TEXT: SIMON DUNSTAN 
   ILLUSTRATED BY HENRY MORSHEAD 
  FRENCH ARMOUR IN 
  VIETNAM 1945–54
  
  NEW VANGUARD 267
  FRENCH ARMOUR IN 
  VIETNAM 1945–54
  SIMON DUNSTAN 
  ILLUSTRATED BY HENRY MORSHEAD
  
  CONTENTS
  THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK 
  4
  THE ROLE OF FRENCH ARMOUR 
  6
  • The battlefield and the enemy
  • Equipment
  • Tactics
  • Viet Minh anti-armour tactics
  EVOLUTION OF ARMOUR ORGANIZATION 
  14
  • Amphibious units: 1er Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie
  • Armoured launches
  • Armoured train ‘La Rafale TB’
  REPRESENTATIVE UNIT HISTORY: 1er RÉGIMENT  
   
  DE CHASSEURS À CHEVAL 
  22
  • Cochinchina and Tonkin, 1946
  • Operations 1947–50
  • 1951: ‘The Year of de Lattre’
  • Diversification, and Operation Lotus
  • 1952: Operation Lorraine
  • 1953: reorganization, and Operation Mouette
  • 1954: The ‘Bisons’ of Dien Bien Phu
  THE FINAL BATTLES 
  45
  FRENCH ARMOUR UNITS IN INDOCHINA 1945–54 
  46
  INDEX 
  48
  
  4
  THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK
  In the aftermath of World War II the victorious European powers attempted 
  to reassert dominion over their Asian colonies lost to the Japanese. The 
  French government of Gen Charles de Gaulle was determined to reclaim 
  French Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos).
  At the Potsdam conference in July–August 1945 between Prime Minister 
  Winston Churchill, President Harry S. Truman and Marshal Joseph Stalin, it 
  had been agreed that responsibility for disarming and repatriating the Japanese 
  forces in Indochina would be divided: above the 16th Parallel the task was 
  entrusted to Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist army, and below it to 
  the British Fourteenth Army. However, the power vacuum following Japan’s 
  surrender to the Allies on 14 August was vigorously exploited by the Viet Minh 
  – the communist nationalist movement headed by Ho Chi Minh, which had 
  been armed and active in the jungle highlands along the Chinese border since 
  1944. The heartland of Tonkin was the Red River Delta, around the capital 
  Hanoi and the main port of Haiphong. On 28 August 1945 the Viet Minh’s 
  military hard core, the People’s Liberation Army led by Vo Nguyen Giap, 
  entered Hanoi, where, on 2 September, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the creation 
  of the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam, embracing Tonkin (North 
  Vietnam), Annam (Central Vietnam) and 
  Cochinchina (South Vietnam). An embryo 
  Viet Minh administration, enforced by the 
  renamed People’s Army (Quan Doi Nan 
  Dan), was quickly implanted in the major 
  Red River Delta towns. (For simplicity, 
  hereafter the military organization is 
  referred to as the Viet Minh as well.)
  One week later, Chinese Nationalist 
  forces crossed the border and rapidly 
  took control of the North, plundering 
  the countryside as they went, but the  
  Viet 
  Minh 
  soon 
  reached 
  local 
  accommodations with their corrupt 
  commanders. On 12  September, British 
  forces of the 20th Indian Division landed 
  in Saigon to accept the Japanese surrender. 
  FRENCH ARMOUR IN 
  VIETNAM 1945–54
  When armoured units arrived 
  in Indochina, most roads had 
  disintegrated due to lack of 
  maintenance during World 
  War II, and those few bridges 
  that survived were often 
  inadequate for AFVs. Here, an 
  M5A1 of Groupement Massu 
  bypasses a destroyed bridge 
  during Operation Moussac in 
  October 1945, the reoccupation 
  of Mytho in the Mekong Delta. 
  The markings identify 1er 
  Compagnie/501e Régiment de 
  Chars de Combat. The squadron 
  comprised three platoons each 
  with six M5A1 tanks, although 
  a total of 16 were available for 
  this operation. Groupement 
  Massu operated in Cochinchina 
  until March 1946, when it 
  was transferred by LSTs to 
  Haiphong for employment in 
  Tonkin. (Author’s collection)
  
  5
  With them was a small French 
  contingent which – together 
  with rearmed Colonial troops 
  released 
  from 
  Japanese 
  captivity – cleared Saigon of 
  the Viet Minh’s weaker and 
  less organized southern allies 
  by the end of the month. In 
  October 1945, units of the 
  Corps Expéditionnaire Français 
  d’Extrême-Orient (CEFEO), the 
  French Far East Expeditionary 
  Corps under the command 
  of Lt Gen Philippe Leclerc de 
  Hautcloque, landed in Saigon 
  with the broad mission to 
  reoccupy French Indochina.
  The first French armour deployed to Indochina in the interwar years had 
  been two five-tank platoons of Renault FTs posted respectively to Hanoi in 
  1919 and Saigon in 1921, augmented by 28 more in 1927. In 1922–27 a 
  squadron’s worth of Peugeot 146 and White TBC armoured cars followed, for 
  internal security, but these AFVs were all obsolete in the face of the Japanese 
  occupation of 1940 and 1941. New armour now had to be shipped out for 
  the reoccupation, and the first unit to arrive was the Groupement de Marche 
  de la 2e Division Blindée, drawn from Leclerc’s famous wartime command.
  This advance expeditionary group comprised a reconnaissance squadron 
  with M8 armoured cars from 7e Escadron/1er Régiment de Marche de 
  Spahis Marocains; a squadron of M5A1 light tanks of 1e Compagnie/501er 
  Régiment de Chars de Combat; a provisional infantry force drawn from 
  the Colonial 4e Bataillon/Régiment de Marche du Tchad and the Navy’s 
  Régiment Blindé des Fusiliers-Marins, with half-tracks; and engineer elements 
  of 71er Bataillon du Génie. This advance force was known as ‘Groupement 
  Massu’ after its commanding officer, LtCol Jacques Massu. It disembarked 
  between 10 and 15 October, and was immediately committed to combat in 
  the Mekong Delta to capture My Tho, in a joint operation with other French 
  troops landed from British Royal Navy ships.
  To extend its flexibility, Groupement Massu was split on occasions into 
  two sous-groupements of infantry and armour, with the latter commanded 
  by Capt Compagnon of 503rd RCC. In the months that followed, other 
  armoured and cavalry units arrived, but several lacked AFVs, and had to 
  fight as infantry until they were equipped with vehicles acquired from the 
  departing British or with wartime American AFVs shipped from France. Step 
  by step, the major towns and roads in southern Indochina were reoccupied, 
  though the hinterland was never pacified.
  By a provisional agreement reached with the Viet Minh, other French units 
  disembarked in the Red River Delta in February–March 1946, beginning an 
  uneasy co-existence with Viet Minh (VM) forces already in place. When 
  the Chinese Nationalists finally withdrew in May 1946 French units from 
  Cochinchina pushed north to seize control of Annam and thereafter Tonkin, 
  but were hampered by the monsoon rains. During the rest of that year  
  Ho Chi Minh negotiated with the Paris government over the future status and 
  Under the watchful gaze of 
  Chinese Nationalist guards 
  and a Viet Minh officer, an M8 
  armoured car of 7e Esc/1er 
  Régiment de Marche de Spahis 
  Marocains – the reconnaissance 
  squadron of Groupement 
  Massu – negotiates the 
  roadway alongside Hanoi’s Paul 
  Doumer railway bridge across 
  the Red River. Note the insignia 
  of the Massu Group’s parent  
  2e Division Blindée and the 
  Cross of Lorraine, symbol of the 
  Free French, on the hull front. 
  This vehicle was the first French 
  AFV to enter the Tonkinese 
  capital on 18 March 1946; the 
  7e Esc/RMSM comprised three 
  platoons each with four M8 
  armoured cars, four jeeps, one 
  half-track and an M8 HMC. 
  (Author’s collection)
  
  6
  constitution of the country. During this 
  interim, Giap consolidated the People’s 
  Army’s safe base areas in the ‘Viet Bac’ 
  region east of the Red River (the 
  provinces of Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang, 
  Thai Nguyen, Bac Kan, Lang Son and 
  Cao Bang), and established a new refuge 
  in the ‘South Delta Base’ (Than Hoa, 
  Nghe An and Ha Tien provinces).
  The Franco-VM talks collapsed in 
  acrimony, and from 23 November 1946 
  hostilities began with a general uprising 
  in Haiphong, spreading to Hanoi on 19 
  December. After fierce street-fighting 
  the French restored their grip on the Delta cities; the People’s Army withdrew 
  to their base areas to build their strength, while guerrilla warfare broke out 
  all over Vietnam. The First Indochina War had begun in earnest.
  THE ROLE OF FRENCH ARMOUR
  The battlefield and the enemy
  Indochina incorporates an extraordinary diversity of terrain, mostly inimical 
  to AFVs. The swampy lowland plains, cut by innumerable waterways, are 
  covered with cultivated paddy fields alternating with areas of dense bush. 
  The hills and plateaus of the highlands that make up most of the country are 
  sometimes bare but usually carpeted with trees, bamboo or elephant grass, and 
  rise into densely jungled mountains cut by river gorges. Both the plains and 
  the highland valleys are studded with vertiginous limestone outcrops known 
  Troops of the 1er Régiment de 
  Chasseurs à Cheval (1er RCC) 
  were embroiled in street-
  fighting and house-clearing in 
  Hanoi for several days starting 
  on 19 December 1946. At this 
  time 1er RCC had only seven 
  M5A1 tanks in the city, together 
  with a few M8 HMCs and M8 
  armoured cars. The tanks 
  operated in pairs or singly in 
  conjunction with an M3 half-
  track. Six officers and three 
  NCOs of the tank platoons 
  were killed in the fighting for 
  Hanoi. Following the battle, 
  the Viet Minh withdrew into 
  the hinterland to conduct 
  guerrilla warfare before 
  growing in strength to become 
  a formidable force capable 
  of deploying conventional 
  divisions in the field 
  culminating in the climactic 
  battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 
  1954. (Author’s collection)
  After World War II some 
  Japanese equipment, such as 
  these Type 95 light tanks and a 
  Type 89B medium, was pressed 
  into French service, alongside 
  French pre-war vehicles such as 
  Renault UE Chenillette infantry 
  supply vehicles fitted with a 
  locally produced machine-gun 
  housing. These vehicles were 
  employed by an ad hoc unit 
  designated Commando Blindé 
  du Cambodge; on 10 August 
  it was deployed to Siem Reap 
  in Cambodia to reinforce the 
  garrison there, together with 
  1er Bataillon Parachutiste SAS. 
  (Author’s collection)
  
  7
  as calcaires. In 1945–46 much of the country was inaccessible to any vehicle; 
  the dirt roads and up-country trails had been poorly maintained during 
  World War II, and the Viet Minh invariably sabotaged those that remained, 
  particularly the countless bridges. The roads were frequently impassable 
  during the six-month monsoon season between roughly April and October 
  and those bridges still intact were mostly inadequate for armoured vehicles. 
  Employed for the most part on routine convoy escorts and route clearance, 
  the road-bound armour units were initially greatly hampered by the dire road 
  infrastructure, and suffered several reverses due to opportunistic enemy action.
  Nevertheless, with stubborn energy, armour leaders located the best 
  secondary roads and passable cross-country tracks. Routes, river and 
  stream crossing points, and trafficable areas in all sectors were classified 
  carefully according to seasonal variations. As the result of hard work and 
  determination, the various armoured units were able to find areas in which 
  they could readily manoeuvre. In an effort to provide mobility across the 
  inundated rice paddies, swamps and waterways that abounded in the 
  Mekong and Red River deltas, specialized units were formed and equipped 
  with American amphibious vehicles developed for the Pacific campaign. (The 
  outstanding example of such units was the Foreign Legion’s 1er Régiment 
  Étranger de Cavalerie – see page 15). In time, only the most rugged mountain 
  terrain and dense jungle areas remained absolutely impenetrable, though the 
  whole road network remained permanently vulnerable to nightly sabotage 
  by Viet Minh village guerrillas.
  Following the reoccupation of Indochina by mobile columns exploiting 
  along roads, it became necessary to extend the struggle all over the country to 
  areas far from highways and passable trails, but these lines of communication 
  always remained a vital battleground. Lacking many airfields or sufficient 
  aircraft, the CEFEO was dependent on overland transportation. Before 
  1951 much of its infantry strength was dispersed as ‘sector troops’ in small 
  company or even platoon posts to provide local security, so the road network 
  was essential for establishing and supplying these garrisons. Threatening 
  small posts and ambushing traffic (including the French forces that reacted 
  to such attacks) was the Viet Minh’s major operational tactic in 1946–50. 
  French armour had to assume the mission of protecting the roads, rivers, and 
  even the railways.
  Armour units were responsible for ‘road-opening’ – checking the security 
  of a route before the daily or periodic traffic of vehicles or convoys passed. 
  The dire shortage of AFVs 
  when the first French armoured 
  units arrived in Indochina 
  prompted rapid improvisation, 
  such as this armed jeep with a 
  modicum of armour protection 
  for the driver; it serves with 1er 
  RCC in August 1950, shortly 
  after the regiment arrived in 
  Tonkin. The vehicle is named 
  ‘VILLEROY’, after a Marshal of 
  France who had commanded 
  this regiment from 1675. 
  The Groupement Massu also 
  employed armed jeeps during 
  its reoccupation of Cochinchina 
  and Annam, fitted with armour 
  plate for the driver and .50cal 
  Browning gunner. Indeed, 
  armed jeeps were used up to 
  the end of the war, in sub-units 
  such as the Peloton de Jeeps 
  Blindées du 9e Escadron/1er 
  REC in Laos. That comprised 12 
  jeeps each with three men, a 
  command jeep with four, and 
  a Dodge WC60 4x4 Dépannage 
  repair vehicle. (Author’s 
  collection)
  
  8
  They then had to maintain security by patrolling or by escorting convoys. 
  The mission was similar on rivers, especially on the Saigon River, from 
  the southern capital down to the sea. On important waterways armoured 
  motorboats were employed, either by separate platoons of six boats or 
  by squadrons with three platoons. The areas of operations of these units 
  extended over wide expanses of country, and included even the smallest 
  tributaries.
  Besides the essential mission of keeping routes of communication open, 
  armour units were called upon to act as ‘fire brigades’. They deployed at 
  short notice to help besieged posts or units pinned down in ambushes. Day 
  and night the armour platoons moved out to rescue their harassed comrades, 
  An M3A1 White Scout Car 
  of 5e Régiment de Spahis 
  Marocains (5e RSM) patrols a 
  track in Cambodia during 1950. 
  Arriving on 28 September 
  1949 as the Groupe d’Escadrons 
  de Spahis Marocains, the unit 
  became the 5e RSM in January 
  1950, with two platoons 
  detached to serve on riverine 
  Vedettes. Equipped with a 
  motley selection of vehicles, it 
  fought mainly in Cochinchina 
  and Cambodia, where it 
  absorbed the Commando 
  Blindé du Cambodge as its 8e 
  Escadron. Note the regimental 
  insignia of a blue Sharifian 
  star with a green outline and 
  the figure ‘5’ in the centre: 
  the number was often just 
  painted in the centre of US 
  factory-applied white stars. 
  The Scout Car is armed with a 
  MAC 31 Reibel 7.5mm machine 
  gun with its characteristic 
  ‘camembert’ 149-round vertical 
  drum magazine, while the 
  troop compartment is covered 
  in vegetation as a sunshield. 
  (Author’s collection)
  In order to reduce losses 
  from ambushes, armoured 
  trucks were employed as 
  troop transports; this GMC 
  CCKW 353 is on operations in 
  Laos in 1951. The floor of the 
  rear troop compartment was 
  lined with a thick rubber mat as 
  protection against mines, and 
  Reibel 7.5mm machine guns 
  were mounted above each side 
  armour plate and at the rear. The 
  increased weight compromised 
  mobility on the marginal roads, 
  and the steering was extremely 
  heavy, so driving was fatiguing. 
  It was essential to keep the 
  tarpaulin taut so that thrown 
  grenades did not get lodged in 
  any fold of the canvas. 
  (Author’s collection)
  
  9
  running the risk of well-sited ambushes prepared by 
  the Viet Minh before they launched attacks to provoke 
  such relief attempts. Infantry battalions also required 
  armour support during search-and-destroy operations 
  against an elusive enemy who became increasingly 
  better trained and equipped, and close cooperation 
  between infantry and armour became the rule. But 
  dispersion of armour units along roads, a shortage 
  of all equipment before at least 1951, and the poor 
  cross-country mobility of integral wheeled vehicles 
  all limited the benefit of such combined operations. 
  Moving at the same speed as infantry on foot, or 
  carrying out monotonous ‘bouclages’ (area-control 
  operations, involving patrolling between cordon 
  positions), armour units often used up their resources 
  without any real benefit having been gained.
  Equipment
  Mobility was also constrained by the equipment of 
  the French armour units that landed in 1945. The 
  majority was relatively war-weary, of World War II 
  American origin, including M8 armoured cars, M3 scout cars, M3 half-
  tracks, M5A1 light tanks, and M8 75mm HMCs (self-propelled howitzers). 
  The M8 armoured cars and M5A1 tanks had 37mm cannons as their primary 
  weapons. Some regiments were equipped with British Coventry armoured 
  cars mounting a similar 2-pounder gun, and Humber scout cars with various 
  armaments fitted in locally produced turrets, as well as Universal Carriers. 
  Some had the French Panhard AML 178 armoured car with a 47mm gun, 
  the much-esteemed ‘Pan Pan’.
  The characteristic shortcomings of these vehicles were well recognized, 
  but French industry, which had been largely destroyed during World War II, 
  was at that time unable to provide anything better. Moreover, while America 
  supplied equipment for France’s NATO army in West Germany, France was 
  forbidden from shipping any of this out to fight a colonial war of which 
  the US government disapproved. Even with their limitations, however, these 
  early armoured vehicles were useful for road security missions, and even 
  in actual combat. (Despite years of rumours and speculation, the French 
  Army did not employ any captured PzKpFw V Panther tanks in Indochina, 
  although they did ship out some SdKfz 251 half-tracks.)
  The major turning-point in the war came in October–November 1950. 
  In October, after receiving its first serious aid and training from Communist 
  China following Mao Zedong’s victory in 1949, the Viet Minh achieved a 
  stunning victory along Route Coloniale 4 (RC 4), the highway paralleling the 
  Chinese frontier, and expelled the CEFEO from most of the territory north 
  of the Red River Delta. On 25 November, the Chinese launched a major 
  offensive against the US-led UN forces in North Korea. In the face of what 
  was interpreted as a coordinated communist threat to Western interests in East 
  Asia, US military aid to France began to increase dramatically (eventually, 
  America would underwrite 80 per cent of the material costs of France’s war). 
  Similarly, the Viet Minh received increasing quantities of military equipment 
  and training in conventional warfare from the Chinese People’s Liberation 
  Originally armed with a 25mm 
  cannon, some 729 Panhard 178 
  armoured cars were in service 
  during the Battle of France in 
  1940. Production continued 
  for a while under German 
  occupation, and the vehicle 
  saw extensive service on the 
  Eastern Front. In July 1945 
  production resumed of an 
  improved version for the French 
  Army, known affectionately as 
  the ‘Pan Pan’. Here, one of these 
  Panhard & Levassor Type 178B 
  armoured cars, mounting a 
  47mm SA35 cannon in an FL1 
  turret, negotiates a narrow 
  trail in support of 1er Bataillon 
  de Parachutistes Vietnamiens 
  (BPVN) during Operation 
  Chaumière north-east of Tay 
  Ninh during April–May 1952. 
  On the turret sides is the 
  insignia of the 5e RSM, and 
  on the front hull the name 
  ‘VERCORS’, commemorating the 
  famous Maquis battle of
  June–July 1944. (Author’s 
  collection)
  
  10
  Army (PLA). While most of the equipment was of Chinese, 
  Russian or Czech manufacture, ironically the Viet Minh 
  also received American weapons that had been captured 
  by the Chinese in Korea.
  Beginning from December 1950, the CEFEO’s M5A1 
  Stuart light tanks were superseded by American M24 
  Chaffees. The low ground pressure (less than 10psi) of 
  the M24 was its most appreciated characteristic. Light, 
  fast, reliable and well armed, the Chaffee could be driven 
  everywhere during the dry season, and – with care – even 
  across flooded rice paddies. Nevertheless, the M5A1s 
  remained in service until the end of the war, notably in 
  dispersed squadrons as part of new motorized infantry 
  brigade groups. These Groupes Mobiles (see below) first 
  proved their worth during Gen de Lattre de Tassigny’s 
  defence of the Red River Delta in January–June 1951, 
  against Giap’s premature attempts to follow up his 1950 victory on RC 4. 
  The CEFEO’s loss of the Chinese frontier region and the Viet Minh’s 
  support by China raised real fears of direct PLA intervention in Tonkin, and 
  consequently a battalion of M36B2 tank destroyers was deployed there in 
  November 1950, together with M4 Sherman tanks. In the event, these AFVs 
  were mainly used to support infantry units as mobile artillery.
  The fundamental limitation to armour operations was the lack of a 
  suitable troop transport vehicle with adequate cross-country ability. Despite 
  its wartime reputation, the M3/M5/M9 series of half-tracks was less effective 
  in the difficult terrain of Indochina. Furthermore, most infantry in fact moved 
  either on foot or in unarmoured trucks that were confined to the few arterial 
  roads. These were frequently narrow and flanked by thick vegetation, so 
  motorized forces were prone to ambush, with the tanks and other supporting 
  AFVs severely constrained from manoeuvring off the roadway.
  Tactics
  Throughout the war, the CEFEO sought repeatedly to engage the Viet Minh 
  in set-piece battles where its superior firepower, motorized mobility and 
  tactical air support could inflict a crushing defeat. General de Lattre achieved 
  considerable success in this way when Giap brought much of his Chu Luc or 
  main force (the Chinese-trained regular divisions) down into the Red River 
  Delta in the first half of 1951, but the Viet Minh learned from that costly 
  lesson. Thereafter, although they continued to employ sacrificial frontal 
  assaults on fixed positions, they chose to fight whenever possible either in 
  ‘untankable’ terrain (as in the Thai Highlands straddling the middle Black 
  River), or – when the French presented them with the opportunity – along 
  roads where CEFEO units were confined to narrow corridors. During 1951–
  53 successive French commanders deployed motorized and mechanized units 
  in thrusts to link up with preliminary paratroop assaults, both on objectives 
  that they sought to hold and in temporary raids into Viet Minh rear areas. 
  (The French in Indochina employed airborne forces more extensively than 
  in any other conflict, with over 250 paratroop drops.) While the potent 
  combination of paratroopers and armour often achieved initial success, after 
  1951 the limitations of the road network and Gen Giap’s choices of terrain 
  prevented it from inflicting any decisive defeats.
  At the start of every day roads 
  had to be ‘opened’ – patrolled 
  and laboriously swept for 
  mines before traffic was 
  allowed to proceed about its 
  business. From the outset of 
  the war route security and 
  convoy escort were the primary 
  roles of armoured units, then 
  equipped with armoured cars 
  supplied by the British, such 
  as these Coventry Mk I cars 
  of 5e Régiment de Cuirassiers 
  ‘Royal-Pologne’ (5e RC) in 
  Cochinchina during 1951. 
  The French Army received 40 
  Coventry Mk I armoured cars 
  from the British in 1946 that 
  equipped two squadrons of the 
  Spahis Tunisiens in North Africa 
  with 35 vehicles while five 
  remained in France. In October 
  1947, they were transferred to 
  Indochina. Proving too heavy, 
  at 10-plus tons, for many of 
  the rudimentary dirt roads and 
  flimsy bridges, they were soon 
  superseded by other AFVs with 
  the turrets then being reused 
  for other purposes. (Photo by 
  ullstein bild/ullstein bild via 
  Getty Images)
  
  11
  In November–December 1951 Gen de Lattre 
  launched an offensive to retake and hold 
  Hoa Binh, an important transport hub about 
  25 miles south-west of the Red River Delta 
  defences and linked to them by RC 6 and a loop 
  of the Black River. A drop on Hoa Binh by three 
  paratroop battalions was accompanied by a drive 
  down RC 6 by four Mobile Groups and two 
  Armoured Sub-Groups including M4 Shermans, 
  and a riverine operation on the Black River (see  
  page 14, ‘Evolution of Armoured Organization’). 
  The attacks were successful and a strong garrison 
  was installed, but Gen Giap then patiently 
  assembled two-plus divisions around Hoa Binh, 
  closing in to attack both the garrison and its 
  communication links. With 20,000 French troops 
  eventually tied down by this campaign, Giap also 
  infiltrated the Delta to threaten the French rear. Eventually, after long and 
  costly running battles to keep RC 6 open, in late February 1952 Gen de Lattre’s 
  temporary successor, Gen Salan, withdrew the Hoa Binh garrison. Unlike their 
  earlier experience on the Delta plains, in 1952–53 French armour was once 
  again obliged to fight on what was sometimes literally a ‘one-vehicle front’.
  Against an enemy who excelled in ambush tactics and who increasingly 
  did not hesitate to attack AFVs, the missions of the armoured units required 
  substantial numbers of accompanying infantry. The overall manpower 
  shortage made it impractical for the high command to assign their own 
  infantry units permanently to the tank battalions, since French infantry was 
  too precious to leave it idle while the armoured units were undergoing their 
  inevitably lengthy maintenance or being refitted. The infantry units that 
  worked with armour were frequently rotated, thus degrading the cohesiveness 
  of the task forces and the flexibility and rapidity of their operations. Close 
  cooperation between armour and infantry was vital, but, in the words of 
  one armour commander: ‘The fact was that once an operation began, it was 
  pursued at the relatively slow cadence of the infantry, and thus displayed the 
  classic form, familiar since 1918, of infantry combat supported by tanks.’
  Due to lack of resources the fragmentation of units was often carried 
  to extremes, compounded by the numerous requests for armour support 
  from area commanders at all echelons. Nearly always widely dispersed to 
  safeguard communications, when squadrons were assembled it was usually 
  for repetitive operations over the same terrain; these involved the monotony 
  of forming cordons for ‘ratissage’ (village searches), which contributed to an 
  attitude of complacency. This routine reduced the effectiveness of armoured 
  units, and also caused a high rate of wear-and-tear on the elderly equipment, 
  which maintenance personnel were hard pressed to redress. Not only were 
  they not organized to support so many widely scattered detachments, and 
  always short of spare parts, but, having only wheeled vehicles themselves, 
  they were confined to roads.
  Viet Minh anti-armour tactics
  From the outset, Viet Minh tactics were based on ambushes coupled with 
  the extensive use of mines. Some 85 per cent of the AFVs damaged or 
  Mounting a locally fabricated 
  machine-gun turret, a Humber 
  Scout Car Mk II of the 5e 
  Cuirassiers guards a bridge 
  while protecting a convoy on 
  the road to Dalat, southern 
  Annam, in 1952. Typical 
  armament was two machine 
  guns, with the second in the 
  hull. These turrets were made 
  at the Saigon Naval Arsenal. 
  The French acquired some 78 
  examples of the Humber scout 
  car. Intriguingly, Humber scout 
  cars with locally produced 
  turrets were still used up until 
  1974 by Portuguese troops 
  during the war in Angola. 
  (Author’s collection)
  
  12
  destroyed were the victims of 
  mines, ranging from ‘IEDs’ 
  fashioned from unexploded 
  artillery shells and recovered 
  aircraft 
  ordnance 
  to 
  conventional Chinese-built 
  anti-tank mines. The M24 
  tank hulls often resisted 
  mine blasts well, and, in 
  general, the maintenance 
  personnel were able to repair 
  such damage and restore the 
  vehicles to combat service in 
  a relatively short time.
  In 
  1946–50, 
  when 
  fighting 
  essentially 
  as 
  guerrillas, even Viet Minh 
  regular units had very few 
  anti-tank weapons, initially limited to World War II bazookas bought on the 
  Asian black market. They began manufacturing their own copies in factories 
  in the Viet Bac from 1947 (though these suffered numerous misfires and 
  duds). From 1950 China supplied modest numbers of Czech P27 bazookas 
  and DKZ recoilless rifles (RCLs), and in that year the Viet Bac factories began 
  turning out smoothbore 60mm copies of the latter, called SKZ (Sung Khong 
  Giat – confusingly, the same term as they used for bazookas). During 1952 
  China delivered some 170 more DKZs, but research suggests that reports 
  of the Viet Minh having more powerful 75mm RCLs prior to the 1954 
  ceasefire seem to be mistaken. From 1948 VM battalions sometimes received 
  small numbers of attached 75mm guns (French or Japanese) for particular 
  operations, and these were employed ‘over open sights’ against AFVs during 
  road ambushes. The bazookas and recoilless guns can be credited with only a 
  low percentage of the armoured vehicles destroyed. Often, in fact, after they 
  were immobilized AFVs were actually destroyed only by Viet Minh infantry 
  making direct assaults with explosive charges or Molotov cocktails.
  Vietnamese villages were traditionally protected by thick, high earthen 
  walls baked to the strength of brick, and strong palisades of living or cut 
  bamboo in addition to anti-personnel chevaux-de-frise. The Viet Minh, 
  able to call upon almost unlimited local civilian manpower, dug or built 
  M36B2 GUN MOTOR CARRIAGE; 4e ESCADRON, RÉGIMENT BLINDÉ COLONIAL 
  D’EXTRÊME-ORIENT; VINH YEN, TONKIN, 16 JANUARY 1951
  The Régiment Blindé Colonial d’Extrême-Orient (RBCEO) was formed in November 1950. The unit 
  was equipped with M36B2 ‘tank destroyers’ and M4 Sherman medium tanks to counter the 
  perceived threat of Chinese armour along the northern border of Tonkin. In the absence of enemy 
  armour they were employed as fire support for the infantry. In one of the first actions orchestrated 
  by the new commander-in-chief, Gen de Lattre de Tassigny, 4e Escadron provided fire support to 
  Groupes Mobiles 1 and 3 at Hills 101 and 210 on Route Coloniale 2 north-west of Hanoi against 
  elements of Viet Minh Division 308 in the crucial battle of Vinh Yen. The RBCEO proved to be an 
  invaluable asset to the infantry, capable of providing directed fire support out to considerable 
  distances. The squadron comprised five M36B2s, and three M3 half-tracks with the Groupe Porté de 
  Protection – unit troops providing security for the tank destroyers. On the turret side is the insignia 
  of the RBCEO, and the name ‘Lt JOURNET’ in commemoration of a fallen officer.
  A
  In November 1950, the 
  Régiment Blindé Colonial 
  d’Extrême-Orient (RBCEO) was 
  formed in Tonkin and equipped 
  with M36B2 Gun Motor 
  Carriages and M4 Shermans 
  to counter the perceived 
  threat of Chinese tanks on the 
  northern border following the 
  communist victory in autumn 
  1949. Note the RBCEO insignia 
  on the turret sides. When no 
  intervention by Chinese forces 
  occurred, both the M36s and 
  M4 Shermans were usually 
  employed in the fire-support 
  role. The RBCEO was one of 
  the few armoured units to 
  have its own integral M32B1 
  Tank Recovery Vehicles. (Photo 
  by Keystone-France\Gamma-
  Rapho via Getty Images)
  
  13
  
  14
  obstacles on all routes – ditches, berms, or log barricades. A classic method 
  was ‘piano-keys’, long runs of trenches dug close together from alternate 
  sides of a road. Despite the perseverance of the French armoured units and 
  attached engineers, it was often very difficult to pass such obstacles; this 
  was achieved only after exhausting and time-consuming efforts, since French 
  armour in Indochina had neither tank-dozers nor bridgelayers.
  Viet Minh ambushes against road columns usually followed a similar 
  pattern: stop the column or escorted convoy in a narrow passage or other 
  difficult terrain; deliver intensive fire, often from long-prepared positions, 
  with the heaviest weapons available concentrating on the armour, aiming 
  to block the head and tail of the column; then launch a direct assault. The 
  best counter was obviously to discover and avoid these ambushes, but this 
  was difficult when faced by an enemy who was a past master in the art of 
  camouflage. All armour leaders had orders to maintain mobility at any price 
  when they were surprised; an AFV halted and isolated in an ambush is a 
  blind and almost helpless prey for a sufficiently daring enemy.
  EVOLUTION OF ARMOUR ORGANIZATION
  To enhance flexibility in the ‘fire brigade’ role and for independent 
  operations, the first sous-groupements blindés (armoured sub-groups, 
  SGB) were originally organized in 1951. These were not formed units, but 
  temporary assemblies of rotating sub-units. Under the command of a small 
  headquarters, an SGB included one escadron of M24 tanks of four pelotons, 
  each with three tanks and two half-tracks, plus two mechanized infantry 
  companies mounted in half-tracks. The effectiveness of the formula was 
  confirmed during the operations at Hoa Binh in November 1951–February 
  1952, and Phu To in November–December 1952, when it allowed French 
  armour to regain some momentum. However, it was still often necessary to 
  attach an infantry battalion to these units, since their organic strength did not 
  provide enough dismounted soldiers to search villages or outflank ambushes. 
  By the end of 1953 these task forces had a headquarters with a large signals 
  element and an 81mm mortar platoon, a tank squadron of M24s, two- 
  or three-strong escadrons portés of truck-borne infantry with numerous 
  automatic weapons, and another 
  carried in half-tracks. (The language in 
  accounts is sometimes ambiguous, but 
  the term groupement blindé, GB, seems 
  normally to have applied to a territorial 
  armoured command rather than a 
  tactical unit.)
  Also in 1951, groupes d’escadrons 
  de reconnaissance (reconnaissance 
  groups, GER) were organized. These 
  were composed of an M24 tank 
  squadron; an armoured car squadron, 
  of three platoons each with five M8s; 
  and a platoon with three M8 75mm SP 
  howitzers. In addition, each group had 
  attached indigenous infantry. (Virtually 
  A remanufactured M4A1 
  Sherman of the Far East 
  Colonial Armoured Regiment 
  or RBCEO advances along a 
  trail in Tonkin during 1952. The 
  regiment was equipped with 
  53 M4A1 Shermans and six 
  M4A3s with 105mm guns. The 
  75mm-armed Sherman had 
  no firepower advantage over 
  the Chaffee, while its higher 
  ground pressure restricted 
  mobility on soft terrain such 
  as the paddy fields to either 
  side of this track; the 105mm 
  Sherman suffered from the 
  same handicap, but was at least 
  superior in the fire-support 
  role. (Author’s collection)
  
  15
  all CEFEO combat units recruited a proportion of their manpower locally, as 
  integral troops distinct from the attached irregular ‘partisans’ also recruited 
  by unit intelligence officers.)
  The Armoured Sub-Groups and Reconnaissance Groups must not be 
  confused with the Mobile Groups which were created during the same 
  period. The model was the Groupe Mobile Nord-Africain of three Algerian 
  and Moroccan battalions, which disembarked in August 1949; this was 
  redesignated as GM 1 in December 1950, when Gen de Lattre adopted 
  self-contained mixed-arms motorized formations based on the concept of 
  the World War II US Regimental Combat Command. Of brigade size, with 
  3,000 to 3,500 men, a GM was normally composed of a headquarters, three 
  truck-borne infantry battalions, a towed 105mm artillery battery, usually 
  a platoon of three to five tanks, plus integral signals, medical and other 
  service elements. (A Groupe Mobile might be task-organized with additional 
  battalions attached for a particular mission.) In all 17 Groupes Mobiles 
  were created during the war, numbered GMs 1-11, 14, 21, 42, 51, 100 and 
  101. In summer 1953 there were six GMs simultaneously operational in 
  Tonkin and three in Laos and Annam, and three more were created that 
  autumn. The usual infantry composition was one Foreign Legion or Colonial 
  battalion plus two North African or Vietnamese, but two complete GMs of 
  the Vietnamese National Army (ANV) were later formed.
  Amphibious units: 1er Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie
  Elements of 1er REC from Morocco disembarked at Tourane (Da Nang) 
  on 4 January 1947, but without vehicles. They were obliged to fight on 
  foot as two bataillons de marche (expeditionary battalions) until April, and 
  then as truck-borne infantry in Annam, including the recapture of Hue. 
  Once equipped with British light AFVs (including Coventry armoured cars, 
  Humber scout cars and Universal Carriers), the regiment comprised six 
  armoured squadrons. The 1er and 2e Escadrons were based in Saigon, and 
  This Chaffee of the Groupe 
  d’Escadrons de Reconnaissance 
  Divisionnaire (GERD) – a 
  formation retained under 
  strategic control in Tonkin 
  – came to grief during an 
  operation north of the Bamboo 
  Canal in the Red River Delta in 
  January 1954. During 1952–54, 
  398 French AFVs were 
  destroyed, 84 per cent of them 
  by mines and improvised 
  explosive devices. Generally, 
  M24 hulls were rarely ruptured; 
  crew casualties were therefore 
  limited, and maintenance 
  personnel were able to repair 
  the damage relatively quickly 
  – although they were severely 
  hampered by a logistical 
  system that suffered supply 
  delays of six months to a year. 
  In contrast to the M24, other 
  AFVs were often damaged 
  beyond repair or completely 
  destroyed. Once the Viet Minh 
  overcame their psychological 
  fear of tanks they often 
  attacked them with satchel 
  charges at close quarters, 
  irrespective of casualties. 
  (Author’s collection)
  
  16
  the others in Annam: 3e at Tourane, 4e at Hue, 5e at Dong Hoi and 6e at 
  Phan Thiet. In December 1947, 1er REC was reorganized as two squadron 
  groups: 1er Groupe d’Escadrons with 1er and 2e Esc based at My Tho, and 
  2e Groupe d’Escadrons with 3e, 4e, 5e and 6e Esc in the locations listed 
  above, the last having an independent role. The Escadron Hors Rang (HQ 
  and services squadron) remained at Tourane. From early 1948 the armoured 
  squadrons received American equipment, including M5A1 tanks.
  From the earliest days, the CEFEO sought the means for increased cross-
  country mobility across waterlogged terrain, and formed its first amphibious 
  units with unarmoured M29C Weasel cargo-carriers, called ‘Crabes’ (Crabs) 
  by the French. These were initially used by artillery and infantry units for 
  resupply and casualty evacuation, with limited success. In the words of one high 
  command report: ‘They were too few in number, and were handled by poorly 
  qualified personnel. They thus sowed the Plain of Reeds with their burnt-out 
  hulls.’ (This Plaine des Joncs was a million-acre expanse of thickly overgrown 
  swampy terrain and countless waterways between Saigon and the Cambodian 
  border, where the southern Viet Minh had long established many hideouts.)
  The 1er REC first acquired M29Cs from 13e Demi-Brigade de la Légion 
  Étrangère (13DBLE) in late 1947, and trials were conducted by the 1er and 
  2e Esc in the Plain of Reeds. Once suitable tactics and techniques had been 
  worked out, the two squadrons formed a Groupe d’Escadrons Amphibie 
  (GEA). Armed with an LMG or  .30cal machine gun, the Crabe performed 
  better than either foot or motorized troops could, in the type of terrain where 
  it was difficult to discern where the land finished and water began. In the 
  deltas, swamps, inundated paddy fields, along streams and canals and also 
  on coastal beaches, the squadrons undertook a host of varied missions; the 
  Crabes were now claimed to be ‘ranging over the Plain of Reeds, sowing 
  confusion in the ranks of the enemy’.
  Like any armoured unit, 1er REC assured security and pacification in its 
  area of operations, controlling lines of communication and relieving besieged 
  M29C Crabes of the Foreign 
  Legion’s 1er Régiment 
  Étranger de Cavalerie (1er REC) 
  disembark from an LCT at the 
  outset of Operation Normandie 
  in June 1950 on the Plain of 
  Reeds, which began about 
  15km west of Saigon. An LCT 
  could carry up to 25 ‘Crabes’ 
  on such operations; it took 
  approximately 30 minutes to 
  load such a number, and just 
  over 10 minutes to disembark 
  them. At this time a platoon 
  comprised eight M29Cs: five 
  armed with light or medium 
  machine guns, two with an 
  M18A1 recoilless rifle, and 
  one command vehicle. A 
  60mm mortar was also carried 
  within the platoon for indirect 
  fire support, as well as rifle 
  grenades. The ‘splashguard’ 
  bow plate was invariably fixed 
  in the vertical position to allow 
  the driver improved vision to 
  the front. (Author’s collection)
  
  17
  static garrisons. The GEA participated successfully in combined operations, 
  such as Operation Véga in February 1948 in the Plain of Reeds, where it 
  supported 13e DBLE principally by searching and clearing innumerable 
  waterways as well as forming cordons. Thereafter an infantry platoon from 
  13DBLE was assigned to the Crabe units. Over time, the primary goal of 
  freeing Saigon from all serious threats on this front was attained.
  A logical development of the capabilities of the amphibious units came 
  on 25 October 1950, with the introduction of the US Landing Vehicle 
  Tracked (LVT) amphibian tractor or ‘amtrac’, which the French called by 
  its World War II nickname of ‘Alligator’. The LVT4s had a much larger 
  capacity, were armoured, mounted medium or heavy machine guns 
  Crabes and Alligators of  
  2e Esc,1er Groupe d’Escadrons/ 
  1er REC plough through a rice 
  paddy in support of Legion 
  13e DBLE infantry near Tra 
  Vinh deep in the Mekong Delta 
  during the first operation with 
  LVTs in November 1950. During 
  operations in paddy fields and 
  swamps the suspension of 
  the M29C tended to become 
  clogged with rice shoots 
  and other vegetation that 
  overtaxed the relatively fragile 
  mechanism, so crews had to 
  dismount repeatedly in order 
  to clear the bogie wheels and 
  tracks. (Author’s collection)
  In a classic image by Ernst 
  Haas (who would later become 
  a famous photographer of 
  America’s Vietnam War), 
  Crabes come ashore from a 
  typical waterway displaying 
  the colourful markings of 1er 
  REC. By the end of the war the 
  Legion amphibious units were 
  entitled Groupements Amphibie, 
  and were administratively 
  independent of 1er REC. The 
  diminutive M29C was cramped 
  for its four-man crew, so it was 
  common for one man to sit 
  on the raised ‘splashboard’ to 
  guide the driver or keep an eye 
  out for mines or underwater 
  obstacles. Crewmen also stood 
  on the splashboard to survey 
  the surroundings through 
  binoculars, and this often 
  caused it to bend in the middle 
  – a common characteristic of 
  Crabes in Indochina. (Photo by 
  Ernst Haas/Ernst Haas/Getty 
  Images)
  
  18
  and recoilless rifles, and had the seaworthiness that the Crabes lacked. 
  Conversely, the Alligators did not have the same level of mobility across 
  waterlogged terrain as the lighter Crabes. Initially, the Alligators were 
  employed independently in platoons of eight: four troop-carrying LVTs 
  (normally carrying indigenous infantry, termed chasseurs); a command 
  LVT, two 75mm LVT(A)4 fire-support amtracs, and one recovery LVT. 
  This separation did not prove successful, however, leading to a decision to 
  integrate the Crabes and Alligators – a combination that soon demonstrated 
  its effectiveness across the Mekong Delta.
  A Groupe d’Escadrons Amphibie still consisted of two squadrons, but now 
  each had one Alligator platoon (as above) carrying a company of infantry, 
  and three Crabe platoons each with five M29Cs, of which one mounted a 
  57mm recoilless rifle. Thus the 7e Groupe d’Escadrons Amphibie comprised  
  7e Escadron/1er REC with Crabes and 17e Escadron Porté/1er REC in 
  Alligators. Two such GEAs became the 1er Groupement Autonome on  
  1 September 1951; over time these units became a formidable force of five 
  amphibious groups, with the composition of 1er REC rising to 13, then 18 
  squadrons. They fought in both the Mekong and Red River deltas, as well as 
  along the coastlines of Annam and Cochinchina. Eventually they became the 
  autonomous 1er Groupement Amphibie, completely independent of 1er REC 
  except for its insignia and traditions, and a 2e Groupement Amphibie was 
  formed in Tonkin.
  The final composition of a Groupement Amphibie in 1954 included a 
  mobile group headquarters and two tactical sub-group HQs, controlling 
  task forces tailored from the following subordinate elements:
  • 
  Two Crabe companies, each of three platoons with 11 Crabes each.
  • 
  Three Alligator platoons, each with 11 LVTs and three fire-
  support LVT(A)4s. Each platoon normally carried three infantry 
  platoons aboard the LVTs.
  • 
  A separate fire-support platoon of six LVT(A)4s.
  • 
  Other elements such as tank platoons were assigned as necessary, 
  depending on the operation.
  Armoured launches
  In addition, a Peloton de Vedettes Blindées of 4e Esc/1er REC based at Dong 
  Ha manned armoured launches. These operated among the numerous inland 
  waterways, in particular the Dong Ha and Quang Tri rivers, as well as the Benh 
  Hai that subsequently became the border between North and South Vietnam.
   LVT4 ALLIGATOR, 8e ESCADRON, 2e GROUPEMENT AUTONOME/1er RÉGIMENT 
  ÉTRANGER DE CAVALERIE; OPERATION CRACHIN, TONKIN, FEBRUARY 1952
  In late 1945 a French purchasing commission to Manila in the Philippines procured M29C and LVT4 
  amphibious vehicles surplus to US needs after the Pacific campaign. These became the standard 
  equipment of the 1er Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie for combat in the extensive swamplands of 
  Indochina. The first combined operation conducted by the two vehicles being in November 1950, 
  and thereafter their deployment by expanding units spread all over lowland and coastal Indochina. 
  Operation Crachin took place in the Ninh Giang region deep in the Red River Delta, against Viet Minh 
  Division 320 and its regional support units (crachin was the French slang for the cold early-morning 
  mist and drizzle so prevalent in Tonkin). This LVT4 of 8e Escadron is named ‘COLMAR’, after the French 
  First Army’s battle honour in Alsace in 1944; this is painted in white along the sides, together with 
  the vehicle registration number towards the rear. The latter is repeated beside the driver’s position, 
  and on each front quarter is the regimental insignia of 1er REC.
  B
  
  19
  
  20
  Armoured train ‘La Rafale TB’
  Within months of the resumption of hostilities, the railway network 
  across Indochina was heavily interdicted by the Viet Minh and in certain 
  areas completely destroyed. In one incident on 13 February 1948, a train 
  was attacked near Phan Thiet and its passengers massacred. The colonel 
  commanding this sector of South Annam turned to the resident infantry 
  regiment to address the problem, and the task was given to Capt Raphanaud 
  of 2e REI. He personally developed and oversaw the construction of an 
  armoured train (Train Blindé or TB), partly recycling armour plate from 
  Japanese ships. Completed on 10 November 1948, it was christened  
  ‘La Rafale’ (variously meaning either a wind-squall or a burst of gunfire).
  In fact ‘Les Rafales’ would be more accurate, since it could be operated 
  as two separate trains. It comprised two armoured locomotives; 14 
  armoured wagons, of which eight were fighting 
  platforms; one command and communications 
  wagon; an infirmary wagon; two wagons carrying 
  spare railway tracks and equipment; two ballasted 
  ‘pillbox’ wagons to proceed the train to thwart 
  mines; and finally (being French), a cookhouse 
  and eating wagon. The main armament was twin 
  20mm cannon and one 40mm Bofors in two 
  improvised turrets, and the 2-pdr turret from a 
  Coventry armoured car. These were backed up by 
  eight twinned 7.5mm MAC 31 Reibel machine 
  guns, a 60mm and an 81mm mortar, plus grenade 
  launchers.
  All told, the Rafales had a crew of almost 100 
  officers, NCOs, légionnaires and local troops. The 
  turret crews were drawn from 1er REC and other 
  armoured units, in particular the 4e Régiment 
  Crabes and Alligators of  
  8e Esc/1er REC congregate 
  as Dakotas drop supplies 
  during Operation Crachin to 
  interdict Viet Minh infiltration 
  routes across the Red River 
  Delta in February 1952. On 
  the bow of this LVT4 is an M20 
  75mm recoilless rifle. During 
  Operation Crachin 114 soldiers 
  of the Viet Minh 320th Division 
  were reported killed. (Photo 
  by Keystone-France\Gamma-
  Rapho via Getty Images)
  As early as 1945, the French 
  Navy organized the first 
  Dinassaut or Naval Assault 
  Division, composed of LSTs, 
  LSIs, LCTs, LCIs, LCMs and 
  LCVPs for operations along 
  the coastlines and among 
  the dense network of inland 
  waterways. The second of these 
  Landing Craft Mechanized 3 
  seen at the Haiphong naval 
  yard is a Monitor, converted 
  from a standard LCM3 by the 
  Saigon Naval Arsenal. The 
  bow ramp was removed and a 
  circular mounting installed for 
  a Coventry armoured car turret 
  fitted with spaced armour. 
  In addition the Monitor was 
  armed with two 20mm cannon, 
  two .50cal machine guns, an 
  81mm mortar and four rifle-
  grenade launchers.  (Author’s 
  collection)
  
  21
  de Dragons Portés. It was customary for two Rafales to head and tail 
  a standard passenger train closely as escorts. The armoured train first 
  successfully fought off a direct attack on 29 April 1949; others followed, 
  but they soon decreased (although rail bridges remained highly vulnerable 
  to sabotage by night). The Rafales operated once a week on the rail network 
  running from Saigon to Nha Trang; from Tourane to Hue and Dong Ha; 
  and from Haiphong to Hanoi. In July 1954 the Rafales were passed to the 
  Vietnamese National Army.
  Vedette FOM (France Outre Mer) 
  manned by dragoons from the 
  4e RDP, escorting junks carrying 
  rubber from the Michelin 
  plantations along the Saigon 
  River. These armoured motor 
  boats, able to navigate narrow 
  creeks in pursuit of enemy 
  sampans, came in two sizes, 
  8m (as here) and 11m long; the 
  former was usually armed with 
  one .50cal Browning and two 
  or three Reibel 7.5mm machine 
  guns, together with rifle-grenade 
  launchers. Five or six crewmen 
  were drawn from armour units, 
  such as the 4e RDP, RICM, 5e RSM 
  and 1er REC. At the end of the 
  war, 89 Vedettes were in service 
  in all parts of Indochina. (Author’s 
  collection)
  The 40mm Bofors of an 
  armoured train engages 
  potential enemy ambush sites 
  during a run from Saigon to 
  Nha Trang in Annam during 
  February 1952, so this is a Train 
  Blindé de la Légion manned by 
  men from 2e REI and 1er REC. 
  The armament of the ‘Rafales’ 
  seems to have differed from 
  time to time and depending on 
  which wagons were coupled in, 
  but the heaviest armament was 
  this turreted Bofors; turreted 
  twin 20mm cannon, reportedly 
  fitted at some date with infra-
  red sights; and the 2-pdr turret 
  from a Coventry Mk 1 armoured 
  car. (Author’s collection)
  
  22
  REPRESENTATIVE UNIT HISTORY: 1er 
  RÉGIMENT DE CHASSEURS À CHEVAL
  Cochinchina and Tonkin, 1946
  Following the fall of France in 1940, the 1er Régiment 
  de Chasseurs à Cheval remained in being with the 
  Armistice Army allowed by Germany, but was 
  disbanded in August 1942. Reconstituted on 16 March 
  1945 at Montauban in southern France, and equipped 
  with American AFVs, it was intended for deployment 
  to the Far East to fight the Japanese. The Japanese 
  surrender in August 1945 saw 1er RCC’s mission 
  change to reasserting French authority in Indochina, 
  and the regiment’s advance party arrived in Saigon at 
  the beginning of January 1946.
  Lacking equipment, 1er RCC acted in an infantry role, although the 
  regiment did have some armed jeeps (see page 7) for its part in pacification 
  operations in and around Saigon. Two squadrons then received Coventry 
  Mk 1 armoured cars and Humber scout cars, and the HQ Sqn was also 
  equipped with wheeled armour. The most common missions were route 
  security and the support of infantry units on patrol or caught in ambushes; 
  the fighting in Cochinchina at this time was chaotic, involving not only 
  the Viet Minh under the Southern leader Nguyen Binh, but also gangs of 
  renegade Japanese stragglers and religious cultists. When the first armoured 
  car patrols were undertaken their appearance was usually enough to put the 
  opposition to flight, however, and casualties were minimal.
  In summer 1946, the regiment transferred from Cochinchina to Tonkin, 
  after first handing over two squadrons of Coventry armoured cars to the  
  5e Régiment de Cuirassiers (whose traditional title was ‘Royal-Pologne’, 
  ‘Royal Poland’). Shortages in personnel were made up by the wholesale 
  transfer of men from the Régiment de Marche du 8e Dragons, which was 
  stood down on 31 July 1946. Once in the North, 1er RCC replaced the 
  Groupement Massu at the end of its tour in November 1946, taking over its 
  equipment. The 1er Esc received the M5A1s of 501e RCC, and the 2e Esc the 
  M8s of the RMSM. The 1er RCC was based at Hanoi, but with a platoon 
  of M5A1s detached to Lang Son – 150km (93 miles) north-east up RC 1, 
  near the Chinese border. (Thereafter, for the rest of the war the regiment 
  practically only fought in this theatre of operations, under administrative 
  command of the Groupement Blindé du Tonkin headquarters.)
  At this time a modus vivendi was still in force between Ho Chi Minh’s 
  provisional government and troops in Hanoi and Haiphong and the French 
  authorities, but the Viet Minh were visibly preparing for hostilities – 
  fomenting anti-French feeling among the population, erecting checkpoints 
  and barricades, and quietly surrounding many French outposts. Fighting 
  finally broke out with an exchange of fire in Haiphong on 20 November; on 
  the 23rd the French commander-in-chief (C-in-C) Gen Valluy unleashed naval 
  gunfire and air attacks in support of his troops, who controlled Haiphong 
  by 28 November. Ho and Giap quietly withdrew their regular troops from 
  Hanoi to their refuges in the hills and southern Delta, but a French attempt 
  to disarm remaining regional troops on 19 December led to a general 
  Vehicles of Sous-Groupement 
  Blindé 2 pause on RP21 during 
  Operation Tulipe in November 
  1951, during the four-month 
  battle for Hoa Binh against 
  the Viet Minh Divisions 304, 
  308 and 312. These M24 
  Chaffees of 2e Esc/1er RCC 
  carry légionnaires of III/5e REI 
  on their rear decks. Typically 
  of Indochinese roads, there 
  is hardly room for even two 
  vehicles to pass each other. 
  Unpaved and bordered by 
  dense undergrowth, these 
  roads were constantly 
  subjected to sabotage, mining 
  and ambushes. (Author’s 
  collection)
  
  23
  insurrection in the capital. In the street-fighting 
  that followed the French managed to hold the 
  strategically vital Paul Doumer Bridge over the 
  Red River, which allowed them a measure of 
  tactical mobility. The armoured platoons of the 
  1er RCC were soon embroiled in urban warfare, 
  but by 22 December the capital was firmly back 
  under French control. Gia Lam air base was held 
  throughout, which facilitated reinforcement and 
  resupply, and the outer suburbs were finally 
  pacified by 2 January 1947.
  Operations 1947–50
  While these operations were conducted it was only possible to perform 
  minimal maintenance, and intensive patrolling continued with little respite 
  until 20 February 1947. By that time road communications between Hanoi 
  and Haiphong, via Hai Duong, were securely in French hands. The 1er RCC 
  now ranged farther, first with a raid north of the Rapids Canal, then with 
  the reoccupation of Ha Dong south-east of Hanoi. The regiment then drove 
  the Viet Minh out of Nam Dinh and its economically important cotton 
  plantations. By April 1947 the main towns and roads in the Red River Delta 
  were effectively pacified, and the 1er RCC took some well-earned rest. The 
  regiment was now to undergo a reorganization to incorporate a higher 
  proportion of chasseurs portés – cavalrymen serving as motorized infantry. 
  They served in three of the regiment’s mixed squadrons combining armoured 
  cars and truck-borne infantry; the 1er Esc remained an all-armoured 
  squadron, with six platoons each of two M5A1s, an M8 HMC and two half-
  tracks. The 1er RCC’s squadrons were detached north and south throughout 
  Tonkin. The 1er Esc itself had platoons spread between Lang Son 150km 
  north of Hanoi, and Nam Dinh 100km (62 miles) south-east of the capital: 
  this posed significant logistical and manpower problems.
  In October 1947, Gen Valluy launched a major offensive by road columns, 
  parachute assaults and riverine forces in an attempt to surround the Viet Bac 
  and capture the Viet Minh’s high command, but these Operations Lea and 
  The M5A1 tanks of 3e Esc/ 
  1er REC refuel near Phu Vang 
  on 25 August 1952 during 
  Operation Sauterelle in the sand 
  dunes between Quang Tri and 
  Hue bordering Route Coloniale 
  1, the notorious Rue sans Joie 
  – ‘Street without Joy’. Shortly 
  after this operation 3e Esc 
  finally received M24 Chaffees 
  to replace its ageing M5A1 
  Stuarts. (Author’s collection)
  A trio of AFVs of 1er RCC 
  negotiates a diguette or 
  paddy dike. The rice fields 
  themselves were impassable 
  to such vehicles in the 
  growing seasons; accordingly, 
  the Viet Minh often mined 
  these narrow banks, with 
  inevitable consequences. An 
  M8 Howitzer Motor Carriage 
  named ‘WAGRAM’ leads a pair 
  of M3 half-tracks similarly 
  adorned with regimental 
  insignia. The M8 HMC used 
  by sub-unit headquarters 
  elements was popular despite 
  its high ground pressure, on 
  account of its capacity for 
  indirect fire and for engaging 
  targets on high ground, such 
  as calcaires, during ambushes. 
  The M3 series of half-tracks 
  was the main AFV for the 
  infantry attached to armoured 
  units, despite its limitations 
  of mobility in difficult terrain. 
  (Photo by Howard Sochurek/
  The LIFE Picture Collection/
  Getty Images)
  
  24
  Ceinture made few demands on 1er RCC, which 
  remained on the defensive while other troops were 
  deployed up-country. These operations were only 
  partly successful; the Viet Minh withdrew deeper 
  into the Viet Bac, and the French return to the 
  Chinese border country along RC 4 between Lang 
  Son and Cao Bang further stretched their resources.
  The year 1948 saw no major French operations; 
  the CEFEO was suffering badly from a shortage of 
  manpower, since World War II enlistees had been 
  repatriated and it was no longer legal to deploy 
  French Army conscripts to Indochina except as 
  individual volunteers. Nevertheless, 1er RCC found 
  itself constantly patrolling, and was often called 
  upon to break up Viet Minh ambushes. The regiment’s vehicles were in many 
  cases elderly, and in the punishing tropical environment they needed constant 
  maintenance to keep them running. Many risky recovery operations were 
  conducted, or mechanical problems addressed, while under enemy fire.
  The high command’s main attention now swung back to Cochinchina, and 
  by that winter many of the units in Tonkin were being sent south. The trickle 
  of replacements from France did not keep pace with those departing after 
  fulfilling their military service, and a decision to create a 5e Esc of 1er RCC 
  was only achieved by absorbing a complete squadron of the 4e Régiment 
  de Dragons before it was transferred to Cochinchina. For operations in the 
  waterlogged areas of the Delta the 1er Esc received the first of an eventual 33 
  M29C Weasels; by spring 1949 the fully trained Crabe squadron was based 
  at Nam Dinh.
  Following the French reoccupation of the Chinese border country in 
  November 1947, a Groupe d’Escadrons Nord from 1er RCC was detached 
  for operations on Route Coloniale 4. A small staff led by one of the regiment’s 
  majors with an administrative section headed the 3e and 5e Esc based at Lang 
  Son, the former for security operations on RC 4 South (Lang Son-Tien Yen) 
  and the latter on RC 4 North (Lang Son-Cao Bang). These routine missions 
  were not without cost, principally due to mines and booby traps. Lieutenant 
  Bonfait and his whole crew were lost on RC 4 South on 18 April 1949, and 
  Lt Christian Préaud was killed in action on 17 September 1949 during a 
  resupply convoy to the post of Ban Xam. A son of Lt Gen Marie Henri Pierre 
  Préaud, he had four brothers all serving with cavalry units in Indochina; 
  the regiment had seldom lacked a Préaud on its roll 
  of officers. In October 1949 the 5e Esc was given 
  extended responsibility for RC 4 all the way from 
  Cao Bang down to Loc Binh south-east of Lang Son.
  The shortfall of replacements during 1949–50 
  necessitated the recruitment of local personnel 
  directly into French units. The 1er RCC was one of 
  the first units to embrace Vietnamese recruitment, 
  which would increase, as a matter of high command 
  policy, during Gen de Lattre de Tassigny’s tenure as 
  C-in-C in 1951; this process was known in the slang 
  of that time as ‘le jaunissement’ – ‘the yellowing’. 
  (The overall strength of the ABC in Indochina would 
  The crew of an M29C returns 
  fire during an engagement in 
  Tonkin during 1952. Initially 
  the Crabes were armed with 
  a single .303in Bren or 7.5mm 
  FM24/29 light machine gun, 
  but later the .30cal M1919 
  Browning became standard 
  issue, and some even mounted 
  an M18A1 57mm recoilless rifle. 
  (Author’s collection)
  Native chasseurs disembark 
  from an LVT4 of 6e Groupe 
  d’Escadrons Amphibie/1er RCC, 
  forming part of 2e Groupement 
  Amphibie during an assault 
  in the Nam Dinh region. The 
  four troop-carrying LVTs of an 
  Alligator squadron could carry 
  at least one company of slightly 
  built Vietnamese soldiers. 
  Apart from machine guns, 
  some LVTs were fitted with a 
  supplementary M18A1 57mm 
  or M20 75mm recoilless rifle 
  either at the bow (invariably, 
  with an M20) or, as here, on 
  the rear hull quarter. (Author’s 
  collection)
  
  25
  rise from 11,396 all ranks in 
  December  1950 to 16,956 
  in December  1951, and of 
  the latter total no fewer than 
  7,391 were Vietnamese.) By 
  1954 as many as 70 per cent 
  of 1er RCC’s effectives would 
  be Indochinese; they served 
  in mixed-race vehicle crews, 
  with unquestioned loyalty and 
  admirable courage.
  General 
  de 
  Lattre’s 
  appointment on 6 December 
  1950 followed a disastrous 
  defeat in October 1950 that 
  changed the whole tempo of 
  the war. After the communist 
  victory in China in September 
  1949 the Viet Minh acquired safe havens just across the north-west and 
  north-east borders of Tonkin, and over the coming months and years they 
  would be equipped, supplied and trained as conventional troops by the 
  Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Conscription was introduced, allowing 
  the assembly of existing and new regiments into nine-battalion divisions, with 
  recoilless guns, some light artillery and anti-aircraft weapons. The Viet Minh 
  now progressed from guerrilla warfare to major confrontations with the 
  CEFEO, employing the same costly mass-assault tactics as the PLA in Korea.
  The first warning of Gen Giap’s new capabilities and ambitions came 
  in September 1950, in the jungle mountains that stretched along the 
  Tonkin-China border in north-east Tonkin. Route Coloniale 4, paralleling 
  the frontier, led from the Frontier Zone’s rear base at Lang Son up to 
  the furthest northern bastion at Cao Bang, studded along its length with 
  small French posts. In September a sudden Viet Minh assault with artillery 
  support captured Dong Khe, an important post on RC 4 south of Cao 
  Bang. The long-considered decision to abandon Cao Bang was then taken, 
  but the withdrawal was badly mishandled. Outnumbered, both LtCol 
  Charton’s garrison and LtCol Le Page’s brigade sent north to meet them 
  were cut to pieces in the jungle hills in early October, and other garrisons 
  fled south. The ‘disaster of RC 4’ saw the destruction of eight-plus French 
  infantry battalions, with the loss of 5,987 men dead and missing from 
  7,409 engaged.
  Lieutenant Pascal’s platoon of 5e Esc/1er RCC from Lang Son, rushed up 
  to That Khe south of Dong Khe, were killed almost to a man while fighting 
  to cover the escape of survivors of the Charton and Le Page columns. Only 
  Staff Sgt Soulet and one of the regiment’s Vietnamese NCOs escaped to tell 
  the tale, staggering into French lines weeks later. In mid-October a panicky 
  decision was made to evacuate Lang Son itself, and it fell to 1er RCC to 
  cover the withdrawal. Lang Son was abandoned without destroying huge 
  military stores, allowing Giap to capture enough arms and ammunition for 
  a whole division. The whole Chinese border region was lost, exposing the 
  Red River Delta to attack, and this shocking reverse had a severe effect on 
  French morale both in Tonkin and in Paris.
  Mounting 40mm Bofors guns, 
  Alligators of 6e GEA/1er RCC 
  form a ‘bouclage’ (cordon) 
  near Nam Dinh, 1953. A 
  number of LVT4s were fitted 
  at Haiphong naval arsenal 
  with an open-topped turret 
  mounting a Bofors for the fire-
  support role. These vehicles 
  were only employed by the 
  amphibious units of 1er RCC 
  – note the regimental insignia 
  well forward on the hull sides. 
  They proved effective in the 
  Tonkin deltas, but the increased 
  weight and height affected 
  their seaworthiness, so they 
  were rarely used in amphibious 
  coastal assaults. With no threat 
  of air attack, the equipment of 
  the Artillerie Antiaérienne Légère 
  units was distributed for other 
  purposes; 40mm Bofors guns 
  were deployed on armoured 
  trucks, armoured trains and 
  LVTs. (Author’s collection)
  
  26
  1951: ‘The Year of de Lattre’
  Entrusted with retrieving the situation, on 17 December 1950 Gen Jean de 
  Lattre de Tassigny arrived in Vietnam with full military and civil powers. 
  The former C-in-C of the French First Army (‘Rhine and Danube’) in the 
  Liberation of North-West Europe, this famous and flamboyant soldier 
  commanded confidence and loyalty. He immediately launched into a 
  whirlwind of firing and hiring, and used language that soldiers could relate 
  to. He would soon begin one ambitious programme of building a belt of 
  artillery-proof concrete posts around the perimeter of the Red River Delta, 
  and another to regularize and expand the formerly ad hoc enlistment of locals, 
  laying the foundation of the Vietnamese National Army. He also began to 
  form a reserve of manoeuvre units from troops freed from ‘sector’ garrisons, 
  fielding the first couple of Mobile Groups. First, and most importantly, in 
  mid-January 1951 he put heart back into the CEFEO by winning its first 
  unequivocal victory.
  General Giap led two Viet Minh regular divisions in an offensive at 
  Vinh Yenh north-west of Hanoi; he made early progress, but de Lattre 
  checked him with GMs 1 and 3, artillery, and aircraft dropping (for the first 
  time) napalm as well as bombs. He rushed in reinforcements by air from 
  all over Vietnam, and after savage fighting drove Giap into retreat, costing 
  him some 5,000 killed and 8,000 wounded. It had been a close call, and the 
  French lacked the troops to pursue and exploit, but it had shown that the 
  new Viet Minh could be defeated. In March/April 1951 Giap sent parts of 
  1: UNIVERSAL CARRIER Mk 2; 1er COMPAGNIE, 43e RÉGIMENT D’INFANTERIE 
  COLONIALE; COCHINCHINA, 1951
  The original configuration of the CEFEO was predominantly infantry, since tanks were not deemed 
  suitable for the Far East theatre of operations. Once the region was reoccupied, ‘sector infantry units’ 
  were made responsible for security in specific territorial areas. In time the infantry received surplus 
  AFVs from armoured units for patrolling and other mobile missions. As an indication of the 
  improvisation necessary at the time, a skate ring for a water-cooled M1917A1 .30cal machine gun 
  has been fitted to this Universal Carrier. The vehicle displays its name on the sides – the battle 
  honour ‘ARDENNES’ below a tricolor. On the lower front hull is the registration number, and at the 
  driver’s position a hand-painted version of the regimental insignia of 43e RIC featuring the fouled 
  anchor of the Colonial (formerly Naval) units, which retained the nickname of ‘marsouins’ or 
  ‘porpoises’. On the front track guard is a fanion indicating 1er Compagnie: the colours here are 
  conjectural, but based on those of the regimental insignia. Above the crew compartment is a wire 
  mesh anti-grenade screen. 
  Arriving in Cochinchina in February 1946 as part of 3rd Colonial Infantry Division, the 43e RIC was 
  reconfigured as three independent battalions in December 1948. I/43e RIC was stationed at 
  Vinh Long, Can Tho and Long Xuyen in the Mekong Delta, and subsequently became the  
  19e Bataillon Vietnamien.
  2: M8 ARMOURED CAR, 3e ESCADRON BLINDÉ DE RECONNAISSANCE VIETNAMIEN; 
  NAM DINH, TONKIN, MAY 1952
  On the turret near side this armoured car displays the insignia of 3e Escadron; it is not repeated on 
  the other side. The vehicle name ‘SONG DAY’ refers to the Day River in the Red River Delta; the other 
  vehicles in the squadron were similarly named after rivers, e.g. ‘SONG BO’ and ‘SONG LE’. On the 
  wheel arches ‘50 LBS’ is painted in white to denote the correct tyre pressures; above the front wheel 
  mudguard the initials ‘MDAP’ indicate that the vehicle was supplied by the USA under the Mutual 
  Defense Assistance Program. The 3e Escadron Blindé Vietnamien was created in the summer of 1951, 
  one of six such units formed in that year. Equipped with M8 armoured cars, it served in Tonkin until 
  January 1954 when it became part of the ANV’s 3e Régiment de Dragons Vietnamiens. At the time of 
  partition the unit moved to South Vietnam in July 1954, and was subsequently equipped with M24 
  Chaffee tanks after the departure of the French. The plate H-D31 is repeated on the rear left hull.
  C
  
  27
  1
  2
  
  28
  three divisions in a second thrust, at Mao Khe and Dong Trieu to threaten 
  Haiphong; this too was repulsed.
  While some individual platoons of 1er RCC were engaged at Vinh Yen, 
  most of the regiment was deployed to cover Hanoi. It had received its first 
  M24 Chaffees in December 1950, allocating them to the 2e and 5e Escadrons. 
  Each squadron now had four platoons of three tanks each, together with two 
  half-tracks for chasseurs portés. The manpower issue was addressed by the 
  creation of an improvised Vietnamese motorized infantry unit, the Bataillon 
  de Marche du 1e RCC or BMRC. This was led by Maj Cousteaux, with a 
  few lieutenants (including Gen de Lattre’s only son, Bernard) commanding 
  squadrons. In late May to early June, Giap launched his third and most 
  ambitious offensive, by three divisions across the Day River in the south-
  east Delta to threaten Phu Ly and Nam Dinh. This too was defeated, with 
  the loss of some 10,000 killed or captured, 
  by a combination of eight Mobile Groups, 
  armour, artillery and air power. However, 
  the BMRC suffered heavily on 29/30 May 
  during its 48-hour defence of a hill position 
  near Nam Dinh; among its dead were three 
  squadron commanders – Lts Brisgard, 
  Mercier and de Lattre de Tassigny.
  Diversification, and Operation Lotus
  The arrival of the M24 resulted in other 
  organizational changes. For many months 
  the two Chaffee squadrons were paired with 
  mechanized infantry squadrons from the 
  8e Régiment de Spahis Algeriens (8e RSA) 
  A flight of Grumman F6F-5 
  Hellcats of Escadrille 1F from 
  the carrier R95 Arromanches 
  drops napalm on Viet Minh 
  positions at Phu Nho Quan 
  on 4 November 1953 during 
  Operation Mouette, as an M24 
  of 2e Esc/1er RCC stands by 
  during fierce combat against 
  the Viet Minh 320th Division. 
  Ten days earlier, on 24 October, 
  tanks of 1er RCC fought a 
  decisive action at Lai Cac where 
  180 Viet Minh were killed and 
  20 captured in a single day. 
  (Author’s collection)
  Under the direction of Gen de 
  Lattre de Tassigny, national 
  armies were raised in Vietnam, 
  Laos and Cambodia (the 
  countries of the so-called 
  ‘French Union’) from 1950 
  onwards. Five Vietnamese 
  armoured units were organized, 
  and one each in Laos and 
  Cambodia. The creation of 
  these national forces was 
  intended to free French troops 
  from static garrisons for mobile 
  warfare against the Viet Minh; 
  however, training them and 
  providing them with French 
  cadres was a severe strain on 
  the CEFEO’s skilled manpower. 
  Perched atop the turret of this 
  M8 HMC is Capt Duong Ngoc 
  Lam, the CO of 1er Escadron 
  Blindé d’Intervention during 
  1953. (Photo by Keystone-
  France\Gamma-Rapho via 
  Getty Images)
  
  29
  mounted in half-tracks; this unit comprised three squadrons of Algerians 
  and one of fiercely anti-VM Muong tribesmen. Each of these two Sous-
  Groupements Blindé was formed from one M24 squadron of 1er RCC 
  and two half-track squadrons of 8e RSA. Control of the SGBs was shared: 
  1er SGB served under command of 8e RSA, and 2e SGB under 1er RCC.
  Two other 1er RCC squadrons, the 3e Esc (M5A1s) and 4e Esc (M8 
  armoured cars) were incorporated into the Groupe d’Escadrons de 
  Reconnaissance Divisionnaire (GERD), operating nominally under 1er RCC 
  control but assigned missions by the Commanding Officer Western Tonkin. 
  The GERD was reinforced with infantry as required, although it also raised 
  its own Vietnamese ‘Commando’.
  During Operation Medusa in April 1951, the effectiveness of the M29C 
  Crabe in rice paddies led to the Crabes of the 1er Esc/1er RCC being detached 
  to form the core of a Sous-Groupement Amphibie (SGA), coupled with a 
  platoon of four LVT4 Alligators, This was eventually expanded into an  
  11e Esc/1er RCC. By the end of 1951 there were thus detachments of the  
  1er RCC serving in five larger battlegroups: the BMRC, two SGBs, the 
  GERD and the SGA.
  Although Gen de Lattre was an extremely dynamic commander, and his 
  aggressive tactics brought many local victories to French units operating 
  throughout the country, the Chinese-supported Viet Minh proved stubbornly 
  resilient. Despite a dip in Chinese supply deliveries due to the PLA’s parallel 
  commitment to North Korea, these never stopped, and recovered after mid-
  1952. Tens of thousands of volunteers and conscripts continued to be trained 
  in Chinese bases, so the Viet Minh were able to reconstitute units shattered 
  by French firepower at a pace the French could not match. Viet Minh 
  operations were always characterized by impressive mobility across country 
  and extensive knowledge of the terrain, so units were seldom cornered. 
  Throughout the war French 
  armoured units suffered from 
  an almost total lack of tank 
  recovery vehicles. This M24 
  of the 2e Peloton, 2e Esc/1er 
  RCC became bogged during 
  Operation Gerfaut in the rice-
  growing region of Thai Binh on 
  19 December 1953. Wielding 
  his walking stick, the squadron 
  commander Capt O’Mahony 
  directs the recovery operation: 
  the other tanks of the platoon 
  were attached together in a 
  chain by tow cables, and pulled 
  the casualty free. Like many 
  armour officers, Capt O’Mahony 
  has a .50cal cartridge case 
  jammed on the end of his 
  walking stick to test the ‘going’ 
  for his tanks – a technique that 
  originated in the Great War. 
  (Author’s collection)
  
  30
  Attacks were normally made in large numbers and under cover of darkness, 
  and commanders took no heed of their units’ losses.
  The goals of Operation Lotus, the reoccupation of the Muong capital  
  Hoa Binh in November 1951, were to regain control of a transport hub 
  between the South Delta Base and the Viet Bac, and to force the Viet Minh 
  into battle on French terms. However, the links down RC 6 and along 
  the Black River passed through dense terrain, which the Viet Minh could 
  traverse while the CEFEO was limited to road and river traffic. Sous-
  Groupement Blindé 2 and elements of GERD were among the units tasked 
  with safeguarding posts vital to French command of the Black River and 
  with keeping RC 6 open. In December, when Gen de Lattre – heartbroken 
  by the death of his only son, and dying of cancer – left Indochina, Giap’s 
  encircling divisions struck.
  On 11 December 1951 the outpost at Tu Vu on the Black River north 
  of Hoa Binh, defended by Lt Chevreuil’s tank platoon and two platoons of 
  infantry from 3e Esc/1er RCC plus a small artillery detachment, was attacked 
  by a large Viet Minh force. As thick ground mist blanketed the area, the Viet 
  Minh attacked at 2115hrs and kept up the pressure until dawn. The mist 
  hampered the gunners’ observation, and after five successive human-wave 
  attacks the perimeter was penetrated. Only the quick and sacrificial action 
  of the tank platoon averted complete disaster, and Lt Chevreuil was among 
  the tank crewmen killed in action. A counter-attack by Foreign Legion troops 
  relieved Tu Vu at daylight. Later, a similar action at Xom Pheo on RC 6 
  north-east of Hoa Binh cost the Viet Minh over 800 killed – an indication 
  of how many men they were willing to expend in combat. The Black River 
  link was severed on 12 January, and shortly thereafter it took Gen Salan 12 
  battalions with heavy artillery and air cover, and 12 days, to reopen RC 6. 
  Hoa Binh was abandoned the following month.
  1952: Operation Lorraine
  During the Hoa Binh battles, the troops deployed inside the Red River Delta 
  were also hard pressed by the ever more determined Viet Minh. In January 
  LVT4 ALLIGATOR DE DÉPANNAGE, & M29C CRABE; 1er ESCADRON/1er RÉGIMENT 
  ÉTRANGER DE CAVALERIE; OPERATION ACQUARIUM, COCHINCHINA, MAY 1951
  The M29 Weasel, originally designed for operations in snow and ice, only became amphibious 
  with the M29C version, and had too little freeboard for most sea conditions. In the difficult terrain 
  of Indochina the Crabe suffered mechanically from its overladen suspension and the fragility of its 
  engine and clutch. During early operations many were lost because of breakdowns, and had to be 
  destroyed by fire for lack of any means to recover them. This was overcome by better troop 
  training, and the introduction of the LVT4 de Dépannage. This was fitted with the twin-boom lifting 
  equipment from an Ernest Holmes Model-45 HD Wrecker bed and a Gar Wood 15,000lb (6818kg) 
  winch, for extracting even the most deeply bogged vehicle. The recovery Alligator also carried 
  250kg naval anchors to provide a stable platform during recovery missions.
  Here the recovery LVT4, registration number IC-93810, exchanges the engine of a Crabe in the 
  field: a task that took one hour for an M29C and two hours for an LVT. This Crab was commanded 
  by Warrant Officer Blesch, the leader of 2e Peloton, 1er Esc/1er REC, as indicated by the playing 
  card heart symbol. The regimental insignia is painted on the near front quarter. On the far bow 
  quarter is an insignia of a crab combined with the Foreign Legion’s grenade, identifying the  
  1er Groupe d’Escadrons/1er REC, the tactical grouping of the regiment’s 1er, 2e and 6e Escadrons 
  which operated the Crabes and Alligators at this date. The insignia was later retained by the 1er 
  and 2e Groupements Autonomes, and the 1er and 2e Groupements Amphibies, as these 
  expanding tactical units were later renamed.
  D
  
  31
  
  32
  1952, near Dong Coi on the Rapids Canal east of Hanoi, Lt Lieutenant 
  Bertrand Tourret’s tank platoon of 5e Esc/1er RCC were in action with 
  SGB 1. By night, infantry attacked them from close quarters with satchel 
  charges, and the tank crewmen had to use their co-axial machine guns to 
  ‘hose’ them off their comrades’ tanks.
  On 29 October 1952, Gen Salan launched his ambitious Operation 
  Lorraine north-west out of the Delta up RC 2 and the Clear River. This had 
  the dual purpose of destroying Viet Minh supply bases in the Phu Doan-
  Tuyen Quang area, while hopefully distracting Giap from the campaign he 
  was leading far south in the Thai Highlands with three of his five divisions. 
  Salan committed 30,000 men in four motorized brigades, one airborne, two 
  armoured and two riverine groups; among them were the 1er RCC’s 2e and 
  5e Esc, detached respectively to SGB 1 and SGB 2. The paratroops dropped 
  on Phu Doan on 9 November, the armour reached them the next day, and 
  the Viet Minh depots were duly destroyed. The enemy remained elusive until 
  the return march down the narrow corridor, when, on 17 November, the 
  columns were attacked with great ferocity in the Chan Muong Pass by VM 
  Regt 36. Once again the AFVs were attacked fearlessly with satchel charges, 
  and the crews had to shoot the Viet Minh off each other’s turrets. Before the 
  column fought its way back into the Delta the road was again cut, by Regt 
  176, on 23/24 November.
  Fighting an enemy who had lost any fear of French armour, all of the 
  regiment’s squadrons were embroiled in many small battles in the Delta 
  throughout the winter of 1952–53. The practice of carrying Vietnamese 
  infantry on the M24s was adopted; their small stature and agility allowed 
  up to 24 men to ride on each Chaffee, deploying at the first sign of enemy 
  presence. This arrangement permitted longer patrols without tiring the foot 
  soldiers, and patrolling areas that trucks could not access.
  ‘METZ’, the M24 Chaffee of 
  Lt Michel Henry of 1er RCC 
  stands guard as troops search 
  yet another native village, 
  a repetitive task known as 
  ‘ratissage’. The M24 proved 
  to be the outstanding AFV 
  during the war in Indochina. 
  It possessed just the right 
  combination of firepower 
  with an effective high 
  explosive round; good armour 
  protection against most Viet 
  Minh weapons; and, above 
  all, excellent mobility thanks 
  to its low ground pressure. At 
  the end of the conflict, French 
  armour forces in Indochina 
  comprised four armoured 
  groups, two amphibious 
  groups, three reconnaissance 
  groups and six separate armour 
  battalions. (Author’s collection)
  
  33
  1953: reorganization, and 
  Operation Mouette
  General Henri Navarre replaced 
  Gen Salan as C-in-C on 8 May 
  1953. France no longer believed 
  in a military victory, but Navarre’s 
  orders were to improve the 
  military position vis-à-vis the 
  Viet Minh to permit a negotiated 
  political resolution. Navarre 
  had too little armour for it to be 
  decisive at the strategic level, but 
  he attempted to modify his mobile 
  forces into a common organization 
  to permit their enlargement with 
  the equipment at hand.
  The Sous-Groupements Blindés 
  and Sous-Groupements Amphibies 
  in which the 1er RCC’s squadrons 
  were operating were reorganized, 
  as was the regiment itself. First, 
  the 1er RCC personnel were 
  withdrawn from 2e SGA, which 
  now came under control of 1er 
  REC thus removing the Crabes 
  and Alligators from the 1er RCC’s 
  inventory. The joint 8e RSA and 
  1er RCC armoured sub-groups 
  of GB 2 were also rationalized: 
  the 8e Spahis and 1er RCC were 
  to be equipped and organized as 
  separate, identical manoeuvre units. Each had a headquarters, a squadron 
  of M24s, a squadron of chasseurs portés in half-tracks, and three squadrons 
  of truck-borne infantry. The new organization allowed the two regiments to 
  take and hold ground, and each could respond rapidly to multiple threats 
  over a wide area. Collectively, these reorganizations removed all amphibious 
  vehicles and most armoured cars from the regiment’s inventory. The 
  exception was 4e Esc with M8 armoured cars in the GERD, which remained 
  under the territorial commander of North-West Tonkin.
  The 1e RCC now had six squadrons, which made the constant shortage 
  of junior officers even more evident. In Indochina all junior officers had 
  to shoulder responsibilities above their rank. Only three officers could be 
  provided for each squadron; it was commonplace for a warrant officer 
  or senior NCO to command one platoon in a squadron, but with four 
  platoons in each of six squadrons half of them were now led by non-
  commissioned ranks.
  The first combat deployment of the new organization was Operation 
  Mouette on 15 October 1953, a major thrust out of the south Delta enclave 
  against VM Div 320, which involved seven GMs, paratroops, amphibious 
  and riverine units, and armour. The 1er RCC now formed the basis of SGB 2, 
  though the 6e Esc started the operation very short of manpower. By the time 
  Based on the wartime Fieseler 
  Storch observation aircraft, 
  a Morane-Saulnier MS-500 
  Criquet or Cricket flies low 
  over a pair of LVT(A)4 of the 
  1er REC during an operation 
  below the Khé-Non Mountains 
  in the final weeks of the war. 
  The heavily armed LVT(A)4 
  proved to be a highly effective 
  fire-support vehicle to the 
  M29C Crabe formations 
  across the inundated regions 
  of Indochina. With three 
  .30-calibre machine guns and 
  an M3 75mm howitzer that was 
  mounted in the LVT(A)4 and 
  the M8 HMC. In French service, 
  it was known as the ‘lance-
  patates’ or ‘potato-thrower’. 
  (Photo by Keystone-France/
  Gamma-Rapho via Getty 
  Images)
  
  34
  Mouette withdrew on 6/7 November, Div 320 was sufficiently mauled that it 
  was non-operational for more than four months, having lost about one-third 
  of its strength. In one action alone, on 24 October near the important French-
  defended crossroads of Lai Cac, the regiment recorded 180 Viet Minh killed 
  and 20 captured. As usual, the Viet Minh withdrew in the face of strong 
  French advances, aiming to close in behind, but on this occasion the French 
  artillery was well prepared and inflicted heavy losses. 1er RCC elements 
  reconnoitred the forest roads south of Lai Cac, routes perfectly suited to 
  Viet Minh ambushes, and Regt 48 duly manoeuvred to hit them on a stretch 
  of road confined by steep terrain on one flank. This time, however, the 1er 
  RCC anticipated the ambush, and tanks and infantry platoons charged into 
  the expected site before it was properly set. Once again, the Chaffee crews 
  machine-gunned enemy assault sappers off the outside of each others’ tanks.
  For the rest of winter 1953–54, the 1er RCC elements operating with 
  SGB 2 and the GERD had little respite. The regiment patrolled the Son Tay 
  and Phuc Yen areas, and SGB 2 those of Phuy, Nam Dinh and Thai Binh. The 
  new regimental organization proved effective, permitting wide dispersion but 
  rapid deployment and concentration.
  During 1952–53, when Gen Giap’s widely manoeuvring divisions 
  opened new fronts far from ‘tankable’ territory, the French high command 
  had sought to counter them by using their increased air transport fleet 
  and airborne brigades to establish ‘bases aéro-terrestres’ in their path, 
  complete with artillery. The theory was that the Viet Minh, still weak in 
  field artillery and lacking anti-aircraft weapons other than machine guns, 
  could be lured to smash themselves against strong defensive positions 
  installed, supplied, and covered by the French Air Force. Some of these 
  operations were successful, particularly at Na San in December 1952. In 
  autumn 1953, for a variety of strategic reasons, the choice for one of these 
  ‘air-ground bases’ fell upon Dien Bien Phu, an airstrip in a remote valley 
  in the Thai Highlands near the Laotian border. This was duly captured by 
  The commander and crew 
  of an M24 of 6e Esc/1er RCC 
  observe an airstrike on 24 
  June 1953 during an operation 
  near Phuc Yen in the Red River 
  Delta. At this time 6e Escadron 
  was attached to the Groupe 
  d’Escadrons de Reconnaissance 
  Divisionnaire (GERD), controlled 
  by the territorial Groupement 
  Blindé de Tonkin as a strategic 
  asset for widespread 
  independent operations. This 
  image graphically displays 
  the Chaffee’s outstanding 
  characteristic – the low ground 
  pressure providing mobility 
  even in a waterlogged rice 
  paddy. (Author’s collection)
  
  35
  paratroopers on 20 November with Operation Castor, and by the 25th 
  the old airstrip had been repaired sufficiently to take Dakota transports.
  1954: The ‘Bisons’ of Dien Bien Phu
  The base aéro-terrestre at Dien Bien Phu was conceived not only as an 
  ‘anvil’ on which enemy forces diverted from around the Red River Delta 
  could be hammered to destruction, but also as an offensive base from which 
  mobile units and tactical aircraft could strike at the Viet Minh in south-west 
  Tonkin and northern Laos. To augment its offensive capability, a composite 
  squadron of ten M24 tanks was airlifted into the camp.
  Since the French possessed no aircraft capable of transporting an entire 
  18-ton M24, each tank was dismantled in Hanoi into 180 assemblies, and the 
  pieces flown into the valley. The shipment of each tank required six flights 
  by C-47 Dakotas, and two by requisitioned civilian Bristol 170 Freighters, 
  whose large frontal clamshell doors could accommodate the tank hull and 
  turret separately. Even when stripped of every nut and bolt the hull weighed 
  1,761lb more than the Bristol’s official lift capacity of about 14,000lb (6.27 
  tons), so to enable it to gain sufficient altitude over the mountains and to 
  carry enough fuel many components had to be removed from the aircraft 
  to reduce weight, including the co-pilot and even his seat. The loading of 
  the Bristol was so critical that when a hull weighed in at 800lb extra it was 
  refused. A new hull had to be selected.
  Operation Rondelle II began on 16 December 1953, when Lt Bugeat’s 
  platoon from a Foreign Legion AFV repair company, 2e CREBLE 
  (Compagnie de Réparation d’Engins Blindés de la Légion Étrangère), set 
  up an assembly line for the tanks beside the airstrip, and two days later 
  the first ‘skeleton’ arrived. Lieutenant Henri Préaud of 1er RCC recalled: 
  ‘When we saw our tanks in little pieces like a jigsaw puzzle we thought 
  we would become infantrymen, never believing that anyone could make 
  a tank out of this collection of pieces.’ Nevertheless, two Chaffees were 
  A Bristol 170 Freighter Mark 2 
  F-VNAK belonging to Air 
  Viet Nam was impressed 
  into military service for the 
  transport of large items 
  into Dien Bien Phu during 
  Operation Rondelle II. It carried 
  the hulls and turrets of the ten 
  M24 Chaffees into the isolated 
  base aéro-terreste, while C-47s 
  delivered the remainder of 
  the tank parts and spares in 
  half-a-dozen separate flights. 
  The first Dakotas of Operation 
  Rondelle  II landed at Dien 
  Bien Phu on 16 December 
  where they were unloaded 
  by VM prisoners. Six Dakotas 
  and one Bristol had already 
  landed when the first Chaffee 
  hull arrived on 18 December. 
  In less than three days, the 
  first Chaffee was reassembled. 
  The French used the British 
  name ‘Dakota’ for the C47, 
  and the term ‘dakotable’ came 
  to describe any airstrip that 
  could accept this aircraft. 
  F-VNAK was finally destroyed 
  on 18 December 1961, when it 
  crash-landed at Wollongong in 
  Australia. (Author’s collection)
  
  M5A1, 4e ESCADRON 1er RÉGIMENT ETRANGÈRE DE CAVALERIE,  
  OPERATION SAUTERELLE, AUGUST 1952
  E
  1
  2
  8
  9
  10
  11
  12
  13
  14
  
  KEY
  1. M6 37mm gun in M44 combination gun mount
  2. Turret periscope 
  3. .30cal anti-aircraft gun 
  4. Antenna mount base
  5. Track grousers
  6. Twin Cadillac Series 42 16 cylinder (8/engine)
  7. Trailing idler wheel
  8. 106 rounds of 37mm ammunition
  9. Propeller shaft
  10.  Vertical volute spring suspension
  11 Drive sprocket
  12. T16 series rubber padded tracks
  13. Hydramatic transmission 
  14. Co-driver’s M1919A4 .30cal machine gun 
  3
  4
  5
  6
  7
  
  38
  completed by 24 December, and the first platoon – Peloton Carette, named 
  for its commander – was formed on Christmas Day from personnel of the 
  mechanized Régiment d’Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc (RICM); the other 
  crews came from 3e Esc/1er RCC serving with the GERD. Rondelle II ended 
  on 15 January 1954, with the completion of the ten tanks a fortnight ahead 
  of schedule. They were divided into three platoons of three tanks each, plus 
  a headquarters tank for the squadron commander, Capt Yves Hervouët of 
  1er RCC. The squadron became operational on 20 January, assuming the 
  title Escadron de Marche/1er RCC; administratively, it remained attached 
  to 3e Esc/1er RCC. To the troops of the garrison the tanks were known as 
  ‘Bisons’; the Viet Minh would call them ‘Oxen’.
  The HQ tank and two of the platoons were located in the centre de 
  resistance at Dien Bien Phu. Nine of the tanks were named, as was standard 
  practice, after battle honours, painted in white capitals along the turret 
  sides. Hervouët’s tank (callsign ‘Bison Autorité’) was ‘CONTI’, after a 
  seventeenth-century commander of 1er RCC’s ancestor regiment. The 
  ‘Colonials’ of Blue platoon (WO Carette, ‘Bleu 1’) crewed ‘BAZEILLE’, 
  1: M24 CHAFFEE, 2e PELOTON, 2e ESCADRON, 1er RÉGIMENT DE CHASSEURS À 
  CHEVAL; OPERATION MOUETTE, TONKIN, 24 OCTOBER 1953
  With the distinctive regimental insignia of 1er RCC on the turret sides, this M24 named ‘METZ ‘is 
  finished in the standard US olive drab of American-supplied AFVs. ‘METZ’ was commanded by  
  Lt Michel Henry, and the numeral ‘5’ denotes the platoon leader’s tank of 2e Peloton. The 
  registration number – French tricolor, ‘IC’ (signifying Indochina), ‘94113’ – is displayed on the turret 
  rear and on the lower front hull plate, which also carries a bridge classification plate: a black ‘18’ on 
  a yellow disc, indicating the tank’s weight in tons. Operation Mouette (15 October–6/7 November) 
  was a major French offensive out of the southern defences of the Red River Delta to fix and 
  destroy Viet Minh Division 320. The operation involved airborne assaults, seven Groupes Mobile, 
  Dinassaut riverine units and armour support from 1er RCC. On 24 October the tanks of 2e 
  Escadron fought a fierce action against elements of Div 320 near Lai Cac, where 180 Viet Minh 
  were killed and 20 captured in a single day.
  2: M5A1 STUART, 4e PELOTON, 3e ESCADRON/5e RÉGIMENT DE CUIRASSIERS, 
  GROUPE MOBILE 100; PK15, ROUTE COLONIALE 19, 24 JUNE 1954
  The tanks of ‘III/5e Cuirs’ were ancient but re-engined M5A1s. The 4e Peloton, commanded by  
  Lt Goldstein, comprised three M5A1 tanks, two M8 HMC Howitzer Motor Carriages and two M3 
  half-tracks. Vehicle names began with the letter ‘D’ – the platoon leader’s tank was ‘DROUOT II’, the 
  others ‘D’ARC II’ and ‘DE SAXE’; the M8 HMCs were ‘DUROC’ and ‘DON QUICHOTTE’, and the half-
  tracks ‘DAGOBERT’ and ‘DAMOCLES’. The tank ‘D’ARC II’ was commanded by Staff Sgt Leopold de 
  Temmermann; like the others, it was abandoned and burned after the unit fought a determined 
  action at Pointe Kilométrique 15 when 4e Peloton saved (temporarily) from annihilation two 
  companies of the Régiment de Corée, battle-hardened veterans of the French battalion that fought 
  with UN forces in Korea. Along the hull sides are the registration number, tank name and the 
  insignia of the ‘Royal-Pologne’.  The registration number 16207 is repeated on the glacis plate. 
  F
  In a classic example of 
  ‘Débrouille-toi!’ – the Foreign 
  Legion’s traditional mastery of 
  improvisation – légionnaires 
  of 2e CREBLE painstakingly 
  reassemble the M24 Chaffees 
  beside the airstrip at Dien Bien 
  Phu. 2e CREBLE was normally 
  based in Hanoi to service the 
  amphibious vehicles and other 
  AFVs of 1er REC and GB 2 in 
  Tonkin. The team arrived at 
  Dien Bien Phu on 16 December 
  1953, and on the 18th began 
  the reassembly of the first 
  Chaffee ‘jigsaw puzzle’. The 
  gantry for lifting the turrets and 
  other heavy components was 
  also used by 11e Batterie/4e 
  Régiment d’Artillerie Coloniale to 
  assemble their airlifted 155mm 
  howitzers. (Author’s collection)
  
  39
  
  40
  ‘DOUAUMONT’ and ‘MULHOUSE’; Red platoon (Staff Sgt Guntz, 
  ‘Rouge 1’) had ‘ETTLINGEN’, ‘POSEN’ and ‘SMOLENSK’. All the camp’s 
  strongpoints were given female names, in alphabetical order; the most 
  distant was ‘Isabelle’, 5km south of the main centre, to which Lt Henri 
  Préaud’s Green Platoon was allocated, with ‘AUERSTAEDT’ (‘Vert 1’), 
  ‘RATISBONNE’ and ‘NEUMACH’. The squadron’s initial strength was 
  67 all ranks, of whom 32 were Vietnamese. After a preliminary period of 
  running-in and final adjustments, carried out under cover of the morning 
  mist or ‘crachin’ to avoid revealing their numbers, the tanks conducted 
  patrols along the 11-mile-by-3 mile valley to familiarize themselves with 
  the terrain. When not in use the Bisons were concealed in sandbagged 
  revetments incorporating dugouts for crews, ammunition and fuel.
  The Bisons first saw combat on 1 February during an action north-
  west of ‘Gabrielle’, the most distant strongpoint to the north-west, and the 
  next day they practised with 8e BPC (Bataillon Parachutistes de Choc) the 
  reinforcement of ‘Béatrice’, out to the north-east. The Viet Minh artillery 
  now began periodic harassing and ranging fires, and the tanks undertook 
  numerous offensive patrols in conjunction with paratroopers to the slopes of 
  the surrounding hills. Attempts to locate the VM gun positions that eluded 
  French spotter aircraft failed, and Lt Préaud recalled this as an impossible 
  task: ‘We were never able to pinpoint the exact location of their artillery … 
  What’s more, they had dug tunnels into the mountainsides so the cannons 
  could be completely concealed. They were impossible to spot. We never did 
  locate them, let alone destroy them.’ The tanks were also tied into the overall 
  plan for night-time artillery fires.
  The noose of three Viet Minh divisions gathered around Dien Bien Phu 
  by Gen Giap had already taught the garrison the impossibility of offensive 
  sorties by the afternoon of 13 March 1954, when a heavy and sustained 
  artillery bombardment struck the camp. Giap’s two-dozen well-concealed 
  105mm howitzers smashed carefully plotted targets all over the valley, and 
  that night the isolated strongpoint ‘Béatrice’ was overrun by wave after 
  wave of Viet Minh infantry. ‘Gabrielle’ fell 36 hours later; a counter-attack 
  by tanks and paratroopers failed to relieve the Algerian garrison, but did 
  extricate survivors. The airstrip was closed by VM artillery fire on 29 March, 
  and thereafter parachute drops were the only way to get men and supplies 
  into the shrinking perimeter.
  The loss of the two northern strongpoints considerably reduced the tanks’ 
  field of action, but they still provided the shock element in many night-time 
  In mid-February 1954 the 
  Chaffees of 3e Esc de M/1er RCC 
  were camouflaged to break 
  up their visual outlines against 
  the predominant earth colours 
  of the Dien Bien Phu cuvette, 
  which was honeycombed 
  with diggings. At Point d’Appui 
  Isabelle, ‘AUERSTAEDT’ – 
  commanded by Lt Henri 
  Préaud, with the callsign ‘Green 
  One’ – was adorned with brown 
  and yellow stripes over the 
  olive drab base colour. Using 
  both scrounged paint and mud 
  mixed to a paste, no two crews 
  applied the same scheme, but 
  the vehicle names were left 
  visible. (Author’s collection)
  
  41
  counter-attacks up the eastern hills, lit by air-dropped parachute flares, and 
  they inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. The squadron, whether in the field 
  or in its static positions, was constantly subjected to artillery bombardment. 
  In spite of the revetments maintenance was very difficult, and replenishing 
  with ammunition was often only possible by placing the tank over a trench 
  and passing the rounds up through the floor escape hatch.
  Replacements were vital, as Capt Hervouët and Blue platoon commander 
  WO Carette were both wounded while Red platoon commander Staff Sgt Guntz 
  was killed. Of a total of 23 men who commanded tanks during the battle, four 
  were killed and 15 wounded (four, including Yves Hervouët, would later die in 
  captivity). In April, Capt Hervouët led the squadron in action with both arms 
  wounded after suffering a second injury, when his right elbow was hit by the 
  recoil of the 75mm gun. The renowned medical surgeon hero of Dien Bien Phu 
  Paul Grauwin stated: ‘I believe I knew all the tank men, from the captain to the 
  trooper. Even trying very hard, I cannot remember one, who was not bandaged, 
  in splints, or in plaster … ’
  A total of 36 volunteer replacements, some of whom had no jump training, 
  were parachuted in by night during the course of the siege. One of these was 2nd 
  Lt André Mengelle, who recalled: ‘I could see the Viet Minh artillery and mortar 
  fire bursting on the camp as I landed. It was right out of Dante’s “Inferno”. 
  Then in the darkness I heard the noise of the tanks with their Cadillac engines. 
  What a welcome sound! I immediately headed in their direction.’
  With the tanks acting in a fire-support role, ammunition consumption 
  was high. During the battle each tank fired on average 1,500 shells – some 
  A plume of fire and smoke rises 
  above the Dien Bien Phu centre 
  de resistance from a burning 
  fuel dump on 17 March 1954, 
  four days after the start of the 
  battle proper. In the foreground 
  is the poste de commandment 
  of Col Christian de Castries, 
  and beyond are the Chaffee 
  revetments housing ‘POSEN’, 
  ‘SMOLENSK’ and ‘ETTLINGEN’ 
  of Peloton Rouge, commanded 
  by Sgt Ney after Staff Sgt 
  Guntz was killed during the 
  counter-attack to ‘Gabrielle’ 
  on 15 March. The 17th was 
  a relatively quiet day as the 
  Viet Minh replenished their 
  stocks of artillery ammunition, 
  while the French evacuated 
  their wounded by Dakota 
  and helicopter and buried 
  their dead. During the second 
  half of March the Viet Minh 
  concentrated on extending 
  their approach trenches; 
  although fighting continued 
  astride the road down to 
  ‘Isabelle’, major assaults only 
  resumed on 30/31 March. 
  (Author’s collection)
  
  42
  three times the recommended life of an M6 75mm gun barrel. In a typical 
  engagement, between 60 and 100 rounds were fired by each tank, but the 
  M24 carried a basic load of 48 rounds. Extra ammunition was carried on the 
  trackguards and rear decks as well as on the turret floor and in the co-driver’s 
  position. This reduced the fighting crew to four, so the drivers alternated 
  their tasks, with one sleeping while the other undertook maintenance to the 
  tank. Firing so many rounds in such a short time caused problems with the 
  recoil system. Supplies of the specialized oil for the recuperator cylinders 
  were soon exhausted, so the crews resorted to using the olive oil out of 
  sardine cans from K-ration packs. These were taken from anyone who had 
  them, willing or unwilling, but the cans and fish were handed back once the 
  oil had been drained.
  Préaud recalls:
  Inside the tanks we were relatively safe but the real problem was when we 
  had to replenish the tanks with ammunition or fuel since the crew then had 
  to do these tasks outside the armoured protection of the tanks and that was 
  when we suffered the majority of our casualties. It got so bad that we dug 
  deep trenches at night and then placed our reserve ammunition in the bottom. 
  The trenches were narrow enough that we were able to straddle them with 
  the tanks so we were able to pass tank rounds up through the escape hatch 
  in the floor of the tank and avoid the worst of the enemy shelling. However, 
  refuelling the tanks from five-gallon jerry cans remained a major problem 
  to the end. In my platoon I suffered more casualties during refuelling and 
  replenishing outside the tanks than during the battle inside them.
  Similarly, for the crews thirst was a critical problem, as Préaud recalls:
  As the battle intensified we were making between two and three sorties a day 
  in support of the infantry and to repel Viet Minh attacks. Despite extensive 
  battle damage the tanks continued to perform admirably although there were 
  problems with the gun recoil system on account of the high number of rounds 
  fired. Since there were none of the special oils available to replenish the guns’ 
  recuperators we were obliged to use the olive oil from the sardine cans in the 
  combat rations – nobody was allowed to consume the oil during meals but to 
  save it for the tanks. It was the men rather than the tanks that were suffering 
  most and the worst aspect was the thirst. The only water we had was from the 
  Nam Yum river but it had been contaminated by the Viet Minh with rotting 
  carcasses of water buffalo. We didn’t have enough fuel to boil the water to 
  sterilize it so the lack of water got worse and worse. Anyway many of the 
  troops, particularly the legionnaires, relied on Vinogel to make the water 
  palatable – Vinogel was a jellied concentrate of vin rouge that when mixed 
  with water formed a revolting substitute for wine. Morale only really dipped 
  M24 CHAFFEES ‘AUERSTAEDT’ & ‘CONTI’; 3e ESCADRON DE MARCHE/1er RÉGIMENT 
  DE CHASSEURS À CHEVAL; DIEN BIEN PHU, 28 MARCH 1954
  Lieutenant Henri Préaud and Capt Yves Hervouët confer in their tanks ‘AUERSTAEDT’ and ‘CONTI’ 
  during the assault against Viet Minh anti-aircraft positions at Bon Ong Pet and Ban Ban west of the 
  camp on 28 March 1954, when the squadron’s pelotons Bleu & Vert supported the paras of 8e and 
  6e BPC respectively. The M24s of ‘Green platoon’ (‘AUERSTAEDT’, ‘RATISBONNE’ and ‘NEUMACH’) 
  came up from their position in the southern strongpoint ‘Isabelle’ by about 1000hrs, in time to 
  help repulse an enemy counter-attack on 6e BPC.
  G
  
  43
  
  44
  when consignments of Vinogel dropped by parachute fell behind enemy lines. 
  After firing a large number of rounds in combat the fumes inside the turret 
  made the thirst even worse. As the tank commander my throat was so dry that 
  I was often unable to give orders over the radio. At times we resorted to the 
  most basic means to slake our thirst when a helmet liner was passed around the 
  five-man tank crew and each urinated into it. We then added a sachet of Nescafe 
  granulated coffee to the bitter cocktail before we tried to ease our thirst.
  Postscript Henri Préaud continues: ‘In the midst of that awful battle I 
  vowed that if I survived I would produce my own wine and now I have 
  20 hectares of vines here in the heart of Provence and that is what you are 
  drinking today but I still recall how terrible Vinogel was.’
  During the 57-day siege most of the tanks suffered more or less severe 
  damage from bazooka, RCL and artillery fire. ‘BAZEILLE’, penetrated 
  twice, was abandoned on strongpoint Eliane 2 on the night of 31 March/ 
  1 April. Several other tanks, including ‘DOUAUMONT’, ‘ETTLINGEN’, 
  ‘POSEN’, ‘RATISBONNE’ and ‘SMOLENSK’ were also hit; ‘MULHOUSE’ 
  was struck by hollow-charge projectiles three times, and after a 105mm hit 
  the turret had to be patched by welding on a mortar baseplate. Battle damage 
  caused distortion of the turret rings that impeded or prevented traverse, and 
  therefore the ability to lay the guns accurately. By 7 May three tanks’ main 
  guns were out of action for this reason, though the machine guns still allowed 
  their use as ‘blockhouses’.
  The olive drab base colour of the squadron’s tanks was roughly 
  camouflaged in mid-February whatever paint was available, mostly red-
  brown, but this was heavily augmented with streaks or blotches of the ochre 
  earth of the valley mixed with 
  petrol; no two tanks looked 
  the same. Beside the tank 
  names, left clear between the 
  ad hoc streaks of camouflage, 
  the only markings carried were 
  the registration number on the 
  lower hull front and turret 
  rear, ‘AUERSTAEDT’ being 
  IC-94266 and ‘RATISBONNE’ 
  and ‘NEUMACH’ -67 and -68 
  respectively. ‘AUERSTAEDT’ 
  was the only tank to survive 
  the entire battle without 
  serious damage, and on the 
  evening of 7 May it was 
  destroyed at ‘Isabelle’ by its 
  crew. The engine was drained 
  of oil and run at high revs until 
  it seized, the main armament 
  was 
  incapacitated 
  with 
  incendiary grenades, while the 
  ammunition and small arms 
  were thrown into the Nam 
  Youm River. (During a visit in 
  One of the perennial problems 
  for armour units in Indochina 
  was the tendency of higher 
  command to employ them 
  in ‘penny packets’ or even 
  as single tanks, as here. 
  With its crew’s bunker in 
  the background, an M24 
  Chaffee guards a crossroads 
  overlooking the Day River near 
  Phu Ly in the southern Red 
  River Delta in June 1954. On 28 
  June, Col Vanuxem’s masterly 
  fighting retreat, Operation 
  Auvergne, will withdraw French 
  forces from the southern Delta 
  into an enclave around Hanoi 
  and Haiphong in preparation 
  for leaving Tonkin. The sand-
  coloured beret of the crewman 
  is the cotton so-called ‘gurkha’ 
  type, worn by cavalry units 
  pulled to the right in British 
  style, usually with a locally 
  made white-metal regimental 
  badge above the left eye. 
  (Bettmann/Getty Images)
  
  45
  November 1993, Gen Préaud discovered the hulk where he had left it; it 
  was later moved to the main battlefield museum.)
  From the tactical point of view, Capt Hervouët’s gallant squadron 
  played a crucial part in the defence of Dien Bien Phu. Because of their small 
  numbers and their distribution between two widely separated positions 
  it was only ever possible to employ more than six tanks together on one 
  occasion. Nevertheless, in the determination of its attacks, the accuracy of 
  its fire support, and the risks taken in assisting the infantry, the squadron’s 
  outstanding conduct was in the highest traditions of the cavalry. Their 
  courage, and the grievous suffering of their wounded, were to no purpose. 
  Dien Bien Phu was overwhelmed on 7 May, and that evening the crews 
  disabled their tanks as thoroughly as they could. In all, 15 crewmen 
  were killed or disappeared, and virtually all the rest were wounded, four 
  seriously enough that the Viet Minh allowed their evacuation. Among the 
  very few soldiers of the garrison to escape across country were a total of 
  nine tankers, the most senior of them bearing a resonant name: Staff Sgt 
  Fernand Ney reached safety on 3 June, after trekking 125 miles.
  THE FINAL BATTLES
  Although the fall of Dien Bien Phu cost the French Union forces less than 5 
  per cent of their total manpower, the shock – like that of the Tet Offensive 14 
  years later – proved fatal. The French people were weary of ‘la sale guerre’; 
  the Paris government fell, and its successors attended the peace conference at 
  Geneva determined to negotiate a settlement at any price. In the meantime, 
  fighting continued. On 28 June the new C-in-C, Gen Ely, launched Operation 
  Auvergne – the abandonment 
  of the southern Red River 
  Delta, to concentrate forces 
  around Hanoi and Haiphong. 
  During a carefully prepared 
  and conducted ‘collapsing bag’ 
  retreat with air and artillery 
  cover, armoured and motorized 
  groups gave an excellent 
  account of themselves, and on 
  3 July at Phu Ly they shattered 
  six VM regular battalions.
  Further south, assets had 
  been stripped to reinforce 
  Tonkin. In Annam, the mobile 
  defence of the whole Central 
  Highlands plateau now rested 
  on two brigades, Groupes 
  Mobiles 42 and 100. Colonel 
  Barrou’s GM 100 had a good 
  reputation and some first-
  class units, including the 
  two-battalion Régiment de 
  Corée, veterans of the Korean 
  Scoured to bare metal by years 
  of blistering sun and monsoon 
  rains, an M8 HMC lies forlornly 
  by the roadside of RC 19 in 
  the Central Highlands at the 
  height of America’s Vietnam 
  War in 1969, some 15 years 
  after the destruction of Groupe 
  Mobile 100 by VM Regts 108 
  and 803 on 24–27 June 1954. 
  Tragically, the US armed forces 
  failed to learn the lessons of the 
  French experience, and were 
  condemned to make many 
  of the same mistakes during 
  their war in South-East Asia. 
  (Author’s collection)
  
  46
  War; the mainly Khmer BM/43e RIC; and 3e Esc/5e Régiment de Cuirassiers, 
  with M5A1s. Since its arrival in the Central Highlands in mid-December 
  1953, GM 100 had covered almost 2,000 miles through enemy-dominated 
  territory, continually harassed by forces outnumbering it 5 to 1. On 24–27 
  June, while moving to link up with GM 42 on RC 19 in heavily overgrown 
  country between An Khe and Pleiku, the brigade was blocked, driven off the 
  road, and almost destroyed in repeated ambushes. Casualties were reckoned 
  as about 35 per cent in men and 85 per cent in vehicles, including all the 
  armour, and 100 per cent in heavy equipment.
   The fate of GM 100 was to cast a long shadow, for it greatly 
  influenced American military thinking on the use of armour in Vietnam. 
  To many casual observers it seemed to prove the impossibility of armoured 
  operations in jungle warfare; in fact, of course, GM 100 was not an 
  armoured unit at all, but was composed of truck-mounted infantry with 
  only one armoured squadron in support. Confined to movement on roads, 
  it was vulnerable to ambushes that gradually but inexorably whittled 
  it away. Nevertheless, its destruction generated among the US Army 
  considerable prejudice against using armour in South-East Asia, and this 
  persisted for many years.
  On 15 July the remainder of 1e RCC joined the GERD in the Son Tay 
  area, staying in action until the 27 July ceasefire agreed under the Geneva 
  Accords signed on 20 July 1954. Vietnam was partitioned along the 17th 
  Parallel, and on 9 October the last French troops left Hanoi. By an awful 
  irony, the last tank to leave the city bore the name ‘ALGÉRIE’ – where, for 
  the next eight years, the French Army was to be mired in yet another futile, 
  bloody war.
  FRENCH ARMOUR UNITS IN INDOCHINA 1945–54
  Note: After the partition of Vietnam in October 1954 some units moved 
  from Tonkin and northern Annam to the new Republic of (South) Vietnam, 
  and the last French troops did not leave that country until April 1956.
  • 
  Groupement de Marche de la 2ème Division Blindée, including 
  the 1ère Cie de March du 501ème RCC but with volunteers from 
  all three tank battalions of the 2ème DB, as well as from the 7ème 
  Esc du 1er RMSM. The unit arrived in Saigon on 10 September 
  1945 and was disbanded 16 November 1946.
  • 
  Commando Blindé du Cambodge. Based in Phnom Penh. Using 
  various equipment including ex-Japanese armour and British 
  vehicles. Later attached to the 5ème Régiment de Cuirassiers as 
  its 8ème Escadron in September 1946.
  • 
  9ème Régiment de Dragons. Arrived in Saigon in October 1945. 
  Became GUALBEO in January 1946 Groupement d’Unités 
  d’Armes Lourdes de la Brigade d’Extrème Orient. Equipped 
  mainly with British vehicles (Universal Carriers and Humber 
  scout cars et al.). Disbanded July 1956.
  • 
  Escadron Autonome de Reconnaissance. Recce unit of the 
  Brigade d’Extrème Orient. Arrived in Saigon in February 1946. 
  Fully equipped with British vehicles (Universal Carriers and 
  Humber scout cars).
  
  47
  • 
  Bataillon Porté du Groupement Blindé du Haut Tonkin. Mixed 
  armour/infantry unit. Formed October 1946 and disbanded 
  April 1947 with remaining elements composing the 5ème 
  Escadron du RICM.
  • 
  Groupe d’Escadrons de Marche de l’Arme Blindée. Created January 
  1947 with volunteers from North Africa. Lack of equipment 
  resulted in deployment as infantry. Consequently disbanded in 
  March 1947 and personnel dispersed to various cavalry units.
  • 
  Escadron Lourd de Réparation. Specific maintenance unit 
  attached to 1er RCh from January 1947 and then to RICM in 
  January 1951.
  • 
  Régiment de Marche de Spahis d’Extrème Orient. Arrived in 
  Saigon in February 1947. Equipped mainly with M8 armoured 
  cars. Became 2ème Régiment de Spahis Marocain in May 1947. 
  Repatriated 30 March 1955.
  • 
  1er Régiment de Hussards Parachutistes with one company 
  incorporated in the 2ème Bataillon du 1er Régiment de Chasseurs 
  Parachutistes.
  • 
  1er Régiment de Chasseurs. Arrived in Saigon January 1946; 
  repatriated and disbanded 1955.
  • 
  5ème Régiment de Cuirassiers ‘Royal-Pologne’. Arrived  
  2 February 1946. Organized on the model of British recce unit 
  using Coventry armoured cars, Humber scout cars and initially 
  ex-Japanese tanks before issue of US equipment. Repatriated at 
  the end of the conflict.
  • 
  4ème Régiment de Dragons Portés. Arrived in March 1947. Unit 
  specifically using armoured trains and riverboats. Disbanded in 
  June 1954.
  • 
  8ème Régiment de Spahis Algériens. Arrived 18 April 1950. 
  Disbanded at the end of the conflict.
  • 
  2ème Régiment de Spahis Marocains. Formed on 1 December 
  1947 from the Régiment de Marche de Spahis d’Extrème 
  Orient formerly with Groupement Massu. Transferred to 
  Morocco in 1955.
  • 
  5ème Régiment de Spahis Marocains. Arrived as GESM or 
  Groupe d’Escadrons de Spahis Marocains on 28 September 1949. 
  Became 5ème RSM in January 1950, with two riverboat platoons 
  detached. Disbanded January 1955 with remaining personnel 
  moved to the 2ème RSM.
  • 
  6ème Régiment de Spahis Marocains. Arrived in 18 February 
  1949. Repatriated August 1955.
  • 
  1er Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie. Arrived 4 January 1947. 
  Transferred to Tunisia from November 1955–January 1956.
  • 
  Régiment d’Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc. Arrived in Saigon  
  4 November 1945. Transferred to Algeria in May 1955.
  • 
  Régiment Blindé Colonial d’Extrème Orient. Formed 
  November 1950. Disbanded February 1955 with remaining 
  personnel transferred to RICM.
  
  48
  INDEX
  Figures in bold refer to illustrations.
  AFVs  4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 22, 23, 
  C26, 32, 35, F38
  ambushes  7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 21, 22, 23, 
  24, 34, 46
  America  5, 7, 9, 10, 16, 17, 22, F38, 45, 46
  ammunition  25, E37, 40, 41, 42, 44
  7.5mm  8, 20, 21, 24; 20mm  20, 21; 
  37mm  9, E37; 40mm  20, 25; 47mm  
  9; 57mm  18, 24; 60mm  12, 16, 20; 
  75mm  9, 12, 14, 18, 20, 24, 33, 41, 
  42; 81mm  14, 20; 105mm  14, 15, 
  40, 44
  Annam  4, 5, 7, 11, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 45, 46
  armour units  7, 8, 9, 21, 44, 46
  armoured cars  10, 14, 22, 23, C26, 33
  Coventry  9, 15, 20, 22, 47; Mk I  10, 
  21, 22; M8  5, 6, 9, C26, 29, 33, 47; 
  Panhard AML 178  9; Panhard & 
  Levassor Type 178B  9; Peugeot 146  5; 
  White TBC  5
  artillery  10, 12, 15, 16, 25, 26, 28, 30, 34, 
  40, 41, 44, 45
  Cambodia  4, 6, 8, 16, 28
  camouflage  14, 40, 44
  cannons  40
  20mm  20, 21; 25mm  9; 37mm  9; 47mm 
  SA35  9
  casualties  15, 16, 22, 29, 42, 46
  China  9, 10, 12, 25
  Cochinchina  4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 18, 22, 24,  
  C26, D30
  communications  7, 8, 11, 16, 20, 23
  convoys  7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 24
  Corps Expéditionnaire Français d’Extrême-
  Orient (French Far East Expeditionary 
  Corps, CEFEO)  5, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16, 24, 
  25, C26, 28, 30
  Day River, the  C26, 28, 44
  Demi-Brigade de la Légion Étrangère, 13e 
  (Foreign Legion Half-Brigade, DBLE)  
  16, 17
  Dien Bien Phu  6, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41, G42, 45
  equipment  6, 9, 10, 11, 16, B18, 20, 22, 25, 
  D30, 33, 46, 47
  escadrons: 1er Groupe d’Escadrons  15, 16, 
  17, D30; 2e  15, 16, 17, 22, 28, 29, D30, 
  32, F38; 3e  16, 23, C26, 29, 30, F38, 40, 
  G42, 46; 4e  A12, 16, 18, 29, 33, E36; 5e  
  16, 24, 25, 28, 32; 6e  16, D30, 33, 34; 7e  
  5, 18; 8e  8, B18, 20; 17e  18
  Foreign Legion, the  7, 15, 16, 17, D30, 
  35, 38
  France  5, 7, 9, 10, 21, 22, 24, 33
  Giap, General Vo Nguyen  4, 6, 10, 11, 22, 
  25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 40
  Groupe d’Escadrons Amphibie (group of 
  amphibious squadrons, GEA)  16, 17, 
  18, 25
  Groupe d’Escadrons de Reconnaissance 
  Divisionnaire (group of recce squadrons, 
  GERD)  15, 29, 34
  Groupes Mobiles (motorized infantry 
  brigade groups, GM)  10, A12, 15, 26, 
  33, F38, 45, 46
  Groupement Massu  4, 5, 7, 22, 47
  guerrillas  6, 7, 12, 25
  Haiphong  4, 6, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 44, 
  45
  half-tracks  5, 9, 10, A12, 14, 23, 28, 29, 33
  Hanoi  4, 5, 6, A12, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 32, 
  35, 38, 44, 45, 46
  Hervouët, Capt Yves  38, 41, G42, 45
  Hoa Binh  11, 14, 22, 30
  Hue  15, 16, 21, 23
  Humber scout cars  9, 11, 15, 22, 46, 47
  Indochina  4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 17, B18, 20, 
  21, 22, 24, 25, D30, 32, 33, F38, 44, 46
  infantry  5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, A12, 14, 15, 16, 
  17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, C26, 28, 29, 30, 
  32, 33, 34, 40, 42, 45, 46, 47
  insignia  5, 8, 9, A12, B18, 23, 25, C26, 
  D30, F38
  Japan  4, 5, 6, 12, 20, 22, 46, 47
  Korea  10, 25, F38, 45
  North  9, 29
  Lai Cac  28, 34, F38
  Lang Son  6, 22, 23, 24, 25
  Laos  4, 7, 8, 15, 28, 35
  legionnaires  20, 22, 38, 42
  LVT4 Alligators  17, B18, 20, 24, 25, 29, 
  D30
  M24 Chaffees  10, 12, 14, 15, 22, 23, C26, 
  28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, F38, 40, 41, G42, 
  44
  AUERSTAEDT  40, G42, 44; 
  BAZEILLE  38, 44; CONTI  38, G42; 
  DOUAUMONT  40, 44; ETTLINGEN  
  40, 41, 44; MULHOUSE  40, 44; 
  NEUMACH  40, G42, 44; POSEN  40, 
  41, 44; RATISBONNE  40, G42, 44; 
  SMOLENSK  40, 41, 44
  M29Cs  16, 17, B18, 24, D30
  Crabes  16, 17, 18, 20, 24, 29, D30, 33; 
  Weasels  16, 24, D30
  M5A1 Stuart tanks  4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 16, 22, 
  23, 29, E36, F38, 46
  M8 armoured cars  5, 6, 9, 14, 22, 23, C26, 
  28, 29, 33, F38, 45, 47
  HMCs (self-propelled howitzers)  5, 6, 9, 
  23, 28, 33, F38, 45
  machine guns  6, 11, 24, 32, 34, 44
  .30cal  16, 33; .50cal  20; Browning 
  .50cal  21; FM24/29 light machine gun  
  24; heavy  17; light machine guns  16; 
  medium machine guns  16, 17; MAC 
  31 Reibel 7.5mm  8, 20, 21; M1917A1 
  .30cal  C26; M1919A4 .30cal  E37
  maintenance  4, 11, 12, 15, 23, 24, 41, 42, 
  47
  manoeuvres  7, 26, 33, 34
  manpower  11, 12, 15, 23, 24, 28, 33, 45
  Mekong Delta, the  4, 5, 7, 17, 18, C26
  mines  8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 20, 24
  mobility  7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 18, 23, 29, 
  32, 34
  Nam Dinh  23, 24, 25, C26, 28, 34
  NCOs  6, 20, 25, 33
  operations: Acquarium  D30; Auvergne  44, 
  45; Castor  35; Ceinture  24; Chaumière  
  9; Crachin  B18, 20; Gerfaut  29; Lea  23; 
  Lorraine  30, 32; Lotus  28, 30; Medusa  
  29; Mouette  28, 33, F38; Moussac  
  4; Normandie  16; Rondelle II  35; 
  Sauterelle  E36; Tulipe  22; Véga  17
  paratroops/paratroopers  10, 11, 32, 33, 
  35, 40
  pelotons  14
  2e  29, D30, F38; 4e  F38; Bleu & Vert  
  G42; Carette  38; Peloton de Vedettes 
  Blindées du 4e Escadron  18;  Peloton 
  de Jeeps Blindées du 9e Escadron  7; 
  Peloton Rouge  41
  Préaud, Lt Gen Marie Henri Pierre  24, 35, 
  40, G42, 44, 45
  reconnaissance  5, 14, 15, 32
  Red River, the  5, 6, 23
  Delta  4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 15, B18, 20, 23, 
  25, C26, 30, 34, 35, F38, 44, 45
  Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval (1er RCC)  
  6, 7, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 
  34, 35, F38, 40
  Régiment de Cuirassiers (Cuirassier 
  Regiment): 5e  10, 22, F38, 46
  Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie (Foreign 
  Legion Cavalry Regiment, REC): 1er  7, 
  15, 16, 17, B18, 20, 21, 23, D30, 33, 38
  Régiment Étranger d’Infanterie (Foreign 
  Legion Infantry Regiment, REI): 2e  20, 
  21; 5e  22
  Régiment de Marche de Spahis Marocains 
  (Moroccan Cavalry Expeditionary 
  Regiment, RMSM)  5, 22, 46
  Régiment de Spahis Marocains (Moroccan 
  Cavalry Regiment, RSM): 5e  8, 9, 21
  reoccupation  4, 5, 7, 23, 24, 30
  Route Coloniale (main road, RC)  F38
  1  22, 23; 2  A12, 32; 4  9, 10, 24, 25; 6  
  11, 30; 19  45, 46
  Saigon  4, 5, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 46, 47
  Naval Arsenal  11, 20; River  8, 21
  Sous-Groupement Blindé (armoured sub-
  group, SGB)  14, 29, 32, 33, 34
  1er  29; 2e  29
  tactics  7, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 23, 25, 29, 
  D30, 35, 45
  Tassigny, General de Lattre de  10, 11, A12, 
  15, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30
  Tonkin  4, 5, 7, 10, A12, 14, 15, B18, 22, 
  23, 24, 25, C26, 29, 33, 34, 35, F38, 44, 
  45, 46, 47
  turrets  9, 10, 11, A12, 20, 21, 25, C26, 28, 
  32, 35, E37, F38, 42, 44
  Universal Carriers  9, 15, C26, 46
  Viet Bac  6, 12, 23, 24, 30
  Viet Minh (VM)  4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, A12, 
  14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
  28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, F38, 40, 41, 
  G42, 45
  Vietnam  4, 6, 12, 15, 17, 18, 24, 25, C26, 
  27, 28, 29, 32, 40, 45, 46
  Vietnamese National Army (ANV), the  15, 
  21, C26
  volunteers  24, 29, 41, 46, 47
  World War II  4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 24
  
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  EDITOR’S NOTE
  In Osprey house style, French unit titles in this text have English 
  capitalization, e.g. 1er Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval rather than … à cheval. 
  Such titles and other French administrative terms are italicized on first 
  mention but not thereafter.
  French ranks are generally Anglicized in this text. A cavalry corporal was a 
  brigadier, but there is no British or US equivalent to the next senior rank of 
  brigadier-chef. The ranks of cavalry sergeant and staff-sergeant were 
  maréchal des logis and maréchal des logis chef respectively; the equivalents 
  of the British warrant officer class II and class I were adjudant and adjudant 
  chef. The titles of majors’ ranks varied according to appointments; a major 
  in a cavalry line command was a chef d’escadrons.
  AUTHOR’S NOTE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
  This New Vanguard volume draws heavily on the account Le 1er Régiment 
  de Chasseurs à Cheval en Indochine (L’Arme Blindée Cavalerie – Revue 
  Historique des Armées Paris 1984) by Colonel Robert d’Alançon, who 
  commanded the regiment in 1953–54, and is duly acknowledged.
  I am immensely grateful to General André Mengelle and General Henri 
  Préaud for the graphic accounts of their experiences at the battle of Dien 
  Bien Phu: suffice to say these were imparted during excellent luncheons at 
  their respective homes in the south of France. Colonel Michel Henry ABC, 
  formerly of 1er Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval, provided much important 
  information, again over memorable meals at restaurants in Paris and his 
  home in Normandy.
  For the section on the 1er Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie, the author has 
  drawn on the researches of Martin Windrow, and on Kepi Blanc magazine 
  passim. Osprey’s Men-at-Arms 322, The French Indochina War 1946–54 by 
  Martin Windrow (Oxford, 1998), is an essential introduction to the political 
  background, opposing forces and complex course of the war. His 
  magisterial work The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in 
  Vietnam (Wiedenfeld & Nicolson; London, 2004) is an outstanding account 
  of the battle of Dien Bien Phu, but set in the context of the events and 
  armies of the war as a whole.
  My sincere thanks to Colonel Thomas Seignon ABC, of the French Army’s 
  tank museum, the Musée des Blindés at Saumur. The author wishes to 
  express his gratitude to the office of the Chef d’État Major de l’Inspection de 
  l’Arme Blindée et Cavalerie for providing much of the material for this book.
  Finally, this book would never have seen the light of day without the 
  stalwart efforts of M.P. Robinson, who diligently translated numerous 
  French documents over many months.
  ABBREVIATIONS & FRENCH TERMS USED IN THE TEXT
  ABC 
  Arme Blindée Cavalerie (Armoured & Cavalry Arm)
  BM 
  Bataillon de Marche (task-organized expeditionary battalion, 
  operating independently of its parent unit)
  BPC 
  Bataillon de Parachutistes Coloniaux, also … de Choc (8e BPC)
  CEFEO 
  Corps Expéditionnaire Français d’Extrême-Orient (French Far East 
  Expeditionary Corps)
  DBLE 
  Demi-Brigade de la Légion Étrangère, 13e (Foreign Legion Half-
  Brigade – an infantry regiment, so-named to commemorate its 
  World War II legacy)
  escadron cavalry squadron (Brit), troop (US)
  GEA 
  Groupe d’Escadrons Amphibie (group of amphibious squadrons)
  GER  
  Groupe d’Escadrons de Reconnaissance (group of recce 
  squadrons)
  GM 
  Groupe Mobile (motorized infantry brigade group)
  peloton 
  cavalry troop (Brit), platoon (US)
  porté 
  lit. ‘carried’ – motorized infantry (e.g. see RDP)
  RBCEO  
  Régiment Blindé Colonial d’Extrême-Orient (Far East Colonial 
  Armoured Regiment)
  RC 
  Route Coloniale (main road), also Régiment de Cuirassiers 
  (Cuirassier Regiment)
  RCC  
  Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval (Light Cavalry Regiment), also 
  Régiment de Chars de Combat (Combat Tank Regiment)
  RDP 
  Régiment de Dragons Portés (Motorized Infantry Regiment)
  REC 
  Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie (Foreign Legion Cavalry 
  Regiment)
  régiment cavalry regiment (Brit), squadron (US)
  REI 
  Régiment Étranger d’Infanterie (Foreign Legion Infantry 
  Regiment)
  RICM 
  Régiment d’Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc (Morocco Colonial 
  Infantry Regiment – mechanized)
  RMSM 
  Régiment de Marche de Spahis Marocains (Moroccan Cavalry 
  Expeditionary Regiment)
  RSM 
  Régiment de Spahis Marocains (Moroccan Cavalry Regiment)
  RP 
  Route Provinciale (secondary road)
  SGB 
  Sous-Groupement Blindé (armoured sub-group)
  VM 
  Viet Minh (for simplicity, used in this text for both the political 
  movement and its People’s Army)
  
SOURCE: textdata/thevault/Osprey System/New Vanguard (NVA)/Osprey - NVA 267 - French Armour in Vietnam 1945-54.pdf