepids 
  raging with the sword, the Rugi breaking off the spears in their own wounds, 
  the Suebi fighting on foot, the Huns with bows, the Alans drawing up a battle-
  line of heavy-armed and the Heruls of light-armed warriors. Finally, after 
  many bitter conflicts, victory fell unexpectedly to the Gepids. For the sword 
  and conspiracy of Ardaric destroyed almost 30,000 men, Huns as well as 
  those of the other nations who brought them aid. (Jordanes)
  Fate was no more kind to Aetius than it was to Attila. The emperor Valentinian 
  was never well disposed towards him and with the Hun threat removed his 
  need to rely on Aetius was diminished. On 21 September 454 Valentinian 
  summoned his general to court at Ravenna and killed him with his own 
  hand. The following year Optila and Thraustila, two of Aetius’ Hun 
  bodyguards, assassinated Valentinian in turn.
  Three years after the battle at the Catalaunian Fields most of the main 
  protagonists were dead. Theodoric died on the field, and his son Thorismund 
  was assassinated by his brother Theodoric II in 453. Attila died that same 
  year and his son Ellac was killed at Nedao in 454. Aetius also met his death 
  in 454. Gaul and Italy were still nominally Roman and the Huns would never 
  again be a threat, but the Western Empire was on her last legs.
  In 475 Orestes, Attila’s former Roman secretary, made his son Romulus 
  Augustulus emperor with the backing of Herul, Rugian, Scirian and Thuringian 
  mercenaries. Many of them would have been the sons of men who had fought 
  for Attila at the Catalaunian Fields. Under the leadership of Odoacer, these 
  men rose in revolt the following year, killed Orestes and on 4 September 476 
  deposed Romulus, effectively ending the West Roman Empire forever.
  The arms and equipment of 
  these Sarmatian warriors 
  depicted on Trajan’s column 
  seem to have become 
  increasingly widespread in 
  latter years of the Roman 
  Empire. Many Romans, Goths, 
  Alans and Huns would have 
  been similarly equipped in the 
  5th century although horse 
  armour was relatively rare. 
  (Deutsches Archäologisches 
  Institut, Rome)
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  92
  There are no monuments, no signposts and no physical reminders of the 
  great battle that took place on the Mauriacian Plains beyond Troyes. Yet the 
  battlefield is well worth a visit.
  Troyes itself has an atmospheric medieval centre complete with narrow 
  cobbled streets and ancient timber-frame houses. There are several excellent 
  museums. The Musée Saint-Loup is not to be missed as it contains the treasure 
  of Pouan, which is so far the only archaeological find that may be linked to 
  the battle. In addition to this there is a good collection of Frankish weapons 
  from the 5th–7th centuries alongside Gallo-Roman and Celtic artefacts.
  To explore the battlefield itself you will need a car and it helps to have 
  1:25,000-scale maps from the Institut Géographique National (you will need 
  both maps 2717E and 2817O as – predictably – the battlefield straddles the 
  edges of both). Access to much of the area is along farm lanes that will not 
  be marked on ordinary road maps and satnav is unlikely to be of any help. 
  Driving out from Troyes to the west the dominance of the Montgueux ridge 
  becomes immediately obvious. It stands out in stark contrast to the perfectly 
  flat fields that surround Troyes for many miles around. A single lane track 
  winds its way through vineyards (this is Champagne after all) to the top from 
  where you can see for miles around, just as Thorismund would have in 451.
  After surveying the plains from the heights you should head down to the 
  village of Grange-l’Évêque which would 
  have been more or less at the centre of 
  Aetius’ line. Then turn south along a farm 
  track towards the foot of the ridge where 
  Thorismund’s Visigoths would have 
  ridden down the slope into the flank of 
  the Ostrogoths. Finally it is worth heading 
  north-east across the featureless farm 
  fields to the Seine, following the probable 
  route taken by Attila as he retreated to his 
  camp. This may well have been in the 
  vicinity of Saint-Lyé where there are ruins 
  of an ancient bridge over the river. 
  Looking back from Saint-Lyé towards the 
  Montgueux ridge you can really 
  appreciate the wide-open space and 
  realise why Attila would have chosen this 
  place to do battle.
  THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY
  The medieval centre of Troyes. 
  The Musée Saint-Loup is well 
  worth a visit, especially to see 
  the magnificent treasure of 
  Pouan.
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  93
  If you have more time it is well worth taking a drive to Sens. There is a 
  modern autoroute which will get you there quickly but on the return to 
  Troyes you should take the D660, which is the old Roman road that Attila 
  would have taken on his retreat from Orléans. Driving along this road, which 
  follows the River Vanne, it is easy to appreciate why the rolling terrain would 
  have not suited Attila’s horse archers and why he fell all the way back to 
  Troyes. Sens has a good Gallo-Roman museum but the main attraction is the 
  massive late Roman walls that still stand intact in places, albeit with some 
  later medieval additions. On the way back to Troyes along the D660 it is 
  worth stopping at Fontvannes, the source of the Vanne and the probable 
  place of Aetius’ camp the night before the battle. From here you can take the 
  secondary roads up the heights to the north-west until you reach the heights 
  above Grange-l’Évêque. There you can see what Aetius would have seen on 
  the morning of 20 June 451 and ponder the decisions he would have taken.
  A drive of 80km north to Châlons-en-Champagne to explore the 
  surrounding area will be enough to convince you that the terrain there does 
  not conform to any of the near contemporary descriptions of the battle, 
  despite the fact that it is commonly known as the Battle of Châlons. From 
  Châlons it is not too far to make a detour to the Musée des Temps Barbares 
  at Marles to the north-west of Reims. Here there is a very good reconstructed 
  Frankish village and an excellent museum devoted to finds from the barbarian 
  invasions of Gaul. The museum frequently hosts re-enactment groups.
  BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING
  Primary sources
  Ammianus Marcelinus, History. A 4th-century Roman army officer, Ammianus gives a detailed description of the Huns as they 
  seemed to the Romans when they first burst on the scene in 376. He is also an invaluable source for military activity 
  of the later empire up to the Battle of Adrianople in 378. The full version is available in the Loeb Classical Library 
  and an abridged edition in the Penguin Classics series entitled The Later Roman Empire: A.D. 354–378. There is 
  also an online version at http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/ammianus_00_eintro.htm.
  Gregory of Tours, The History of the Franks, translated by Lewis Thorpe, Penguin Classics (1974). Written by the Gallo-
  Roman Bishop of Tours in the mid-6th century, this gives a brief account of the battle and the siege of Orléans.
  Jordanes, The Origins and Deeds of the Goths, translated by Charles C. Mierow and published online by the University of 
  Calgary (http://people.ucalgary.ca/~vandersp/Courses/texts/jordgeti.html). Written around 100 years after the event 
  this is the single most important source on the battle and the armies that fought there.
  Notitia Dignitatum. This official listing of all Roman civil and military posts in the early 5th century is an invaluable source on 
  the theoretical organisation of the Roman army at the time as well as providing pictures of shield designs for most 
  units. Several online translations exist with the most detailed modern analysis of the military aspects being Luke 
  Ueda-Sarson’s at http://www.ne.jp/asahi/luke/ueda-sarson/NotitiaPatterns.html.
  Priscus of Panium. Only fragments of his works remain; however, his famous description of his embassy to Attila still exists. All 
  his surviving fragments are contained in C. D. Gordon (see Secondary sources).
  Sidonius Apollinaris, Poems and Letters, translated by W. B. Anderson, Loeb Classical Library (1936). The surviving letters 
  of this 5th-century Gallo-Roman aristocrat give a fascinating insight into the period. They also provide first-hand 
  accounts of events before and after the battle.
  Flavius Vegetius, De Rei Militari (Concerning Military Matters). Several translations exist including online versions such as 
  http://www.digitalattic.org/home/war/vegetius/. Probably written in the 390s, this military manual describes the 
  training, organisation and tactics of the later Roman army. However, it mixes up historical and contemporary 
  practises with Vegetius’ prescription for improvements and should not be taken at face value.
  Secondary sources
  Bachrach, Bernard S., A History of the Alans in the West, University of Minnesota Press (1973). A very useful insight into the 
  Alans, who fought alongside Aetius.
  Barker, Phil, Armies and Enemies of Imperial Rome, Wargames Research Group (1981). Although primarily written for 
  wargamers and now slightly dated, this book still gives an excellent and easily accessible overview of the later 
  Roman army and its enemies.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  94
  Bishop, M. C. and Coulston, Jon C. N., Roman Military Equipment, Batsford (1993). An excellent, detailed reference book 
  with a good chapter on late Roman equipment.
  Boss, Roy, Justinian’s Wars, Montvert Publications (1993). Although focused on the 6th century, the author provides interesting 
  and thoughtful insights into the Gothic, Frankish and Roman armies, much of which is applicable to the 5th century.
  Bury, Jon B., The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians, Norton Library (1967). A series of lectures by the late Irish historian 
  first published in 1928. Bury gives a good analysis of the events leading up to the battle and clearly identifies Troyes 
  rather than Châlons-en-Champagne as the location. He rejects the idea that the battle was particularly significant.
  Delbrück, Hans, The Barbarian Invasions, translated by Walter J. Renfroe, University of Nebraska Press (1990). Originally published 
  in German in 1909, this book remains one of the best military studies of the barbarian migrations. Unfortunately 
  Delbrück dismisses the battle with a single sentence saying that there are not enough sources to do it justice.
  Drinkwater, John and Elton, Hugh (eds.), Fifth-century Gaul: A Crisis of Identity, Cambridge University Press (1990). A 
  collection of academic papers focusing primarily on non-military and non-political subjects. It gives a very good 
  insight into the state of Gaul at the time of Aetius and Attila.
  Elton, Hugh, Warfare in Roman Europe AD 350–425, The Clarendon Press (1996). An excellent study of the late Roman 
  military system which probably overstates the case for a strong professional Roman army right to the end of empire.
  Ferril, Arther, The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation, Thames & Hudson (1988). This book concludes that 
  Rome’s fall was not internal weakness but the deterioration of the Roman army. Some of the conclusions are rather 
  bizarre, such as a faulty analysis which concludes that by 451 the Huns fought on foot.
  Fields, Nic, The Hun: Scourge of God AD 375–565, Osprey Publishing (2006). This book gives more detail on Hun warriors 
  who fought at Campus Mauriacus.
  Gibbon, Sir Edward, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–89). This monumental work is still hard 
  to beat despite its age. Originally in six volumes, a number of abridged versions have been published since.
  Girard, M. ‘Campus Mauriacus: A New Study on the Battlefield of Attila’, Revue Historique (XXVIII, 1885). The first and only 
  detailed study of the battlefield prior to this Osprey book. M. Girard presents an excellent case for identifying the 
  ridge of Montgueux as the ridge mentioned by Jordanes.
  Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of the West, Phoenix (2009). A very useful and readable overview written by a military historian 
  although he tends to pass over the Battle of Campus Mauriacus.
  Gordon, Colin D., The Age of Attila, University of Michigan Press (1966). This incredibly useful book contains the surviving 
  fragments of Priscus, Olympiodorus, Malchus and Joannes Antiochenus.
  Halsall, Guy, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376–568, Cambridge Medieval Textbooks (2007). A detailed 
  academic study of the barbarian invasions which integrates archaeological and historical evidence. It is more useful 
  for an insight into the times rather than the battle itself.
  Heather, Peter, The Goths, Blackwell (1998). An excellent and very readable study of the Goths (both Visi- and Ostro-) 
  although the battle is pretty well glossed over.
  Howarth, Patrick, Attila: King of the Huns, Constable (1994). An easy to read account of Attila and the Huns.
  Jones, Arnold H. M., The Later Roman Empire, 284–602, Blackwell (1964). This is probably the most exhaustive study of the 
  later empire, including an exceptionally good chapter on the army and an appendix on the Notitia Dignitatum.
  ——, The Decline of the Ancient World, Longman (1966). This is an abridged version of the above book which unfortunately 
  cuts out most of the interesting military bits.
  Kelly, Christopher, Attila the Hun: Barbarian Terror and the Fall of the Roman Empire, The Bodley Head (2008). A comprehensive 
  account of the Huns, Romans and the events of the 5th century, well written in a non-academic, narrative style.
  Lot, Ferdinand, The End of the Ancient World and the Beginnings of the Middle Ages (1927). Despite its age this book gives an 
  excellent overview and analysis of the transition from the classical world to early medieval Europe.
  MacDowall, Simon, Late Roman Infantryman AD 236–565, Osprey Publishing (1994).
  ——, Late Roman Cavalryman AD 236–565. Osprey Publishing (1995).
  ——, Germanic Warrior AD 236–568, Osprey Publishing (1996). These three books in the Osprey Warrior series give more 
  detail on the Romans and Germans who fought at the Catalaunian Fields.
  Man, John, Attila the Hun, Bantam Books (2005). A highly readable, non-academic book most useful for a chapter detailing 
  the lessons to be learned from Lajos Kassai’s revival of mounted archery.
  Maenchen-Helfen, Otto J., The World of the Huns, University of California Press (1973). This book remains the most complete 
  and detailed study of the Huns.
  Moss, J. R. ‘The Effects of the Policies of Aetius on the History of Western Europe’, Historia (LXXII, 1973). An interesting 
  article which concludes that Aetius’ fixation on Gaul at the expense of Africa and naval power was fatal to the 
  Western Empire.
  Muhlberger, Stephen, The Fifth-Century Chroniclers: Prosper, Hydatius, and the Gallic Chronicler of 452, Arca Classical and Medieval 
  Texts (1981). This collection of excerpts from the chronicles gives first-hand accounts of events in the 5th-century West.
  Tackholm, Ulf, ‘Aetius and the Battle on the Catalaunian Fields’, Opuscula Romana (VII, 1969). This article is an excellent, 
  detailed analysis of the battle and the events leading up to it.
  Thompson, Edward A., The Huns, Blackwell Publishing (1999). Although first published in 1949 this book still remains one 
  of the best histories of the Huns and their impact on the Roman Empire. The author also pays more attention to the 
  impact of the Bacaudae than most other historians.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  95
  INDEX
  Figures in bold refer to illustrations.
  Aetius, Flavius  16
  his army and order of battle  29–35
  background and previous campaigns  5, 
  7, 8, 10–12, 16–17
  at Catalaunian Fields  35, 54, 55, 57, 
  58, 60–64, 68, 74, 82–83, 84
  after Catalaunian Fields  86–87,  
  89, 91
  death  21, 91
  and the Franks  23
  march on Orléans  42
  and Orléans siege  48, 49
  pursuit of Attila to Troyes  53–54
  Agathius  33–34
  Alamanni  9, 37, 39, 66
  Alans
  in Aetius’ army  33, 35
  appearance  35, 56
  background  5, 8, 9, 17, 49–50
  at Catalaunian Fields  62, 64, 69, 
  73–76, 78–79
  at Nedao  90–91
  Ammianus Marcelinus  5, 33, 37, 69, 76
  Anianus, Bishop of Orléans  47, 48
  Ardaric, King of the Gepids  27–28, 40, 
  63, 90–91
  Armorica (Brittany)  8, 9, 17
  Armoricans  34, 49–50, 65, 76
  armour  18–19, 32–33, 39–40, 70–71, 83
  horse  33, 91
  Attila, King of the Huns
  his army and order of battle  29,  
  36–40
  background and previous campaigns  
  5–6, 9–12, 24–27, 26
  at Catalaunian Fields  57, 60–61, 
  65–68, 69, 75, 77, 83, 84–85
  after Catalaunian Fields  86–87, 88–90
  death  90
  march on Orléans  41–47
  Orléans siege  47–49
  retreat to Troyes  49–54, 51
  Aurelianum see Orléans
  Avitus, Flavius Maccilius Eparchius  8, 
  12, 21
  Bacaudae  8, 9, 17, 32, 34
  see also Armoricans
  belt buckles  34, 38
  Boniface, Count of Africa  17
  British  9, 17, 34
  see also Armoricans
  Brittany see Armorica
  bucellarii  31, 34
  Burgundians
  in Aetius’ army  34, 50
  appearance  18–19
  in Attila’s army  37, 39
  and Attila’s death  90
  background  8, 9, 17, 18–19
  at Catalaunian Fields  65, 66, 76
  tactics  39
  Bury, J. B.  48, 88
  Callinicus  6
  Catalaunian Fields, Battle of the (451)
  aftermath  86–91
  battlescenes  70–71, 78–79
  bird’s-eye views  62–63, 74–75, 84–85
  the combat  68–85
  contemporary sources  4
  importance assessed  88
  initial deployments  61–68, 62–63
  location  4, 55–57
  opening moves  58–61, 59
  other names  4, 55, 56
  terrain  43, 47, 49, 50–51, 50–51, 55, 
  57, 61, 65–68, 73, 82–83, 87
  Châlons  55, 56–57, 76
  Childeric, King of the Franks: ring  23
  Chronicle of Fredegar  23, 87
  Chronicle of Hydatius  43, 90
  Chronicle of Prosper  17, 56
  clothing and appearance
  Alans  35, 56
  Burgundians  18–19
  Germans  23, 39–40, 40
  Goths  5, 22, 23
  Huns  6, 18–19, 24, 39, 39
  Romans  8, 28, 32, 35, 36, 39, 44, 54, 
  83
  Visigoths  35, 78–79
  coins  4, 24
  Cologne  45
  Constantinople  5, 6, 9, 9
  Constantius  12
  Creasy, Sir Edward  88
  Dengizic (Dintzic)  27, 40
  dice  30
  Diogenes, St, of Arras  45
  Ellac  27, 40, 91
  Elton, Hugh  32
  Ernac  27, 40
  Eutropia  45
  Felix  16–17, 21
  Ferrill, Arthur  55
  foederati  34
  Fontvannes  46, 53, 54, 92
  Franks
  in Aetius’ army  33–34, 49
  in Attila’s army  37
  background  8, 9, 10, 23–24
  at Catalaunian Fields  63, 65, 66, 75, 
  76, 77
  after Catalaunian Fields  87
  engagement with Gepids  52–53
  equipment  34, 88
  tactics  39, 40
  weapons  6, 33, 36
  Gaiseric, King of the Vandals  10
  Galla Placidia  16–17, 21
  Gaul
  history and political situation  6–8, 9, 
  16–17
  maps  7, 42
  Geneviève, St  43–44
  Gepids
  in Attila’s army  37, 38–39, 40
  background  27–28
  at Catalaunian Fields  63, 66, 69, 75, 
  76, 82
  engagement with Franks  52–53
  at Nedao  90–91
  Germans
  appearance  23, 39–40, 40
  tactics  38–39
  see also individual peoples by name
  Gibbon, Sir Edward  4, 23
  Girard, M.  56
  Goths  5, 5, 22, 23
  see also Ostrogoths; Visigoths
  Gregory of Tours  23, 43, 47, 87
  Gundicharius, King of the Burgundians  
  17, 18–19
  helmets
  eastern-style  32, 83
  western-style  18–19, 28, 39, 58, 64, 87
  Heruls  37, 38–39, 40, 66, 91
  Honoria, Justa Grata  9–10, 90
  Hornhausen relief  23
  horse archers
  at Catalaunian Fields  69, 70–71
  fighting methods  37–38, 38
  Hunnish  18–19, 37–38, 40
  Roman  33, 36
  horses
  armour  33, 91
  brands  35
  furniture and trappings  18–19, 37, 39, 
  81, 88
  housing  15
  Huns
  appearance  6, 18–19, 24, 39, 39
  in Attila’s army  29, 37–38, 39, 40
  background  5–6, 8, 9–12, 16–17, 
  18–19, 24–27
  at Catalaunian Fields  63, 69–73, 70–
  71, 75, 76, 78–79, 81–83, 84–85
  after Catalaunian Fields  86–87, 89–91
  empire  11
  march on Orléans  41–47
  Orléans siege  47–49
  retreat to Troyes  49–54, 51
  rings  27
  skull deformation  6, 24
  tactics  37, 69–73, 70–71
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  96
  Jordanes
  on Aetius’ army  29–30, 31, 32, 33, 34
  on Ardaric  27
  on Attila  24, 25, 27
  on Attila’s army  29, 37
  bias  4
  on Catalaunian Fields  54, 55, 56, 58, 
  60, 65–73, 77, 81–83
  on Catalaunian Fields aftermath  
  86–87, 90–91
  on Catalaunian Fields terrain  51
  on Franks  33
  on Gaiseric  10
  on Gepid–Frank engagement  52–53
  on Heruls  40
  on Orléans siege  48, 49
  on Sangiban and Alans  23, 33
  on Valamir  27, 28
  on Visigoths  22, 31
  Kassai, Lajos  37–38, 69
  laeti  34
  Leo I, Pope  90
  Liticians  34
  Lupus, St, Bishop of Troyes  46, 53
  Marcian (Flavius Marcianus Augustus), 
  Eastern Roman emperor  9, 21, 25, 90
  Marles: Musée des Temps Barbares  6, 15, 
  31, 34, 92
  Merovech (Meroveus), King of the Franks  
  23–24
  Metz  42, 43
  Montgueux ridge  55, 60–61, 65, 66, 68
  fight to take  58–61, 59
  nowadays  92
  significance for Catalaunian Fields  64
  terrain  56
  neck rings  40
  Nedao, Battle of (454)  90–91
  Nicasius, Bishop of Reims  45
  Odoacer  91
  Olibriones  34
  Onegesius  27
  Orestes  91
  Orléans (Aurelianum)
  Attila’s march on  41–47, 42
  siege  23, 47–49
  Ostrogoths
  in Attila’s army  37, 38–39, 40
  background  5, 28
  at Catalaunian Fields  63, 66, 69, 75, 
  76, 77, 78–79, 82
  see also Goths
  Paris  43–44
  Pouan, treasure of  27, 38, 40, 45, 57, 60
  Priscus
  on Aetius’ relations with Attila  12
  on Attila and the Huns  10, 25, 27,  
  90
  on Franks  23
  reliability as source  4
  Procopius  40
  re-enactors  8, 29, 30, 35
  Les Régales  64
  Reims  45
  rings  27
  Riparians  32, 33
  Roman Empire: geography  6
  Roman-Visigoth army
  march on Orléans  42
  and Orléans siege  48, 49
  overview and order of battle  29–35
  pursuit of Attila to Troyes  52–53, 
  53–54
  Romans
  in Aetius’ army  29–31, 32–33, 35
  appearance  8, 28, 32, 35, 36, 39, 44, 
  54, 83
  at Catalaunian Fields  62, 64–65, 69–
  73, 70–71, 74, 76–77, 82–83, 84
  tactics  30
  Romulus Augustus, Western Roman 
  emperor  91
  Rugians  37, 39, 66, 91
  Sangiban
  at Catalaunian Fields  35, 61, 62, 64, 
  74
  and Orléans  23, 47, 48
  Sarmatians  31–32, 33, 39, 91
  see also Alans
  Saxons  9, 34, 49, 65, 76
  Scirians  37, 38–39, 91
  Seine, River  50–51, 52, 53, 89
  Sens  41, 42, 93
  Servatius, St, of Tongaren  45
  settlements  15
  shields
  Frankish  33
  Gothic  5, 78–79
  Roman  53, 83, 86
  shieldwall formation  30, 70–71
  Sidonius Apollinaris
  on Aetius crossing the Alps  30
  on Attila’s army  36–37
  on Avitus  8
  background  4
  on Huns  39
  on Theodoric II  22–23
  siege tactics  43, 54
  Stilicho  17
  tactics
  battles  30, 35, 37–39, 40, 69–76, 
  70–71
  sieges  43, 54
  Theodoric I, King of the Visigoths
  background  9, 10, 22
  at Catalaunian Fields  34, 54, 61, 62, 
  64, 74
  death and burial place  57, 74, 77,  
  86
  march on Orléans  42
  and Orléans siege  43
  Theodoric II, King of the Visigoths  
  22–23, 87, 91
  Theodosius I, Eastern Roman emperor   
  22
  Theodosius, Column of  32
  Theodosius, Obelisk of  5
  Thiudimir  28
  Thorismund, King of the Visigoths
  in Aetius’ army  35
  background  22
  at Catalaunian Fields  56, 62, 64, 74, 
  77–83, 78–79, 84
  after Catalaunian Fields  86–87,  
  91
  Montgueux ridge attack  58–61
  Thuringians  37, 39, 66, 91
  Tibatto  8
  Trajan’s column  91
  Troyes  48, 92
  Attila spares  46
  Attila’s retreat to  49–54, 51
  Musée Saint-Loup  4, 27, 30, 33, 36, 
  38, 40, 45, 57, 60
  nowadays  92
  Ursula, St  45
  Valamir, King of the Ostrogoths  27, 28, 
  40, 63, 75
  Valentinian I, Western Roman emperor  
  86
  Valentinian III (Flavius Placidius 
  Valentinianus Augustus), Western 
  Roman emperor  16, 21, 90, 91
  Vandals  10, 29
  Vanne, River  45, 46, 51–52, 53
  Vegetius  32–33
  Venice  89–90
  Vidimir  28
  Visigoths
  in Aetius’ army  31, 34–35
  appearance  35, 78–79
  background  5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17,  
  22, 31
  at Catalaunian Fields  56, 62, 64,  
  69–73, 74, 76, 77–83, 78–79, 84
  after Catalaunian Fields  86–87
  Montgueux ridge attack  58–61, 59
  tactics  39
  see also Goths; Roman-Visigoth army
  weapons
  bows and arrows  18–19, 31, 33, 36, 
  70–71
  franciscae (axes)  6, 18–19, 36
  Frankish  6, 33, 36
  javelins and darts  29, 70–71, 78–79, 
  83
  overview  30–34, 36–40
  Sarmatian  91
  spears  6, 18–19, 78–79
  swords  6, 18–19, 45, 60, 78–79
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
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  3D bird’s-eye views by The Black Spot
  Battlescene illustrations by Peter Dennis
  Originated by PDQ Media, Bungay, UK
  ARTIST’S NOTE
  Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the colour 
  plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale. The 
  Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever. All enquiries 
  should be addressed to:
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  DEDICATION
  To Caroline, who tramped around the battlefield with me and saw things 
  that I missed.
  AUTHOR’S NOTE
  In order to make things easy to follow I have used modern place names 
  rather than ancient ones. Therefore it is Troyes rather than Augustobona 
  Tricassium and Orléans instead of Aurelianum or Cenabum. I make an 
  exception where the ancient name is well known, such as Constantinople 
  rather than modern Istanbul.
  There are many spelling variations of barbarian names, no doubt 
  because Roman writers used an approximation of what they thought they 
  had heard which have since been anglicised over the years. Therefore the 
  King of the Visigoths is variously known as Theodoric, Theodorid, 
  Theodorich, or Thiudareiks. As with place names I have tried to use those in 
  most common modern usage.
  Unless specified otherwise, all photographs are from the author’s 
  collection.
   
  Artillery
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  Regiment
  Battalion
  Corps
  Army Group
  Key to unit identification
  Commander
  Parent
  unit
  Unit
  identifier
  (+) with added elements
  (–) less elements
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SOURCE: textdata/thevault/Osprey System/Campaign Series (CAM)/CAM 286 - Catalaunian Fields 451.pdf