TEXT: Cruzin’ for a Bruzin’:
  The Avalon Hill and John Garret Counter Sets
  for the 1940 Campaign in France
  By Carl Schwamberger
  The most well known PanzerBlitz/
  Panzer Leader pieces for the 1940
  campaign in France are those by
  Ramiro Cruz, published by Avalon Hill
  in The General in 1976. They reflect
  one school of French military history
  still popular in the 1970s, but which
  present problems when trying to model
  or simulate the battles of 1940. Other
  pieces were published elsewhere with
  alternative values. A set authored by
  John Garrett in Outposts magazine,
  circa 1974-76, represents a wide study
  of PB playing piece expansion, and
  includes the French of 1940.
  There are significant differences
  between the Cruz and Garrett
  interpretations, specifically in the
  numbers of vehicles each counter
  represents and in the combat values on
  the pieces. Further, when used
  according to the TO/TE of the French
  army, and deployed as per the actual
  battles, the Cruz French tank and
  infantry pieces cannot offer significant
  opposition to the Germans. This would
  not be a issue if the myth of a universal
  French collapse were true, but most of
  the key battles were not easy for the
  Germans. Some were near-run things,
  and in more than a few armored
  battles the French won tactical victories.
  Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult if
  not impossible to reproduce these
  outcomes with the Cruz counters when
  using them as per the actual battles.
  Several German tank pieces reflect the
  same general problem: they cannot
  perform successfully the tasks that,
  historically, they succeeded in.
  My object in this article is to examine
  selected Cruz French tank pieces
  according to the original standards of
  PanzerBlitz design. The corresponding
  Garrett pieces are included for
  comparison and to examine their
  usefulness as alternatives. The methods
  to find tank or armored combat values
  described by Alan Arvold in his
  noteworthy article, “Anti-Armor Attack
  and Range Factors in PanzerBlitz”
  (Imaginative Strategist, 2005) will be
  used. My object is to provide a starting
  point for a reconsideration of the
  various 1940 PB pieces. I caution the
  reader, however, that what follows is
  
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  Imaginative Strategist 10 July 2006
  merely a basis for further discussion; I
  have no intention of dictating firm
  conclusions.
  The starting points of gun penetration
  and armor thickness are straight-
  forward enough. The modifiers one
  applies to these, however, are much
  more subjective. I have used those in
  the Arvold article for consistency, but
  have added a few select others. Many
  other possible modifiers are possible
  but the validity of those and others
  rides on largely best guess or opinion;
  without clear evidence I have been
  reluctant to use them. Identifying
  mathematical values for any game is
  tricky. At the scale of PB/PL the
  analysis revolves around the per-
  formance of individual weapons and
  crew, and their combined performance
  as small units, specifically platoon-sized
  units. Beyond that the issues of crew
  training and tactical methods are
  difficult to pin down. I have not been
  able to find critical analysis or data
  tables for the effectiveness of various
  small combat formations. Hard facts for
  rates of fire, gunnery skills, the
  effectiveness of specific platoon, squad,
  or individual vehicle tactics for the
  1940 campaign in France are few.
  Researching the anecdotal evidence
  from eyewitness accounts is extremely
  time consuming and filled with traps.
  For example, there is a popular view
  that the French army was much inferior
  to the German army in training and
  skill. In certain aspects this was the
  case. Some large formations such as
  the French 55th and 71st Divisions
  spent little time training. Conversely,
  there is solid general evidence of the
  better-led French units making the time
  for proper training. At the crew/
  squad/platoon the evidence of their
  level of training compares favorably
  with the Wehrmacht.
  One method for evaluating respective
  combat abilities and cross checking
  other evidence is to identify which side
  caused the other the greater casualties.
  In the case of the tanks there are some
  general figures for each side that
  suggest similar combat losses were
  suffered. Unfortunately these do not
  make a clear separation of combat
  losses from mechanical breakdowns,
  neither do they separate losses in tank
  versus tank combat from losses by
  artillery, aircraft, mines, or antitank
  guns. Overall in tank versus tank
  engagements there is a rough parity of
  losses between the Germans and the
  French.
  Eyewitness accounts clarify matters a
  little. On one hand there is the oft-
  repeated quote of a German officer
  that, “French tanks attack in loose
  order, singly or in small groups.” This
  remark derives from an observation
  made during the battle of Merdorp,
  during which, depending on which
  account is read, the Germans lost
  between 140 and 190 tanks. The
  French lost between 90 and 110.
  Further confusion with this example
  
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  Imaginative Strategist 10 July 2006
  comes from the heavy use of artillery
  by the French and direct Luftwaffe
  support. Many other like examples are
  available. Typically the German
  description is of 100 French tanks
  attacking at X and half are destroyed.
  The French version is that 20 attacked
  and 5 were lost. With such material
  one is limited again to educated
  guesses.
  Considering all this, I have largely
  rejected making up modifiers for
  training differences. The Defensive
  Tactics Modifier described by Arvold is
  included for consistency for the
  German pieces. The Offensive Tactics
  Modifier I have applied to both sides.
  To the French tanks I have added three
  modifiers. The armor modifier illustrates
  the gross advantage in side armor
  these tanks had. True, several French
  tanks had this or that flaw tucked
  away, but the tanks opposing them had
  two universal flaws: their armor was
  too thin to resist the average AP ammo
  of the era, and it was poorly sloped.
  The modifiers for turret or gun crew
  and for platoon size are self-
  explanatory. These are all three fairly
  subjective, but no more so than the
  earlier modifiers used for the PB
  combat values.
  The modifiers for platoon size I left out.
  The Germans did not use a universal
  platoon of five tanks in 1940, and
  many companies were mixed with two
  different types. The French did not
  formally mix tanks at the company or
  battalion level. They did use three
  different platoon sizes, 3, 4, or 5, and
  like 
  the 
  Germans 
  had 
  “extra”
  command tanks in each company and
  battalion.
  The excluded modifiers can be plugged
  in by the reader easily enough. I will
  eventually do so myself as solid data is
  located.
  Chart 1: Attack Factors
  The first chart provides the base for the
  Attack Factors of the armored units.
  Numbers for penetration and armor
  thickness are drawn from several
  sources wherever possible. To a limited
  extent I have averaged these, where it
  is not clear which source is best. There
  are two numbers for penetration
  displayed for the French weapons. The
  first line derives from French sources,
  which are mostly based on armor
  penetration tests conducted at 100
  meters versus vertical steel plates. The
  second line represents German tests,
  which were conducted at 500 meters
  versus plate at a 30 degree angle. All
  the German penetration numbers are
  assumed to be from this 500 metre/30
  degree test. Both tests have their
  usefulness. There is some evidence that
  the engagement ranges of the 1940
  tank battles were much less than 500
  meters. More importantly, the German
  tanks of 1940 had poorly sloped
  armor. Very few planes on the panzers
  surfaces came close to the 30 degrees
  they tested themselves against.
  
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  Imaginative Strategist 10 July 2006
  If we follow Dunnigan’s method, we
  find that the raw AF for the examples
  given in chart one are at odds with
  both Cruz and Garrett’s counters. The
  Cruz values are closer to the computed
  values but again these are for the
  10—to—14 vehicle per piece ratio. The
  first modifier affecting the French
  
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  Imaginative Strategist 10 July 2006
  firepower would be the rate of fire. The
  number of turret crew are shown for
  each tank. In the case of the Char
  B1bis the driver/gunner and loader are
  included 
  for 
  the 
  75mm 
  gun.
  Confirmation of the effect of the smaller
  crew jumps out everywhere in the
  historical record. To be fair there are
  occasional remarks by French tankers
  that the small crew was an advantage,
  but the weight of the record suggests
  otherwise.
  The B1bis presents a aggravating
  problem with its two guns. If these had
  a similar range of capabilities versus
  armored and soft targets it would be
  simple to combine them into a single
  AF. But the 75mm gun apparently
  lacked an AP round and had very poor
  penetration. The 47mm gun was not
  much 
  good 
  versus 
  infantry.
  Complicating this is the presence of two
  machine guns, raising the potential H
  class AF.
  The Offensive Tactics category is
  straightforward 
  enough 
  for 
  the
  Germans. For the French the question
  returns to that of just how effective the
  crews were. There is no overall or
  general indicator that they were any
  less aggressive than the Germans. For
  every example of French tanks
  withdrawing we can find another of
  German tanks crews breaking off an
  attack or a French unit pressing bravely
  in. Lacking statistical data on this, I
  haven fallen back on the anecdotal
  evidence (and the principle of innocent
  until proven guilty) to give the French
  the same modifier.
  Chart 2: Defense Factors
  The armor thicknesses given in Chart 2
  are best case, usually hull front or the
  gun mantels. Note the values given for
  the side armor of the French. These are
  consistent, and the book values are
  only 15 to 20 per cent less for rear
  armor. Also the slope of the hull and
  turret armor was usually between 45
  and 70 degrees. The side armor for the
  German models is significantly less,
  averaging between 10 and 20mm. The
  slope is typically between 70 and 90
  degrees on the German tanks.
  The DF for the Cruz French are
  apparently based on the idea that
  these counters represent full companies
  of 10 to 14 vehicles. To make up for
  these masses, one can stack only two
  tank pieces per hex, but this still allows
  the player to concentrate far more
  tanks than was typical. It is not clear
  how many vehicles Garrett’s pieces are
  based on, although his text suggests 3
  to 5. The B1 tanks came in companies
  of ten and platoons of three. The other
  infantry support tanks were in platoons
  for four. The cavalry, however,
  organized most tank units into platoons
  of 5, with 22 in a squadron. The
  platoon size of five is the most common
  for the Somua 35 or Hotchkiss 39,
  which were usually found in the cavalry
  tank regiments where the smallest unit
  had five tanks.
  The platoon size modifier is included to
  illustrate a possible difference. I suspect
  
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  Imaginative Strategist 10 July 2006
  like all the modifiers it needs further
  research.
  Following Arvold’s description of
  Cruz’s methods, the German tanks
  have their DF raised to account for
  superior tactics – specifically, their
  practice of keeping the axis of advance
  at a angle to the enemy, thus adding
  an extra angle or “artificial slope” to
  the armor. I have severe reservations
  about the difference this practice would
  have made historically; nor is it clear
  that this tactic was in common use in
  1940, or even that it was unique to the
  Wehrmacht. Given that, the reader
  may be astonished to learn that, in
  game terms, the DFs for the Cruz
  counters are increased by 60 to 100
  per cent, apparently by this tactical
  
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  Imaginative Strategist 10 July 2006
  modifier. It is questionable, but I
  include it in order to keep this analysis
  consistent. The Panzer IV crews were
  trained for a support role; however,
  they were frequently required to close
  with the enemy in order to supplement
  the inadequate Panzer II and Panzer
  38t models. Consequently the tactics
  modifier may not be appropriate for
  them.
  Ranges
  It is clear from the several penetration
  tables I used that ranges beyond 700
  meters for AP rounds are questionable.
  The AH ranges are suitable for the
  higher AF of those pieces. Garrett’s
  pieces have longer ranges, but the AF
  is significantly less, negating the
  advantage.
  Conclusions
  The results do not closely align with
  either the counters designed by Cruz or
  Garrett. The French armor defense
  values lean towards Cruz, but problem
  here is that his counters represent a
  group double or triple the 5 tank
  counters upon which the analysis is
  based. Cruz’s assumption of grossly
  ineffective French tank crews, requiring
  2 or 3 tanks to represent one, is
  questionable. Garrett, for his part,
  seems to be ignoring the tactics
  modifier for the German tanks the AH
  pieces reflect. Or he may have
  assumed smaller platoons. The derived
  attack factors slightly favor Garrett. The
  exception is in the case of the more
  powerful French guns – the L33 37mm
  and the 47mm guns. Why Garrett
  rated these lower is not clear.
  Two courses for change suggest
  themselves. The simplest is to use the
  Cruz versions of the French pieces, but
  double the number used. That is, use
  two counters to represent a company
  or 10 to 14 tanks, or 5 to 7 tanks per
  counter. This allows one to create
  scenarios with the French armor closer
  to its historical capability. I recommend
  this route when making a Garrett
  counter set is not a option. On the
  German side, the exceptions to Cruz’s
  pieces are the Panzer IV and the Stug
  III B carrying the 75mm L24 gun. I
  highly recommend doubling the AF to a
  10 H for both.
  Another method is to use the Garrett
  values with some small modification,
  which is my personal preference. This
  allows a little better modeling of the
  tactics of the French armored forces
  through the use of 3 to 5 vehicle
  counters. Use the Cruz values for most
  of the German tanks and the French AT
  guns. In either case, I strongly
  recommend keeping the stacking for
  French armor at two per hex. This
  reproduces the French practice of
  fighting in smaller more dispersed
  groups than the Germans.
   Carl Schwamberger
  May 2006
  
SOURCE: textdata/thevault/Panzer Leader & Panzer Blitz/Imaginative Strategist - Panzer Leader/Carl on Cruz.pdf