TEXT: GORDON L ROTTMAN
  ILLUSTRATED BY BRIAN DELF
  US MACV-SOG 
  RECONNAISSANCE
  TEAM IN VIETNAM
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  WARRIOR • 159
  US MACV-SOG
  RECONNAISSANCE
  TEAM IN VIETNAM
  GORDON L ROTTMAN 
  ILLUSTRATED BY BRIAN DELF 
  Series editor Marcus Cowper
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  CONTENTS
  INTRODUCTION
  4
  MACV–SOG
  RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION
  12
  Finding the elusive SOG
  TRAINING
  18
  One-Zero Course 
  RT training
  APPEARANCE
  26
  EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS
  30
  Individual equipment 
  Weapons
  CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
  43
  BELIEF AND BELONGING
  44
  ON CAMPAIGN
  49
  Mission preparation
  EXPERIENCE OF BATTLE
  51
  Post-mission
  AFTERMATH OF BATTLE
  61
  BIBLIOGRAPHY
  63
  INDEX
  64
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  INTRODUCTION
  Throughout the 1960s the insurgency in South Vietnam gradually escalated.
  While denying involvement, North Vietnam had long supported the
  insurgency with arms, munitions, supplies, and advisers. Some small North
  Vietnamese Army (NVA) units were operating in South Vietnam in support
  of the Viet Cong (VC), the military arm of the National Liberation Front, the
  outlawed South Vietnamese communist party.
  While some of the troops and materials arrived in the south by crossing the
  demilitarized zone along the 17th Parallel, which separated North and South
  Vietnam, and others by boat, by far the most were sent through Laos and
  Cambodia. This was accomplished via the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail,
  which North Vietnam had begun to develop in mid-1959. The North
  Vietnamese government issued a resolution changing its “political struggle” in
  the south to an “armed struggle.” At the end of 1964 the first NVA regiment
  marched down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and entered South Vietnam. Events
  escalated rapidly. In February 1965 the US authorized air attacks against
  North Vietnam. In March the first US Marine ground-combat troops arrived
  and the following month US troops were authorized to conduct offensive
  operations. In May the first US Army conventional ground-combat troops
  arrived and NVA divisions began deploying via the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
  Known as the Truong Son Road after the 1,500–8,000ft Laotian mountain
  range it traversed, the name “Ho Chi Minh Trail” was bestowed by the
  Americans, and was later adopted by the North Vietnamese. It was not merely
  a trail or road winding through the forested hills and valleys of Laos and
  Cambodia; the route was a network of interconnected roads and foot trails
  allowing alternate ways to bypass flooding and deceive air attacks. It was never
  known what roads would be in use or which were under repair at any one
  time, misleading analysts. The trailhead was at Techepone, inside southeastern
  Laos. Truck convoys reached it over numerous roads running out of North
  Vietnam. The trucks were for supplies; troop units and replacements traveled
  on foot. Units traveled south in battalion- and company-sized increments and
  transported their own crew-served weapons. Replacements traveled in groups
  varying in size from five men to up to 500, the most common being 40–50.
  They carried only individual weapons and five days’ supply of rice. They would
  march for four or five days, staying at a way station each night, after which
  they would have a rest day and were resupplied with rations.
  4
  MACV-SOG RECONNAISSANCE
  TEAM IN VIETNAM
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  Huge amounts of supplies were shipped south. In order to supplement the
  trucks, ox carts, reinforced bicycles, and even elephants were used. Supplies
  also flowed down the region’s rivers, allowing some to get through during
  the wet season, which essentially shut down the roads. Even fuel pipelines
  were laid. The foot and bicycle trails were 2–5ft wide, while truck roads were
  18ft wide. In 1964, 20–30 tons of supplies a day were hauled down the trail.
  By the 1965 dry season it was 90 tons a day.
  5
  This short section of the Ho Chi
  Minh Trail in Laos was a highly
  desirable target because it
  snaked along a hillside above 
  a river. B-52 bombs bursting 
  on either side would bury or
  collapse the road. Approaching
  insertion helicopters could
  discern the Trail’s route from
  miles away. (John Plaster)
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  It developed into a monumental logistics effort,
  operated by the 559th Transportation Group,
  which maintained the trail system, supply caches,
  storage dumps, barracks, maintenance facilities,
  hospitals, and command-and-control facilities, 
  as well as base areas where the supplies and troops
  were marshaled and sent into South Vietnam 
  on branch trails. The 559th Transportation 
  Group was organized into 15 logistical-base units 
  (binh tram), later 27, each responsible for 30–50
  miles of trail. They typically were composed of
  two truck-transport, engineer, and air-defense
  battalions and single communications-liaison,
  signal, security, and medical battalions. Sometimes
  there was an SA-2 missile battalion and a food-
  production unit, which cultivated gardens and
  raised livestock. Besides defending, repairing,
  maintaining, and expanding the trail system, the
  base units operated way stations and provided
  guides. Local Laotian and Cambodian guides were
  employed until 1965, after which only VC/NVA
  communications-liaison agents were used, for
  security purposes. The 559th’s motto was “Build
  roads to advance, fight the enemy to travel.”
  The weather played a major role in both the
  NVA’s supply effort and Free World measures to
  interdict it. The southwest monsoon (rainy season) ran from mid-May to
  mid-September, bringing heavy rains, overcast skies, and high temperatures.
  The northwest monsoon (dry season) lasted from mid-October to mid-
  March, with limited rain and moderate temperatures. This is when the Trail
  saw its heaviest use, and when American reconnaissance and air interdiction
  aimed at it was at its most intense.
  6
  A GAZ-51 cargo truck runs
  down the muddy Ho Chi Minh
  Trail as it is photographed by
  an SOG RT. In many places the
  Trail was wide enough for two-
  way traffic. (John Plaster)
  A heavily bomb-blasted
  portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
  is pockmarked with 500lb,
  750lb, and 1,000lb bomb
  craters. (John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Obviously the Ho Chi Minh Trail’s use as a
  logistics and replacement transportation system, its
  base areas, and the privileged sanctuary it provided
  the NVA/VC was an extremely important aspect
  of the Vietnam War. A basic precept of war is to
  interdict the enemy’s line of communications. 
  This was much easier said than done with the 
  Ho Chi Minh Trail. The vast majority of it ran
  beneath jungle canopy, bridges and fords were
  camouflaged, and routes were frequently changed.
  Areas were laid bare by bombs and the spraying
  of defoliant, but these areas were often bypassed
  and camouflage screens were erected. Antiaircraft
  defenses were heavy, and in particularly dangerous
  areas truck travel was undertaken at night.
  A simple dirt road is not as easily disrupted as
  a modern hard-surfaced highway. A wide highway
  is easily located, even in forested areas, is straighter
  than a narrow dirt road snaking beneath the trees,
  and is easier to hit with a bomb for these reasons.
  Three things happen when a 750lb general-
  purpose bomb is dropped on a dirt road: a large
  hole is created, nearby vegetation is blown away
  from the hole, and loose soil is displaced and
  scattered about. Only two things needed to be
  done to bypass a large hole in a road; nearby
  vegetation needed to be removed and loose soil laid to provide a new road
  surface bypassing the hole. The bomb craters also provided water reservoirs
  and bathing facilities.
  The Trail was well protected by air defenses and ground troops. These may
  not have always been trained infantry and security units, although combat units
  passing through the area would often be pressed into security and pursuit
  A Laotian valley peppered 
  with bomb craters, completely
  obliterating a portion of the 
  Ho Chi Minh Trail. In some
  instances the NVA were able 
  to rebuild such a battered
  section by winding the route
  through the craters and
  making it look like it did not
  exist. In other instances they
  completely bypassed the area
  with a new road. (Frank Greco
  via John Plaster)
  7
  An aerial photograph of the 
  Ho Chi Minh Trail showing
  bulldozer tracks in Laos where
  overnight repairs of bomb
  craters have been made.
  Bulldozer tracks were
  sometimes confused with 
  tank tracks. Regardless, air
  attacks on the area to destroy
  dozers were valuable, as they
  inhibited efforts to repair 
  the Trail. (Ted Wicorek via 
  John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  A One-Zero armed with a
  silencer-equipped .45-cal. M3
  “grease gun.” A Claymore bag
  is carried at his right hip and 
  a strobe-light case is on the
  right shoulder strap of his
  STABO harness. The man 
  in the background is armed
  with a 5.56mm XM177E2
  submachine gun. (John Plaster)
  duties. Service troops would be turned out to search
  for American reconnaissance teams. There were
  also very efficient NVA counter-reconnaissance
  companies who actively sought and pursued recon
  teams. In order to determine the exact location of
  the hidden routes, bridges, fords, dumps, rest areas,
  truck parks, and air defenses, and to determine
  which trails and roads were in use, the traffic
  pattern and schedule, etc., someone had to go 
  in on the ground and look at it up close. Aerial
  visual reconnaissance, aerial photographs, satellite
  surveillance, and radio interception provided little
  if any of this much-needed intelligence information.
  Prior to 1965 there was no existing unit
  capable of covertly operating in such a dangerous
  environment.
  MACV–SOG
  As with any new and unprecedented initiative, the
  early days of MACV-SOG were flawed with
  misconceptions, over-expectation, and mistakes.
  Aware of extensive NVA infiltration of advisers
  and supplies, in 1961 the new Kennedy
  administration implemented a National Security
  Action Memorandum that expanded the Central
  Intelligence Agency’s authority to introduce South
  Vietnamese agents into North Vietnam and Laos. The CIA did not have the
  specialized tactical expertise or the logistical resources to conduct such
  operations. Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs provided the training
  expertise. Efforts were made to drop South Vietnamese agents into the North
  and it proved a disaster. Of the 22 teams inserted in 1961–63, by late 1963
  8
  RECON TEAM DUTY POSITIONS
  12-man team
  Six-man team
  1-0 team leader
  1-0 team leader
  1-1 assistant team leader
  1-1 assistant team leader/radio operator
  1-2 radio operator
  1-2 radio operator (optional)
  0-1 indigenous team leader
  0-1 indigenous team leader
  0-2 interpreter
  0-2 interpreter
  0-3 grenadier
  0-3 grenadier
  0-4 grenadier
  0-4 scout
  0-5 scout
  0-6 scout
  0-7 scout
  0-8 scout
  0-9 scout
  Note:
  Positions beginning with “1-“ were ﬁlled by Americans, and those beginning with “0-” were ﬁlled by 
  indigenous soldiers.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  only four remained operational with most having been killed, captured, or
  turned. The CIA’s ineffective ability to run this program led to many of the
  paramilitary projects in Vietnam being transferred to the military. Operation
  Switchback in November 1963 turned the programs over to US Special Forces
  (USSF). This included ground-reconnaissance operations in Laos. The
  operation was not concluded until December, and Military Assistance
  Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG,
  pronounced “Mac-Vee-Sogg”) was established on January 24, 1964.
  The group’s cover mission was to conduct analysis of lessons learned in
  combat involving all branches of service. It was actually a joint
  unconventional task force tasked with conducting covert strategic
  reconnaissance missions into Laos and South Vietnam, as well as sabotage
  and “black” psychological operations. Ground, air, and naval assets were
  employed to insert, collect, extract, and otherwise support these operations.
  MACV–SOG was first headquartered in Cholon outside Saigon, and
  moved into Saigon in 1966. Its air assets – Air Studies Group – operated
  infiltration and various specialized support aircraft, both fixed-wing and
  rotary-wing. The naval assets – Maritime Studies Group – operated
  specialized high-speed watercraft for infiltration and raiding. The MACV–
  SOG Training Center and Airborne Operations Group provided specialized
  training. A Psychological Studies Group operated broadcasting stations. 
  The largest and most important SOG unit was the Ground Studies Group
  (OP-35). It operated several forward operating bases (FOBs) throughout
  South Vietnam. These were launch sites for small reconnaissance teams that
  9
  In 1969 Project Ford Frum 
  saw SOG members aboard
  Army O-1 Bird Dog observation
  aircraft of the 219th Aviation
  Company photographing
  points of interest in Laos and
  Cambodia. Here six NVA graves
  were revealed in a bomb-
  shattered bamboo thicket.
  (Frank Greco via John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  conducted extremely dangerous intelligence-collection missions, mainly
  aimed at the Ho Chi Minh Trail. These usually had two or three Americans,
  with the rest of the team made up of men indigenous to the region. Most of
  these men were Montagnards, Cambodians, or Nùngs. The SOG began
  missions into Cambodia in June 1967.
  MACV–SOG was assigned some 2,000 Americans, mostly Army Special
  Forces, and over 8,000 specially selected, highly trained Vietnamese troops 
  of the Special Commando Unit. In all 4,000 USSF troops served in MACV–
  SOG, along with another 2,700 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine personnel,
  in addition to civilian staff. It had its own air force, composed of US Air Force,
  South Vietnamese, and Nationalist Chinese helicopter and transport units. 
  On 1 November 1967 MACV–SOG reorganized its ground reconnaissance
  elements into three field commands: Command and Control North, Central,
  and South (CCN, CCC, and CCS). SOG, unlike the Ground Studies Group,
  was a Special Forces unit, even if a high percentage of those in the Ground
  Studies Group were from the Special Forces. Special Forces soldiers were
  considered the best recon men because of their flexibility and since they were
  trained to operate deep within enemy territory and organize guerrillas. This
  new mission would also take place behind enemy lines and would demand
  flexibility and adaptability.
  MACV–SOG had five primary responsibilities. These were:
  1. Cross-border operations conducted to disrupt the VC, Khmer Rouge,
  Pathet Lao, and NVA in their own territories.
  2. Keeping track of all imprisoned and missing Americans and conducting
  rescue operations (Bright Light).
  3. Training and dispatching agents into North Vietnam to run resistance
  movements and intelligence-collection operations.
  4. “Black” psychological operations, such as establishing false NVA
  broadcasting stations inside North Vietnam.
  5. “Gray” psychological operations.
  This Soviet- or Chinese-made
  2½-ton GAZ-51 cargo truck was
  halted and the driver snatched
  by a CCC RT. A yet-to-be-
  ignited AN-M14 thermite
  grenade sits on the hood.
  North Vietnam lost thousands
  of trucks on the Trail, mainly 
  to US air attacks based on 
  SOG intelligence. (John Plaster)
  10
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  MACV–SOG was also entrusted with specific tasks, such as apprehending
  and killing selected enemy personnel and the recovery of sensitive documents
  and equipment if it was lost or captured by the enemy.
  CCN, CCC, and CCS conducted covert cross-border reconnaissance
  missions into Laos and Cambodia and some operations inside South Vietnam.
  They each consisted of a reconnaissance company composed of a varied
  number of reconnaissance teams (RTs), and “Hatchet” reaction forces
  operating as exploitation platoons and companies. It is the RTs that are best
  known and that undertook the most dangerous missions.
  These extremely perilous missions were oriented around collecting
  intelligence on NVA traffic, operations, and activities, as well as facilities (rest
  camps, supply transfer points, truck marshalling areas, supply depots,
  antiaircraft-gun positions, bridges, fuel dumps, pipelines, etc.) found along
  the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
  Besides collecting intelligence, they undertook sabotage missions, tapped
  telephone lines, planted electronic sensors, apprehended prisoners for
  interrogation, inserted exploding ammunition into dumps, conducted bomb-
  damage assessment (BDA), and searched for downed airmen. The intelligence
  collected on these missions supported the extensive aerial interdiction
  campaign conducted by the US Air Force on the Trail. While the RTs
  attempted to avoid contact with the enemy, they would fight back viciously if
  compromised. The Presidential Unit Citation awarded to MACV–SOG best
  describes this: “Pursued by human trackers and even bloodhounds, these small
  teams outmaneuvered, outfought, and outran their numerically superior foe.”
  There was a high chance of being detected and engaged in enemy territory.
  Extraction took considerable time, and, by the time helicopters arrived, an
  RT’s location and situation had often changed drastically. They could not be
  supported by artillery when operating inside Laos and Cambodia. Fighter-
  bombers could support RTs in Laos, but not in Cambodia, as this was
  forbidden by Washington. Helicopter gunships could support RTs in both
  The preferred means of
  extraction was simply for 
  the chopper to sit down on 
  the ground and for the RT to
  pile into the bird. It was by far
  the fastest means of boarding
  the extraction helicopter. 
  It was also safer and more
  comfortable than “string”
  (STABO harness) or ladder
  extractions. (Mike Sloniker 
  via John Plaster)
  11
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  countries. The US officially had no troops deployed in these supposedly
  neutral countries. While those countries’ governments may have declared
  themselves neutral, the reality was that the NVA/VC operated freely in these
  privileged sanctuaries, maintaining huge base areas, logistical facilities, and
  lines of communication. The SOG RTs were some of the few Free World units
  habitually operating beyond the artillery umbrella.
  RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION
  The USSF soldiers in MACV–SOG had a wide variety of experience prior to
  volunteering for the Special Forces. Young NCOs with at least one enlistment
  (three years’ service) under their belt were most desired. The Special Forces
  were intended to train guerrillas, counterinsurgency troops, and other
  countries’ special-operations units, and they needed a degree of experience to
  do this. The need for Special Forces troops became acute in 1966, and it was
  opened up to soldiers still in their first tour of duty. They were still required
  to meet all other Special Forces standards. That meant that they had to have
  A UH-1H Huey extracts an RT
  during training using STABO
  rigs. This was a harness
  arrangement incorporated into
  the recon man’s web gear in
  lieu of load-bearing equipment
  suspenders. A Special Forces
  NCO and two officers
  developed the system in 1969
  at the MACV Recondo School.
  (Dale Boswell via John Plaster)
  12
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  a General Technical (GT) score of 100, the same as required for officers, have
  a high-school diploma, and be at least 20 years of age. The GT was a form
  of IQ test. They had to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) to
  airborne standards, the Combat Water Survival Test (CWST), and the Special
  Forces Selection Battery. The latter was a series of tests of personality, critical-
  decision-making ability, self-location skills (using a series of photos), and
  Morse-code aptitude. They also had to have a clean police record and be
  qualified for a Top Secret security clearance. They were required to be triple
  volunteers; that is, they must have volunteered for the Army, airborne, and
  Special Forces. Qualified conscripts were accepted, but they had to extend
  their two-year enlistment period to three years. Upon completion of Special
  Forces training, which generally took 6–12 months, they were required to
  have at least 18 months remaining in their enlistment. If not, they had to
  extend it by at least a year.
  First-enlistment volunteers were recruited during basic training or when
  attending jump school. Many Special Forces volunteers had served in the
  82nd or 101st Airborne Divisions or other airborne units. Still others may
  have served in any type of unit, including service support. Their diversity of
  skills was considered valuable. The challenge at this point was getting the
  approval of their first sergeant, sergeant major, and commanding officer, who
  were generally reluctant to lose a good man.
  Special Forces candidates
  undergoing the Phase I Field
  Training Exercise at Camp
  Mackall, NC. It was here that
  they were introduced to
  patrolling techniques.
  (Author’s collection)
  13
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  All US Army soldiers undertook the eight-week Basic Combat Training
  (BCT) course. They then undertook Advanced Individual Training (AIT) 
  at training centers or at branch service schools for the more technical 
  skills. Most of these courses lasted 8–12 weeks. Upon completion the soldier
  was awarded a Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) identifier. Light
  infantrymen, for example, were assigned the MOS “11B” after eight weeks’
  training1. This was the preferred MOS for Special Forces volunteers who were
  selected during BCT. It was a critical MOS because of the demands for light
  infantrymen brought on by the Vietnam War, and if slots were unavailable
  many future Special Forces soldiers were sent to combat-engineer (12B)
  training at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The eight-week 12B training was considered
  as valuable to Special Forces troops as that for 11B. They were taught many
  of the combat and patrolling skills of infantrymen, as well as demolitions,
  the use of booby traps and mines, fortification, and obstacle construction,
  amongst other skills.
  Before attending Special Forces training volunteers went through the
  Airborne School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Commonly called “jump school,”
  it was three weeks long and physically intense. Typically, around 30 percent
  of a class washed out. Five jumps were required for award of the coveted
  jump wings.2
  Four recon men are extracted
  on “strings,” that is, by STABO
  extraction. The canvas panels
  were an effort to reduce the
  spinning effect caused by the
  helicopter’s rotor downwash.
  (John Plaster)
  14
  1 Infantry training (BCT and AIT) is discussed in Warrior 98: US Army Infantryman in
  Vietnam 1965–73.
  2 This is discussed in detail in Warrior 132: US Army Long-Range Patrol Scout in Vietnam
  1965–71.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Special Forces training was conducted at the John F. Kennedy Center for
  Special Warfare (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina3. Assigned to the
  Special Forces Training Group (SFTG), students found training to be different
  from anything they had previously experienced. They were there to learn and
  it was very much an academic environment. The harassment they had
  previously experienced in BCT, AIT, and jump school was virtually absent,
  unless one earned it.
  Phase I of Special Forces Tactics and Techniques was four weeks of land
  navigation, basic survival, patrolling, and methods of instruction. It was here
  that the Special Forces student found that training others was his primary
  job. They were awarded the green beret at the end of this phase.
  There was a break of several weeks between each training phase, during
  which students performed work details, kitchen police (KP) duty, and acted
  as counter-guerrilla (CG) forces. In the latter they acted as the aggressors
  against the students undertaking their field-training exercises, which lasted
  one week for Phases I and II, and two weeks for Phase III. Serving as a CG
  proved to be a valuable part of the men’s training, providing them with more
  patrolling, land-navigation, and tactical experience. The Phase I field-training
  exercises saw many wash out, as it was demanding in land-navigation
  techniques, evasion skills, and physical endurance.
  Recruits then received their Special Forces MOS training in Phase II.
  These specializations included Engineer (12B, ten weeks), Light and Heavy
  Weapons (11B and 11C, eight weeks), Operations and Intelligence (O&I)
  SFC Jerry “Mad Dog” Shriver 
  of CCS is armed with a .45-cal.
  M3 “grease gun” fitted with a
  silencer. The silencer could not
  be fitted to the M3A1. An M26
  fragmentation grenade is on
  his right harness strap and 
  a Gerber Mk II fighting knife 
  is on his left harness strap. 
  (Jim Fleming via John Plaster)
  15
  3 Special Forces training is described in Warrior 28: Green Beret in Vietnam 1957–73.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  (11F, 12 weeks), Communications (05B, 16 weeks), and Medical (91C, 
  32 weeks). These jobs were identified by the same MOS codes as their
  conventional equivalents, but they were very different and more in-depth. An
  “S” special skill identifier was added to their MOS (e.g. “11B4S”). For
  example, engineers received not only one week of conventional demolitions
  training, but also another one training with expedient unconventional
  explosives. The weapons specialists received extensive training on numerous
  foreign weapons. The O&I NCOs were trained in planning Special Forces
  operations, intelligence techniques, and how to operate agent nets within 
  a guerrilla or counterinsurgency unit. The radiomen learned Morse code,
  how to operate special radios and use expedient antennas, and long-range
  communications. The medics were trained much more than any other
  enlisted medical personnel, to include the treatment of gunshot wounds 
  and amputations.
  Phase III lasted six weeks and covered unconventional warfare, organizing
  guerrilla forces, low-level tradecraft, and other guerrilla-warfare skills. 
  The two-week field-training exercises saw the students organized into 
  10–12-man “A-teams” (a group of officers and senior NCOs formed to train
  and lead guerrillas, though in this case the teams were without officers) and
  conducting an unconventional-warfare exercise in which they trained a small
  guerrilla force composed of 82nd Airborne Division paratroopers, often from
  service support units, and then led them on patrols and raids.
  Upon graduation they were now “flash-qualified” and sewed on their new
  Special Forces unit’s beret flash. Some went directly to the 5th SFGA in
  Vietnam, but most were assigned elsewhere: 1st SFGA on Okinawa was
  responsible for the Pacific and Asia (exclusive of Vietnam and Thailand); 3rd
  SFGA at Fort Bragg was responsible for Africa; 6th SFGA, also at Fort Bragg,
  was responsible for the Middle East; 7th SFGA at Fort Bragg was deployable
  worldwide as a backup unit; 8th SFGA in Panama was responsible for Latin
  America; 10th SFGA in West Germany was responsible for Europe; and the
  46th Special Forces Company was based in Thailand. Training as Special
  Forces soldiers continued in units, and some men would later be reassigned
  to the 5th SFGA in Vietnam.
  Finding the elusive SOG
  MACV–SOG was highly classified, and few Special Forces soldiers knew
  what it was. There were rumors about SOG’s existence and such
  organizations as CCN, CCC, and CCS and Projects DELTA, OMEGA, and
  SIGMA (which also conducted covert recon missions), but no one really knew
  what they were. Special Forces veterans of these activities never spoke of them
  and told others they overheard talking about them to keep quiet.
  Mrs Billye Alexander, popularly known as “Mrs A,” worked at the
  Pentagon’s Office of Personnel Operations. She was responsible for assigning
  Special Forces soldiers to Vietnam. She also identified and assigned selected
  Special Forces NCOs needed by SOG. Many Special Forces soldiers desiring
  Vietnam duty simply called Mrs A directly and requested an assignment. So
  many Special Forces soldiers volunteered for Vietnam that the assignments
  had to be restricted, even though there were Special Forces shortages in
  Vietnam, because otherwise other Special Forces units would have been left
  short of men. There were simply not enough qualified Special Forces soldiers
  to go around. While few men knew much about SOG or even what it stood
  for, they heard rumors and sought the assignment.
  16
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  17
  Once in Vietnam they found that it was just as
  difficult to learn any more about the mysterious
  organization. One had to know someone in the
  unit or be extremely persistent. Those making
  enquiries were often told to wait until they were
  assigned to an A-team before pursuing it further.
  This was a put-off, and anyone understanding
  how the Army worked knew that once assigned
  to an A-team it would be even more difficult to be
  reassigned. The 14-man A-teams manning the
  many remote strike-force camps were considered
  “fat” if they had ten men. There was not much of
  a chance of being let go once a home had been
  found for them.
  After being in-processed through one of the
  replacement battalions, Special Forces soldiers
  reported to the 5th SFGA Headquarters at Nha Trang. They were provided
  with a briefing on Special Forces activities, the strike forces scattered from
  one end of the country to the other, the Mobile Strike Force Command
  (MIKE Force)4, various training operations, and guarded mention might be
  made of the special reconnaissance projects. There was no mention of SOG,
  however. Some were more persistent and approached either the sergeant
  major or an acquaintance who had been in-country for a while, or made
  inquires at the Project DELTA or GAMMA compounds down the road. They
  may or may not have had any luck. Some dug deeper and found out where
  the secreted CCN, CCC, or CCS were located. By determination and
  subterfuge some made their way to Kontum, Da Nang, or Ban Me Thuot.
  Technically they were AWOL, but if they could sell themselves they had a
  home. NCOs who had previously served in Vietnam and had contacts might
  be asked to sign up for SOG. If replacements were urgently needed then they
  were asked if they wanted to volunteer for SOG during in-processing.
  All Special Forces soldiers assigned to the 5th SFGA were required to
  undertake the Combat Orientation Course (COC, or “Cock Course”)
  conducted by the MACV Recondo School (an abbreviated Ranger course).
  This entailed a week of acclimatization and refresher training in land
  navigation, first aid, communications, directing artillery and air strikes,
  patrolling, company tactics, working with interpreters, etc. Morning runs with
  sand-filled rucksacks were the order of the day. The second week saw the class
  moved to Hon Tre Island. Here they undertook practical exercises in what they
  had learned the previous week. They also conducted a three-day combat patrol.
  Returning to Nha Trang, the Special Forces soldiers received their
  assignments. Some who had managed to find their way to an SOG base
  skipped the COC. They would undertake additional training, however. Once
  accepted by SOG, the new man would be interviewed by the sergeant major
  and different One-Zeros in order to find a personality and temperament fit.
  He would be issued uniforms, weapons, and equipment and assigned a
  fighting position for base defense. Some men might be assigned to staff
  positions, “Hatchet” platoons, the security company, and so on. It depended
  on their temperament and where they were needed. Most recon men were
  weapons or engineering specialists. Fewer were trained in communications or
  4 See Battle Orders 30: Mobile Strike Forces in Vietnam 1966–70.
  Four men of RT Marine of CCN
  are lifted out by a McGuire-rig
  extraction system fitted to a
  57th Aviation Company UH-1H.
  The men could not be hoisted
  into the helicopter, but had to
  ride below it. (Frank Greco via
  John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  O&I. Even fewer were medics, as these were needed in the strike camps,
  though a Special Forces medic could conduct a reconnaissance or offensive
  operation just as effectively as other Special Forces men. Most Special Forces
  troopers carried a security clearance of “Secret,” but those assigned to SOG
  were eligible for “Top Secret” clearance.
  TRAINING
  Other than training within their assigned Special Forces groups, there was
  not a lot of additional training undertaken by Special Forces. Some engineers
  took courses in the operation of heavy equipment, and some medics
  undertook additional training, but very few attended Recondo School or
  Pathfinder School (for tactical air-traffic control). Such skills were already
  included in Special Forces training. High Altitude Low Opening (HALO)
  A
  ONE-ZERO COURSE, DONG BA THIN
  The three-week One-Zero Course covered a wide range of subjects at a fast pace. The sergeant-
  first-class instructor (1), a former One-Zero assigned to Special Forces Detachment B-51, wears 
  the typical duty uniform with the LLDB (Vietnamese special forces) pocket patch and LLDB jump
  wings over the right pocket. SF troopers assigned to MACV-SOG wore the same uniform, but
  without the LLDB insignia, which indentified advisers to the LLDB. The student uniform was
  undershirts in the hot classrooms. Here an orientation is conducted on the KY-38 Nestor secure
  voice system (2) attached to an AN/PRC-77 FM radio (3). The KY-38 permitted secure voice
  communications without the need for encrypting messages using KAC codebooks. The downside
  was that the AN/PRC-77 and KY-38 together weighed about 50lb. The two units were carried by
  two different men. The “Key-38” required two BA-386 batteries and the “Prick-77” required one,
  which meant a large number of the heavy spare batteries had to be carried (4). The KY-38 had 
  to be reset every day using the KYK-38 mechanical key-fill device (not shown), which reset the
  pins in the 64 holes seen in the open mechanical-memory-system cover (5).
  18
  The 30ft extraction ladder
  allowed RTs to be inserted 
  and extracted from LZs and 
  PZs that the helicopter could
  not land on. The ladders, one
  on each side (though only 
  one is deployed here), could 
  be dropped through thin trees,
  brush, and high grass. 
  (Mike Sloniker via John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  1
  2
  2
  3
  4
  5
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  20
  parachute-jump training and scuba training were limited at the time. 
  A number of men did attend Ranger School, and Ranger-qualified Special
  Forces NCOs were found throughout SOG.
  One-Zero Course
  Regardless of what an SOG recon man may have learned in infantry AIT,
  from serving in an infantry unit, the Ranger Course, the COC, or any other
  training, he still had a lot to learn. All of his past training and experience was
  of course applicable and valuable, but there were several unique aspects to
  SOG operations. First, they were conducted “across the fence,” in Laos and
  Cambodia, where the US officially had no troops. They operated without
  artillery or close air support, something few US units ever risked doing,
  though they did receive this support when operating in South Vietnam. They
  seldom had direct radio contact with bases, relying on communications relay
  aircraft flying on the Vietnamese side of the border. These were C-130
  airborne battlefield command-and-control centers, designated “Hillsboro”
  during the day and “Moonbeam” at night. This caused further delays in
  requesting desperately needed extraction aircraft and attack helicopters.
  While any reconnaissance patrol could find itself deep among enemy forces,
  SOG RTs routinely went into heavy occupied and controlled base areas with
  the enemy expecting their presence. Specialized counter-reconnaissance units
  were fielded to hunt down RTs and large numbers of combat and service
  troops would be turned out. The RTs seldom numbered over nine men and
  had to be able to fight viciously and give the impression of being a larger
  force than they really were.
  All Americans assigned to RTs underwent One-Zero training, which
  qualified them both for RT duty and as an RT leader, after the requisite
  mission experience. There were many instances of new men being assigned to
  RTs and sent on missions prior to attending One-Zero training. They were of
  course fully briefed, and they rehearsed with the RT during its pre-mission
  preparations. They would still be sent on the course as soon as possible even
  though they might have a number of missions under their belts.
  The course was conducted at Dong Ba Thin, located between Nha Trang
  and Cam Ranh Bay under Special Forces Detachment B-51. It was here that
  Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB) were trained, along with the MIKE Force
  jump school. The three-week course ran seven days a week. There was no
  room for slow learners and they were expected to be sharp and flexible. The
  instructors were all former One-Zeros. Classes contained 20 or more men and
  might include a few Special Forces members from other reconnaissance forces.
  One-Zero instruction included: survival, escape and evasion, resistance to
  interrogation, advanced first aid, immediate-action drills (IADs), silenced
  weapons, detecting booby traps, setting booby traps, demolitions, defensive
  and offensive use of Claymores, arm and hand signals, determining friendly
  and enemy personnel, target identification, radio procedures, use of spotter
  aircraft, directing air strikes, AN/URC-10 emergency radio, patrol
  procedures, working with indigenous troops, using an interpreter, mission
  planning, mission briefback5, post-mission debriefing, and more.
  5 A mission briefback was conducted just before a mission launched. The team would brief
  the commander or operations officer on how they were going to conduct the mission from
  insertion to extraction, and demonstrate that they had covered all contingencies and were
  adequately prepared and equipped to accomplish the mission.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  21
  A two-day mission was conducted prior to graduation in order to practice
  skills and procedures. Team leaders were rotated in each of the RTs and a
  quick field debriefing was undertaken after each rotation, with every man
  having a turn as the One-Zero. A simple graduation ceremony was held in the
  mess hall, where each man received a certificate, quickly returned to his FOB,
  and went to work.
  It was common for a snap link
  to be attached to the right
  shoulder of the suspenders,
  and a fighting or utility knife
  attached to the left shoulder
  strap. Note the colored- and
  white-smoke grenades on the
  right side of the belt along with
  M26 fragmentation grenades.
  (Jay Massey via Steve Sherman)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  RT training
  The One-Zero was responsible for training his RT. There was no collective
  training of all RTs. Training was routine and generally conducted at a relaxed
  pace, depending on mission tempo. With two or three mission runs each
  month the RTs kept sharp. Training picked up when a new man, American
  or indigenous, was assigned. Replacements had to be be fully integrated into
  the team and understand all of its tactics, techniques, and procedures.
  RT movement formations were simple. Because they normally traveled
  in dense foliage they used a column. The distance between men varied
  depending on visibility, but they were fairly close in order to preclude
  accidental separation. In light vegetation they would move in a staggered
  formation with alternating men a meter or so right and left of the centerline.
  Crossing dangerous areas such as roads, trails, or streams required caution.
  Some RTs crossed one man at a time in single file after first possibly sending
  a man to check the far side. This was dangerous if the enemy opened fire
  with the RT split on opposite sides of the obstacle. Most found the best
  way was to get on line and all cross at once. This also reduced the chance
  of individuals being separated. Once across the danger area the RT might
  pause long enough to listen for enemy activity and then move out quickly
  to get away from the area. Crossing obstacles that slowed movement (e.g.
  a steep-sided stream, extremely dense and tangled underbrush, or a deep
  gully) demanded precautions. The first men across could not simply keep
  going; they had to wait for the others to make their way across.
  Recon men typically undertook practice firing every other day. This
  consisted of close-range rapid-fire, accuracy firing, rapid-reloading practice,
  or live-fire IADs. The One-Zero took his team out to a secluded area and
  they moved through terrain with different densities of vegetation to practice
  movement formations and IADs. The One-Zero would shout “Contact” and
  a direction (front, right, left, or rear) and the RT would respond to the
  supposed threat. Some RTs carried a magazine of tracers or one with every
  other round being a tracer. They opened fire in rapid three- or five-round
  bursts, and the swarm of tracers, coupled with bursting grenades, would
  rattle the enemy, experienced or not.
  How the RT reacted to the threat depended on the terrain and amount
  of fire they were under. SOPs varied, but the following was typical. 
  The immediate response was for everyone who could bear their weapons
  in the direction of enemy to open fire with everything they had. If the
  B
  RT TRAINING WITH INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM
  RT training was continuous, in order to perfect and improve the team’s skills and implement
  lessons learned from earlier missions. This six-man RT practices the “banana peel” IAD. It was
  designed as a means to break contact rapidly and maintain continuous fire on what was hopefully
  a surprised and at least momentarily disorganized enemy. The maneuver calls for the point man,
  or whoever detected the enemy first, to open fire immediately on full-automatic while the second
  man in line throws a WP grenade in order to blind the enemy. In training a burning-type AN-M8
  white-smoke grenade was thrown instead. The grenadier begins pumping out high-explosive
  rounds as fast as possible. The point man (here wearing an NVA uniform and gear to confuse the
  enemy further) darts back to the rear, running down the column’s center – each man has stepped
  to the right or left to make a lane. Each man continued to fire and throw fragmentation grenades
  before he too peeled back. This process was repeated until contact was broken with the dispirited
  enemy, and the team would then change direction frequently as they moved to their PZ. Such
  IADs were rehearsed over and over with simulated attacks from any direction until it became
  second nature. Such exercises were conducted every 1–3 weeks, along with the test firing of
  weaponry, thus allowing ammunition to be replaced.
  22
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  24
  enemy fire was heavy, SOPs often specified that every man fired at least
  five magazines while grenadiers fired as rapidly as possible, launching a
  grenade every 2–3 seconds. The idea was to gain fire superiority and make
  the enemy believe they were facing a larger force in order to confuse them
  and make them keep their heads down as the RT broke contact. For an
  engagement from the flank the RT turned in that direction and open fired
  while on-line. If engaged from the front or rear the RT conducted a “peel-
  back” or “banana peel.” The point man emptied a magazine and threw a
  grenade and ran to the rear, reloading, as the second man then emptied 
  a magazine and threw a grenade. One of these may have been white
  phosphorus (WP) to blind and panic the enemy. Odd-numbered men
  stepped to the right and even-numbered men to the left to leave a “lane”
  down the center of the formation. Some men might throw grenades to the
  sides, discouraging anyone attempting to flank them. Each man would
  peel back after firing and take up a position to the rear on-line to mass
  their fire or repeat another peel-back. This would continue until the One-
  Zero ordered them to run for it once they had enough breathing room.
  This was his judgment call. Care had to be taken to prevent separation
  and hitting one another. A Claymore or grenade with a one-minute delay
  fuse might be set on the back-trail as well as trip-wired grenades. 
  The point man and rearguard usually carried a pre-rigged Claymore for
  this purpose.
  The RT would then change direction and head for the nearest pick-up
  zone (PZ). Each American team member was aware of where these were in
  relation to the day’s planned route. Of course, the enemy also knew where
  RT Michigan of CCN rushes
  across a bomb-blasted area 
  and into cover. This shows 
  how canteens and colored-
  smoke grenades were carried
  on the back of rucksacks. Note
  the coiled utility rope on the
  second man’s belt. (Ken Bowra
  via John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  suitable clearings were and would possibly head in that direction or send
  units to occupy them. If a PZ was found to be occupied then the team would
  have to try another one, head east to South Vietnam (which the enemy
  expected), or turn back into enemy territory in the hope of losing their
  pursuers, where they would hide out and wait for things to cool down. While
  on the move they would attempt to make contact with a radio-relay aircraft
  and request extraction.
  Occupying a “remain overnight” position (RON) was also practiced
  during RT training. Some One-Zeros selected the RON site, passed it, then
  fish-hooked back to occupy it and ambush any enemy in pursuit. Others
  made a direction change off their course and occupied the RON by halting
  where the One-Zero ordered. RONs would be occupied at dusk, when
  reduced visibility made it difficult to see what the RT was doing, but when
  there was still enough light for them to emplace Claymores and study the
  ground in front of them. RONs well away from streams were selected as the
  noise of the water could mask the enemy’s approach.
  RTs also conducted training on radio procedures, first aid, land navigation,
  air–ground signaling, and any other skills the One-Zero felt needed improving.
  Changes or enhancements to their SOP based on lessons learned were
  practiced, as were rehearsals for special mission requirements such as a
  prisoner snatches or wiretapping.
  25
  A 158th Assault Helicopter
  Battalion UH-1H brings out 
  a CCN RT from Laos with two 
  of the team hooked onto the
  aluminum extraction ladder
  with snap hooks on their
  harnesses. (Mike Sloniker 
  via John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  APPEARANCE
  Rather than muscle-bound Rambos, Special Forces troopers tended to be lean
  and of average height, but as in any group, they came in all shapes and sizes.
  Recon men were typically in their 20s, but some were in their early 30s.
  However, with the extreme physical and physiological demands inherent in
  their missions, it was a young man’s enterprise. Many kept their hair cut short
  because of the heat and for cleanliness, but some grew their hair longish.
  Mustaches were uncommon, mainly because Special Forces sergeants major
  tended to frown on them. Tattoos were uncommon and discouraged in
  Special Forces in order not to advertise who they were. There were few
  African-Americans and only small numbers of Hispanics in SOG.
  The standard uniform worn at an FOB was olive-green jungle fatigues
  and jungle boots with a green beret. The beret was adorned by the 5th SFGA
  flash, even though SOG was not part of the 5th. The USSF patch and airborne
  tab was worn on the left shoulder, jump wings and Combat Infantryman
  Badge over the left chest pocket and the “US ARMY” tape, while the
  nametape was over the right chest pocket. SOG personnel were not awarded
  the honorary LLDB jump wings, as were 5th SFGA personnel, as they were
  not advisers to the LLDB. Nor did members of SOG wear the LLDB patch
  on the left chest pocket. Rank chevrons were worn centered on the upper
  sleeves. From 1968 subdued pin-on or sew-on rank insignia could be worn
  on the collars, but Special Forces soldiers tended to retain the sleeve insignia.
  Additionally, while subdued insignia were authorized, Special Forces retained
  full-color insignia on jungle fatigues, viewing them as a “garrison” uniform.
  They were to appear as other Special Forces personnel and wore no insignia
  identifying them as belonging to SOG. Prior to deployment to Vietnam each
  soldier was issued three sets of tropical combat uniforms. These consisted of
  jungle fatigues, five sets of olive-drab undershirts and undershorts, two olive-
  drab towels, and two pairs of tropical combat boots.
  There was no “standard” mission uniform. Uniforms were “sterile,”
  meaning that their national origin could not be identified. No insignia of any
  form was worn. The most common were US jungle fatigues with labels
  removed, which could be mistaken for the NVA’s dark-green uniforms. Usually
  the “jungles” were camouflaged by lightly spray-painting irregular black bands
  C
  RON
  At sunset the RT would seek a suitable site in which to “remain overnight.” RONs were selected
  some distance from trails, streams, gullies, or natural movement routes. Sometimes the smallest
  possible clump of brush was selected, in the hope that searchers might think that the brush patch
  was too small to hide an RT. Hidden in dense brush – stripped away here to depict the RT’s
  position – they would form a “wagon wheel,” sitting back-to-back leaning against their rucksacks
  or lying prone facing head-out and close enough to alert each other with the tap of a boot. One
  man at a time would stealthily creep out and emplace his Claymore mine 10–30yds away on the
  other side of a substantial tree to protect the RT from its blast and secondary fragmentation. He
  would retain the firing device in his pocket and connect it upon returning to the team. If the
  enemy approached a RON then they would blow all their Claymores simultaneously and break
  out in a clock direction ordered by the One-Zero. They might hold their fire in order to prevent the
  enemy from knowing which direction they were headed. The direction the One-Zero faced was
  designated “12 o’clock,” and that was the planned direction in which they would move out in the
  morning. Breaking out of a RON and evading the enemy in the dark could easily result in team
  members becoming separated, and efforts were made to keep everyone together, especially since
  the RT would typically make misleading changes of direction away from the RON.
  26
  The unofficial patches of CCN,
  CCC, and CCS. These gaudy
  insignia were not worn on
  uniforms, but often on “party
  jackets” worn when off duty,
  and painted on unit signs.
  (Author’s collection)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  28
  on them. This was often done with one man spraying the
  other after they had donned their uniforms and web gear.
  Laundering removed much of the paint, and uniforms
  were resprayed before each mission. The lower legs were
  saturated with insect repellent in order to deter leeches.
  Some individuals sewed additional pockets on their
  shirtsleeves. Trousers were altered to make them tight
  fitting, which prevented them from getting snagged on
  vegetation and making noise.
  Some RTs wore NVA-style uniforms. From a distance
  an American could be mistaken for Vietnamese in such a
  uniform and among shadows and vegetation. Black,
  khaki (actually light brown), and dark-green uniforms
  were procured for this purpose. In some instances green
  jungle fatigues were dyed black. Some teams would outfit
  the point man in an NVA uniform, including an AK-47
  and chest magazine pouches, in order to give an
  unexpectedly encountered enemy a moment’s pause. 
  The rearguard too might be so uniformed. The black
  uniforms were effective at night, but stood out in daylight
  among the green vegetation.
  Tiger-stripe camouflage, worn by the Civilian Irregular
  Defense Group (CIDG)6, was not generally used by SOG as it was too readily
  identified as a pattern used by Free World forces. However, “tigers” were
  sometimes worn by some RTs operating in thick underbrush, where they 
  were very effective. They were sometimes worn when conducting training
  outside the base camp so it would be assumed that they belonged to the CIDG.
  Undershirts and underwear were seldom worn as they trapped sweat 
  and causing chafing and rashes. Some men even wore no socks. Dog tags, 
  ID cards, and other items that might indicate the recon man’s name or
  nationality were prohibited.
  Some RTs insisted that all members wear the same type of headgear, as this
  improved friend-or-foe recognition when silhouetted at night. Others allowed
  individual preference. Most wore the full-brim “boonie hat,” which was
  relatively shapeless, comfortable, and provided protection from sun and rain.
  Most were olive green or had a camouflage pattern. Some men had orange
  marker-panel material sewn into the inside of the hat. They could turn the
  inside of the hat toward an aircraft and “flash” it by opening and closing 
  the hat. They could also turn the hat inside out to aid being spotted by an
  extraction aircraft. Some men wore headscarves made from olive-drab
  triangular bandages, a simple cloth triangle. These were also used as neck
  scarves or “drive-on rags,” as were wide strips of olive-drab towels. With NVA
  uniforms they usually wore black or green boonie hats or, in rare istances, tan
  or light-green NVA pith helmets. In some areas the NVA instituted a “color
  of the day” policy, with hats specifying which color would be worn on which
  days at irregular intervals. An RT in the area of operations (AO) would be on
  the lookout each morning to see what color was being worn that day. Trouser
  belts might be an issue black web belt, a 15ft olive-drab web A7A cargo strap
  cut to belt length, a triangular bandage folded into a belt, or a doubled length
  of nylon climbing rope knotted, which could also be used for other purposes.
  Tiger-stripe camouflage was
  seldom worn by RTs, but in
  some cases it was. “Tigers”
  offered effective concealment in
  much of Vietnam’s vegetation,
  especially bamboo. These men
  wear triangular bandages as
  sweatbands. Both men are
  armed with XM177E2
  submachine guns mounting
  XM148 grenade launchers.
  (James Bolen via Steve
  Sherman)
  6 The CIDG was a body of locally raised troops advised by Special Forces personnel.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  29
  Standard jungle boots were usually worn, but sometimes Canadian-made
  Bata boots were used as they had similar soles to some NVA boots. Jungle
  boots had a distinctive sole pattern and efforts were made to develop boots
  with less distinctive soles. This included soles that looked like an indigenous
  bare foot, a truck-tire pattern known as “Ho Chi Minh sandals,” and even
  a leaf-impression pattern. Such efforts failed as they provided poor traction,
  were uncomfortable, and they lost their effect when worn down. On occasion
  thick socks were pulled over boots or they were wrapped in burlap. These
  wore out quickly, provided bad traction, and made for difficult walking when
  wet. Efforts to obscure tracks with leafy branches greatly disturbed ground
  cover and attracted the attention of even inexperienced trackers to the path.
  In areas where land leeches were particularly bad, some men wore World
  War II leggings over their boots with their trousers bloused into them.
  Camouflage sticks, or “cami sticks,” were carried by each man, the most
  common being colored loam and light green, with a color on each end. Loam
  was used on the high facial areas that would reflect light: the forehead,
  cheekbones, nose, jaw line, chin, and ears. Light green was used around the
  eyes, lower cheeks, and neck. The back of the neck, hands, and wrists were
  also camouflaged. Most military equipment was dark-colored, usually in olive
  drab, but some items were not subdued or were glossy. These would be spray-
  painted or worked over with a camouflage stick.
  Part of the art of camouflage was ensuring that gear was silent, with no
  metal-on-metal noise, creaking, or jingling. Equipment was padded against
  soft items placed between harder ones. Other items were protected by tape 
  or rubber bands. One item, named “100mph tape” because it was required
  to remain attached to a surface in a 100mph wind, was a form of early 
  duct tape that was preferred, as it was colored green or dark olive drab. Black
  plastic electrical tape was sometimes used to secure items, but this had the
  disadvantage of being glossy.
  Smell was also an issue. Scented soap and aftershave was not used before
  missions. There was no washing, shaving, or teeth-brushing during a mission.
  Food was not heated and no coffee or cocoa was prepared. Food and heating-
  tablet smells were avoided. Insect repellent had an odor too, but this was faint.
  US recon team One-Zeros 
  and One-Ones. Note the green
  2in.-wide “100mph tape”
  affixed to the M16A1 rifle.
  Three men wear strobe-light
  cases on their right shoulders.
  The man to the far right wears
  a black VC uniform. (James
  Bolen via Steve Sherman)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS
  Individual equipment
  The equipment, or “web gear,” carried by recon men varied greatly and
  changed over time. There was no standard SOG assemblage. Some RTs were
  allowed individual preference in addition to what their job, weapon, and
  mission required. Other RTs had specific standards regarding what and where
  items were carried in order to allow critical gear to be recovered from
  casualties.
  Recon men carried their equipment in layers. The first layer was carried on
  their person, in their pockets. If they lost their web gear and rucksack they 
  still retained essential items on their person. This included a pocket knife, 
  two compasses, a watch, a map, a notepad and pen, morphine syrettes, an
  emergency radio, and various air–ground signal devices. The compasses, carried
  in a pocket, might have been attached to the uniform by a “dummy cord.”
  The next layer was the web gear or load-bearing equipment (LBE). There
  was a great deal of variance here, but they were based on two systems. 
  A favorite was the World War II Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) belt. Four
  XM177/M16 magazines could fit into each of its six pockets. Typically five
  pockets held magazines and one held items the bearer wished to retain if he
  lost his rucksack. Air–ground marker items might have been carried in that
  pocket. Canteen carriers, first-aid pouches, and other pouches were attached
  D
  ONE-ZERO’S ON-PERSON LOAD
  The equipment carried by One-Zero John Plaster (CCC), the SOG chronicler, included a great deal
  of gear. Other American RT members carried essentially the same equipment, although grenades
  and other munitions might differ. This plate displays the equipment carried on his person, mainly
  in uniform pockets. The equipment carried in his rucksack and in his web gear is depicted in Plates
  E and F, respectively. Plaster carries a 5.56mm XM177E2 submachine gun loaded with 
  the only 30-round magazine he possesses. He wears sterile US jungle fatigues, which have 
  been camouflaged with black spray-paint. Extra pockets have been sewn onto his sleeves.
  1. Map covered by acetate
  2. AN/URC-10 emergency radio
  3. Wristwatch
  4. Wrist compass
  5. Lensatic compass
  6. Pilot-type pen flashlight
  7. SDU-5/E strobe light
  8. M186 pen flare projector with seven flares
  9. Mini colored-smoke grenade
  10. Mk III air–ground signal mirror
  11. Air–ground signal panel (cut from larger VS-17 marker panel)
  12. Pocket knife
  13. Whistle
  14. Camouflage stick
  15. Anti-malaria tablets in plastic bottle
  16. Salt tablets in plastic bottle
  17. Four morphine syrettes in plastic bottle
  18. Notepad and pen in plastic bag
  30
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  to the BAR belt. Some men cut off the two back pockets and sewed on
  canteen carriers. Most men carried two 1qt plastic canteens with small bottles
  of halazone water-purification tablets taped to the cap’s retaining strap. Since
  food or beverages were not heated some soldiers did not carry a canteen cup.
  The other LBE systems were the M1956 cotton gear and the similar
  M1967 nylon gear, which were developed for Vietnam. These items were
  often mixed in web-gear sets. The pouches and carriers were attached to a
  pistol belt. M1956 ammunition pouches held four 20-round XM177
  magazines, four 30-round carbine magazines, or three 40mm grenades. It
  was too deep for M16 magazines, so a field dressing was often placed in the
  bottom to raise the magazines. The M1967 nylon pouch was similar, as well
  as a shallow version to accommodate XM177 magazines. A grenade could be
  attached to either end of these pouches. Many recon men did not use
  ammunition pouches, but rather canteen carriers with up to six on a belt.
  Five XM177 or six M2 carbine magazines could be held in a canteen carrier,
  as could four hand grenades or six 40mm grenades. A first-aid or survival kit
  was often attached to the back center of the belt.
  This ammunition was heavy; 20 fully loaded M16 magazines weighed
  14lb. Suspenders were attached to take the weight off the hips, onto which
  first-aid kits, compass pouches, grenades, and other items could be attached.
  The number of magazines carried varied according to an RT’s SOP,
  mission requirements, and individual preference. A typical magazine load for
  a man armed with an XM177 was one 30-round magazine and 20 20-round
  magazines, totaling 450 rounds. This number is based on full magazines, but
  most men carried one or two fewer rounds in their magazine to prevent
  straining the follower spring. Some men placed a tracer as the third round
  A recon team poses beside 
  its insertion Huey, along with
  the flight crew. This is a rare
  instance in which most RT
  members were armed with
  silenced M3 “grease guns.”
  Note that a snap link is
  attached to the rucksack
  shoulder straps to allow 
  them to be hooked to
  extraction ropes or ladders,
  which was safer than keeping
  them on one’s back when
  being extracted. The silver
  tubes strapped atop some
  rucksacks are handheld 
  “pop-up” signal flares. 
  (James Bolen via Steve
  Sherman)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  33
  from the bottom to signal that the magazine was nearly empty. Strips of
  100mph tape were fastened to the bottom of magazines as pull-tabs. They
  were placed into pouches mouth down to help keep out dirt, and with the
  bullets pointed away from the body in the event that pouches were hit and
  rounds detonated.
  A soldier typically carried four to six fragmentation grenades and two WP
  grenades, along with two to four colored-smoke grenades. One or two smoke
  grenades were carried on the web gear and the rest on the outside of the
  rucksack. A few V40 mini fragmentation grenades might be carried as well.
  Grenades were carried on the ends of magazine pouches, in canteen carriers,
  Claymore bags, pockets (V40s), or attached to their belt suspenders. Some
  men straightened the arming pins and warped them with electrical tape. This
  allowed them to use the grenade while holding their weapon or with a
  wounded arm. They yanked off the tape with their teeth and then pulled the
  pin with their teeth. The safety clip would be thumbed open. An eight-man
  RT might carry 80 fragmentation and WP grenades and about 30 40mm
  grenades per grenadier. That translates into a great deal of firepower in a
  firefight. Most grenadiers wore the grenade-carrier vest with 18 high-
  explosive grenade and four pyrotechnic pockets.
  Knives were carried more as utility tools than as weapons. Common makes
  included Randall Models 14 and 16, Baker SOG Recon, Gerber Mk II, Marine
  Ka-Bar, and Air Force survival knives. Pocket knives were carried too.
  Vietnamese rucksacks were provided by the Counterinsurgency Support
  Office (CISO). These were modeled after an NVA rucksack, so they were ideal
  for deception purposes. They were made of gray-green or olive-drab colored
  waterproofed canvas and had three external pockets. They were of a crude
  and simple design, with the shoulder straps’ ends simply knotted to buckles.
  It had a flap-covered, strap-secured main compartment. They had no support
  frame, making it uncomfortable with a heavy load. Their relatively small size
  limited their load and thus mission duration. The CISO also procured
  hammocks, ponchos, poncho liners, lightweight sleeping bags, and other gear
  sized for Asians and produced at low cost. These were not as durable as US
  gear and the green and gray-green colors varied widely. In northern Vietnam
  and Laos the night could be cold, making poncho liners, sleeping bags, and
  sleeping sweaters necessary. The lightweight sleeping bag consisted of a
  flannel-lined, water-resistant rectangular cover closed by snaps on one side
  and at the foot end.
  Other gear was distributed through the team and might have included an
  Olympus Pen EE 35mm camera, a 20x M49 observation telescope, one or
  two pairs of 6x30 M13A1 or 7x50 M15A1, M16, or M17A1 binoculars,
  occasionally an AN/PVS-1 or -2 starlight scope, and, when conducting 
  a wiretap mission, a voice-activated General Electric 8-track cassette 
  tape recorder with wiretapping leads. Some individuals carried additional
  medical supplies, such as field dressings, gauze pads and rolls, adhesive tape,
  morphine syrettes, IV saline solution, serum-albumin cans, and codeine cough
  syrup. Most carried a “One-Zero med kit” or what was simply called a “pill
  bottle.” This was a large plastic pill bottle containing anti-malaria, salt,
  aspirin, Darvon 65, Lomotil, penicillin, and dextro-emphetamine tablets all
  mixed together. These were shared with the indigenous troops. Additional
  demolition materials and even M21 antitank mines might have been required
  for some missions. Items necessary for prisoner snatches included tie-locks,
  handcuffs, sandbags (used as hoods), and blindfolds.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  The XM28 mask protected only from tear gas, but it was compact and
  light as opposed to the bulky and heavy M17 gas mask. RTs carried them for
  protection from their own tear-gas grenades and because areas along the Ho
  Chi Minh Trail were dusted with aerial-delivered tear-gas powder that could
  be stirred up when passing through foliage.
  Usually only one radio was taken, carried by the One-One, but sometimes
  a second was carried by the One-Two. In some instances the One-Zero
  preferred to carry a radio, especially if two were carried. Radios were the
  RT’s lifeline to report their location or intelligence, and call for air support
  or extraction. The 26lb AN/PRC-10 radio was used initially. It was complex
  to operate, requiring manual calibration, and it rapidly burned through
  batteries. Its range was only 3–5 miles. In 1966 the AN/PRC-25 was
  introduced. It was simple to operate, more reliable, and less battery-hungry.
  It weighed 24lb and had a range of at least 5 miles. The AN/PRC-77 of 1968
  differed in having an attachment for a KY-38 secure-voice device, and this
  began to be used by SOG. The “25” was transistorized while the “10” used
  vacuum tubes.
  E
  ONE-ZERO RUCKSACK GEAR
  The typical contents of a One-Zero’s indigenous rucksack, based on the NVA rucksack, contained
  mission and personal-sustainment items. The demolition materials (1–4) were for targets of
  opportunity and could also be used to break contact with the enemy. The Claymore mine was 
  for securing a RON and breaking contact. The delay fuses could be used on the Claymore when
  breaking contact. The poncho shown here (15) is a gray-green indigenous model, but a heavier
  and larger olive-drab US model might have been used. The lightweight sleeping bag (16), which
  was flannel-lined and had a water-resistant cover, might be substituted by a gray-green
  indigenous poncho liner or a slightly larger woodland-pattern camouflaged US poncho liner. 
  A gray-green sleeping shirt (17), a pullover sweater-like garment, was sometimes carried.
  Northern Cambodia and southeast Laos could experience chilly and sometimes wet nights. 
  Olive-drab 37 x 37 x 52in. triangular bandages were worn as headbands, neck scarves, belts, 
  as weapon slings, and even as a means to secure prisoners.
  1. Two M112 1¼lb C4 demolition charges
  2. Two M60 fuse igniters and two 14in. (40-second) time-delay fuses
  3. Four M7 non-electric blasting caps in protective 10-cap box
  4. M2 blasting-cap crimper
  5. M18A1 Claymore mine, M57 firing device, and 100ft M4 firing-wire spool
  6. M34 WP grenade
  7. M18 violet- and yellow-smoke grenades
  8. Customized jungle first-aid kit
  9. 2qt collapsible canteen
  10. Two 1qt canteens
  11. Ten PIR or LRP meals (one of each pictured)
  12. Small machete
  13. Two tie-lock hand restraints
  14. Insect repellent
  15. Lightweight poncho
  16. Lightweight sleeping bag
  17. Sleeping shirt
  18. Indigenous rucksack
  34
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  Both radios were FM and called the “Prick-
  10” or “Prick-25.” They normally used a
  3ft-long flexible tape antenna. A collapsible
  long antenna increased the range by a few
  miles, but it was impossible to walk with
  through foliage with the 10ft-long whip
  antenna. A spare battery was carried for each
  planned day of the mission’s duration. Radios
  were monitored during the day but turned off
  at night in the RON. The radio operator
  carried the signal operating instructions (SOI)
  with call signs, daily and alternate frequencies,
  and the KAC codebook.
  American team members carried pocket-
  sized emergency radios. These were small 
  and lightweight, and transmitted voice or a
  continuous-wave homing beacon on a single
  preset guard frequency: 243.0 MHz. Their
  range was 10 miles in voice mode and longer
  in beacon mode. An extraction aircraft could
  home in on the beacon tone and then two-way
  voice contact was established to pinpoint the
  RT’s location. These radios were used only if
  the main radio was lost or damaged.
  Weapons
  Light and compact weapons were necessary for
  the heavily loaded RTs, but an even more
  critical factor was firepower. If they were detected then an RT had to make
  its way to a PZ as rapidly as possible and call for immediate extraction. This
  took time, at least an hour, and if engaged they required significant firepower
  to have even a slight chance of surviving. The ability of weapons to penetrate
  through brush and bamboo was an important consideration for RTs, as they
  operated among dense vegetation in an effort to remain undetected.
  An initial requirement was that the weapons carried on missions into Laos
  and Cambodia could not be of American manufacture. This was to ensure
  plausible deniability of US involvement. This restriction was lifted in 1967,
  by which time US weapons were wider spread. There were exceptions, such
  as the M2 carbine and .45-cal. pistol, as these weapons had long been in use
  in the region. Weapons usually had their serial numbers ground off.
  The first standard weapon was the Swedish Carl Gustav m/45b submachine
  gun (aka the “Swedish-K” or “K-gun”7) procured by the CIA. It was compact,
  with a folding stock, making it only 21.7in. long when collapsed and 31.1in.
  long when extended. It weighed 7.3lb, but 9.2lb loaded with a 36-round
  magazine. It was rugged and reliable. However, the 9mm round had poor
  penetration through brush and bamboo. Sweden, in protest against the war,
  placed an arms embargo on the US in 1966 and the K-gun supply dried up.
  The Korean War-era .30-cal. M2 carbine was also used initially. It was
  light and compact, weighing 5.7lb and being only 3ft long. It was a selective-
  fire weapon and had a 30-round magazine. Its problem was that it fired 
  7 The “K” is derived from Kulsprutepistol (machine pistol).
  Voice-activated General Electric
  cassette-tape recorders were
  used to record NVA field-
  telephone conversations
  during wiretap missions. This
  first-generation wiretap used
  alligator clips connected to the
  telephone wire and required
  the insulation to be stripped.
  The second-generation tap
  used thin wires that were slid
  into the insulation. The third-
  generation tap used an
  induction clamp folded over
  the wire, without tampering
  with the insulation at all.
  Wiretaps helped determine
  convoy schedules on the Trail.
  (John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  the .30-cal. cartridge, which was underpowered, offered only a short range,
  and obtained poor penetration through dense brush and bamboo. It was not
  very accurate and overheated rapidly when fired on full automatic. A
  shortened version was sometimes field-modified. The barrel was cut down
  almost to the end of the forearm and the shoulder stock was cut off, leaving
  the pistol grip. There was no front sight. This weapon was notoriously
  inaccurate and created a great deal of muzzle blast and recoil. It was strictly
  a “pray and spray” weapon of marginal effectiveness, being useful only for
  suppressive fire under ranges of 20yds. It was usually carried by a cord
  around the neck with the weapon hanging at waist level.
  37
  Indigenous members of a CCS
  RT pose before a 2½-ton M135
  cargo truck. Most are armed
  with XM177E2 submachine
  guns and have taped the
  muzzles. Two carry M79
  grenade launchers and one 
  an M16A1 rifle to provide 
  a longer-ranged weapon. 
  (A. J. Sharp)
  A very heavily armed RT 
  New York of CCN, with three
  Americans and nine indigenous
  members. Most carry XM177E2
  submachine guns, but other
  weapons include two 40mm
  M79 grenade launchers (front
  right, back left), a .30-cal. M2
  carbine with M8 grenade
  launcher fitted with an M34 WP
  grenade on a launcher adapter
  (back row, second from left), an
  RPG-2 grenade launcher (front
  left), a cut-down 60mm mortar
  (front row, third from right),
  and an American with a
  7.62mm RPD light machine 
  gun (front row, second from
  right). (Martin Bennett via 
  John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Some RTs carried AK-47 and AKM assault rifles. These were mainly
  Chinese-made Type 56 copies. AKs weighed 7.5lb and were 35in. in length.
  There were distinct advantages to using AKs; they reinforced the impression
  that an RT seen from a distance was NVA/VC, and ammunition and
  magazines taken from enemy dead could be used. In a chance encounter with
  the enemy, the sound of AK shots would not necessarily cause a reaction
  among other enemy in the area. Additionally, the AK was a very effective and
  reliable weapon, with good penetration through foliage.
  Another Soviet-designed weapon used by some RTs was the RPD light
  machine gun. This 14.5lb bipod-mounted weapon was one of the lightest
  machine guns in use. It fired the same ammunition as the AK and used a 100-
  round belt in a drum magazine. Some had the barrel cut back to the gas tube
  and the bipod removed, reducing its 40.8in. length by about 8in. and
  knocking off a few pounds of weight. The shortened RPD provided an RT
  with considerable firepower while weighing about 11lb less than an M60
  machine gun.
  CIA-procured silenced submachine guns were mainly used for prisoner
  snatches. One of the most popular was the British 9mm Sten Mk IIS, as it was
  light at 7.5lb and could be broken down to be carried in a rucksack and
  assembled before the snatch. Other suppressed weapons were the .45-cal. M3
  “grease gun,” 9mm Carl Gustav m/45S, Israeli 9mm Uzi, and the M16A1
  with a Sionics suppressor. With the exception of the Uzi, these silencers were
  permanently fitted and impossible to remove in the field, lengthening the
  F
  ONE-ZERO’S WEB-GEAR LOAD
  The top web gear set (1) is based on an M1937 BAR belt and nylon M1967 suspenders, with a 
  WP grenade taped to its left shoulder strap and a snap link on the right shoulder strap; the left
  pouches and the first on the right held four XM177 magazines each (with a field dressing in each
  to raise the magazines) plus a notepad in the front pouch on the right, an AN/URC-10 radio in
  second pouch from the right, and the third from the right was cut off and an M1967 canteen
  carrier attached. An M1942 first-aid pouch held three mini-fragmentation grenades. A Browning
  Hi-Power pistol was carried in an M1 holster for the .45-cal. M1911A1 pistol. On the right, below
  the pouches, is an M1910 canteen carrier with six XM177 magazines. Some recon men carried 
  an empty canteen carrier in which to quickly shove empty magazines rather than trying to place
  them in magazine-filled pouches. The middle web-gear set (2) consists of an M1956 web belt 
  with two M14 magazine pouches, two carriers with 1qt canteens, three M1956 canteen carriers
  (two for magazines and one for grenades), along with M1956 suspenders on which are placed 
  an XM28 protective-mask case and M34 WP and M7A2 tear-gas grenades. The bottom web gear
  set (3) is composed of an M1956 belt, old-style M16 magazine pouches, M1956 canteen carriers, 
  a strobe light, a first-aid pouch, a serum-albumin can, and a snap link on the M1956 suspenders. 
  4. FN-Browning Hi-Power pistol with 13-round magazine
  5. 20 20-round XM177E2 magazines (380 rounds in total)
  6. Two 1qt canteens with halazone tablets
  7. XM28 tear-gas protective mask and case
  8. Six M67 fragmentation grenades
  9. Three V40 mini-fragmentation grenades
  10. M34 WP grenade
  11. M7A2 tear-gas grenade
  12. Leather gloves with the fingers cut off
  13. Two snap links
  14. Two field dressings
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  weapon considerably and increasing its weight. These weapons were not
  effectively suppressed if fired on full automatic, as the working of the bolt and
  firing mechanism made too much noise, and the buffers within the silencers
  wore out rapidly. They were normally fired on semi-automatic mode using as
  few rounds as necessary.
  The Belgium-made FN-Browning 9mm Hi-Power pistol was standard,
  and was CIA-procured. It was very reliable and had a 13-round magazine.
  Many men carried it attached to a cord around their neck and hanging on
  their chest inside their shirt. Others carried their pistol in a trousers cargo
  pocket or canteen carrier. It was always attached by a dummy cord. Some
  individuals carried Colt .45-cal. M1911A1 pistols with a 7-round magazine.
  Privately acquired .45-cal. and 9mm pistols were also used, as were revolvers.
  From 1968 the primary RT weapons were the 5.56mm XM177E1 and
  XM177E2 submachine guns. These were shortened-barrel, telescoping-stock
  versions of the M16A1 rifle. Both weapons used 20-round magazines; few
  30-round magazines were available. While the XM177 was lighter and more
  compact, its penetration through vegetation was poor and it was less accurate
  and shorter ranged than the M16. For better control on full-auto, some men
  attached a pistol grip to the forearm. Some RTs carried one or two M16A1s
  to obtain longer range. The XM177 (the “Colt Commando” or CAR-15)
  was well liked. If kept clean it was reliable enough. While some RTs were
  entirely armed with XM177s, there were not always enough available so a
  mix of weapons was carried. Early on only the Americans had them, with
  the indigenous men carrying Swedish-Ks or M16s.
  A CCS recon team with most
  men armed with M16A1 rifles.
  The point man carries an M3
  “grease gun” with silencer. 
  All carry BAR belts and M26
  fragmentation grenades 
  can be seen. On display is 
  a Chinese 7.62mm Type 53
  carbine – a copy of a Soviet
  Mosin-Nagant M1944 and
  widely used by the VC and 
  NVA service units, where it 
  was commonly known as 
  the “red-stock rifle” or the 
  K-44. (James Bolen via Steve
  Sherman)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Grenade launchers gave an RT an edge in combat as they were effective
  in keeping the enemy down and disorganizing him. A rapid number of high-
  explosive rounds confused the enemy and made him believe he had engaged
  a larger force. The 40mm M79 shoulder-fired, single-shot grenade launcher
  weighed only 5.95lb and allowed high-explosive rounds to be fired 150yds
  away at point targets and at a range of up to 375yds for area fire. There was
  also a canister (buckshot) round with a 35yds range, though it was not very
  effective in brush nor did it have much shot spread. Various colored-smoke
  and flare rounds were available. The M79 was sometimes modified by cutting
  the barrel down by 3in., removing the rear sight, and sawing off the butt
  stock, leaving a pistol grip. It was inaccurate and lacked range, but it was
  used for breaking contact at short range. The cut-down M79 was carried on
  a neck cord or in a canvas holster. A grenadier may or may not have carried
  a submachine gun, but he would at least have carried a pistol. Two under-
  barrel grenade launchers were tested, the XM148 of 1967 and XM203 of
  1968, mounted under the M16A1 or XM177E2 barrel. 
  Weapon slings were removed and replaced by cords or triangular
  bandages tied to the sling swivels. Conventional wisdom called for slings to
  be removed, as the weapon should always be held at the ready and never
  slung. The reality was that there were times that a recon man needed both
  hands free, so simplified slings were used. Weapons were sometimes painted
  with camouflage or had their shape altered with green tape.
  Some RTs carried one or two 5.2lb single-shot M72 or M72A1 light
  antitank weapons (LAWs) for breaking contact, which fired a 66mm high-
  explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rocket. A LAW fired into an enemy position was
  quite discouraging.
  Hand grenades were valuable for breaking contact and engaging the
  enemy closing in on the RT. The most common “frags” were the lemon-
  shaped M26 and the baseball-shaped M67, issued in 1967. A unique grenade
  used by SOG was the Dutch-made V40 fragmentation grenade. This little
  grenade was 1.5in. in diameter and weighed just 4.8oz. It was quite effective,
  could be thrown farther than the heavy US grenades, and a large number
  could be carried.
  The M34 WP grenade was very valuable for breaking contact. Burning
  gobs of WP showering down on a pursuing enemy were terrifying, could
  begin fires to block the enemy, and generated dense smoke. The problem 
  was that they were heavy at 1.5lb and they were difficult to throw any
  considerable distance. The grenade’s burst threw burning particles up to
  30yds, farther than the grenade could be thrown through brush.
  41
  The Colt 5.56mm XM177E1
  submachine gun, also known
  as the Commando or CAR-15,
  with its butt retracted and a 
  20-round magazine beside it.
  The XM177E1 had a 10in. barrel
  while the XM177E2 had an
  11.5in. barrel and could be
  fitted with a 40mm XM149
  grenade launcher. The longer
  barrel reduced muzzle flash.
  (National Infantry Museum)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  42
  AN-M8 white-smoke grenades generated dense
  grayish-white smoke suitable for screening. The
  M18 colored-smoke grenades were used to mark
  the RT’s location to aircraft and could also be used
  for screening. Violet and yellow “smokes” were
  mainly used for marking, owing to their sharp
  contrast with vegetation. Red smoke served to
  signal that an RT was in contact or to warn off 
  a helicopter approaching a hot PZ. Green was
  seldom used, because it did not stand out against
  the lush vegetation. The NVA also had grenades of
  these colors, but not violet, so violet smoke was
  preferred for marking.
  M7A2 and A3 riot-control grenades were also
  used to break contact, creating a cloud of tear gas
  for 15–35 seconds. The enemy seldom had gas
  masks. Besides burning the eyes, nose and throat,
  and temporarily blinding its victim, it caused a
  burning sensation in moist areas such as the
  underarms and groin. Many Vietnamese feared
  tear gas, believing that it caused sickness.
  The M18A1 Claymore antipersonnel mine was
  a 3.5lb directional mine with 1.5lb of C4 behind
  704 ball bearings, making them devastating to assaulting troops and those in
  ambush kill zones. It was electrically detonated by command, or it could be
  rigged with a tripwire. When detonated, the ball bearings blasted out in a 60-
  degree fan with an optimum range of 50yds, but they were dangerous up to
  250yds. Blast and secondary fragmentation were dangerous within 100yds.
  They were set to cover approaches to RONs and they were also left on an RT’s
  trail with a time-delay fuse if being pursued. Claymores were also used in
  ambushes and prisoner snatches to wipe out the bulk of the ambushed patrol.
  RT West Virginia of CCN with
  two Americans – One-Zero Ron
  Knight (back row, center) and
  One-One Larry Kramer (front
  row, right) – with ten
  indigenous men; all are
  outfitted as NVA. Their
  armament includes Chinese
  7.62mm Type 56 (AKM) assault
  rifles, a 40mm M79 grenade
  launcher (back row, second
  from left), and the One-One
  with a cut-down 7.62mm 
  RPD machine gun. In the
  background is an indigenous
  soldier with an M79 grenade
  launcher. (Ron Knight via 
  John Plaster)
  From 1967 onwards, SOG
  obtained a small number of
  40mm XM148 under-barrel
  grenade launchers, here
  mounted on an M16A1 rifle.
  They could also be fitted on 
  the XM177E2 submachine gun,
  but not earlier versions. The
  XM148 and the improved
  XM203 available the following
  year allowed the grenadier to
  carry a shoulder arm easily.
  Note that this One-Zero is
  wearing a grenadier’s vest,
  carrying 22 40mm rounds.
  (James Bolen via Steve
  Sherman)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  43
  Another pursuit-deterrence device, also set on enemy trails for harassment,
  was the M14 antipersonnel mine. The little “toe-popper mine” weighed only
  3.5oz. Except for the firing pin it was made entirely of plastic, making it
  undetectable by mine detectors. It measured 56mm in diameter and was
  40mm high. The 1oz shaped charge could take off a foot. They were usually
  buried on a trail in a diamond pattern, improving the chances of an enemy
  treading on one.
  CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
  The most common mission conducted by RTs was area recon, in which they
  entered a specific area to reconnoiter for enemy activity, roads and trails,
  facilities, etc. It was not uncommon for an area to be a “dry hole,” devoid of
  enemy. Regardless, the RT would usually remain for its planned mission
  duration. They might find documents, abandoned equipment, and supplies,
  and be able to estimate the strength of units that had been there.
  Point recon missions sent RTs to a specific grid coordinate to determine
  or verify what was there. It might be a suspected bridge, truck parking area,
  or where a radio-direction finder had located a transmitter. Road watches
  saw RTs attempting to creep in close enough to place a road, trail, or river
  under surveillance. This was extremely dangerous and seldom accomplished
  owing to the heavily patrolled cordon up to half a mile from these routes.
  Road-watch teams sometimes managed to lay antitank mines in mud holes
  and fords. These two missions might result in B-52 Arclight and AC-130A
  Spectra gunship strikes.
  Bomb damage assessment (BDA) missions were hazardous as RTs were
  typically inserted into the impact area immediately after an Arclight strike.
  Almost half the B-52 strikes blasted empty jungle, with BDA teams finding
  either nothing, or, worse, hundreds of enemy emerging from bunkers. 
  The RT might have to fight its way out.
  A display of enemy weapons
  captured on missions. Against
  the wall, from left to right, are:
  four 7.62mm Type 53 (M1944)
  carbines, two 7.62mm SG-43
  machine guns, and a 12.7mm
  DShKM 1938/46 machine gun.
  At the front are a 7.62mm RPD
  light machine gun to the left
  and a 7.62mm DP light
  machine gun to the right.
  (James Bolen via Steve
  Sherman)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Sensor and beacon missions saw teams emplacing sensors to detect foot
  or vehicle movement and transmit a signal. Radar-bombing beacons were
  emplaced at precise points, which bombers guided in on and which helped
  them to hit their targets.
  Wiretap missions required teams to locate a telephone line, which usually
  paralleled roads, and tap them with voice-activated recorders. The tapes were
  then returned for analysis. These missions were conducted from mid-1966
  to late 1970, when they were replaced by an air-dropped monitoring device
  that only had to land near a phone line to retransmit conversations.
  Prisoner-snatch missions were dangerous, as they usually involved
  ambushing a larger force in order to grab a prisoner, who might be 
  wounded. It required great imagination and flexibility to pull off. From 1966
  to 1970 only 44 POWs were snatched, the maximum in one year being 12.
  Taking a prisoner alive on any mission resulted in a week-long period of
  R&R for Americans and a wristwatch or monetary reward for indigenous 
  team members.
  From 1968–69 SOG inserted exploding 7.62mm and 12.7mm ammunition
  under Project Eldest Son. An RT on a recon mission would leave rounds 
  along trails used by the enemy so that they appeared to have been dropped 
  by comrades. RTs would also insert a round into the magazines of dead 
  enemy soldiers. Boxes of tainted 82mm mortar rounds were placed in
  ammunition dumps.
  BELIEF AND BELONGING
  Soldiers volunteering for the Special Forces did not fit any stereotyped profile.
  Many simply wanted to serve among the best soldiers. Others wanted
  adventure, a challenge, to prove themselves, or to see how far they could go.
  Still others thought the mission was so valuable that it was worth the risks.
  Loners and rebels did not fit in. Teamwork was essential: whether an A-team
  or an RT, there was no “I” in “team.” They were generally patriotic (in a
  mild sense) and apolitical. It should be noted that Special Forces soldiers had
  the highest divorce rate in the Army, owning to their long and frequent
  absences. It was said that you could identify a Green Beret because he has 
  BELOW
  A portion of the Ho Chi Minh
  Trail in Laos, cutting through 
  a bamboo thicket. This
  photograph demonstrates 
  just how close RTs would
  approach the Trail. (Frank
  Greco via John Plaster)
  BELOW RIGHT
  Way stations and rest areas
  were built all along the Ho Chi
  Minh Trail, where southbound
  troops would rest. These
  “hooches” were made of
  bamboo and hidden in bamboo
  groves, making them difficult 
  to detect at all but the closest
  ranges. RTs discovering these
  sites reported the coordinates
  and photographed them so
  analysts could determine the
  most effective aerial munitions
  with which to attack them.
  (John Plaster)
  44
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  45
  “a star sapphire ring, a Seiko watch, a demolition knife, sports-car keys, and
  divorce papers,” and that “you may meet a Green Beret you don’t like, but
  you’ll never meet one that you’ll forget.”
  There was no typical SOG recon man. They may have had a common
  Special Forces background, but their previous experiences in the Army and
  civilian life differed greatly. While across-the-border reconnaissance demanded
  that detection be avoided, SOG RTs could easily find themselves in a deadly
  engagement. SOG recon men tended to be more aggressive than other types
  of reconnaissance units; they did not hesitate to fight it out. Often their
  aggressiveness allowed them to bluff their way out of dangerous situations
  through sheer brashness. They fully understood how dangerous the job was.
  Since they carried no US identification, the North Vietnamese were within
  their rights to treat them as spies and saboteurs. Team members had an
  agreement that if they were so severely wounded that they had to be left
  behind, they would not be left alive.
  Like other Special Forces soldiers they firmly believed in the benefits of
  unconventional warfare and were not as rigid in their thinking as many
  conventional soldiers. They were flexible and adaptable. Doctrine and
  manuals meant nothing. They did whatever worked and were not afraid to
  try something new, no matter how unconventional. It was not uncommon
  for recon men to keep extending their tours six months at a time.
  Freedom of action was a key feature of Special Forces and SOG operations,
  the rule being: “Tell me what to do and I’ll do it, but don’t tell me how to do
  it.” One-Zeros were allowed a great deal of latitude and control over both
  their team and mission. They were given a mission and then allowed to plan
  every aspect of it. If someone higher up was so bold as to dictate how an RT
  was to perform its mission, once on the ground the One-Zero would do it his
  own way anyway. It was an affront for anyone to tell the man on the ground
  ABOVE LEFT
  A recon team cautiously
  trudges down a footpath 
  of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 
  Such paths were not used 
  for vehicle traffic. (Charles 
  Aycock via Steve Sherman)
  ABOVE
  A recon team’s photograph 
  of one of many branch trails 
  of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It was
  common practice to place a
  weapon or other piece of gear
  in the photo to provide scale,
  here an XM177E2 submachine
  gun. (Charles Aycock via Steve
  Sherman)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  what they thought he should do. It was only
  he who could see the ground and vegetation,
  know the capabilities and limitations of 
  his men, have a feel for their condition and
  state of mind, and understood better than
  anyone else what the immediate enemy
  situation was. The One-Zero was the most
  experienced man, regardless of rank. There
  were buck sergeant One-Zeros with sergeants
  first class under them.
  The RT was the center of their world. They
  were not concerned with how other RTs 
  did their business and were not interested in
  anything regarding echelons above them. They
  looked out for their comrades, both American
  and indigenous. They worked, fought and
  played hard, with the American team members
  usually sticking together during stand-down.
  The original RTs consisted of three
  Americans and 9–12 indigenous men. The
  large teams gave them the capability to match
  their strength to the mission. They could
  organize as a small recon team, typically with
  two Americans and four indigenous men, a
  “heavy RT” of 9–12 men allowing them to
  fight their way out of some situations, or as a
  Spike team. A Spike team was intended for direct-action missions such as
  recovering downed airmen, ambushes, or prisoner snatches. Many One-Zeros
  felt that the larger teams were too difficult to hide, made too much noise,
  and were still too small to fight effectively. It required two choppers to insert
  and extract large teams. Not all of the indigenous soldiers would be employed
  on every mission. There were always some indigenous troops who were on
  leave, injured, ill, or needed a break.
  In late November 1968 RT composition was changed to two Americans
  and six indigenous men, owing to increasing casualties and shortages of
  qualified personnel. Often a third American was temporarily attached as a
  One-Two to break in a new man, who would later be assigned as a One-One
  on another team. When a “heavy RT” was needed an RT would simply be
  reinforced from another.
  G
  THE RT
  This eight-man RT is depicted in the normal traveling formation, a simple column. From front 
  to rear, they are in the following order: indigenous point man wearing NVA uniform and armed
  with an AKM, indigenous grenadier armed with an M79, a US One-Zero armed with an XM177E2, 
  a US One-One with radio and armed with an XM177E2, an indigenous interpreter armed with 
  an XM177E2, an indigenous team leader armed with a XM177E2, an indigenous grenadier 
  armed with an M79, and an indigenous rearguard armed with an XM177E2. The rearguard 
  wears an NVA shirt, but has a US weapon and web gear. Each man had an assigned sector of
  observation. They were trained to move their weapon in unison with their eyes to give them as
  much edge as possible if the enemy was detected at close range. Movement was extremely slow.
  A single step would be taken, and then each man would scan his sector closely and listen for any
  suspicious sounds before taking another step.
  46
  SSG John Plaster, of RT
  California of CCC, upon
  returning from a mission. 
  He wears olive-green jungle
  fatigues lightly sprayed 
  with black bands. On his web
  gear are M67 fragmentation
  grenades and he carries an
  XM177E2 submachine gun
  along with the traditional and
  well deserved post-mission
  beer. (John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  48
  Regardless of the hazards of their mission and their hard-acquired skills
  and expertise, SOG recon men received no more pay than any other Special
  Forces soldier in Vietnam, and promotions were just as slow. SOG was
  generous with valor decorations, although where the act occurred was
  classified. They were also permitted limitless visits to in-country R&R centers
  during stand-down; most ordinary soldiers were typically granted just one visit. 
  Recon men could “un-volunteer” at anytime without criticism if they were
  burned out or felt that their luck had run out. If one’s mindset wasn’t right it
  was better to leave recon work. They might go to the command-and-control
  staff, training, Hatchet Force, or a security company. There were some recon
  men who felt they were indestructible, owing to good fortune and skill, but
  many others understood that each successful mission brought them closer to
  the brink.
  The FOBs from which the RTs operated were self-contained compounds
  with barracks for the USSF and indigenous personnel, latrines, washrooms,
  mess halls, supply rooms, headquarters, and O&I centers. They were
  surrounded by defensive berms, trenches, machine-gun bunkers, and barbed-
  wire barriers. RT personnel typically lived in two-man rooms while the
  indigenous men had their own team house and quarters. There would be a
  modest club and dayroom with a TV showing the Armed Forces Television
  Network and where movies were shown.
  The relations between the Americans and the indigenous men varied. First
  there was the language barrier. Americans had only a basic understanding of
  Vietnamese and the various Montagnard and other ethnic dialects were
  difficult. Among the indigenous team members was a designated combat
  interpreter, who might also be the senior indigenous man, acting as their leader
  and representative. It was through him that the Americans dealt with the
  indigenous men. Many of them spoke some basic English and most strived to
  learn more. This negated the Americans’ opportunity to learn their language.
  The indigenous members of the Special Commando Unit could be
  Montagnards, Cambodians, ethnic Chinese Nùngs, or Vietnamese. They were
  always of the same ethnicity within an RT. They knew one another well and
  recruited friends, relatives, or fellow villagers or tribesmen they trusted. The
  Americans spent some off-duty time fraternizing with their indigenous team
  members, but cultural differences limited this, with some spending more time
  with them than others. Their backgrounds, interests, and outlook differed
  greatly. Nonetheless, the Americans took care of their indigenous comrades
  on and off duty. They tried to get them the best weapons and equipment.
  They saw to their training and made sure that their living conditions and
  chow were adequate. They had to trust one another’s skills and competence
  – their lives depended on it. The reality was that the Americans were the recon
  men. It was they who planned and prepared for the mission. They collected
  the intelligence information, recorded the data, made communications, and
  led the mission. The indigenous men were basically bodyguards to provide the
  necessary firepower if it came to a fight. For this they were well paid and
  cared for.
  They were basically civilian employees of the US Government and were
  officially referred to as Special Commando Unit personnel, but this term was
  seldom used. Many had no prior military service although some had been in
  the CIDG camp strike forces or MIKE Forces. They were eligible for US valor
  awards and the Purple Heart, but it was seldom that they received anything
  above a Bronze Star.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  49
  ON CAMPAIGN
  CCN, CCC, and CCS operated independently, with overlapping areas of
  operation. CCN at Da Nang was the largest, and conducted operations in
  southern Laos and northern Cambodia. It operated FOB 1 at Phu Pai, FOB
  3 at Khe Sanh (closed in mid-1968), and FOB 4 at Da Nang. CCC at Kontum
  operated FOB 2 from that location. It operated in the same areas as CCN.
  CCS was the smallest of the commands and operated out of Ban Me Thout.
  It was responsible for southern Cambodia.
  Hatchet platoons of five USSF and 42 indigenous men served as reaction
  forces to exploit targets found by RTs, as well as recovery forces to aid in the
  extraction of RTs. Three platoons comprised an exploitation company, with
  at least one at each FOB. CCN and CCC possessed three or four Search,
  Location, and Annihilation Mission (SLAM) companies intended as reaction
  forces or to conduct short-term road cuts inside Laos. Each FOB also
  possessed a security company.
  Each command possessed a reconnaissance company to which the RTs
  were assigned. CCN had about 30 RTs, CCC about 25, and CCS only 16.
  CCN and CCC RTs were named after states, and when those ran out CCN
  named RTs after poisonous snakes. CCS RTs were named after weapons,
  tools, and weather phenomena.
  Mission preparation
  When an RT was alerted for a mission the American members attended a
  briefing by the intelligence section, usually three or four days prior to
  insertion. Emergency missions might only allow a few hours’ notice. This
  briefing took about an hour and specified the AO, the mission, what it was
  expected to achieve, enemy activity, means of insertion, date and time, and
  mission duration (this was flexible). The Americans planned the mission after
  studying maps and aerial photographs. They might discuss the AO with other
  RT Montana of CCN
  demonstrates a fully manned
  team with three Americans 
  and nine indigenous Special
  Commando Unit Montagnards.
  All are armed with XM177E2
  submachine guns with 
  30-round magazines except
  one man with a 7.62mm M60
  machine gun. Two indigenous
  men possess 40mm XM149
  grenade launchers. Note the
  One-Zero, Mike Sheppard 
  (back center), with a .45-cal.
  M1911A1 pistol tucked into 
  his STABO harness. This team
  had made a rare freefall
  parachute jump into Laos. 
  (Billy Greenwood via John
  Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Air Force North American
  Aviation Rockwell OV-10
  Bronco FAC aircraft were 
  used from 1969. They were
  armed with four 7.62mm 
  M60 machine guns and two
  seven-tube 2.75in. WP rocket
  pods. These aircraft were
  painted light gray. (Frank 
  Greco via John Plaster)
  teams who had been there. The One-Zero and sometimes the One-One might
  be flown over the AO in a forward-air-controller (FAC) aircraft known as a
  “Covey.” He would study the terrain and select LZs and PZs as well as study
  his initial route.
  In the remaining days the plan would be refined and changed as additional
  information came in. Although the team’s other Americans provided input,
  the One-Zero’s decision was final. He decided every aspect, including
  selecting the LZ and weapons and equipment, each man’s role, the team’s
  routes on the ground, and their PZ. The RT conducted movement and IAD
  rehearsals (including live-fire exercises) and trained on unique mission
  aspects. They also drew equipment, supplies, and fresh ammunition. Weapons
  were disassembled, cleaned, test fired, and then recleaned without
  disassembly. Radios and other electronic communications gear was tested.
  The radio operator received the mission frequencies, call signs, and codes.
  Everyone was packed and ready by the evening before insertion. The One-
  Zero closely inspected each man, ensuring he had each and every item of
  equipment and his weapons, that he was camouflaged and made no noise
  when moving, that he understood all aspects of the mission, and to check on
  his attitude. Every man had to know who carried what critical items and
  where to find them. The team presented a briefback to the sergeant major or
  an operations officer, laying out every aspect of the mission. Questions were
  asked and answers provided. One of the main goals of the briefback was to
  check the RT’s state of mind.
  Besides the established FOBs, the RTs were inserted from temporary
  launch sites, usually Special Forces camps. Some teams were flown by C-130s
  to Thailand and would launch from there. An RT might spend hours or even
  weeks at a launch site awaiting the order to go.
  RTs did most of their movement in daylight. Night movement was far too
  slow and noisy, and the risk of running into the enemy was high, as there
  were many in the vicinity of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
  50
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  51
  EXPERIENCE OF BATTLE
  The action described in this chapter is based on a real-life operation, but has
  been compressed and altered for the purposes of this book. The mission called
  for a six-man RT to reconnoiter a small north–south valley, through which
  ran a little-used road. The area was heavily forested with moderate-to-dense
  underbrush. Air reconnaissance of roads farther to the west indicated that
  they were seeing less use and that this eastern road might now be seeing more
  traffic. The RT was to confirm or deny the road’s use, assess its condition, and
  determine its grid coordinates on three points in order to allow it to be plotted
  and targeted for air attack. It was hoped that this could be accomplished in
  four days, but the team was prepared for a five-day stay. They were “crossing
  the fence” into Cambodia.
  No two missions were alike and none was routine. A final readiness
  inspection was conducted in the operations building and the RT applied their
  camouflage. They walked to the helicopter pad, where the sergeant major
  and other staff were present. The insertion chopper arrived and the team
  boarded it. Each man knew exactly what he was supposed to do, the order
  of disembarkation, and the direction in which they were moving out.
  Prior to 1970, most SOG helicopter support was provided on an as-
  available basis by conventional Army and Marine aviation units. SOG
  typically required some 45 helicopters a day for all three command-and-
  control operations. By the time they had learned the nuances of these special
  cross-border operations the units had often been changed. There were three
  dedicated helicopter units: the Vietnamese Air Force’s 219 Helicopter
  A recon team loaded and ready
  for insertion inside a UH-1H
  helicopter. In the early days,
  before XM177E2 submachine
  guns were available, RTs carried
  .30-cal. M2 carbines. While a
  US-made weapon, they were 
  so widely available throughout
  Southeast Asia that they could
  not be attributed directly to 
  the US. Note that a poncho is
  wrapped around the 7.62mm
  M60D door gun to protect it
  from dust during landing and
  takeoff. It would be removed
  when the team made their
  insertion run. (Warren Calkin
  via Steve Sherman)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  52
  Squadron with Sikorsky CH-34 Choctaws, the US Air Force’s 20th Special
  Operations Squadron with Bell UH-1F and UH-1P (gunship) Hueys, known
  as the “Green Hornets,” and the 21st SOS “Pony Express” Sikorsky CH-3B
  Sea Kings working out of Thailand.
  Insertions were extremely dangerous. LZs were scarce in many areas and the
  NVA/VC placed lookouts on as many as possible. This was especially true in
  southern Laos. They might fire signal shots or dispatch a runner to alert their
  headquarters. To counter this, very small clearings and those overgrown with
  brush and saplings (“hover holes”) were used, as were bomb-blasted areas.
  Besides touching down on the ground, choppers would hover over
  inadequate LZs with the recon men hanging from the skids and dropping
  through the brush, rappelling from two ropes on each side, or descending a
  30ft roll-out ladder on each side. Four men could rappel to the ground in five
  seconds, but the following men required almost a minute to hook up. An RT
  could descend using ladders in less than a minute, and they came into
  increasingly wider use.
  Occasionally, false insertions were made, where a series of multiple
  landings were made throughout an area, with the RT being inserted at only
  one of these. The enemy would either attempt to dispatch patrols to all of the
  LZs, and being made in dim light it would be impossible to tell exactly where
  the touchdowns were made, or ignore some and simply be on the alert for an
  RT prowling the area. False insertions were seldom practiced as it overexposed
  helicopters to ambush. Sometimes an RT was extracted and another inserted
  in order to dupe the enemy.
  The One-Zero would select the team’s insertion time. Many preferred first
  light as it gave them the visibility needed to move quickly from the LZ area
  and then all day to move to their AO. Others preferred last light as it made
  it difficult for the enemy to move to and locate the LZ and find a trail. LZs
  were so extensively watched in Laos that CCN usually preferred insertion at
  last light.
  Besides the insertion chopper there was a command-and-control aircraft
  with the launch-site CO or XO, one or two gunships (used only if the RT
  was engaged after insertion), and a Covey ready to call in fighter-bombers, 
  if this was permitted.
  The Vietnamese Air Force’s
  219th Helicopter Squadron 
  was assigned to MACV-SOG 
  for cross-border operations.
  This excellent unit was
  equipped with Sikorsky CH-34
  Choctaw cargo helicopters. It
  was armed with a single .30-cal.
  M1919A4 machine gun in the
  left door. While obsolescent,
  the CH-34 proved reliable and
  effective for its mission.
  Kingbees were painted in a
  two-tone olive-green and olive-
  drab pattern with a light-gray
  underside. (John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  53
  The insertion chopper would go in low and fast, as a low altitude reduced
  the chance of visual detection. It was difficult for the enemy to tell the
  direction of flight, especially if the chopper made S-turns on the approach.
  Distance was impossible to determine as there was so much sound distortion
  among the ridges and forest. The door gunners would be alert and the team
  locked and loaded. The “pucker factor” was high. The RT knew not to fire
  from within the aircraft, because if they did so they could hit the aircraft or
  the disembarking team members. The first man out was the One-Zero, and
  everyone followed no matter what, even if the wood line bristled with gunfire.
  If a two-door helicopter the One-One went out the side opposite that of the
  One-Zero. The chopper might not even set down. Three or four men would
  be in each door of a Huey. 
  Our particular RT hit the ground running and bee-lined into the trees; the
  chopper was gone before they reached them. After some 100yds they halted,
  accounted for everyone, ensured that nothing had been dropped, oriented the
  map, listened for enemy activity, and then moved out heading west-
  northwest. The chopper orbited some distance away as long as fuel allowed,
  around 10–20 minutes, and maintained radio contact with the RT. If the team
  The Air Force’s 20th Special
  Operations Squadron used 
  Bell UH-1F, P, and N Huey
  helicopters to insert and extract
  SOG reconnaissance teams in
  Laos and Cambodia from 1965–
  72. Known as “Green Hornets,”
  they were armed with two M60
  machine guns. Some
  helicopters carried a pair of
  seven-tube 2.75in. rocket pods.
  The Green Hornets could be
  identified by their four-color
  camouflage pattern (olive
  green, forest green, black, 
  and sand) and their light-gray
  underbelly. Army Hueys were
  painted in solid olive green.
  Green Hornets bore no national
  markings. (Alfonso Rivera via
  John Plaster)
  A recon team conducts training
  using an early type of ladder 
  to board a hovering UH-1H
  helicopter. This type of narrow
  ladder proved to be more
  difficult to climb and descend
  than the wider ladder
  introduced later. (Warren Calkin
  via Steve Sherman)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  54
  made contact they would call for extraction from their LZ or head for a PZ.
  There were some instances when RTs were immediately extracted and then
  reinserted on an alternate LZ. The RT moved away from the LZ rapidly, but
  after a halt slowed to their normal movement rate. An FAC remained in the
  area until dark.
  Movement was agonizingly slow when the enemy was in the vicinity, even
  when believed to be some distance away. Each man had his own surveillance
  sector. The point man looked for nearby threats, be it the enemy, tripwires, or
  natural or manmade obstacles. The man behind him looked farther forward
  and across a wider front for more distant threats, and kept the point man on
  course. The others observed to the flanks. The rearguard brought up the rear,
  walking backwards much of the time, or at least frequently looking over his
  shoulders. An RT might cover only 500–1,000yds a day in particularly
  dangerous areas. To move, a man meticulously scanned his sector, moving his
  weapon in sync with his eyes and scanning any suspicious area. He would
  then check the ground where he would step next, check his sector again, and
  move his foot. He would set it down toe first followed by his heel. The slightest
  crackle of dry leaves, twigs, or gravel would cause him to freeze and reposition
  his foot. After scanning his sector and listening he would repeat the process.
  They would minimize bending or breaking vegetation. The rearguard would
  attempt to disguise disturbed ground or bent vegetation, though there really
  was not much that could be done. Sweeping with a leafy branch did nothing
  to cover tracks, but simply looked like someone had swept the ground with a
  leafy branch. It was impossible to prevent tracks on muddy ground. Efforts
  A door gunner readies his
  M60D as his UH-1H lifts off after
  inserting an RT. His would be
  the last friendly face they
  would see for some days.
  (Author’s collection)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  55
  would be made to minimize scuffing the sides of
  gullies and stream banks or leaving marks crossing
  over fallen trees. There were times when men had
  to crouch when moving through low vegetation or
  even crawl on their hands and knees. This was
  wearing, especially crouching with full equipment.
  A rest halt was made every hour to drink, apply
  camouflage, check equipment, and listen.
  RTs made three scheduled daily reports. They
  were made during a routine halt at no set time.
  This made it more difficult for the enemy to
  monitor calls than if they were made at set times.
  The first would be made around first light before
  the team began moving. Another was made at
  midday and the last at night when the team halted.
  The One-Zero told the radio operator what to
  send and he encrypted the SITREP, a relatively
  slow process unless the message was short. The
  antenna was unfolded, contact made with a
  Hillsboro, Moonbeam, or Covey aircraft, and the
  whispered message transmitted. The RT would
  then move out immediately.
  Our team had been inserted on the east side of
  a ridge and the first day saw them making their
  way down its western side and across a stream.
  They crossed the stream, avoiding scuffing the
  bank. Once hidden on the other side, one man returned and filled all empty
  canteens. Shortly after leaving the stream they heard a signal shot to the
  south. No doubt their insertion helicopter had been seen and the shot was an
  effort to drive them north into a patrol. Instead, they moved southwest
  toward the shot while working their way up the ridge. Because their presence
  was now known, movement had to be extremely slow. They later heard
  another shot, closer this time. They had moved 700yds and it was
  approaching dusk. The One-Zero decided that the enemy suspected they were
  in this valley. Arm and hand signals were used along with the lowest whispers
  if speech was necessary.
  Rather than RON on this side of the ridge they increased their pace and
  crossed to the other side. This was dangerous, as it involved moving faster
  and crossing the ridge crest, a natural travel avenue. They approached the
  crest cautiously, as the foliage was lighter there. There was no sense in
  watching to see if it was traveled; it either was or it wasn’t. Waiting might
  only have them run into a patrol. They found a footpath with recent tracks.
  It was narrow enough for them to step across without leaving boot prints.
  Forming up parallel to the trail, they quickly moved across as an entity and
  fell into line to move rapidly downhill.
  Below the crest they changed direction, heading west, then southwest and
  northwest. This side of the ridge was a long gradual slope down to the
  suspected road. Estimating that they were a quarter of the way down, and
  finding the brush dense, the One-Zero selected a RON. They coiled up in the
  densest and smallest patch they could find. The One-Zero bedded down,
  facing in the direction of the target road, which was designated as 12 o’clock.
  If they had to make a break for it they would travel at 5 o’clock to a PZ
  The One-Zero to the left carries
  an XM148 grenade launcher 
  on an M16A1 rifle. Note the 
  two “mini smoke” colored-
  smoke grenades taped to 
  his suspender’s right shoulder
  strap. The XM148 proved to 
  be flawed: it was difficult to
  cock, had poor sights, and 
  its key parts easily broke.
  (James Bolen via Steve
  Sherman)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  56
  farther north on the ridge they had been inserted on. Six Claymores were
  emplaced and the evening SITREP was made after contacting Moonbeam.
  Weapons and equipment were checked, socks changed (removing one boot at
  a time), and the first meal of the day eaten, which consisted of cold rice and
  mackerel. The two Americans whispered the next day’s plan and the
  interpreter passed it to the indigenous men. Working clockwise around their
  circle they each took a one-hour watch, beginning with the One-Zero. If a
  man snored he was nudged awake.
  At 2020hrs they made out the faint sound of truck engines. Small convoys
  were passing on the road at irregular intervals. They estimated a total of 
  6–10 trucks in each of the six convoys. The One-Zero recorded the time for
  each, the last being at 0210hrs.
  An hour before first light the team was alert. The morning SITREP was
  passed and breakfast eaten (rice and dried shrimp and candied pineapple
  chunks). They were alert for movement and sounds as dawn filtered through
  the trees. They recovered the Claymores and continued to listen. Just as they
  were moving out, three shots cracked in sequence atop the ridge, some
  distance apart. The RT was concerned about the possibility of an enemy
  sweep coming down the ridge, as well as security and patrols along the road.
  They had confirmed that the road was in use, but they still needed to
  determine its location.
  The team slowly emerged from its thicket and moved downhill. The point
  man spotted an NVA patrol at 2 o’clock. Slowly crouching, they were stone
  silent as the four men passed 50yds ahead of them. After several long minutes
  the team moved forward. The One-Zero determined that they were on a ridge
  finger identifiable on the map. At its base a narrow stream curved around it
  and flowed down the valley. Heading down the draw on one side of the finger
  they approached the stream and entered its bordering brush and reeds.
  Carefully crossing the stream and passing through a band of brush they found
  the single-lane, hard-packed road. Pulling back into the brush the One-Zero
  worked out a six-digit coordinate based on the location of the ridge finger.
  They pushed on another 200yds and plotted another coordinate. The road
  RT Washington of CCN moves
  through a bamboo thicket
  inside Laos. This is rather light
  bamboo; it can be much denser
  and very difficult to move
  through. (Howard Sugar via
  John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  57
  appeared to follow the stream. That was good enough location fixing for the
  One-Zero. They recrossed the stream and heard two NVA soldiers walking
  their bicycles down the road. The interpreter reported that they were
  complaining about increased guard-duty hours – information of intelligence
  value. The RT moved back up the ridge and another patrol, of six men,
  passed behind them. Later, two signal shots were heard atop the ridge. Coiling
  up in a thicket the One-One encrypted a message confirming truck traffic, the
  size and interval of the convoys, and the road’s coordinates. It was
  transmitted to Hillsboro and they requested an extraction bird to be on
  standby and gave the plotted PZ coordinates.
  Without warning, AKs blasted through the brush from 4 o’clock, just
  30yds away. The team instantly turned five XM177E2s and an M79 on the
  enemy. They withdrew in a peel-back IAD, throwing fragmentation and WP
  grenades. The One-Zero directed where they should take position and
  repeated the maneuver as the NVA came at them. This time they drastically
  veered uphill at a run. The One-One set up a Claymore with a one-minute
  delay and on they ran. The Claymore detonated with an echoing explosion.
  There was no further pursuit. They had breathing room to contact a Covey
  and request immediate extraction. A former One-Zero in the Covey was on
  the radio. Heading up the ridge they had almost gained the crest when AKs
  rattled from 9 o’clock. There were only two or three enemy and again
  grenades were thrown.
  One of the indigenous men bounced into a tree and onto the ground. The
  team built a perimeter around him as the One-Zero tried to find the wound.
  The One-One started a saline IV but shortly afterwards they realized that he
  was dead. They had no choice but to leave the body. Another indigenous
  team member ripped open the man’s rucksack and armed a Claymore. Others
  passed his magazines out and one took his XM177E2. More AKs joined the
  barrage and the team moved out, throwing only a few grenades as they
  needed to conserve them. The One-Zero ordered the team to run and then
  trot as they looped right, paralleling their route, before halting. Everyone
  loaded full magazines. The claymore detonated behind them. They soon
  heard the pursuing enemy to their right and to the front. Now the team
  stalked, veering in on the enemy from the flank. They saw seven NVA soldiers
  creeping low, and the RT slowly went flat. Surprise was complete when they
  opened fire at 20yds, emptying two magazines each.
  Now they moved back uphill, cutting farther to their left. Distant shouts
  could be heard. Near the ridge crest they came upon very thick brush and
  coiled into a wagon-wheel formation. They gulped water and gave a
  magazine and grenade count. Fragmentation grenades were running low and
  there were no more WP grenades. The Covey was talking to them; extraction
  was 20 minutes out. That was a long time. More shouts were heard downhill.
  The RT moved through the thicket closer to the crest. The Covey called,
  “Ladders or strings?” “Ladders,” came the reply. Two NVA soldiers came
  trotting down the crest path. The One-Zero had to order everyone to hold
  fire. They needed time and did not want to attract attention. The Covey came
  over high and reported a clearing of sorts less than 100yds down the ridge.
  The team moved, paralleling the crest of the ridge. The Covey came around
  again. “Hey good buddy, 10–15 dinks coming at you, 200yds south on the
  ridge trail. We got ’em.” The Covey came in behind the NVA and fired two
  WP rockets. The RT could hear screams. The enemy knew that WP rockets
  marked targets for fighter-bombers. Movement on the ridge ceased for a time.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  “Five minutes out,” reported the Covey. The team bee-lined for the PZ.
  The gunships arrived first, buzzing the ridge. AKs popped in the distance and
  a machine gun crackled. The One-Zero ordered the RT to reverse their hats
  in order to reveal the orange-lined inside. He flashed a signal mirror at the
  Covey. Another WP rocket struck 100yds south of them. The Covey would
  be using that as a reference point to give the gunships the team’s location.
  The enemy knew that an extraction was under way and their officers
  would be pressing their men to close in. They would be rewarded for
  destroying the team. There was movement down the ridge. The RT held its
  fire and set up their remaining Claymores around them. Smoke grenades were
  held ready to mark the PZ. The command-and-control chopper was up high.
  They knew urgent coordination was going on between the Covey, gunships,
  and the extraction bird.
  The Covey came over the radio: “You’re too far from the PZ. The bird’s
  inbound.” AKs suddenly rattled from below and a whistle shrieked. The team
  returned fire. “Blow the Claymores!” shouted the One-Zero. They all
  detonated with shattering blasts. “Di di mau!” shouted the One-Zero, urging
  H
  ENGAGED
  A worst-case scenario was for an RT to be engaged and suffer a serious casualty straight off, while
  still distant from an extraction PZ. Here, an indigenous team member has taken bullet hits in his
  legs. There is hope he can be saved if an extraction chopper makes it in time and the team can get
  him hooked up for a “string” extraction via a STABO harness, a McGuire rig, or possibly hook him
  to an extraction ladder, any of which could be lowered through trees if they were not too dense.
  The RT needed to be able to hold off the enemy for an hour. To do this they needed to undertake
  moves to evade them and keep them guessing about the RT’s intent and destination. Ideally, they
  would lose their pursuers and then be able to hide out at a suitable extraction point. The main
  technique to losing the pursuers was to make it as difficult and dangerous for them as possible to
  pursue the RT, giving them an excuse to quit or at least to slow them down by forcing them to be
  extremely cautious. Here, the One-One prepares an M18A1 Claymore mine, which will be left on
  the RT’s trail and timed to detonate after a one-minute delay. He is inserting the time-delay fuse
  fitted with an M7 blasting cap and an M60 fuse igniter. The One-Zero is treating the wounded
  team member. Teams could not carry blood plasma, but they might carry serum albumin
  contained in a key-and-strip-opened can. This was a blood-volume expander that absorbed bodily
  fluids into the circulatory system to prevent its collapse from loss of blood. Ideally a 500ml bag of
  saline solution would be administered through an intravenous injection in order to provide
  additional fluid. The serum-albumin can contained a 100ml bottle of serum albumin, a plastic 
  bag-like suspension sling, an airway cannula (a needle inserted into the bottle’s stopper to 
  let in air, aiding the albumin flow), and the injection needle and rubber tube.
  58
  The Douglas A-1H Skyraider
  attack aircraft, known as a
  “Sandy,” was valuable for 
  close air support of RTs in
  trouble or to hit targets of
  opportunity discovered by 
  RTs. Skyraiders carried a variety
  of general-purpose explosive,
  cluster, WP, and napalm
  bombs, plus 2.75in. rockets 
  and four 20mm cannon,
  allowing them to attack 
  a wide range of targets.
  Skyraiders were flown 
  by the 1st, 6th, 22nd, and
  602nd Special Operations
  Squadrons. (John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  60
  CCC One-Zeros formed up 
  with the Zero-Twos and their
  indigenous teams lined up
  behind them. They are waiting
  to greet a returning RT. (Ted
  Wilcorek via John Plaster)
  his men to move quickly. Throwing grenades as they went, the team darted
  toward the PZ. It was not much of one, being covered in thin brush and
  saplings, but it was clear enough for a ladder extraction. They pulled their
  STABO harness leg straps down and connected them.
  They could hear the chopper. Violet smoke was tossed. AKs cracked and
  whistled. The chopper came in at treetop level, with the 35ft ladders unrolling.
  The door gunners were hammering their M60 machine guns into the trees.
  Team members were spraying fire, emptying their magazines. Dust and leaves
  billowed from the rotor blast, blinding both the RT and the enemy. Two men
  leapt onto each ladder, with the One-Zero grabbing on last, after throwing
  his final grenade. They didn’t try to climb in, but hooked onto the ladders
  with their STABO harness snap links. Bullets whizzed past them as they lifted
  off and the gunships rolled in, giving the ridge a good pasting with rockets
  and guns. Clinging to the ladders, it was a long ride back to the FOB skimming
  over the treetops.
  An RT rapidly boards a Huey on
  a PZ deep in Laos. The number
  of men that could load into 
  a Huey often determined the
  RT’s size. Trying to get a second
  chopper into a PZ to take out
  the second part of an RT when
  it was under pursuit could be
  disastrous. (Mike Sloniker via
  John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  61
  Post-mission
  En route to the FOB the RT might sit down on a friendly
  airstrip and climb inside the helicopter. If the extraction had
  been particularly hairy then everyone who was free at the
  FOB would turn out to greet the returning patrol. If things
  had gone according to plan then the launch officer and a few
  buddies would be on hand. The RT members would stow
  their gear and get the indigenous men started on equipment
  and weapons maintenance. The Americans would buy beers
  or soft drinks at the small FOB clubhouse and then report to
  the “S-2 hole.” An officer and an NCO conducted the
  debriefing. The One-Zero talked through every aspect of the
  mission, in virtually a minute-by-minute narrative. Specific
  questions regarding intelligence information were asked. 
  A shorter hand-written narrative on a pre-printed form
  would also be completed, the RT’s track of its movement
  rendered on a map, any map updates plotted, and lessons
  learned of value to other RTs discussed.
  RTs were given at least 3–4 days’ stand-down time after
  a mission. A week off was given if possible before the team went back into
  cycle ready to be assigned a mission. In the meantime they trained, conducted
  weapons firing, implemented lessons learned, and practiced techniques.
  AFTERMATH OF BATTLE
  MACV–SOG was deactivated on April 30, 1972. CCN, CCC, and CCS had
  been reorganized and reduced as Task Force 1, 2, and 3 Advisory Elements,
  respectively, in March 1972 to assist the ARVN Special Mission Service under
  the Strategic Technical Directorate, which had taken over the SOG
  reconnaissance mission.
  SOG RTs had accomplished a great deal over the years, but the cost was
  high. A dozen entire RTs disappeared and never made radio contact after
  insertion. A total of 49 US SOG members are still listed as missing in action
  along with scores of indigenous personnel8. The number of US SOG
  personnel killed in action was 407. Virtually 100 percent of RT members
  were casualties at some point, with an incredibly high number of wounded.
  It is said that the RTs suffered higher casualty rates than even Civil War
  regiments. While Special Forces personnel assigned to MACV–SOG made up
  only 10 percent of the Special Forces in Vietnam, they suffered over half the
  number of Special Forces members killed in action and 85 percent of those
  who went missing. There were only a few rare exceptions under unusual
  circumstances when RT members were taken prisoner.
  Some suffered post-traumatic stress disorder owing to the continuous and
  intense psychological and physical stress and anxiety. Some did not experience
  it for many years and it manifested itself in many ways. The physical strain and
  various illnesses such as malaria, dysentery, and dengue fever too took their
  toll. The areas the RTs operated in were often saturated with Agent Orange
  and CS (tear-gas) powder.
  RT members relax outside their
  mess hall after returning from a
  mission. They wear standard US
  olive-green jungle fatigues and
  a variety of boonie hats. (James
  Bolen via Steve Sherman)
  8 Policy was that even if a man was seen shot, confirmed dead, and left behind, he was
  considered missing in action unless the body was recovered.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  62
  General Westmoreland declared that up to 50 percent of intelligence on
  enemy troop locations and logistical activities received by MACV was
  provided by Special Forces, while SOG supplied some 75 percent of the
  intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. RTs are also credited with the highest
  enemy-to-friendly kill ratio, inclusive of directed air strikes: 158 enemy to
  one friendly in 1970. As many as 100,000 NVA personnel supported the Ho
  Chi Minh Trail and a large percentage of these were infantry, security, and
  counter-reconnaissance troops necessary to counter small RTs. These were
  troops that could have otherwise been employed on combat operations inside
  South Vietnam.
  Eight Special Forces members assigned to SOG were awarded the Medal
  of Honor, along with two Navy SEALs and an Air Force special-operations
  officer. A total of 23 MACV–SOG members received the Distinguished
  Service Cross, the second-highest medal for valor, and over 2,000 other
  awards for valor were presented. SOG itself was finally awarded the much-
  deserved Presidential Unit Citation in 2001.
  As an example of the valor displayed by SOG recon men, Sergeant First
  Class Jerry M. Shriver (CCS), MIA April 24, 1969, during his 3½ years’
  continuous service in Vietnam was presented with: two Silver Stars, one
  Soldier’s Medal, seven Bronze Stars for Valor, one Air Medal, three Army
  Commendation Medals for Valor, and one Purple Heart.
  SOG cross-border operations remained classified until the 1980s, when
  the files were declassified. Regardless of what some believe, SOG operations
  are no longer classified.
  With no small effort this CCS
  recon team was extracted with
  the launcher tube of a
  camouflage-painted Chinese-
  made 122mm DKB rocket
  launcher. There was a prevalent
  fear that higher headquarters
  would disbelieve RT reports of
  what they discovered and it
  was not uncommon for them
  to go to great efforts to return
  with a sample. (James Bolen via
  Steve Sherman)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  63
  BIBLIOGRAPHY
  Gillespie, Robert M., Black Ops, Vietnam: An Operational History of MACVSOG,
  Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011
  Greco, Frank, Kontum: Command and Control: Select Photographs of SOG 
  Special Ops During the Vietnam War, Privately published, 2005
  ——, Running Recon: A Photo Journey with SOG Special Ops along the Ho Chi
  Minh Trail, Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 2004
  Kearny, Cresson H., Jungle Snafus … and Remedies, Cave Junction, OR: Oregon
  Institute of Science & Medicine, 1997
  Meyer, John Stryker and Peters, John E., On the Ground: The Secret War in
  Vietnam, Oceanside, CA: Levin Publishing, 2007
  Meyer, John Stryker, Across the Fence: The Secret War in Vietnam, Oceanside, CA:
  SOG Publishing, 2011 (expanded edition of On the Ground: The Secret War in
  Vietnam)
  Plaster, John L., SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars, Boulder, CO: Paladin
  Press, 2000
  ——, SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam, New York:
  Penguin Group, 1997
  Palmer, Joe and Dumont, Robert, SOG Medic: Stories from Vietnam and Over the
  Fence, Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 2007
  Shultz Jr., Richard H., The Secret War Against Hanoi: The Untold Story of Spies,
  Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam, New York: Harper
  Perennial, 2000
  Stanton, Shelby, Green Berets at War: US Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia
  1956–1975, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985
  ——, Special Forces at War: An Illustrated History, Southeast Asia 1957–1975,
  Charlottesville, VA: Howell Press, 1990
  ——, Vietnam Order of Battle: A Complete Illustrated Reference to US Army
  Combat and Support Forces in Vietnam 1961–1973, Mechanicsburg, PA:
  Stackpole Books, 2003
  A still-dazed NVA truck driver
  snatched by a CCN RT is
  unloaded from a Huey after 
  a successful prisoner snatch.
  While successful snatches were
  infrequent and dangerous
  undertakings, the prisoners
  invariably proved to be
  valuable intelligence sources
  on how the Ho Chi Minh Trail
  system operated. (John Plaster)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  64
  References to illustrations are shown in bold.
  Advanced Individual Training (AIT)  14
  Alexander, Mrs Billye (“Mrs A”)  16
  Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT)  13
  Ban Me Thout  17, 49
  “banana peel”  23, 24
  Basic Combat Training (BCT)  14
  Bell UH-1F/1P Huey helicopters (“Green
  Hornets”)  52, 52
  bomb damage assessment (BDA) missions  43
  Camp Mackall, North Carolina  13
  Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  8–9, 36, 38
  Combat Orientation Course (COC)  17
  Combat Water Survival Test (CWST)  13
  Command and Control Central (CCC)  10,
  11, 46, 49, 60
  Command and Control North (CCN)  10,
  11, 37, 42, 49, 49, 56, 63
  Command and Control South (CCS)  10, 11,
  37, 49, 62
  Da Nang  17, 49
  Dong Ba Thin  20
  Douglas A-1H Skyraider aircraft  58
  extraction  11, 11, 12, 14, 17, 28, 25, 60, 60
  ladders  18, 53
  McGuire rig  17
  STABO  12, 14
  Fort Benning, Georgia  14
  Fort Bragg, North Carolina  15, 16
  forward-air-controller (FAC) aircraft  50, 50
  forward operating bases (FOBs)  9–10, 48, 49
  GAZ-51 cargo trucks  6, 10
  GT (General Technical) tests  13
  HALO (High Altitude Low Opening)
  training  18
  “Hatchet” reaction forces  11, 17, 48, 49
  Ho Chi Minh Trail  4–8, 5, 6, 7, 44, 45, 62
  immediate-action drills (IADs)  20, 22, 50
  insertion  51, 52–53
  “jump school”  14
  Knight, Ron  42
  Kontum  17, 49
  Kramer, Larry  42
  landing zones (LZ)  50, 52, 54
  M135 cargo trucks  37
  Military Assistance Command, Vietnam –
  Studies and Observation Group (MACV-
  SOG)
  achievements  62
  Air Studies Group  9
  awards  62
  character of personnel  44–48
  composition  10
  deactivation  61
  establishment  8–9
  Ground Studies Group (OP-35)  9–10
  insignia  26, 26
  Maritime Studies Group  9
  Pathfinder School  18
  Presidential Unit Citation  11
  Psychological Studies Group  9
  Recondo School  17, 18
  recruitment  12–18
  responsibilities  10–12
  training  13, 14–16, 18–25
  see also Command and Control
  Central/North/South; reconnaissance
  teams; weapons and equipment
  Military Occupation Specialty (MOS)  14,
  15–16
  Mobile Strike Force Command (MIKE Force)
  17, 20
  Nha Trang  17
  North Vietnamese Army (NVA)  4
  559th Transportation Group  6
  graves  9
  RT engagement with  57–58
  One-Zeros
  mission planning  50
  on-person load  30, 31
  rucksack gear  34, 35
  training  18–21, 19
  web gear  38, 39
  Operation Switchback 9
  Operations and Intelligence (O&I)  15, 16
  pick-up zones (PZs)  24–25, 36, 50
  Plaster, SSG John  46
  reconnaissance teams (RTs)
  camouflage  28, 28, 29
  casualties  58, 59, 61
  clothing  26–29, 28, 29
  composition  46, 48
  daily reports  55
  debriefing  61
  engagement with enemy  57–58
  extraction  11, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 25, 60, 
  60
  insertion  51, 52–53
  mission preparation  49–50
  modus operandi  22–25, 43–44, 46, 47, 
  51–60
  movement  22, 23, 46, 47, 54–55
  One-Zeros  17, 18–21, 19
  post-mission  61, 61
  prisoner snatches  44, 63
  RT California  46
  RT Michigan  24
  RT Montana  49
  RT New York  37
  RT Washington  56
  RT West Virginia  42
  Spike teams  46
  support  11–12, 20
  training  18–25
  see also weapons and equipment
  “remain overnight” (RO) positions  25, 26,
  27, 55
  Search, Location and Annihilation Mission
  (SLAM) companies  49
  Sheppard, Mike  49
  Shriver, SFC Jerry M. “Mad Dog”  15, 62
  Sikorsky CH-3B Sea King helicopters  52
  Sikorsky CH-34 Choctaw helicopters  
  52, 52
  Special Forces Detachment B-51  20
  Special Forces Group Airborne (SFGA)  
  16, 17
  Special Forces Selection Battery  13
  Special Forces Training Group (SFTG)  15
  Techepone  4
  UH-1H Huey helicopters  32
  and extraction  12, 17, 25, 53, 60
  and insertion  51, 54
  US Special Forces (USSF)  9, 10, 12, 49
  Viet Cong (VC)  4
  Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB)  20, 26
  way stations  44
  weapons and equipment
  AK-47 assault rifles  38
  ammunition  32–33
  antipersonnel mines  42–43
  Carl Gustav m/45b submachine guns  36
  gas masks  34
  grenade launchers  37, 41, 42, 55
  grenades  33, 41–42
  knives  33
  light antitank weapons (LAWs)  41
  M16A1 rifles  37, 40, 40, 55
  M18A1 Claymore mines  42
  M2 carbines  36–37, 51
  M3 “grease guns”  8, 15, 32, 40
  medical supplies  33
  on-person  30
  pistols  40
  radios  34, 36
  RPD light machine guns  37, 38
  rucksacks  33
  snap links  21, 32
  Sten Mk IIS submachine guns  38
  tape recorders  33, 36
  Type 53 carbines  40
  web gear  30, 32
  XM177E1 submachine guns  40, 41
  XM177E2 submachine guns  8, 28, 37, 
  40, 49
  Westmoreland, General William  62
  INDEX
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  First published in Great Britain in 2011 by Osprey Publishing
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  or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical,
  photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission
  of the copyright owner. Inquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.
  A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
  Print ISBN: 978 1 84908 513 7
  PDF e-book ISBN: 978 1 84908 514 4
  EPUB e-book ISBN: 978 1 84908 942 5
  Editorial by Ilios Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK (www.iliospublishing.com)
  Page layout by: Mark Holt
  Index by Alison Worthington
  Typeset in Sabon and Myriad Pro
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  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
  The author is indebted to Frank Greco (CCC), Bruce Perry (CCS), John L.
  Plaster (CCN), A. J. Sharp (CCS), Trey Moore of Moore Militaria, and Steve
  Sherman of RADIX Press for their invaluable assistance.
  ARTIST’S NOTE
  Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which
  the color plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale.
  All reproduction copyright whatsoever is retained by the Publishers.
  All enquiries should be addressed to:
  Brian Delf,
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  MEASUREMENT CONVERSIONS
  Imperial measurements are used almost exclusively throughout this book.
  The exception is weapon calibers, which are given in their official
  designation, whether metric or imperial. The following data will help in
  converting the imperial measurements to metric.
  1 mile = 1.6km
  1lb = 0.45kg
  1oz = 28g
  1 yard = 0.9m
  1ft = 0.3m
  1in. = 2.54cm/25.4mm
  1 gal = 4.5 liters
  1pt = 0.47 liters
  1 ton (US) = 0.9 tonnes
  1hp = 0.745kW
  ABBREVIATIONS
  AIT
  Advanced Individual Training
  AO
  area of operations
  BCT
  Basic Combat Training
  CCN, CCC, CCS Command and Control North, Central, and South
  CIA
  Central Intelligence Agency
  CIDG
  Civilian Irregular Defense Group
  CO
  commanding officer
  CS
  tear gas
  FAC
  forward air controller
  FOB
  forward operations base
  IAD
  immediate-action drill
  LZ
  landing zone
  MACV–SOG
  Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observation
  Group
  MOS
  military occupation specialty
  NCO
  noncommissioned officer
  NVA
  North Vietnamese Army
  O&I
  operations and intelligence
  PZ
  pick-up zone
  RON
  remain overnight
  RT
  reconnaissance team
  SFGA
  Special Force Group (Airborne)
  SITREP
  situation report
  SLAM
  Search, Location, and Annihilation Mission company
  SOI
  signal operating instructions
  SOP
  standard operating procedures
  USSF
  United States Special Forces
  VC
  Viet Cong
  WP
  white phosphorus (“Willie Pete”)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
SOURCE: textdata/thevault/Osprey System/Warrior Series (WAR)/Osprey - WAR 159 - US MACV-SOG Reconnaissance Team in Vietnam.pdf