TEXT: Plotting, scheming, working, fighting: intelligence operations in the 
  dead corners and unplumbed depths of the 1970s
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  2
  • c r e d i t s •
  World War Cthulhu Architect: Dominic McDowall
  Line Developer: Scott Dorward
  Creative Directon: Dominic McDowall and Jon Hodgson
  Art Director: Scott Purdy
  Writing: Scott Dorward, Martin Dougherty and Ken Spencer
  Cover Art: Jon Hodgson
  Interior Art: Scott Purdy and Sam Manley
  Graphic Design and Layout: Paul Bourne
  Editing: Andrew Kenrick
  Publisher: Dominic McDowall
  Published by Cubicle 7 Entertainment Ltd
  Suite D3 Unit 4 Gemini House, Hargreaves Road, Groundwell Industrial Estate, Swindon, SN25 5AZ, UK. Reg. no 6036414
   
  Call of Cthulhu is the Registered Trademark of Chaosium Inc., and is used with their permission. http://www.chaosium.com
  This book, including all art, concepts, characters, text, and intellectual properties 
  (besides those belonging to Chaosium and used under license) 
  © 2016 Cubicle 7 Entertainment Ltd. 
  Any unauthorised use of copyrighted material is illegal. Any trademarked names are used in a historical or fictional manner; 
  no infringement is intended.
  Find out more about World War Cthulhu: Cold War and our other games at www.cubicle7.co.uk
  Disclaimer
  This book contains descriptions of real places, real events, and real people. These may not be presented accurately and with 
  conformity to the real world nature of these places, people, and events and are described in terms of the folklore, myths, and 
  legends about them, further reinterpreted through the lens of the Cthulhu Mythos. 
  No offence to anyone living or dead or to the inhabitants of any of these places is intended. Just as these stories have formed 
  the basis for local folklore, so they are being used here as the basis around which to spin tales about the ancient horrors 
  from the imagination of H. P. Lovecraft and those who have expanded upon his visions.
  
  3
  S E C T I O N  4 6  O P E R AT I O N S  M A N U A L
  INTRODUCTION 
  4
  Welcome to Section 46 
  4
  Using the Operations Manual 
  5
  COMMUNICATION AND DECEPTION 
  7
  Lies, Damned Lies and Amended Truths 
  8
  Disguises and Cover Identities 
  10
   
  Levels of Cover Identity 
  12
  Investigation, Interrogation and Torture 
  13
   
  Stage 1: Routine Observation 
  14
   
  Stage 2: Routine Investigation 
  14
   
  Stage 3: Active Investigation 
  14
   
  Stage 4: Hostile Interrogation 
  15
   
  Defeating Investigation 
  15
  Props – Forged, Fake and Real 
  18
  Communications 
  20
   
  Signals, Codes and Ciphers 
  23
   
  Drops and Other Forms of Communication 
  24
   
  Use of Propaganda and Lies 
  25
  NETWORKS AND ASSETS 
  28
  Sources and Assets 
  29
   
  Reliability and Leverage 
  30
   
  Squeezing and Burning Sources 
  30
  Building a Network 
  31
   
  Core Staff 
  31
   
  The Structure of a Network 
  32
   
  Recruiting Assets 
  32
   
  Pre-Approach 
  34
   
  Approach 
  34
   
  The Pitch 
  35
   
  Procurement and Facilitation 
  35
   
  Personal Meetings 
  36
   
  Informers and Double Agents 
  37
  Planning Operations and Operational Orders 
  39
   
  Exfililtration, Exploitation and Clean-up 
  41
   
  Compartmentalilisation and Operational Security 
  41
   
  Operational Orders 
  42
  Safe Houses and Other Locations 
  43
  FIELD OPERATIONS 
  46
  Operating in the Countryside 
  46
  Operating in Urban Environments 
  48
  Mobility, Infiltration and Exfiltration 
  49
   
  Infiltration 
  49
   
  Exfiltration 
  50
  Movement in the Face of the Enemy 
  51
  Special Forms of Movement 
  52
  Breaking and Entering 
  54
  SURVEILLANCE AND 
  INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
  58
  Surveillance 
  59
   
  Mobile Surveillance and Counter-Surveillance 
  60
   
  Use of Vehicles 
  61
   
  Tailing a Subject 
  61
   
  Additional Considerations 
  63
  Using Technical Means 
  64
   
  Listening Devices 
  65
  On-Site Analysis 
  66
  Reporting Back 
  67
  PERSONAL VIOLENCE 
  70
  Taking Direct Action 
  71
   
  Personal Combat 
  71
   
  Use of Firearms 
  73
   
  Stealth and Concealment 
  74
  Use of Explosives and Incendiary Devices 
  75
  Silent Killing 
  77
  Assassination Techniques 
  79
   
  Shoot to Kill 
  79
   
  Silence and Surprise 
  79
   
  Mobile Targets 
  80
  Poison and Other Chemicals 
  81
  Types of Drugs, Poisons and Pathogens 
  83
  Disposing of Bodies and other Evidence 
  85
  COVERT OPERATIONS 
  90
  Operating alongside Local Insurgents, Dissidents and Revolutionaries 
  90
   
  Insurgents, Revolutionaries and Dissidents 
  90
   
  Neutral Groups 
  92
   
  Motivations and Methodology 
  92
  Operating alongside Combat Troops 
  92
  Sabotage and Disruption 
  94
  Guerrilla Warfare 
  96
  Missions and Operations 
  97
   
  Mission and Operational Planning 
  97
   
  Mission Components 
  99
   
  Cleaning Up 
  100
   
  Tactical Considerations 
  100
  Close Protection Duties 
  100
  Combat in Urban Terrain 
  101
  Small-Unit Military Tactics 
  101
  Deniability 
  102
  APPENDICES: SPECIAL WEAPONS AND 
  PRE-GENERATED CHARACTERS 
  106
  Handguns 
  106
  Longarms 
  106
  Machine Guns 
  107
  Rocket and Grenade Launchers 
  108
  Grenades 
  109
  Riot Guns 
  110
  Nuclear Warfare 
  110
  Pre-generated Characters 
  114
  INDEX 
  126
  • c o n t e n t s •
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  4
  • I N T R O D U C T I O N •
  W e l c o m e  t o  S e c t i o n  4 6
  While few of you will find yourselves on battlefields or facing enemy fire, 
  never forget that we are at war. Your duties as intelligence officers 
  will regularly place you in danger. Many of the people you rely on for 
  information and support will betray or kill you without a second thought. 
  You will sometimes have to support madmen and terrorists while leaving 
  the noble to die or suffer. The world has crept to the brink of nuclear 
  annihilation more than once in living memory, and while our leaders sign 
  arms limitation treaties, there are still enough weapons out there to kill 
  us all a thousand times over. And these are the least of our worries.
   
  As members of Section 46, you are part of an older, deadlier battle. Like 
  the Cold War, it has no borders, no rules and, if we fail in our jobs, no 
  survivors. As time and technology change the world, Our Other Enemy changes 
  with it. Some grow bolder, hiding behind the masks of New Age religions and 
  self-help groups. Others span the world in ways that were never possible 
  before, taking advantage of the same advances in travel and communications 
  as we do. Worse, the line between armed extremist group and cult grows ever 
  more blurred, and when we are especially unlucky, the two worlds bleed into 
  one another.
   
  Either one of these battles may seem overwhelming. Together, they are 
  almost beyond human comprehension. Many of you will give your lives, your 
  sanity or your freedom to keep safe people who will never know your names. 
  You will have to do terrible things that will slowly poison your minds as 
  much as Our Other Enemy may. And you will often do all these things with 
  no official support and no possibility of rescue or salvation if the worst 
  happens.
   
  We know what we ask of you, and we ask it because we know what you are made 
  of. Through your sacrifices, you hold off unimaginable nightmares. This is 
  a war humanity cannot afford to lose. 
  - N
  m O S T  S E C R E T  F O R  S e c t i o n  4 6  E Y E S  O N L Y
  m O S T  S E C R E T  F O R  S e c t i o n  4 6  E Y E S  O N L Y
   #67Y8-9a
  
  5
  USING THE OPERATIONS MANUAL
  The bulk of this book is made up of techniques for tradecraft, 
  surveillance, agent recruitment, combat and covert 
  operations, designed to help members of Section 46 in 
  their intelligence work as well as their more secret struggle 
  against the Mythos. These are collated from the practices 
  of the various intelligence agencies whose members work 
  secretly within Section 46. They provide guidance for field 
  officers, analysts, recruiters and anyone who may have to on 
  occasion to get their hands dirty.
  Throughout the book, you will find boxed text that explains 
  how these techniques translate into new game mechanics for 
  Call of Cthulhu. These boxes are addressed directly to the 
  player or Keeper, and are marked with the following symbol: 
  Additionally, there are a number of special inserts from N 
  and his field officers. While members of the intelligence 
  services are given thorough training, there are special 
  considerations that need to be kept in mind when dealing 
  with the Mythos. 
  These additions are not meant to be shared outside Section 
  46 under any circumstances. The notes are addressed 
  directly to the reader and can be identified by the following 
  symbol: 
  Finally there is an appendix that details a number of the 
  more unusual or specialist weapons of the period. 
  We hope that this manual helps your investigators in their 
  struggles in the secretive and murky worlds of espionage 
  and ancient inhuman evil. If they fail, God help us all…
  I N T R O D U C T I O N
  
  CHaPTer 
  ONe
  C o m m u n i c a t i o n 
  a n d 
  D e c e p t i o n
  
  7
  The word ‘espionage’ essentially means ‘discovering secrets’, 
  and is routinely used as short hand for all intelligence 
  work. However, discovering secrets is only part of what 
  intelligence agencies do. Much of the information gathered 
  is not secret at all, though it may not be in plain sight. For 
  example, a great deal of data can be gathered simply by 
  observing traffic patterns, ships in harbours, shift changes at 
  local factories, routine troop movements and other activity 
  that are not ‘secret’, as such. Few nations will permit known 
  spies to operate freely in their territory, however. Thus there 
  is an element of secrecy and deception about our intentions, 
  which allows us to then observe the mundane.
  Other data can be obtained by reading local newspapers and 
  listening to the radio news, although again this may not be 
  accessible to those located in Western home countries. A 
  great deal of what might be considered espionage is nothing 
  more than careful observation of what a local citizen could 
  see freely in his daily life, made possible by a carefully 
  crafted cover story that allows the operative to be where the 
  opposition would prefer they were not.
  Secret information is rather harder to obtain, since it is 
  concealed as a matter of course. Obtaining it requires the 
  sort of skulduggery normally associated with espionage: 
  breaking and entering, intercepting mail, stealing documents 
  or recruiting informants by some means. However, there is 
  a huge difference between obtaining secret information and 
  discerning the enemy’s secrets.
  To be any use, information must be collated and analysed, 
  but for this to happen it must first be transmitted to friendly 
  analysts. Communication is vital to operations if they are to 
  have any meaning, although it also provides an opportunity 
  for the opposition to monitor our activities and expose our 
  networks. Indeed, it could be argued that communication 
  is what intelligence work is all about. We communicate 
  our findings back to the analysts, we monitor and intercept 
  the communications used by others… and we also use 
  communication to deceive and confuse our opponents. 
  Deception can take many forms, not all of them deliberate. If 
  the opposition genuinely believes something to be true and 
  we obtain that information then we, too, can be deceived. 
  There have been instances of our own false information 
  coming back via hostile channels and being believed! 
  Deception is also allied to ambiguity and information denial. 
  That is to say, it is desirable to deny the opposition as much 
  information as possible, even routine data, in order to give 
  him less to work with in the long term. This is one reason 
  for keeping foreign spies out of our territory even if all they 
  see is the routine and mundane.
  Ambiguity also serves our purposes by forcing the 
  opposition to doubt his sources and to be unsure if he can 
  trust the data he does obtain. If some of the information 
  gathered by operatives is wrong or misleading, this has 
  more than a local effect – it means that other data must 
  be treated with suspicion. By way of example, if a potential 
  • C O M M U N I C A T I O N •
  A N D  D E C E P T I O N
  C O M M U N I C AT I O N  A N D  D E C E P T I O N
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  8
  enemy suddenly starts moving military forces around and 
  undertakes reconnaissance overflights of the border regions, 
  this suggests that something is about to happen. However, if 
  this occurs every few months as part of a ‘routine exercise’, 
  raising local tensions but little else, then we cannot be sure 
  that this occasion is any different. 
  Creating ambiguity and denying the enemy useful information 
  are not, strictly speaking, the same thing as deceiving the 
  enemy, although deception plays a part in (and is facilitated 
  by) both. Deceptions vary considerably, from the direct lie told 
  or the false passport, to the far subtler process of encouraging 
  the opposition to deceive himself about our strengths and 
  intentions. The most effective deception encourages the 
  opposition to jump to logical (but incorrect) conclusions then 
  corroborate or reinforce those same conclusions, rather than 
  seeking to convince him outright. It is much easier to convince 
  an enemy that he is right in conclusions he has already drawn 
  than to make him change his mind.
  Deception, as a rule, serves two primary purposes. By 
  deflecting suspicion or convincing the enemy that a person 
  or object is harmless we can prevent that person or object 
  from coming to harm. This is termed ‘protective deception’. 
  By deceiving the enemy we can achieve a specific goal and 
  further our mission or improve the general strategic situation. 
  This is an ‘active deception’, and will usually require multiple 
  avenues of deceptive activity to convince the opposition. Few 
  intelligence operatives will believe information that is not 
  corroborated elsewhere.
  Servants of Our Other Enemy are 
  not the trusting kind. These are not 
  simple shopkeepers and clerks you 
  can bluff or bull your way past. 
  They know things, and they know the world 
  they move in. You can trust in two advantages 
  when maintaining your cover against them. The 
  world of the Enemy is not monolithic, it is 
  divided and secretive and thus few know its 
  true breadth and depth. Second, these fellows 
  are degenerate and often mad, and although 
  dangerous, an operative can play on both these 
  factors to deceive and misdirect them. -N
  Desperate and deranged only begins 
  to cover Our Other Enemy, and this 
  desperation is the best tool you have 
  against them. They are fanatics in the 
  most literal sense; their capacity for rational thought 
  has long since evaporated. They are cunning and 
  resourceful, as are many animals. -Steuben
  LIES, DAMNED LIES 
  AND AMENDED TRUTHS
  The most convincing liar is someone who believes they are 
  telling the truth. The next best thing is to build a framework 
  upon which to hang lies, then to reinforce that framework 
  with as much truth as possible. The aim is for an operative 
  to come as close as possible to convincing themselves that 
  they are telling the truth, after which convincing someone 
  else becomes a lot easier. 
  A person who is asked questions, even quite searching 
  questions, about their life and their business in a given place 
  will normally be able to give natural-sounding answers. 
  They may be nervous, especially if confronted by aggressive 
  questioning or if they have heard that bad things happen in 
  police custody, but their answers will still sound natural and 
  plausible if they are telling the truth. 
  In other words, an innocent person nervously telling the 
  truth should still be able to convincingly answer how many 
  brothers and sisters they have, where they went to school 
  and how they came to be out late tonight. They will be able 
  to furnish details of their occupation, workplace and daily 
  life without much thought. They may not be able to recall 
  offhand specific details such as the make of their employer’s 
  car – that is the sort of thing some people take note of and 
  others do not – but they will be able to give an idea of its 
  type and colour if they have seen it at all.
  Someone who does not have a ready answer to simple 
  questions will provoke additional questioning even if they 
  are not suspected of outright lying. If caught unprepared, an 
  operative may have to invent a story that explains why they 
  are doing whatever it is has provoked the questioning. It is 
  difficult to come up with something convincing off the cuff. 
  This is the place where lies can first collapse – before they 
  are even told. If the subject of questioning is obviously 
  trying to invent details when asked or cannot provide off-
  the-cuff answers to simple questions, then they are almost 
  certainly making things up. The best way to avoid this is 
  for an operative to have a rehearsed story ready and for 
  them to be as familiar with it as with their real life story. 
  Contradictions make lies easy to spot, and a badly prepared 
  story may have many. 
  It is possible to avoid this first pitfall by having a well-
  rehearsed story ready for anyone who asks, but this is not 
  the best option. It may sound too pat, for one thing, and 
  there is a huge difference between delivering what amounts 
  to a prepared speech and answering questions in a natural 
  
  9
  manner. A set of quick and simple answers might suffice to 
  get past the most basic of questioning, but to be reasonably 
  sure of success a different approach is needed.
  The key is immersion. An operative should be thoroughly 
  familiar with their cover story and reasons for being 
  wherever they are likely to be questioned, and this goes 
  far beyond knowing that their cover is a business courier 
  for a firm of London-based lawyers. The operative must 
  mentally create the firm’s premises, employees and other 
  details, and should be able to describe previous business 
  trips or incidents of note. In short, when the operative has 
  to lie about who he is and what he is doing, he should not 
  be parroting a story learned by rote; he should be speaking 
  from memory – albeit created, imaginary memories. 
  When combined with a cool nerve and a familiarity with 
  telling lies gained in training (if it did not exist before) this 
  ability to speak naturally as if from memory makes lies 
  difficult to detect. An effective operative should have already 
  learned to control ‘liars tells’, such as nervous glances away 
  from the person being lied to, fidgeting or a tendency to 
  blab out far too much detail. People telling the truth do not 
  trot out their entire rehearsed story at the drop of a hat; 
  they speak with familiarity, often making assumptions about 
  what the listener knows. 
  Most liars give themselves away in the delivery of their 
  story, long before anyone actually considers the words that 
  were spoken. If a lie is well delivered, this can often be 
  enough to satisfy questioning – especially if there is no real 
  reason for suspicion. Indeed, it is possible to say very little 
  but make it sound natural enough that the questioner lets 
  the matter go.
  If a lie gets past the delivery stage, then the lie itself must 
  stand up to inspection. Few lies are more than three layers 
  deep; that is, a questioner can usually find a hole in any 
  given story with a couple of questions. For example, if an 
  operative is posing as a university professor researching a 
  book on the ancient history of the region then it stands to 
  reason that he will be able to answer questions about who 
  will publish the book, what other books he has written, 
  which university he works for and so forth. He should also 
  be able provide some information on the subject of the book 
  – or at least he must be able to say something that sounds 
  plausible. 
  Again, good preparation is essential to effective lying. If the 
  delivery of the lie does not reveal it for what it is, and the 
  fabrication does not collapse when questioned a little more 
  deeply, then most questioners will be satisfied. If not, then 
  they will have to work at disproving the lie, which is far 
  more difficult than simply poking a hole in it and watching 
  it unravel. 
  It is not always possible to thoroughly prepare a background 
  and supporting information, so an operative should always 
  have a framework in mind to hang the details on. Elements 
  of the operative’s own life can be used – these are likely 
  to be both plausible and familiar – but this is not always 
  appropriate to the situation. The key is to have a firm basis 
  onto which details can be slotted at short notice, enabling 
  the operative to build a cohesive story quickly if necessary.
  The operative should always lie from a solid basis – and he 
  must be aware that there is more to a lie than the information 
  it contains. A lie should be delivered so that it sounds like 
  it is coming from who the operative is pretending to be. A 
  farm labourer will use different words and analogies to an 
  oil company engineer; someone confident in his status or 
  power will answer questions differently to a nervous citizen 
  stopped in the street by the police. 
  Obviously, the lie must be consistent, and should contain 
  just enough information to sound plausible. That is not the 
  same as ‘enough information to satisfy the questioner’ – it 
  may be that a plausible answer will be followed by more 
  searching questions. This is how the game is played; the 
  operative must resist the temptation to give the questioner 
  all the information he could possibly want all at once, as this 
  will seem suspicious in its own right. 
  The operative should know more than he is saying, and 
  always be able to furnish more information, but should 
  always remember that there are two stages to lying. The 
  first is to convince the listener that the operative is not lying, 
  and the second is to make him believe what the operative is 
  saying is true. The closer a lie is to what the listener already 
  believes to be true (which may not be the same as the actual 
  truth!) then the more likely it is to be believed. 
  One of the most important, and 
  perhaps the most dangerous, lies you 
  are going to tell is the one to your 
  agency. The activities of our section 
  must remain secret; the risk is too great if we 
  are discovered. By piggybacking on another 
  mission we gain access to greater resources 
  than working on our own, but also expose 
  ourselves. In a very real sense your identity 
  as an operative for your nation's agency is a 
  cover, and one that must withstand even closer 
  scrutiny than any you may adopt in the field. -N
  C O M M U N I C AT I O N  A N D  D E C E P T I O N
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  10
  Believing your own lies
  An investigator who wants to try 
  to internalise their cover story 
  enough that it no longer feels like 
  a lie may attempt a Hard Intelligence roll 
  to cement all the details. If successful, 
  this will allow the player a bonus die on 
  any rolls (usually social skills) made 
  when defending details of the cover.
  If the investigator is suffering from 
  indefinite insanity, this can be a risky 
  proposition. The Keeper should feel free 
  to use the rules for delusions to project 
  aspects of the cover identity into the 
  investigator’s life and vice versa, as 
  they become less sure of which identity 
  is the real one.
  DISGUISES AND 
  COVER IDENTITIES
  Perhaps the most important lie an operative will tell is their 
  cover story: the false identity they assume in order to go 
  about their business. All of the principles of lying apply to 
  the creation of a cover identity that will resist attempts to 
  penetrate it. 
  A cover identity is different to a disguise, and different again 
  to a cover story concocted for a particular mission. The latter 
  is a plausible explanation for why an operative is in a given 
  area, what they are doing and why they are not causing any 
  kind of problem. Everything that operatives do in foreign 
  territory (and most of the things they do on home soil too) 
  should have a cover story attached to it. This story should 
  match their cover identity or their disguise at the time.
  If the operative’s cover identity is an office worker in a 
  shipping firm, then there are many missions that can be 
  covered by their routine activities. However, it would be 
  hard to explain why a petty bureaucrat was on a farm 
  several miles from their base city – at least in the course of 
  their normal duties. 
  If a suitable story can be created then this might prove 
  acceptable; if not, then the operative should temporarily 
  disguise themselves as something other than their normal 
  cover identity – and this disguise should match the cover 
  story for the operation. 
  An easy way to disguise oneself as 
  a servant of Our Other Enemy is 
  to simply not bathe or clean one's 
  clothes. Often these servants are at 
  least somewhat insane and care little for their 
  personal grooming. This is especially true of 
  low-level servants who do not have to face 
  the scrutiny of the mundane world. While it is 
  best to let the grime accrue naturally, necessity 
  at times requires an operative to hastily muddy 
  their appearance a bit. Keep in mind the filth 
  will need to look a part of the image, not 
  simply smudged on. -N
  I have learned the hard way that bums 
  have their own communities, and take 
  violent exception to new people on their 
  turf. It’s easier to infiltrate a cartel of 
  heroin smugglers than the local street sleepers. 
  - Miller>
  It cannot be stressed enough that any operation or mission 
  must have a cover story attached to it, even if that cover is 
  nothing more than normal day-to-day business appropriate 
  to the operative’s cover identity. Often a long-term cover 
  identity will suggest plausible cover stories for missions; it is 
  worth considering carefully which operatives to use for any 
  given operation, since some will be more easily able to fit 
  with the cover story than others.
  A cover story is the ostensible reason for a given set of 
  actions. Some parts of a mission (such as blowing something 
  up or stealing documents) cannot be covered, but a good 
  cover story at least gives the operative a plausible reason 
  to be in the area. This does not apply only to the mission 
  itself; an operative may be suddenly asked to account for 
  why a member of their network was in a place they would 
  not normally be several weeks or months after the event. A 
  good cover story will allow this to be explained long after 
  the fact – and the story will only be strengthened by a little 
  difficulty in remembering or looking up the records of which 
  employees were where on that day. It might seem suspicious 
  if there was an explanation ready at hand for something that 
  happened months ago.
  Cover stories will usually tie in with the operatives’ long-
  term cover identity, unless they are using some other 
  temporary cover or disguise for a given mission. Disguises 
  can be part of a cover identity but are usually short-term and 
  don’t need to be as detailed. It is often possible to adopt the 
  most rudimentary disguise with success, especially if the 
  operative looks like he belongs.
  
  11
  For example, an operative who wants to be mistaken for a 
  truck driver might well get away with nothing more than 
  adopting a general mode of dress and not making a mistake 
  that might give him away as someone who has never 
  driven a truck. Such a disguise might not stand up to close 
  inspection but it is likely to be sufficient to drive a truck 
  into an unsecured loading area, wandering around while the 
  cargo is loaded, then driving out again.
  While it may get hectic in the field, 
  keep in mind that you might need more 
  than one cover identity, especially 
  when dealing with Our Other Enemy. 
  You might run into a bit of trouble with a cover 
  identity that needs to both be a respected 
  businessman and a crazed follower of Some 
  Thing. Nothing can blow a mundane cover 
  faster than being caught in a compromising 
  situation while pursuing your alternate mission. 
  -N
  It is not usually necessary to create a full backstory for this 
  imaginary truck driver. Using a disguise is mostly a matter 
  of not standing out and attracting attention, and quite 
  often there is nothing more to it than that. An operative 
  disguised as a police officer might be able to walk into a 
  crime scene, pick up evidence and walk off with it without 
  being questioned at all. 
  However, a disguise should usually be accompanied by a 
  basic cover story – where the truck has come from, which 
  precinct the policeman just transferred from, and so forth. 
  The act of preparing such a story often helps the operative 
  get so convincingly into character that he is less likely to be 
  questioned. 
  A long-term cover story, on the other hand, requires 
  careful preparation. Clothing, luggage, personal effects and 
  documentation must all match, and care must be taken to 
  make items seem natural. Nothing interests a customs agent 
  more than a case full of brand-new clothes, and it does not 
  matter whether the operative is thought to be a smuggler or 
  a spy – caught is caught.
  All the aspects of a good lie (see pg. 8) must be applied 
  to a cover story, and more. The operative must be able 
  to describe his background, childhood, employment and 
  present circumstances in a natural and not-obviously-
  rehearsed manner. Most of this information will never be 
  asked for, but by preparing it the operative builds the basis 
  for his lies. Assuming they are well delivered, they will seem 
  plausible and will defeat the three-layer test.
  A good cover identity is accompanied by habits of dress, 
  mannerisms and figures of speech that support it. It is not 
  usually appropriate for an operative to try to impersonate 
  someone from a culture they know little about. It is possible 
  that such mistakes will go unnoticed if onlookers are equally 
  unfamiliar with such a culture, but this cannot be relied 
  upon. Something as simple as a gesture or a figure of speech 
  can give an operative away, or at least engender suspicion. 
  Our Other Enemy sometimes has 
  international reach. A cell in Detroit 
  might have connections with one in Paris. 
  This makes repeat use of a cover hard, 
  but if you can come up with a cover that Detroit 
  and Paris both trust, use it. Just be ready to burn 
  that cover if, and when, it gets exposed. 
  - Miller>
  Props and other supporting items are also critical to a good 
  cover story. Someone who is travelling or working overseas 
  may not have many personal items with them, but they will 
  usually have some items from home. Those who have lived 
  in an area for a long time will have accumulated various 
  paraphernalia – the absence of such items can suggest that 
  the operative does not consider the area to be home. 
  Of course, items in the home are unlikely to be exposed 
  to scrutiny unless a search is conducted, but the cover 
  identity should still be maintained at all times. The 
  operative’s living space should remind them of who they 
  are for the duration of an assignment and must fit with 
  their cover identity. It is possible that foreign intelligence 
  personnel may gain access to an apartment, hotel room or 
  wherever else the operative is living, and they should see 
  nothing to arouse suspicion that the operative is anything 
  other than their cover identity claims to be. It can cause 
  considerable strain to live a false life in this manner, but it 
  is part of the intelligence business. Some operatives take 
  to it better than others. Some can only manage fairly short 
  assignments before the strain begins to show; in such cases 
  the operative must be withdrawn before they compromises 
  the network. Others can live their false life for years with 
  no ill effects. 
  As a rule, it is much easier to maintain a ‘slightly false’ cover 
  than a completely alien one. In other words, if an operative 
  comes from an educated background they will find it more 
  comfortable – and therefore less stressful – to pose as a 
  foreign national in the target country on business (living a 
  lifestyle similar to his usual one at home) than to pretend 
  to be an uneducated migrant worker living a completely 
  different lifestyle to the one the operative is used to.
  C O M M U N I C AT I O N  A N D  D E C E P T I O N
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  12
  All too often, Our Other Enemy is 
  underestimated in their ability to blend 
  in with the mundane world. Members of 
  cells still need to eat, they need to sleep 
  and they need to meet one another. The Boss tends 
  to look down on servants of Our Other Enemy and 
  assume them to be dangerous yet often incompetent. A 
  cover or disguise that places one as a needed service 
  provider, a repairman, waiter or even a taxi driver, 
  allows an operative to get close to the target in a 
  manner that is both covert and beneath suspicion. Who 
  notices the bellboy? Who cares about the background 
  of the telephone repairman? Who even talks to these 
  people? - Rodriquez
  LeveLs of Cover IdentIty
  A cover identity can be assessed according to its strength, 
  which is defined as the level of scrutiny it can resist. The 
  lowest level is the ‘polite fiction’, in which the operative 
  makes little attempt to pretend that he is not an intelligence 
  officer and the local authorities ignore the fact that he is 
  so long as the fiction is maintained and no overt acts are 
  undertaken. This is part of the intelligence game; many 
  nations will tolerate one another’s spies so long as they are 
  polite about it and do not cause trouble. 
  There is a limit to how much an operative with this 
  weak a cover identity can achieve – which is one reason 
  for tolerance – but such personnel are useful as a means 
  of collecting low-level information. It might even be in 
  the target country’s interests to allow this to happen. A 
  deception can be carried out by allowing the operative to 
  witness whatever the host nation wants them to see, but 
  more commonly a nation will want reports to be submitted 
  showing that nothing untoward  is happening. 
  The weakest true cover identity is one that will satisfy lax 
  or unconcerned inspection, sometimes defined as the ‘bored 
  passport inspector’. A cover identity that does not arouse the 
  suspicion of an ordinary public official (with no affiliation to 
  the intelligence services and no reason to be alert) is good 
  enough for many purposes, especially for a short mission. 
  Such a cover can be thrown together quickly with little more 
  than a briefing and some mental preparation, appropriate 
  clothes and haircut, and documents that will usually include 
  a passport. 
  A cover of this sort can be deepened later by adding more 
  elements, but as a rule a light cover will be used for a single 
  mission and then abandoned. It will not withstand even a 
  moderate investigation, though it may take the opposition 
  some time to find the gaps in the story. Making a cover of 
  this sort work is mainly about avoiding suspicion and not 
  attracting attention. Once the operative is investigated, they 
  will more than likely be found out.
  Maintain 
  a 
  forgettable 
  and 
  bland 
  appearance, it makes it easier to become 
  a cast off of society or a leader of the 
  higher culture. Sadly, my appearance is far 
  too distinctive for such measures. - Steuben
  A strong cover is prepared in far more detail, and is necessary 
  for a long-term deployment. The operative needs to have 
  detailed knowledge of the cover identity’s life and work, 
  and there must be corroborating evidence. The operative’s 
  workplace and residence must comply with the cover identity 
  to a degree that a detailed search – assuming it does not find 
  anything incriminating such as a weapon or a false passport 
  – will actually serve to strengthen the cover identity. If this 
  level of cover is investigated by local intelligence services they 
  should find only evidence that corroborates it. 
  The very strongest of covers is backed up by evidence ‘back 
  home’; in other words, if an enemy intelligence service 
  sends investigators to the operative’s ostensible home town 
  they should find evidence that the operative lived there. If 
  the operative claims former military service, there should be 
  convincing records in the appropriate archives. 
  
  13
  It is probable that the opposition will never gain access to this 
  information and that the effort put into it might seem to be 
  wasted, but that is not so. First, it is always possible that our 
  own intelligence services have been compromised, or that the 
  opposition might somehow gain access to records – or a lack 
  of them – that could expose the operative as a fraud. 
  Even if this is not the case, the fact that such careful 
  preparation has gone into creating a cover identity will 
  remove doubt from the mind of the operative. If he knows 
  that the opposition cannot discover that he was never 
  ‘really’ dishonourably discharged from the Royal Air Force 
  – because there are records to show he was, and people 
  who can remember it happening – then his confidence in 
  his identity is strengthened. This can be a critical factor 
  in surviving an investigation, since the weakest part of an 
  operative’s cover identity is of course the operative himself. 
  Whatever props and supporting data may exist, one mistake 
  on the part of the operative can reveal him for what he is. 
  INVESTIGATION, INTERROGATION
  AND TORTURE
  Torture is an unreliable means of obtaining information, but 
  that does not mean that a captured operative will not face 
  it. Most intelligence services understand that information 
  extracted under torture is useless, as the subject will usually 
  say whatever the torturer wants them to. There are those 
  that still think physical torture serves a useful purpose, 
  however, and in fact it can. But that purpose is not obtaining 
  reliable, accurate intelligence from an unwilling subject.
  Torture or the threat of torture can be used to coerce 
  someone into carrying out an act, either immediately or at 
  a later date under threat of further punishment if they fail. 
  Torture might be used to coerce an operative or someone 
  associated with a network to steal documents or lead 
  colleagues into a trap. It can also be used to weaken the 
  subject’s will, but used alone it rarely succeeds as a method 
  of investigation.
  The lower sorts of people can easily be 
  intimidated or bribed into cooperation, 
  and rarely have the necessary intellect to 
  willingly serve Our Other Enemy. Some do 
  so in a rote manner, much as many of the faithful 
  do during their weekly services. These sorts should 
  be your targets, they lack the ability to truly believe 
  in what they espouse and yet are weak enough to 
  be manipulated with ease. - Steuben
  A subject might be beaten upon capture or afterwards, or 
  tortured with a view to wearing down their will to resist, but 
  this will be used alongside subtler methods of interrogation. 
  Drugs are sometimes used to confuse the subject or to 
  weaken their will but again, this does not always provide 
  truthful, useful, or even coherent information. 
  The best way to obtain reliable information is to convince 
  the subject that they want to give it to you or, failing that, 
  to trick the subject into revealing it. One common gambit is 
  to use physical violence as a demonstration of what might 
  happen, then befriend the subject and ‘protect’ them from 
  it, perhaps by making them believe that they have been 
  Bonuses and Penalties on Cover identities
  As discussed, certain preparations or circumstances may strengthen or weaken an 
  investigator’s cover. The following list gives some ideas about when to apply bonus 
  or penalty dice to rolls made defending an investigator’s cover (usually social 
  skills). There will always be special circumstances, and the Keeper should use this list 
  as inspiration for eventualities not explicitly mentioned.
  •	 The cover identity is not appropriate for the mission: 1 penalty die
  •	 The cover identity is well-prepared and rehearsed, with suitable props and supporting 
  documentation: 1 bonus die
  •	 The cover identity has been improvised with little or no time to prepare: 1 penalty die
  •	 The cover identity is similar to the investigator’s own in nationality, education and 
  social status: 1 bonus die
  •	 The cover identity is utterly unlike the investigator’s own in nationality, education 
  and social status: 1 penalty die
  •	 The cover identity is backed by details ‘back home’: 1 bonus die 
  C O M M U N I C AT I O N  A N D  D E C E P T I O N
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  14
  transferred to a different and rather gentler set of captors. 
  A combination of reducing the subject’s faith in their peers 
  and their loyalty to their country, the offer of rewards 
  or at least freedom, and the building of a bond between 
  interrogator and subject are all common ways to bring them 
  from a position of determined defiance to one of willing 
  compliance. This process can be subtle, and often involves 
  asking the subject for something minor at first; once they 
  begin complying they will generally continue to do so.
  The measures used against a suspected operative will vary 
  depending on how certain the captors are that the captive 
  is an intelligence agent, and how much they think they can 
  get away with. They may be prevented from going too far 
  by their own people; for example, if the subject is being held 
  in a police station, the enemy’s intelligence services might 
  not be willing to inflict violence even if they could get away 
  with it, as they might not want to draw attention or cause a 
  conflict with local law enforcement agencies. In some areas 
  there are no such considerations and the operative is at the 
  mercy of whoever has access to them.
  Of course, this is the most extreme situation, with the 
  operative in custody being interrogated whilst their place of 
  residence is searched and their work colleagues questioned. 
  For things to reach this stage, the situation must have 
  progressed through several stages.
  stage 1: routIne observatIon
  The lowest level of threat to an operative’s cover identity is 
  that of routine observation by law enforcement personnel, 
  enemy intelligence services who are not particularly alert 
  or suspicious, and anyone else who might think there is 
  something a bit off about the operative and take an interest.
  Assuming the operative’s appearance matches their cover 
  story and they have basic documents, so long as they do 
  not make any stupid mistakes they should not arouse undue 
  suspicion. This level of threat to the operative’s identity is 
  constant and passive; there is always the chance of discovery, 
  but it is unlikely and nobody is actively looking for them. 
  If the operative does attract attention, the most likely result 
  is a fairly casual set of questions: a routine investigation, as 
  described below.
  stage 2: routIne InvestIgatIon
  A routine investigation takes place whenever someone 
  questions the operative’s cover identity in any way. This 
  might be nothing more than a casual question from an 
  innocent stranger, or a requirement to present documents at 
  a border crossing. Again, the questioner has no real reason 
  to suspect the operative, but they are doing something that 
  requires an answer and that answer will be evaluated.
  A routine investigation of this sort might be unrelated to the 
  operative’s activities (border guards always ask for passports, 
  not just when they think someone might be a foreign agent) 
  or related (for example, when passing a police patrol after 
  carrying out an act of sabotage that has raised alert levels). 
  Either way, there is no direct suspicion; defeating this 
  investigation is a matter of telling good, plausible lies whilst 
  looking the part and having the right documents.
  A routine investigation will usually take the form of a few 
  questions and the presentation of documents. Questioners 
  will not normally be seeking to catch the operative in a lie, 
  but will likely spot a weak story and investigate further. If 
  so, the investigation becomes an active investigation.
  stage 3: aCtIve InvestIgatIon
  An active investigation might be undertaken if the operative 
  is caught doing something suspicious, or if evidence from 
  elsewhere points to the operative. An error in dealing with 
  a lower level of threat might also result in it escalating to an 
  active investigation. The questioner now has good reason 
  to suppose that the operative is hiding something, and 
  wishes to find out what it is. Note that the questioner might 
  not suspect the operative of being a spy; they may believe 
  the operative is a criminal or be convinced they are hiding 
  something but unsure as to what. 
  At Stage 1 and 2, it would normally be sufficient to leave 
  the questioner in doubt that the operative is guilty of 
  something; the default position is usually ‘innocent until 
  strongly suspected to be guilty’. At Stage 3 this position 
  is reversed: the operative will have to make the questioner 
  believe their innocence, and may have to do so despite a 
  significant body of evidence or suspicion. 
  If dealing with police or other bodies bound by due process, 
  it may be enough to not admit to anything or to obfuscate 
  the issue to the point where it becomes clear a conviction 
  will be impossible to achieve. However, in many parts of 
  the world due process is unheard of, and some agencies will 
  waive it if they have strong suspicions. 
  The operative will face persistent and repeated attempts to 
  trap him in a lie or a contradiction, to ask questions that 
  he would be able to answer if innocent but cannot, or to 
  get him to admit to something. His workplace and abode 
  
  15
  will likely be searched, and he will be required to account 
  for his movements. It may still be possible to defeat such 
  an investigation by protesting innocence, providing good 
  explanations and so forth, but the operative will need an 
  airtight cover and a good performance under interrogation 
  to succeed. 
  stage 4: HostILe InterrogatIon
  If the operative is believed to be such by their captors (or 
  they believe the operative to be guilty of a serious enough 
  crime) then they face an openly hostile interrogation – quite 
  likely with no regard to the niceties of law. It is virtually 
  impossible to defeat such an interrogation and be released 
  having been found to be innocent; the best the operative can 
  hope for is not to give too much away under interrogation and 
  perhaps survive to be rescued or exchanged at a later date. 
  A hostile interrogation may or may not involve drugs and 
  torture, but it will certainly be lengthy and unpleasant. In 
  most cases, the interrogator will begin convinced that the 
  operative’s cover story is bogus or that they are guilty of a 
  major crime, and will mainly be concerned with proving it 
  or getting the operative to provide additional information. 
  A truly incredible performance coupled with an excellent 
  cover identity might just be enough to let the operative beat 
  the interrogators, but under most circumstances a hostile 
  investigation will end only when the interrogators have 
  some reason to conclude it. That could mean imprisoning 
  or executing the operative, passing the operative to another 
  agency or continuing to hold them indefinitely while they 
  deal with other matters. At this point there is little the 
  operative can do to save themselves; they can only hope 
  that their release is somehow engineered – and that is both 
  unlikely and out of their hands.  
  defeatIng InvestIgatIon
  Operatives must bear in mind that their cover identity is 
  subject to challenge on a constant basis. Quite literally, every 
  time they speak, interact with someone or are even just 
  observed by a casual passer-by their cover identity can be 
  ‘blown’. This threat is constant and for the most part passive; 
  if the operative has not aroused suspicion then the threat still 
  exists, but nobody is actively trying to find holes in his cover.
  Nevertheless, this routine threat can result in operatives being 
  exposed. A chance word, a gesture out of place or some other 
  minor slip up could cause someone to look more closely. It is 
  countered, of course, by constantly remaining ‘in character’ 
  and developing habits that support the cover identity. 
  Routine and trivial interactions with police and local officials 
  – including non-government personnel such as railway staff, 
  for example – also fall under the category of routine and 
  passive threats. A border official glancing at passports or a 
  policeman scanning the crowds on the alert for trouble will 
  not specifically be trying to penetrate an operative’s cover, 
  but will notice anything out of place and investigate.
  This level of threat requires no special measures from the 
  operative. Their cover is already built; all they have to do is 
  act natural and do what whoever their cover identity would 
  do under the circumstances. A quite feeble cover or a simple 
  disguise might well be sufficient, providing the operative 
  gives the observer no reason to look more closely. 
  Degrees of alertness vary; it is always possible to encounter a 
  minor official just after he has been reprimanded for laxness 
  or a normally observant police officer who is tired at the end 
  of a long shift. It may be possible to manipulate the situation 
  in order to reduce alertness, such as passing a checkpoint at a 
  very busy time or taking advantage of some distraction. 
  Always keep in mind that Our Other 
  Enemy possesses abilities above 
  and beyond what one would expect 
  from even the most sophisticated 
  C O M M U N I C AT I O N  A N D  D E C E P T I O N
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  16
  technological surveillance. Through occult 
  and esoteric means you might be spied upon, 
  observed and even investigated, often without 
  any clue to tip you off. Maintain your cover 
  identities to greater depth and for greater 
  lengths than you feel would be required for 
  there is no safe place to let your guard down. 
  -N
  None indeed. - Steuben
  A common and effective gambit when leaving the scene 
  of an operation is to join a crowd, fleeing with them if 
  appropriate or gawking and dispersing. An operative who 
  does not look out of place and who does what everyone else 
  is doing is unlikely to be spotted, and providing there is no 
  reason for this gambit to fail (such as being covered in blood 
  or dishevelled from a fight) then it is far more effective than 
  trying to slip away as everyone else is moving towards the 
  scene of an incident. However, it does require a cool nerve 
  to stay in proximity to an incident, and if onlookers are 
  being questioned then remaining can be counterproductive.
  Once someone takes an interest in the operative, things 
  become a little harder. Active questioning of this sort might 
  not be hostile; many questions are routine and do not 
  indicate grave suspicion, merely that a situation has arisen 
  The main skill used to stay in 
  character and maintain a cover is 
  Disguise, though there may be times 
  when the Keeper decides to dispense with 
  a skill roll – if the player does a good 
  job of describing how suspicion is avoided, 
  this can be rewarded by not having to roll 
  the dice.
  Defeating simple, passive threats to a cover 
  is a very basic function for an undercover 
  investigator, and under most circumstances 
  they should be able to go about their 
  business without blowing their cover. The 
  Keeper might ask for a skill roll every few 
  weeks of operations, but a failure does not 
  necessarily mean that the investigator is 
  blown. Sometimes people just fail to notice 
  little things… or even quite big ones. 
  However, knowing that a roll was failed a 
  few weeks back might increase a player’s 
  paranoia – was the investigator ‘made’ and 
  now being tailed? This sort of worry is 
  an excellent way for the Keeper to torment 
  players.
  A skill roll is also needed (but can be 
  dispensed with, as noted above) when the 
  investigator encounters a threat to their 
  cover, such as when crossing a border or 
  interacting with officialdom. In this case 
  the investigator must make a Disguise roll 
  and, if successful, they need do nothing 
  more – they have not aroused any form 
  of suspicion and, unless they have done 
  something very stupid like trying to cross 
  a border without a valid passport, they 
  will be able to go about their business 
  unhindered. 
  If the Disguise roll is failed, all is not 
  lost. Errors might not be noticed by bored, 
  tired or lax officials. The Keeper should 
  make an opposed Spot Hidden roll to find 
  out. This represents the whole process, 
  even if the investigator has to present 
  their passport and state their business 
  multiple times. The skill level of the 
  officials can be adjusted to suit their 
  state of alert.
  If the Spot Hidden roll is failed, the 
  investigator’s gaffe goes unnoticed. If 
  it succeeds, the usual result is a round 
  of more searching questions. See Defeating 
  Active Questioning, opposite.
  The investigator may try to explain away the 
  gaffe using a social skill before the matter 
  escalates enough for them to face active 
  questioning. This qualifies as pushing the 
  failed Disguise roll: if the player fails 
  this pushed roll, the Keeper is at liberty 
  to introduce further complications, such as 
  the authorities inflicting a vicious beating 
  as they detain the investigator, or the 
  investigator inadvertently incriminating a 
  colleague or agent.
  defeating Passive threats
  
  17
  in which the operative must be asked some questions and 
  their answers evaluated. Previous comments about level of 
  alert and distractions apply here, too.
  However, once this situation has arisen the operative 
  must actively defend their cover and explain their actions. 
  They may well be asked the same questions as a ‘passive’ 
  Any active questioning faced by an 
  investigator requires a higher level 
  of skill to defeat than a simple 
  trotting out of well-rehearsed answers to 
  routine questions. Much depends on whether 
  the questioning results from a routine 
  requirement or whether there is real 
  suspicion, but in all cases the investigator 
  will have to account for their activities in 
  a manner that is in keeping with their cover 
  story. The Keeper might grant a bonus die 
  or not require a skill roll at all if the 
  player spins a good story, but in the case 
  where the authorities are sure they have 
  caught a spy there are limits to how much 
  can be achieved by telling lies.
  If the active questioning is fairly 
  routine, there will be no serious attempt 
  to poke holes in the investigator’s story 
  and certainly no violence. All that will 
  happen is the questioner will be a little 
  suspicious and will want plausible-sounding 
  answers that satisfy their curiosity. Where 
  the investigator is under serious suspicion 
  or is subject to a hostile interrogation, 
  the questioner will make determined efforts 
  to find something wrong with the story.
  In either case, the investigator must make 
  a Fast Talk or Persuade roll to provide 
  suitable answers that sound plausible. If 
  this is routine questioning they will be 
  released if their answers are acceptable 
  and will probably not be under any more 
  suspicion than before. Failing this roll 
  means that the investigator will be detained 
  and formally interrogated. 
  Note that ‘interrogation’ simply means 
  rigorous questioning. There are circumstances 
  where violence or harsh measures might be 
  used but most interrogations do not involve 
  physical coercion. They are, however, 
  a battle of wits and wills between the 
  investigator and the interrogator. 
  This 
  situation 
  is 
  important 
  enough 
  to be role-played in some detail. The 
  interrogation process is exhausting for the 
  investigator, even if there is no physical 
  coercion. They must pass an CON roll, or 
  else their will breaks and they admit 
  something that compromises them. Assuming 
  this is passed, the interrogation takes one 
  or more ‘rounds’. During each round the 
  investigator must make a Persuade or Fast 
  Talk roll to plausibly answer questions, 
  with the difficulty level set by the the 
  interrogator’s Psychology skill. 
  •	 If the investigator succeeds and the 
  interrogator fails, the interrogator 
  buys their story and releases them. 
  •	 If 
  the 
  investigator 
  fails, 
  the 
  interrogator 
  becomes 
  sufficiently 
  convinced that the investigator is lying 
  to hold them. They will be passed to 
  the appropriate authorities, depending 
  on what the interrogator believes the 
  investigator is guilty of.
  •	 If both succeed or both fail, the battle 
  of wits continues.
  If the interrogator uses torture, the CON 
  roll can be made Hard or even Extreme 
  depending on the Keeper’s decision about 
  the severity of the torture. However, 
  if torture is used then so long as the 
  investigator succeeds in their Fast Talk 
  or Persuade roll, the interrogator will 
  probably decide that since they are sticking 
  to their story despite torture, it may well 
  be true. Release is likely at this point 
  – but the Keeper should decide whether or 
  not the authorities still have suspicions 
  about the investigator. This may lead to 
  them being watched in the future.
  defeating aCtive Questioning
  C O M M U N I C AT I O N  A N D  D E C E P T I O N
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  18
  investigation might ask – name, occupation, business in the 
  area and so forth – but the questioner will be looking for 
  holes in their story. The operative will likely be expected to 
  furnish details and repeat them correctly. The questioner 
  may quote back what the operative has said incorrectly to 
  see how they respond, and in general will try to trip the 
  operative up and catch them in a lie.
  Providing the operative has a decent cover story and keeps 
  their cool, this sort of active questioning can be defeated 
  without extreme measures. In other words, the operative 
  should be able to convince the questioner that they really 
  are an innocent person going about legitimate business. The 
  difficulty of doing this can vary considerably depending on 
  who the operative is dealing with and their level of alert, 
  but active questioning does not indicate that the operative 
  is blown. 
  An operative will have to defeat at least routine active 
  questioning numerous times in the course of a deployment. 
  There is always a risk, but it is not usually significant unless 
  the operative is caught doing something that is difficult 
  to explain. However, the operative must observe the 
  questioner carefully, as well as any associates they might 
  have. If it seems that things are going awry, there may be an 
  opportunity for escape. Naturally, someone who runs when 
  questioned will be assumed guilty – of something at least – 
  if caught, but a timely escape may be the best option if the 
  interrogation starts to go badly.
  A hostile interrogation is unlikely to take place in the street; 
  the subject will almost always be detained and confined in 
  some manner. This might be immediate, such as taking the 
  subject to an interrogation room at a border post for further 
  questioning, or the subject may be fully secured at a police 
  station or a similar facility before interrogation. The latter 
  suggests that the opposition are pretty sure the subject is 
  guilty and are seeking confirmation or hoping to extract 
  information; the former indicates a slightly lower level of 
  suspicion. 
  The operative needs to weigh the odds and decide whether 
  to try to bluff their way through the interrogation. Fleeing or 
  attempting to shoot their way out might be the only option, 
  but these are desperate measures that, even if successful, 
  will have repercussions for the whole network. 
  It may be possible to use other methods to bypass the 
  interrogation, such as bribery or threats of intervention 
  by powerful friends. This can work, especially in corrupt 
  regions or where the officials are unsupervised. A measure 
  of deception is usually necessary when offering a bribe: 
  few officials will take money to let a foreign spy into the 
  country; there is simply too great a risk of repercussions. 
  However, the same official might well take a bribe to ignore 
  minor discrepancies in paperwork when accompanied by a 
  believable tale of administrative errors from an apparently 
  harmless person.  
  Interrogators often claim or insinuate that they have proof 
  of guilt, or that others will sell the subject out, and it is 
  therefore in his best interests to make a deal and come clean. 
  This is sometimes true but more commonly it is a gambit to 
  trigger a confession. The operative might be able to figure 
  out whether such claims are true by carefully observing the 
  questioner – an interrogation can be a two-way process.
  PROPS – FORGED, 
  FAKED AND REAL
  A cover identity requires a number of props; physical items 
  that support and reinforce the cover. For a simple disguise, it 
  is often possible to get away with using the most rudimentary 
  of props; if a disguise will not survive close inspection due 
  to its hasty nature, it matters very little whether or not 
  the operative’s shoes are authentic and convincing when 
  carefully examined.
  A different situation exists with a cover identity. Obviously, 
  all items and clothing should look the part when subject 
  to a casual glance from a distance. Greater authenticity 
  provides defence against closer inspection. For example, a 
  jacket might look fine from a distance but use a weave of 
  cloth not normally seen in the operative’s region. If anyone 
  notices this, the operative will have to explain why they 
  have an imported jacket. Foreign intelligence services will 
  take a strong interest in someone who has clothing from 
  a potential enemy nation, especially in countries where 
  imports are not permitted.
  The same goes for labels, methods of stitching and so forth. 
  These will not be obvious to a casual glance, and even 
  when answering a few routine extra questions at a customs 
  post it is unlikely that officials will examine the label inside 
  an operative’s shirt collar. However, if they come under 
  suspicion the operative might be closely examined, and such 
  small details will confirm that the operative is a fake. At that 
  point, their fate is sealed. 
  Props must therefore be as authentic as possible. If the 
  operative is posing as a foreign businessman, they will of 
  course have clothing from their own country. If they are 
  pretending to be a local, they will not. It is often possible 
  
  19
  – and generally desirable – to obtain real items such as 
  clothing, shoes, pens, handkerchiefs and such like once 
  established in the target area, and to dispose of faked items 
  as much as possible. 
  Some items are more difficult to obtain locally. Documents, 
  passports and similar must be forged – and forged well. 
  Care must be taken to correctly match paper types, bindings 
  and embossing styles as well as the more obvious words 
  and photographs. This can be done by our own intelligence 
  services, but obviously takes time. Documents must then 
  be brought to the operatives in the field, which can be a 
  hazardous undertaking.
  Forgers working in the criminal world can be a useful 
  asset, and many countries have a thriving black market 
  in documents including passports. This often occurs as 
  a result of corruption, incompetence and inequality in 
  a society. If ordinary people cannot obtain documents 
  they need and are entitled to, forgeries may be the only 
  solution. We can take advantage of this situation, although 
  obviously any interaction with criminal elements can be 
  risky in itself.
  Agents have at their disposal a 
  selection 
  of 
  false 
  documents 
  relating to Our Other Enemy. These 
  include forged diaries, grimoires 
  and ritual instructions that are patently useless 
  but appear to be genuine. Keeping abreast 
  of new technologies, these are available 
  in physical form as well as on microfiche 
  and as photostat copies. These forgeries 
  are expensive and dangerous to make, their 
  use should only be as needed and not when 
  other means of building a cover as cattle, an 
  esoteric bookseller or other such person can 
  be accomplished through other means. -N
  The last thing one would want to do 
  is lose one of these excellent forgeries. 
  However, one can take some solace in 
  the fact that if lost they do not contain 
  anything dangerous to the general public. -Steuben
  Clothing and everyday items can be used to conceal or 
  disguise necessary pieces of equipment, but wherever 
  possible it is better to operate without a piece of equipment 
  than to carry it just in case. Weapons, in particular, are 
  highly incriminating if the operative is caught with them 
  and should be carried only when an operational requirement 
  exists. Some operatives like to have a weapon ‘just in case’, 
  and this can boost confidence. This is a dangerous and 
  amateurish attitude. 
  Weapons are hard to conceal. Even quite a small handgun 
  is a bulky and solid object to conceal, and there are only so 
  many places about the body one can be carried. A weapon 
  will be found by even the most cursory of searches.
  That said, if a weapon is needed then it can be concealed by 
  clothing: waistbands and shoulder holsters can be covered 
  by a jacket or a loose shirt, while ankle holsters can be 
  concealed by trouser legs. Most people will not notice a 
  weapon even if it causes a slight bulge in clothing, and 
  sometimes even a weapon held in the hand can be concealed 
  by keeping the hand below the waist and close to or behind 
  the leg. 
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  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
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  This may seem overly simple but it is possible to walk 
  right up to someone with a handgun or a knife held in this 
  manner, perhaps keeping their attention with the other hand, 
  and still deliver an attack by complete surprise. However, 
  bodyguards and law enforcement officers are trained to look 
  at a subject’s hands and will spot a gun or knife carried in 
  this way.
  Weapons can be concealed in other objects, perhaps in a 
  disassembled condition. The decision of when to put the gun 
  together must be finely judged, especially in a time-critical 
  scenario. A weapon simply put in a bag and concealed by 
  other items will be spotted as such by a search, whereas a 
  disassembled weapon might be disguised as a collection of 
  harmless items.
  Other equipment can also be concealed or disguised, though 
  it must be reiterated that any piece of ‘spy equipment’ can be 
  incriminating; the less an operative is carrying, the smaller 
  the chance of discovery. One of the commonest pieces of 
  equipment is a device for concealing other small items. A 
  brooch, cufflinks or the heel of a shoe can be hollow and 
  used to carry a range of small items. Similarly an attaché case 
  or other bag can have concealed compartments. The lining 
  of a coat or jacket offers other possibilities for concealment.
  Of course, all of these measures are well known to the 
  intelligence services of most countries and are therefore 
  not guaranteed to evade detection by a proper search. If 
  possible, items should be disguised in novel ways or not 
  carried at all; what is not there cannot be found no matter 
  how thorough the search may be.
  COMMUNICATIONS
  To be of any use, information must be transmitted to the end 
  user, whether orders and instructions, requests for support 
  or equipment, or intelligence gathered through an operation. 
  We can disrupt or intercept the communications of others, 
  and in turn they can do the same to us. Communications is 
  a field where the sword has two edges: we must be on our 
  guard for measures that we ourselves are using elsewhere.
  Radio and telephone communications offer a fast and reliable 
  means of passing information, but can be intercepted or 
  eavesdropped. As a rule, operatives should not say anything 
  on the telephone that they cannot explain away under 
  their cover story. There are simply too many ways for the 
  opposition to eavesdrop, and even just knowing that the 
  operative made a call to a certain number can be enough to 
  trigger an investigation.
  Much the same apply to radio communications. Very few 
  people use radio in their daily lives, so unless the operative’s 
  cover includes an interest in ‘ham’ radio (by itself potentially 
  arousing  suspicion that would otherwise not exist) they will 
  have no good explanation for being caught with a radio. 
  Radio communications, if used at all, should never be 
  ‘in clear’ (in other words, not encoded in some way) and 
  should be carried out from a remote area where discovery 
  is unlikely. Many intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
  routinely scan for unlicensed radio broadcasts including 
  pirate radio stations and other non-espionage uses, and can 
  use direction-finding equipment to locate a transmission 
  site. 
  If radio is to be used then it must be assumed that a 
  transmission will be intercepted at some point, and that the 
  authorities will attempt to find the transmitter. The only way 
  to avoid this is to keep moving it and to make essential 
  broadcasts only. These should be as short as possible and 
  encoded in some manner. 
  The alternative is to use a transmitter that the opposition 
  cannot shut down, and to get the content for broadcasts 
  to it covertly. If secret information can be hidden ‘in plain 
  sight’ among innocent content, it may be possible to use a 
  civilian transmitter or a pirate radio station to communicate. 
  Similarly, radio broadcasts of an innocuous nature can be 
  used to convey information or instructions by means of 
  prearranged codes. This form of radio communication is 
  limited but less risky than a lengthy two-way conversation. 
  The interception of radio-frequency signals forms part of 
  the Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Signals Intelligence 
  (SIGIT) fields. This is typically beyond the remit of most field 
  operatives, who specialise in traditional ‘human intelligence’ 
  (HUMINT), but may at times be relevant.
  Our Other Enemy rarely makes direct 
  use of anything that can be picked 
  up with SIGIT or ELINT. More likely, 
  their activities will impact local 
  communications systems. Strange whispers or 
  even shadowy images can be sure signs of 
  the presence of Enemies from other realms. 
  Standard SIGIT or ELINT protocols can be 
  used to narrow down a location or investigate 
  and anomaly. -N
  ELINT operations seek to obtain useful information from 
  any and all transmissions made by the enemy. Much can be 
  learned from the fact that a radio transmitter is broadcasting 
  
  21
  from a certain place, or that a radar set has been used in a 
  particular locality. Analysis of the transmission can indicate 
  what type of radar or radio is in use, which in turn allows 
  conclusions to be drawn about the type of installation or 
  activity it is used for. 
  For example, maritime navigational radar has a different 
  signature to air defence radar, and radars associated with 
  short-range anti-aircraft guns or missiles are different 
  from those used to detect high-flying bombers or to guide 
  long-range air defence missiles. Thus, by monitoring 
  transmissions from a site our analysts can determine that 
  a major strategic air defence installation is in the area. It 
  may be more difficult for them to obtain photographs of the 
  installation or to steal documents from it – which is where 
  HUMINT becomes critical.
  Sometimes you have to look in the spaces 
  between spaces, so to speak; or at least 
  the signals between signals. Just don’t let 
  them look back. - Miller
  SIGINT seeks to obtain information from the opposition’s 
  transmissions. This requires the interception and decryption 
  of transmissions, which can be a lengthy and difficult 
  process. Much can be learned from callsigns and the fact 
  that radios were in use at a particular time, and if signals 
  can be fully decrypted this can yield a treasure trove of 
  information. HUMINT plays a part in obtaining the means 
  to decrypt transmissions: code books and the like are high-
  value targets, and it is possible to achieve much by simply 
  learning the opposition’s radio procedures.
  Listening in on Our Other Enemy and their 
  freak impacts on SIGIT and ELINT is very 
  dangerous, despite the value the Boss 
  places on such techniques. It is far too easy 
  to hear something that you shouldn’t while straining 
  to hear something that you need to. If you think not 
  being able to get a disco number out of your head is 
  bad, try that with one from Elsewhere. - Rodriquez
  Naturally, all of these measures can be used against us as 
  readily as by us. For this reason, most communications 
  within a network should be direct and personal. Documents, 
  photographs and reports will normally need to be physically 
  handed between operatives and taken to a location from 
  where they can be sent or transmitted home. Once items 
  reach friendly territory or a place from where they can be 
  carried in a diplomatic bag (which, by treaty, is immune to 
  inspection) then it is reasonably certain that they will reach 
  the destination. However, diplomatic bags are sometimes 
  snatched and other ‘secure’ communications can still be 
  compromised. 
  Radio and telephone communications should only be used 
  for very urgent messages or where no other alternatives 
  exist. The shorter the message and the less overall time 
  spent on the air, the smaller the chance of interception. One 
  way to achieve this is to use code words and phrases. These 
  can convey important information in a very short space of 
  time. 
  To make it difficult to infer a meaning to a code, words and 
  phrases should be assigned randomly to a preselected list of 
  meanings. A set of phrases will normally include a ‘duress 
  code’, which permits the operative to warn listeners that 
  something is badly wrong – normally this means they are 
  being forced to make the transmission. 
  We inherited a set of codes from 
  our wartime predecessors, and even 
  though our intelligence services are 
  known to have been penetrated by the 
  opposition these have, for the most part, not 
  been changed. The one-word codes assigned 
  to Mythos creatures by Network N during World 
  War Two are still in use. 
  These codes are contained in document 'Case 
  Seven'. They are on the Reserved List and 
  are never assigned as reporting codes by the 
  Western Allies. The Reserved List contains 
  numerous special-case codes, most of which 
  fall outside our remit and their meanings are 
  therefore, quite rightly, not available to us. Only 
  those assigned a set of Reserved Codes are to 
  know of the list's existence, and revealing that 
  we know of the list will indicate to outsiders 
  that we are involved with at least one of the 
  Special Cases. We do not want the attention 
  this may bring about.
  All references to Our Other Enemy – in all 
  forms of communication – must be encrypted 
  and should use Case Seven reporting codes 
  rather than the actual names of creatures. The 
  opposition must not suspect that we have agents 
  abroad with knowledge of unusual activity and 
  creatures. Our task will become enormously 
  more hazardous if our personnel are hunted 
  for their knowledge and their transmissions 
  become a signal for enemy investigators to 
  descend upon an area. -N
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  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
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  C A S E  S E V E N  C O D E  W O R D S
  To avoid revealing information about Our Other Enemy to telegraph and radio operators, 
  the following code words should be used in all written and transmitted communications. If 
  no codeword can be found for an event, use the nearest approximation and prefix with COLD.
  Burn this document as soon as you have memorised it.
  SUPPER: Occult Text, Class One (e.g. Necronomicon, De Vermis Mysteriis).
  TIFFIN: Occult Text, Class Two (e.g. Saracenic Rituals, The People of the Monolith).
  LEFTOVERS: Occult Text, Class Three (notes, diaries, etc.).
  PITCHFORK: Dagger, Ritual.
  HAYSTACK: Altar, Sacrificial.
  PIGSTY: Suspected Summoning Site.
  ABATOIR: Confirmed Summoning Site.
  CATTLE: Cult, Malignant.
  SCARECROW: Sorcerer, Lone.
  CARBUNCLE: Portal to non-terrestrial destination.
  BUNION: Subterranean temple or catacombs.
  POLONIUS: Ghoul.
  COLD POLONIUS: Subterranean creature of unknown classification.
  OPHELIA: Deep one.
  COLD OPHELIA: Aquatic or amphibious creature of unknown classification.
  *
  *
  *
  *
  *
   
  M
   
  O
   
  S
   
  T
   
   
  S
   
  E
   
  C
   
  R
   
  E
   
  T
   
  *
  *
  *
  *
  *
  handling radio CommuniCations
  The basics of using a radio transmitter are taught to all field operatives, 
  along with standard measures for avoiding detection. Investigators can be 
  assumed to be able to set up a fairly standard transmitter or send a signal on 
  the desired channel. Other operations require the use of the investigator’s skills in 
  a slightly unusual context. 
  Attempting to avoid detection involves a combined Signals and Tradecraft roll. A 
  successful roll will usually indicate that the transmission was sufficiently short and 
  well-timed to avoid detection by routine measures.
  Any task that requires modifications to the set, significant adjustments to overcome 
  local conditions or repairs, uses Electrical Repair skill. For example, modifying a set 
  to broadcast on an unusual channel or to burn through interference would use this skill.
  Most other operations are simply applications of what the investigator has been taught 
  about radio communications, falling under the Signals skill. Fairly simple tasks will 
  be completed with ease; more complex or unusual applications can be covered by a skill 
  roll. 
  
  23
  sIgnaLs, Codes and CIpHers
  A code essentially substitutes a word, symbol or phrase for 
  a piece of information. This may be a particular subject such 
  as a place, circumstance or person or a word or phrase. 
  The use of a code will usually shorten a transmission by 
  allowing the meaning of a message to be conveyed with a 
  short phrase or a single word.
  One-word codes convey a meaning rather than the specifics 
  of the message. A prearranged code such as “Anchor” might 
  mean something quite complex, such as the fact that a 
  specific place has evidence of activity by Soviet intelligence 
  agents but there are no signs of combat personnel there. 
  The more specific a code is, the less generally useful it will 
  be; most codes can be used to construct complex messages 
  as they have a more general meaning, but very important 
  pieces of information are usually assigned a specific code.
  For example, the Soviet Northern Fleet might be given the 
  code word “Brimstone” and the concept of “at sea, probably 
  on exercise” be assigned the code “Roundabout”. The 
  phrase “Elements Brimstone Roundabout” indicates that at 
  least part of the Northern Fleet has sailed from its home 
  port on what is thought to be an exercise. It is unlikely that 
  anyone without knowledge of the appropriate codes could 
  deduce the meaning of this message even if they decrypted 
  it.
  Signals of various other sorts can also be used to convey 
  a meaning. Prearranged signals such as a particular book 
  on a windowsill can be used to indicate that it is safe for 
  the operative to come to his informant’s house, or that a 
  message has been left at a prearranged drop point. Signals 
  of this sort, like codes, require prearrangement and cannot 
  convey a meaning that lies outside their field of coverage. 
  Ciphers, on the other hand, translate not the meaning of 
  a word but its letters. This allows a message to be created 
  with any meaning the Agent wants it to have, and then 
  encrypted to make it hard to read. The problem with ciphers 
  is that they can be broken by various means. If the ‘key’ to a 
  cipher is known (such as from a captured enemy code book) 
  then it can be read as easily as a clear transmission, but even 
  if it is not known the cipher can sometimes be cracked by 
  looking for common words.
  As a result, a simple substitution cipher is of little value. 
  Complex ciphers, which rearrange the letters in a word and 
  break the text into blocks of a set length (such as four-letter 
  blocks) can make it hard to recognise words, and of course 
  mixing codes and ciphers results in a translation both of 
  meaning and of actual text. 
  The most secure cipher likely to be available to an operative 
  in the field is the one-use pad. This contains a key that can 
  be used to encrypt any message, and is extremely difficult 
  (perhaps impossible) to decrypt without the identical 
  corresponding pad. Such pads allow communication only 
  between an operative and the holder of the other pad and 
  may thus suffer from some lack of flexibility. However, so 
  long as proper channels for information flow have been set 
  up this is an extremely secure means of communication.
  handling Codes and CiPhers
  For the most part, use of codes and 
  ciphers is routine; it is something 
  all intelligence operatives are 
  trained to do. Personnel will be able to 
  automatically encrypt and decrypt their 
  own messages and those using a system 
  they have the key to. However, when an 
  investigator wants to figure out a coded 
  or ciphered message they have found, they 
  will have a more difficult time.
  A simple code can sometimes be broken 
  with no outside help. Codes of this type 
  are likely to be in use with amateurish 
  dissident groups or possibly very backward 
  national armed forces. An INT roll (or a 
  Cryptography skill roll, if this is higher) 
  will allow an investigator to decode a 
  message encoded in a simple cypher). If 
  they make a Hard success, they have broken 
  the code and can read future messages that 
  are sent using it fairly easily, though 
  they will require some time to decode 
  them. More complex codes, such as those 
  used by the Soviet armed forces, cannot 
  generally be broken by local means, if 
  they can be broken at all. Decryption and 
  analysis will usually have to be carried 
  out by experts back home. Information 
  gained from such complex codes will tend 
  to be a matter of plot, not skill rolls. 
  Operatives may sometimes be able to get 
  a decrypt of an enemy code, but often 
  will not. They may also be provided with 
  information that has come in from other 
  parts of the intelligence community such 
  as decryption by SIGINT personnel or 
  other, more secret, means.
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  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  24
  drops and otHer 
  forms of CommunICatIon
  Some messages or information can be conveyed by a simple 
  signal. The most common use for this is to inform members 
  of a network that there is a message waiting in a dead drop. 
  This system is used to build cut-outs into the communication 
  system and protect operatives if some part of their network is 
  compromised.
  Thus an operative who spots a particular signal – say, a hat 
  left on the dashboard of a certain car – knows that a given 
  circumstance has occurred. The amount of information that 
  can be conveyed in this manner is limited, but nonetheless can 
  prove important. Prearranged signals of this kind are passive 
  in nature and are unlikely to be detected, but equally the 
  operative cannot be sure they will not be accidentally removed 
  or simply not spotted by the intended recipient. 
  It is important to know the symbols 
  the servants of Our Other Enemy use. 
  Being obsessed creatures, they tend 
  to use the same symbols over and 
  over, and through this inattentively label their 
  dead drops and other resources. That is not to 
  say that every three lobed star is a sign that 
  our friends who follow it are using a loose 
  brick to pass information, but it is a viable 
  clue. Still, more than one cell of cattle has 
  been sent to slaughter through these means. -N
  The initial signal conveys relatively little information, but if the 
  message is “under observation, stay away” then this can be 
  invaluable. It can also inform the operative that more detailed 
  information is available from a drop. The usual form of a drop 
  message is written, probably coded or encrypted. A drop system 
  can take the form of a verbal message left with a ‘human drop’ 
  who knows only the message itself, not what it means. When 
  given the correct identification phrase the human drop passes 
  on the message and then goes on with their business. 
  Human drops have advantages and disadvantages. They 
  allow communication between people who will never meet; 
  but they add an extra person to the chain, which can increase 
  the chances of detection. However, written messages have 
  their own drawbacks. 
  Any written message can expose everyone involved to the 
  risk of exposure if it is found, and can be used as evidence 
  by the enemy more effectively than a verbal message might 
  be. Written messages should thus be destroyed once they 
  are delivered, ideally by burning.
  While it may be all well and good for 
  our esteemed spider to sit in his web and 
  learn these things, those of us in the field 
  must keep a certain detachment from 
  the more dangerous and esoteric of our intelligence 
  work. Failure to do so will lead the weak-willed to 
  a dark end. - Steuben
  In extreme circumstances, an operative may have to attempt a 
  brush pass. This requires the operative to walk past the agent 
  with whom them are exchanging information, making contact 
  fleetingly to pass a message or item. If this is performed 
  successfully, an observer will only see two people walking past 
  
  25
  each other. The fact that the operative and their agent are in 
  the same place at the same time is risky, however, and may 
  raise suspicions even if the exchange goes unobserved. This 
  technique should only be used when there is no other option.
  Written messages can be concealed within an innocuous letter 
  or card, either written in a ‘secret ink’ that only becomes visible 
  when treated correctly or encoded within the text. Such a 
  concealed message must be well enough hidden to evade at 
  least casual notice. If there is any danger that the operative 
  is under suspicion and their mail is being read, it must be 
  very well concealed indeed. As with other written forms of 
  communication, a letter with a secret component is all the 
  proof that hostile intelligence personnel need.
  use of propaganda and LIes
  Propaganda takes various forms, some crude and some 
  subtle. Certain regimes simply repeat the party line over and 
  over through every medium possible until people believe the 
  message even though they are fairly sure it isn’t true. As a 
  rule, the truth is a more powerful propaganda weapon than 
  lies – not least since it is impossible to be caught in a lie if 
  you have told the truth.
  When working with local assets, truthfulness builds trust, 
  though it may be necessary to balance truthfulness against 
  the intended result – there are times when it is necessary 
  to misrepresent a situation in order to make it look less 
  disastrous. Operatives should be aware that being discovered 
  to have lied may cause trust and cooperation to break down.
  When a piece of propaganda makes no attempt to hide its 
  origins, this is termed ‘white propaganda’. Since the source 
  is obvious, it is usually counterproductive to tell lies, but 
  the truth can be told in a way that suits our purposes. We 
  might, for example, put out the entirely truthful story that 
  a recent Warsaw Pact military exercise was in fact staged 
  and scripted, and its immense success was certain from the 
  start. We might not mention the sheer size of the exercise 
  and the numbers of tanks and aircraft involved, as we do not 
  want to play up the strength of the enemy’s forces.
  White propaganda often consists of information the enemy 
  would prefer not be made public, but which is true and 
  can therefore be independently verified. White propaganda 
  also serves our cause more indirectly; it will strengthen the 
  reputation of our operatives for telling the truth when it is 
  corroborated.
  White propaganda also includes images and information that 
  are not directly damaging to the enemy but which aid the 
  friendly cause. For example, posters exhorting workers to 
  meet their production targets or to foster goodwill towards 
  allies. Neither are not directly harmful to the enemy, but it 
  is designed to manipulate the populace into thinking in a 
  way that the propagandists approve of. White propaganda 
  is generally candid about its origins; for example pro-
  government posters will generally not conceal the fact that 
  they were issued by the government itself.
  Black propaganda is deliberately misleading about its origins. 
  Often it will purport to originate from the enemy, such as 
  fake radio broadcasts pretending to be foreign stations or 
  ‘leaked’ documents revealing ‘facts’ that are damaging 
  to the enemy. Black propaganda may be true or contain 
  truthful elements, but more commonly is made up of lies. 
  You want to talk about black propaganda? 
  It doesn’t get any blacker than some of 
  the books our other enemy pass around. 
  They promise power, or at least safety, 
  if you worship their damnable gods and make 
  the right sacrifices. That’s as pathetic as cows in 
  a slaughterhouse praying to the man with the big 
  knife. - Steuben
  Somewhere between white and black propaganda lies the 
  field of grey propaganda. Grey propaganda does not identify 
  its source, or is vague about it, but does not deliberately 
  attempt to mislead its origins. Often this is done to conceal 
  whose agenda the propaganda supports. Grey propaganda 
  tends to appear neutral in its viewpoint or to have been put 
  out by legitimate bodies or persons.
  For example, a fabricated report ostensibly published 
  by a respected academic at a university with no political 
  connections, but which is biased towards a particular 
  viewpoint, might be considered a piece of grey propaganda. 
  It would be ‘black’ if it purported to be sanctioned by a 
  political body other than the one actually issuing it, but 
  since it claims a neutral source it should be considered to 
  be ‘grey’.
  The truth is a powerful propaganda weapon, and is more 
  commonly employed in white than black or grey propaganda. 
  However, all three types can make liberal use of truths, half-
  truths, deceptive statements and outright fabrication. 
  “Speak loudly and repeat” is the crudest form of propaganda. 
  This technique is commonly used to indoctrinate a domestic 
  population or to try to wear down the morale of enemies. 
  There may be a few true details here and there to strengthen 
  the story, but this sort of propaganda is for the most part 
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  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  26
  simply made up to suit the purposes of the user. This can be 
  very effective, especially when the local population has no 
  other source of news than the official radio and TV channels 
  or where it takes an indirect form. 
  Other forms of propaganda are subtler, and revolve around 
  concealing some truths and using others in a misleading 
  manner. For example, a prominent exponent of free speech 
  and governmental reform might be arrested on a trumped-
  up charge (usually something nasty to appal the general 
  population) and much made of the event. With no real case 
  against him, he will eventually be released, but this part of 
  the story might be suppressed. Although the mud thrown 
  at this person’s reputation is entirely invented, some of it 
  will stick and his credibility will be damaged even though 
  he is entirely innocent. This sort of propaganda relies on 
  the spreading of rumours and gossip, and reporting through 
  newspapers and radio.  
  I’m not sure the boss would like this too 
  much, but I’ve had some success in pitting 
  groups of cattle against each other. 
  Sometimes all it takes is the right words in 
  the right ears, or a few planted documents. The next 
  thing you know, they’re playing “my god can beat up 
  your god” and stabbing each other with sacrificial 
  knives. - Rodriquez
  You are correct. I do not like this. 
  These people have no concept of 
  subtlety, and their petty battles risk 
  exposing us all.  -N
  Propaganda often uses the truth in a manner that can be 
  misleading, for example presenting unrelated events (that 
  really did happen) as a conspiracy or master plan. A crashed 
  spy plane, which came down due to mechanical failure, 
  might be presented as shot down in the hopes of making the 
  enemy believe the propagandists’ side has weapons capable 
  of engaging high-flying aircraft.
  Propaganda of all types can be used to shape attitudes to 
  various groups, for example fostering the belief that everyone 
  of a particular nationality or ethnicity is corrupt or stupid. It 
  can be used to destroy the reputation of a person or to shift 
  the blame for a defeat, setback or unpopular decision on to 
  a suitable scapegoat. Similar methods have been used to 
  destroy former national heroes in many totalitarian nations 
  strengthening the current regime.
  Most operatives will use propaganda on a very local basis, 
  such as presenting information in such a way as to win over 
  local supporters. 
  A large-scale propaganda campaign intended to inspire local 
  workers into a campaign of passive resistance or to stir up 
  anti-government feeling is more likely to be orchestrated at 
  home, with operatives in the field carrying out various tasks 
  to facilitate it or make use of it. 
  It is tempting to use propaganda 
  against Our Other Enemy. The right 
  words, especially in a country with 
  a national religion or a strongly 
  religious population, can turn official attention 
  towards the cattle. You might even summon 
  the spectre of populist mob violence. Such a 
  scheme is all too prone to expose things best 
  left occluded and rend the penumbra we work 
  within. -N
  The op went bust, but I legged it to safety, and with the parcel as well. This is how things can go 
  wrong: you trust the wrong people. How was I supposed to know the Russian was 46 as well? If she 
  was. Which she wasn’t, wasn’t. Back to Blighty for the debrief with the Guv. - Stanton
  
  CHaPTer 
  TWO
  N e t w o r k s 
  a n d 
  A s s e t s
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  28
  It is rare for an operative to work entirely alone. In order 
  to carry out effective intelligence work it is necessary 
  to build a network. This is always a risky business; each 
  additional member of a network increases the chance of it 
  being penetrated or revealed to the enemy, and bringing in 
  a new asset always creates a period of increased risk. Some 
  components of a network will be fellow intelligence operatives 
  who can (usually) be trusted to be both competent and discreet. 
  However, any intelligence agency can be compromised so. 
  Similarly, some operatives are cowboys who take unnecessary 
  risks or disregard procedures, while others are simply inept. 
  A degree of mistrust towards everyone can be a boon among 
  operatives, but too much of it can cripple an operation.
  If fellow operatives are subject to slight mistrust (or at least, 
  not being above suspicion when something goes wrong) then 
  local assets are not to be trusted at all. An asset is someone 
  who carries out some task for the network, either regularly 
  or as needed. A good network has many assets, run by one 
  or more case officers, but can disconnect itself from any or 
  all of them at need. 
  Our 
  Other 
  Enemy 
  have 
  difficulty 
  developing assets outside of their own 
  cattle. Still, do not be surprised if the 
  saner-appearing can leverage a few assets 
  from outside circles. Once, I was too focused on 
  the movements of the main group of cattle and did 
  not realise until nearly too late that a rickshaw 
  driver was a dupe carrying messages between the 
  two leaders. - Rodriquez
  Yes, Our Other Enemy uses much the same 
  methods as we do. In turn, we must use 
  those methods to a higher degree of 
  efficiency. The stress this entails means 
  that you may have to use and cast off assets often. 
  If a few healthy cells must be cut out to excise 
  the cancer, then so be it. - Steuben
  Operatives with jobs within the network need access 
  to a certain amount of information, though this can be 
  compartmentalised to prevent any one person revealing too 
  much. Assets do not need much information at all, though 
  they may require some to be able to function or to secure 
  their loyalty. Assets should never be trusted with mission-
  critical information or secrets that could compromise the 
  network as a whole. 
  Note that one of the greatest dangers to an intelligence 
  network is a shift in the loyalties of its own people. An 
  operative might be compromised or suborned by the enemy, 
  but more often this happens when an operative ‘goes 
  native.’ There are many routes to going native, but the most 
  commonly encountered is when an operative develops close 
  relationships with their assets or the country in which they are 
  operating. For example, a case officer who is handling several 
  local informants might develop a close relationship with one 
  of them, which can cause complications. 
  An operative who has ‘gone native’ can still be useful to the 
  network and their home country, but their loyalties will at 
  the least be divided. It can be difficult to tell the difference 
  between someone who is blending in well and someone who 
  has gone native until they make some telling action – by which 
  time it can be too late. The decision as to what to do with an 
  operative who has gone native can be a tricky one. They may 
  still be useful, in a reduced capacity, but once they realise 
  they are being cut out of the loop they may become resentful. 
  A disaffected former network member is a dangerous thing to 
  leave in the field. Another hazard to networks is the danger 
  of fratricide; the situation where two operations collide and 
  interfere with one another. This can happen within a network, 
  and is far more likely when different intelligence agencies are 
  operating in the same area. Preventing fratricide is sometimes 
  referred to as ‘keeping the lines straight’ but can be difficult 
  when information is compartmentalised.
  Access to information within a network should be on a ‘need 
  to know’ basis. That is, personnel should only have access 
  to information they need in order to fulfil their function. 
  However, too little can be as dangerous as too much, though 
  often in different ways. Sometimes ‘good to know’ (useful but 
  not vital) information can be provided to assist personnel in 
  keeping their lines straight or setting up an operation. 
  Operatives might also go about obtaining their own ‘good 
  to know’ and ‘nice to know’ information if they think it is 
  necessary or helpful. This can create a situation where several 
  members of the network are running their own assets to 
  try to fill in the blanks surrounding the data they have been 
  given through official channels. Such a situation can lead to 
  fratricide or a network being indirectly penetrated by hostile 
  intelligence agencies. 
  One way to handle certain kinds of information is to ‘black 
  box’ it. Black boxed information is to be trusted and treated 
  • N E T W O R K S  A N D  A S S E T S •
  
  29
  as unquestionably accurate, but its source is never hinted 
  at nor revealed. This can make some operatives nervous, 
  especially if black boxed information has in the past turned 
  out to be unreliable. Most information passed from one part 
  of a network to another is black boxed for security reasons. 
  There will be times where investigating 
  Our Other Enemy reveals information 
  useful for less esoteric matters. In these 
  cases you should always ‘black box’ the 
  information in order to keep the source secret. 
  Do not do this if you fear that the source might 
  be discovered in some way. Defeating Our Other 
  enemy is of greater concern than serving some more 
  mundane agenda. - Steuben
  SOURCES AND ASSETS
  The term ‘source’ is applied to anyone providing information 
  to an operative. The term is extremely vague and can cover 
  anything from a gossipy newspaper vendor to a high-
  value informant in the enemy’s intelligence community. 
  The term ‘agent’ is used for someone who acts on behalf 
  of the intelligence services, such as a person who collects 
  information or engages in spreading propaganda among 
  dissidents, but is not one of our operatives. The term ‘asset’ 
  is more generally used to mean anyone who is of value to 
  the network.
  Be flexible in your network and 
  assets. There is a greater issue at 
  hand: in fact, two greater issues. No 
  potential asset is placed too far below your 
  station to be used. This is one place where a 
  disguise or alternative cover identity can be 
  useful. There is no reason why a businessman on 
  holiday needs to interact with a lowly street 
  tough, but an opium runner certainly would. This 
  also provides layers of security for your true 
  mission and main cover. -N
  The commonest use for assets is information gathering. 
  Information of all sorts can be valuable, but two factors 
  make one source more valuable than another: reliability and 
  access. Reliability can be hard to judge; some sources may 
  be working for enemy intelligence agencies, dangling some 
  information as a lure to draw in our operatives. Others have 
  their own agenda or are prone to invention. Reliability can 
  be judged most accurately over time, but this luxury is not 
  always available. 
  Access to useful information is what makes some assets more 
  valuable than others. This is usually due to what is termed 
  ‘positioning’. Positioning is not so much about locality as 
  it is contact with information flow and other sources. For 
  example, two sources in the same city may not be of the same 
  value if one has access to high-end information and the other 
  can only report on mundane happenings. 
  Assets must always be considered expendable, and the 
  network must be able to dissociate itself from one without 
  being compromised. Each and every time an asset is used 
  there is a risk they will be blown, so the decision to make use 
  of a high-value asset is a difficult one. Some assets become 
  ‘sleepers’ who may not be activated for many years, if ever.
  N E T W O R K S  A N D  A S S E T S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  30
  While assets are expendable, a loyal 
  asset is more valuable. Even if you are 
  not going to need an asset right now, 
  keep some degree of contact with 
  them. This is abundantly true of those who have 
  knowledge of use against Our Other Enemy. 
  Such people are rare, which makes them doubly 
  valuable. However, do not hesitate to cut one 
  out if needed, even permanently. -N
  Some sources are as valuable as they will ever be from the 
  moment of first contact. This is particularly true of low-
  value informants or assets who are positioned in a way that 
  is only useful under very specific circumstances. Others 
  can be or must be developed once contact is made. This 
  can mean building trust or developing a relationship with 
  the asset, or convincing them by some means to work for 
  the network. In some cases an asset can be developed by 
  helping them insinuate themselves more closely into the 
  target organisation.
  In any region and field of interest, there is a ‘centre of 
  gravity’. This is the point where an asset can collect the 
  most information – or the greatest quantity of valuable 
  information – on a given subject for the least effort or 
  outlay. An asset located close to the centre of gravity is 
  extremely valuable. This does not necessarily translate to 
  the most difficult to obtain: circumstances vary and the 
  centre of gravity may not be in a place that is especially 
  well secured.
  reLIabILIty and Leverage
  Sources and other assets vary considerably. The least reliable 
  are those who simply want money for information – they 
  will take money from other clients too. The ‘true believer’ 
  can be a troublesome asset too. This is someone who 
  believes passionately in a particular cause, which may be 
  nothing whatsoever to do with why they are recruited as an 
  intelligence asset. True believers can sometimes be induced 
  to supply information to others who share their beliefs or 
  support their agenda, but can be easily alienated if they are 
  treated as cranks or their beliefs are belittled.
  Servants of Our Other Enemy can often 
  be categorized as ‘true believers’, which 
  can make them rather easy to manipulate 
  if you can convince them that you are a 
  fellow traveller. Easy, yes, but not safe by any 
  means. Running a network of cattle is walking 
  a razor’s edge; any misstep and you become the 
  target for their insanity. - Rodriquez
  The most reliable sources are those who sympathise with us 
  and want to help voluntarily, though it can be hard to tell 
  if this is a real belief or a gambit on the part of a hostile 
  agency. Some voluntary assets are not very useful even if 
  they are reliable. For example, some countries are popular 
  retirement destinations, or people from our home countries 
  may have gone to live there and be willing to help our 
  intelligence services. However, it is not all that likely that a 
  retired merchant sailor (for example) will have access to much 
  information of critical importance to us.
  Coerced sources are usually the best in terms of reliability and, 
  if selected well, usefulness. Coercion can take many forms. 
  One common trick used by various intelligence services is 
  to obtain photographs of the asset doing something that 
  would harm his reputation, livelihood or safety. Sometimes 
  an attractive person, termed a ‘swallow’ by some intelligence 
  agencies, will seduce the target for the purpose of obtaining 
  such photos. Of course, much depends on whether the target 
  cares if his indiscretion is revealed.
  It can be hard to turn someone whose 
  lusts are for the bizarre symmetries of 
  reality or who has seen horrors too tough 
  to imagine. You can’t bribe them, you 
  can’t seduce them, and you can’t beat them into 
  working for you. You can convince them you are 
  one of them, though that has its risks. - Miller>
  Discrepancies in financial and business dealings, or crimes 
  hidden in the target’s past, are all potential leverage. So is a 
  history of providing information to intelligence services. This 
  means that once coerced into working for our network an 
  asset continues to provide us with leverage for future use. 
  However, it is possible to push an asset too far; if too much 
  is asked they may refuse, or sell the network out. When this 
  happens it is usually in return for escaping the consequences 
  of their earlier actions. 
  squeezIng and burnIng sourCes
  It may sometimes be necessary to ‘squeeze’ a source in order 
  to get more from them than they want to give. This is easier 
  where a source is coerced; one who is working for money 
  may find it relatively easy to refuse an additional payment if 
  they think the risk is too high or the task is too much trouble. 
  Thus, even if a source is simply working for payment it can 
  be worthwhile finding some leverage to use if they need to be 
  squeezed. The fact that they have provided information to a 
  foreign intelligence operative for money might be sufficient, but 
  it does require revealing to the source that they have done so. 
  
  31
  It may be preferable to find some other means to coerce 
  them, which does not expose our operatives for what they 
  are. All assets should be distanced from the network as much 
  as possible. Information and instructions can be passed by 
  dead drop (with no direct contact between the asset and his 
  handler – see pg. 24), or by contact with a single member of 
  the network. This way no asset can reveal much, whether 
  voluntarily or otherwise. Ideally an asset should not know 
  anything beyond the fact that he has done certain things for… 
  someone. He should not know whether that someone is part 
  of a huge network or is a solo operative, nor anything about 
  the larger plans he is part of.
  Remember that your identity as an agent of 
  a national intelligence service is the only 
  thing allowing you to fight the good fight. 
  Blowing that can be as easy as burning a 
  network and not having a good explanation why. I’m 
  not saying don’t burn that network, I am just telling 
  you to be prepared to justify it to your superiors. - 
  Rodriquez
  BUILDING A NETWORK
  An intelligence network typically comprises several, loosely 
  connected components. Wherever possible ‘cut-outs’ should 
  be used; people who carry information and instructions 
  between the different parts of the network. If part of the 
  network is compromised, the cut-out can disappear, ensuring 
  that captured or suborned personnel have no idea how to 
  contact the rest of the network. Of course, the enemy may 
  be able to make an educated guess as to who is part of the 
  network, perhaps by considering who has an identity that 
  would make a good cover. If part of a network is compromised 
  but the cut-out has worked, members may still be questioned. 
  The enemy might claim to have proof of complicity, but this 
  is unlikely to be true.
  Most networks will not include analysis staff, since analysts 
  need to know a great deal of information about many things 
  in order to do their work. It is therefore far too risky to station 
  them anywhere that they could be grabbed by the enemy. 
  Similarly, cryptanalysts (who attempt to break enemy codes) 
  are not stationed anywhere but friendly territory. Some low-
  level analysis and cryptography can be carried out on-site 
  by staff who are part of a network, but those who specialise 
  in such tasks are forbidden from entering enemy or even 
  neutral territory.
  Core staff
  The senior intelligence officer in a region is usually termed the 
  Head of Station, and will often be a member of an embassy 
  staff. If this is the case, they are – like all diplomatic personnel 
  – what is termed ‘legal’. This means that the opposition can 
  sPot rules for reCruiting assets
  Most often, the process of recruiting an asset is a major event, possibly providing 
  the focus for a scenario or a chapter of a campaign. In such cases, the Keeper 
  will want to play the process out over a number of scenes, with the investigators 
  using a variety of skills as they gather information, plant incriminating evidence, set 
  up honey traps or apply pressure to the right points of their recruit’s life. 
  Occasionally, however, the Keeper may want to handle the recruitment simply in order to 
  focus on a different strand of the campaign. In these cases, recruitment may simply be 
  abstracted to a single roll that combines a number of skills. Some examples are:
  •	 Planting false evidence and blackmailing the target: combined Stealth, Tradecraft 
  and Intimidation.
  •	 Determining whether the target is corrupt and offering a suitable bribe: Psychology, 
  Tradecraft and one of Charm, Fast Talk or Persuade.
  •	 Seducing and sexually blackmailing the target: Charm, Intimidate and Tradecraft.
  •	 Discovering who or what the target cares about and threatening it: Psychology, 
  Intimidate and Tradecraft.
  •	 Appealing to the target’s ego or ideology: Psychology, Tradecraft and one of Charm, 
  Fast Talk or Persuade.
  N E T W O R K S  A N D  A S S E T S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  32
  expel them and refuse permission to return to their territory, 
  but cannot imprison, interrogate or eliminate them without 
  causing a diplomatic incident. ‘Illegals’, by this definition, are 
  those who are not openly working for their home nation (in 
  some capacity); they therefore have no protection if captured. 
  If the Head of Station and support staff are ‘legal’, then 
  making contact with them can be problematic, although it 
  does offer protection against key personnel being arrested and 
  interrogated, and allows items to be moved in and out of the 
  target country in a ‘diplomatic bag’. Most ‘illegal’ networks 
  will rarely, if ever, have contact with a legal Head of Station, 
  instead relying on their own channels for communication. 
  Our Other Enemy does not care about 
  diplomatic immunity, 'legal ' personnel 
  at an embassy or mission, diplomatic 
  bags or any of the safe means you 
  are used to. -N
  Sometimes they are Our Other Enemy. 
  - Miller>
  A network that does not fall under the control of the Head 
  of Station will have its own commander and key personnel, 
  who will not normally undertake work in the field. There 
  will be one or more case officers who handle assets, plus 
  experts who deal with communications or other critical 
  tasks. Some networks might also have vehicle or intrusion 
  specialists, linguists or other necessary personnel, though this 
  is something of a luxury and is by no means common.
  A network may have various field operatives attached 
  to it. Some of these might have access to the network’s 
  headquarters, if it has one, whilst others might be kept at a 
  distance for security reasons. These general personnel carry 
  out a variety of tasks in the field, ranging from simple driving 
  and security work, to surveillance and ‘black bag’ (breaking 
  and entering) jobs. Some have no other function than to act 
  as couriers to liaise with other parts of the network; they can 
  serve as cut-outs as needed.
  tHe struCture of a network
  A network that is larger than a couple of case officers and 
  a commander will usually be subdivided in a manner not 
  dissimilar to the way many insurgent forces are divided into 
  self-contained ‘cells’. Members of a cell will usually know 
  (or at least have a reasonable idea) who one another are, but 
  communication between cells is minimal and always by way 
  of a cut-out. Ideally, members of a cell will not know how 
  many other cells there are, let alone any details about them.
  Cells can be organised in a variety of ways. The simplest is 
  to have each reporting to a central ‘command cell’ by way of 
  a cut-out. However, sometimes a cell will have command of 
  one or more other cells, which report to it and have no direct 
  contact with the command cell. 
  Cells can be organised by locality or by function, or as a 
  combination of both. That is, a network might have a central 
  command cell that controls two regional cells, one of which 
  has a subordinate cell tasked with a specialist function such 
  as watching a particular location. In addition, the command 
  cell controls two local general/information-gathering cells 
  and a specialist cell formed of field operatives who are moved 
  around and given various tasks depending on what the other 
  cells have learned. The loss of any of these cells, other than 
  the command cell, would not cripple the network.
  reCruItIng assets
  A network must be built slowly and carefully. Some functions 
  can be fulfilled by operatives sent from home, but it is not 
  usually possible to send a whole network’s worth of operatives 
  and hope to avoid detection. Even the most obtuse of foreign 
  intelligence agencies will notice something amiss if this is 
  attempted. A network must instead be grown over time, with 
  assigned personnel then beginning the task of developing 
  local assets.
  When establishing your own network 
  of assets, keep in mind that you are 
  playing a double game. If an asset 
  can be used both for agency and 
  Other work, then do so. This is particularly 
  easy with couriers, cut-outs and others who 
  have no idea who they are working for or 
  why. -N
  The selection of potential assets is a tricky business. 
  Intelligence agencies sometimes position their own personnel 
  where they are likely to be approached, and even if this is not 
  the case some potential assets may be spooked by an approach 
  and alert the authorities. The selection and approach process 
  is best compared to an assassination attempt: the assassin 
  does not strike unless they are confident they can succeed. 
  The same applies to approaching a potential asset. 
  There are exceptions to this rule. If our intelligence agencies 
  are known to be interested in an area, then a deliberately 
  ham-fisted approach to potential assets can actually be 
  quite useful. The opposition can hardly fail to notice the 
  efforts being made, which may serve to distract them from 
  subtler operations elsewhere. They will also attempt to place 
  
  33
  personnel where these clumsy recruitment efforts will find 
  them, which enables us to feed information to the opposition 
  through operatives about whom they think we are ignorant.
  However, for the most part potential assets must be carefully 
  observed and evaluated long before an approach is made. 
  Some of the factors that make an asset desirable can also 
  make them a bad choice. Someone who is rabidly opposed 
  to their government might be very willing to help us, but 
  they will also attract attention – and will probably already 
  have done so. Such people are best used as decoys or else 
  left alone to cause a nuisance to the opposition by their own 
  efforts.
  It might be nearly impossible to turn 
  one of the cattle into an asset. Few 
  have interests outside their insanity 
  that you can turn to your advantage. 
  You can play on their devotion, especially the 
  lower ranked and more ambitious members of 
  a cell, by offering books, scrolls, or (fake) 
  items of esoteric interest. A better target 
  would be a person who, while not an intimate, 
  has access to the cell's lair or other meeting 
  place. The ritual chamber still needs electricity, 
  and the house above likely has a telephone line. 
  Food might be delivered, the leader of the 
  cattle might have an accountant who handles 
  their money, or the swimming pool might need 
  to be cleaned. The most dangerous of servants 
  of Our Other Enemy can maintain a façade of 
  the mundane, and such a façade can be our 
  way in. -N
  Newcomers to the area of operations are best treated with 
  suspicion. A new junior scientist who pops up at a location of 
  interest just as we begin recruiting assets in the area might be 
  a lucky find, but they are far more likely to be a plant for the 
  enemy’s intelligence services. 
  Newcomers are unlikely to be well positioned to obtain good 
  information unless they are highly placed, in which case 
  they may be very loyal or be under observation – or both. 
  Obviously gaining someone in a high position as an asset is a 
  coup, but it is a high-risk operation.
  Walk-ins are also to be treated with suspicion. A walk-in 
  is anyone who offers their services (usually but not always 
  as an informant) without being approached. It should go 
  without saying that a properly covert network will not be 
  directly approached because nobody knows it is there, but 
  sometimes local citizens will contact an embassy directly. 
  Alternatively, they may approach business representatives 
  who have nothing to do with intelligence work, but might be 
  able to put them in contact with someone who wants their 
  services. If the network is in a friendly or neutral country 
  then walk-ins often hope to be assisted in defecting in return 
  for their services or information. 
  Walk-ins are to be treated not 
  merely with suspicion, but with a 
  higher degree of scrutiny than with 
  operations against mundane targets. 
  They represent a grave danger to Section 46. 
  Even knowing about us is a sure sign of a 
  security breach. Always assume that a walk-
  in is a servant of Our Other Enemy, and treat 
  them accordingly. The most important piece of 
  information you can acquire about a walk-in is 
  how they even know about us. -N
  Where genuine, walk-ins can be a godsend, but the prospect 
  of being given something for nothing should alarm any 
  intelligence operative. The potential asset’s motivations might 
  make them unreliable, or they might be under observation 
  by the opposition – they could of course be an intelligence 
  operative. It is possible to become so mesmerised by the 
  possibilities created by this windfall that the operative fails to 
  wonder if it is all too good to be true.
  N E T W O R K S  A N D  A S S E T S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  34
  assessing walk-ins
  While the Psychology skill may 
  help assess the trustworthiness 
  of a walk-in, it cannot be relied 
  upon. If the walk-in is a skilled liar, 
  the difficulty of the roll will at least 
  be Hard, or possibly Extreme for a genuine 
  master of deception. Even a success may 
  not reveal for sure that the target is 
  lying, given that the circumstances will 
  probably make them nervous enough to make 
  their reactions hard to assess.
  The Keeper is encouraged to avoid 
  simple rolls in circumstances such as 
  these. Assessing the validity of a walk-
  in should be a process, requiring the 
  investigators to poke around in the 
  target’s life, mounting surveillance, 
  discreetly 
  questioning 
  acquaintances 
  and searching through their belongings. 
  If the walk-in is a plant from another 
  agency, they will have gone to a great 
  deal of effort to fabricate convincing 
  evidence; testing its veracity could 
  require some Hard rolls.
  Once an individual has come to the attention of the network 
  as a potential asset they must be evaluated. This is usually 
  done by a combination of surveillance and digging into their 
  background. Much can be learned about an individual from 
  their habits. Small details like which paper they read or 
  what brand of cigarettes they favour can be used to build a 
  picture of their personality, and by observing these things an 
  operative can determine what a foreign intelligence operative 
  would see if he target attracted interest. A potential asset who 
  might set alarm bells ringing with their daily habits should not 
  be approached.
  Financial matters are also of great interest. These can be 
  investigated in many ways. One option is to obtain information 
  directly either by observation or by gaining access to ledgers, 
  receipts and so forth. Another is to use secondary sources, 
  for example by investigating the shops and businesses the 
  target buys from. A potential asset who is careless with 
  their own money and prone to extravagant spending will 
  more than likely do the same with funds earned working for 
  our network. This could draw unwelcome attention. Heavy 
  spending, especially beyond the target’s means, might also 
  indicate that they are corrupt or in financial trouble. This 
  could make them vulnerable to coercion or bribery – or both 
  – but also implies that they might be a security risk. 
  What an individual spends their money on can be telling in 
  other ways. It may reveal that they are supporting someone 
  – perhaps a sick relative or a child that nobody knows about, 
  perhaps one or more mistresses – or is already paying 
  blackmail to someone. It can also suggest weaknesses or 
  areas of interest such as wine or art that can be made use of 
  by an operative.
  Before a potential asset is approached, their case officer 
  should already be in possession of a complete profile. This 
  must address all aspects of their life and personality, ranging 
  from their taste in food and clothing to any interest in sport 
  or culture. Not all of these details will seem relevant, but the 
  facts do add up and something that was overlooked as trivial 
  might turn out to be very important indeed. Most importantly, 
  the profile will indicate whether the individual is worth the 
  risk of an approach 
  No matter how much effort has been put into assessing an 
  individual, it is always necessary to be willing to abandon the 
  effort if the risks are too great or the benefits too small. For 
  example, investigation into a potentially useful asset might 
  reveal that although they have a ‘big title’, they are actually 
  of little importance and have access to no information of 
  any real worth. Tempting as it might be to proceed with an 
  approach just in case the asset turns out to be more useful 
  than expected, if the risk is not justified by a realistic prospect 
  of worthwhile gains then the operation must be terminated.
  pre-approaCH
  It is sometimes possible to make a pre-approach in order to 
  sound out the potential asset. This should be carried out by 
  someone the asset will not encounter again whilst involved 
  with the network, and they must not realise that anything has 
  happened. The pre-approach could take the form of a chance 
  encounter with an attractive person in a bar, a few moments 
  of shared grumbling with a kindred spirit whilst waiting for a 
  train, or some similar innocuous situation. 
  approaCH
  If the pre-approach goes well and the potential asset responds 
  in a suitable manner to a few loaded phrases, then the actual 
  approach can go ahead. This is the most dangerous moment 
  of all, and is often preceded by a period in which the subject 
  is befriended or a working relationship is developed under the 
  pretence of more normal business or social interaction. 
  
  35
  tHe pItCH
  At some point, however, it is necessary to take the plunge and 
  make ‘the pitch’. How this is done depends very much on the 
  assessment of the individual. In some cases, especially where 
  the subject is to be bribed or coerced, a straightforward and 
  businesslike approach may be best. This may be accompanied 
  by a certain amount of hostility if the subject is being 
  coerced and it is deemed necessary to make them fear the 
  consequences of non-compliance. However, even in the case 
  where coercion using the threat of violence is the chosen 
  method, operatives may find it more effective to be civil and 
  matter-of-fact about the situation. 
  Where a subject is to be suborned or seduced (not necessarily 
  in a sexual context) into working for the network, a friendly 
  or at least civil approach is definitely necessary. It may be 
  possible to present the situation as a business arrangement, 
  with a clear agreement on what is to be given in return for 
  what – though of course our end of the deal need not be 
  honest! However, some subjects may find this approach 
  distasteful. Someone who is helping us because they despise 
  their own government or out of some similar idealism will 
  not like their grand gesture being treated as a business 
  transaction. 
  This does not necessarily mean that some form of roundabout 
  bargaining will not take place; it almost certainly will. 
  However, it will be couched in idealistic and high-minded 
  terms that allow the subject to pretend that he is not 
  negotiating a price for his treachery.
  With or without this sort of self-delusion, it is wise to mislead 
  the subject about who they are going to be working for or 
  what they will be expected to do. If the asset later finds out 
  that they have been lied to they may become disaffected, 
  but this risk is usually outweighed by the fact that they do 
  not know who they have been reporting to. Similarly, it is 
  generally easier to persuade someone to betray their country 
  or employer in a small way than on a grand scale. Once 
  the subject has become inured to the idea, or they have 
  incriminated themselves and can be coerced, then they can 
  be squeezed as necessary to force them into greater acts of 
  subversion. 
  proCurement and faCILItatIon
  Exactly what will bring a given individual under the network’s 
  control can vary considerably. Some will sign up voluntarily 
  because they think they are helping a friend or furthering 
  their ideals. Some want to win the approval of someone they 
  admire or are attracted to. Some can be controlled through 
  fear and others through bribery with money or sex. Some 
  have a particular weakness or need that, if located, will 
  give us control over them where normally they would be 
  incorruptible. It is worth restating that the correct approach 
  must be planned beforehand and this requires a lengthy 
  period of preparation. A failed attempt at subversion can 
  result in an operative or even a whole network being blown, 
  so caution is absolutely necessary.
  Appeals to self-interest and greed can vary considerably, and 
  as a rule the more sophisticated the bribe has to be, the more 
  reliable the subject. Someone who is willing to betray a trust 
  for cash is probably not all that trustworthy, whereas a subject 
  who needs money to pay off a debt or to help someone else 
  (such as obtaining medical assistance for a relative) will 
  typically be a person of ‘better’ character and less likely to 
  try to change the deal or to seek additional bribes elsewhere.
  Offers of money may have to be couched in other terms, 
  especially when dealing with an idealist or  a corrupt and 
  self-serving individual who somehow considers themselves to 
  be better than everyone else. In such cases procurement or 
  facilitation might offer a more palatable alternative to bribery, 
  though it amounts to the same thing. Someone who would 
  not take money might be willing to accept the promise of a 
  necessary medical procedure for a relative, or to be handed 
  fake passports to get their children out of the country.  
  Procurement and facilitation are very similar. Procurement 
  refers to obtaining something the subject wants or will be so 
  delighted by that they will be amenable to requests, whilst 
  facilitation refers to making something possible for him. A 
  man with a love of cars might be won over by the procurement 
  of a particular model; one whose interests are more carnal 
  can be bribed by facilitating his sexual proclivities.
  It is possible to build on this procurement/facilitation 
  relationship until the subject becomes dependent on our 
  operatives to obtain the things they want and have come to 
  expect. It then becomes possible to coerce the subject by 
  threatening to end the relationship. In addition to influencing 
  the subject to act for us, this also gives them a strong incentive 
  not to betray the network or even to actively protect it.
  Note also that operatives cannot afford to be concerned with 
  the effects of subversion on the subject. Someone who betrays 
  their country or some other trust risks a dire fate, but that 
  is not our concern. Operatives must be willing to coerce or 
  suborn individuals in the full knowledge that they are thereby 
  placed in great danger in the long or short term. Let us not 
  forget that these people are helping us for their own reasons 
  and are not necessarily our friends. They are also corrupt, 
  or traitors, or guilty of something; but none of that matters. 
  N E T W O R K S  A N D  A S S E T S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  36
  The only factors that matter are that the subject is useful 
  and available. That said, operatives still need to consider the 
  consequences for anyone they recruit as an asset. Not for 
  humanitarian or friendly reasons, but because it may affect 
  what the subject is willing to do, and how useful they can 
  be. Blatantly recruiting and using people is only viable in the 
  short term, and can draw unwelcome attention. Thus the fate 
  of the asset does matter, in that it can have an effect on future 
  operations. This is the only reason it can matter, however. A 
  case officer who cares too much about their assets has gone 
  native and may become a liability.
  Finally, it should be noted that the best way to make use 
  of a given individual may not be to suborn or coerce them 
  directly. An official’s wife, mistress or friend might be a better 
  choice as an asset than the official themselves. They may be 
  able to obtain information from the subject even though they 
  would never divulge it even under torture; the same goes for 
  obtaining documents, keys and the like from the subject, who 
  might never find out that they are the source of the leak they 
  are investigating. 
  Making someone close to an important subject an asset has 
  one other potential use; it can be used to gain leverage to 
  coerce them. Someone who would never betray a trust to 
  save themselves might be entirely willing to work for us in 
  return for not turning in their loved ones. Handled properly, 
  this approach can be used to ‘trade up’ assets by suborning 
  someone of relatively low value and getting them to do 
  something that would land them in trouble if discovered. 
  Once the true subject compromises themselves to protect a 
  loved one, they become vulnerable to a direct approach. 
  personaL meetIngs
  Contact between members of the network is hazardous unless 
  it is covered by the operatives’ assumed identities. Obviously, 
  if two operatives have cover identities that work in the same 
  building or for the same firm, then being seen together is 
  unlikely to arouse suspicion. Under most other circumstances 
  a face-to-face meeting is an occasion of increased risk. Even 
  a previously reliable asset could make a mistake or might have 
  been ‘turned’ by the opposition. Often intelligence services 
  will offer minor assets a deal whereby they are treated 
  leniently in return for exposing their contacts.
  Some personal meetings are unavoidable. It may be necessary 
  to call key personnel together for a planning session or a 
  briefing, though wherever possible orders are disseminated 
  to those requiring them without everyone having to be in the 
  handling ProCurement and faCilitation
  If an investigator is attempting to use procurement or facilitation techniques to 
  recruit a new asset, the first stage is to find out what the potential recruit 
  desires. An investigator attempting to discover this through conversation may 
  use a combined roll against Psychology and either Charm or Fast Talk, depending on the 
  approach. If the investigator is attempting to piece this together from research, this 
  instead calls for a combined Psychology and Tradecraft roll.
  In most cases, an investigator is able to call upon the resources of their agency to 
  furnish the means to tempt a potential asset. There are exceptions, however. If the 
  potential recruit is making unreasonable demands, such as much larger amounts of money 
  than the agency would normally pay, the investigator may make a Trust roll to secure 
  these resources. Time pressures may also preclude going through official channels, in 
  which case the investigator may be forced to find alternative sources.
  While an officer should never be expected to use their own finances, and doing so may 
  risk operational security, Credit Rating may still be appropriate for having useful 
  contacts or the proper bearing to operate in certain social circles. An investigator may 
  roll against Credit Rating to identify people who can supply items such as luxury cars 
  or high-quality drugs, and then use the appropriate social skills or outright theft to 
  obtain them. Catering to a potential recruit’s sexual desires may involve a Tradecraft 
  roll to have suitable contacts, Credit Rating to hire a high-class prostitute or Charm 
  to talk a suitable individual into whatever is required.
  
  37
  same place. Not only is it hard to create a cover story for such 
  a gathering or to conceal it from notice, but it is best if most 
  network members never meet and therefore cannot identify 
  one another.
  A suitable cover story must exist for any personal meeting. This 
  need not be complex; a businessman who visits an upmarket 
  bar in the evening and chats with a couple of other patrons is 
  hardly anything out of the ordinary. However, everyone must 
  be able to explain their presence at the meeting spot. If any 
  operative attracts attention then others they have met with may 
  also be questioned. 
  If your assets are fairly separate from 
  each other in time and space, you can 
  use the same cover for both, if it fits. 
  Just remember that time and space are 
  relative. Nothing is worse than running two assets 
  under the same cover and having both of them 
  walk into the bar while you are working with a 
  third. - Miller>
  The choice of meeting spot depends greatly upon the activity 
  that is to take place. A quick exchange of objects, such as a 
  handgun or an envelope containing cash or instructions, can 
  be carried out anywhere there is suitable concealment. If a 
  lengthy conversation is necessary then the location must offer 
  both a plausible reason for stopping there and some measure 
  of privacy. Most meetings must take place in public areas, 
  for various reasons. Somewhere that has people coming and 
  going all the time is a reasonable choice, but crowds cause too 
  many problems. A quiet bar, café or restaurant is a reasonable 
  choice, or perhaps the waiting room of a small railway station. 
  Obviously, the more times a meeting spot is used the greater 
  the risk, so meeting places – and times – must be varied as 
  much as possible.
  Operatives must be mindful that the authorities are not the 
  only threat. Random passers-by might report people behaving 
  suspiciously or might even take exception to what they think 
  is going on. Operatives do not want any sort of attention, and 
  while cover stories such as meeting a prostitute or something 
  similar are useful in some areas, local conditions may make 
  this a poor choice. 
  Care must be taken to act naturally throughout the meeting. 
  Observers will be a lot less suspicious of people who smile 
  or laugh as if enjoying a social conversation than of people 
  who speak quietly and furtively; as always it is important 
  to act appropriately for the surroundings. Other factors that 
  might stand out to an observer include an operative who 
  looks impatient before a ‘chance meeting’ takes place. Little 
  things that seem slightly ‘off’ can provide the opposition 
  with enough clues to compromise a network. Operatives 
  should always be alert for surveillance or other risks when 
  approaching a meeting, and should be willing to abort 
  the contact and leave the area of he is suspicious. When 
  a meeting between a high-value operative and someone 
  from outside the network is required, it is advisable to use 
  a cut-out to bring the contact from an initial meeting to a 
  secondary site, or to intercept the contact en route to the 
  meeting. This may avoid any hostile surveillance or snatch 
  squad waiting at the contact location.
  Operatives should not, under any circumstances, meet a 
  contact at a place and time of the contact’s choosing unless 
  they are absolutely sure of their trustworthiness. All meetings 
  should be on the operative’s own terms and the time and place 
  should not be provided prematurely. It is acceptable to tell the 
  contact when but not where at the time the meeting is set up, 
  with the location provided at the last minute. Alternatively, the 
  contact might be told when and where to pick up the details of 
  the meeting, ensuring that he cannot feed them to the enemy 
  in advance.
  Informers and doubLe agents
  There are many reasons why a network member might start 
  working for the enemy or an asset might inform on a handler. 
  Greed, disaffection over how he has been treated or with the 
  Western world in general, pressure from foreign intelligence 
  agencies, even just a falling-out with someone can be a cause. 
  Assets have been known to betray their handlers for the most 
  petty of reasons, and ultimately the reasons are less important 
  than the betrayal.
  One way to deter betrayal is the use – or threat – of a 
  network’s enforcers. These may or may not actually exist, but 
  if the asset thinks that the network has personnel whose sole 
  task is to hurt or kill them if they misbehave, they are more 
  likely to stay on the straight and narrow. Killing a suspected 
  informant does solve the immediate problem but the body 
  must be disposed of and of course the opposing intelligence 
  community may draw conclusions from his disappearance. It 
  is sometimes more useful to arrange for the informant to be 
  dealt with by local criminals or to set them up to look like 
  they have betrayed another group and allow them to deal 
  with the problem.
  disPosing of Bodies
  See pg. 85 for details of disposing 
  of bodies safely and thoroughly.
  N E T W O R K S  A N D  A S S E T S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  38
  At times it may be necessary to remind an asset or even 
  an operative that there are consequences for inappropriate 
  conduct. Some assets will brag about their involvement 
  in covert activities or start making stupid errors through 
  complacency, and may need correction. Often this need 
  be nothing more than ‘polite threats’ but it may eventually 
  become necessary to discipline or even eliminate part of the 
  network to prevent a security breach. If an asset or operative 
  is about to be captured and cannot be removed from the 
  situation, the only option may be to kill them before they 
  can talk. 
  Never hesitate to sacrifice a network 
  in order to achieve victory over Our 
  Other Enemy. All too often the schemes 
  of servants of Our Other Enemy can 
  lead to world-shattering consequences. Such 
  a threat pales in comparison to the mundane 
  concerns of national interests. Burn an asset 
  or even a whole network of them. Make 
  sacrifices, even the supreme one. -N
  Though it is far better to sacrifice another 
  than yourself. Live to fight another day 
  and you do more harm to Our Other 
  Enemy than simply dying for the cause. 
  Let the fanatics die for theirs. - Steuben
  This is a rather extreme case, and knowing why an asset 
  might turn informer can help prevent it from happening 
  or enable a network to dissociate itself in time to avoid 
  damage. Most assets lack finesse so it can be fairly obvious 
  when the behaviour of one changes. More dangerous is the 
  double agent, who pretends to be working for one side but 
  is actually feeding information to the enemy.
  Although dangerous to the network these informers can be 
  useful. A known informer can be fed incorrect or misleading 
  information. If this is obviously damaging to the enemy the 
  informer may be eliminated by them, solving a security 
  problem for the network. However, it may be possible to 
  play an informant more subtly, by giving them access to 
  information that is mostly correct but not very useful to the 
  enemy. Once the informant is trusted, they can be used to 
  feed disinformation directly to the enemy; even if they are 
  perceived as unreliable this can be useful. 
  If the enemy believes an informant is reliable, they will 
  act upon what the informant says. If, on the other hand, 
  the informant is sometimes wrong, the enemy will seek 
  corroboration or fail to act at all. The unreliability of one 
  informant can undermine confidence in others. Even if an 
  informant is not useful as a conduit for false information, 
  they can still be used to confuse the enemy and cloud the 
  issue. 
  One other benefit of a known informant is that the enemy 
  will be unlikely to expend much effort on placing another 
  informant within our network if they already have one. So 
  long as the informant is carefully watched and fed only 
  non-damaging information, the opposition may well be 
  satisfied with the situation. If the enemy does not realise 
  we know about their informant they may underestimate our 
  capabilities. 
  It may be possible to ‘turn ‘ an informant or leak within 
  the network, creating a double, triple or quadruple agent 
  – though there does come a point where it is impossible 
  to say for sure whose side a given individual is on. This 
  often happens when someone gets into the habit of making 
  whatever deal he thinks will save him from the latest threat, 
  creating layers of promises to help both sides and reveal any 
  attempts to coerce or turn him by other agencies. 
  A turned informant is slightly different to one who is detected 
  but eliminated. The latter is deliberately lied to whereas the 
  former is, theoretically, cooperating voluntarily. Some of the 
  information they give to the opposition must be accurate 
  enough to satisfy them. If the flow of information stops or 
  the data passed on is always worthless, the enemy will realise 
  
  39
  that their informant has been detected. To remain useful the 
  informant must still provide at least some truthful intelligence.
  assessing unreliaBle agents
  By the time a triple-agent reaches 
  the stage where they are saying 
  whatever 
  they 
  believe 
  their 
  handlers want to hear, it can be difficult 
  to get any kind of read on them. The agent 
  is so used to lying that it has become 
  easier than telling the truth or, worse, 
  they may start to believe their own lies. 
  Psychology rolls against such targets 
  should always be set at least one degree 
  of difficulty higher than the target’s 
  opposing skill level would normally 
  dictate. In the case of opposed rolls, the 
  investigator gains a penalty die.
  The informant must be considered expendable, and even 
  if they are led to believe that they have been returned to a 
  position of trust within the network they can never again be 
  trusted with important information. 
  PLANNING OPERATIONS 
  AND OPERATIONAL ORDERS
  Before planning any sort of operation, and repeatedly during 
  the planning process, the question of risk versus reward 
  must be addressed. At times, doing nothing is the best 
  option for a network if the enemy has an ongoing security 
  alert. In fact, a network without any ongoing operations is 
  still not ‘doing nothing’; it is remaining covert and ensuring 
  that it continues to be available when needed. A network 
  that is compromised over a trivial operation has been lost 
  for no real gain. 
  When planning an operation, the value of the eventual 
  goal must be weighed against the consequences of a failed 
  operation – and also a successful one. A minor operation that 
  succeeds but results in an increased level of vigilance might 
  not have been worth it. Operatives might be willing to risk 
  their own lives but there are wider considerations. 
  Defeating Our Other Enemy is the 
  only thing of concern; all the rest is 
  window dressing to enable that great 
  work to be carried out. -N
  A blown op can result in the loss of several operatives; 
  arguably this may be acceptable, but the network is a strategic 
  asset that will take a long time to replace. Each time it is 
  hazarded there is a risk that this asset will be gone forever. 
  Few operations are worth the certain loss of part or all of a 
  network. Planners must balance the potential rewards against 
  the risk to the network. Such risks can be reduced by the 
  use of cells and cut-outs, or by using expendable assets to 
  carry out the dangerous parts of the mission. Planning an 
  operation takes place in several stages. A partial plan may 
  be formed, highlighting what information and equipment is 
  required for the operation. An assessment of how these might 
  be obtained can lead to the plan being scrapped and a new 
  one formulated. 
  Target Selection may be dictated by orders from elsewhere, 
  or the network’s command staff may spot a potential target 
  whilst working through information gathered routinely by 
  the network. For example, routine observation of a naval 
  dockyard might indicate that schematics for the Soviet Navy’s 
  attack submarines are held there. Obtaining these would be 
  valuable to Western navies and strategic planners, so this 
  might be a mission worth undertaking.
  Preliminary Reconnaissance and Assessment may already 
  be partially complete at this phase; routine observation may 
  have already yielded much of the necessary data. This must 
  still be confirmed, especially if the observations are not 
  recent, and any gaps in the necessary data must be filled. 
  All manner of information may be useful at this stage, but 
  security procedures and means of access to the target are 
  of paramount importance. At this stage the feasibility of the 
  operation is assessed, leading to a ‘scrap, shelve or set up’ 
  decision. If the operation seems to offer a reasonable balance 
  of risk to gain, the network’s commanders can proceed to the 
  set-up stage.
  Setting Up an operation can be a complex business, and 
  may require resources or personnel that are unavailable to 
  the network. Additional personnel or equipment can be 
  requested, but this takes time and requires the situation be 
  re-evaluated once they are available. Local assets or locally 
  available resources such as cars, uniforms and the like must 
  also be obtained.  Gaining assets in place is a lengthy business, 
  whereas activating an asset already in place is much quicker. 
  Generic items such as tools and weapons can be obtained 
  well ahead of time, but where grabbing an item or person 
  would alert the opposition this can only be done immediately 
  before or during the actual operation. At the set-up phase, 
  operatives must obtain all necessary information to make 
  these ‘facilitating actions’ as quick and simple as possible, 
  but must do so in such a way as to not alert the opposition. 
  N E T W O R K S  A N D  A S S E T S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  40
  Once all the pieces are in place, reconnaissance continues 
  as the network waits for the right opportunity. If necessary, 
  a stand-down order can be given right up to the initiation 
  of the final operation. As a rule, ops gain ‘psychological 
  momentum’ as they advance through the planning and set-up 
  phases, making a decision to abort much more difficult to 
  make. However, it is the duty of the network’s commanders 
  to shelve an operation if necessary. No matter how much time 
  and effort has been invested, standing down always remains 
  an option. It may be the best choice in the long term.
  reQuesting resourCes
  Trust 
  rolls 
  may 
  be 
  required 
  when 
  requesting 
  resources 
  for 
  an operation, but only if these 
  resources are notably unusual or expensive 
  (budgets are especially tight in British 
  intelligence at this time), or if getting 
  them to the investigators involves risk 
  to other officers or agents. Reasonable 
  requests 
  for 
  money, 
  information 
  or 
  equipment should be granted as a matter 
  of course.
  Final Reconnaissance is the last set of reports before 
  the launch order is given. Sometimes this is a deliberate 
  measure, such as when the network’s commander requests 
  a final recon or report to ensure that nothing significant has 
  changed. On other occasions the final recon may be a routine 
  report that indicates conditions are right for the operation – or 
  that something has arisen that requires an immediate launch 
  or abort. Final recon can sometimes overlap (deliberately or 
  otherwise) with the facilitation sub-operations.
  handling reConnaissanCe
  In 
  most 
  cases, 
  the 
  Keeper 
  will probably want to play out 
  reconnaissance as a scene, calling 
  for skill rolls as appropriate. If the 
  operation is not an integral part of the 
  scenario, an alternative is to simply 
  abstract it to a combined Tradecraft 
  and Spot Hidden roll (or Tradecraft and 
  Signals, Listen or other appropriate skill, 
  depending on the form the reconnaissance 
  takes).
  [
  Facilitation is the final stage before an operation begins, and 
  some facilitating elements can only be carried out whilst the 
  main mission is underway. Facilitation includes such measures 
  as kidnapping a keyholder, obtaining a vehicle or uniforms that 
  are likely to be missed before too long, and other necessary 
  tasks that cannot be carried out in the set-up phase. This 
  includes moving an exfiltration team into position or ‘putting 
  the squeeze’ on an asset to obtain assistance. Facilitation is 
  the last point where all operatives can be ordered to stand 
  down, and as a rule the enemy will realise that something has 
  happened if this is the case. Aborting at this stage is frustrating 
  for everyone involved and can pose its own dangers. 
  handling faCilitation
  It is probably more interesting 
  to play these actions out fully, 
  but they may also be abstracted. A 
  kidnapping may require a combined Stealth 
  and Fighting (Brawl) roll, and stealing 
  resources such as uniforms could be 
  handled by a combined Stealth and Locksmith 
  roll (Electronics could potentially take 
  the place of Locksmith for more modern 
  security systems). Tradecraft should only 
  be combined with such rolls if the targets 
  are trained in Tradecraft themselves.
  
  41
  The Primary Mission is whatever the planners intend it to be. 
  It may be possible to add secondary objectives to a mission, 
  but an excess of goals can make an operation unwieldy or 
  just plain unworkable. The primary mission should always be 
  worth all the effort put into it, even if no secondary goals 
  are achieved, and must be accomplished no matter what 
  success or failure is encountered on secondary goals. Planners 
  must avoid the temptation to expand a mission during the 
  various stages of its planning and execution. The goal must 
  be set from the outset. Changing a the primary mission goal 
  requires going back to the beginning of the planning phase 
  and creating a new mission with a new objective.
  exfILtratIon, expLoItatIon 
  and CLean-up
  No mission should be considered without a definite plan for 
  how the operatives are to be extracted from the mission area 
  and protected afterwards. If personnel are to leave the country 
  or the region, this must be planned for in advance. Ways of 
  avoiding any security measures triggered by the operation 
  must also be thought out. This includes personnel who are not 
  involved with the operation and may know nothing about it, 
  but whose activities might be detected by a security force on 
  alert. Planners must consider the implications of the operation 
  for all personnel, not just those involved.  Similarly, there must 
  be a plan to exploit success. If documents are obtained, they 
  must be conveyed to intelligence analysts. Snatched personnel 
  must be held somewhere, interrogated and passed on or dealt 
  with. Word of success must sometimes be passed back to 
  intelligence chiefs back home. Similarly, the network must 
  ‘clean up’ after the operation. This includes disposing of cars, 
  weapon, tools and perhaps bodies in a manner that will not 
  lead the opposition to network members if they are discovered.
  Clean-up might be the most important 
  part of any of our operations against 
  Our Other Enemy. Disposing of bodies, 
  destroying evidence of your presence 
  and such should be routine for you. However, you 
  will also need to sanitise the occult situation. 
  Retrieve or destroy artefacts and books of 
  interest. Obliterate any ritual items or symbols 
  used by the cattle. Witnesses may also need to 
  be eliminated and, sadly, victims of a cell often 
  are too far damaged mentally and emotionally 
  to be left in the care of medical personnel. Do 
  what you have to do, even if it is one of your 
  fellow operatives. Clean it all. -N
  An operation is not complete, and should not be considered 
  successful, until the gains are in the right hands and all 
  personnel are as safe as possible from repercussions. This can 
  take time, and an operational plan might include a lengthy 
  period of reduced activity.
  CompartmentaLIsatIon 
  and operatIonaL seCurIty
  Operational security (OPSEC) is vital to the survival of any 
  network, and one of the key tools is compartmentalisation. 
  Compartmentalisation of tasks, compartmentalisation of 
  information… compartmentalisation of everything that can be 
  compartmentalised. The basic rule is “don’t ask, don’t tell.”
  Some planners need to know everything that is going on in order 
  to put together a workable plan or to ensure that operations 
  do not collide. Everyone else gets information on a ‘need to 
  know’ basis. This is a standard procedure but operational 
  security goes further than this. Personnel conducting parts of 
  an operation may not know what the overall plan is, but the 
  fact that they are active can be an indicator that something is 
  about to happen. If the opposition spots this then a heightened 
  alert state may ensue even if the target of the operation is not 
  deduced. Timing is an essential part of operational security. If 
  a part of the operation can be carried out without much chance 
  of detection then the plan needs to allow time for a ‘slow and 
  quiet’ execution. If it is likely to trigger an alert then this needs 
  to be left as late as possible, leaving enough time to complete 
  the sub-operation. 
  Actions that must be carried out whilst the main operation is 
  already underway, such as procuring a vehicle for exfiltration 
  and getting it into position, are risky. There is the possibility that 
  the sub-op will fail whilst the main op is already committed, 
  perhaps leaving the operatives with no means of escape or 
  with a critical obstacle still in place. There is also the risk that if 
  the timings do not mesh properly the sub-op may be detected 
  and compromise the main operation.
  Good planning and competent execution can remove a lot 
  of these risks, though they are never completely eliminated. 
  Over-compartmentalisation can cause its own problems. 
  Personnel with little information cannot reveal it (deliberately 
  or otherwise) but this does not mean they will not unknowingly 
  take some action that compromises the mission. Planners must 
  balance the need to keep secrets with the requirement to give 
  personnel the information they need not only to carry out their 
  mission but also to avoid accidental security breaches. Some 
  personnel, at least, need to have enough information that they 
  can make informed decisions in the field if the operation goes 
  awry or central control breaks down. Compartmentalisation 
  of tasks is desirable. For example, if the mission is to shoot 
  a target, the mission personnel might be subdivided into a 
  N E T W O R K S  A N D  A S S E T S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  42
  diversionary group, a gun carrier and an assassin. The ‘gun 
  carrier’ conveys the weapon from storage and passes it to the 
  assassin soon before they are due to strike, then disappears. If 
  they are caught with the weapon then they cannot reveal the 
  target. Likewise, the diversionary group might not know the 
  target. Another group whose task is to get the assassin into 
  the target’s vicinity can do so and then withdraw, reducing the 
  number of personnel exposed to risk when the trigger is pulled.
  operatIonaL orders
  Orders are yet another form of communication, and one that 
  must be mastered by network commanders. Indeed, anyone 
  who instructs someone else – an asset or another operative, 
  or a cell within the network – to carry out any task must be 
  familiar with how to present orders that are clear and easy to 
  follow. The last thing a network needs is assets and operatives 
  fumbling around trying to figure out what they are supposed 
  to be doing. 
  Good orders are especially important when dealing with 
  outsiders. Assets, local militia, insurgents and similar may 
  not have an understanding of procedure and will make 
  basic mistakes, especially if they misinterpret something that 
  seems obvious to the planners. Military and law enforcement 
  personnel are better at following instructions, but there is 
  still room for error. This is especially true when working with 
  organisations that have standard ways of thinking and acting. 
  Certain words have very different meanings to members of 
  various services, so terminology must always be used with 
  due care and attention. Similarly, personnel used to civilian 
  law enforcement procedures will act differently to those 
  cleared for action in a war zone. 
  Orders must be given in a format that presents personnel with 
  what they need to know, what we want them to do, and what 
  we want them not to do. Additional information and details 
  need to be clear and concise. 
  Orders may be delivered in written form or in a face-to-face 
  briefing, as required. Standing orders can also be triggered by 
  a signal or code phrase. The most risky – in terms of orders 
  becoming garbled – form of transmission is when a third 
  party has to pass the orders on. It is not always possible to 
  acknowledge receipt of orders or to verify their authenticity, 
  nor to obtain clarification if their orders do not seem to fit the 
  circumstances. This is a risk inherent in intelligence work, which 
  can be managed by good procedures, but never eliminated.   
  The planners will create a full set of operational orders, but 
  this will not be made known to most (or perhaps any) of 
  the personnel carrying out the mission. Once the complete 
  plan is laid out and checked for likely problems, orders for 
  all of the compartmentalised sections of the operation can 
  be created and passed to those carrying out the component 
  parts. It should be stressed that the parts must be derived 
  form a coherent whole; trying to create an operation by 
  writing orders for all the component parts and hoping they fit 
  together at the end is a recipe for disaster.
  A good set of operational orders will include the following:
  •	
  The purpose of the mission and intended outcome.
  •	
  Likely consequences of both success and failure.
  •	
  Personnel required to carry out the mission.
  •	
  Equipment, information and other items are needed to 
  facilitate the mission.
  •	
  The location and circumstances under which the 
  mission is to be carried out.
  •	
  Facilitation sub-operations necessary to make the 
  mission feasible.
  •	
  The mission plan itself.
  •	
  Additional information as necessary including any 
  circumstances to be avoided.
  •	
  Contingency orders, such as alternate exfiltration 
  methods.
  Once these operational orders are ready, personnel can be 
  given their individual and small-group orders. There is usually 
  no need to include very detailed information in these orders, 
  but the main set of operational orders will indicate if and 
  when information is necessary.
  The following standard 5-heading format for orders should be 
  used for individual orders:
  •	
  Information
  •	
  Intention
  •	
  Method
  •	
  Administration
  •	
  Inter-Communication
  Information includes as much detail as is necessary on the 
  target or objective of the mission (or the operative’s part in 
  it), but operatives should not be given information that they 
  do not need. They may also be informed in a general sense 
  about other things that will be going on, such as the fact that 
  there will be a diversion while they enter the target building. 
  Operatives should not know precise details unless they are 
  needed for their mission role.
  Intention is an indication of the intent of the operative’s 
  mission. Security must be balanced against the morale benefits 
  of knowing an operative’s place in a larger scheme. Generally 
  
  43
  it will suffice to outline the general aim of the mission and 
  the importance of each operative’s part in making the larger 
  whole work.
  Method is a detailed set of instructions for what each operative 
  is to do, how and when. The method must include what means 
  (weapons, explosives, apparently accidental damage) are to be 
  used, how to get by enemy security, how to reach the target 
  and how to get away afterwards. Timings are essential. Where 
  possible, each operative should know only their own part in the 
  mission and any details necessary to cooperate with his fellows.
  Administration covers facilitation of the mission with such 
  matters as weapons supply, transportation, documentation and 
  other necessary items, and the identity of any contacts to be 
  met with. Measures for dealing with casualties and dispersing 
  after the mission will also be included in this section as well as 
  the cover story if the operation is not overt.
  Inter-Communication describes the means of communicating 
  during the operation. There may be none; once an operative 
  is committed to their part of the mission he will be expected 
  to carry it out without further guidance. If communication is 
  deemed necessary then this section will spell out how it is to 
  be accomplished and any security arrangements surrounding it. 
  SAFE HOUSES 
  AND OTHER LOCATIONS
  The term ‘safe house’ can promote a dangerous way of 
  thinking. There are no completely safe places, and each time 
  a location is used there is a chance that it will be discovered 
  by the opposition. However, the term ‘safe house’ is used for 
  any location deemed secure enough to be used for meetings, 
  storage of equipment or to house operatives and assets. A 
  network’s headquarters might also be considered a safe house, 
  but would not normally be used to shelter operatives or assets, 
  as this risks expose it. In a large network there may be several 
  personnel whose sole task is to protect and operate safe houses. 
  It is often necessary to create an atmosphere of normalcy about 
  a location, so houses need to be lived in, businesses operated 
  and so forth. Safe house personnel are usually armed or have 
  weapons available. Some other locations are given the term 
  ‘safe house’ with varying degrees of reliability. For example, a 
  network that needs to hide someone quickly might persuade a 
  local asset to provide a safe house – perhaps their own home. 
  How safe this locality is can vary considerably.
  Other locations can be used to store equipment and vehicles 
  until needed, and may be the base for a specialist cell within 
  the network. Such a cell might only have one or two members. 
  Examples include a mechanic and a facility for altering the 
  appearance of vehicles, or an armoury that is the base for an 
  explosives expert. Most networks do not have the luxury of such 
  facilities. In an emergency they can be used as a safe house, 
  but the facility must then be moved in case it is compromised.
  We simply do not have the resources 
  to provide you with your own safe 
  houses, extractions and other support. 
  You will receive what we can give 
  you, but you have been chosen because of your 
  ability to work outside of close support of 
  management. This is why you are piggybacking 
  on another mission, after all. -N
  Some networks have a ‘final’ safe house whose sole purpose 
  is to facilitate the escape of key network members if the 
  authorities are closing in. Such facilities are something 
  of a luxury and even if they exist will not be used for a 
  single operative – once used, such a critical facility must be 
  considered expended and a new one set up. Most operatives 
  will not know of the existence of such an ‘escape house’, 
  and the network leadership will generally prefer to allow 
  a compromised operative to be caught rather than risk 
  their emergency escape route. This is not merely for selfish 
  reasons: the enemy must be denied access to the highest-
  N E T W O R K S  A N D  A S S E T S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  44
  value personnel even if the rest of the network is lost. Few 
  networks are large enough to have many – if any – specialist 
  facilities, but most should have at least one safe house 
  prepared before any operation, and should try to maintain 
  one for contingencies even when there is no operation in 
  the offing. Circumstances vary considerably, however, and 
  a network that has all the facilities its personnel would like 
  to have is probably wasting resources that would be better 
  put to use elsewhere. It is a sad fact of intelligence work that 
  all operations run on a shoestring budget, and creativity is 
  necessary where resources are inadequate. Which is to say, 
  always. 
  If you are of the better sort, you might be 
  tempted to use your own resources in this fight. 
  Do not give into that temptation, for it can be 
  all too easy to trace such expenditures back to 
  you. As much as it pains me to say this, you must simply 
  learn to live within the means of your cover, even if that 
  entails less than ideal lodging or provisions. -Steuben
  Access to safe houses is normally 
  arranged ahead of time. If an 
  investigator needs to find a safe 
  house in an emergency situation, much will 
  depend on the lines of communication open 
  to them.
  If the investigator can contact their direct 
  superior or handler in the intelligence 
  services, and the request is a reasonable 
  one, no roll is usually required. One 
  exception may be if the investigator is 
  operating in hostile or sparsely populated 
  territory, with insufficient preparation, 
  in which case the Keeper may call for a Luck 
  roll for there to be a suitable safe house 
  within easy reach.
  If the investigator is relying on other 
  colleagues within the intelligence services, 
  such as the local Head of Station, and the 
  safe house has not been pre-arranged, then 
  a Trust roll may be required. The Keeper 
  may ask for a Hard roll if the investigator 
  makes this request of a member of an allied 
  intelligence service instead of their own.
  Approaching agents to provide a safe house 
  is riskier. If the agent is a member of 
  another organisation, the Keeper may ask for 
  a Trust roll, adjusting the difficulty level 
  depending on the investigator’s approach 
  and whether they are being hunted by the 
  authorities. If the agent is not allied with 
  any group, an interpersonal skill roll will 
  be more appropriate.
  As a last-ditch effort, the investigator 
  may attempt to bribe, coerce or convince an 
  acquaintance or even a stranger to provide 
  shelter and resources. Depending on the 
  approach the investigator takes, this may 
  call for a Charm, Fast Talk, Intimidate 
  or Persuade roll. The difficulty should 
  be Hard for someone the investigator 
  knows, but who does not fully trust them, 
  and Extreme for a stranger. Suitable 
  threats, bribes, flirtation or similar 
  may afford the investigator a bonus die. 
  In these circumstances, failure does not 
  necessarily mean that the target refuses the 
  investigator’s request for help; they may 
  take the investigator in and then call the 
  authorities, or look for a way to use the 
  investigator for their own purposes.
  In a populated environment, an investigator 
  almost always has the option of taking 
  shelter in a vacant building, but this 
  will not offer the access to supplies, 
  communications and medical help that a well-
  prepared safe house affords. An investigator 
  should make a Luck roll to find a suitable 
  building in an emergency.
  loCating a safe house
  Aeroplane travel is faster, but the train is much safer. Less official eyes on a train, and you can scarper 
  easier if things go wrong, wrong. It also gives you time for a breather. Not that it is safe, nowhere is safe 
  any more. On a long trip you should get a sleeper. You can hole up in a cabin. Gives you time to sleep and 
  read, read. - Stanton
  
  CHaPTer 
  Three
  F i e l d 
  O p e r a t i o n s 
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  46
  Almost any activity undertaken by operatives outside a 
  safe house or network headquarters can be considered a 
  ‘field operation’. It must never be forgotten that something as 
  simple as going out to buy a sandwich and a newspaper entails 
  significant risk when undertaken in a hostile country, using a 
  false identity. However, minor tasks and day-to-day activities 
  can more properly be considered routine, requiring no more 
  than maintenance of the cover identity. Such tasks can be 
  carried out by someone with no training beyond an ability 
  to assume a false identity. Many field operations, however, 
  require more specialist skills or additional considerations. 
  OPERATING IN THE COUNTRYSIDE
  Operations in the countryside can be more complex than 
  many city-dwellers might imagine. Distances tend to be 
  greater between places of interest, and the links between 
  them are rarely good. Roads tend to be narrow and twisty, 
  and if there is a rail service at all it will be intermittent. 
  Thus simply getting from one place to another can pose 
  challenges that would not exist in the urban environment. 
  Weather tends to have a greater influence on activities in 
  the countryside. Extremes of weather can bring down trees, 
  wash out roads or demolish bridges, but even fairly mild 
  weather can cause problems. In a town or city, people will 
  typically still go abroad during a heavy rainstorm because 
  the pace of life rarely slows – it is still necessary to go to 
  work, theatre tickets cannot be returned and so forth – but 
  someone tramping about in the open will stand out in the 
  countryside. Of course, there are tasks that require country 
  dwellers to go abroad in bad weather, but it is common to 
  build a schedule around the weather rather than ignore it. 
  Someone who acts differently will stand out.
  This presupposes that the operative is in the relatively benign 
  countryside of Western Europe. Getting cold and wet is 
  unpleasant, and the weather can put very real obstacles in 
  the way of an operation, but these are minor considerations 
  compared to the very real dangers of operating in an area 
  with limited water, venomous snakes, wild animals and 
  other serious threats. It is quite possible to die of cold in the 
  snow of the Polish winter or from thirst by a track in Angola 
  without ever crossing an enemy agent.
  You don’t have to go as far as Siberia to get 
  away from the relatively safe countryside 
  of Europe. There are plenty of places in 
  Eastern Europe, especially in Romania and 
  Hungary, that can pose a problem. By far the worst 
  is being stuck in the middle of North America during 
  a blizzard; no trees, roads buried and not a single 
  landmark in sight. - Rodriquez
  Rural communities are small, and most people will know 
  one another by sight. Strangers will often stand out as a 
  result of their speech, dress and mannerisms but even if 
  • F I E L D  O P E R A T I O N S •
  
  47
  they do not they will not be recognised. In a town or city, 
  it is nothing out of the ordinary to meet a person you do 
  not know. In a small village, it may actually seem more 
  suspicious if the operative does blend in; someone who is 
  making an effort to seem like a local but who is known not 
  to be might arouse suspicion where an obvious visitor with 
  a plausible cover story would not.
  Many rural populations are hostile to outsiders. Locals might 
  be suspicious of ‘townies’ for reasons unrelated to espionage. 
  All manner of social ills can lead to resentment even if the 
  locals have nothing to hide, and some may also be engaged in 
  illegal activity ranging from under-declaring property for tax 
  or unlicensed distilling There is also the possibility of strange 
  local customs that ‘outsiders don’t understand’, which might 
  create a habit of hostility to outsiders. Hostility can vary 
  from a sullen disposition and a practice of giving vague or 
  misleading answers to questions – perhaps even a refusal to 
  serve outsiders in the local pub or shop – to outright refusing 
  to deal with outsiders. In more remote or underdeveloped 
  areas this might even include direct hostility of an armed 
  and violent form. Operatives might be confronted with 
  angry locals armed with shotguns, spears or whatever else is 
  common in the area, especially if they are poking into things 
  that are not their business.
  Cities provide Our Other Enemy with 
  places to hide, but so too does the 
  countryside. Far away from official 
  scrutiny, tied to older orders of life 
  and older beliefs, and often incestuous in 
  both the literal and figurative sense, the rural 
  parts of the world are a hotbed for strange 
  activity. Such cattle cells might be even more 
  difficult to root out as they are protected 
  by the suspicions of the locales towards any 
  outsiders. In fact, an entire community might 
  be part of the plot. When operating in rural 
  areas, trust no one. -N
  understanding the loCals
  Even if an investigator is not trying 
  to pass themselves off as a local, 
  they may still need to understand 
  those around are them. If the investigator 
  is trying to communicate with someone who 
  speaks in a dialect or has an impenetrable 
  accent, the Keeper should set the difficulty 
  of the Other Language roll as Hard.
  One of the main obstacles – or hazards – in the countryside 
  is wildlife. Some of these are directly dangerous but others 
  create a subtler problem. For example, operatives would 
  naturally be cautious if there are dogs around – whether 
  guard dogs or working animals –  but other animals can 
  readily give away an intruder. Geese are kept as guard 
  animals in some cultures, and they have a tendency to make 
  a great deal of noise and commotion if disturbed.
  Wild birds can give away an operative’s position by taking 
  flight. A town-dweller might think nothing of seeing a 
  handful of birds suddenly fly up into a nearby tree, but to 
  someone used to living in the countryside this indicates 
  that something – probably a predator – has disturbed them. 
  This also draws attention to the location of the disturbance. 
  Other animals, even docile cattle, may react to a stranger’s 
  presence by becoming agitated or by approaching in search 
  of food. 
  navigating the Countryside
  While 
  briefings, 
  maps 
  and 
  compasses can help, it is all too 
  easy to get lost in unfamiliar 
  countryside. The Keeper should ask for 
  a Navigate roll if failure could lead 
  to interesting consequences. This may 
  include stumbling across an enclave 
  of locals, up to no good, or falling 
  behind on the objective, forcing the 
  investigators to take dangerous risks in 
  making up lost time. If the investigators 
  are travelling through countryside in 
  the dark, or in bad weather, the Keeper 
  may ask for a Hard Navigate roll due to 
  decreased visibility.
  Investigators spending significant time 
  travelling through rural or remote areas 
  may also be required to make a roll against 
  the Survival specialisation appropriate 
  to the environment. This is especially 
  appropriate if the investigators have 
  limited supplies or if the landscape is 
  especially hostile.
  You know all those old tales about witches 
  and warlocks having animals under their 
  control, familiars and the like? There might 
  be some truth to them, or maybe it is just 
  F I E L D  O P E RAT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  48
  my imagination. Still, when I am in the countryside and 
  see all those animals, especially the birds, I can’t help 
  but feel they are watching me. - Rodriquez
  Darkness in the countryside can present an easily 
  underestimated hazard. On an overcast night in the 
  countryside it can be virtually impossible to see where you 
  are putting your feet, let alone any distance. Operatives 
  must be prepared for this situation and perhaps carry a light 
  source or else avoid being caught outside after dark. 
  OPERATING IN 
  URBAN ENVIRONMENTS
  The urban environment is better suited to most field 
  operations than the countryside. However, there are certain 
  considerations that need to be borne in mind when operating 
  in the urban environment. 
  Wherever there are people gathered in one place, there is 
  conflict. Rival criminal organisations and street gangs, or 
  even just local drunks who resent a newcomer in ‘their’ bar, 
  can all pose a hazard to the unwary operative. Other forms 
  of conflict can be subtler but equally as dangerous; a housing 
  dispute or a union on strike can change the conditions in a 
  neighbourhood to the point of endangering operatives or 
  preventing certain activities.
  Operatives must be aware of social conditions. Obvious 
  errors include attempting operations in an area repeatedly 
  raided by police to break up gang activity, or having 
  operations disrupted by local thieves. 
  Our Other Enemy can be found in 
  all parts of a city, from the seedy 
  warrens of the poor to the gleaming 
  halls of the rich and powerful. 
  However, the madness and insanity of servants 
  tends to drive those who pursue less-than-
  wholesome interests into the gutters.
   This means you are more likely to be operating 
  in areas prone to crime, as well as ethnic, 
  racial and class violence. Keep a check on 
  any prejudices you might have, and keep in 
  mind that others will not be doing the same. 
  -N
  You do not want to be caught in a 
  race riot while hunting down a pack of 
  cemetery creepers. - Miller>
  People are the main resource to be exploited in a city. If the 
  operative can befriend someone they may be willing to offer 
  help with trivial errands, reducing the amount of exposure 
  the operative faces and the amount of challenge their cover 
  identity meets. Money is more important to an operation 
  in the urban environment; at the very least, it will be much 
  easier to find someone who can be bribed, or a necessary 
  item for sale. 
  Whatever the local means of exchange, ‘hard currency’ is 
  popular – though possibly illegal – in many areas. Hard 
  currency is money that is stable and will retain its value, 
  such as pound sterling and US dollars, which tend to be 
  vastly more stable than many Third World currencies. 
  Even where local money does not become wildly devalued 
  overnight, Western currencies are often prized very highly. 
  However, the authorities tend to watch for those using hard 
  currency either from a law enforcement perspective or out 
  of corrupt self-interest.
  Care must be taken when undertaking what is termed 
  ‘big-budget espionage’. Money can be a short-term 
  solution to problems, but it is not a bludgeon that can 
  be used with impunity. Trying to buy people and services 
  can attract far much attention; word travels fast in the 
  urban environment.
  The urban world is also very cluttered. What separates 
  places is not so much the distance between them as the time 
  and effort required to get from one to the other. Bridges 
  and other river crossings are ideal places for checkpoints or 
  observers, while railway stations are obvious security points. 
  Old cities often have crooked streets that do not lead where 
  they look like they might, or unexpected dead ends where 
  an area has been redeveloped. An operative can easily lose 
  their bearings in an unfamiliar area, derailing the timings on 
  a sensitive operation.
  Light is another important consideration. Few areas are 
  completely dark, and many are too well lit to allow stealthy 
  operations. This can work both ways: some light is necessary 
  for operations at night, whilst too much makes it difficult to 
  avoid detection. 
  As a rule, operatives in an urban area do better to hide 
  in plain sight, disguising themselves as someone with 
  legitimate business in the area, rather than trying to avoid 
  detection altogether. Even if the target of the operation is 
  somewhere conducive to stealth, transit to and from that 
  area will probably have to cross populated, well-lit areas and 
  due consideration to appearance should be given. 
  
  49
  navigating urBan environments
  Navigating in urban areas is far 
  less complicated than doing so in 
  the countryside. The Keeper should 
  only call for Navigate rolls in exceptional 
  circumstances. 
  If 
  the 
  investigators 
  have become lost after a pursuit, are 
  trying to get their bearings after being 
  abducted and blindfolded, or have to make 
  a snap decision about the fastest way to 
  get to an unfamiliar location, a roll may 
  be appropriate. Without time pressure, 
  it is usually simple enough to get cues 
  from street signs, public transport and 
  local landmarks that a Navigate roll is 
  unnecessary. 
  MOBILITY, INFILTRATION 
  AND EXFILTRATION
  Much of the time an operative’s methods of mobility will 
  be dictated not so much by efficiency as what will attract 
  the least amount of notice. Patience is an essential virtue in 
  intelligence work; no matter how urgent the situation, little 
  is gained by attracting attention. Operatives may have to 
  amble when they want to rush, or take a roundabout route 
  rather than climbing over a fence and proceeding directly to 
  the target location. 
  Similarly, means of mobility must tie in with an operative’s 
  cover identity. Air travel is expensive, and beyond the means 
  of many working-class people. If the operative’s cover 
  identity would not be able to afford to fly then they cannot 
  unless they adopt a different persona for the journey, and 
  that carries with it a whole new set of risks. 
  At times fairly basic means of transport are more effective 
  than others. In a traffic-choked city it may be more efficient 
  to use a bicycle or moped than an executive saloon. Again, 
  cover identity will determine whether this is appropriate.
  Whatever means of transportation are used, for most 
  operations there are distinct phases of mobility: approach, 
  infiltration and exfiltration. The approach to the target area 
  should be made as efficiently as possible. It is possible to 
  circumvent the question of whether the transport fits with 
  the operative’s cover identity by remaining out of sight in 
  the back of a van or hiding in the footwell of a car, but it 
  will then be necessary to avoid being seen getting into and 
  out of the vehicle. 
  InfILtratIon
  Approach movement ends at the mission ready point, which 
  will usually be well short of any heavily secured area. From 
  this point onward, the operatives are engaged in infiltration. 
  Infiltration by stealth requires an indirect approach, possibly 
  accompanied by the removal of guards and sentries. A 
  stealthy infiltration is usually made on foot, which allows 
  speed to be varied according to circumstances.
  Fast movement can be noisy and makes early detection 
  of hazards difficult, but constantly creeping along not 
  only takes a long time but can wear down the patience of 
  operatives who might pick exactly the wrong moment to 
  start advancing at a faster pace. A suitable balance must be 
  struck, with occasional pauses to assess the situation and 
  observe the lay of the land ahead.
  A deceptive infiltration has entirely different speed 
  requirements. Operatives must move at a pace that will not 
  attract suspicion. Thus an operative trying to mingle with a 
  crowd headed towards a sporting or music event must move 
  with the flow of people; one who is approaching a mansion 
  pretending to be a guest at a function cannot be seen to be 
  in too much of a hurry. Obviously, a deceptive infiltration 
  also requires a disguise or cover identity and the ability to 
  get past any security without raising the alarm or causing 
  mayhem. 
  It may be possible to build ‘dashes’ into an infiltration 
  wherever the operative can be sure they will not be 
  observed. However, a dinner guest who arrives sweaty or 
  dishevelled will attract attention, so fast movement must be 
  used judiciously. Infiltration takes as long as it takes. 
  The entire infiltration phase of an operation can be replaced 
  with a reckless charge under some circumstances. It may 
  be possible to launch an assault from a position close to 
  the target if it is a remote area or has poor sight lines, 
  or for operatives to blatantly drive up to the gates and 
  shoot their way in. This is generally inadvisable, but it is 
  occasionally effective and sometimes is the only possible 
  approach. However, choosing to make an assault rather than 
  an infiltration should be a last resort.
  Movement during the active phase of the mission might 
  be stealthy, deceptive or aggressive depending on 
  circumstances. Often a combination of the three can be 
  used. For example a disguised operative might walk right 
  F I E L D  O P E RAT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  50
  past one security checkpoint, sneak through an area that 
  guests are not supposed to enter then dash to the objective 
  when the opportunity arises. They might then explain 
  their presence using deception and allow themselves to be 
  escorted back to the party with important documents in 
  their pocket. Creativity and good judgement are necessary 
  under such complex circumstances.
  Calling for rolls 
  during oPerations
  The Keeper must resist the temptation 
  to call for too many rolls when 
  investigators 
  are 
  on 
  missions. 
  Always remember that the investigators are 
  trained professionals, usually with field 
  experience. They should not fail routine 
  activities. Rolls should only be called for 
  when they face active resistance, are working 
  from faulty intelligence or circumstances 
  have forced them to improvise.
  If rolls are required, consider using 
  combined rolls rather than a string of 
  skill checks. Breaking into a building 
  may 
  require 
  Stealth 
  and 
  Locksmith; 
  calling for separate rolls against both 
  lowers the chances of the investigator 
  succeeding. 
  There 
  may 
  be 
  occasions 
  where this is appropriate, such as when 
  the investigators are facing active 
  opposition, but most of the time it will 
  simply devalue the abilities of skilled 
  characters. Similarly, when investigators 
  are working in a team, don’t ask every 
  player to make the same skill roll. For 
  Stealth rolls, for example, it may be 
  appropriate to ask for a roll for the 
  investigator with the highest skill when 
  they are leading the rest of the team. 
  Under less controlled circumstances, the 
  person with the lowest skill should make 
  the roll for the group instead.
  exfILtratIon
  Exfiltration is the opposite of infiltration, and subject to 
  similar considerations. In some circumstances, ‘withdrawal’ 
  might be a better term than exfiltration, especially if an 
  operation has ‘gone loud’. However, exfiltration or ‘exfil’ 
  covers all methods of leaving the operational area. A rapid 
  withdrawal, perhaps accompanied by gunfire and pursuit, 
  is not the ideal ending to an operation but may be the only 
  option. However, it is far better to stealthily slip out again 
  or walk out the front door after bidding the target a fond 
  goodnight than to frantically try to break contact with 
  pursuers.
  To this end, one critical decision about exfiltration is when 
  to begin. If an operation has been noisy or bodies have 
  been left lying around, getting out as soon and as quickly 
  as possible seems to be the best option. However, even 
  then it may be possible to dissemble through the inevitable 
  questions and leave later with cover identity still intact. This 
  requires a steady nerve and a cast-iron cover, however. 
  Exfiltration may be by the same means as infiltration, or 
  could take an entirely different approach. Operatives have 
  been known to obtain a guard’s equipment and clothing to 
  join a pursuit, slipping away at some suitable juncture. 
  One particularly daring strategy is to remain in the target 
  location but misdirect its security personnel into going 
  outside to look for the operative. This can clear the way to 
  a secondary objective, or even the primary objective if the 
  alert was triggered by some other circumstance. 
  More commonly, the operative must decide whether to leave 
  immediately after the operation is carried out or to remain 
  on site and try to allay suspicion. Once the decision to leave 
  is made then stealth or deception – or both – are used to 
  get out of the immediate operational vicinity and to break 
  contact with any pursuers or observers. Final withdrawal 
  might be made using a vehicle left for the purpose, but this 
  risks discovery or even an ambush. 
  Alternatively, an exfiltration team (or just a single operative) 
  will meet the operational team with whatever is needed to 
  get completely out of the area. This will usually include 
  a vehicle of some kind, but might also include changes 
  of clothing, supplies, documents and anything else the 
  operation team might require. A secondary exfiltration point 
  should be agreed beforehand, and possibly a backup plan if 
  that, too, is compromised.
  Getting out after a mission is every bit as important as 
  getting in, and not only from the point of view of operative 
  survival. Ideally, the operative’s cover remains intact after an 
  operation, but at the very least the opposition should not be 
  able to deduce too much from how the operative went about 
  carrying out the mission. 
  
  51
  By way of example, there are two very different approaches 
  to a task as simple as stealing a target’s wallet. One option 
  involves kicking his front door in, hurling flashbangs and 
  concussion grenades around his living room and shooting 
  his dog. Furniture is overturned, the target is roughed up 
  and the house is set on fire before the operatives leave with 
  the wallet. Alternatively, one day the owner realises that he 
  cannot find his wallet, but has no idea what has happened to 
  it nor when he last saw it. He is not even sure what was in it, 
  so when he finds it again he is not sure if anything is missing 
  or if his money has been replaced with counterfeit notes. Or 
  perhaps the contents of the wallet are examined and copied, 
  but the wallet then replaced, the owner none the wiser. 
  The first option is relatively easy to set up using a brute 
  force approach, but the victim will be on the alert 
  thereafter. A stealthy approach to infiltration followed by 
  a rapid withdrawal with the wallet obtains the wallet and 
  its contents, but again the victim will know something has 
  occurred. The best approach is one where the victim never 
  even realises that anything has happened, so that if it later 
  turns out that the dog must be killed or the house set on 
  fire there is no high alert status to make this more difficult. 
  Infiltration is vital to completing the mission at hand, 
  but exfiltration is equally important to avoid making 
  future operations that much harder. It also helps keep our 
  operatives alive and in the game, so must not be neglected. 
  It is far too easy to think in terms only of the objective; 
  good intelligence work is always conducted with an eye to 
  the future.
  MOVEMENT IN THE FACE 
  OF THE ENEMY
  If the operative must move around in an area close to the 
  enemy, the best choice is probably deception; the operative 
  goes about his business openly under some sort of cover. It 
  is generally easier to walk up to a gate carrying a delivery of 
  flowers or bread than it is to creep through the undergrowth 
  and try to slip through. 
  Our Other Enemy needs to remain as 
  covert in their actions and membership as 
  we do. They do not want to attract the 
  official gaze, and one fine way to get into 
  their lairs is to pose as a minor public officer. Law 
  enforcement is too threatening, but the electric and 
  water meters still need to be read, buildings still get 
  inspected, and most nations run a census of some kind. 
  - Rodriquez
  If deception is used, the operative will have to talk their 
  way into the target locality. This means having a good 
  cover story for the infiltration and suitable props to support 
  it, as well as the ability to lie convincingly. It helps if the 
  victims of the deception are predisposed to believe the cover 
  story; a hurriedly concocted tale about a last-minute call 
  to examine a noisy electrical generator is less believable 
  than yet another delivery of food and wine for the target’s 
  upcoming party. 
  A certain amount of research and information gathering 
  is necessary when planning any mission, and some of this 
  should be directed at the habits of the target and their 
  security staff. If certain local firms are used for deliveries and 
  their vans are waved through security without inspection, 
  this is the ideal means of infiltration. If the target has very 
  fixed habits then any deviation from the usual timings and 
  methods will arouse suspicion that will not be allayed by any 
  amount of persuasion.
  I once posed as a health inspector to 
  get into a café run as a front by a 
  cell. Got a good look at their layout 
  and numbers, cited them for a few 
  violations, and even picked up a small bribe to 
  look the other way. - Miller>
  F I E L D  O P E RAT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  52
  Similar comments apply to evading capture by patrols in the 
  countryside. The best way to break contact with pursuit or 
  to slip past a patrol is to have them discount the operative 
  as harmless. A patrol searching for a suspected infiltrator 
  might approach a gentleman fishing by the river to ask if he 
  has seen anything or advise him to leave the area. They may 
  suspect that this is the infiltrator but if their suspicions can 
  be allayed with a well-delivered cover story the infiltrator 
  has gone one better than bypassing this patrol – he has 
  made them essentially blind to his presence.
  If deception is not possible then it is necessary to hide or 
  sneak. The operative must be mindful of colours, shapes and 
  movement. For example, if an operative is climbing over a 
  fence and finds themselves illuminated, movement will draw 
  the eye in a way that a static shape will not. An operative 
  standing by a fence is obvious; one who is lying along a 
  fence rail so that the operative’s body blends into the rail’s 
  shape much less so. Since the observer’s eye expects to see a 
  long shape at that point, it may not discern the human figure 
  against the expected shape of the fence.  
  The shape of the human head or face is very distinctive and 
  will draw attention if it is spotted somewhere unexpected. 
  The same goes for anything straight, such as a rifle barrel, 
  since straight lines do not occur in nature. Covering straight 
  objects in netting or putting a sack over them can greatly 
  assist in maintaining a covert posture. However, this 
  presupposes that the item does not stand out because it 
  is metallic or of a colour that makes it very obvious to an 
  observer. 
  Dark colours are generally harder to make out than light 
  ones, especially at night. However, black tends to be ‘too 
  dark’ and dark grey, blue or green are better choices for 
  night-time concealment. If colours are used for camouflage, 
  they must match the local foliage or other colours. Green 
  and brown disruptive patterns stand out against brickwork, 
  and even a slight variation in colour can stand out on the 
  edge of a forest.
  Movement, especially fast or regular movement, is another 
  giveaway. The human eye is better at spotting a stationary 
  object that starts to move than one that is already in motion, 
  which is one reason that the ‘sniper crawl’ works. Under 
  the right conditions it is possible to crawl across fairly open 
  ground, under observation, for very long distances without 
  being spotted. 
  Military snipers – albeit exceptional ones – have been 
  known to crawl for the better part of a mile to reach a firing 
  position, shoot a key enemy figure and then creep away 
  again without being seen. However, this requires incredible 
  endurance and patience, since covering a mile at this pace 
  might take an entire day or even more.
  The rule for stealthy movement in the face of the enemy is 
  ‘low and slow’, with lower tending to equate to slower. When 
  under good cover or unobserved the operative can move 
  quickly in an upright posture, dropping into a crouch when 
  cover is not so good or the opposition is close. Crawling on 
  all fours is tiring and slow, but a ‘flat crawl’ or ‘sniper crawl’ 
  is even more exhausting. In this posture the operative is flat 
  to the ground, moving by pushing themselves with the feet 
  and pulling with their arms without bending limbs or lifting 
  their body off the ground. 
  With good camouflage or in darkness, an operative moving 
  like this is virtually impossible to spot unless the enemy is 
  right on top of them… and even then they can be missed if 
  they freeze in place. 
  sPot rules for sniPer Crawls
  A lengthy sniper crawl is as much 
  a matter of physical endurance 
  and mental discipline as it is of 
  stealthiness. An investigator attempting 
  such a crawl should make a combined roll 
  against CON, POW and Stealth to represent 
  this. Failure does not necessarily mean 
  that the sniper is spotted, but that 
  their stamina or resolve is failing. 
  The investigator may attempt to drive 
  themselves on by pushing the roll, but 
  this time failure will mean discovery or 
  any other consequence the Keeper deems 
  appropriate.
  SPECIAL FORMS OF MOVEMENT
  Special forms of movement may also be used by operatives 
  when required. These include rappelling out of a helicopter, 
  abseiling down a building or cliff, and swimming to the 
  target. Rappelling and similar fast-rope techniques are 
  mainly used by assault troops, but operatives may be 
  required to use this skill for a fast insertion. For example, a 
  helicopter ostensibly carrying out an innocent mission might 
  drop off an operative or a team along the way. If there is 
  nowhere to land, or if landing might be observed, then fast-
  rope techniques are useful.
  
  53
  sPot rules for raPPelling
  Unless an investigator is under time pressure or threat, there is no need for a 
  roll to rappel down a rope. If the circumstances are fraught or dangerous, the 
  Keeper may ask for a DEX roll. Failure may indicate that the process is taking 
  long enough to put the investigator at risk. The player may call for a second, pushed 
  roll, with the Keeper setting consequences such as becoming entangled or taking damage 
  from falling or enemy fire. 
  On rare occasions, investigators 
  may have to parachute into hostile 
  territory to perform covert actions 
  or, in worst-case scenarios, parachute from 
  a plane that is in the process of crashing. 
  The basics of parachuting can be taught 
  relatively quickly, and do not require 
  specific training,though mastery can be a 
  skill of its own (see below). 
  Given that most aeroplanes are likely to 
  be flying hundreds of metres above ground 
  level, a fall without a parachute is a near 
  certain fatality. The Other Damage table 
  on pg. 124 of the Call of Cthulhu rulebook 
  would place such a fall in the “splat” 
  category, inflicting 8D10 of damage; even 
  halving this with a successful Jump roll is 
  unlikely to lead to a happy outcome. Under 
  routine conditions, the Keeper should not 
  call for a roll when trained or experienced 
  investigators make a parachute jump. If the 
  conditions are dangerous, such as coming in 
  under enemy fire, executing a LALO jump or 
  parachuting from an aeroplane that is out of 
  control, use the following rules.
  When parachuting under such circumstances, 
  the investigator must pass a DEX roll with 
  two bonus dice. Success means that the 
  character is free and clear of the aircraft 
  and has pulled the ripcord for the parachute 
  without difficulty. If this roll is failed, 
  this means that the parachute is tangled 
  with the aeroplane or the investigator is 
  disorientated and falling incorrectly. The 
  investigator may attempt a DEX roll with 
  a bonus die to free the chute or to right 
  themselves.
  If the second roll is also a failure, this 
  means the chute is tangled or was improperly 
  deployed. All hope is not lost! The investigator 
  can use their reserve chute, requiring a 
  Regular DEX roll. If that last-ditch roll 
  is also a failure, the investigator falls, 
  taking 8D6 damage (4D6 if the investigator 
  passes a Jump roll) from the fall and likely 
  meets an untimely end. If the last roll is 
  a success, the reserve chute opens and the 
  parachuting investigator must make a Jump 
  roll land properly with. Failing the Jump 
  roll causes 1D6 points of damage, or 1D10 if 
  the roll is a fumble.
  If 
  for 
  some 
  reason 
  the 
  investigator 
  is parachuting without any training or 
  experience, the Keeper may require a combined 
  INT and DEX roll for the investigator to 
  be able work out how to scramble into the 
  chute. Getting out of an aeroplane in an 
  uncontrolled jump (such as a plane spiralling 
  towards the ground) may require a Jump or 
  Dodge roll.
  Any physical action (combat skills, Dodge, 
  Throw or similar) attempted while parachuting 
  will require a Hard roll. 
  Finding an ideal spot to land might require a 
  Spot Hidden roll, and landing without being 
  spotted (or quickly gathering and concealing 
  the parachute and harness) requires a Stealth 
  roll. Ideally, the landing is in an open 
  field, airstrip or cleared area, away from 
  trees. If the investigator is forced to land 
  among trees, the keeper should require a DEX 
  or Luck roll to avoid the parachute being 
  tangled and caught. If the chute is caught, 
  the investigator must make a successful Climb 
  or Jump roll to get disentangled from the 
  parachute cords without taking damage. If 
  this roll is unsuccessful, the investigator 
  may take damage from the fall as per the 
  normal falling rules. 
  sPot rules for ParaChuting
  F I E L D  O P E RAT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  54
  Other means of using aircraft for an insertion tend to be 
  rather specialised but are sometimes the only way to get an 
  operative into an area quickly. Parachuting and landings by 
  light aircraft were used with success by SOE during World 
  War Two and remain useful but have since been augmented 
  by special techniques. These include HALO (High Altitude/
  Low Opening) jumps, whereby the operative makes a long 
  free fall from an altitude so high that oxygen is required, 
  opening the parachute very late to avoid detection. 
  LALO (Low Altitude/Low Opening) is an even more 
  extreme technique. In this method, an aircraft such as a 
  C-130 Hercules flies very low and delivers operatives or 
  troops by suddenly entering a near-vertical climb so that 
  the personnel essentially fall out of the open cargo ramp 
  at the rear. Static lines automatically open their parachutes 
  immediately, but since the delivery altitude is just a few 
  hundred feet a LALO jump can only be made over water – 
  and even then the impact is hard.
  A parachute and associated equipment is a dead giveaway 
  that personnel or materiel have been delivered to an area, 
  so operatives who have landed or received equipment need 
  to hide the chutes as quickly as possible and then leave 
  the area. A hard-learned rule developed by SOE during 
  World War Two is that operatives should never, under any 
  circumstances, return to the site of a parachute insertion. 
  Anything that is hidden there is lost once the operative 
  leaves the area.
  Insertion from water can be carried out using boats, 
  swimming or more exotic means. Certain submarines are 
  equipped to deliver divers off an enemy coast, often with 
  propulsion aids to permit them to carry more equipment 
  or transit further without tiring. Insertion can be direct to 
  shore but rivers and inlets offer a chance to bypass the coast 
  to some extent. Advanced equipment such as propulsion 
  units should be returned to the parent vessel by a retrieval 
  team, whereas more basic items such as swim fins can be 
  concealed in the manner of a parachute. Similar comments 
  apply as for parachutes; operatives cannot return to the 
  site of concealed swimming equipment unless it has been 
  secured by an exfiltration team. 
  Abseiling is used to get down a vertical or near-vertical 
  surface from above. It allows an indirect approach to a 
  target area that might not be detected, but requires that 
  equipment be transported to the start point and left there. 
  Anyone caught on a rope is very vulnerable, so abseiling 
  should be used with caution. It is also rather difficult to get 
  back up a rope quickly, so an abseil is usually considered a 
  one-way option with exfiltration by some other means.
  sPot rules for aBseiling
  Unless an investigator is under 
  time pressure or threat, there is 
  no need for a roll to abseil down 
  a surface safely. If the circumstances 
  are fraught or dangerous, the Keeper may 
  ask for a DEX roll. If the investigator 
  is trying to operate quietly, this may be 
  combined with a Stealth roll. 
  If the investigator fails this roll, they 
  have become temporarily stuck. A second, 
  pushed roll is required to continue, 
  with the Keeper setting consequences 
  for failure that may include discovery, 
  becoming stuck or falling, with resultant 
  damage. 
  BREAKING AND ENTERING
  Missions requiring breaking into a building are often referred 
  to as ‘black bag’ operations. Breaking and entering is never 
  the goal of the mission; it is something that is necessary 
  to facilitate the desired outcome. However, no black bag 
  operation should ever be considered trivial; something as 
  simple as a dead bolt can derail an entire mission.
  Most operatives have at least some training in lock picking 
  and similar means of bypassing security, but picking a lock 
  can take time even for the most skilled of operatives. There 
  is always a risk of discovery, and since these are rather 
  obvious ‘negative’ activities it will be hard to come up with 
  a plausible reason for doing so. The best that the would-be 
  burglar can hope for is to be taken for a criminal or perhaps 
  an unethical journalist, rather than an intelligence operative.
  Mechanical locks are not usually very complex and can be 
  picked with simple tools, but there are alternatives. Often 
  the device itself can be operated without unlocking it, by 
  slipping a thin object though the space between door and 
  frame. Combination locks cannot be picked in the same 
  manner as mechanical ones but are often susceptible to 
  the same weaknesses. A deadbolt is impervious to this 
  treatment, however, remaining firmly engaged with the 
  door frame unless manually or electrically withdrawn. This 
  cannot be done from outside the door. 
  When selecting an entry point, assuming that stealth is 
  desirable, an operatives should work on a lowest likelihood 
  
  55
  of discovery basis rather than the easiest lock to pick or 
  the most convenient entry point. This is especially true if 
  physical damage to the door or window is necessary to 
  open it. Many windows are poorly secured and can be 
  forced without difficulty, but this may make noise or cause 
  damage. Choosing the right entry point greatly reduces the 
  chance of discovery.
  If it is not possible to gain entry by quietly picking a lock 
  or forcing a poorly secured window, noisier methods might 
  be required. Breaking a pane of glass in a door may give 
  access to a key or dead bolt on the inside, but will make a 
  noise. This can be reduced if the operative pushes the glass 
  out of place rather than just smashing through it, especially 
  if a small pane can be pushed from one corner and removed 
  intact. Noise can also be covered by sounds coming from 
  elsewhere, though obviously broken glass or a missing pane 
  may well be spotted.
  Operatives can abandon any attempt to remain covert and 
  smash their way through doors or windows. The ‘fireman’s 
  key’ (a heavy kick delivered to the door) is quick but noisy, 
  and lighter doors can be shoulder-charged. For secure doors, 
  the best option may be to shoot out the hinges or bolts with 
  a shotgun.
  Alarms and other security systems – including lethal ones 
  – are usually keyed to entry points and passageways. The 
  simplest sound an alarm when a fence is cut or a door is 
  opened. These can often be bypassed by running a connector 
  (a wire) between points on each side of the area to be cut or 
  the circuit that will be broken by opening the door, ensuring 
  that current continues to flow. 
  Fair warning, some of our foes 
  employ unnatural security measures 
  that put even the most ferocious 
  Doberman to shame. -N
  However, the best way to bypass security systems of this sort 
  is to make use of natural and routine breaks in the system, 
  or to get the operators to bypass the system themselves. If a 
  door is routinely opened to let a sentry make their rounds, 
  then this can be exploited by an operative moving into 
  the building. Alarms are sometimes set off by accident or 
  technical malfunction, and will often be reset without being 
  checked if this is a frequent nuisance. 
  Operatives can exploit this by deliberately setting off 
  the alarm at intervals over a few days. After a while the 
  operators will stop rushing out to see what has caused the 
  alert and will simply reset the ‘malfunctioning’ system. 
  Natural security systems such as guard dogs can be spoofed 
  in a similar way, by getting them to raise an alarm so often 
  that they are discounted. However, there is an additional 
  risk if the guards’ response is to release the dogs. As an 
  alternative, dogs can be given food, contentedly causing 
  them to watch intruders without barking. Food can also be 
  drugged or poisoned, or guard animals can also be shot with 
  a suppressed handgun: the Smith & Wesson Model 23 ‘Hush 
  Puppy’ got its nickname from its use for this purpose by US 
  Special Forces teams in Vietnam (see World War Cthulhu: 
  Cold War, pg. 151).
  As with any situation that leaves evidence lying around, 
  shooting or drugging a guard dog starts the ‘discovery 
  clock’ ticking. If robust methods are used to bypass security 
  or to force an entry the operation should remain covert if 
  possible but needs to move to a ‘fast and quiet’ approach 
  rather than a more time-consuming stealthy posture. The 
  unknown amount of time before the intrusion is discovered 
  must be used to best effect, which means that greater risks 
  are justifiable in order to get further in or even to complete 
  the mission before the alert is sounded. 
  Wherever possible, operatives should take advantage of 
  the enemy’s routine or holes in his security coverage, and 
  also of weak points such as predictable shift changes or 
  unimaginative patrol schedules. The most difficult part of 
  F I E L D  O P E RAT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  56
  an infiltration should be timed to coincide with the lowest 
  alert on the part of the security force. This is typically 
  entry to a building through the main secured obstacle – its 
  outside doors and windows – but might instead be some 
  mission-critical transition through an area that is normally 
  well patrolled. 
  As with most other field operations, time is a critical factor 
  when entering a secured area, but this does not equate to 
  haste. Good timing and expert use of variances in speed 
  may be critical. For example it may be necessary to rush 
  across a courtyard while the guards are distracted, then wait 
  for several minutes for a shift change before attempting to 
  pick the lock on the chosen entry point. Judging the right 
  moment is much vital, and any technical task such as lock 
  picking must be completed in a quick but unhurried manner. 
  Likewise, it may be necessary to make the decision to 
  abandon an attempt to pick a given lock or force a window 
  and withdraw or seek another way in. This must be finely 
  judged, as must the decision to resort to forcing an entry 
  rather than opening a door and slipping inside. Operatives 
  must not become fixated on one method; there are times 
  when the fireman’s key is more appropriate than the clever 
  use of a black bag. However, as always, the rule is that once 
  noise is made or damage is done, there may be little to gain 
  from remaining covert. 
  Operatives should always be willing to abandon a mission 
  and make another attempt if this is a better option. A failed 
  entry will alert the enemy, and even a successful one may 
  be counterproductive if it is detected. These matters should 
  have been considered when the mission was planned, 
  enabling operatives to make intelligent decisions based on 
  the circumstances around them. 
  Nobody likes to report an aborted mission, but sometimes 
  this is the best decision. If so, it is the operative’s duty to 
  withdraw and accept the failure rather than bludgeoning 
  through for the sake of ego or a perfect operational record. 
  Bollocks to the train, train. 
   
  Buy or rent a car, plenty of room to manoeuvre and get away if you
   have to. Plenty, plenty of places to hide. Hide and read. 
   
   
   
  No conductors looking at you and knowing, knowing. 
  Easier to hide the body, though on a train you could just toss, toss it. - Stanton
  
  CHaPTer 
  fOur
  S u r v e i l l a n c e 
  a n d 
  I n t e l l i g e n c e
  G a t h e r i n g
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  58
  Information gathering is the most important activity carried 
  out by an intelligence operative. It is the primary purpose of 
  many missions and is necessary to every mission. For every 
  mission that has complete and accurate information already 
  in place at the planning stage, there is another mission 
  mounted to gather it in the first place. 
  It is worth noting that in our line of work anyone who thinks 
  they have complete and accurate information is overdue for 
  retirement; there is no such thing. Data can look good but be 
  incomplete, inaccurate or just flat-out wrong. An essential 
  part of preparing any mission is to corroborate, cross-check 
  and verify as much of the available information as possible. 
  Information gathering by operatives and assets is termed 
  ‘Human Intelligence’ (HUMINT) and can take three main 
  forms. Tertiary information gathering makes use of sources 
  such as newspapers, tourist maps and similar commonly 
  available items. The operative has no control over the 
  accuracy of information gained from such sources, but 
  they can be a useful means of getting bulk data or basic 
  information for little effort and virtually no risk.
  You might be tempted to dismiss 
  tertiary sources of information; such 
  would be a foolish thing to do. You 
  will not find one article or other 
  item that points out the existence of Our Other 
  Enemy, but the entire picture might be found 
  in pieces. The local newspaper story about 
  missing cats, another story about a break in 
  at a warehouse, and a third piece of gossip 
  concerning a brawl at the docks might all be 
  parts of a larger picture.  -N
  Secondary information gathering is based on reports made 
  by assets run by the operative or informants who might be 
  paid or otherwise induced to provide data. It may be that 
  an asset who is well placed can get data that an operative 
  cannot. Secondary information gathering is not always 
  reliable; an asset could make mistakes or invent details 
  for their own reasons. They might give outright false or 
  misleading information or leave out part of the truth if it 
  suits their agenda. 
  Secondary data must be treated with some suspicion but it is a 
  means of obtaining intelligence for relatively little risk. 
  Primary intelligence gathering is undertaken by the 
  operative directly. This is riskier than employing an asset or 
  buying a newspaper. Regardless of the danger level, primary 
  information gathering allows the operative to be sure that 
  what is reported is what is seen. Whilst the best data usually 
  comes from complex and well-executed missions, much of 
  the information gathered by operatives comes from mundane 
  activities that can be generally grouped as surveillance and 
  observation. We draw a distinction between the two for 
  convenience more than anything else; the principles are the 
  same for both.
  First thing I do when in a new city is pick 
  up one of each of the local newspapers. 
  Even grab up the wild hippie rags, those 
  freaks sometimes have something of 
  value. Really, the whole counter-culture thing is 
  like bait for Our Other Enemy. - Miller>
  Observation is little more than ‘keeping your eyes open’ and 
  gathering information from whatever mundane sources are 
  available. It does not require any real covert activity, other 
  than the routine maintenance of a cover identity or disguise. 
  Observation can take the form of buying and reading a 
  newspaper or counting the trucks that go past whilst eating 
  lunch at a restaurant.
  Observation is unlikely to garner any deep secrets unless 
  the opposition slips up, but it allows a picture to be built 
  of the general situation and some of the specifics. It is 
  easy to forget about the wealth of information that can 
  be obtained by routine observation, but it is extremely 
  important. Observation of this sort generally creates a 
  huge volume of low-value information, which must be 
  collated and analysed. 
  This takes time and a considerable amount of effort, and is 
  often considered a waste of time. 
  This impression is incorrect; low-value data often has 
  important information concealed within it, and even if it 
  does not the general picture it provides can be used to give 
  context to more specific pieces of information. These specific 
  data items are often obtained by targeted surveillance of a 
  person or place; without general observation we might not 
  know where to look.
  S U R V E I L L A N C E  A N D
  • I N T E L L I G E N C E  G A T H E R I N G •
  
  59
  information gathering
  The Keeper should always look for 
  ways to reward thorough planning. 
  If the investigators have carefully 
  and successfully researched a potential 
  recruit’s life before approaching her, 
  they should gain one or two bonus dice 
  on any interpersonal skill rolls made 
  while convincing the agent to work for 
  them. Similarly, detailed knowledge of 
  a target’s normal movements may give 
  a bonus on rolls made to assassinate 
  him, and thorough surveillance of a 
  facility should afford a bonus on roll to 
  infiltrate it.
  Of course, luck also plays a role. All 
  that detailed information gathering may 
  be for naught if your target cancels 
  plans due to sickness, or the facility 
  is subject to a surprise audit on the day 
  of the mission. The Keeper may call for a 
  group Luck roll to determine if anything 
  unexpected has changed.
  SURVEILLANCE
  Surveillance is the business of covertly watching a person 
  or place, or listening to what is happening there. It differs 
  from observation in that the methods used are ‘sneaky’. 
  Surveillance can be carried out by technical means such as a 
  listening device, but it still has to be put in place. Likewise, 
  direct surveillance by personnel must be covert, requiring 
  either concealment, disguise, or both. Where technical aids 
  are required, such as binoculars or a camera, the task of 
  keeping surveillance covert becomes much more difficult. 
  A key factor is the necessity of balancing risk to potential 
  reward. It is rare that any given piece of surveillance work 
  justifies exposing operatives to significant risks, and quite 
  often there will be places where the subject cannot be kept 
  under observation. If the opposition have done a good job of 
  securing an area or have robust security procedures it may 
  be necessary to abandon surveillance at a certain point and 
  pick up the subject again when they leave the secured area. 
  By way of example, the enemy might have their own counter-
  surveillance personnel tailing the subject or sweeping 
  the area around his route. These personnel will know 
  what makes a good observation point and will be highly 
  suspicious of anyone they encounter in such an area even if 
  there is no overt activity. This sort of security arrangement 
  is manpower-intensive and is rarely encountered other than 
  for very important individuals working on highly sensitive 
  projects.
  Our Other Enemy often possesses 
  senses or esoteric means of 
  observation 
  we 
  have 
  little 
  understanding of. Keep this in mind 
  when setting up your surveillance operation. 
  Your blind might be perfectly hidden from 
  mundane 
  detection 
  and 
  secure 
  against 
  electromagnetic detection, but you still might 
  be caught out by something that can 'see' 
  between walls or even possess precognitive 
  abilities. Always, always keep two or more 
  escape options open.  -N
  The best form of surveillance is to place an operative 
  somewhere they can observe the subject on a long-term 
  basis, such as working in a bar the subject spends a lot 
  of time in, or insinuating someone into their workplace. It 
  is occasionally possible to position someone at the centre 
  of the subject’s life by means of a friendship, romantic 
  attachment or business arrangement engineered by the 
  operatives. More commonly, an operative can be positioned 
  or an asset obtained somewhere loosely connected with 
  the subject’s routine, giving a patchier coverage for less 
  effort.
  If it is not possible to attach someone to the target or their 
  entourage, more conventional surveillance operations are 
  necessary. Surveillance can be static or mobile; often an 
  operation will be a bit of both. Static surveillance is easier 
  to carry out than mobile, and can be performed either using 
  concealment or disguise. 
  Concealment can be quite basic, such as sitting in a car or 
  using bushes for cover. If access to buildings is possible then 
  a suitable window makes an excellent vantage point. Few 
  people look above their eye height, so unless the operatives 
  make movements close to the window that will draw the 
  eye then they will remain concealed. Similarly, rooftops can 
  be used for ‘concealed’ surveillance even if the operatives 
  are not actually hidden. Unless they give themselves away, 
  they are not likely to be spotted except by trained counter-
  surveillance personnel. As always, a low profile and a lack 
  of sudden or large movements will allow the operatives to 
  remain covert. 
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  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  60
  The main problem with using high vantage points is 
  the difficulty in following if the subject moves on. An 
  observation post of this sort must be set up well in advance, 
  since the operatives need to reach their high position, and 
  without attracting attention. The effort required to obtain 
  high observation points is wasteful if the subject is only 
  in view for a short time, so this method should only be 
  considered if the subject is fixed in their routine or if the 
  position offers a view of their home or workplace.
  seleCting a suitaBle vantage Point
  Identifying a suitable vantage 
  point for surveillance calls for 
  a combined Stealth and Tradecraft 
  roll. If the investigator does not have 
  time to scope the area out properly ahead 
  of time, the Keeper may also call for a 
  Luck roll for there to be an accessible 
  vantage point.
  Disguise in the context of surveillance means that the 
  operatives are in plain sight, and are using some means of 
  making their activities seem innocuous. This might require a 
  specific disguise, such as posing as workmen or handing out 
  advertising flyers, but more commonly the disguise takes 
  the form of a cover activity. Cover activities need not be 
  complex; walking a dog or having lunch in a pavement cafe 
  will suffice, but the key to disguising surveillance activity 
  is for it to be immediately obvious what ‘those people’ are 
  doing. 
  The last thing an operative needs is for a passer-by to wonder 
  what they are up to. A cover activity that has to be explained 
  is far less useful than one that is immediately obvious as 
  innocuous. Two men in business suits having lunch whilst 
  surrounded by briefcases and other business paraphernalia 
  suggests ‘business lunch’; it will be quickly forgotten by 
  casual observers. Two men hanging around with no obvious 
  purpose will cause passers-by to wonder what they are 
  doing and perhaps remember them if questioned later. 
  One of the most significant threats to a surveillance operation 
  is the possibility that passers-by may become involved. This 
  can be as simple as someone demanding to know what the 
  operatives are doing, and might happen for a variety of 
  reasons. For example, the operatives might be confused with 
  criminals, or mistaken for police or political enforcement 
  agencies. Local gangs might also consider the operation to be 
  an intrusion onto their ‘turf’. Even if nothing serious happens, 
  an operatives does not want to attract attention. 
  The behaviour of the subject can have consequences for 
  the operatives. A subject who annoys people creates a 
  hostile atmosphere in which the operatives have to work. 
  They may receive the backlash from whatever the subject 
  did, especially if people think they are connected. This is 
  possible if the operatives stand out in any way. 
  Surveillance operatives are far less likely to run into 
  problems if they look like they belong in the area or are 
  engaged in some innocuous activity. However important the 
  surveillance operation may be, operatives must not fixate 
  upon the mission to the point where they start to stand 
  out, or else the mission is likely to fail. Often there is a 
  choice to be made between good but risky surveillance and 
  patchier but more covert operations; in most cases covert is 
  the default choice.
  mobILe surveILLanCe 
  and Counter-surveILLanCe
  Sometimes a location rather than a person is the subject of 
  such a stakeout. It may be necessary to watch a building or 
  other location for an extended period during which virtually 
  nothing happens. Operatives need to remain alert enough 
  
  61
  to react if the situation changes or of they are ‘made’, but 
  for the most part they will simply spend long hours sitting 
  around. Negative information can sometimes be useful, 
  such as when a target’s suspected location can be narrowed 
  down by finding out where they are not. Most stakeouts are 
  boring – not at all like the glamorous lives of fictional spies.
  staying alert during stakeouts
  If an investigator stakes out a 
  location for an extended period 
  of time, the Keeper should call 
  for a combined CON and POW roll to 
  determine if they manage to stay alert 
  throughout. Failure results in any Spot 
  Hidden or Listen rolls being made at a 
  Hard difficulty level. The investigator 
  may gain bonus dice on the CON/POW roll 
  by splitting the surveillance with other 
  team members or using stimulants to stay 
  alert.
  Mobile surveillance conducted on foot is a tricky business; 
  using vehicles even more so. Often a semi-mobile method is 
  employed, whereby the operatives drive or walk to a static 
  observation point, then move on to another. This is generally 
  much simpler than ‘tailing’ a subject on the move, but does 
  require a certain amount of care. 
  use of veHICLes
  Using a car as a base for semi-mobile surveillance provides 
  both mobility and concealment; few people will look into 
  a car, so it may be possible to use binoculars or a camera 
  in locations where they would otherwise be noticed in the 
  open. It is important to select the vehicle carefully. 
  Cars should be nondescript and suited to the area they are 
  working in. A beat-up family car will not stand out in some 
  neighbourhoods where an executive saloon would be very 
  obvious, and vice versa. Performance is far less important 
  than appearance, though a vehicle must above all be reliable. 
  It should be impossible or very difficult to trace back to the 
  network. 
  As a rule, theft is not a good option for obtaining a vehicle; it 
  may be reported, risking interference from the local police. 
  Theft is useful as a short-term expedient but wherever 
  possible vehicles should be obtained ahead of time and 
  modified by changing their number plates and their colour. 
  A good option is to buy a vehicle privately for cash or from 
  a dealer through a false identity. Offering a good (but not 
  extravagant) price can reduce a seller’s willingness to ask 
  questions. 
  Care should be taken to find out if the car has a history; 
  operatives have been known to drive around in vehicles 
  hurriedly sold by criminals after being used in a robbery or 
  body dump. Illegal or unroadworthy vehicles remain a viable 
  option if the means exists to repair them and create a false 
  identity. This is unlikely to be a capability that exists within 
  a network, but some workshops may be willing to do this 
  for a price if approached carefully. Contacts in a criminal 
  organisation can often assist, but should never be trusted.
  Assuming a suitable vehicle is available, using it is largely 
  a matter of common sense. Operatives must be familiar 
  with local traffic laws and the behaviour of road users. In 
  many areas these are quite different concepts, and a vehicle 
  scrupulously obeying traffic regulations that everyone else 
  ignores will stand out just as much as one driving recklessly 
  amongst sedate traffic. Operatives must not fixate so much 
  on their surveillance task that they forget about basic driving 
  skills.
  Embassy cars with diplomatic plates should be avoided 
  for most purposes. Diplomatic cars do have their uses, 
  however. For example, this might be the only way to get 
  an operative into a particular area. They can be dropped 
  off somewhere secluded and picked up again when the car 
  leaves. Alternatively the diplomatic car might be used to 
  ‘flush out’ a response. Most sensitive and secret locations 
  have a policy of advising personnel to not approach cars 
  with diplomatic plates, but instead to respond in an indirect 
  manner, usually by placing ‘polite obstacles’ in the way of 
  any further forays. By observing the low-key response to a 
  car going somewhere it should not, it may be possible to 
  determine that the enemy has something concealed there. 
  taILIng a subjeCt
  ‘Tailing’ a subject follows similar principles whether on foot 
  or in a vehicle. The operative must remain close enough to 
  keep the subject in sight but proximity increases the risk 
  of detection. It is sometimes necessary to hang back and 
  lose sight of the subject from time to time, risking losing 
  them completely in return for a reduced possibility of being 
  spotted. If this is the case, a measure of educated guesswork 
  is necessary to predict where the subject will go next and 
  to reacquire them before they are out of sight too long. This 
  is a risky strategy, but is sometimes the only way to avoid 
  detection.
  S U R V E I L L A N C E  A N D  I N T E L L I G E N C E  G AT H E R I N G
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  62
  Tailing a person or vehicle requires quick wits in order to 
  react to what the target does. If they start browsing through a 
  market stall or pull over to buy a cup of coffee, the operative 
  following must find a plausible reason to also stop, or must 
  pass by and wait until the subject moves on again. This is 
  a ways to spot a tail; a vehicle or person who matches your 
  movements too closely is probably following you. The best 
  way to deal with this is to have multiple operatives involved 
  in a surveillance operation. If one is in a difficult position 
  they can pass innocently by or turn off the road, leaving the 
  subject to be picked up by another. However, this requires 
  both the personnel and the coordination required to pull off 
  the swap without being spotted.
  Some subjects are blithely oblivious that they might be 
  followed, which makes things much easier for the operative. 
  However, with only very basic security precautions a subject 
  can make themselves hard to tail without being spotted. If 
  the operatives are ‘made’ then the subject may try to shake 
  the tail. How overt they are might vary.
  If the subject does not care if the operatives realise they have 
  been ‘made’, they will probably make a sudden attempt to 
  break contact by getting out of sight. They may simply flee, 
  perhaps through an area that makes it difficult to follow. If 
  they prefer the tail to think they have simply lost contact, the 
  subject must be more subtle. Any fast movement will begin 
  when out of sight of the operatives. The usual gambit is to 
  pretend that nothing has been noticed then move briefly out 
  of sight a few times before using one of these contact losses 
  as an opportunity to get clear. 
  For example, the subject might turn several corners or 
  move through an area with a lot of clutter, casually as if 
  oblivious to the tail, then at a suitable juncture he will dash 
  around another corner or otherwise put himself where the 
  tail cannot find him when he attempts to reacquire contact. 
  Entering a building then going out of a side door can work 
  well, especially if the subject changes his appearance in the 
  process; something as simple as putting on or removing a 
  hat can make the subject difficult to reacquire once visual 
  contact has been lost.
  Attempts to lose a tail – covertly or otherwise – can become 
  a battle of wits between the operative and their subject. 
  Good counter-surveillance skills will also help an operative 
  to spot the best opportunities for a subject to elude them 
  and suggest where they might go. It is always risky to 
  allow the subject to stay out of sight for more than a few 
  seconds, but if the operative is reasonably sure the subject 
  is about to attempt to break contact it may be necessary 
  to take measures such as going around the other side of a 
  building rather than following them directly. If the operative 
  guesses correctly they will reacquire the subject when they 
  think they have broken contact. If not, the operative’s own 
  action will cause the surveillance to fail. As with most other 
  endeavours, a team of operatives can cover more options 
  and provide some insurance against this sort of gambit.
  Many subjects will routinely carry out ‘dry cleaning’ 
  manoeuvres to shake off a tail even if they have not spotted 
  one. Gambits such as using a different exit or rounding a 
  corner and then suddenly dashing to another to get out of 
  sight, as is the trick of taking four turns in the same direction 
  when driving. If a car is still behind after the subject has 
  driven in a circle, it is almost certainly a tail. 
  These gambits are routinely taught to government employees 
  and military officers, and are often employed in a habitual 
  and unimaginative manner. Someone who behaves like 
  this is probably not a high-level security operative; the 
  real experts are far subtler. However, even very basic dry 
  cleaning can make a subject difficult to follow unless the 
  operative can anticipate what they might do. The toughest 
  subjects to follow are those who seem predictable, perhaps 
  using routine, unimaginative tactics, and then suddenly 
  do something completely unexpected. Being able to 
  follow someone like this without being ‘made’ requires a 
  combination of good skills and a certain amount of luck.
  handling moBile surveillanCe
  See the Vehicular Surveillance 
  section on pg. 134 of World War 
  Cthulhu: Cold War for guidelines 
  about handling tails.
  If an investigator picks up a tail, or 
  is trying to follow a target who has 
  realised that they are being tailed, 
  and you want to play the cat-and-mouse 
  game between pursuer and pursued in 
  detail, it is possible to use a modified 
  version of the chase rules from the 
  Call of Cthulhu rulebook. These are 
  usually subtler scenes than a normal chase, 
  relying on cleverness and perception more 
  than speed, so use Tradecraft rolls in 
  place of DEX or Drive Auto. Manoeuvres 
  might involve misdirection, ducking into 
  crowds, doubling back and use of public 
  transport.
  
  63
  addItIonaL ConsIderatIons
  The worst-case scenario for surveillance work is not losing 
  contact with the subject but instead being drawn into a 
  trap. A surveillance team that is ‘made’ might be followed 
  back to their safe house or swept up by a snatch team. A 
  static observation point might be surrounded by hostile 
  security personnel; a team on the move might be ambushed 
  or confronted with overwhelming force. The fact that the 
  operatives are tied to the movements of the subject creates 
  a vulnerability that can be exploited by the opposition. 
  Operatives must therefore remain vigilant in case they 
  are under observation or being approached by hostiles. 
  The option to break off surveillance and either return to 
  innocuous activities or rapidly get out of the area must 
  always be available. Exfiltration and escape routes must be 
  open and ready at all times. 
  When using vehicles, whether for surveillance or to fulfil 
  other transport requirements, operatives must keep in 
  mind that their vehicle creates vulnerabilities as well as 
  capabilities. It can be followed, watched, stolen or even 
  rigged with explosives if the opposition is so inclined. Care 
  must be taken when returning to a vehicle in case it is under 
  observation; a few simple and unobtrusive measures can 
  greatly reduce the chances of being caught by a rigged car.
  Planting and finding Car BomBs
  See pg. 138 of World War Cthulhu: 
  Cold War for details of planting 
  and detecting car bombs.
  Operatives should park on a slope where possible, making 
  it difficult to place anything under the vehicle, and should 
  approach it from a direction that allows an unobtrusive 
  glance underneath. The ‘dropped the keys’ can be used but 
  is obvious to those who know what to look for. Surveillance 
  operatives should also watch for these actions on the part 
  of a target. This will reveal if someone is security-aware 
  or not.
  If an observation point is used more than once it is 
  possible for operatives to become highly complacent and 
  treat it as ‘home’ or ‘always safe’ territory, when this is 
  usually far from the case. An observation point must be 
  observed before entering it every time it is used, and must 
  be scrutinised for bugs, listening devices or evidence that 
  someone else has been there. Otherwise there is a risk that 
  the operatives will walk into a trap when they return to the 
  observation post.
  Equipment must not be left behind at an observation point 
  if possible. It may attract thieves or be tampered with by 
  enemy operatives, and most items will provoke interest from 
  the opposing security services. Equipment that is left must 
  be concealed or positioned where it will not attract notice. 
  Some items are sufficiently mundane that they can be left 
  in the open or used as a means to conceal others, but no 
  item connected specifically with espionage should ever be 
  left where it can be found. Even if all that happens is theft 
  by a light-fingered passer-by, the item might attract attention 
  if sold or displayed, perhaps leading security personnel to 
  realise that there are intelligence operatives active in the 
  area. 
  S U R V E I L L A N C E  A N D  I N T E L L I G E N C E  G AT H E R I N G
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  64
  USING TECHNICAL MEANS
  Surveillance by technical means typically refers to the use 
  of ‘listening devices’, which can intercept telephone or voice 
  conversations. However, there are other means available, 
  notably Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). This is the art of 
  obtaining intelligence from signals of various sorts and can 
  be subdivided into the fields of Communications Intelligence 
  (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT).
  ELINT is concerned with signals not directly used for 
  communications, such as radar and similar emitters, as 
  well as the general electromagnetic emissions from systems 
  such as power transmission stations. ELINT can be used as 
  a form of surveillance, in that it is often possible to track 
  a vehicle or vessel emitting navigational or military radar 
  signals. Much can be learned from analysis of these signals. 
  The fact that a radio is transmitting at all can provide 
  useful information, especially when it is transmitting from a 
  supposedly uninhabited place. Similarly, a military force can 
  be kept under distant observation by detecting transmissions 
  between sub-formations even if these cannot be understood 
  by the surveillance operatives.
  For the most part, ELINT methods are of limited use to 
  surveillance operatives, as they only indicate that something 
  is there rather than what it is doing or what is being said. 
  An operative in the field is unlikely to have the equipment 
  required to analyse radio transmissions in terms of strength 
  and content, but since many radar and radio systems operate 
  on known frequencies a certain amount of information can 
  often be gleaned. 
  radio eavesdroPPing
  Radio communications in general 
  are covered by the Signals skill, 
  but this will only be useful if 
  the transmissions are sent en clair. 
  In the field, not even the Cryptography 
  skill will help deal with encrypted 
  transmissions. The only real hope is for 
  the investigators to obtain the correct 
  equipment to unscramble the broadcasts, 
  which may be a mission objective in 
  itself.
  COMINT methods require the interception of a signal or 
  transmission in an intelligible form. Phone tapping is a 
  special case and is discussed below; for the most part we 
  are concerned here with interception of radio transmissions. 
  Most sensitive radio traffic is scrambled and encrypted, and 
  therefore beyond the means of an operative to make sense 
  of. However, transmissions are sometimes made ‘in clear’ 
  either due to sloppy procedures or between less security-
  conscious operators. There is little chance of an operative 
  making much sense of traffic between the Soviet Northern 
  Fleet and its base, but guerrillas in Angola might not have 
  encrypted radio equipment available. 
  COMINT and ELINT are often very 
  useful against mundane targets, but 
  some of the entities of Our Other 
  Enemy emit fields that scramble or 
  degrade the quality of electronic devices.  -N
  I have seen taps blown out, bugs fired, 
  and once an operative bleed from the 
  ears while listening to a tape. Though 
  the last one may have just been a 
  Dylan album. - Miller>
  If COMINT is to be any use, operatives must understand the 
  language in which transmissions are made and any codes 
  used. These are rarely complex in third-world militaries; call 
  signs are often egotistical rather than deceptive, and even 
  in the armies of major powers there can be a tendency to 
  match a call sign to a unit type. Thus it is sometimes possible 
  to discern from a call sign alone whether a unit is ‘teeth’ or 
  ‘tail’, and whether it is armoured, infantry or artillery based. 
  Thermal (infrared) cameras can be used for surveillance 
  under some circumstances, though the image can be 
  difficult to make out by an untrained observer. One of the 
  most important uses of thermal technology is detection 
  rather than surveillance; the thermal device will indicate 
  that a person is present even if it is not possible to tell what 
  they are doing. Other means can then be used to observe 
  the subject. 
  Likewise, thermal cameras will indicate if a vehicle’s engine 
  is running or has been running recently; the same goes for 
  generators and other equipment. Knowing that a remote 
  building has power may be useful even if it is not possible to 
  see what is going on inside. 
  Low-light (sometimes called ‘starlight’) vision devices are 
  also available, though they tend to be quite bulky and/
  or fragile. Work is underway to develop a military-grade 
  starlight scope that can be fitted to a weapon, and this will 
  probably become available in the next few years. For now, 
  however, various experimental and special-purpose low-light 
  systems are available. These do not make vision possible in 
  
  65
  total blackness, but they can enable a subject to be observed 
  in near-darkness. Care should be taken not to look at light 
  sources as the device’s technology amplifies light.
  LIstenIng devICes
  The most common technical means used by surveillance and 
  intelligence personnel are listening devices of various sorts. 
  The simplest of these, in terms of technical sophistication 
  and ease of use, are telephone taps. Most telephones are 
  unsecured, making it possible to listen in on a conversation 
  by ‘tapping’ into the line at an exchange or junction box. 
  However, the presence of a tap sometimes causes a slight 
  sound on the line that can give away its presence. Since taps 
  can be readily used against us, operatives should be alert 
  for such signals. A simple rule is never to say anything on 
  the telephone that you would not want to be overheard by 
  hostile intelligence personnel.
  One way to avoid a tap is to use a different line. This may 
  sound obvious but a person under surveillance might use a 
  public phone or one connected to a different exchange for 
  private conversations. Of course, the recipient has to do the 
  same if the tap is between the receiving phone and their 
  local exchange; an operative should not make the error of 
  assuming that just because they used a public phone in a 
  different part of the city their calls are secure. 
  Secure phone lines, which use scrambler systems, are 
  available but are not 100% proof against penetration 
  by intelligence operatives. The equipment needed to 
  descramble a conversation is not portable and as a result will 
  be unavailable to operatives in foreign countries. However, 
  embassies and similar installations will have ‘secure’ phone 
  lines with this sort of technology, and it may be available if 
  circumstances merit the effort required to deploy it.
  Internal telephone communication tends to be unsecured, 
  and conversations are often unguarded. It may be possible 
  to plant a tap or a recording device on an internal phone 
  line such as one between two parts of a base. Lines that 
  run under a river between military or political facilities are 
  often unsecured, due to the difficulty of getting at them to 
  plant a tap. If operatives can get access somehow, a wealth 
  of information might be extracted.
  Learn to be creative when using 
  telephone taps. Often the employment 
  of these devices requires that a 
  superior sign off on them. While 
  some high-ranking officers will leave the 
  details and discretion to the operative, many 
  more want to make sure their own careers are 
  safe. With scandal being such a common cause 
  of early career termination, it does push some 
  into an overly conservative viewpoint.   -N
  Conversations within a building can be monitored with a 
  variety of listening devices, or ‘bugs’. These are usually 
  planted somewhere that gives good concealment but which 
  does not impede their ability to overhear a conversation. Air 
  ducts and the like are good locations, but not if there are 
  noisy fans nearby. 
  Some bugs record conversations and must be retrieved to 
  collect their data, which can be hazardous. Others transmit 
  using radio and picked up by nearby receivers. The range 
  of any bug is short, making it necessary for operatives to 
  place themselves and their receiver close to the target. 
  Good security procedures may make this impossible. Often 
  the buildings close to a sensitive location are occupied by 
  people performing innocuous tasks from whom no useful 
  information can be obtained; controlling these buildings 
  makes it very difficult for operatives to get close enough 
  to receive signals from bugs. This is only possible for large-
  scale operations, however, and is more likely to be done by 
  a network operating on friendly turf. A network operating 
  in a foreign city will not have the luxury of creating such a 
  buffer zone against bugs.
  Bugs can be detected in a variety of ways. A physical 
  search of likely locations is the most obvious, but those 
  that transmit can also be detected by using a receiver that 
  sweeps across many frequencies. This will only detect a bug 
  that is transmitting; some devices do not constantly transmit 
  and may be missed by a sweep.
  Bugs must be planted or otherwise brought into a secure 
  area to be useful. Their power supply does not last forever, 
  and in some cases they have to be retrieved to obtain their 
  information. The best defence against bugs is the physical 
  security of a location. Places that are hard to get into such 
  as well-secured ducts are also hard to plant a bug in, and 
  potential suspects who might plant one – such as someone 
  disguised as a cleaner – should not be left unobserved for 
  long enough to both plant a bug and return the area to its 
  previous condition. Damage to fittings, signs of furniture or 
  shelving being moved and similar disturbances may indicate 
  that a bug has been planted or retrieved.
  An alternative to bugging is to get as close as possible to 
  the subject in a neighbouring room or building and place 
  S U R V E I L L A N C E  A N D  I N T E L L I G E N C E  G AT H E R I N G
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  66
  microphones or simply listen. It may be possible to break 
  through a wall in a neighbouring building and create a 
  listening space within an embassy or other supposedly 
  secure location. Power sockets and similar utilities often 
  have a space behind them which can be accessed without 
  going through the secured part of the building. Care must 
  be taken to avoid making noise that will be heard in the 
  target area – sound travels both ways!
  It is also possible to hear what is happening inside a building 
  by using a laser or infrared beam targeted on a window. 
  Sounds inside the building will cause very small vibrations 
  in the glass, which can be picked up by sensitive equipment 
  as it reflects the beam. Equipment of this sort is rather bulky 
  and hard to conceal, so is typically used from within a facing 
  building. Operatives concerned about their own security 
  may consider holding sensitive conversations in a room with 
  no windows. Of course, the enemy can do the same. 
  Bugs and other remote 
  listening deviCes
  See World War Cthulhu: Cold War 
  pg. 161 for more details of the 
  varieties and uses of listening 
  devices, and methods for detecting them.
  ON-SITE ANALYSIS
  In the normal course of operations, raw data is fed back 
  ‘up the chain’ to analysts at home. Their task is to sift and 
  collate it and to draw conclusion, just as the operative’s is to 
  ensure that the data collected is as complete and accurate 
  as possible. It is not normally desirable for an operative to 
  attempt analysis; their well-intended efforts can confuse 
  an issue or render a piece of critical information invalid or 
  obscure. 
  However, there are times when operatives in the field or at 
  the network’s headquarters must engage in some analysis of 
  data in order to plan a mission or to decide what to do next. 
  At its most basic, this analysis includes deciding where to 
  place surveillance posts to observe a given subject, which 
  might require analysis of the subject’s lifestyle and habits. 
  In a wider sense, much can be learned from simple 
  observations filtered through a keen mind. Any field 
  analysis will be of the quick-and-dirty sort, and can lead to 
  erroneous conclusions if the operative has limited data to 
  work from. However, local observations can be highly useful 
  in drawing short-term conclusions valid for the immediate 
  area of operations. 
  You will be the on-site analyst for 
  most missions. Sending information up 
  the chain of command is too great of 
  a security risk for our organisation. 
  Do not trouble yourself: you would not be in 
  this position if you could not handle it, nor 
  will you be for long.  -N
  By way of example, an untrained observer might be quite 
  capable of noting that there are soldiers guarding an 
  installation, but a skilled operative can learn much more 
  from their equipment, insignia and methods. Troops that are 
  sloppy in dress and who leave equipment lying around are 
  unlikely to be of high calibre. The same can be said for 
  those who run predictable, unimaginative patrol routines or 
  highly erratic, half-hearted ones. 
  High-quality formations tend to be equipped with more 
  modern vehicles and weaponry, including anti-aircraft and 
  anti-tank systems, or at the very least will have equipment 
  that is well maintained and properly secured. Likewise, 
  high-end formations tend to undertake drills and training 
  even when deployed to guard an area; poor-quality units 
  will goof off and go to seed in such a role. 
  Do you know the common ranks, branches 
  of service and units of your opposition? Of 
  course you do. You can tell Soviet Army 
  troops from Border Troops at a glance. But 
  what about the various types of Our Other Enemy? 
  True, this knowledge is dangerous on a practically 
  cellular level, but it is necessary. - Rodriquez
  Simple extrapolation from these clues will tell an operative 
  what the enemy is likely to do in the event of an alert. 
  Poor units might not notice thefts or an infiltration to steal 
  documents, and in many cases fear of the ‘vertical stroke’ 
  (the wrath of high command descending through everyone 
  in the chain of command down to the person who actually 
  screwed up) will cause such units to conceal problems rather 
  than report them. The enemy might actually conspire to 
  conceal our operatives’ actions!
  Poor-quality units will also respond sluggishly to an alert, 
  and in an inept manner. Personnel are far more likely to 
  fall for a diversion or deception, and again might assist us 
  by making mistakes that confuse the situation. If an enemy 
  patrol can be induced to start shooting at shadows in one 
  
  67
  area, a covert operations team will have a much easier time 
  getting in and out of the objective. 
  Conversely, a high-end formation will react quickly and 
  effectively. It will put out aggressive and imaginative 
  patrols that do far more than amble along a well-defined 
  path, occasionally looking around. Knowing that the force 
  securing an objective is such a formation tells us a lot about 
  the target’s importance, but also about the risks inherent in 
  trying to infiltrate it. 
  One very important consideration is whether the forces 
  guarding an area are police (or perhaps paramilitary security 
  units), regular soldiers or a political formation such as the 
  Soviet NKVD. Again, this tells us a lot about the objective as 
  well as how the force guarding it will act when alerted. 
  Political troops in Warsaw pact countries have far more 
  latitude about using violence than ordinary soldiers or police. 
  NKVD and similar political troops are more likely to open fire 
  than those with less political clout, due to greater confidence 
  that they will avoid any consequences for their actions. 
  On-site analysis of the quick-and-dirty sort may also be 
  necessary when deciding how urgent a piece of information 
  is. Much of the data gathered by surveillance is routine, and 
  whilst useful it is not worth making a special effort to report 
  it. Other information is low-priority; the appearance of a 
  new type of military truck is something that the intelligence 
  services need to know about sooner or later but it is hard to 
  imagine a situation where reporting it is of great urgency. 
  All information is useful and should be reported when 
  possible, but at times the operative in the field needs to make 
  a decision about what needs to be reported immediately and 
  what can wait for a safer opportunity.
  You know the books we sometimes get 
  our hands on? Don’t look in them. Ever. 
  - Miller>
  REPORTING BACK
  As already noted, it is not desirable for operatives to carry 
  out their own analysis; we have experts for that. Even if 
  a quick-and-dirty analysis is carried out in the field, what 
  goes back ‘up the chain’ must be the raw data. Our analysts 
  will decide what is relevant and what is not; they will put 
  two and two together from first principles. This requires 
  that they are working from first principles and that data has 
  not been unintentionally altered by attempts to collate and 
  analyse it further down the chain. 
  Reports can vary considerably in length and content. Ideally, 
  all data must be passed back but often this is not possible. 
  Moving vast volumes of record cards or paper can be 
  a problem at the best of times; doing it whilst crossing a 
  hostile border is well-nigh impossible. Thus a report must 
  be tailored to the means used to transmit it and to the 
  circumstances surrounding it. Wherever possible, however, 
  our analysts should be presented with as much raw data as 
  we can transmit to them.
  You are probably used to having to gather 
  a large amount of data to present to your 
  superiors, especially if there is a need to 
  build a criminal case or gain enough proof 
  so that a diplomat can be sent home. This is not 
  the case with Our Other Enemy. You just need 
  enough intel to know when, who, what and where. 
  The rest is up to you. I kind of like that simplicity. 
  - Rodriquez
  analysing information
  If the investigators need to make a quick on-site analysis of the material 
  they have gathered, this will usually be covered by either Military Science 
  or Tradecraft rolls, depending on the type of intelligence. At the Keeper’s 
  discretion, an appropriate weapons or vehicle skill may be used for background knowledge 
  about military equipment instead. 
  Of course, members of Section 46 may also need to use the Cthulhu Mythos skill for on-
  site analysis as part of their true missions. It is rarely advisable to carry Mythos 
  tomes around in the field, and communications may not be possible over normal channels, 
  so there is sometimes no substitute for a head full of dangerous and blasphemous 
  knowledge.
  S U R V E I L L A N C E  A N D  I N T E L L I G E N C E  G AT H E R I N G
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  68
  This follows a well-established principle that information 
  is like a wedge. Operatives at the sharp end should have 
  only the information that they need to carry out their 
  missions, whilst analysts should have every single scrap of 
  data that can be gathered. If the means to transmit a piece 
  of information without compromising the security of the 
  network exists then it should be reported. 
  Operatives should not be concerned with what seems 
  relevant, and should also not make judgements about what 
  might be misleading or deliberately deceptive. It is the 
  business of analysts to find deceptions or concealed truths, 
  and for this they need all the information they can get. Also, 
  there is the danger that an operative ‘on the ground’ might 
  discard a piece of information because they think it is untrue 
  when in fact the ‘big picture’ would reveal that it is not. 
  Similarly, no piece of information is trivial. Data that is 
  already known may provide corroboration of information 
  obtained by other methods, and can serve as a guide to the 
  reliability of new information. Indeed, the absence of certain 
  data can tell analysts a lot, particularly when the enemy is 
  trying to deceive us. However, the analysts need to be sure 
  that this information was genuinely not present rather than 
  being omitted from a report for other reasons. 
  No piece of information is of any use until it has been 
  reported, analysed and passed to the planners for use. 
  This all takes time, which can be in short supply. Some 
  information must be transmitted immediately to have any 
  value, and some is so important that it must be passed 
  back up the chain as quickly as possible. Most routine 
  information, however, is not so time-dependent. Operatives 
  in the field must balance the importance making a full and 
  timely report against the security risks. Few data items are 
  worth a ‘blown’ network or even a single asset. 
  When do you report back? Only in 
  the direst of circumstances should 
  you break security and contact us 
  during a mission. Generally, you will 
  know how to do so before you depart, and 
  are trusted to maintain the strictest security at 
  all times. If you are not given any means of 
  reporting back until the mission is completed, 
  you are neither expected nor desired to do 
  so.  -N
  Keep your lies straight, especially the big ones. Lying about those things that live in the cracks is hard, mate. 
  You never know who’s seen them, or who they’ve seen. 
   
   
   
  Am I me or a cover, cover? 
  What is inside, inside the pages of me. 
   
  I need a break, a holiday, holiday. Good thing the Guvnor, the Guvnor is sending a couple of blokes 
  to give me a lift. I should get my rest then, then. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
  Oh god do I need a kip. - Stanton
  
  CHaPTer 
  Five
  P e r s o n a l 
  V i o l e n c e 
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  70
  Most of the violence done by our operatives is on a personal 
  scale. A single guard may have to be eliminated or a key 
  member of an enemy organisation might be targeted for 
  assassination. Violence of this sort falls into two main 
  categories: targeted and facilitation. Targeted violence 
  usually means assassination of a key figure, and may be the 
  primary or a secondary objective of a mission. It must be 
  planned for not only in terms of how and when the act will 
  be carried out, but also in terms of what the effects will be 
  and what response is likely to be made by the enemy.
  Sometimes it will not be appropriate to simply assassinate the 
  target. It may be necessary to make the killing look accidental 
  or like a crime rather than an intelligence operation. It may 
  be desirable that the target simply disappears and is never 
  found – if this can be combined with planted evidence that 
  they were eliminated by their own side, have defected to the 
  enemy or have vanished in some other potentially damaging 
  circumstance, then additional benefits may accrue from the 
  elimination. 
  Either way, care must be taken to ensure that the target 
  is eliminated correctly, which may require that a carefully 
  planned and halfway-executed operation be aborted at the 
  point of success.
  You don’t need to kill everyone in a cell 
  of cattle in order to eliminate it. If you 
  are certain that most are dabblers in the 
  works of Our Other Enemy, or are unlikely 
  to recover from a loss of leadership, then take out 
  the leaders. One won’t be enough; take out the entire 
  inner circle to be sure. - Rodriquez
  Rodriquez is a little too soft on this one. 
  Eliminate them all and you won’t have 
  to worry about the cell springing up 
  again. - Miller>
  Facilitation violence is directed at anyone who is in the 
  way at the time. Guards, drivers, people wearing a uniform 
  the operative needs and similar targets may need to be 
  eliminated in order for the mission to proceed, to evade 
  detection or to obtain a necessary item. Facilitation violence 
  may or may not be planned. 
  Eliminating a courier to get a case or an official to obtain 
  a security pass may be an essential part of an operation; 
  as such this should be planned as carefully as the primary 
  mission. The act must be covert and timely; the elimination 
  must be performed such that the enemy does not have 
  time to realise something is amiss, and must be sufficiently 
  discreet as to go unnoticed at least until the mission is 
  complete.
  Some facilitation violence is of an impromptu nature. An 
  unexpected guard or other hostile who is in the way may 
  need to be removed. It is not possible to plan for such 
  eventualities other than in the most general of terms, such 
  as by practising stealth and deception along with silent 
  killing techniques. However, where possible guards should 
  be evaded or otherwise bypassed rather than killed. Even 
  if the elimination is silent, the body may be found or the 
  victim missed. From the first killing in an operation the 
  clock begins to run down. Hiding bodies can slow down the 
  process, but not indefinitely.
  Some targets are best left alone no matter what. Local 
  police will usually search vigorously for the killer of one 
  of their own even if they would not make much effort if 
  the victim was a civilian or a rich man’s bodyguard. Public 
  officials and high-prominence citizens will also cause a stir 
  if they are killed. 
  There are times when even if we are willing to take such an 
  overt action in the knowledge that the enemy’s intelligence 
  apparatus will be set against us, we will still choose not to 
  stir up the region’s law enforcement as well. The two are 
  often not connected even in countries where they are on 
  the same side. On neutral ground the enemy’s intelligence 
  apparatus will be unlikely to cooperate with the local police.
  Thus it may be necessary to abort an operation if it will 
  bring a response that is more widespread than we are ready 
  for. We are effectively at war with the enemy’s intelligence 
  services, but not necessarily their police or the enforcers of 
  the local crime cartel. Long-term goals will be compromised 
  by making an entire region hostile to us; trying to conduct 
  intelligence operations in the midst of a manhunt is tricky 
  at best.
  It is necessary to build into an operational plan just how 
  much facilitation violence is acceptable and what targets 
  absolutely must not be attacked. An abort is frustrating but 
  the alternative will be much worse. Violence is a tool, but 
  one that must be used with precision. 
  • P E R S O N A L  V I O L E N C E •
  
  71
  TAKING DIRECT ACTION
  Direct action is rare in intelligence work, and under normal 
  circumstances it is only used after a careful period of 
  planning and set-up. Action should be short and decisive; 
  the longer an operative is engaged, the greater the chance 
  that something will go badly wrong. For example, snatching 
  a foreign diplomatic courier or a suspected spy should take 
  no more than a few seconds and give the target no chance 
  to resist. A bungled snatch that results in a fight or a pursuit 
  might attract local law enforcement or other intervention 
  whether it ultimately succeeds or not.
  Thus a good set-up is vital, followed by swift and decisive 
  action taken without hesitation. Poor setup can result in the 
  operation failing from the outset, whereas bad execution can 
  sometimes be dealt with by improvisation and determination. 
  Poor execution can, however, result in complications – a 
  simple document snatch could end up with the operative 
  trying to evade a pursuit by a whole city’s police force as 
  well as hostile intelligence operatives. 
  Our Other Enemy can take many forms, and 
  that simple cattle might actually be the 
  master. There are tainted lineages that can 
  pass as human, things that can consume a 
  person’s insides and wear them as a mask, and other 
  things that puppet people. Make sure of your target 
  before you strike. - Rodriquez
  Sometimes, there is no alternative but to use violence in either 
  a planned or unplanned manner. The former is much safer, 
  as good planning permits many variables to be controlled 
  and the dice to be loaded before the order to commence 
  is given. However, in the situation where something has 
  gone awry or an operative must evade capture, it may be 
  necessary for the operative to think on their feet and use 
  violence wherever necessary. Violent action should be taken 
  suddenly, ideally by surprise, and with overwhelming force 
  at the key point. 
  More than this, though, action must be taken with an aim 
  in mind. Intelligence operatives do not skirmish with the 
  enemy for the sake of it; every shot fired or blow struck 
  must be in accordance with a deliberate aim. That may be 
  the completion of a mission or the removal of an obstacle, 
  but it must take the operative closer to his aim. If the 
  object is to escape capture then winning a gunfight is 
  irrelevant unless it is furthers that aim. An opportunity 
  to escape is worth more than eliminating a couple more 
  pursuers. Operatives who forget this rule can become 
  engrossed in the fight rather than working towards their 
  chosen outcome. 
  The servants of Our Other Enemy 
  frequently must be eliminated in a 
  permanent and satisfying manner. Use 
  the same procedure you would for 
  any other such act. You might even find it 
  liberating to not need as much red tape to 
  effect a clear and decisive goal.  -N
  personaL Combat
  Where it is necessary to engage in combat, either armed 
  or otherwise, the most important factor is precise and 
  deliberate action. This must be ferocious and violent, but 
  P E R S O N A L  V I O L E N C E
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  72
  always controlled. If it is necessary to fight at all then it is 
  necessary to do whatever it takes to win. 
  A wounded enemy might shoot an operative in the back, 
  or could give information that will lead enemy intelligence 
  services to the operative. Hesitation to shoot or strike may 
  give bodyguards an opportunity to act or the target a chance 
  to escape. Be ruthless but not vindictive; operatives are 
  willing to kill if the situation merits it but do not seek to do 
  so for any reason other than the mission. 
  Stealth, deception and positioning can be used to give the 
  operative the advantage if they have initiated the combat; 
  they must be willing to withdraw if the odds are not good. 
  Remember that a failed attack on a target will result in a 
  state of alert and an active search for the attackers. If the 
  option is available the operative should weigh the chances of 
  success now against the possibility of a better opportunity 
  later. 
  Sometimes the operative will not have a choice whether or 
  not to engage in combat, such as when they are fired upon 
  by hostiles after being detected in the course of a mission. In 
  this case the odds will likely be poor; an operative is almost 
  certain to be outnumbered, at least after a short time as 
  additional hostiles arrive, and may be outgunned. The goal 
  in this case is survival and escape; firing a weapon is likely a 
  poor option. Concentrating on driving or evading the enemy 
  is a better alternative, especially in the dark where a muzzle 
  flash will give their location away. Holding fire and slipping 
  away is likely to be a better option.
  Similar comments apply to personal combat with hand 
  weapons or when unarmed. If the operative has the choice 
  of whether or not to enter combat then they can strike 
  suddenly and unexpectedly. This is the key to success when 
  eliminating a sentry or snatching a target. If, on the other 
  hand, the operative is attacked, by hostiles trying to detain 
  him for example, then the goal is to instead facilitate escape 
  rather than defeat his opponents. 
  If an opponent can be downed or pushed into a place they 
  cannot quickly get out of, the operative has a chance to 
  escape. There may be little point in finishing off a guard 
  if others are on the way, although if the only person who 
  has seen which way the operative is headed can be killed 
  or rendered unconscious then this may be worthwhile as it 
  facilitates escape. 
  Even the most mundane-looking of 
  the servants of Our Other Enemy may 
  possess personal abilities beyond 
  the norm. It might seem like a well-
  placed bullet should suffice, but there have 
  been instances where this has not been the 
  case. Researching your target and getting a 
  firm concept of its abilities is even more 
  crucial than with a mundane direct action 
  mission.  -N
  In general, body blows that wind the target or kicks to 
  their knees can be useful in slowing pursuit and facilitating 
  escape, and may be a better option than trying for a knock-
  out punch. An operative who strikes bone with a closed fist 
  risks damaging their hand, which can subsequently make it 
  impossible to operate a weapon. Open-hand strikes are a far 
  better option.
  An operative should only have to engage in unarmed combat 
  when caught completely by surprise or when attempting 
  to abduct a target. At any other time they should be able 
  to procure a weapon of some kind. This may be purpose-
  built, such as a fighting knife, but could be any improvised 
  weapon. 
  using imProvised weaPons
  In Call of Cthulhu, use of improvised weapons generally falls under the Fighting 
  (Brawl) or Throw skills, depending on whether or not they are used hand-to-hand. 
  Some items are less suitable for weapons, as they are unwieldy, poorly balanced 
  or painful to hold (such as a hot poker); in such cases, the Keeper may assign a penalty 
  die to anyone using them.
  When it comes to determining the damage inflicted by improvised weapons, the table 
  on pg. 401 of the Call of Cthulhu rulebook has many examples that may be used as 
  inspiration. In general, small items will inflict 1D4 of damage, medium ones 1D6, and 
  large or heavy items 1D8. Sharp or pointed items may also impale.
  
  73
  Virtually any object can be used as a weapon. Kitchen knives 
  are an obvious choice but screwdrivers and most other stiff 
  and narrow objects can deliver a puncture wound. Blunt 
  implements such as hammers, bricks, typewriters and even 
  soup cans can all be used as weapons. 
  An operative who is caught unarmed can usually find a 
  weapon of some kind within seconds, if they apply a little 
  ingenuity. Unarmed combat skills can be used to acquire a 
  suitable weapon from a target with which to finish the job. 
  Failing all else, basic grappling skills can be used to cause 
  the opponent to fall, after which a quick stomp will put 
  them out of action.
  use of fIrearms
  Most of the time, an operative will be armed only with 
  a handgun – if they are armed at all. A handgun has the 
  advantages of being light and concealable, and can be 
  quickly brought to bear; but they do not penetrate cover 
  well and have a short accurate range. More importantly, 
  even with a two-handed shooting stance most people – even 
  highly trained people – cannot hit a distant target reliably 
  with a handgun. 
  Handguns are valuable mainly because they can be carried 
  where larger weapons cannot. They are not a good choice 
  for sustained combat or for fighting at even moderate range, 
  but are entirely capable of inflicting fatal injuries. A handgun 
  is well suited to close range assassination and any gunshot 
  will tend to slow pursuit. When a team is clearing an area 
  a handgun is a good choice of weapon for an operative 
  expected to be operating controls or opening doors.
  Quick and accurate handgun shooting is arguably the most 
  important combat skill learned by an operative as it is likely 
  to be the most readily available weapon. Operatives should 
  learn to operate a range of weapons; slight differences in 
  positioning of safety catches, magazine release and the like 
  can be critical when an enemy’s weapon is taken in the 
  middle of a desperate encounter.
  If serious combat seems likely, the operative should first 
  consider whether it is better to avoid it altogether. If not, 
  then a larger weapon is probably required. Submachine 
  guns are a reasonable compromise between handling and 
  firepower. They tend to be short and light enough to be 
  quickly brought to bear, and are well suited to operations in 
  buildings or vehicles. 
  Very small submachine guns are actually less accurate 
  than handguns as the recoil of their automatic fire disrupts 
  careful aiming. Larger and longer submachine guns are 
  more precise but also require more room to use. Very small 
  submachine guns (or machine pistols as they are sometimes 
  called) such as the Vz61 Skorpion are best suited to close-
  range assassination rather than sustained combat, whereas 
  larger weapons are useful in combat out to fairly long ranges.
  Submachine guns are a favourite weapon of bodyguards and 
  security forces. They are intimidating when displayed and 
  give the user the capability to lay down withering firepower 
  to cover extraction of the principal they are protecting or to 
  quickly down a threat. Submachine guns and shotguns are 
  the most likely ‘bigger guns’ encountered by an operative in 
  the course of a mission. 
  Many entities will shrug off fire from 
  handguns, and you may be tempted to 
  use heavier weapons. Those that can 
  ignore a pistol can usually be trusted 
  to ignore a rifle as well. Paradoxically, there 
  are credible reports of entities that can shake 
  off a bullet but are vulnerable to a blade. The 
  downside, of course, is that if you are close 
  enough to stab it, it likely has a host of nasty 
  appendages to tear you apart with. -N
  Yeah, cemetery creepers are said to be 
  immune to bullets, but a large enough 
  volume of fire will put one down. The 
  problem is, there is usually more than one. 
  Adding to this, the close confines of their habitats 
  makes volumes of fire tricky to produce. - Rodriquez
  A shotgun offers many of the advantages of a submachine 
  gun, and will often have superior knock-down power. 
  Whereas a submachine gun delivers a stream of bullets, 
  some of which might miss, a shotgun at close range delivers 
  all its pellets to the target at once. The result can instantly 
  disable an opponent and can also be used to destroy door 
  locks and hinges. However, shotguns poorly penetrate cover 
  and body armour, and are effective only at quite short range 
  as their pellets quickly lose their velocity. The large bore of 
  a shotgun is an excellent deterrent to violence or incentive 
  to cooperation.
  Rifles offer very good penetration and accuracy at range, 
  especially full-bore or ‘battle rifle’ calibre weapons such as 
  the 7.62x51mm FN FAL used by the British army. However, 
  such weapons are not easily concealed and are most likely to 
  be employed for sniping or overwatch as operatives carry out 
  a mission. Assault rifles are shorter and lighter, and usually 
  capable of fully automatic fire. This will quickly disable 
  P E R S O N A L  V I O L E N C E
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  74
  most targets at short range and can be used to suppress 
  enemies at greater distances by putting a lot of rounds close 
  to their position. 
  Firing a weapon ‘from the hip’ or one-handed whilst moving 
  is extremely inaccurate and virtually guarantees the firer 
  will miss. However, it may be that all is required is to force 
  the enemy to take cover whilst the operative retreats or 
  continues the mission. Operatives should be mindful of the 
  value of suppressive fire, and should be willing to expend 
  ammunition to keep enemies under cover when appropriate. 
  It is not always necessary to ‘win’ a gunfight; what matters 
  is completing the mission or evading capture.
  firing from the hiP
  Firing from the hip incurs a 
  penalty die to attack rolls, but 
  the attacker will be able to travel 
  their MOV rate x5 yards in a combat round. 
  This may also allow the attacker to lay 
  down suppressing fire (see pg. 126 of the 
  Call of Cthulhu rulebook). 
  steaLtH and ConCeaLment
  It is a well-proven concept that when attempting to avoid 
  detection, an operative should only move when necessary. 
  Movement makes noise and attracts the eye; more so when 
  that movement is rapid. The basic concept is ‘low and slow’, 
  making use of shadows and all available cover. 
  It is possible for an operative to move through fairly open 
  terrain without being detected if they possess some form of 
  camouflage; the less cover there is, the slower the operative 
  must move. Few people have the patience to do this under 
  the stress of field conditions, however; most personnel will 
  lose their nerve upon feeling exposed for too long and will 
  dash into cover. Similarly, the only way to avoid detection 
  when a dark scene is suddenly illuminated is to freeze in 
  place; movement will certainly be spotted, but whilst 
  remaining still is something of a gamble, it is the best of a 
  bad set of options.
  In rural terrain, military camouflage is useful for concealed 
  movement. Disruptive pattern clothing breaks up the shape 
  of the human body, though the head and face tend to attract 
  the eye. A shapeless soft hat and face veil of a sort used by 
  snipers will work well, and applying colouration to the face 
  to make it less obvious is also effective. If camouflage paints 
  are not available, mud will work. However, if the operative 
  is spotted whilst camouflaged then there is no chance to 
  provide a cover story. Camouflage will be recognised as 
  such, ensuring that the enemy knows that the operative is up 
  to no good. Less effective camouflage such as dark-coloured 
  civilian clothing is still useful for concealment and may be 
  explained away. Dark colours such as blue and green are 
  best; black is ‘too dark’ and tends to stand out from the 
  surroundings.
  In the urban terrain where most operations take place, rural 
  camouflage is generally inappropriate. If stealth is required, 
  then a combination of dark clothing, use of cover and 
  shadows, and waiting for observers to be distracted must 
  suffice. In general, if there are other people about and there 
  is some plausible reason for being in the area it is better to 
  use misdirection or deception than stealth; openly walking 
  around as if the operative has every right to be there might 
  avoid detection far better than skulking through the bushes.
  For operations where there is no plausible cover story, such 
  as entering the guarded compound of a prominent local 
  figure, there may be no alternative to stealth followed by 
  a ‘loud’ phase. Loud in this case typically means shooting 
  with unsuppressed firearms; in other words, the complete 
  abandonment of any pretence at stealth. Somewhere 
  between the stealthy and loud phases is a situation where 
  the operative takes actions that will eventually be discovered 
  and which cannot be taken as anything but hostile. 
  By way of example, shooting a guard with an unsuppressed 
  handgun is ‘loud’; eliminating him silently with a knife 
  is not, but it still changes the situation. The dead guard 
  will eventually be found (or at least noted as missing from 
  his post) and an alert will be sounded. It is not absolutely 
  certain that a mission will go loud from this point on, but it 
  is likely. Speed becomes more important than stealth at this 
  juncture, though it is usually possible to evade detection long 
  enough to break contact with guards or other hostiles. For 
  this reason operatives should not switch to a ‘loud mindset’ 
  but must be able to judge whether stealth or speed and 
  aggression are the best options at that particular moment – 
  and to act accordingly.
  In a situation where there is no plausible cover story and 
  the operative has to rely on stealth, it may seem that the 
  best option is to go in armed for battle. However, this is 
  not always the case. Guards who are not expecting an 
  attack may hesitate, or might choose to investigate rather 
  than shooting or sounding an alarm, if they are unsure of 
  what is happening. Someone blatantly marching across the 
  countryside with a rifle presents a fairly clear situation, 
  
  75
  whereas what appears to be a lost tourist may provoke a 
  different response – at least long enough for the operative 
  to deal with the situation. 
  There is always the possibility of people uninvolved with 
  the mission being alarmed at seeing armed personnel and 
  informing the local police. If at all possible the operative 
  should dress and act in a manner that creates ambiguity 
  about their intention and identity. A guard who would open 
  fire on an armed intruder might instead confront a group of 
  drunks wandering home and send them on their way with 
  a blow or two. This creates an opportunity to deal with the 
  situation without going loud.
  Unless a team of operatives has a reason to move and act like 
  a military force (for example, when armed and in a restricted 
  area) they should conceal their weapons and behave like 
  ordinary people. Movement that is too purposeful can 
  attract attention; too little chatter is surprisingly obvious. A 
  group that acts like it has a completely innocent reason for 
  being where it is might elicit a ’chase off’ response rather 
  than a hostile one – there are usually repercussions when 
  guards open fire and most are quite reluctant to do so.
  USE OF EXPLOSIVES 
  AND INCENDIARY DEVICES
  Explosives come in two basic types: low explosives and 
  high explosives. Low explosives (for example gunpowder) 
  explode relatively slowly and create a pushing effect that 
  is useful for moving rubble or demolishing light structures. 
  High explosives (such as TNT or various military explosives) 
  explode more quickly and have a cutting effect. Low 
  explosives push things around; high explosives pulverise 
  them. 
  Both types have their use on a mission, and operatives may 
  additionally find incendiary devices highly effective too. 
  Incendiaries cause fires or destroy materials by burning. 
  An explosion might cause a fire, but there is no guarantee. 
  Placing an incendiary device in a flammable building or near 
  materials will almost certainly cause it to catch fire and burn 
  fiercely.
  Fire is said to cleanse, but experience 
  has taught us that not all entities are 
  susceptible to such ministrations. Fire 
  does attract attention, usually of the 
  official kind, but the use of fire can bring a 
  horde of civilians running to the source. This 
  makes too many witnesses to easily disperse, 
  much less distract, misdirect or eliminate. -N
  Explosives have many applications, none of which are 
  particularly subtle. Where possible, operatives should use 
  pre-packed explosives of known quantity so that the effects 
  of an explosion can be predicted. Home-made or improvised 
  explosives are less reliable in terms of detonation and effect, 
  but can be useful if carefully used. 
  Explosives and incendiary devices can be used for anti-
  personnel or anti-materiel work, and for many such 
  applications a military grenade is an ideal package. There are 
  two common incendiary grenade types. White phosphorous 
  grenades burn on contact with air and throw fragments of 
  P E R S O N A L  V I O L E N C E
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  76
  burning phosphorous out to several feet away. These will set 
  most materials they touch alight and pose a severe threat to 
  nearby personnel. White phosphorous also produces a dense 
  cloud of smoke, but it is not a ‘smoke grenade’ as such.
  Thermite grenades are heavy but burn very hot; hot enough 
  to destroy an artillery piece if the grenade is placed in the 
  breech or dropped down the barrel. Thermite will set almost 
  anything alight and will even melt steel. Its anti-personnel 
  use is limited as it cannot be thrown far and does not project 
  burning material. However, thermite is an excellent means 
  of destroying even solid metal objects. 
  Many hand grenades are of a fragmentation type, which 
  have a small blast radius but fling pieces of sharp metal 
  (comprising the casing, plus notched wire wrapped around 
  the bursting charge) out to a considerable distance. This is 
  extremely dangerous to nearby personnel but has limited 
  blast effects; it may initiate other explosives but will probably 
  not do critical damage to structures. 
  Most high explosives require a fairly high initiation energy. 
  Heat is unlikely to be enough to set off an explosive, and 
  expedients such as shooting dynamite will not initiate it if it 
  is in good condition. A small explosion is the usual means 
  of initiation, typically provided by a blasting cap, which is in 
  turn set off by a timer or electrical impulse.
  Primers of this sort are usually produced from less-powerful 
  explosives that require less energy to detonate them. A 
  grenade or similar explosive device will also suffice, but this 
  has limitations in terms of how and when the detonation 
  occurs. Some high explosives, such as nitroglycerine, are 
  unstable and may detonate if struck hard.
  Low explosives such as gunpowder can usually be set off 
  by heat. A burning fuse may be enough to set off a powder 
  charge, which will then initiate more stable explosives 
  located next to it. Low explosives are also far easier to 
  improvise than more powerful ones. 
  Explosives and incendiary devices must be tailored to the 
  intended application. For anti-personnel work, any explosive 
  will create blast and heat which will endanger people 
  nearby. However, the behaviour of blast in built-up areas 
  is complex; blast is a shock wave of air pushed away from 
  the explosion and can be redirected or reflected by hard 
  surfaces, causing areas of increased destruction and other 
  places that are almost untouched. 
  To ensure maximum anti-personnel effect, explosives can 
  be packed with loose material that will be flung out when 
  the explosion occurs. This could take the form of a nail 
  bomb (an explosive device surrounded by nails or other 
  small heavy objects that will act as projectiles) or might be 
  improvised from local materials.
  stats for various exPlosives
  See the Appendices for more about 
  explosive devices and grenades.
  Destruction of objects such as a vehicle or piece of 
  machinery can be accomplished in many ways. A sizeable 
  internal explosion or incendiary device will cause at least 
  some damage to most objects and vehicles; a thermite 
  grenade placed on the engine deck of a tank will burn right 
  through the engine and wreck the vehicle. Similar mayhem 
  will be caused to any other machinery attacked in this 
  manner. Ideally, a high explosive ‘cutting’ charge should be 
  placed at a critical point to cripple or destroy machinery; 
  low explosives might simply cause distortion and minor 
  damage to heavy machinery.
  For the demolition of structures, it is necessary to place 
  charges quite precisely. Steel and concrete supports can be cut 
  with high explosives using a fairly small charge provided it is 
  correctly placed. Low explosives may merely push some parts 
  of the structure, around which may not be enough to collapse 
  it; though a weakened bridge or other structure might still be 
  denied to the enemy until major repairs are undertaken.
  Even if use of explosives is peripheral to a mission, such 
  as blowing something up to cause a diversion, then it is 
  still critical that the demolition succeeds. If a gate must 
  be blasted open to allow access or exfiltration then failure 
  will compromise the mission. The only time demolition can 
  be considered non-critical is when operatives engage in 
  additional sabotage or destruction on an opportunistic basis. 
  This is useful under some circumstances but should not be 
  permitted to interfere with the primary mission. 
  It is important that explosives are handled by an operative 
  trained in their use. Mines, grenades and the like can be 
  employed by anyone who knows how to emplace them, 
  but setting a charge requires calculations that are beyond 
  the capabilities of untrained operatives. Only in the most 
  desperate circumstances should an untrained operative take 
  a best guess and go for it. In such situations it is important 
  to err on the side of massive overkill; failed demolition at 
  three points is worth a lot less than one extravagant piece 
  of destruction. 
  
  77
  The only good kill is overkill, make sure 
  you did the job right and you won’t have 
  to do it again. - Miller
  handling demolition tasks
  Not all intelligence personnel are 
  trained in the use of explosives, but 
  many quick-and-dirty demolitions 
  do not require much skill. Anyone can drop 
  a thermite grenade into a tank or stick 
  a limpet mine on the side of a ship. 
  The question in this case is not usually 
  one of success or failure, but degree of 
  success; a badly placed limpet mine might 
  not sink a ship, but it will certainly 
  cause some damage provided it does not 
  fall off. Most intelligence personnel are 
  smart enough to be shown how to ensure 
  this does not happen.
  Complex demolitions such as bringing 
  down a bridge or derailing a train 
  in motion require the attentions of 
  a skilled operative and can take some 
  time. Calculating stress points and 
  charge sizes is not the stuff of exciting 
  adventures, so a demolition of this sort 
  is best used as a matter of plot. The 
  time required to set up the explosives is 
  a ‘clock’; the site must be kept clear 
  of interference for this time. Just 
  getting to the demolition site can also 
  be an adventure, requiring removal of 
  obstacles, elimination of guards and the 
  like. 
  Skill rolls may still be required to 
  ensure the demolition goes as planned, but 
  for the most part the actual demolition 
  work can be fairly routine. Facilitating 
  it is the stuff of adventure.
  SILENT KILLING
  The key to any sort of silent killing is surprise. An opponent 
  who cries out or kicks things over will likely attract attention, 
  and an enemy who discharges a weapon will certainly do so. 
  Efficiency is vital; the longer a kill takes the more likely 
  noise becomes. Generally a close approach is required, 
  using stealth or deception. Infiltration might be assisted by 
  sniper cover using a suppressed weapon, but this still makes 
  a fair amount of noise and is only useful in a situation where 
  there is already a fair amount of sound to cover the shots. 
  A silent killing technique must cause the target to die, or be 
  rendered incapable of speech and action, in a short time. For 
  this reason firearms, even extremely quiet ones, are chancy. 
  At very close range a headshot or a round into the heart 
  will cause near-instantaneous disablement, but even a slight 
  variation in the aim point can permit the target to raise the 
  alarm or even begin fighting back. 
  Techniques that would be useful for an assassination, such 
  as shooting repeatedly into the abdomen, kidneys or liver 
  to cause fatal blood loss, or the lungs to prevent breathing, 
  may take too long to be effective as silent kills. 
  Firearms must be used very precisely if at all. It is tempting to 
  consider a gun as the easy method compared with sneaking 
  close enough to use a knife, but to be certain of a silent kill a 
  gunman must be close enough that a knife becomes a viable 
  option. It must also be reiterated that there is no such thing 
  as a completely silent firearm. Even the very best make at 
  least a little noise; most suppressed guns simply make less 
  noise than an unsuppressed one, not no noise. 
  Some fairly crude methods are entirely workable. A heavy 
  blow to the back of the skull with a blunt instrument will 
  usually cause immediate unconsciousness, and even if it 
  does not it should render the target vulnerable to a finishing 
  move. A blow heavy enough to crack the skull will often 
  cause death, though not necessarily instantly. 
  Thus, clubbing an opponent over the head is a reasonably 
  effective method of facilitating a quick kill or disablement, 
  though it does impose the risk of the target falling hard and 
  causing secondary noise. A blow from behind is best; even 
  someone caught by surprise may be able to defend against 
  one from within his field of vision, and it is rather hard to 
  disguise this action.
  Sharp, pointed implements are far more effective. A blow 
  almost anywhere other than the head is survivable and 
  will usually produce a lot of noise from the target. Death 
  can be caused most quickly by cutting the major arteries; 
  specifically the inside of the thigh, the inside of the upper 
  arm, the neck and the torso behind the collar bone. The latter 
  requires a downward stabbing motion which was perfected 
  by wartime commando trainers and used effectively in many 
  theatres. A stab from behind into the kidney area can also 
  cause rapid disablement and death.
  P E R S O N A L  V I O L E N C E
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  78
  It wasn’t human. I found that out when I 
  slipped the garrotte around its neck and 
  pulled it in tight. No carotids, maybe. 
  So I kept hold and used my knife on its 
  kidney. No kidneys of course. After that, things 
  got a bit hectic… - Miller
  The key in all these cases is to keep the target quiet; in terms of 
  vocal noise, dropped items and knocking objects over – until 
  they are dead or unconscious. This can take many seconds, so 
  the usual method is to grab the target from behind, placing a 
  hand over the mouth before delivering the fatal knife stroke. 
  It is possible to cut the vocal chords, usually by a thrust into 
  the neck from the side and then pulling the knife to cut. 
  However, this takes precision and will be accompanied by a 
  great deal of blood loss. It is impossible to avoid being stained 
  by blood when attempting this manoeuvre.
  sPot rules for silent kills
  Mechanically, silent kills can be 
  treated as a special application 
  of the Striking the First Blow 
  (Surprise) rules found on pg. 106 of 
  the Call of Cthulhu rulebook. The main 
  difference is the requirement that the 
  strike be silent; this may be handled 
  by using a combined Fighting (Brawl) and 
  Stealth roll for the attack.
  Strangulation, whether with a garrotte, clothing or by 
  manual means, is an effective and surprisingly quick method 
  of killing. Closing off the windpipe makes it difficult for the 
  target to breathe or call out but can take an extended time 
  to render them unconscious. Instead, what is necessary is to 
  compress the carotid arteries that supply oxygenated blood 
  to the brain. These are at the sides of the neck and are 
  best compressed by an arm around the neck from behind. 
  Squeezing with the hands is much less effective and is 
  relatively easy to dislodge. 
  The ‘Judo strangle’ or ‘rear naked choke’ taught by military 
  instructors is highly effective for silent killing. One forearm 
  goes around the neck of the opponent from behind, with 
  the strangle locked in with the other arm. It is applied by 
  pushing the opponent’s head forward, essentially closing 
  off the neck by compressing the operative’s arm and the 
  opponent’s neck into the same space. If applied fast and 
  hard a strangle of this sort can produce unconsciousness in 
  7-10 seconds and will kill soon afterwards.
  A similar effect can be achieved with a rope or garrotte 
  pulled around the neck, though it must be tight. If blood 
  flow to the brain is reduced to an insufficient degree the 
  target will be able to struggle and perhaps escape. To avoid 
  this, the target should be pulled in close and held tightly to 
  prevent escape or countermeasures. 
  In short, the key to close-quarters silent killing is to get the 
  target under control and keep them like that until they are 
  dead.
  sPot rules for Chokeholds
  If 
  an 
  investigator 
  has 
  been 
  trained in the use of chokeholds, 
  the Keeper may allow him or her 
  to attempt to take down an opponent in 
  a single round. This involves performing 
  a combat manoeuvre with an extra penalty 
  die, to reflect the difficulty of 
  targeting the carotid artery. If the 
  attack is successful, the target must 
  pass a Hard CON roll or fall unconscious 
  for 1D6 rounds.
  [
  
  79
  ASSASSINATION TECHNIQUES
  Assassination differs from silent killing in that the primary 
  goal is the death of the target. Obviously, there are times 
  where an assassination must be performed silently, but when 
  this is unnecessary there are various methods available. It is 
  worth noting that if an assassination attempt fails, further 
  opportunities are unlikely if the target or their security detail 
  realise that an attempt has been made. Highly overt methods 
  are somewhat all-or-nothing, whereas it may be possible to 
  use a subtler method with a lesser chance of alerting the 
  target if it fails.
  sHoot to kILL
  The simplest method of assassination is to shoot the target 
  with a firearm. In theory, any gunshot wound can kill, so 
  conventional wisdom suggests that a large-calibre rifle bullet 
  might be the most efficient method. However, as distance 
  increases so too do the variables. A long-range shot has only 
  to be slightly off to be non-fatal or even to miss entirely. 
  Ideally a circumstances must be created such that the target 
  is stationary at a known point and therefore relatively easy 
  to hit. A skilled spotter should be employed to observe the 
  effects of a hit or to correct misses if there is time.
  A well-operated cell rarely attracts police 
  interest and thus its leaders are not under 
  investigation. This makes their sudden 
  murder noteworthy, especially if they 
  are believed to be upstanding members of their 
  community. Remember that you need to maintain 
  deniability. A few extra unaffiliated corpses may 
  very well throw off the hounds.- Miller>
  The fundamental rule for firearms assassination is that 
  close range increases the chance of success – but also the 
  difficulty of obtaining the shot and escaping afterwards. If it 
  is possible to shoot and disable the target then close in and 
  deliver a coup de grace then this is an effective method. The 
  next best thing is to shoot the target multiple times. A target 
  that is not instantly killed may be saved by prompt medical 
  attention; a group of shots not only increases the chance 
  of an instant kill by striking a vital organ but also makes 
  treating a non-fatal shooting more difficult. 
  Thus a small-calibre handgun or rapid-fire submachine 
  gun may be the best choice for close range assassination. 
  A group of small-calibre wounds close together are much 
  more difficult to treat than a single larger-calibre one or a 
  dispersed group. The low recoil of a small-calibre weapon 
  will not move the aim point around much, ensuring accuracy 
  and tight grouping. One technique for weapons of this sort 
  is rather unappetisingly called ‘zippering’. A series of shots 
  is ‘walked’ up the abdomen of the target so that they create 
  a wide wound zone. This makes bleeding very difficult to 
  control and virtually ensures death even if medical attention 
  is swiftly received.
  Zippering, yeah, try and zipper something 
  made of living flame and see where that 
  gets you. Better still, zipper the bastard 
  who called it, those who work for him and 
  anyone who saw it. - Rodriquez
  Zippering requires a weapon capable of multiple rapid shots, 
  such as a semi-automatic pistol or a small-calibre revolver. 
  A machine pistol, or a handgun capable of automatic fire, 
  will serve admirably but may attract unwelcome attention. 
  At longer ranges a similar effect can be achieved by using 
  a larger submachine gun or an assault rifle. Dumping an 
  entire magazine into the target is known in some quarters as 
  a ‘fast kill’ and, whilst hardly elegant, it virtually guarantees 
  rapid death. 
  sILenCe and surprIse
  The key here is to get close to the target and deliver the 
  attack by surprise. Ideally the victim will know nothing of 
  the threat until he is hit, though often there is no option but 
  to deploy the weapon as the operative approaches which may 
  alert guards or the target himself. It is the operative’s ability 
  to put themselves in position using stealth or deception 
  that dictates the success or otherwise of the assassination 
  attempt; skill with the weapon and the characteristics of the 
  weapon itself are of lesser importance at close range. 
  A ‘silent’ weapon such as the Welrod pistol or the De Lisle 
  carbine (both were used during World War Two but remain 
  available) offers the advantage of not alerting guards or 
  nearby non-combatants. It may be possible to kill the target 
  whilst nobody is looking then move off before the alarm 
  is raised. Weapons of this sort do not shoot quickly, but a 
  target that is disabled by the first shot can be finished off 
  with a second. It is sometimes more effective to shoot to 
  disable with the first round, then to kill with the second 
  – but only if there is little chance of guards being alerted. 
  It should however be noted that even ‘silent’ weapons are not 
  without noise. A so-called ’silencer’ (whether manufactured 
  or improvised) fitted to a pistol or a submachine gun will 
  greatly reduce the sound it makes but the shot will still 
  be audible over a short distance. It may not be recognised 
  as such, however, nor noticed through a wall or over 
  background noise. It is also notable that working a pistol 
  P E R S O N A L  V I O L E N C E
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  80
  slide or the bolt of a larger weapon creates a distinctive 
  sound that can seem surprisingly loud when there is no 
  other noise; in the dead of night, for example.
  Steuben has been compromised. Take 
  all necessary action. -N
  If there is time for only one shot, then it must be perfectly 
  placed to kill the target. This is often the case when using a 
  sniper rifle or similar weapon, or with a weapon such as a 
  pistol cartridge disguised in a lipstick container, a pen or a 
  similar item.  These are one-shot weapons, and while they 
  are sometimes reloadable, the chance for assassination will 
  be long gone by this time. These weapons must be used by 
  surprise, either by stealth or distraction. 
  One potential drawback to such methods is their precision. 
  A target that has been killed in their office by a close-
  range pistol shot suggests the actions of a skilled assassin; 
  this may draw a determined response. It may sometimes 
  be beneficial to make an assassination seem like the work 
  of local criminals, political or business rivals, or perhaps 
  someone the victim has offended in a serious manner. 
  mobILe targets
  It is relatively easy to secure a building by first checking it 
  for explosives and hostiles and then flooding the grounds 
  with guards, but high levels of security are less simple to 
  maintain when the target is on the move. 
  Crowds offer an excellent opportunity to get close to the 
  target, and random foot traffic in a public place offers a 
  chance to blend in with background activity. There are 
  many distractions in public, all of which can weaken a 
  target’s security their his own situational awareness. The 
  random actions of people going about their business will 
  often provide an opportunity for the assassin to approach 
  the target even if the situation has not been manipulated to 
  create one.
  Similarly, 
  vehicles 
  present 
  many 
  opportunities 
  for 
  assassination. A vehicle can be rigged to malfunction 
  or explode, though this first requires access to it. Such 
  tampering can be detected by a security detail or an alert 
  target, and is not always reliable. 
  Rigging a vehicle to malfunction is an uncertain method of 
  assassination. A common method is to cause the brakes to 
  fail, which has the added advantage of not being obviously 
  assassination. However, brake failure can be survivable or 
  the target may be extricated from the situation by skilful 
  driving. It is more difficult to tamper with steering or other 
  vital vehicle functions.
  A simple bomb wired into the ignition can be effective, 
  but it can be triggered by the wrong person starting the 
  vehicle. Command detonation is more assured, and offers 
  two different methods of attack. The first is a bomb in the 
  vehicle itself, which is detonated at a time of the operator’s 
  choosing. This requires access to the vehicle, and the end 
  result is overt. 
  Equally obvious is the emplaced device, which is detonated 
  when the target vehicle is within range of the bomb. 
  An emplaced device is only useful if the target’s route is 
  known; it is standard practice among bodyguard details to 
  vary routes wherever possible and to maintain security about 
  timing and route to be taken. This can make an emplaced 
  bomb impractical. 
  The timing of a detonation is critical; even a small error can 
  make an emplaced bomb survivable. One option is to use 
  the target vehicle as a trigger, either when it comes into 
  direct contact with the device or by timing its passage from 
  a known point to the detonation site. Alternatively, if the 
  target’s escort vehicle always maintains an exact spacing, 
  the escort can be used as a trigger. 
  Explosives can be used against a vehicle in other ways. An 
  anti-tank rocket will obliterate most civilian vehicles, leaving 
  no survivors. Alternatively, it may be possible to throw an 
  explosive or incendiary device, or even a grenade, into the 
  vehicle. Open-topped cars are most readily attacked in this 
  manner. 
  A vehicle can be attacked with firearms. Something as 
  simple as killing the driver can cause a fatal crash, though if 
  it is possible to shoot the occupants of a vehicle then it will 
  be more effective to engage the target directly. Getting a 
  precise shot on a moving target is difficult, especially when 
  firing from a moving vehicle too. Automatic weapons are 
  most useful for such attacks; rifles are preferable as they 
  have greater penetration than submachine guns; the frame 
  of a car offers only a little protection to the occupants but 
  sometimes is sufficient to impair lighter calibres.
  Riddling the passenger compartment with automatic gunfire 
  is crude but effective. It may also be useful to shoot out 
  tyres, thereby causing loss of control. A crash may finish 
  off wounded occupants and will certainly immobilise the 
  vehicle, allowing a more precise finish to the attack or at 
  least preventing the occupants from reaching assistance. 
  
  81
  Similar considerations apply to aircraft and watercraft, with 
  the added comment that both operate in an environment 
  that can be hostile to human life. An aircraft that suffers a 
  mechanical failure in flight can kill its occupants either by 
  crashing or indirectly by stranding them in a remote area. A 
  crash can be made to seem accidental, especially if weather 
  conditions are already poor. 
  Similarly, boats do meet with disaster from time to time. If 
  a wreck is not found then it may be impossible to prove that 
  the disappearance was the result of foul play. There may 
  also be doubt as to whether the target has been snatched, 
  has defected or has simply been lost at sea.
  As a general rule it is easier to assassinate a target away from 
  official functions and workplace. Not only is the mindset of 
  the target different when on ‘home’ territory or when away 
  from work, but they are more likely to move freely and 
  present opportunities that might otherwise be lacking. There 
  is also the consideration that the places an official is likely to 
  go on duty will have their own security measures in place. An 
  assassination is best carried out somewhere that the operative 
  will have only to contend with one set of security measures.
  POISONS AND OTHER CHEMICALS
  Chemical substances have a variety of uses in intelligence 
  work, not all of them violent in intent.  
  Drugs, poisons and other agents need to get into the victim’s 
  bloodstream in order to work, and this occurs in four main 
  ways:
  •	
  Ingested agents must enter the body through the 
  digestive system, i.e. they must be eaten or drunk. 
  handling assassination attemPts
  If an assassination attempt is made in a manner that is covered by the standard 
  combat rules, then these can be used as normal. For example, if an operative 
  attempts a drive-by shooting with a submachine gun then this is a fairly typical 
  combat situation. 
  To be considered a special case an assassination attempt must come as a surprise to 
  the target; the character must approach undetected or unsuspected and make the initial 
  attack by surprise. This requires the use of other skills to deceive the target into 
  not suspecting the assassin or causing them to fail to notice that he is there at all. 
  The actual attack will come at the end of a series of other actions required to facilitate 
  it, and this may not be simple. It may be that a would-be assassin will jump through 
  all manner of hoops to reach the target, only to find that they are at least partially 
  alerted. In this case, the assassination attempt becomes regular combat. Players who get 
  it right will find that a successful assassination is almost an anticlimax. Those who 
  bull their way through may well fail completely.
  Note that for an assassination attempt to take place, it is not necessary that the target 
  be completely oblivious. For example, a false threat might cause the target to seek the 
  safety of their vehicle, not realising that the ‘bodyguard’ holding the door open is 
  the actual assassin. Although agitated and alerted, the target might still be taken by 
  surprise by this unexpected threat. Similarly, a target who is looking towards a known 
  threat can still be assassinated by someone who sneaks up behind them or shoots them in 
  the back. In short, to be considered an assassination attempt the situation must deprive 
  the target of any chance to make meaningful resistance or evasion during the initial 
  attempt to kill them.
  See pg. 137 of World War Cthulhu: Cold War for game mechanics covering assassination 
  attempts.
  P E R S O N A L  V I O L E N C E
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  82
  •	
  Injected agents can be delivered by hypodermic 
  needle. They can also be injected by other means, 
  such as the fangs of a snake. It is not necessary for 
  the injection to be neat and tidy; any method that 
  breaks the skin will work, such as stabbing the target 
  with a blunt pen whose nib contains a pellet of the 
  agent. However, the aim is to get the agent into the 
  bloodstream so that the target’s own body functions 
  carry it to his vital organs. Injection into a vein is most 
  effective, whereas merely crushing the agent into an 
  area of mangled skin might not be.
  Inhaled agents generally take the form of a vapour but can 
  be a toxic gas such as chlorine. Some gases are not actually 
  harmful so much as they do not support respiration. 
  An opponent can be effectively drowned in carbon dioxide; 
  they will not suffer any harm from the carbon dioxide itself, 
  but will still die from lack of oxygen. Chlorine and other 
  gases have additional harmful effects, such as causing 
  blistering of the skin or lungs.
  Contact agents can pose a hazard if they touch any bare 
  skin. Many are more effective if they can come into contact 
  with mucous membranes such as the eyes and mouth, and 
  even more so if breathed in. 
  Poisons are rarely of use against Our 
  Other Enemy, and their use against 
  their servants is not recommended. A 
  poisoned target is likely to end up in a 
  hospital before they end up dead, either taken 
  there by an accomplice or a bystander. Even 
  if the target is left alone to die, poisoning is 
  likely to bring official interest, something we 
  cannot afford. Considering the lengths needed 
  to effectively poison someone and the risks 
  entailed, more direct means are desirable. -N
  Protection against different agents depends upon their mode 
  of use. Ingested agents require food or drink to be consumed 
  injected agents must be conveyed to the bloodstream by 
  a penetrating injury or a needle. Avoiding intoxication by 
  handling drugs, Poisons, toxins
  We roughly subdivide chemicals into drugs, poisons and toxins depending on their 
  general effects. Medical textbooks may use a different set of definitions, but 
  these will suffice for running a game of World War Cthulhu.
  For our purposes, a POISON is any substance that is likely to cause severe harmful 
  effects to the target if it is introduced. These effects include death or physical 
  damage of a sort that can be modelled with the combat rules. 
  A TOXIN in this context is a substance that causes some other harmful effect such as 
  temporary reduction in characteristics or skills. 
  All other substances that can affect a character are termed DRUGS for our purposes. Drugs 
  include chemicals such as sodium pentathol, which is often used during interrogation;I 
  it does not cause harm to the target (or at least, that is not its main purpose), and so 
  is not considered a poison or toxin. Most drugs can kill if administered in excessive 
  doses or when combined with other chemicals, but are still considered drugs rather than 
  poisons unless harming the target is the primary purpose.
  We use the term AGENT as a catch-all in this context for any drug, toxin or poison that 
  might be used by or against operatives. Agents can take many forms but are typically a 
  gas, liquid or pill. In order to deliberately introduce an agent into someone’s body 
  it must be produced or converted into some form that permits this. For example, some 
  poisons can be dissolved in liquid for delivery. It would be quite difficult to get an 
  enemy operative to eat a packet of sedative powder, but dissolved in a glass of wine it 
  becomes somewhat easier to deliver.
  
  83
  these agents is a matter of being careful with what food and 
  drink is accepted and maintaining good personal security. 
  The most likely scenario for an operative to be injected 
  with a chemical agent is after capture, through it could 
  occur in a situation where they have let their guard down 
  inappropriately.
  Contact and inhaled agents are defeated by avoiding contact 
  with the agent or preventing it from coming into contact 
  with respiratory surfaces. A purely respiratory agent can be 
  defeated by a respirator or other breathing device, though 
  many (such as tear gas) can affect the victim by contact 
  with mucous membranes in the eyes. Nerve gases can be 
  defeated only by complete impermeable coverage of the 
  body (in an NBC suit) and a gas mask or similar device 
  sealed to the suit. However, partial protection is possible by 
  covering as much skin as possible and breathing through a 
  cloth or filter. This will not work in the middle of a gas cloud 
  but where the agent is somewhat dispersed these measures 
  will give the operative a chance of survival.
  Ultimately, whether or not the victim is affected by an agent 
  depends on the severity of intoxication and their natural 
  resistance. If an agent is kept completely ‘out’ of the target, 
  such as when an attempt to inject them fails, then they 
  cannot be affected at all. If they are exposed to the agent, 
  they may still resist its effects. Note that not all agents have 
  an immediate effect. Some cause secondary effects that can 
  take hours or even days to become apparent. 
  types of drugs, 
  poIsons and patHogens
  There are a great many agents that an operative might be 
  exposed to. Most are chemically derived, but some of those 
  below are of a biological nature. This section also contains 
  some notes on radiation and fallout which may be relevant 
  to certain situations. 
  damage and other effeCts from ChemiCal agents
  The effects of most toxins can be modelled using the rules found on pg. 129 of the 
  Call of Cthulhu rulebook. In these cases, the toxin causes damage that is healed 
  as normal. Indeed, some agents (snake venom, for example) cause physical damage 
  to the area around the site of intoxication. Some poisons are instantly fatal, and may 
  or may not have other effects if the victim survives. For example, someone who resists 
  a potentially fatal toxin may suffer from blurred vision, headache and nausea for some 
  time afterwards, or may take physical damage that could end up being fatal in its own 
  right. Other agents have different effects which may not be directly fatal but which can 
  impair an investigator to the point where they are taken out by some secondary cause.
  Depending on circumstances, the Keeper may wish to call for CON rolls from poisoned 
  investigators to determine how badly incapacitated they are by pain, delirium or 
  paralysis; failure could lead to all rolls being made at a higher level of difficulty 
  (Regular becomes Hard, Hard becomes Extreme), or with a penalty die if opposed, until 
  the investigator receives an antidote or medical help. This is especially appropriate 
  for psychoactive agents or soporifics that may not inflict physical damage.
  P E R S O N A L  V I O L E N C E
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  84
  Bacterial Agents make use of bacteria that grow and multiply 
  in the host. Effects vary considerably, and although many 
  agents are resistant to antibiotics some specialist treatments 
  do exist. Bacterial agents can be difficult to weaponise; in 
  other ways, whilst it is easy to culture the deadly bacteria, 
  creating reliable means of delivery is a problem. 
  The most well-known bacterial agent is anthrax, which 
  causes flu-like symptoms that can (but do not always) kill if 
  spores are inhaled. Like most bacterial agents, anthrax has an 
  incubation period before symptoms present themselves (1-6 
  days in this case). Respiratory and skin contact protection 
  are both required to avoid infection.
  Biological Toxins are similar to chemical toxins except that 
  they are derived more or less directly from living organisms. 
  The toxins are not alive and cannot be transmitted, but in 
  some cases the organism creating them can. 
  Examples include botulinum (which causes respiratory 
  failure some 36 hours after an incubation period of 24-26 
  hours) and aflatoxin, which is a toxin derived from fungi. 
  Aflatoxin causes rapid kidney failure and death, and can be 
  passed on to others who come into contact with fluids from 
  the victim. Ricin is of particular interest to the intelligence 
  community since it can be delivered by almost any means. 
  After ingestion or inhalation it incubates for 12-24 hours 
  before causing death after another 36-72 hours. Ricin 
  poisoning produces symptoms that can easily be mistaken 
  for a viral infection.
  Blister Agents cause coughing and respiratory distress 
  in addition to severe irritation of the eyes. Many, such as 
  lewisite and mustard gas, also create what appear to be 
  corrosive burns on the skin. These do not usually appear 
  for some hours after exposure, and can occur when moving 
  through a contaminated area even though no other effects 
  have been noted – contamination is quite persistent. Blister 
  agents are simple to manufacture and may be encountered 
  when operating in remote Third World countries where 
  enforcement of international treaties is unheard of. NBC 
  suiting will prevent skin effects, whilst respiratory protection 
  is required when the agent is present in gas form. 
  Blood Agents include cyanide and prevent absorption 
  of oxygen into the blood. Low doses manifest symptoms 
  within an hour or two of exposure, including deep and rapid 
  breathing, dizziness and similar symptoms of deoxygenation. 
  Higher doses cause rapid unconsciousness and death. 
  Exposure is usually by inhalation, but intoxication can take 
  place by way of cuts in the skin. Cyanide pills are often used 
  as suicide devices. 
  Chemical Incapacitants, including mace, pepper spray and 
  tear gas, irritate the airways and mucous membranes of the 
  eyes and nose. This causes coughing, eye irritation and vomiting 
  in most targets, and can be fatal in very high concentrations. 
  Contact with the irritant is enough to produce an effect, 
  whilst breathing it has the greatest impact. Partial protection 
  is possible with nothing more than a cloth held over the mouth 
  and nose, especially where the agent is highly dispersed.
  Choking Agents include gases such as phosgene and 
  chlorine, which damage the respiratory tract. Onset of 
  symptoms may be slow, taking anything from 30 minutes to 
  more than 24 hours. Death occurs as a result of fluid build-
  up in the lungs. Exposure can be prevented by respiratory 
  protection such as a gas mask.
  Nerve Agents include various ‘nerve gases’ such as 
  sarin, soman and tabun. These are formed by a liquid that 
  evaporates to create a lethal gas. Minor doses can be non-
  fatal, though sometimes still cause long-term effects. Mildly 
  intoxicated casualties are often disorientated and have 
  difficulty in thinking clearly. Fatal doses result in convulsions 
  and respiratory failure. Skin contact can be fatal but requires 
  a stronger dose than inhalation; the only sure protection is 
  full NBC suiting followed by proper decontamination. 
  Plagues sometimes forms the basis of a biological weapon, 
  but can also be a natural threat in some regions. Plagues are 
  bacterial in nature and are hard to control once released; 
  this makes their use by most nations somewhat unlikely, 
  although some terrorist groups might consider their use. 
  Bubonic plague, which caused the Black Death, is difficult to 
  weaponised but it believed that the Soviet Union may have 
  done so. A pneumonic form of plague can be dispersed by 
  aerosol and represents a greater threat, although exposure 
  to sunlight will kill it in a few hours. This form of plague 
  has an incubation period of 2-3 days followed by high fever 
  leading to death from respiratory and circulatory collapse. 
  Infection can be avoided by normal medical protection: 
  gowns, masks and gloves, or the equivalent.
  Psychoactive Agents range from gases such as BZ to 
  chemicals such as LSD. BZ can be delivered in gas form 
  – BZ gas grenades exist – and can incapacitate targets 
  through confusion, hallucinations or stupor. Side-effects can 
  continue for weeks after exposure. Respiratory protection is 
  necessary. Chemicals such as LSD have no military value as 
  they are hard to weaponised – delivery is usually by ingestion 
  or injection – but can be useful in interrogation. Threats 
  have been made by various nations to use psychoactive 
  chemicals against military or civilian targets, but no known 
  attacks have occurred.
  
  85
  Soporifics come in various forms including gases, vapours 
  and ingested chemicals. The latter may be a pill or 
  ‘knockout drop’, or a powder that can be dissolved in liquid. 
  Ether or chloroform vapour will also render the victim 
  unconscious. An excessive dose of any soporific can be 
  fatal. Some chemicals do not render the victim unconscious 
  but can cause a tranquil state in which the subject does 
  not care about discomfort or even pain, and is often highly 
  suggestible. It is usually obvious that the subject is under the 
  influence of tranquillisers of this sort; at the very least they 
  will behave strangely and may seem drunk or high.
  Viral Agents are essentially normal viral diseases employed 
  as a weapon. Like bacterial agents and plagues, they are 
  difficult to control once released and can mutate, making 
  their use as a weapon inadvisable. Protection against viral 
  agents is the same as for other diseases; contact should 
  be avoided with infected people or animals. However, 
  the incubation period of vital diseases may allow infected 
  persons to contact many potential victims.
  Examples of viral agents include Ebola and other viral 
  haemorrhagic fevers, many of which are not carried by 
  humans. Infection must be by contact with an infected 
  animal or deliberate means, but once infected a person can 
  pass on the virus by contact with blood and body fluids. The 
  most serious viral threat is smallpox, which has an incubation 
  period of 10-17 days and about 30% fatal thereafter. Natural 
  outbreaks of smallpox still occur from time to time, but the 
  disease is all but eradicated in the natural world. It is highly 
  transmissible, and would make a potent if indiscriminate 
  biological weapon. 
  Radiation and Radioactivity are neither chemical nor 
  biological threats, but are similar in some ways, especially 
  since many radioactive materials are also highly toxic. There 
  are two primary threats from radioactivity. The first is direct 
  exposure to intense radiation in the form of gamma rays. 
  These penetrate flesh and most other materials. A radiation 
  suit offers a little protection but it is not possible to enter a 
  high-radiation area without being contaminated. The body 
  can withstand a certain amount of radiation without coming 
  to harm, and more with only mild or long-term effects. 
  Severe radiation poisoning is fatal and untreatable. The only 
  sure protection is thick earth or metal.
  The second threat from radioactivity comes from exposure 
  to radioactive materials emitting alpha and beta radiation. 
  These are short-ranged and easily blocked by thin metal or 
  even paper, but highly damaging, especially if inhaled or 
  ingested. 
  An NBC suit or similar protection will prevent most effects if 
  suitably decontaminated; in the case of moderate exposure 
  the threat can be greatly reduced by disposing of clothing 
  and washing all dust or other material off the skin. It is 
  imperative to avoid breathing or eating food contaminated 
  by radioactive material, such as fallout from a nuclear 
  explosion. 
  DISPOSING OF BODIES 
  AND OTHER EVIDENCE
  Operatives who leave evidence of their activities lying 
  around are likely to be discovered, especially if that evidence 
  consists of human corpses. There are times, for example 
  during a ‘fast and quiet’ entry to a locale, when guards must 
  be dropped where they are found and left there. This is 
  particularly true where a guard in an inaccessible place is 
  shot by a sniper to clear the way for an entry team. However, 
  wherever possible any and all evidence of an operative’s 
  activities should be concealed or removed entirely. 
  a note aBout ChemiCal and BiologiCal weaPons
  Dying of plague or anthrax is hardly the stuff of fun gaming sessions. We do 
  suggest that the information given here be used as part of the background rather 
  than a new and not very exciting way to kill off investigators. A biological or 
  chemical threat might be part of the backdrop to a mission or a complication to one; for 
  example, having to operate in a contaminated area. 
  That said, we have included information on these threats for the Keeper to make whatever 
  use of they see fit. If investigators ignore the warnings then maybe they will die of 
  a perfectly mundane haemorrhagic fever instead of the arcane horrors they are battling. 
  Nobody said the job was safe…
  P E R S O N A L  V I O L E N C E
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  86
  In the longer term, evidence such as cartridge cases left at an 
  operational locale can lead the enemy’s intelligence services 
  to the operative. Basic errors like failing to remove wrappers 
  and half-eaten food from a location used for surveillance 
  can give the enemy good information to go on. Clean-up of 
  all operational locales should be a habit for all operatives. 
  This includes removing fingerprints from any items touched 
  and disposing of any rubbish such as papers, food wrappers 
  and the like in a manner that ensures they will not be found, 
  or at least so as to be of no use to the enemy.
  Cleaning uP oPerational loCales
  If there is a chance that a 
  location used by the investigators 
  will come under scrutiny by the 
  police, 
  counterintelligence 
  services 
  or other interested professionals, the 
  Keeper should have one member of the team 
  make a combined Stealth and Tradecraft 
  roll. Failure could mean that the team 
  have left suspicious traces, and a 
  fumble or failed pushed roll that they 
  have missed some item that will make it 
  possible to trace or identify them. 
  For mundane waste such as food or a newspaper used as 
  a disguise prop, it may well be sufficient to dispose of 
  items in the same manner as any other waste, using normal 
  amenities. Items will be lost amid all the other waste and 
  will soon be gone forever. However, disposal should be at 
  a distance from the operational locale; hostile intelligence 
  services may search every bin within a considerable distance 
  from the scene. 
  You might think that fire is a good means 
  to cleanse a site after all the hard 
  work is done. The Boss doesn’t think so, 
  but he tends to be a bit more cautious 
  these days. Look, fire wipes out those bloodstains, 
  scrawled runes, ancient tomes and a lot of esoteric 
  brick-a-brac. It also hides bodies nicely; at least in 
  the manner we need to hide them. Despite what the 
  fire marshal says on the witness stand, fire science 
  is not that accurate, and the coroner is less likely 
  to look over charred remains as closely as a fresh, 
  clean corpse. - Rodriquez
  For more incriminating items, such as cartridge cases 
  or guns, greater care is needed. Items of this sort can be 
  concealed in a basic manner, for example wrapping them in 
  a bag, and then placed in a bin along with other rubbish, but 
  this should only be done if the operative needs to get rid of 
  the items in a great hurry. 
  Rivers and other bodies of water offer a good way to get rid 
  of guns and similar items; the chances of one being found 
  are low providing disposal is not near to the operational 
  locale. It may be useful to handoff an incriminating weapon 
  to another operative tasked with disposal; providing the 
  handoff is not observed the chances of interception before 
  disposal are greatly reduced. 
  Even if a weapon cannot be traced back to the user, much 
  can be learned from it or from casings left at the scene of 
  a shooting. One solution is to use a revolver or bolt-action 
  weapon, so that cases stay in the weapon until the operative 
  extracts them; semi- and fully-automatic weapons fling 
  cases out during the reloading cycle which can make them 
  hard to recover quickly, or at all.
  If the operative is forced to kill someone, the body must be 
  disposed of unless the intent is for it to be found. Transporting 
  a body is risky, and disposal can cause problems. Extremely 
  hot and sustained fire will destroy a corpse, but otherwise it 
  may be best to bury it somewhere remote. Other items can 
  also be buried if no better means of disposal is available. 
  Providing the site is carefully chosen and the operative is 
  unobserved, discovery should be unlikely. 
  However, any place an operative can get to with a body 
  without taking so long about it that they attract attention 
  is a place that others might go. Eventually undergrowth 
  will hide a burial site, and this process can be speeded up 
  by careful concealment, but a fresh burial is quite easy to 
  spot even by a random passer-by. Disposal of items, bodies 
  and such like must be permanent. Once disposal has taken 
  place the operative should never go back in case he leads 
  the enemy to the site. It may be tempting to check that a 
  disposal has not been discovered; this is too risky. 
  Disposal of inhuman remains is a 
  difficult process. Often, they rather 
  thankfully take care of that themselves, 
  dissolving into nothingness and leaving 
  little to clean up. When they do not, you run 
  two risks. First, even dead their forms are 
  shocking and dangerous, sometimes merely to 
  one's mental health, other times they are toxic 
  in some manner. Second, and possibly the more 
  important, risk is that of discovery. Even the 
  bones of the more-humanoid creatures do not 
  
  87
  appear human in the least, and if discovered 
  can easily lead to too many questions being 
  asked by the wrong people. -N
  Industrial solvents. You can buy them at 
  speciality stores with the right permits, 
  and you can fake those permits pretty 
  easy. Me, I like to dump things that 
  should never be found into a foundry. Except Deep 
  Ones: I send those back into the sea. - Miller
  In the context of the mission at hand, disposal of bodies and 
  other incriminating items may be impossible. If an operative 
  or team is moving fast, it may not be possible to conceal 
  any evidence of their passage. However, as noted elsewhere, 
  as soon as bodies start to drop, the countdown to discovery 
  begins. It can be slowed by concealing evidence, such as by 
  dragging bodies out of sight. 
  It will rarely be possible to sanitise the site of a kill; there 
  is likely to be blood or other evidence of the act, but a 
  bloodstain is less likely to be spotted than a corpse lying 
  around, especially at night. As a simple rule, the more 
  imminent completion of a mission is, the less care need be 
  taken about concealing bodies. For example, if a driver is 
  killed for his uniform on the day of the operation, it is vital 
  that the body is not discovered in time to raise the alarm 
  or else the mission will be blown from the start. A guard 
  eliminated at the front gates of an assassination target’s 
  residence must not be discovered until the assassins are 
  close enough to strike. The amount of care taken to conceal 
  the killing must match the length of time it needs to remain 
  undiscovered.
  Of course, in an ideal mission the enemy should not realise 
  anything has happened until the operatives are long gone, 
  if they ever know for certain that an operation took place. 
  However, at the very least bodies and other obvious signs 
  that something is happening must be concealed until the 
  operation is over if the operatives want to make a clean 
  exit. 
  This may be more difficult than it sounds. A corpse is not 
  only heavy, but is extremely awkward to move and may 
  leave a blood trail in doing so. Objects can fall out of 
  pockets and hands, leaving clues for alert guards to pick up 
  on. The best hiding places for bodies are inside something 
  such as a car or cupboard, but operatives must be aware that 
  a corpse may continue to bleed and give its position away 
  in this manner. 
  A corpse can be dragged out of sight to hide it from casual 
  glances. Concealment of this sort can be enhanced by 
  covering it or otherwise breaking up the distinctive outline 
  of a human body. A shapeless clump of shadows may not 
  pique the interest of a passing guard on a rainy night, 
  but a leg sticking out of a clump of bushes certainly will. 
  What cannot be completely hidden can be camouflaged by 
  simple expedients like draping a dark blanket or curtain 
  over it. 
  It should be noted that under most circumstances it is better 
  not to kill anyone at all. If guards and other personnel can 
  be misdirected, bribed or otherwise bypassed then less 
  evidence is left behind of an intelligence operation and the 
  response may be lower-key than if a team of operatives 
  blasts its way through the opposition to carry out its mission. 
  P E R S O N A L  V I O L E N C E
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  88
  I, I need to be picked up. 
   
  The two men the Guvnor sent answered the codewords, but I didn’t, didn’t 
  recognise them. They had human faces, but anyone can wear one of those! 
   
   
  I told them to unmask, but they just looked at me with those  
   
  empty, empty glass eyes. 
   
   
  GE T, GE T ME OUT OF HE RE. DON’T BREATHE; 
  BREATH, THE SHADOWS SEE. 
  The Guvnor, the Guvnor has been compromised. - Stanton
  handling the disPosal of Bodies
  Hiding a body quickly requires a combination of skill, strength and luck. In 
  situations where the investigators are under time pressure, or there is a 
  significant risk of discovery, the Keeper should call for a combined STR, Luck 
  and Spot Hidden roll. This covers the process of identifying a suitable hiding place, 
  dragging the body into position and not leaving obvious blood stains or other trails in 
  the process.
  If there is time to dispose of a body methodically, the Keeper may call for a combined 
  Stealth and Tradecraft roll to remove all traces of what has happened. This is only 
  required if the site of the kill is likely to come under scrutiny, or if the Keeper 
  simply wants to make the players nervous. 
  If the investigator needs to make it difficult to identify a body by cutting off hands 
  or fingers, pulling teeth or removing the head, and they have never done so before, the 
  Keeper may call for a Sanity roll (0/1D6). Investigators who have experience of this 
  kind of work are assumed to have become at least partially inured; the Keeper may still 
  call for a Sanity roll, but this should only be for colour, reflecting how reluctant the 
  investigator is, or whether the process makes them vomit.
  
  CHaPTer 
  SiX
  C o v e r t 
  O p e r a t i o n s 
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  90
  The term ‘covert operation’ is used in this chapter to refer to 
  operations that go beyond the bounds of typical espionage 
  and counter-espionage missions. Whilst a burglary to obtain 
  documents or a kidnapping of a foreign scientist might fall 
  under the heading of covert operations, these tend to be 
  low-key missions that do not involve anyone outside our own 
  intelligence services and support agencies. The following 
  sections deal with situations where personnel must operate 
  alongside local rebels and dissidents, or must engage in 
  more direct methods including direct (but deniable) armed 
  confrontation.  
  OPERATING ALONGSIDE LOCAL 
  INSURGENTS, DISSIDENTS AND 
  REVOLUTIONARIES
  The enemy of your enemy is not your friend. He is a co-
  belligerent; he is hostile to your enemy, but that says nothing 
  about his attitude towards you. In some cases, warm and close 
  relationships can be formed with local insurgent or dissident 
  groups, and some may genuinely be our friends in either a 
  personal or political sense. But to assume this relationship 
  exists simply because of a shared enemy is dangerous.
  Some co-belligerents have their own agenda and some hate 
  us as much as the common enemy. There is no guarantee 
  that they will not turn on us due to their own internal 
  politics or because our aims diverge from theirs. Similarly, 
  some groups are sufficiently corrupt that they will sell out 
  our operatives or change sides for gain, and even within a 
  truly friendly group there may be individuals who will do so 
  given the right circumstances. Our intelligence operatives 
  actively make use of this possibility; it stands to reason that 
  the opposition will too.
  Even within a closely allied group, the nature of their 
  hostility to our enemy may differ from ours, and some 
  of their personnel may be inclined to act in a way that 
  compromises our goals. We can, as a rule, control our own 
  people but there is no guarantee that a local revolutionary 
  working with us can or will do so. Caution must always 
  be exercised when working with locals, not least since the 
  possibility exists that they are playing both sides off against 
  the other or are seeking to gain from the situation. Even if it 
  is obvious to us that cooperation is in the common interest 
  this does not mean that someone else will see it the same 
  way, no matter what they have said or done in the past.
  Our Other Enemy is Our Other Enemy; 
  this does not mean that other foes 
  are not enemies. While it may be 
  acceptable to work with them to 
  defeat a greater evil, do not at any point 
  assume that someone on the other side of the 
  line is your ally. Even if they are one of us, you 
  and they should treat each other as assets, to 
  be used and disposed of as necessary for a 
  greater good. -N
  Therefore, any cooperation with local insurgents, dissidents 
  or revolutionaries must be tackled with caution and care so 
  as not to ‘go native’ (see pg. 28). Cut-outs are necessary to 
  reduce the damage if locals betray our operatives, and we 
  must be careful only to share information that is necessary. 
  That said, it is possible to sour relations with local groups 
  by seeming not to trust them, so cooperation must be (or 
  seem to be) sufficiently wholehearted as to satisfy the locals 
  about our intentions and relations with them.
  In other words, local groups are to be used rather than 
  treated as friends. If it is in our long-term interests to make 
  sacrifices on their behalf then it is acceptable to do so; as 
  a rule we want locals to do our dirty work for us and to 
  take the consequences of our actions. This is harsh, but 
  necessary. These are not our people, and quite likely not our 
  friends in the long term either.
  Operating with individuals and small groups is discussed 
  in Chapter Two: Networks and Assets; the situation is 
  slightly different when working with larger groups. It is 
  possible to evaluate assets on an individual basis and form 
  an opinion of their reliability. This is not usually possible 
  with groups;  operates tend to deal only with part of the 
  group and cannot assess individuals from a fleeting contact.
  Insurgents, revoLutIonarIes 
  and dIssIdents
  Local groups can be divided into different categories based 
  on their capabilities and attitudes towards us and the 
  opposition: insurgents, revolutionaries and dissidents. 
  Insurgents are actively engaged in fighting against the 
  opposition, usually by means of an urban or rural guerrilla 
  war. Whilst this is often aimed at an eventual change of 
  government, we draw a distinction between insurgents (who 
  • C O V E R T  O P E R A T I O N S •
  
  91
  are actively using military means, albeit perhaps on a small 
  scale) and other types of opposition groups.
  Revolutionaries are actively seeking the overthrow of a 
  government and (usually, but not always) its replacement 
  with a more acceptable regime – acceptable to them, that 
  is, not necessarily to us. We consider a revolutionary to 
  become an insurgent when they engage in open warfare. 
  This can happen for a variety of reasons, and almost always 
  ensues following a failed coup. 
  Revolutionaries may be willing to fight as insurgents or 
  may prefer to use other means. These can include legal 
  and constitutional methods, often with a mixture of illegal 
  activity. For example a revolutionary group might be 
  unwilling to engage in warfare but find coercing judges to 
  rule in the manner they are directed entirely acceptable. 
  Revolutionaries can come from within a regime, such as a 
  clique of army officers who wish to form a junta, or may 
  represent a disaffected segment of the populace. 
  Dissidents are unhappy with the opposition and often 
  prepared to cause low-level trouble – perhaps including 
  rioting – but do not engage in military action and are not 
  usually intent on replacing the government. Dissidents can 
  range from politicised workers or students to a segment 
  of an unhappy population. Most dissident groups are not 
  very extreme – for example many intellectuals are willing 
  to go no further than writing a particularly nasty pamphlet 
  on governmental wrongdoings – but within their ranks can 
  often be found potential assets or individuals willing to go 
  to extreme lengths. 
  dealing with dissident grouPs
  Reading, 
  understanding 
  and 
  manipulating people can be a matter 
  of life or death to an intelligence 
  officer. This is especially true when 
  dealing 
  with 
  groups 
  of 
  insurgents, 
  dissidents and guerrillas. The problem 
  is that dealing with such groups presents 
  many potential difficulties. 
  The Keeper should use the following 
  guidelines 
  for 
  adjusting 
  Psychology 
  rolls to read a group of guerrillas or 
  interpersonal skill rolls for attempting 
  to convince or manipulate them.
  One penalty die for each of:
  •	 The investigators have to work through 
  an interpreter.
  •	 The group has no defined leader.
  •	 The group is from a country that 
  has historical reasons to distrust 
  Western powers.
  •	 The group receives material support 
  from the Soviets.
  One bonus die for each of:
  •	 The group are ideologically opposed 
  to the investigators’ enemies.
  •	 The 
  investigators 
  are 
  providing 
  material aid.
  •	 The investigators are working with 
  good intelligence about the group’s 
  goals and ideologies.
  Dissidents often have no real agenda beyond protesting 
  about conditions they find unfair or unacceptable. They 
  must be approached with caution; someone who is unhappy 
  at their own government may still be loyal to it when the 
  alternative is working with a foreign intelligence service.
  C O V E R T  O P E R AT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
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  It should be noted that many dissident groups are ineffectual. 
  Membership may be more of a fashion accessory for 
  ‘revolutionary-chic’ individuals than a statement of actual 
  intent. Indeed, many of these pseudo-revolutionaries would 
  be horrified at the thought of doing more than talking about 
  overthrowing the government and might actually warn the 
  authorities rather than allow an operation that might upset 
  the local apple cart. 
  Dissident groups are often heavily infiltrated by police 
  and intelligence agency informers, and may be highly 
  disorganised. Their internal politics can be quite vigorous, 
  with some members seeking direct and violent action (or 
  shouting about it a lot for the sake of status within the 
  group) and others urging a more patient and subtle (or 
  ineffectual) approach. 
  neutraL groups
  Neutral groups might not share our enemy, but they can 
  still prove useful to us. For example, a crime cartel might 
  be able to obtain equipment or move personnel on our 
  behalf, but are doing it for their own reasons – typically 
  profit. Relations with a neutral group are often more of a 
  business arrangement than a political alliance, but given the 
  circumstances under which we operate such relationships 
  can prove hazardous.
  motIvatIons and metHodoLogy
  It is important to understand the motivations of any given 
  group; what they might be willing to do and why. Dissidents 
  will not respond well to calls to attack our opponents and 
  might disown or even betray operatives if they go too far. 
  Nor are they likely to be receptive to offers of arms and 
  military equipment in the same way that an insurgent group 
  would. Similarly, workers’ groups are likely to respond to 
  different approaches to intellectuals and students, and have 
  the capability to disrupt the enemy in different ways. 
  As a rule, it is best to quietly supply information and 
  support to dissidents and revolutionaries, and hardware 
  to insurgents; and then to exploit the harm they do to the 
  opposition rather than try to precisely dictate what they do 
  or relying on specific actions. Individuals within a group can 
  be run as assets and may be trustworthy or reliable, but a 
  group as a whole should be considered neither.
  You might get the idea of working with 
  one cell of cattle against another; this is 
  a very bad idea. If you think working 
  alongside a group of counter-insurgents is hairy, 
  try it when the guy next to you is twitching away 
  to his own visions. - Miller>
  Any group can move in either direction along the spectrum 
  between mildly disaffected and fanatical revolutionary, 
  and it is possible for a group as a whole to progress from 
  dissidents to revolutionaries or insurgents, and vice versa. 
  This process can be manipulated by operatives who support 
  the right people and provide information (true or otherwise) 
  that pushes the group in the desired direction. There are 
  times when destabilisation is desirable and others when 
  we would prefer stability and peace. It may or may not be 
  possible to ask groups to take the desired action, but it is 
  always possible to manipulate them in the right direction – 
  or at least to try.
  trust and guerilla grouPs
  The Trust mechanic comes into play 
  when an investigator is a member of 
  a particular organisation or has 
  strong ties with them. If an investigator 
  is simply supporting a guerilla group 
  or using them to achieve a particular 
  objective, Trust is rarely a factor. If 
  the investigator is trying to infiltrate 
  the group or build a long-term working 
  relationship with them, however, Trust 
  becomes more important. Refer to Building 
  Trust on pg. 48 of World War Cthulhu: 
  Cold War for details.
  OPERATING ALONGSIDE 
  COMBAT TROOPS
  At time, operatives will be required to operate alongside 
  our own or allied armed forces. In some situations this 
  may be overt cooperation, such as when intelligence 
  agency personnel assist combat troops or accompany them 
  on a mission. Cooperation may or may not be deniable; 
  operational orders will cover how to relate to combat troops 
  and how much information is to be divulged.
  Our own troops and those of allied nations are not the enemy 
  of our enemy; they are our friends. However, that does not 
  make them trustworthy. US personnel currently serving in 
  Vietnam, for example, may be demoralised conscripts who 
  
  93
  do not want anything to do with intelligence operations for 
  the simple reason that they are dangerous and often ‘dirty’. 
  Disaffected and demoralise troops may not see the point 
  of the mission and may not care about it. Mistrust is likely, 
  and is probably well grounded as we do not routinely reveal 
  operational details to those who do not need them.
  Care must be taken not to place too much faith in regular 
  troops; the holds true for civilian law enforcement personnel. 
  Most are dedicated – or at least willing – to do their duty, 
  but they do not see the big picture as we do, and may not be 
  pleased to be put in danger for a vague or nebulous reason. 
  Regular soldiers and law enforcement personnel may also 
  lack critical skills and more importantly mindset. They may 
  hesitate from taking ‘dishonourable’ but necessary actions, 
  and may actually derail a mission by refusing orders or 
  arguing at a time when action is critical.
  By far the biggest problem when operating 
  alongside common soldiers is security. They 
  cannot know about Our Other Enemy, yet 
  there are times when you need to operate 
  alongside them in order to carry out your mission. 
  It is a cold calculation, but sometimes you have to 
  expose them to psychological danger in order to get 
  the job done, and clean up the mess afterwards. 
  - Rodriquez
  That said, these people also serve and must not be regarded 
  with contempt or condescension. It may, however, be 
  necessary under extreme circumstances to sacrifice or even 
  betray them. We must never do this lightly, but there are 
  times when the mission is more important than the survival 
  of an assigned escort force. Hard choices must be made at 
  times, but wherever possible allied and assigned forces must 
  be treated fairly and accommodated as far as our mission 
  and standing orders permit.
  Cold calculations are our business, 
  and if you must feed an entire platoon 
  into the maw to advance our fight, do 
  so, and do so without remorse.  -N
  This applies to us as well. - Steuben
  Operations alongside regular troops or ordinary law 
  enforcement personnel are not uncommon for some 
  intelligence services in some parts of the world, but it 
  is more likely that any combat personnel involved in our 
  missions will be drawn from elite formations within the 
  military and law enforcement world. These personnel share 
  a mindset closer to ours and are both highly trained and 
  very motivated. Their methods tend to be more direct but 
  they are ‘our kind of people’ in a way that regular soldiers 
  are not.
  Elite covert-operations personnel may be mistrustful of 
  intelligence operatives, but as a rule they are mistrustful 
  of anyone who has not earned their confidence. They are 
  skilled at combat but have far greater capabilities than 
  this; stealth, misdirection and specialist skills such as 
  communications and use of explosives are all likely part 
  of their training. 
  Many teams of elite forces are experts at winning over the 
  local population; they may speak local languages and know 
  customs that will gain them friends within the population.
  The same skills are useful in an urban environment but 
  this is more our province. It is rare for elite combat troops 
  to be assigned to an intelligence operation other perhaps 
  than in a specialist role as communicators, snipers or an 
  assault team. Few elite operators are trained for the sort 
  of long-term undercover work that intelligence personnel 
  carry out. 
  Overall, when working with combat troops or law 
  enforcement personnel, the general rule is that ordinary 
  police and soldiers can only be trusted with routine tasks, 
  whereas elite forces can be briefed on their part in the 
  operation and allowed to see to the details from their own 
  formidable skill set. 
  The most important distinction, however, is that elite 
  operators live in the same world as we do and understand 
  the hard choices that must sometimes be made. They can be 
  relied upon in a way that ordinary combat personnel simply 
  cannot. However, their worldview is still that of the warrior, 
  and differs from that of an intelligence operative. Applied 
  correctly, these differing mindsets and skill sets can be a 
  powerful combination. 
  One of the problems when dealing 
  with the military is that they tend 
  to favour a military approach to 
  problem solving. Our Other Enemy 
  tends to be resistant to the direct application 
  of force. This is one of the many reasons we 
  do not involve the military in our efforts, and 
  you should keep this in mind when in the field. 
  The right man at the right place at the right 
  time can do more good than a thousand bullets 
  and bombs ever could. -N
  C O V E R T  O P E R AT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  94
  Covert oPerations sPeCialists 
  as investigators
  Depending 
  on 
  the 
  nature 
  of 
  the scenario or campaign, the 
  investigators may regularly be 
  working 
  alongside 
  covert 
  operations 
  specialists. An intelligence officer from 
  SIS, for example, may rely heavily on 
  the Special Air Service (SAS) for certain 
  missions.
  If such personnel are going to play regular 
  parts of your game, there is no reason not 
  to make them investigators. A player may 
  choose to swap between an intelligence 
  officer and a covert operations specialist 
  for different parts of the campaign, 
  as appropriate. On some occasions, the 
  Keeper may choose to have the players 
  switch over to playing an entire team of 
  covert operations specialists to carry 
  out a hostage rescue, counter-terrorism 
  operation or similar, then go back to 
  playing their usual intelligence officers 
  to deal with the aftermath. 
  Covert operations specialists can be 
  created using the normal investigator 
  creation rules in World War Cthulhu: 
  Cold War. If the investigator has a 
  previous occupation in the military and 
  specialised training as a covert actions 
  operative, they can be created with the 
  appropriate set of skills. 
  SABOTAGE AND DISRUPTION 
  Sabotage, on a fairly small scale, can be the primary 
  objective of a mission or may be a means to an end. For 
  example, sabotage of an important machine or device could 
  draw out a human target: maybe the key engineer whose 
  task is to keep the machine running, or a specialist scientist 
  sent to troubleshoot a programme. These personnel will 
  then be more vulnerable to assassination or kidnapping. 
  It might be hard to locate that cell leader, 
  stop a tome from changing hands, or 
  otherwise quietly disrupt a cell attempting 
  a major contact with Our Other Enemy. You know, 
  they often have a set location and time they must 
  do this thing in, a time and place open to sabotage. 
  - Rodriquez
  Similarly, sabotage can be used to aid reconnaissance, 
  enabling operatives to see how the enemy responds and who 
  they send to deal with the problem. However, under most 
  circumstances the sort of sabotage that can be undertaken 
  by operatives will be of limited strategic value and may well 
  represent an unnecessary risk of personnel in return for a 
  very small gain. 
  Conversely, sabotage of a specific capability can be critical 
  enough to merit an entire operation. 
  By way of example, a nation that has built a fast breeder 
  nuclear reactor may be able to produce materials for use in 
  nuclear weapons. Sabotaging the building or operation of 
  such a reactor could set their nuclear programme back years. 
  In this context, personnel can be considered a component of 
  the programme; sabotaging it may require the elimination or 
  removal of key personnel.
  Sabotage on a small scale, such as disabling a machine in 
  a factory for a day or two, is rarely worth the risk to an 
  operative. Such minor sabotage, if it is done at all, is best 
  
  95
  carried out second or third hand by disaffected locals or 
  rebels recruited and by the operative. Even then, it is unlikely 
  to be worthwhile unless the production that is being disrupted 
  is extremely high-value or difficult to replace locally. Slowing 
  down the only machine for 300 miles capable of producing 
  a precision component is potentially worthwhile; the tiny 
  reduction in a nation’s industrial output is not. 
  Sabotage of industrial production needs to be large-scale in 
  order to be useful to our cause. This can be accomplished by 
  various means that have little to do with machine-breaking. 
  One option is to sow discontent among workers and foment 
  labour disputes. 
  Passive resistance and ‘slow working’ proved effective 
  during the World War Two when practised by workers in 
  occupied countries; a similar situation exists in nations 
  that have been forced to accept communism or where an 
  unpopular dictator or junta is in place.
  In such a case, there may be no need to actually damage 
  anything; indeed this might be counterproductive. If a 
  workers’ go-slow appears to have no outside cause, this 
  will probably cause more disruption over time than violently 
  crippling a vital piece of machinery; the latter will probably 
  bring about a more robust response than the former. 
  A workers’ dispute might even cause more widespread 
  problems for the target if it grows into a general strike.
  If workers can be induced to cause actual damage to their 
  equipment, or local saboteurs can be persuaded to take 
  direct action, they will need to know what to target and 
  how. Indiscriminate damage may not be the best option; 
  operatives should ensure that saboteurs attack the most 
  critical components of a local industrial system or those 
  that will cause the greatest destruction in the long term. 
  If a shortage of a certain part can be identified then 
  machines that require it are better targets than a critical 
  piece of equipment for which a good set of spares is always 
  maintained.
  Sabotage can also be accomplished through political and 
  financial means as well as by direct action. Supply of raw 
  materials can be disrupted by blowing up a bridge on 
  the delivery route, but this has a shorter-term effect than 
  blackmailing a raw material supplier into accepting contracts 
  from other project, or engineering a dispute with local 
  hauliers who carry raw materials to and from the plant. 
  Likewise, shipping and rail infrastructure can be disrupted 
  directly in the short term, but it may be far more effective 
  to persuade the crane operators’ union that they are being 
  swindled by their employers. 
  Sabotage might also be carried out for political ends. For 
  example, if a flagship government project fails to reach the 
  targets that were loudly trumpeted at its inception, this can 
  damage the opposing government. Disruption of electricity 
  supplies or necessary goods to a population centre makes 
  the local government seem weak and ineffectual even if it 
  has little impact on industrial production.  
  Sabotage on a small scale might be carried out by operatives 
  to facilitate a mission. For example, a vehicle might be 
  sabotaged, or a mechanism operating a swinging or lifting 
  bridge, to trap a target in the kill zone. However, a general 
  sabotage campaign is best carried out by local dissidents 
  who have been given some training in what to do and how 
  to go about it.
  If the goal is the long-term weakening of foreign industrial 
  and economic production, with the associated political 
  damage, then a low-key sabotage campaign best suits 
  our purposes. It is better for production to be slowed by 
  ‘accidents’, disputes and unavailability of raw materials or 
  parts for machines that unaccountably keep breaking down, 
  than by overt and dramatic action. The latter is more useful 
  meChaniCal saBotage
  If an investigator wishes to disable an item of machinery in a hurry, and does not 
  care about covering their tracks, then the Keeper can call for a Luck or Mechanical 
  Repair (or Electrical Repair if there is a lot of wiring) roll to cover a brute-
  force approach such as dropping a spanner in the works. If the machinery is particularly 
  complex or has exposed workings, this may afford the investigator a bonus die.
  Should the investigator wish to make the damage look accidental, the roll becomes Hard; 
  alternatively, the Keeper may ask for a combined Mechanical Repair and Tradecraft roll 
  for the investigator to cover their tracks.
  C O V E R T  O P E R AT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  96
  if an area is on the brink of major unrest or revolution, since 
  highly obvious actions can encourage further attacks. 
  Timing can be key, disrupt their time 
  table and you can throw the whole thing 
  off for days or weeks, giving you time to 
  get the job done right. If the stars are 
  right, make ‘em wrong. - Miller
  The sort of sabotage we encourage should therefore be 
  tailored to the ends we wish to accomplish. Big, graphic 
  actions can be part of a destabilisation campaign but are 
  actually less damaging than ongoing low-key sabotage. 
  Of course, creating the right conditions for a sabotage 
  campaign conducted at third hand may require various 
  missions to obtain documents, coerce individuals or 
  otherwise manipulate the target group into acting on our 
  behalf. Slow and subtle impairs the opposition in the long 
  term; big and noisy is more properly used for political 
  ends such as making the government seem ineffectual or 
  triggering further unrest.
  GUERRILLA WARFARE
  Historically, guerrilla warfare has always been the province 
  of a weaker power against a stronger one. It takes little more 
  than a cause and a weapon to be a guerrilla fighter, but to 
  be effective is a more difficult proposition. It is worth noting 
  that although the terms are often confused, guerrillas and 
  terrorists are two different things. A terrorist uses fear for 
  political ends, often striking at civilian targets, whereas a 
  guerrilla is fighting a war and will attack militarily valuable 
  targets. Of course, the key to winning is to attack the enemy 
  where they are weak, and it is possible to stray over the 
  line from guerrilla warfare into terrorism, but they are not 
  intrinsically the same.
  It is important to know the ideology 
  of the guerrillas you are working 
  with, if for no other reason to make 
  the relationship proceed without any 
  disruptions. However, if you can manipulate a 
  small force to perform the heavy lifting for 
  an otherwise quiet mission, and can rely on 
  them to succeed, there is no reason to use this 
  relationship towards your own ends. -N
  Guerrillas typically operate in small groups, and may be 
  active in urban or rural regions, or both. Organisation is 
  typically loose, with leadership by charismatic or effective 
  individuals rather than a formal chain of command, although 
  a guerrilla force often has some of the trappings of a regular 
  military. As guerrillas gain in power they tend to transition 
  to a more conventional military organisation and style of 
  operation.
  Dealing with an insurgency can absorb large amounts of 
  manpower and resources; indeed it may be in our interests 
  for a war to be kept going rather than being won by the 
  either side. If our opponents pull out of a region with burned 
  fingers, that may suit our political ends and may present us 
  with a propaganda opportunity, but having them bogged 
  down in an interminable struggle may actually benefit us 
  more. It also creates intelligence opportunities that might 
  not otherwise exist; unstable regions are more ‘porous’ than 
  a post-insurgency state is likely to be.
  Nations undergoing an active guerrilla 
  war are even more unstable than 
  nations engaged in more formal 
  conflicts. This instability is a double-
  edged sword. One the one hand it is easier for 
  us to operate, the borders are more porous, 
  the local security forces have other issues to 
  deal with, crime becomes commonplace, and 
  the secretive movement of men and material 
  becomes commonplace. However, all these 
  advantages also work in favour of Our Other 
  Enemy. -N
  It is important to remember why we are involved in an 
  insurgency. If we want a region cleared of foreign influences 
  then that is our goal; if we prefer to leave it unstable and keep 
  our opponents’ attention focused on it then we must operate 
  differently. The level and type of support furnished will be 
  geared to preventing the defeat of the insurgents rather than 
  facilitating their eventual victory – but we must ensure that 
  they think we are working towards them winning their war. 
  It may even be necessary to betray friendly insurgents to 
  derail a potential victory – we may not be able to afford to 
  be friends to the enemy of our enemy!
  Guerrillas can cause a disproportionate amount of damage 
  to our enemies (and to us if the situation is reversed) and 
  can make the movement of even routine supply convoys a 
  major operation involving heavy escorts and sweeps of the 
  local area. In addition to ambushing supply runs and patrols, 
  guerrillas might attack infrastructure such as bridges and 
  canals, assassinate enemy officials and capture remote 
  outposts.
  Some actions will inevitably be taken purely for the sake of 
  striking at the enemy, but co-belligerent guerrillas should 
  
  97
  be encouraged to make every action they take further 
  their cause (actually, our cause!) either by obtaining arms, 
  equipment and information or by denying something of 
  value to the enemy. Operations should also be geared to 
  maintaining and increasing popular support. This is vital to 
  a successful guerrilla campaign as locals  might be unwilling 
  to fight but will provide support or harbour to the guerrillas.
  Note that guerrilla groups are often close-knit and mistrustful 
  even of other guerrillas fighting for the same cause. A 
  campaign can be riddled with paranoia – often rightly so, 
  since planting informers is a common way of finding and 
  eliminating the guerrillas. As a result, a guerrilla force is 
  typically highly compartmentalised, with groups varying in 
  size, equipment, effectiveness and reputation. 
  This can be hazardous or useful depending on circumstance, 
  but operatives must always remember that the guerrilla 
  group they are associated with may not have the same 
  outlook as others. Mistrust is natural, and hostility may 
  not be for logical reasons. The enemy of our enemy is a 
  co-belligerent, nothing more (see pg. 90 for more about 
  working alongside such groups).
  determining the effeCtiveness 
  of guerilla grouPs
  As well as the use of Psychology to 
  determine a group’s motivations, 
  as discussed in the Dealing with 
  Dissident Groups box out on pg. 91, the 
  investigators may wish to evaluate how 
  effective a group will be in helping 
  achieve the mission objective. This 
  largely comes down to use of the Military 
  Science skill, which will be similarly 
  affected by organisational, language and 
  cultural barriers. 
  The Keeper should add a penalty die to 
  such rolls if the investigators do not 
  speak the same language as the guerrillas, 
  if they do not have adequate intelligence 
  on the group or if the group does not 
  have any defined leadership. 
  Thorough intelligence gathering about 
  the group should afford a bonus die.
  MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
  Although the terms are often used interchangeably, a mission 
  tends to be small in either the number of personnel involved 
  or the scope of its goals, whereas an operation tends to be 
  larger and usually comprises multiple components; multiple 
  assets and operatives may have missions to accomplish within 
  the wider context of the operation. For example, operatives 
  might be given a mission to obtain secret documents as part 
  of a wider operation to find out what the opposition knows 
  about our anti-ballistic missile defence systems.
  There are some general rules for intelligence missions 
  and operations, which apply whether operating with local 
  guerrillas or carrying out a more normal intelligence 
  operation. The first and most important rule is: no mission or 
  operation should be carried out unless there is a worthwhile 
  gain, and this must be balanced against risk. 
  It will almost always be more important to retain capability 
  than to expend it for some single goal. A co-belligerent 
  guerrilla unit wiped out on a badly planned mission 
  deprives us of its use in the future and may create problems 
  in our relationship with others, whilst the loss of our own 
  operatives or their supporting assets is damaging to our 
  cause in the long term. 
  Cancelling an operation once preparations are underway 
  can be bad for morale and will upset local ‘friendlies’ who 
  want to see action, but under most circumstances it is better 
  to wait. It is rarely possible to attempt the same operation 
  the same way twice, so avenues of approach should not 
  be wasted. Note that local groups may not be reliable and 
  may proceed anyway, either deliberately in defiance of our 
  instructions or simply due to the vagaries of communication 
  in the intelligence environment.
  If an opportunity is unlikely to come again and the 
  importance is great, then an operation might go ahead 
  against rising odds. This is always expensive, however, in 
  terms of personnel lost and the chance of utter failure. It 
  must be remembered that any operation could be the last 
  for any given intelligence network. Potential gain from the 
  operation must be weighed against the possibility that our 
  local intelligence network could be severely disrupted for 
  some time to come, or even eliminated entirely.
  mIssIon and operatIonaL pLannIng
  Assuming that the operation or mission goes ahead, it will 
  take place in several stages. The first, and probably the most 
  important, is reconnaissance and information gathering. This 
  applies equally to military and intelligence operations – we 
  C O V E R T  O P E R AT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  98
  must know as much about the target and the likely response 
  as possible. Political fallout must always be factored into 
  operational planning, and may be a reason to abort the 
  operation – our nation’s political ends are always at the 
  heart of any operation.
  Not quite always. There may be 'Other' 
  considerations! -N
  Subtlety and misdirection are our primary tools when 
  carrying out an operation. Ideally, the target should not 
  know something has happened until well after the operation 
  is over, if at all. This is not always possible, so speed and 
  stealth are also important considerations. 
  It is better to be ushered into the target location by a guard 
  after presenting an invitation or to simply walk past dressed 
  as a servant than to sneak by, but all of these are better than 
  shooting your way in or trying to rush past the defences. 
  The ‘louder’ an operation becomes, the greater the risks 
  and the more extreme the response. Political fallout is 
  much greater from overt, ‘loud’ operations than polite, 
  quiet ones. That said, if violence is to be used at all then it 
  must be employed with ruthlessness and conviction. ‘Force 
  multipliers’ must be brought to bear at the critical point; 
  again these include speed, stealth, surprise and so forth. 
  These factors must be built into mission planning if they 
  are to be employed usefully. The team assigned to obtain 
  clothing and documents must be ready to hand them over to 
  the team carrying out the mission, and operatives assigned 
  to support withdrawal (such as drivers or couriers who are 
  to be handed the ‘take’ from the mission) must be in place 
  and ready to go. Information should be compartmentalised. 
  For example, the facilitation team do not need to know what 
  the main mission target is, and the entry team do not need 
  to know the final destination for the ‘take’. It is safest for 
  everyone if information is shared on a need-to-know basis – 
  but too little information can wreck a mission. Judging how 
  much must be known by whom is a fine art and lies at the 
  heart of good mission planning.
  You will have two missions to plan 
  and execute, and the interweaving 
  of them is crucial. Use your national 
  cover's resources for insertion and extraction, 
  and your best judgement on how to use such 
  resources during the mission. Always keep in 
  mind that we have few dedicated resources 
  other than our personnel, and all else should 
  come from your mundane employer. -N
  No two missions are exactly alike, and the same mission 
  could require a different approach if repeated in a different 
  locale or tactical situation. Often the approach used will be 
  dictated by the opportunities that present themselves or the 
  assets available. However, some common principles apply to 
  almost all operations and missions.
  Firstly, a large and complex operation – and usually even 
  quite small and simple one – must be broken down into 
  component parts. Sometimes these must be dispersed over 
  time, which may be the only way to complete the task 
  without blundering into an enemy ambush. ‘Wait’ is a valid 
  operational order and personnel must be able to obey it. 
  A single asset or operative who goes off half-cock can 
  compromise a whole operation. 
  Tasks and information must be compartmentalised within a 
  mission, and missions must be compartmentalised within an 
  operation. An asset or an operative needs only to know what 
  they are to do and how to go about it. They do not need to 
  know if their actions are part of a wider operation or not. 
  Indeed, it is better if they do not, under most circumstances.
  
  99
  Every mission is different, and often orders will be quite 
  general. For example, an operative might be tasked with 
  obtaining an unobtrusive delivery van and being at a certain 
  place with it at a particular time. The details may not be 
  important, other than the obvious consideration that the 
  operative must not attract the attention of the authorities. 
  At times, orders will be quite specific. This is usually the 
  case during a multi-part operation or a mission where the 
  actions of various personnel must be coordinated. Such 
  missions require far more detailed planning but may still 
  include quite general components. 
  For example, a given operative might be instructed to pass 
  critical documents to another at a certain time and place but 
  allowed to use his own discretion as to how they obtain and 
  transport them. It is often best when working with skilled 
  personnel who know their environment to simply tell them 
  what is required and what they must not do, and leave the 
  details up to them.
  mIssIon Components
  Some missions will have all of the following components, 
  others just a few:
  Information Gathering can take place over a long period if 
  necessary. Often this is part of routine operations and data 
  that has already been obtained can be used, though some 
  form of reconnaissance is usually necessary when planning 
  an operation.
  Early Facilitation is a matter of obtaining necessary items 
  or ensuring that they can be quickly obtained when needed. 
  Documents, clothing, vehicles and so forth can often be 
  quietly assembled well before an operation without any 
  danger of compromising it. It may be that an operation 
  cannot even be contemplated without a particular item, 
  circumstance or piece of information, so a large part of the 
  early facilitation phase may be waiting for this to become 
  available. Some items will be routinely available but there 
  will usually be specific requirements. If possible, missions 
  to obtain these will be separate from the overall operation, 
  allowing it to be safely aborted if facilitation goes awry.
  Timely Facilitation is carried out at the beginning of the 
  operation, or sometimes once it is in motion. Any actions 
  likely to cause alarm, such as stealing keys or vehicles, must 
  be done as late as possible to limit the chance of detection. 
  This can mean that some elements of a mission, such as 
  the vehicles to be used for extraction, are obtained after it 
  has begun. Although this entails some risk, the chance of 
  alerting the enemy must be weighed against the possibility 
  that part of the operation could go awry.
  Approach is usually the final opportunity to safely abort 
  the mission. As operatives approach the target they may 
  conduct their own appraisal of the situation or receive a 
  final update from surveillance in place. A final abort/commit 
  decision is made at this stage.
  Infiltration of some form is required for most missions. This 
  may be deceptive, covert (or, rarely) overt. The latter is only 
  likely when carrying out a mission such as a violent snatch, 
  an assassination that cannot be handled in some less obvious 
  manner, or a rescue mission where there are no other good 
  options. Infiltration ends when mission personnel reach their 
  targets, but that does not translate to ‘going loud’. Ideally 
  the whole mission is carried out quietly and without the 
  opposition being entirely sure what has happened.
  Action is the critical phase of the mission, during which 
  the operatives carry out their assigned task. There may be 
  multiple actions within a mission – and certainly there will 
  be within a large operation – and these may not all happen 
  at the same time. Ideally this part of the mission is carried 
  out ‘on the quiet’ and operatives will be able to avoid a 
  ‘grab and run’ situation. 
  However, circumstances will dictate what is possible. Note 
  that for some operatives, this phase consists of nothing 
  more than watching and feeding information to others, or 
  being in position to cover a withdrawal.
  Exfiltration should ideally be carried out quietly and 
  without fuss. If the aim is to extract personnel or critical 
  documents, an exfiltration that involves rushing to waiting 
  vehicles whilst a sniper provides covering fire is acceptable. 
  However, a quiet exfiltration is best as it increases the 
  chance of a clean operation (in other words, one that does 
  not bring about a major response from the opposition).
  Finalisation can sometimes be the beginning of a new 
  mission. For example, once personnel have exfiltrated from 
  their mission and passed stolen documents to a courier, the 
  mission to bring them to the final recipient begins. For the 
  personnel involved in a given mission, finalisation means 
  ensuring that they are not followed or pursued, returning 
  arms and equipment to wherever they are kept, and resuming 
  normal activities. Finalisation requires as much planning as 
  C O V E R T  O P E R AT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  100
  any other stage of an operation, and just as much care if the 
  network is to remain viable in the long term.
  All missions and operations are different, of course, and 
  care must always be taken not to fall into habits or to simply 
  follow doctrine when it is not appropriate. This can lead to 
  an operation going awry or may give the opposition clear 
  indication of the perpetrators. 
  CLeanIng up
  All evidence as to the origin of personnel involved in a 
  mission must be left behind. Personal effects are an obvious 
  clue to the nationality and allegiance of an operative, and 
  even items as simple as clothing labels can give away a great 
  deal of information. 
  Weapons should be of ‘international’ origin; in other words, 
  of a sort available on the open market, rather than being 
  associated with a particular nation. The exception, of 
  course, is when weaponry belonging to the opposition can 
  be appropriated or when operating in an area flooded with 
  arms of a particular origin. 
  Wherever possible, they should be sanitised. This means 
  removing all serial numbers and other identifying marks that 
  can allow a particular gun to be traced back to its origin. 
  It is, however, well known to all intelligence services that 
  our operatives are sometimes supplied with a weapon that 
  never had any serial numbers – which might be a giveaway 
  in itself. It is better for a captured weapon to be examined 
  and found to have been locally sanitised than to be obviously 
  supplied to a covert operations force.
  taCtICaL ConsIderatIons
  Whether operating in the field or conducting an operation 
  such as a kidnapping, tactical considerations are paramount. 
  The difference between a five-second bag-and-grab with the 
  target in a car and gone before any response materialises, 
  and a shoot-out with the local police might be down to 
  nothing more than good positioning and cooperation. 
  Operatives may sometimes have to work alone, or with only 
  distant cover, but where possible a team should be deployed 
  to maximise capability at the key point. 
  No more than one or two operatives can physically engage 
  a given target without the risk of getting in one another’s 
  way, so in cases of physical action such as kidnapping the 
  usual set-up is for two operatives to overpower the target 
  and others to facilitate the snatch. Additional personnel can 
  prevent interference or clear the exfiltration route. 
  Mutual trust is vital; operatives must be able to concentrate 
  on their own task without having to worry about a 
  teammate’s capabilities. It is not desirable to completely lose 
  track of the overall situation but an operative whose task 
  is to cover one approach should be able to do so without 
  having to watch the others or struggle with a target who 
  is trying to escape. The action should be sudden, made by 
  surprise and over quickly. This is impossible when trying to 
  carry out more than one task. 
  CLOSE PROTECTION DUTIES
  Most comments that apply to infiltration, kidnap and 
  assassination also apply to preventing them. An infiltration 
  can be assisted by an observer who feeds information to the 
  infiltrator or uses a suppressed rifle to prevent interference. 
  Operatives protecting a building should consider likely spots 
  for such support and be prepared to deal with them.
  When protecting a VIP, common practice is to have one 
  operative assigned as the bodyguard, who stays close to the 
  principal, and other members of the close protection (CP) 
  team dealing with potential threats as they emerge. Some 
  members of the CP team may be a little distant from the 
  principal, perhaps moving ahead to check alleys and side 
  roads or lagging behind to prevent anyone moving up from 
  behind. 
  An attack plan should always take into account that the 
  target may have a scout out to the front or sides, so it may 
  not be possible to simply hide and ambush them. There is 
  also the possibility of some members of the CP team being 
  outside the kill zone at the moment of a strike; it is not 
  unknown for a kidnapping or assassination team to find 
  itself taking fire from behind.
  In the event of an attack, the bodyguard is responsible 
  for last-ditch protection of the VIP, and for getting them 
  to safety. The rest of the CP team are there to block the 
  approach of potential hostiles and to engage them (physically 
  or with firearms) where necessary. Again, mutual trust is 
  important. In a good CP team the nearest operative deals 
  with a potential problem whilst others watch their own 
  sectors in case this is a distraction.
  
  101
  For example, if a shouting, agitated individual bursts out of 
  a crowd and rushes towards the VIP, they will be stopped 
  by the nearest member of the CP team. If this pulls them 
  off station, others will move to maintain all-round cover and 
  it is quite likely that everyone will glance is that direction 
  as all-round awareness is vital in the close protection role. 
  However, the rest of the team should not become fixated 
  on what is happening; they know it is being dealt with 
  and they have their own sector to cover. Under most 
  circumstances the threat will not reach the bodyguard, let 
  alone the VIP.
  A sloppy close protection team is easy to distract or draw off; 
  a good one remains ready for anything even whilst dealing 
  with a threat, and does not use disproportionate force to deal 
  with a problem. Simple thugs might become distracted by 
  beating up someone who got in the way or who seemed like a 
  threat for a moment; skilled CP professionals do only what is 
  necessary and then return to their mission, which is watching 
  for new threats and ensuring the safety of their client. 
  Some VIPs use their ‘minders’ as muscle to show everyone 
  how powerful and important they are, shoving people around 
  and threatening them. However, high-end security tends to 
  be polite, unobtrusive and vastly more effective. How hard it 
  is to spot all the close protection operatives can be a useful 
  measure of how good the security they provide will be.
  COMBAT IN URBAN TERRAIN
  Ideally, a mission will be accomplished without resorting 
  to firearms, but as we do not live in an ideal world the 
  most common environment an operative is likely to find 
  themselves in a firefight is the built-up, urban environment. 
  In such a cluttered environment, any exchange of fire is 
  likely to be at close range. Use of cover, aggression and 
  speed are often the decisive factors.
  An operative cannot afford to become pinned down under 
  cover. Missions are usually time-sensitive and opposition 
  will increase over time. If forward progress is not possible 
  then the only option is to break contact and withdraw; a 
  protracted firefight will usually result in a failed mission 
  whatever the outcome. 
  An operative may have no weapon larger than a handgun 
  available, but more powerful armament should be provided 
  if combat is expected. Shotguns and submachine guns are 
  excellent for clearing a room or getting past a guard, and are 
  ‘handier’ in tight spaces. 
  Urban combat is a three-dimensional business. Windows 
  and rooftops can create firing points that negate cover, and 
  shooters in these positions might not be spotted by someone 
  whose attention is at ground level. If possible, it may be 
  best to move through buildings rather than out in the open. 
  Although this creates the possibility of an encounter at 
  short range, this is more likely to be pre-empted by an alert 
  operator than a rooftop sniper who might not be spotted 
  before they open fire.
  Whether on an individual or small-unit scale, any combat 
  in urban terrain is likely to be a complex and chaotic affair. 
  The enemy may have no idea how many hostiles they face 
  or where they are, which can create advantages for a fast-
  moving and determined team. 
  The opposition will almost always have the advantage that 
  they can defend their positions and wait for assistance; we 
  must win, whereas they have only to avoid losing for long 
  enough for help to arrive. If it does not seem likely that the 
  operative can win quickly, combat should be avoided. 
  seleCting sniPer nests
  Selecting a suitable sniper nest 
  is similar to selecting a vantage 
  point, as described on pg. 60. 
  The only difference is that instead of a 
  combined Stealth and Tradecraft roll, the 
  sniper should make a combined Stealth and 
  Firearms (Rifle/Shotgun) roll.
  SMALL-UNIT MILITARY TACTICS
  Whilst to a great extent open combat is the antithesis of 
  intelligence operations, sometimes the best or only way to 
  achieve a goal is through direct military action. This will 
  usually take the form of a small unit of skilled personnel, 
  heavily armed, making a sudden assault on an enemy 
  position or possession, eliminating the defenders and then 
  carrying out the mission at hand. 
  From the point of view of an intelligence operation, the first 
  rule of combat is to leave it to the professionals. Wherever 
  C O V E R T  O P E R AT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  102
  possible, if an operative is working with combat personnel 
  then they should be allowed to handle their part of the task, 
  with the operative hanging back until it is reasonably safe. 
  This is more than simple self-preservation – the mission 
  becomes meaningless without the operative. 
  It is worth noting that no combat zone is ever 100% safe, 
  even after the shooting stops, so operatives need to be 
  ready to defend themselves. However, unless an extra gun 
  is critical to success the operative needs to stay out of the 
  firing line as much as possible. That said, it may be useful to 
  have a basic understanding of tactics. 
  avoiding ComBat
  If an investigator is working with 
  a small military unit in pursuit 
  of an objective, but wants to 
  avoid being caught up in any combat, 
  there are two main factors at play: luck 
  and caution. 
  If the unit is operating in a combat 
  zone, but is not setting out to engage 
  the enemy, a group Luck roll will be 
  required to avoid action. If this fails, 
  the investigator will need to find cover. 
  A combined Stealth and Spot Hidden roll 
  will allow an investigator to find and 
  use a suitable hiding place, but this 
  assumes that there is time to do so. If 
  the unit encounters the enemy, refer to 
  the Striking the First Blow (pg. 106) and 
  Diving for Cover (pg. 113) sections of the 
  Call of Cthulhu rulebook for guidance.
  The individual infantryman, usually equipped with a semi-
  automatic or fully automatic rifle, is the basis of most 
  combat teams. Specialists such as point men might carry 
  shotguns or submachine guns, and submachine guns may be 
  substituted for rifles if urban combat is expected. 
  However, for the most part combat takes the form of an 
  exchange of rifle fire, supported by light automatic weapons. 
  Most squads contain at least one light or general-purpose 
  machine gun. 
  The basic principle is fire and movement; part of the 
  force provides covering fire while another element moves 
  to a better position. Once a good position is achieved – 
  for example, one that allows enemy positions to be taken 
  under a crossfire – the enemy can be eliminated or forced to 
  withdraw from cover that no longer has any value. 
  Few firefights end with the total destruction of the opposing 
  force, unless the enemy is cornered and refuses to surrender 
  or is eliminated by grenades thrown into their final refuge. 
  More commonly, one side retreats or flees leaving the other 
  in possession of the battlefield. 
  For our purposes, terrain is virtually worthless, as are 
  casualties inflicted upon the enemy. What matters is the 
  ability to continue or complete the mission. Thus clearing an 
  enemy force from the route is useful, as is taking possession 
  of a signals station from which we might obtain useful 
  intelligence. Winning a gunfight is a means to an end, 
  nothing more.
  investigators in Command
  If one or more of the investigators 
  is a covert operations specialist, 
  the Keeper is advised to let them 
  command the unit rather than following 
  the orders of an NPC. Not every player 
  has knowledge of military tactics, so the 
  Keeper should be prepared to allow the 
  investigator to make Military Science 
  rolls in order to determine the best 
  course of action.
  DENIABILITY
  There are times when overt action can be used to send a 
  message, but this is a political matter and not usually one 
  for the intelligence community. More commonly in our line 
  of work we do not want anyone to know for sure that we 
  were involved, even if they are aware that something has 
  happened.
  Deniability runs two ways; make sure that 
  your actions against Our Other Enemy must 
  be deniable to your mundane loyalties. The 
  boss likes us to think of our agency jobs as 
  
  103
  a cover, a cover you need to keep above all others. 
  - Rodriquez
  The perfect outcome in many cases is that our actions go 
  unnoticed, at least in the wider scheme of things. Failing 
  that, if the opposition is unsure exactly what has happened 
  and who is responsible then that is a good outcome. For 
  example, if we can create a situation where a building has 
  been destroyed by fire and both personnel and documents 
  are missing, but the opposition does not know if they are 
  dead, destroyed or taken, then this is a good outcome – 
  especially if they do not know for sure which agency is 
  responsible. Ideally, the enemy should not be able to say for 
  definite that it was an operation at all.
  It is inevitable that an operation might leave behind some 
  evidence, in which case the only remaining recourse is 
  deniability. That is to say, our political masters must be 
  able to deny that they were involved with some degree of 
  plausibility. The opposition must not be given clear proof 
  that our agencies were responsible for a clear act.
  Deniability can take the form of a plausible assertion or a 
  polite fiction. The latter occurs when there is no certain 
  proof but the opposition is pretty sure who is responsible. 
  A ‘polite fiction’ that our political masters would never 
  sanction such a thing might be acceptable because if the 
  opposition admits that they know what we did and they 
  are sure we did it, they have to act upon that or be seen 
  to be weak. If they decide that it is not in their interest to 
  act then they may choose to accept the polite fiction at 
  face value. 
  The political game that we are involved in is complex and 
  dangerous; a misstep could send us down the road to open 
  warfare or a nuclear exchange. Above all else it is the duty 
  of an operative to deny the opposition concrete information 
  that could be used against us. This usually means taking 
  care to clean up after an operation, to use sanitised weapons 
  and to operate quietly and subtly. It can, however, mean 
  desperate efforts to destroy equipment and documents 
  as the opposition’s personnel close in. It might also mean 
  ensuring that personnel are not taken alive.
  The fate of an operative who is captured can vary 
  considerably. It is sometimes possible to effect a rescue or 
  an exchange, and in some cases personnel have managed 
  to avoid serious consequences and been released. This is 
  rare, and only when the evidence against the operative is 
  extremely slight.
  If Our Other Enemy captures you do 
  not expect rescue. Take care of the 
  issue yourself in a satisfactory and 
  final manner.  -N
  Prisoner exChanges
  If an investigator is captured 
  in the course of a mission, 
  whether they will be exchanged 
  swiftly is largely determined by their 
  value and whether their own government 
  has a suitable prisoner to offer up in 
  exchange. This can be resolved through 
  a combined Trust and Luck roll. If this 
  fails, the investigator’s colleagues 
  may try to convince their superiors in 
  the intelligence services or government 
  contacts to pursue the exchange on their 
  behalf. Doing so could provide the basis 
  for a short side-mission in a campaign, as 
  the investigators negotiate the internal 
  politics, bureaucracy and egos of their 
  own intelligence services.
  C O V E R T  O P E R AT I O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  104
  Damage caused by captured personnel can be minimised 
  by compartmentalisation of information and by distancing 
  planners with a knowledge of the network as a whole from 
  hazardous operations. There is always some damage when 
  personnel captured, and if the opposition are reasonably 
  sure that they have an intelligence operative in custody then 
  they may use very extreme means to obtain information. 
  Operatives are trained to resist interrogation but there are 
  limits to the endurance of any given person. Captors may 
  never give up, or may torture operatives for the sake of 
  revenge rather than any useful purpose.
  It may be that death really is preferable to capture. If there 
  are no other options, an operative may have to take the hard 
  decision to terminate a colleague or ally who is in danger 
  of impending capture, or to take their own life. With no 
  prospects but suffering that ends only in betrayal of friends 
  and country, death might be seen as a kindness. 
  In the final analysis, it is the duty of all operatives to keep 
  secret information from the enemy and to deny them all 
  assistance. A live operative might be used against their 
  home country even if they do not give up any secrets, by 
  causing political embarrassment or even escalation of the 
  situation. In such circumstances, it may be the final duty 
  of the operative to die rather than to aid the enemy. By 
  preserving the deniability of our operations at the cost of 
  their life, an operative may enable us to keep on opposing 
  our enemies and prevent the escalation of a situation into a 
  major international incident.
  the ConseQuenCes of failure
  The 
  World 
  War 
  Cthulhu: 
  Cold 
  War rulebook provides guidance 
  for Sanity and Trust awards and 
  penalties following a mission, and our 
  published scenarios include examples 
  of such outcomes. Failed missions will 
  probably prove quite detrimental to the 
  careers and mental health of investigators, 
  and this will only be compounded by their 
  involvement with Section 46. 
  It is difficult enough to go through a 
  debrief for a mission that resulted in the 
  death of half your team without having to 
  cover up the fact that they were devoured 
  by a thousand-eyed monstrosity older than 
  mankind.
   
  They are red, red, red and long, long, long. I have, have, to put them back, back. 
       Get them off, off this bus stop floor. 
  I have seen the page, pages of me, me. 
  They, they see me, they, they read, read, me, me, me. - Stanton
  
  CHaPTer 
  Seven
  A p p e n d i c e s :
  S p e c i a l  W e a p o n s
  a n d 
  P r e - G e n e r a t e d
  C h a r a c t e r s 
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  106
  A variety of special weapons are available to operatives 
  working in the field. Some are issued by intelligence agencies 
  and others can be obtained from the enemy. Note that much 
  of this equipment is peculiar to a particular nation’s armed 
  forces or intelligence services and as such tends to make it 
  rather obvious who sent a given operative. 
  The following weapons are either special purpose items or 
  heavy weapons that are unlikely to be encountered outside 
  of a war zone or a military base. They include underwater 
  weapons, explosives, anti-tank systems and support weapons 
  such as machine guns.
  Yeah, an Uzi might take down some small 
  fry, but C4 or a Claymore certainly will. 
  Too bad you won’t get the chance to use 
  one. It’s not like you can file a request for 
  monster hunting weapons. - Rodriquez
  Handguns
  Welrod ‘Silent Pistol’
  Developed for use by SOE during World War Two, the 
  Welrod pistol is not a combat weapon; it is an assassination 
  tool. Chambered for 7.65mm (.32 ACP) ammunition it holds 
  8 rounds in the magazine, with a new round chambered 
  manually by working the action. The grip must be dismantled 
  to reload the magazine. The Welrod is virtually silent due to 
  its internal suppressor.
  Heckler & Koch P11
  Introduced in 1976, the H&K P11 is an underwater pistol 
  with five barrels, each capable of firing a single shot using 
  electrical initiation. The entire barrel block must be replaced 
  to reload the weapon. 
  SPP-1 Underwater Pistol
  The Soviet SPP-1 is a four-barrel smoothbore pistol designed 
  for use underwater. It is reloaded by replacing the block 
  at the breech end of the barrels; this contains four rounds 
  and effectively reloads each of the barrels. The SPP-1 
  has a double-action trigger and can be fired in or out of 
  water, although it is much less accurate out of water than a 
  conventional pistol. 
  Longarms
  De Lisle Carbine
  A World War Two-era weapon created using parts from 
  a Lee-Enfield rifle and a Thompson submachine gun, the 
  De Lisle has an integral suppressor that makes it almost 
  completely silent. It uses a 7-round magazine and fires .45 
  ACP ammunition. It is effective out to about 250m, although 
  accuracy drops beyond 100m.
  A P P E N D I X  A :
  • S P E C I A L  W E A P O N S •
  HANDGUNS
  Weapon
  Skill
  Damage
  Base 
  Range
  Attacks per 
  round
  Bullets in 
  gun
  HP’s 
  resistance
  Malfunction
  Welrod ‘Silent 
  Pistol’[1]
  Firearms 
  (Handgun)
  1D8
  5 yards
  1
  8
  8
  99
  Heckler & Koch 
  P11[2]
  Firearms 
  (Handgun)
  1D8
  15 yards/ 
  5 yards 
  underwater
  1 (3)
  5
  6
  99
  SPP-1 Underwater 
  Pistol[2, 3]
  Firearms 
  (Handgun)
  1D8
  15 yards/ 
  5 yards 
  underwater
  1 (3)
  4
  6
  99
  [1] Due to the effective suppressor, any Listen rolls to detect the sound of a Welrod firing are made at an Extreme 
  difficulty level.
  [2] Can be used underwater, although doing so incurs a penalty die. Damage is halved when used underwater.
  [3] Receives a penalty die when fired out of water.
  
  107
  APS Underwater Rifle
  Introduced in 1975, the APS is a smoothbore rifle fed from 
  a 26-round magazine. It is capable of automatic fire and will 
  operate underwater or in air, though it is less accurate than a 
  standard rifle and not well suited to general combat.  
  RPK
  A variant of the AK-47 family of assault rifles, the RPK is 
  basically an overgrown rifle with a longer, heavier barrel and 
  a bipod. It can use AK assault rifle magazines or a larger 
  45-round magazine. A 70-round drum is also available, 
  but is not widely used. The RPK is chambered for Soviet 
  7.62x39mm ammunition.
  maCHIne guns
  FN MAG 58/L7
  The Belgian-made FN MAG machine gun is used by the 
  armed forces of dozens of countries, most notably the 
  United Kingdom, where it is designated L7. The MAG 58 
  is a true machine gun, with a quick-change barrel to allow 
  one to cool while another continues to fire. It is fed from a 
  belt composed of metal links, allowing a belt of any desired 
  length to be produced.  It is chambered for 7.62x51mm 
  NATO ammunition. The MAG 58 is the classic general 
  purpose machine gun and is often referred to as a GPMG 
  (either spelled out or pronounced ‘jimpy’). 
  M60
  The M60 machine gun is the standard support weapon 
  of the US Army. It is chambered for 7.62x51mm NATO 
  ammunition and fed from an ammunition belt. Early models 
  required asbestos gloves for a barrel change, but later 
  variants have the barrel attached to the carrying handle, 
  which is used to hold the hot barrel as it is removed. 
  Maschinegewehr 3 (MG 3)
  Developed from the World War Two-era MG 42, the MG 3 
  is chambered for 7.62x51mm NATO ammunition and has a 
  very high rate of fire.  
  RPD/Type 56/Type 62
  The Soviet-made RPD is a reliable and effective weapon, 
  despite its somewhat crude appearance. Chambered for 
  7.62x39mm Soviet ammunition, it is fed from a 100-round 
  belt housed in a drum. Versions of the same weapon are 
  produced in China, where they are designated Type 56, 
  and North Korea, where they are designated Type 62. RPD 
  machine guns are widely exported and supplied to Soviet-
  backed insurgents worldwide.
  LONGARMS
  Weapon
  Skill
  Damage
  Base 
  Range
  Attacks per 
  round
  Bullets in 
  gun
  HP’s 
  resistance
  Malfunction
  De Lisle Carbine
  Firearms 
  (Rifle)
  2D6+2
  100 yards
  2
  7
  15
  00
  APS Underwater 
  Rifle[1]
  Firearms 
  (Rifle)
  2D6
  50 yards
  1 or 2
  26
  8
  99
  RPK
  Firearms 
  (Rifle)
  2D6+4 
  90 yards
  1 (3) or Full 
  Auto
  30
  10
  99
  [1] Can be used underwater, although doing so incurs a penalty die. Damage is halved when used underwater. Also 
  receives a penalty die when shot on land.
  A P P E N D I X  A :  S P E C I A L  W E A P O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  108
  PKM
  The PKM machine gun entered service in 1969 with Soviet 
  and Warsaw Pact forces. It is a conventional general-purpose 
  machine gun. 7.62x39mm Soviet ammunition is carried in a 
  belt contained in a box, which stops the belt from swinging 
  around and snagging on obstructions.
  roCket and grenade LaunCHers
  M2 Carl Gustav Recoilless Rifle
  Developed in Sweden in the 1940s, the Carl Gustav is a 
  reusable support weapon capable of firing an 84mm 
  projectile out to a distance of a kilometre, although it is 
  unlikely that most users could hit anything at even half that 
  distance, especially if the target is moving. The Carl Gustav 
  is used by the British Army, among others, providing a 
  degree of anti-armour and anti-fortification capability.
  RPG-7
  The RPG-7 comprises a reusable launcher that is simple to 
  use and extremely rigged, and a rocket-propelled grenade 
  with a 70mm warhead. It is modestly effective against 
  tanks and can easily destroy lighter vehicles. The RPG-7’s 
  maximum range is about 900m, but the effective range 
  is much shorter. Most users are unlikely to score a hit at 
  anything over 100-200m.
  M72 LAW
  A one-shot disposable rocket launcher capable of firing 
  a 66mm warhead out to a distance of 200m, the M72 is 
  reasonably effective against most tanks from the side but is 
  unlikely to penetrate frontal armour. It is light enough to be 
  carried by an infantry soldier until needed.
  While it might be tempting to use a 
  LAW or RPG to hunt big game, so to 
  speak, these weapons present severe 
  security issues. First and foremost, 
  acquiring them. Even if you can manage to get 
  one, 'off the books', so to speak, their use is 
  hardly covert. -  N
  M79 Grenade Launcher
  Also known as a ‘bloop tube’ for the noise it makes, or a 
  ‘thump gun’, the M79 is the standard grenade launcher in 
  use by the United States military. It fires a 40mm grenade 
  that cannot be thrown. It is reloaded by break-open action, 
  in the manner of many sporting shotguns. A skilled user can 
  put a grenade through a window at 100-150 yards.
  H&K 69A1 Grenatpistole
  Developed as an under-barrel weapon to fit on an assault 
  rifle, the 69A1 resembles a large pistol with an extendible 
  shoulder stock. It functions as a standalone 40mm grenade 
  launcher
  M203 Grenade Launcher
  The M203 is only just entering use at the beginning of the 
  decade. It is designed to fit under the barrel of an M16 
  assault rifle, allowing one member of a squad to function as 
  a grenadier without also depriving the squad of a rifleman. 
  Like the M79, it can fire a wide range of grenades including 
  high explosive anti-personnel rounds and a high explosive 
  dual-purpose round designed to penetrate up to 5cm of light 
  armour.
  RIFLES AND MACHINE GUNS
  Weapon
  Skill
  Damage
  Base 
  Range
  Attacks per 
  round
  Bullets in 
  gun
  HP’s 
  resistance
  Malfunction
  FN MAG 58/L7
  Firearms 
  (MG)
  2D6+4
  100 yards
  Full Auto
  50
  12
  99
  M60
  Firearms 
  (MG)
  2D6+4
  110 yards
  Full Auto
  100
  12
  99
  Maschinegewehr 
  3 (MG3)
  Firearms 
  (MG)
  2D6+4
  100 yards
  Full Auto
  50/100
  12
  99
  RPD/Type 65/
  Type 62
  Firearms 
  (MG)
  2D6+4
  110 yards
  Full Auto
  100
  14
  99
  PKM
  Firearms 
  (MG)
  2D6+4
  110 yards
  Full Auto
  100
  12
  99
  
  109
  grenades
  Fragmentation Grenades
  The standard-issue US Army hand grenade, the M26, consists 
  of an explosive core surrounded by notched wire, all housed 
  within a metal casing. The grenade causes a certain amount 
  of blast but its main killing power is due to fragments of 
  wire and casing being hurled out at great speed. Lethal 
  radius is about 15m. The M26 is due for replacement by the 
  broadly similar M67 grenade in the 1970s. Fragmentation 
  grenades in use by many other armed forces are generally 
  similar in performance, such as the British L2A2.
  Stun Grenades
  Referred to as ‘distraction’ or ‘stun’ grenades, these weapons 
  normally produce a bright flash or a very loud noise, or 
  both. Flash grenades essentially overload the eye and cause 
  blindness for a few seconds, whereas concussion-type 
  grenades rely on the effect of overloading the ear to cause 
  disorientation and deafness. There is a fire risk associated 
  with these grenades, but they are not intended as incendiary 
  weapons.
  Gas and Smoke Grenades
  Most gas grenades have a pyrotechnic and chemical 
  reaction effect that produces a cloud of gas. Various agents 
  generally known as tear gas are common, causing irritation 
  to the eyes and, in cases of extreme inhalation, respiratory 
  distress. Some gases are more likely to cause vomiting in 
  addition to irritation. Other gases can be used, including the 
  hallucinogenic BZ gas. Gas grenades are available in several 
  forms, including rifle grenades, hand grenades, grenades 
  launched from a specialist launcher and shotgun shells. 
  Smoke is used by most military forces for concealment 
  purposes, and various forms of coloured smoke grenades are 
  also available for signalling purposes. Smoke is generated by 
  pyrotechnic means, which can create a fire hazard.
  Incendiary and Phosphorous Grenades
  Incendiary grenades are designed to burn extremely hotly, 
  destroying anything nearby and starting a fire. Most 
  incendiary grenades use thermite and are referred to as 
  thermite grenades, but may contain other substances as 
  well. Incendiary grenades can be used to disable heavy 
  equipment such as artillery weapons and will completely 
  destroy smaller items. They are not very useful in a combat 
  role, however. 
  Phosphorous grenades create an incendiary effect but will fling 
  burning phosphorous out to a distance of several metres as 
  well as creating a dense cloud of smoke. Phosphorous burns on 
  contact with air and will cling to anything – and anyone – that 
  it strikes, making it an excellent, if unpleasant, weapon.
  ROCKETS AND GRENADE LAUNCHERS
  Weapon
  Skill
  Damage
  Base 
  Range
  Attacks per 
  round
  Ammo 
  Capacity
  HP’s 
  resistance
  Malfunction
  M2 Carl Gustav 
  Recoilless Rifle
  Firearms 
  (Heavy 
  Weapons)
  12D10/2 
  yards
  500 yards
  1
  Separate
  20
  99
  RPG-7
  Firearms 
  (Heavy 
  Weapons)
  3D10/2 
  yards
  100 yards
  1
  1
  14
  99
  M72 LAW
  Firearms 
  (Heavy 
  Weapons)
  8D10/1 
  yard
  200 yards
  1
  1
  14
  99
  M79 Grenade 
  Launcher
  Firearms 
  (Heavy 
  Weapons)
  3D10/2 
  yards
  100 yards
  1
  1
  12
  99
  H&K 69A1 
  Grenatpistole
  Firearms 
  (Heavy 
  Weapons)
  3D10/2 
  yards
  20 yards
  1
  1
  12
  99
  M203 Grenade 
  Launcher
  Firearms 
  (Heavy 
  Weapons)
  3D10/2 
  yards
  20 yards
  1
  1
  14
  99
  A P P E N D I X  A :  S P E C I A L  W E A P O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  110
  rIot guns
  Federal Riot Gun
  Although some shotguns are sometimes referred to as 
  ‘riot guns’, this weapon is a less-lethal device that projects 
  ‘baton’ rounds (large projectiles intended to knock down 
  and stun opponents), tear gas, smoke and flare rounds. It 
  can be encountered worldwide; various equivalent weapons 
  also exist in other countries.
  ARWEN
  Becoming available in 1970, the Anti-Riot Weapon, Enfield 
  (ARWEN) is a British 5-shot weapon fed from a rotary magazine. 
  It can launch less-lethal baton rounds out to about 100m.
  Schermuly Anti-Riot Gun
  A British single-shot break-open weapon capable of firing 
  a range of ammunition including baton and gas rounds, 
  the Schermuly weapon and others like it are typical of the 
  weapons in use when the media reports the use of ‘rubber 
  bullets’ to control a situation. 
  nuCLear warfare 
  Nuclear weapons are an integral part of the Cold War, so 
  it seems only fitting to include some information for the 
  Keeper. The threat of nuclear annihilation is ever-present, 
  and might be triggered by just one unexpected detonation. 
  There are many possible plots involving nuclear weapons 
  GRENADES
  Weapon
  Skill
  Damage
  Base Range
  Attacks per 
  round
  Ammo 
  Capacity
  HP’s 
  resistance
  Malfunction
  Fragmentation 
  Grenade
  Throw
  4D10/3 
  yards
  STR/5 yards
  1/2
  1
  10
  99
  Stun Grenade
  Throw
  1D10/3 
  yards[1]
  STR/5 yards
  1/2
  1
  10
  99
  Gas Grenade
  Throw
  N/A[2]
  STR/5 yards
  1/2
  1
  10
  99
  Smoke Grenade
  Throw
  N/A[3]
  STR/5 yards
  1/2
  1
  10
  99
  Incendiary 
  Grenade
  Throw
  2D10[4]
  STR/5 yards
  1/2
  1
  10
  99
  Phosphorous 
  Grenade
  Throw
  2D10/3 
  yards[4]
  STR/5 yards
  1/2
  1
  10
  99
  [1] All targets within 5 yards must pass a Hard CON roll or be blinded/deafened for 1D6 rounds.
  [2] All targets within 5 yards or within the same enclosed space as a tear gas grenade must pass a Hard CON roll or 
  be incapacitated by nausea and blindness for 1D6 rounds; failure also means that targets suffer a penalty die on all 
  actions for the next 10 minutes. 
  Targets affected by BZ gas are not immediately incapacitated, but receive a penalty die on all actions until they 
  next sleep. If the Keeper wishes to subject the investigator to hallucinations as a result of BZ gas, the Delusions and 
  Reality Checks section on pg. 162 of Call of Cthulhu provides a useful framework. If the investigator is not suffering 
  from a bout of madness, the Keeper may allow the investigator to use CON instead of Sanity to make Reality Checks, 
  with no risk of Sanity loss for failed rolls. Investigators undergoing bouts of madness still risk losing SAN when 
  making Reality Check rolls to see through drug-induced hallucinations.
  [3] Smoke persists for 1D6 minutes, during which time any attempts to see in, out or through the smoke require a 
  Hard Spot Hidden roll.
  [4] An investigator using an incendiary or phosphorous grenade to start a fire must make a Luck roll to ensure that 
  the fire catches and spreads.
  
  111
  that do not end in a mushroom cloud. Nuclear material to 
  make bombs might have to be protected or denied someone 
  who intends to use it, as might bomb-making components 
  such as triggers. 
  Creating a nuclear weapon is actually quite difficult. 
  Sufficient nuclear material must be obtained and contained 
  in such a way that it remains below critical mass for nuclear 
  fission but can quickly reach that mass when required. This 
  typically means separating nuclear material within the bomb 
  and creating a means to combine it hard and fast. If this is 
  not done effectively the bomb’s yield will be quite low – little 
  better than a conventional bomb of the same size – though 
  it will scatter toxic radioactive material, contaminating the 
  local area. 
  It is possible to create a radiological dispersion device, 
  or ‘dirty bomb‘, using a conventional explosive device 
  surrounded by nuclear material. A dirty bomb is not a 
  nuclear weapon as such; its explosion is no bigger than a 
  conventional bomb. 
  It can be considered the radioactive, toxic equivalent of 
  a nail bomb; an anti-personnel weapon using some other 
  material to enhance the effects of a conventional explosion. 
  A device of this sort will not blast missile silos open, but 
  it will kill a lot of people and make an area uninhabitable. 
  True nuclear weapons create a huge explosion that is rated 
  in terms of kilotons or even megatons (thousands or millions 
  of tons of TNT). A detonation causes several effects, 
  starting with ‘thermal bloom’. This is a pulse of infrared 
  radiation that can incinerate nearby people and objects, and 
  will cause fires at much greater distances. It is accompanied 
  by radiation and an electromagnetic pulse which can destroy 
  electronic devices in the area. 
  The blast effect is caused by air being pushed away from 
  the explosion, and a secondary inrush of air as it comes 
  back to fill the low-pressure area created. This causes the 
  characteristic mushroom cloud as the air rises, taking with it 
  dust and smoke particles. 
  A detonation at ground level causes a huge cloud of 
  fallout, which can fall up to a hundred miles or more from 
  the detonation site depending on the wind conditions. 
  Radioactive fallout is highly dangerous by way of skin 
  contact and ingestion or inhalation, but within 15-20 days 
  most of its radioactivity will have decayed to safer levels. 
  A nuclear device can also be exploded above the target, 
  creating a downward shock effect intended to crack hard 
  targets such as missile silos or bunkers. Lighter structures 
  will be affected by the blast as it radiates out from the 
  detonation. There will usually be a zone of total annihilation 
  RIOT GUNS
  Weapon
  Skill
  Damage
  Base 
  Range
  Attacks per 
  round
  Bullets in 
  gun
  HP’s 
  resistance
  Malfunction
  Federal Riot Gun
  Firearms 
  (Shotgun)
  1D6[1]
  20 yards
  1
  1
  10
  00
  ARWEN
  Firearms 
  (Shotgun)
  1D6[1]
  20 yards
  1
  5
  10
  00
  Schermuly Anti-
  Riot Gun
  Firearms 
  (Shotgun)
  1D6[1]
  20 yards
  1
  1
  10
  00
  [1] Damage listed is given for baton rounds. As these are designed to incapacitate through pain, anyone hit with one 
  should make a CON roll, even if the round does not inflict a Major Wound; failure means that the target is unable to 
  take any action for the next 1D6 rounds.
  All targets within 3 yards or within the same enclosed space as a detonating tear gas round must pass a Hard CON 
  roll or be incapacitated by nausea and blindness for 1D6 rounds; failure also means that targets suffer a penalty die 
  on all actions for the next 10 minutes.
  The effect of smoke rounds persists for 1D6 minutes, during which time any attempts to see in, out or through the 
  smoke require a Hard Spot Hidden roll.
  A P P E N D I X  A :  S P E C I A L  W E A P O N S
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  112
  exPosure to radiation
  Radiation should be treated in the same manner as poisons. The Keeper should 
  have investigators make a CON roll when first exposed, and then at the frequency 
  listed in the guidelines below. Success means the investigator does not suffer 
  the effects for the period of exposure. If the investigator fails the roll, use the 
  following guidelines to determine the effect of exposure:
  MILD EXPOSURE: Low-level fallout. Internal exposure to a tiny quantity of mildly 
  radioactive material, such as radium. 
  CON roll every month. Failure results in 1D10 damage and 1D10 loss of APP from burns 
  and hair loss. If they survive, afterwards the investigator must pass a Luck roll 
  with two bonus dice to avoid developing cancer, organ failure, blindness or another 
  chronic, life-threatening health problem.
  MODERATE EXPOSURE: Significant fallout. Exposure to low concentrations of radioactive 
  gas. Internal exposure to small quantity of radioactive material (effects will 
  continue until subject dies). 
  CON roll every day. Failure results in 1D10 damage and 1D10 loss of APP from burns and 
  hair loss. If they survive, afterwards the investigator must pass a Luck roll with 
  one bonus die to avoid developing cancer, organ failure, blindness or another chronic, 
  life-threatening health problem.
  STRONG EXPOSURE: Exposure to a the site of a recent nuclear weapon detonation. Exposure 
  to strong concentrations of radioactive gas. Internal exposure to larger quantity of 
  radioactive material (if swallowed, effects will continue until subject dies).
  CON roll every hour. Failure results in 1D10 damage and 1D10 loss of APP from burns 
  and hair loss. If they survive, afterwards the investigator must pass a Luck roll 
  to avoid developing cancer , organ failure, blindness or another chronic or life-
  threatening health problem.
  Intense exposure: Direct exposure to a nuclear core.
  CON roll every round. Failure results in 1D10 damage and 1D10 loss of APP from burns 
  and hair loss. If they survive, afterwards the investigator must pass a Hard Luck 
  roll to avoid developing cancer, organ failure, blindness or another chronic, life-
  threatening health problem.
  
  113
  surrounded by a region of decreasing damage characterised 
  by fires and blast effects. 
  Nuclear devices range from ‘suitcase nukes’ (demolition 
  charges that can be carried in a light vehicle) through 
  tactical weapons such as missiles, nuclear depth charges 
  and the like, right up to multi-megaton warheads intended 
  to destroy cities or missile silos. Most weapons use nuclear 
  fission, but more powerful weapons can be produced using 
  nuclear fusion. These thermonuclear weapons are harder 
  to produce and are beyond the means of all but the most 
  advanced nations. 
  Enhanced radiation weapons (‘neutron bombs’) are a 
  specialist version of a standard nuclear weapon intended to 
  create a greater radiation pulse. They still have blast and heat 
  effect, but produce more direct radiation with the effect that 
  they will kill personnel at a greater distance by radiation 
  effects without increasing damage to infrastructure. 
  M28/M29 Davy Crockett
  Nuclear weapons come in many shapes and sizes, from 
  large strategic missile warheads and bombs designed to 
  be delivered by aircraft through ‘battlefield’ or tactical 
  nuclear missiles. There is even an infantry-portable ‘nuclear 
  bazooka’. This is the M28/M29 Davy Crockett nuclear 
  weapon, which can be fired from a tripod out to a distance 
  of 1.5-2.5 miles. Its blast and radiation burst would almost 
  certainly kill everyone within a quarter-mile.
  The Davy Crockett weapon is currently in use  with the 
  US Army, though it has been phased out of European 
  deployment in the past few years. There were those who 
  opposed its withdrawal, citing weapons of this sort as the 
  only way to stop the ‘Red Steamroller’, whose assault seems 
  inevitable. 
  This weapon stands as an indicator 
  of the times in which our operatives 
  live, and the reason why they must 
  succeed in their missions. A world 
  that feels the need for weapons of this 
  sort stands on a knife-edge even without the 
  intervention of Our Other Enemy. - N
  A P P E N D I X  A :  S P E C I A L  W E A P O N S
  
   
  NATIONALITY: British
  AGE: 57
  SEX: Male
  PERSONALITY: Leader
   
  PERSONAL DESCRIPTION
  Portly, jowled and hook-nosed, St John has wispy white hair surrounding 
  his bald crown. His avuncular manner is carefully practiced, and he enjoys 
  playing the role of the harmless old duffer. While his tastes are somewhat 
  eccentric, St John is always perfectly turned out, favouring light-coloured 
  suits and cravats.
   
  BACKGROUND
  A relic of wartime intelligence and an original member of Network N, St John 
  returned to SIS after the dissolution of SOE in 1946. He has worked a variety of 
  foreign postings, specialising in counter-intelligence. His cold-blooded ability 
  to distance himself from the human cost of his actions makes him exception-
  ally good at his job, if a dangerous person to work with.
   
  IDEOLOGY/BELIEFS
  Espionage is best considered as a game. It is arrogance to consider oneself 
  a player: most of us are sacrificial pawns at best.
   
  TRAITS
  St John is obsessed with small details, and often absent-mindedly corrects 
  the grammar of those around him.
   
  INITIAL MYTHOS EXPERIENCE
  As a young teenager, St John and his brother Richard used to explore the 
  ruins of the recently demolished Exham Priory. The house’s reputation for 
  evil secrets made it irresistible to two thrill-seeking adolescents. Despite 
  the thorough destruction of the house itself, the brothers found cracks 
  and crevices amidst the rubble. After a bit of planning, they made their 
  way down into the darkness using ropes and lanterns, and discovered 
  what seemed like an entire hidden world there. They also discovered that 
  they were not alone, that misshapen things that resembled men only in 
  the worst possible ways dwelt in the darkness, devouring anything they 
  could catch. St John barely escaped, and his nightmares are filled with the 
  screams of his brother as he was snatched down into the darkness. Richard 
  was never seen again.
  Percival St John
  
  Percival St John
  Leader
  Intelligence Officer
  Field Officer
  57
  Male
  British
  SIS
  50
  50
  60
  40
  50
  60
  80
  70
  5
  O
  O
  None
  0
  O
  O
  21%
  50%
  60%
  1%
  20%
  20%
  40%
  50%
  40%
  40%
  40%
  25%
  60%
  Organisation Knowledge
  (Soviet Union)
  50%
  Organisation Knowledge
  (Eastern Europe)
  Language (Russian)
  Language (German)
  60%
  50%
  70%
  21%
  21%
  80%
  50%
  70%
  Webley MK IV revolver
  1d10
  11
  14
  20
  25
  10
  25
  10
  30
  12
  20
  8
  25
  10
  30
  12
  40
  16
  35
  14
  10
  4
  25
  10
  30
  12
  1
  1
  10
  4
  10
  4
  20
  8
  25
  10
  20
  8
  20
  8
  20
  8
  12
  5
  30
  12
  25
  10
  25
  10
  30
  12
  35
  14
  10
  4
  40
  16
  10
  4
  25
  10
  35
  14
      40 
      20 
      8
  
   
   
    Portly, jowled and hook-nosed, St John has wispy 
  white hair surrounding his bald crown. His avuncular manner is carefully 
  practiced, and he enjoys playing the role of the harmless old duffer. While his 
  tastes are somewhat eccentric, St John is always perfectly turned out, favouring 
  light-coloured suits and cravats.
   
                Ego. St John sees espionage as a game and himself as a 
  grandmaster.
   
                Michael Brownlow, a new officer in the section who 
  St John has found himself mentoring. The boy is still green, but cunning, and 
  reminds St John of himself when he was young.
   
                    The Greene Club in St James’s, where St John meets 
  colleagues from Section 46 for a sauna every Sunday morning.
   
                      A poison capsule St John took from an SS officer in 
  the war. It may come in useful one day.
             St John is obsessed with small details, and often absent-mindedly 
  corrects the grammar of those around him.
                                                   When they were children, St John and 
  his brother, Richard, explored the ruins of the notorious Exham Priory. Richard 
  was taken into the darkness by a misshapen humanoid creature and never seen 
  again.
  SIS
  40% (20/8)
  Section 46
  40% (20/8)
  Bentley T series four-door saloon
  £100
  Wealthy
  600
  £60,000
  
   
  NATIONALITY: Hungarian
  AGE: 28
  SEX: Male
  PERSONALITY: Thinker
   
  PERSONAL DESCRIPTION
  Tall, dark-haired and with sharp, intelligent eyes, Lantos is a handsome 
  man and uses this to his advantage. He is also a natural mimic, and while 
  his Hungarian accent is noticeable when he is not trying to disguise it, he 
  affects a perfect English accent most of the time.
   
  BACKGROUND
  The younger brother of one of the student leaders of the demonstrations 
  that sparked the 1956 uprising in Hungary. Lantos was smuggled out of 
  Hungary by Clarence Downs, an SIS agent who had been working with 
  Lantos’ brother, after the rest of his family were killed by the Soviets. 
  Downs adopted Lantos and raised him in England, but Lantos never forgets 
  where he came from. His background, language skills and facility for 
  deception made him a natural recruit for SIS, and he has been working as 
  an agent since leaving university.
   
  IDEOLOGY/BELIEFS
  The Soviets are responsible for the deaths of too many people Lantos has 
  loved, and they need to pay.
   
  TRAITS
  Speaks thoughtfully and carefully, leaving long silences while he considers 
  what to say next.
   
  INITIAL MYTHOS EXPERIENCE
  Disobeying direct orders, Lantos broke into an address in West Berlin 
  that a contact had told him was a Stasi safe house. Instead of finding the 
  Hungarian double agent he had been tracking, Lantos found himself facing 
  an old man living in skin-crawling filth. The man had a strangely elongated 
  face and his mouth opened far too wide as he cried out in alarm. As the man 
  stumbled towards Lantos, reaching out with sharp and filthy fingernails, 
  Lantos panicked and shot him. The man fell back and slowly dissolved into 
  a pool of foul liquid that writhed with small, worm-like shapes. Lantos 
  never reported the experience to his superiors, but the short period of 
  psychiatric care he required brought him to the attention of N’s associates.
  JOzsef LantOs/JOseph dOwns
  
  József Lantos/Joseph Downs
  Thinker
  Intelligence Officer
  Field Officer
  28
  Male
  Hungarian
  SIS
  60
  50
  50
  80
  70
  40
  60
  50
  9
  O
  O
  None
  0
  O
  O
  60%
  40%
  1%
  60%
  60%
  50%
  70%
  60%
  50%
  40%
  Organisation Knowledge
  (Soviet Union)
  60%
  Organisation Knowledge
  (Eastern Europe)
  Language (Russian)
  Language (English)
  60%
  21%
  40%
  21%
  50%
  80%
  70%
  Switchblade
  1d4
  30%
  50%
  21%
  30%
  11
  10
  60
  30
  12
  25
  10
  25
  10
  40
  16
  35
  14
  20
  8
  30
  12
  25
  10
  30
  12
  20
  8
  1
  1
  30
  12
  30
  12
  25
  10
  15
  6
  35
  14
  30
  12
  25
  10
  25
  10
  10
  4
  15
  6
  30
  12
  20
  8
  20
  8
  30
  12
  10
  4
  25
  10
  10
  4
  40
  16
  35
  14
      60 
      30 
     12
  
   
   
    Tall, dark-haired and with sharp, intelligent eyes, 
  Lantos is a handsome man and uses this to his advantage. He is also a natural 
  mimic, and while he his Hungarian accent is noticeable when he is not trying to 
  disguise it, he affects a perfect English accent most of the time.
   
                Ideology. The Soviets are responsible for the deaths of 
  too many people Lantos has loved, and they need to pay.
   
                Lantos’s adoptive father, Clarence Downs, an SIS officer 
  who smuggled Lantos out of Hungary during the failed revolution in 1956, fol-
  lowing the death of his family.
   
                    The Golden Lion in Soho, a gay bar where Lantos 
  spends the occasional evening when he is sure no one from the security service 
  is watching him.
   
                      His brother’s watch, the only memento Lantos has 
  of his family.
             Speaks thoughtfully and carefully, leaving long silences while he 
  considers what to say next.
                                                   While searching a Stasi safe house in 
  West Berlin, Lantos encountered a grubby old man with strangely elongated features, 
  who had apparently broken in. The man attacked Lantos, who panicked and stabbed 
  his assailant. The man dissolved into a pool of foul liquid that writhed with worms.
  SIS
  40% (20/8)
  Section 46
  40% (20/8)
  Gold cigarette lighter
  £20
  Average
  160
  £4,000
  A good selection of stylish suits
  
   
  NATIONALITY: British
  AGE: 34
  SEX: Female
  PERSONALITY: Bruiser
   
  PERSONAL DESCRIPTION
  Small, with a wiry build that hides how muscular she is. Blonde hair, 
  usually tied back in a ponytail. High cheekbones, pale skin and dead eyes. 
  Shelden rarely speaks unless spoken to.
   
  BACKGROUND
  Shelden was born in Malay, the daughter of a British rubber plantation 
  owner. The Malayan National Liberation Army stormed the plantation in 
  1948, killing her father and taking Shelden as a hostage. Some months 
  later she was found in the jungle by the British Army, skinny, dressed in 
  rags and carrying a bloody machete. She rarely talks about what happened 
  to her, but the notes made by an Army medic at the time suggest that she 
  had killed one of her captors in his sleep and escaped. She had been hiding 
  in the jungle for months. Shelden was just 10 years old. Shelden grew 
  into a troubled teenager, involved in a string of violent incidents that kept 
  her in borstal. After N read her file and pulled some strings, Shelden was 
  recruited into SIS as a young adult. When Shelden is assigned to a mission, 
  unpleasantness is usually expected.
   
  IDEOLOGY/BELIEFS
  Survival is all that matters, no matter the cost.
   
  TRAITS
  Sits extremely still unless she is actively doing something.
   
  INITIAL MYTHOS EXPERIENCE
  When Shelden hid in the jungle as a child, she took shelter in a crumbling 
  old stone building, overgrown with creepers and covering the entrance to 
  a network of caves. There she met things that lived in the dark, things that 
  were almost like men but with very different appetites. They sheltered her 
  until her eventual rescue, although Shelden doesn’t know whether they saw 
  her as their ward or a future meal. The psychiatrist that N makes Shelden 
  see has helped her realise that her fears are less about what happened to 
  her in the dark and more about what she did there. Shelden finds it difficult 
  to stomach meat to this day. 
  Laura Shelden
  
  Laura Shelden 
  Bruiser
  Intelligence Officer
  Covert Actions Operative
  34
  Female
  British
  SIS
  70
  60
  60
  80
  50
  40
  50
  50
  9
  O
  O
  +1d4
  +1
  O
  O
  50%
  40%
  3%
  50%
  60%
  40%
  80%
  50%
  21%
  50%
  Organisation Knowledge
  (Southeast Asia)
  Language (Malay)
  40%
  70%
  30%
  60%
  Commando knife
  1d8 + db
  70%
  60%
  50%
  30%
  (Jungle)
  40%
  Walther PPK .32 pistol
  1d8
  12
  10
  60
  35
  14
  30
  12
  30
  12
  40
  16
  25
  10
  20
  8
  25
  10
  25
  10
  25
  10
  20
  8
  1
  1
  25
  10
  30
  12
  20
  8
  40
  16
  35
  14
  25
  10
  30
  12
  25
  10
  20
  8
  10
  4
  25
  10
  15
  6
  30
  12
  35
  14
  15
  6
  20
  8
      80 
     40 
    16
  
   
   
    Average height, with a wiry build that hides how 
  muscular she is. Blonde hair, usually tied back in a ponytail. High cheekbones, 
  pale skin and dead eyes. Shelden rarely speaks unless spoken to.
   
                Shelden was recruited into SIS at N’s behest. He saw 
  her emotionless manner, propensity for violence and experience of the Mythos as 
  assets.
   
                Billy, a tramp who sleeps rough in Tower Hamlets Cem-
  etery Park. There is something about him that reminds Shelden of her childhood, 
  and she is drawn to him.
   
                    Tower Hamlets Cemetery Park. Shelden goes for 
  long, peaceful walks amongst the wild undergrowth, crumbling gravestones and 
  collapsed tombs.
   
                      A small soapstone carving that Shelden has had 
  since she was a child. It resembles a man, but with canine features. She talks to 
  it in her dreams.
             Sits extremely still unless she is actively doing something.
                                                   As a child in Malay, Shelden took shelter 
  from guerillas in an ancient, crumbling building. There she was watched over by 
  creatures that resembled humans, but had strange, unwholesome appetites. They 
  sheltered her until her eventual rescue, although Shelden doesn’t know whether they 
  saw her as their ward or a future meal.
  SIS
  30% (20/8)
  Section 46
  50% (20/8)
                              An old, deep scar over her right eye.
  Mini Cooper
  £20
  Average
  160
  £4,000
  Antique Fairbairn-Sykes fighting knife
  
   
  NATIONALITY: American
  AGE: 52
  SEX: Female
  PERSONALITY: Expert
   
  PERSONAL DESCRIPTION
  Shoulder-length, curly blonde hair turning to grey, and a broad face that makes her look slightly 
  fat despite her lean build. Gysbers has a calm, almost deferential manner that masks her 
  intelligence and capacity for ruthlessness.
   
  BACKGROUND
  Gysbers was one of the first members of the OSS to be trained at Camp X in Ontario before the 
  USA entered World War Two, and was trained by and worked alongside members of SOE, finally 
  taking part in a number of covert missions in occupied Europe. It was then that Gysbers was 
  recruited to Network N, and she has remained loyal to N and his mission through her subsequent 
  service in the CIA. Gysbers has spent much of her career in Berlin. While she has been passed 
  over as station chief on multiple occasions, as it is not seen as a suitable job for a woman, few 
  people in the CIA know East Germany as well as she does.
   
  IDEOLOGY/BELIEFS
  Gysbers is a doubting Catholic who struggles with her faith in the context of the things she has 
  seen and what she believes she has to do to keep her country and the world safe.
   
  TRAITS
  Fiercely loyal to those she considers friends; she is just none too sure who her friends are any more.
   
  INITIAL MYTHOS EXPERIENCE
  While studying cyphers at Camp X, Gysbers chanced upon a coded transmission intercepted in France 
  that no one had been able to crack. She puzzled over it in her free time, almost as a hobby; it slowly 
  dawned on her that the transmission was not encoded at all, but was simply in a language no one 
  had recognised. In her attempts to understand the words, they began to infect her thoughts. Inhuman 
  words crept into her speech, and her dreams were consumed by images of alien vistas and the 
  endless spaces between the stars. One night she was brought out of a trance in the middle of some 
  woodland near Lake Ontario by Percival St John, a British SOE trainer at Camp X; the forest was 
  shifting around them in the darkness and it seemed like the trees themselves were walking. With the 
  help of St John and N, Gysbers eventually returned to her senses, but she has retained a sensitivity to 
  psychic emanations from inhuman sources.
  eleanOr Gysbers
  
  Eleanor Gysbers
  Expert
  Intelligence Officer
  Intelligence Analyst
  52
  Female
  American
  CIA
  50
  40
  50
  50
  60
  60
  80
  70
  6
  O
  O
  None
  0
  O
  O
  40%
  50%
  2%
  40%
  25%
  50%
  Organisation Knowledge
  (Western Europe)
  70%
  Organisation Knowledge
  (Eastern Europe)
  Language (Russian)
  Language (German)
  70%
  60%
  21%
  45%
  80%
  Browning Hi Power 9mm pistol
  1d10
  21%
  21%
  50%
  60%
  60%
  (Soviet 
  Union)
  40%
  9
  14
  25
  25%
  25
  10
  20
  8
  25
  10
  25
  10
  30
  12
  30
  12
  40
  16
  35
  14
  20
  8
  10
  4
  25
  10
  25
  10
  1
  1
  12
  5
  10
  4
  20
  8
  35
  14
  30
  12
  30
  12
  30
  12
  30
  12
  25
  10
  35
  14
  20
  8
  10
  4
  22
  9
  40
  8
      25 
      12 
      5
  
   
   
    Shoulder-length, curly blonde hair turning to grey, 
  and a broad face that makes her look slightly fat despite her lean build. 
  Gysbers has a calm, almost deferential manner that masks her intelligence and 
  capacity for ruthlessness.
   
                Gysbers joined the OSS at its inception out of a sense 
  of patriotism, and moved into the CIA after the war. She has been a spy for so 
  long now that she can’t remember any other life.
   
                Don Gysbers, her estranged husband. He didn’t want to 
  follow his wife’s career around the world, and they separated. Still, whenever 
  Gysbers travels back home, they always seem to end up in bed together.
   
                    The site of the former US embassy in East Berlin, 
  now nothing more than a ruin in the security zone. It is a symbol of everything 
  that has gone wrong since the war.
   
                      Her pet cat, Flowers, who is never quite as happy 
  to see her as she would like.
             Fiercely loyal to those she considers friends; she is just none too sure 
  who her friends are any more.
                                                   Gysbers attempted to translate a cipher 
  of unknown provenance while working as a code breaker at Camp X, near Ontario, 
  during World War Two. Her mind was infected with alien thoughts, leading to fugue 
  states and strange visions. These recur in times of stress.
  CIA
  40% (20/8)
  Section 46
  40% (20/8)
  Scanlock bug sweeper
  £100
  Wealthy
  500
  £50,000
  (Note: Gysbers has assets mainly in US dollars and German marks, but they 
  are presented in British pounds for consistency)
  
  SECTION 46 OPERATIONS MANUAL
  126
  A
  (Spot Rules for) Abseiling 
  54
  (Defeating) Active Questioning 
  17
  Additional Considerations 
  63
  Analysing Information 
  67
  Appendix A: Special Weapons 
  106
  Approach 
  34
  APS Underwater Rifle 
  107
  ARWEN 
  110
  (Handling) Assassination Attempts 
  81
  Assassination Techniques 
  79
  Avoiding Combat 
  102
  B
  Bacterial Agents 
  84
  Believing your Own Lies 
  10
  Biological Toxins 
  84
  Blister Agents 
  84
  Blood Agents 
  84
  Breaking and Entering 
  54
  Bugs and Other Remote Listening Devices 
  66
  Building a Network 
  31
  C
  Calling for Rolls During Operations 
  50
  Case Seven Code Words 
  22
  (A Note About) Chemical and Biological Weapons 
  85
  Chemical Incapacitants 
  84
  (Spot Rules for) Chokeholds 
  78
  Choking Agents 
  84
  Cleaning Up 
  100
  Cleaning up Operational Locales 
  86
  Close Protection Duties 
  100
  (Handling) Codes and Ciphers 
  23
  Combat in Urban Terrain 
  101
  Communications 
  20
  Communications and Deception 
  6
  Compartmentalisation and Operational Security 
  41
  (The) Consequences of Failure 
  104
  Core Staff 
  31
  (Bonuses and Penalties on) Cover Identities 
  13
  (Levels of) Cover Identity 
  12
  Covert Operations 
  90
  Covert Operations Specialists as Investigators 
  94
  D
  Damage and Other Effects from 
  Chemical Agents 
  83
  De Lisle Carbine 
  106
  (Handling) Demolition Tasks 
  77
  Deniability 
  102
  Determining the Effectiveness of Guerilla Groups 
  97
  Disguises and Cover Identities 
  10
  (Handling the) Disposal of Bodies 
  88
  Disposing of Bodies 
  37
  Disposing of Bodies and Other Evidence 
  85
  Dealing with Dissident Groups 
  91
  Drops and Other Forms of Communicication 
  24
  (Handling) Drugs, Poisons, Toxins 
  82
  (Types of) Drugs, Poisons and Pathogens 
  83
  E
  Exfiltration 
  50
  Exfiltration, Exploitation and Clean-up 
  41
  (Stats for various) Explosives 
  76
  (Use of) Explosives and Incendiary Devices 
  75
  Exposure to Radiation 
  112
  F
  (Handling) Facilitation 
  40
  Federal Riot Gun 
  110
  Field Operations 
  46
  (Use of) Firearms 
  73
  Firing from the Hip 
  74
  FN MAG 58/L7 
  107
  Fragmentation Grenades 
  109
  G
  Gas and Smoke Grenades 
  109
  Grenades 
  109
  Guerrilla Warfare 
  96
  (Eleanor) Gysbers 
  123
  H
  H&K 69A1 Grenatpistole 
  108
  Handguns 
  106
  Heckler & Koch P11 
  106
  I
  (Using) Improvised Weapons 
  72
  Incendiary and Phosphorous Grenades 
  109
  Infiltration 
  49
  Information Gathering 
  59
  Informers and Double Agents 
  37
  Insurgents, Revolutionaries and Dissidents 
  90
  Introduction 
  4
  (Defeating) Investigation 
  15
  Investigation, Interrogation and Torture 
  13
   
  Stage 1: Routine Observation 
  14
   
  Stage 2: Routine Investigation 
  14
   
  Stage 3: Active Investigation 
  14
   
  Stage 4: Hostile Interrogation 
  14
  Investigators in Command 
  102
  L
  (József) Lantos/Joseph Downs 
  118
  Lies, Damned Lies and Amended Truths 
  7
  Listening Devices 
  65
  Longarms 
  106
  M
  M2 Carl Gustav Recoilless Rifle 
  108
  • I N D E X •
  
  127
  M203 Grenade Launcher 
  108
  M28/M29 Davy Crockett 
  113
  M60 
  107
  M72 LAW 
  108
  M79 Grenade Launcher 
  108
  Machine Guns 
  107
  Maschinegewehr 3 (MG 3) 
  107
  Mechanical Sabotage 
  95
  Mission and Operational Planning 
  97
  Missions and Operations 
  97
  Mission Components 
  99
  (Handling) Mobile Surveillance 
  62
  Mobile Surveillance and Counter-Surveillance 
  60
  Mobile Targets 
  80
  Mobility, Infiltration and Exfiltration 
  49
  Motivations and Methodology 
  92
  (Special Forms of) Movement 
  52
  Movement in the Face of the Enemy 
  51
  N
  Navigating the Countryside 
  47
  Navigating Urban Environments 
  49
  Networks and Assets 
  28
  Nerve Agents 
  84
  Neutral Groups 
  92
  Nuclear Warfare 
  110
  O
  On-site Analysis 
  66
  Operating Alonside Local Insurgents, Dissidents and 
  Revolutionaries 
  90
  Operating Alongside Combat Troops 
  92
  Operating in the Countryside 
  46
  Operating in Urban Environments 
  48
  Operational Orders 
  42
  P
  (Spot Rules for) Parachuting 
  53
  (Defeating) Passive Threats 
  16
  Personal Meetings 
  36
  Personal Combat 
  71
  Personal Violence 
  70
  (The) Pitch 
  35
  PKM 
  108
  Plagues 
  84
  Planning Operations and Operational Orders 
  39
  Planting and Finding Car Bombs 
  63
  Poisons and Other Chemicals 
  81
  Pre-Approach 
  34
  Prisoner Exchanges 
  103
  Procurement and Facilitation 
  35
  (Handling) Procurement and Facilitation 
  36
  (Use of) Propaganda and Lies 
  25
  Props – Forged, Faked and Real 
  18
  Psychoactive Agents 
  84
  R
  Radiation and Radioactivity 
  85
  (Handling) Radio Communications 
  22
  Radio Eavesdropping 
  64
  (Spot Rules for) Rappelling 
  53
  (Handling) Reconnaissance 
  40
  (Spot Rules for) Recruiting Assets 
  31
  Recruiting Assets 
  32
  Reliability and Leverage 
  30
  Reporting Back 
  67
  (Requesting) Resources 
  40
  Riot Guns 
  110
  Rocket and Grenade Launchers 
  108
  RPD/Type 56/Type 62 
  107
  RPK 
  107
  S
  Sabotage and Disruption 
  94
  (Locating a) Safe House 
  44
  Safe Houses and Other Locations 
  43
  Schermuly Anti-Riot Gun 
  110
  Selecting a Suitable Vantage Point 
  60
  (Laura) Shelden 
  118
  Shoot to Kill 
  79
  Signals, Codes and Ciphers 
  23
  Silence and Surprise 
  79
  Silent Killing 
  77
  (Spot Rules for) Silent Kills 
  78
  Small-Unit Military Tactics 
  101
  (Spot Rules for) Sniper Crawls 
  52
  (Selecting) Sniper Nests 
  101
  Soporifics 
  85
  Sources and Assets 
  29
  SPP-1 Underwater Pistol 
  106
  Squeezing and Burning Sources 
  30
  (Percival) St John 
  113
  Staying Alert During Stakeouts 
  61
  Stealth and Concealment 
  74
  (The) Structure of a Network 
  32
  Stun Grenades 
  109
  Surveillance 
  59
  Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering 
  58
  T
  Tactical Considerations 
  100
  Tailing a Subject 
  61
  Taking Direct Action 
  71
  (Using) Technical Means 
  64
  Trust and Guerilla Groups 
  92
  U
  Understanding the Locals 
  47
  (Assessing) Unreliable Agents 
  39
  Using the Operations Manual 
  5
  V
  (Use of) Vehicles 
  61
  Viral Agents 
  85
  W
  (Assessing) Walk-Ins 
  34
  Welcome to Section 46 
  4
  Welrod ‘Silent Pistol’ 
  106
  I N D E X
  
SOURCE: textdata/thevault/Call of Cthulhu (CoC) (BRP) [multi]/7th edition/World War Cthulhu/World War Cthulhu - Cold War - Section 46 Operations Manual.pdf