TEXT: German Infantryman (3) 
  Eastern Front 1943-45 
  
  DAVID WESTWOOD has been 
  interested in the armed forces 
  of the Wehrmacht for as long 
  as he can recall. He has 
  researched orders of battle on 
  the German Army of World 
  War II, and has written 
  a title on Kriegsmarine 
  submarines. He is currently 
  working on an illustrated 
  cartographic guide to the 
  Army's campaigns on the 
  Eastern Front. He is married 
  and lives in Derbyshire, UK, 
  where he pursues his passion 
  for fly-fishing. 
  ELIZABETH SHARP trained 
  in Fine Art at the Leicester 
  College of Art and 
  Technology, UK, in the 1960s. 
  A full member of the Society 
  of Equestrian Artists, she 
  has served on its Executive 
  Committee for several years. 
  She is also a full member 
  of the Society of Women 
  Artists and exhibits regularly 
  in London with both groups, 
  as well as in other mixed 
  exhibitions around the 
  country. Elizabeth has 
  produced artwork for clients 
  from all over the world, 
  and also enjoys sculpture. 
  
  Warrior • 93 
  OSPREY 
  PUBLISHING 
  German Infantryman (3) 
  Eastern Front 1943-45 
  David Westwood • Illustrated by Elizabeth Sharp 
  
  First published in Great Britain in 2005 by Osprey Publishing, Midland House, 
  West Way, Botley, Oxford 0X2 OPH, United Kingdom. 
  Email: info@ospreypublishing.com 
  Osprey Publishing Inc., 443 Park Avenue South, Suite 806, New York City, NY 
  10016, USA. 
  © 2005 Osprey Publishing Ltd. 
  All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, 
  research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and 
  Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
  retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, 
  electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, 
  without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be 
  addressed to the Publishers. 
  A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. 
  ISBN 1 84176 780 8 
  Editor: Christopher McNab 
  Design: Ken Vail Graphic Design, Cambridge, UK 
  Index by Alan Thatcher 
  Maps by MLRS Books Ltd 
  Originated by The Electronic Page Company, Cwmbran, UK 
  Printed in China through World Print Ltd. 
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  Artist's note 
  Readers may care to note that the original paintings from 
  which the colour plates in this book were prepared are 
  available for private sale. All reproduction copyright 
  whatsoever is retained by the Publishers. All enquiries 
  should be addressed to: 
  Elizabeth Sharp, 
  Stanton Graphics, 
  Stanton Court, 
  Denton, 
  Near Grantham, 
  Lincolnshire NG32 1JT 
  UK 
  stangraph@aol.com 
  The Publishers regret that they can enter into no 
  correspondence upon this matter. 
  Author's Dedication 
  In memory of the late Dr David G. Chandler, formerly Head 
  of the Department of War Studies, R.M.A. Sandhurst. 
  
  CONTENTS 
  INTRODUCTION 
  4 
  ANTI-PARTISAN WARFARE 
  5 
  Attack on a partisan headquarters (June 1943) 
  WINTER COMBAT 
  12 
  TACTICAL DEFENCE 
  15 
  An armoured forces task force seizes two vital bridges (August 1944) 
  FIGHTING IN TAIGA AND TUNDRA 
  27 
  German raid on a Russian strongpoint in northern Finland (February 1944) 
  German withdrawal through the taiga (September 1944) • The Swamp Bridgehead (June 1944) 
  THE BATTLE FOR GERMANY 
  54 
  The Oder Crossings • Fighting in Berlin 
  BIBLIOGRAPHY 
  60 
  COLOUR PLATE COMMENTARY 
  61 
  INDEX 
  64 
  
  GERMAN INFANTRYMAN (3) 
  EASTERN FRONT 1943-45 
  INTRODUCTION 
  the spring of 1943, German forces were no longer the undisputed 
  masters of the battlefield. In North Africa they were being pushed 
  back into an enclave in Tunisia, facing defeat by the combined Allied 
  forces, and in Russia they were on the back foot after Stalingrad. The 
  battle of Stalingrad had been a resounding defeat for both the German 
  6 Army, which had been surrounded and subsequently surrendered, and 
  for the German General Staff, which had seen the tide of war reversed, 
  with the Russians beginning an offensive in November 1942 which was 
  to end in Berlin in May 1945. 
  However, the quality of the German soldier was to have a significant 
  effect on the Russian front. The fighting qualities which were so obvious 
  in the advance and in Blitzkrieg were to be equally valuable in the fighting 
  retreat which the Germans conducted over the whole of the eastern front 
  in the two years it took the Russians to reach the German capital. 
  Basic training in Germany always emphasised the need for rehearsal 
  and practice, and although the training period was shortened as the 
  situation grew worse, the German soldier proved himself adept at 
  fighting the interminably long rearguard action. In Germany efforts were 
  continually being made to try to stem the Russian advance, but the sheer 
  size of the Russian Army and its never-ending reserves of manpower, 
  coupled with its growing expertise, made the final result inevitable. 
  Improved weaponry was seen by the 
  Germans as one way of making up for the 
  manpower shortages becoming increasingly 
  apparent in the German Army. The MG42 
  machine gun was a great improvement on the 
  MG34, having far fewer stoppages due to dust 
  and dirt, and in the winter the use of sunflower 
  oil also reduced the freezing-up of this and 
  other weapons. A significant step forward was 
  also made in rifle technology: the appearance 
  of Russian semi-automatic and self-loading 
  rifles resulted in experiments which eventually 
  produced the MP44. This rifle (see colour 
  plates and commentaries) fired a practical 
  battlefield round, was semi-automatic, and had 
  a 30-round magazine. Unfortunately for the 
  average Landser, issue was more often than not 
  to the Waffen-SS troops rather than to line 
  infantry, and the Kar 98k was still the standard 
  rifle for most infantrymen. 
  Leave on the eastern front was 
  welcomed, and the Germans 
  tried to ensure a reasonable 
  rotation system. These men are 
  on their way out, as is shown by 
  the smiles on their faces. All 
  soldiers travelled with weapons 
  to assist in guarding their leave 
  transport against partisan attack. 
  The journey was long, and those 
  on leave often spent more time 
  travelling than at their 
  destinations. 
  
  Support weapons were little modified 
  in themselves, but some units benefited 
  from the development of the assault gun 
  {Sturmgeschutz), tracked guns which were 
  sometimes also armoured. These guns 
  were issued as a substitute for the more 
  complicated tanks, and as support 
  artillery they were of great value in the 
  field. Some versions were fitted with 
  anti-tank guns - such weapons were 
  singularly useful against the mass tank 
  attacks of the Russians, as long as they 
  were supported by infantry. 
  Air support steadily waned for the 
  Germans, and the sight of large 
  numbers of Luftwaffe aircraft opening 
  an attack were only a memory in 1943, 
  1944 and 1945. Most aircraft were 
  either defending Germany against the 
  increasing strength of the Allied air 
  offensive, or, on the eastern front, suffering from spares or fuel 
  shortages. Russian ground-attack aircraft were far more in evidence. 
  The Russians had surprised the Germans initially by their total lack 
  of coordination in defence; by the spring of 1943 another Russian Army 
  had appeared, one which was hell-bent on recovering the land taken by 
  the Germans in such brutal fashion, and with few qualms about the way 
  it achieved that objective. The appalling German racial attitude towards 
  the Russians was about to reap its harvest, and ordinary Russians and 
  troops left behind during the German advance led to increasing 
  numbers of partisans, whose combat methods were unforgiving. 
  Partisan warfare during the Russian campaign was vicious, with 
  neither side giving any quarter. Needless to say, the Russians learned 
  quickly from early failures, and soon the Germans were faced with a 
  rear-area security problem which grew until they were waging war not 
  only on their front-line but also in their lines of communication at the 
  rear. Nowhere seemed safe. The war in Africa was, in direct contrast, a 
  war between soldiers alone; in Russia it seemed to every German that he 
  had to fight the Russian Army, the Russian people, the Russian weather, 
  never-endingly. 
  The tactical examples chosen for this book all exhibit the various 
  characteristics of the fighting from 1943 to 1945, and the small-unit 
  tactics that evolved. The fighting retreat was nothing new, but to carry 
  out such a retreat for over two years was quite remarkable; that it 
  happened was due to a very great extent to the fighting qualities of 
  German infantry who fought until they could fight no more. 
  Rest and relaxation were almost 
  as rare as leave on the eastern 
  front. Here a section takes some 
  time off in front of their section 
  dugout. This is a well-made 
  home, with overhead protection 
  against shell and bomb attack, 
  but it has yet to be finished with 
  even more earth overhead. 
  Personal laundry is on the table 
  in the foreground, together with 
  a practical scrubbing brush. 
  ANTI-PARTISAN WARFARE 
  German reports noted that: 'Partisan operations do not conform to any 
  hard and fast tactical doctrine or principles that have general 
  applicability. The partisan fighter is unpredictable and unscrupulous. His 
  
  Russian prisoners. The man 
  in the centre is searching his 
  companion for head lice. Life 
  was not free of parasites for 
  either side. 
  weapons are usually simple in design 
  and limited in number. They achieve 
  deadly effectiveness in the hands of a 
  tough, crafty group of individuals who 
  operate almost entirely independent of 
  normal logistical support. Proficient in 
  camouflaging their activities, these men 
  spread a reign of terror over the civilian 
  population of their own country.' 
  Those German troops engaged in 
  anti-partisan warfare would concur with 
  the 'reign of terror' assessment. The 
  experience of fighting the partisans was 
  often horrific and exhausting, as this 
  German soldier's account testifies: 'We 
  tramped through scrub and bushes for 
  about two weeks, in water most of the 
  time. It was pointless to try and get our boots dry. We had sporadic 
  contacts with the partisans. One episode from that time upset me 
  terribly. The Russians had captured one of our reconnaissance patrols, 
  four men. Three of them were old hands and they quickly scampered off 
  and were gone, leaving an 18-year-old behind them dead on the ground. 
  I was only 19 myself at this time. The Russians had not only killed him 
  but absolutely massacred him. His whole brain hung out of his smashed 
  skull. We also went on night marches, hunting the partisans. Once, 
  when we came to a clearing, partisans suddenly jumped out of the wood 
  and started firing at us. We returned the fire, of course. But one of our 
  sergeants was hit in the neck and killed.' 
  The principal tactical lessons learned by the Germans in their first 
  encounters with partisans in Russia were, according to official documents: 
  1. Partisans give no quarter and it is therefore a mistake to 
  employ second rate or weak forces against them. If casualties 
  are to be held to a minimum and time is to be saved, the anti-
  partisan forces must be as strong as possible and equipped 
  with weapons, such as tanks and guns, that are not available to 
  the partisans. 
  2. In order to encircle partisan forces, a tight ring must be 
  thrown around the entire area. Russian partisans did not 
  continue a hopeless engagement, but attempted to disperse, 
  to disappear individually from a pocket, or, if necessary, to 
  break out, and reassemble in a previously designated area. If 
  partisan elements slip through a cordon too weakly manned, 
  they are certain to resume operations in another location after 
  a short while. 
  How these lessons were applied can be seen in a specific anti-partisan 
  operation conducted in June 1943. 
  Attack on a partisan headquarters (June 1943) 
  By early 1943 the partisans were directing their activities mainly against 
  the major railway lines used to move supplies from Germany to the 
  
  Russian front. Partisan attacks on moving trains and 
  extensive demolition of tracks, bridges and tunnels at 
  times almost halted traffic on the railway routes 
  Warsaw-Gomel-Bryansk and Minsk-Borisov-Smolensk. 
  German anti-partisan operations had developed a 
  definite pattern. As soon as the location of a partisan 
  force 
  became 
  known, 
  it 
  would 
  be 
  attacked 
  simultaneously from several sides. Dawn was the 
  preferred time for such raids. However, these tactics 
  were successful only if the partisans did not learn 
  beforehand of German intentions. After Stalingrad, the 
  partisans increased in numbers and improved their 
  organisation and intelligence system. More and more 
  frequently the Germans, when closing in on one of their 
  strongholds, would find no partisans at all. 
  Early in June 1943 the Germans 
  obtained 
  information that the partisan HQ planning the attacks 
  against the rail line in the Borisov sector had its 
  headquarters at Daliki, about 16km (10 miles) south 
  of Lepel. The partisan force at Daliki was no ordinary 
  group, but the nerve centre for a large partisan area 
  of operations with a well-organised system of 
  communication. It was unlikely that the Daliki staff 
  would not learn about a German advance from several 
  sides. The German commander in charge of the 
  Borisov district therefore decided to entrust the 
  destruction of the partisan headquarters to a 
  bicycle-mounted infantry battalion that had been 
  temporarily withdrawn from the front and made 
  available for anti-partisan operations. The reinforced battalion consisted 
  of four companies, a headquarters with attached signal platoon, and a 
  motorised supply column; 1, 2 and 3 Companies were equipped with 
  bicycles, 12 light machine guns, and six light mortars each; 4 Company, 
  the heavy weapons company, was motorised and had 12 heavy machine 
  guns and six 37mm anti-tank guns. 
  On 24 June Major Beer, the battalion commander, issued the 
  following order to his subordinates: 
  A corporal stands guard. Note 
  the map case on his left hip, 
  which suggests he is a traffic 
  guide as well. 
  1. The battalion will carry out an anti-partisan operation in the 
  Berezina Valley, 20 miles west of Lepel. 
  2. The battalion, less 3 Company, will move out at 0700 on 25 
  June and proceed toward Berezino. On the night of 25 June 
  battalion headquarters and the signal platoon will establish an 
  HQ at Wily; 1 Company will stop in Sloboda; 2 Company in 
  Gadsivlia; and 4 Company in Anoshki. 
  3. Billeting parties will precede the march columns. After the 
  units have arrived at their new quarters (about 1600), billeting 
  parties will report to the battalion command post in Wily at 
  1900 and proceed via Lepel to Berezino where they will obtain 
  billets for 26 June from the local commander. 
  4. At 0700 on 26 June the battalion will assemble just north of 
  Wily and proceed via Lepel to Berezino. 
  
  Two men using a light electric 
  chain saw. The equipment 
  weighed 50kg (111 lb), had a cut 
  of 1m (3ft 3in), and could cut 
  at a rate of 6.4m (21ft) per 
  minute. 
  The first day's march went according to 
  plan, and at 0700 on 26 June the battalion 
  crossed the initial point north of Wily and 
  drove on toward Lepel. At the first house 
  on the outskirts of Lepel the battalion 
  adjutant met the column, ordered a two-
  hour halt and an issue of rations, and 
  directed the company commanders to 
  report to battalion headquarters at the 
  northern edge of the town. 
  As the last company commander 
  arrived at the command post, Major Beer 
  stated bluntly: 'I want you to know right 
  now that I have played a trick on you. 
  Our battalion was never ordered to fight 
  the partisans in the Berezina Valley. That 
  was a fabrication on my part to hide our real objective: a raid on the 
  Borisov area partisan headquarters, reportedly located in Daliki.' 
  The company commanders were not too surprised. If the objective 
  had been stated in battalion orders, partisan agents would have informed 
  their headquarters in Daliki long before the Germans could have 
  reached the village. Beer continued: 'Let's look at the map. When I was 
  ordered to capture the partisan HQ, I tried to develop a plan that would 
  achieve surprise. In this situation I believed that to bring up my four 
  companies during the night and then attempt to break into Daliki from 
  four sides would be impractical. I am convinced that the partisans would 
  have learned of our movement. The distance from Borisov to Daliki 
  incidentally is about 30 miles and I am even more certain that they would 
  have found out about our assembly at night. We would have found Daliki 
  deserted. I would have liked to use a small motorised force of one or, at 
  most, two companies, moving at top speed from Borisov to Sloboda. 
  From there they could have turned right and driven along the cart road 
  to Daliki. The advance elements could have raced right into the centre 
  of Daliki, while the rear elements sealed off the village from the south 
  and east, toward the swamp area. That would have been a real surprise! 
  For such an operation, however, we would need cross country vehicles. 
  'The solution, therefore, was to simulate a normal march movement, 
  such as is frequently made from Borisov to Lepel, with the partisan centre 
  in Berezino as the obvious objective. In order to strengthen the 
  impression of a routine movement, I ordered the battalion to spend last 
  night at a stop over point on our march route directly opposite Daliki. 
  For the same reason I requisitioned billets in different villages in the 
  usual manner, whereupon the billeting parties were ordered to proceed 
  to Berezino. They are arranging for billets there right now, and not until 
  tonight will they know that their efforts were wasted. All these measures 
  are calculated to prevent the partisan leaders from becoming suspicious, 
  and to induce them to remain in Daliki. I am convinced that they were 
  informed last night that the battalion is moving into the Berezina Valley.' 
  Beer looked at his watch and said: 'It is now 0900. Rest your men 
  until 1100. Nothing must point to the fact that we have a different 
  objective. Until that time our objective continues to be Berezino. At 
  1100 the battalion will turn around and drive back over the same road 
  
  we followed this morning, maintaining the same order of march. The 
  three cart roads leading to Daliki will be assigned as follows: 
  1 Company will take the road from Wily through Svyaditsa, 
  2 Company will turn off at Sloboda, 
  and 4 Company will take the road from Gadsivlia. 
  Battalion headquarters will proceed with 4 Company. 
  There will be no intermediate halts, no reconnaissance. The common 
  objective is Daliki. 
  'I believe that the partisan leaders will try to escape into the swamps 
  south and east of the village. Therefore I have ordered 3 Company to 
  take up positions at the adjacent edge of the swamp at 1100. Yesterday, 
  as you know, this company remained in place when the battalion moved 
  out and in the afternoon 3 Company was loaded without its bicycles 
  onto six tarpaulin covered trucks and moved to Gorodok, where it 
  remained overnight. 3 Company is carrying only small arms such as 
  pistols, carbines, submachine guns, and rifles equipped with silencers. 
  Early this morning the Company left Gorodok for Lepel. About 11 miles 
  north of Anoshki, at a point where the forest borders the road, the 
  column stopped, allowing the personnel to detruck, whilst the empty 
  trucks were driven on through Lepel to Berezino. My orders to the 
  Company Commander were to stop for only 30 seconds and keep the 
  motors running.' 
  Beer spread an aerial photograph of the Daliki area on the table and 
  continued: 'Using this photograph as a map, 3 Company was ordered to 
  march by compass due east through the woods and moors, and, after 
  crossing the Essa River, to advance or rather wade into the swamp 
  southeast of Daliki. It will hide in the middle of the swamp. No patrols will 
  be sent out since the Company must remain unnoticed. At 1100, when the 
  battalion turns around, 3 Company will occupy time on the fringe of the 
  swamp facing Daliki and a portion of the forest just east of Ivan Bor. 
  However, when the other companies 
  enter Daliki, it will refrain 
  from 
  attacking, its mission being to capture 
  the partisan leaders when they try to 
  escape. Everything else is secondary. 
  'I would gladly have spared 3 
  Company the march through the wet 
  forest and moors, the crossing of the 
  Essa, and the stay in the swamp, where 
  they will be half devoured by insects. 
  There is a cart road running north 
  toward Liski about 5 miles east of the 
  Borisov-Lepel road, but I believe that 
  this cart road is used as a route of 
  communication between the partisan 
  headquarters and its subordinate units 
  in the forest around Borisov. I have no 
  doubt that an advance along this road 
  would have been reported immediately 
  to partisan headquarters. That is why I 
  ordered 3 Company to take the more 
  difficult route. 
  A captured Russian 76.2mm gun 
  pressed into German service 
  in 1944. The gun was used for 
  anti-tank work, and renamed the 
  7.62cm Feldkanone 288 (r). It 
  weighed 1,120kg (2,468lb) in 
  action, fired a 6.21kg (141b) shell 
  at a muzzle velocity of 680mps 
  (2,230fps), and had a range 
  of 13,000m (42,650ft). 
  
  German infantry in a Russian 
  house. Whenever possible 
  soldiers occupied civilian 
  houses, barns, outbuildings and 
  factories for comfort as well as 
  protection. This was particularly 
  important in the bad-weather 
  months. This trio of men is 
  resting in the evening. 
  'In my estimate, we shall encounter our first resistance at the farm 
  houses in Liski, Podrussy, Pospach, and Ivan Bor, which form a 
  semicircle around Daliki. I am certain that an important partisan 
  headquarters such as this one would not depend solely on close-in 
  security. Any resistance encountered at these farms must be crushed 
  without delay, and for this purpose 4 Company will detach two anti tank 
  guns each to both 1 and 2 Companies. At 1200, gentlemen, I want to see 
  you and your companies enter Daliki. Are there any questions?' 
  After asking a few questions the company commanders returned to 
  their respective units in order to brief their platoon leaders. At 1100 the 
  battalion turned around and retraced its route of three hours earlier. 
  At Wily, 1 Company turned off and proceeded through Svyaditsa. 
  The leading elements were almost in Pospach when a machine gun 
  opened fire from there, forcing them to take cover. As the company 
  anti-tank guns were being brought up, a second machine gun in 
  Pospach opened fire. While one platoon, together with the anti-tank 
  guns, delivered frontal fire on the partisan machine guns, the two other 
  platoons moved through the woods just east of the village in order to 
  envelop it from the rear. Despite the Germans' attempts at 
  encirclement, the partisans managed to get out, but most of them were 
  cut down as they fled across the open country toward Ivan Bor. 
  It was close to 1300 when 1 Company resumed its advance; 2 
  Company, too, was delayed by resistance in Podrussy and 4 Company was 
  the only one to enter Daliki according to plan. The platoon of 3 
  Company nearest Ivan Bor became heavily engaged with the partisans 
  withdrawing from that village. Meanwhile, 1 Company pushed on, but 
  before reaching Daliki it received an order to turn off toward Ivan Bor 
  and to take it from the west. The company used its entire firepower 
  including 12 machine guns, six mortars, 
  and two anti-tank guns, but the partisans 
  in Ivan Bor held out to the last man, 
  very few having been able to get away. It 
  was subsequently learned that when the 
  Germans attacked Pospach, about 20 
  members of the partisan HQ withdrew 
  southward from Daliki and ran up 
  against some 3 Company men hiding at 
  the edge of the swamp. When asked to 
  surrender, the partisans opened fire 
  with their submachine guns, and in the 
  ensuing hand-to-hand 
  fighting 
  the 
  entire group was killed. 
  An attack against the headquarters 
  of a partisan force was always hazardous 
  because a headquarters had a more 
  extensive intelligence system, including 
  closer contact with the local populace, 
  than the ordinary partisan group. If a 
  large force was assembled for an attack 
  on a headquarters, it could be expected 
  that the partisans would learn about the 
  impending operation and would avoid 
  
  Map 50 
  Attack on Partisan HQ in 
  Lepel-Borisov Area 
  (24 - 26 Jun 1943) 
  Attack on a partisan HQ in the 
  Lepel Borisov area. 
  an encounter by timely withdrawal. If the unit to carry out the attack was 
  small, its approach might remain unnoticed. However, it would lack the 
  strength to overcome even the partisan security and covering 
  detachments, and would furthermore be unable to seal off the area to 
  prevent the escape of the leaders. If the leaders of a partisan force were 
  able to escape, the operation would be considered a failure, even if all 
  the other personnel were captured or killed. 
  A possible solution was sometimes found in the employment of a 
  flexible force organised for swift and effective action. Such a force needed 
  vehicles that could move rapidly over long distances and across difficult 
  country. It had to have self-propelled guns and sufficient machine guns to 
  knock out security and covering forces, and an assault echelon to raid the 
  headquarters proper and seize the personnel. The force also required 
  armoured vehicles, flame-throwers, mortars and ground-support aircraft, 
  and, finally, enough troops to seal off possible escape routes. 
  In many areas, the countryside of European Russia was not suitable 
  for motor vehicles and self-propelled guns. The attack on the partisan 
  
  headquarters described above occurred in a sector where forests, 
  swamps and waterways denied the movement of strong forces. In 
  general, partisans preferred to rely on natural country obstacles that 
  could not be surmounted at any season of the year, rather than on 
  customary military security measures. 
  WINTER COMBAT 
  After they had liquidated the Stalingrad pocket, the Russians launched 
  a powerful counter-offensive which quickly carried them westward. At 
  the beginning of February 1943 Soviet tanks took Slavyansk against 
  virtually no German opposition, since the entire sector had been 
  stripped of German troops except for a few service units. In an effort to 
  stem the tide XL Panzer Corps, including two Panzer and one infantry 
  divisions, was moved up from the south and ordered to drive the 
  Russians back across the Donets River. 
  The German soldiers would not only face the Russian onslaught, but 
  also the typical Russian winter weather which prevailed in the 
  Konstantinovka area south of Slavyansk. Blankets of deep snow covered 
  road and countryside alike, and the temperature reached a low of -45°C 
  (-49°F) at night. Such conditions alone were enough to tax the 
  fortitude and hardiness of even the fittest German soldier. 
  The 679 Regiment, 333 Infantry Division, forming part of the XL 
  Panzer Corps, had not seen previous combat in Russia. Upon detraining 
  at the railhead in Konstantinovka at 0400 on 12 February, the soldiers of 
  III Battalion received orders to launch an immediate attack toward 
  Kramatorskaya. The troops assembled, and the forward elements started 
  to move out without delay. At 0800, after having advanced barely a mile 
  east of the Torets River, the German advanced guard ran straight into an 
  oncoming Russian tank force. After a brief clash the unfortunate 
  German detachment was annihilated and the advance party routed. 
  Tank vs infantry combat was a truly unnerving experience, even for 
  veteran soldiers. The former eastern front infantryman Gunter 
  Koschorrek has left a striking account of what it was like to face a 
  Russian T34 attack at close range: 
  The famous 'eighty-eight'. This 
  version is the Flak 36 model 
  designed for anti-aircraft work, 
  but used as an anti-tank weapon 
  from 1940 onwards. It was 
  capable of knocking out all Allied 
  tanks at ranges up to 2,700m 
  (8,858ft) with its muzzle velocity 
  of 980mps (3,815fps) when firing 
  an AP shell. The rings on the 
  barrel indicate the number of 
  kills the gun has made. It is 
  mounted on the four-wheel 
  Sonderanhanger 201. 
  
  'A harsh metallic shot, and a 
  tank shell explodes exactly 
  where my machine gun once 
  stood. Frozen dirt and hot 
  splinters rain down over my 
  head. There is a loud ringing 
  in my ears and it feels as if my 
  eardrum 
  has 
  just 
  been 
  perforated. The acrid powder 
  is sucked into my nose and fills 
  my lungs. But I live, and so 
  does Swina - I can hear his 
  convulsive coughing behind 
  me. And there it is again - the 
  rattle and the roaring as steel 
  tank tracks grind squealing on 
  their rollers. A deathly noise! I 
  press myself like a worm on to the ground. In the trench 
  everything goes dark: the steel monster is parked directly on top 
  of me, blocking out the daylight. Now the sharp steel tracks are 
  tearing up the edge of the trench. Frozen blocks of dirt fall on to 
  my back and half cover me. Will the monster bury me alive? I 
  remember soldiers telling me that tanks have turned on top of 
  trenches until the men below could no longer move and 
  suffocated in the dirt. A hell of a way to die!' 
  For the main body of III Battalion, which was just then moving out of 
  Konstantinovka, the sudden turn of events caused them to waver. The 
  regimental commander realised that he had to act immediately. The 
  overall situation was none too favourable since II Battalion was not due 
  to arrive for 12 hours and I Battalion would take at least another 24 
  hours. When 
  the 
  regimental 
  commander 
  discovered 
  that 
  a 
  self-propelled gun was undergoing repairs in Konstantinovka, he 
  immediately commandeered 
  it. Realising that the danger 
  of 
  encountering enemy tanks was greatest east of the Torets, he chose the 
  road running along the west bank as the new axis of advance. 
  The regimental and battalion commanders mounted the assault gun 
  and proceeded to lead the advance northward. The men were 
  heartened by the sight of their two commanders speeding northward 
  along the new route without encountering enemy opposition. They 
  quickly regained confidence and, falling in behind their leaders, moved 
  forward with new courage. Against light enemy resistance the soldiers 
  fought their way to Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka, and during the night II 
  Battalion, newly arrived, closed up and moved into the same town. 
  On 13 February, as a result of this experience, the regimental 
  commander decided to use II Battalion as the lead element in order to 
  condition the men to combat in Russia. In an effort to simulate greater 
  strength, all motorised vehicles were ordered to follow the lead battalion 
  in plain view of the enemy. This deception could be used only because 
  enemy interference from the air was not expected. Toward evening II 
  Battalion arrived at Krasnotorka without major incident. During the 
  night, however, the unfortunate soldiers suffered heavy casualties from 
  An interesting photograph of the 
  2cm Flak 38 mounted for ground 
  operations. The 2cm AP/HE round 
  weighed 330gms (12oz) and 
  had a muzzle velocity of 830mps 
  (2,720fps), and the 300gm (10oz) 
  HE round a muzzle velocity of 
  900mps (2,950fps). It was a widely 
  used weapon, although most 
  were vehicle-mounted. It was 
  particularly effective against 
  infantry and soft-skinned vehicles. 
  
  A German field ambulance. 
  frostbite when the battalion commander, who was unfamiliar with the 
  severe Russian winter weather, ordered sentries to be posted in the open 
  outside the village. The deception, however, had been successful, 
  judging by an intercepted Russian radio message in which the enemy 
  command was warned that strong German motorised formations were 
  advancing toward Kramatorskaya. 
  The regimental commander moved I Battalion, the last one to arrive, 
  to Toretskiy with orders to capture Krasnotorka the next day. At dawn 
  the men of I Battalion crossed the river, passed through Druzhkovka, 
  and moved into a hollow about 3km (2 miles) south of Krasnotorka. The 
  cross-country march in deep snow was exhausting because the 
  motorised equipment constantly bogged down and had to be pulled out 
  by recovery vehicles. Nevertheless, the battalion arrived in its jump-off 
  position by 1000. 
  The situation facing the battalion commander was exasperating. 
  Ahead of him lay strongly defended Krasnotorka, from where a few 
  enemy tanks were firing in his direction. Between him and his objective 
  loomed a vast expanse of snow that was more than lm (3ft) deep. 
  Despite promised support from a medium artillery battery, a direct 
  frontal assault on the town was bound to fail and involve heavy 
  casualties. From a long way off the Russians could observe the individual 
  German soldiers inching their way forward, their silhouettes clearly 
  outlined against the white background, and could pick them off at will. 
  Although the regimental commander shared his apprehensions, he 
  knew that the attack had to be launched and Krasnotorka had to be 
  taken: 'The only landmark that broke the monotony of the flat 
  landscape was a high, snow-covered fence extending for about two miles 
  along the right side of the road from the turn to the village. This fence, 
  which actually looked more like a wall of snow, might conceal the troops 
  while they worked their way toward the objective in single file, hugging 
  the fence until they reached Krasnotorka. Although far from an ideal 
  solution to the problem of carrying out a frontal assault on the village, 
  this plan was the only apparent way out.' To deceive the Russian garrison 
  and divert its attention, one company was to be echeloned in depth and 
  advance on Krasnotorka on a wide front on the left side of the road. 
  While this company was launching its diversionary attack, the rest of 
  the battalion's soldiers crept to within 500m (1,600ft) of the objective. 
  
  The Russians fell for this ruse and concentrated the fire of 
  their multi-barrelled rocket launchers, self-propelled guns 
  and mortars on these men, who were promptly pinned down. 
  Meanwhile, 'the main assault force continued its advance 
  along the snow fence, infiltrated Krasnotorka, and seized it, in 
  short order. Because of the deep snow, the battalion took two 
  hours to cover the two miles along the fence. The Russians 
  were taken completely by surprise and beat a hasty retreat to 
  Krainatorskaya. A few days later the regiment, committed as a 
  unit for the first time, followed up this initial success by seizing 
  Slavyansk after overcoming stiff Russian resistance.' 
  TACTICAL DEFENCE 
  Initially German tactics during the long withdrawal still 
  emphasised the need for counter-attack as soon as an enemy 
  attack took place. However, many officers soon came to 
  realise that these counter-attacks involved great human cost 
  which was depleting the army, for which fewer and fewer 
  replacements were available. For this reason the fighting 
  retreat was modified so that when the enemy attacked, German troops 
  would withdraw to a rearward prepared defensive position as soon as the 
  first position was in danger of being destroyed. The Germans continued 
  to attack to recover important lost ground, but as the war went on 
  German forces became starved of men - both experienced and 
  replacement troops - and attacks were frequently less forcefully carried 
  out than during the advances of the first two years on the eastern front. 
  A typical prepared battalion defensive position would locate all 
  infantry units behind frontal minefields. Battalion mortars and any 
  short-range infantry guns supported the infantry positions and 
  anti-tank weapons were placed about 1,000m (3,280ft) to the rear, 
  where they were able to shoot enemy tanks but were not immediately 
  A German 8cm Granatwerfer 
  34 in the typical circular trench, 
  which allowed for all-round 
  training and firing. Three 
  ammunition boxes stand 
  in the background. 
  A good view of an MG42 on its 
  tripod, set up for fixed-line firing at 
  night. The ammunition box resting 
  on the back pad in front of the gun 
  is to improve stability, as the gun 
  was prone to vibrate heavily. 
  
  Prepared Battalion defensive position 
  vulnerable to attack. Lanes through the minefields allowed patrols and 
  wire-maintenance parties to operate safely. The rapidity of Russian 
  advances made such positions luxuries, however, and the Germans were 
  often unable to form stop lines except at natural obstacles, particularly 
  rivers. The Russians had learned their basic tactics from the earlier 
  German successes, and with ever-increasing manpower available, plus 
  numerically superior armour and artillery, were now able to give the 
  Germans their lesson back. 
  Defensive positions were arranged in depth, with the strength 
  concentrated where the main enemy attack would take place. Advanced 
  and outpost positions were put out from around 6,500m (21,300ft) in 
  front of the main fighting line (Hauptkampflinie). The Germans aimed 
  to stop the enemy as far out as possible, or to direct his attack towards 
  points of their own choosing. Artillery fire always covered the advanced 
  and outpost positions. 
  From late 1943 onwards, German defence became more passive, as 
  the Wehrmacht began to lack the mobility and reserves they had had 
  previously. The Waffen-SS was kept up to strength whenever possible, but 
  many infantry battalions and regiments were always short of men - both 
  the older, experienced men, and new replacements for the dead, 
  wounded and captured, whose numbers mounted alarmingly. 
  A prepared battalion defensive 
  position, showing its 
  considerable minefield 
  protection. 
  
  Protected by the outpost and advanced 
  positions, the main defence line was, if possible, 
  constructed to give individual strongpoints linked 
  to provide a belt. The strongpoints were built to 
  give all-round defence, and surrounded by wire 
  and minefields. Heavy weapon support consisted 
  of machine guns, mortars and, when possible, 
  infantry guns and anti-tank weapons. The new 
  Panzerfaust was invaluable for giving the German 
  infantryman close-range anti-tank capability. 
  The Germans sited their main 
  defence 
  positions on reverse slopes wherever possible, 
  avoiding detection by the enemy and making the 
  positions more difficult to observe by artillery 
  spotters. If there was time, woods were fortified, 
  but the speed of the Russian advance often made 
  such luxuries impossible. The narrower rivers and 
  streams were defended on the enemy side, and 
  the waterway used as an anti-tank ditch. Wider 
  rivers were defended on both sides where there 
  was a crossing point to allow withdrawal of 
  German troops as the enemy attack developed. 
  In the face of the growing number of Russian 
  tanks, the German soldiers created obstacles to 
  funnel the enemy into lanes protected by 
  anti-tank guns and on to minefields. The main 
  anti-tank ditches were sited between the front-line 
  trenches and the anti-tank gun positions, allowing 
  tanks to penetrate the front-line, only to be destroyed by the anti-tank 
  defences. Infantry accompanying the tanks were destroyed by the 
  machine guns and rifles of the front-line defenders, and by artillery 
  support from the rear. Minefields were concentrated within the 
  defensive positions in the front-line, with only a few scattered mines to 
  the front of those positions. Experience had taught the Germans that 
  Russian artillery fire could easily create safe lanes through minefields. 
  Towns and villages were regarded as excellent strongpoints by the 
  Germans, especially where the buildings were built of stone or good brick. 
  Towns offered especially good anti-tank defences, due to the problems of 
  coordinating attacks in built-up areas and the ease with which tanks could 
  be attacked at close quarters, especially with the Panzerfaust. The edges of 
  the built-up area were lightly defended; the main resistance was 
  concentrated further in. This made artillery support for an attack more 
  difficult to observe and control, and meant that the attackers would be 
  funnelled along roads to points the Germans chose to defend. 
  As the enemy penetrated further in, pockets of Germans would 
  create small centres of resistance to slow down the rate of advance, and 
  provide flanking fire on the attackers. Every attempt was made to trap 
  the attacker in culs-de-sac, and to attack with a mobile German reserve 
  held within the built-up area for that purpose. Larger reserves were held 
  outside the town. 
  The German soldier had, by 1944, learnt the skills of urban combat. 
  Booby traps were laid in both defended and unoccupied buildings; doors 
  Another section position, well 
  dug in with overhead cover, this 
  time of thick concrete blocks. 
  
  A captured Russian Maxim 
  water-cooled machine gun. The 
  weapon was far too heavy and 
  awkward to handle for the 
  Germans to he interested in 
  using it, especially in comparison 
  with the MG42. 
  were blocked and windows filled with sand bags or bricks; 'mouseholes' 
  were established in rows of houses so that the Germans could move 
  internally, away from enemy fire and observation. Firing took place from 
  the centre of rooms, not from the windows, so that muzzle flashes were 
  well concealed from the enemy outside; after firing the Germans 
  frequently moved to another room or even another storey of the building 
  they were defending. Even the cellars were defended, with the lessons 
  learned in Stalingrad being part of German doctrine thereafter. 
  Villages were defended as an entity: the village (if large) would have 
  an inner defensive position surrounded by the outer defensive positions. 
  The same aim was apparent: funnel the enemy into the killing zone in 
  the centre, and harass his advance whilst he was moving through the 
  outskirts. Tanks were regarded as ineffective in built-up areas, but when 
  they were destroyed the Germans made sure that they could not be used 
  by the Russians as observation posts or rendezvous points. 
  Although the Germans had spent the first two years of the campaign 
  in Russia advancing, they had an effective system for withdrawal. The 
  German troops would withdraw if there was no prospect of success in the 
  battle, and particularly if they were in imminent danger of defeat. 
  Careful planning was needed to break off an engagement, and to retire 
  to rearward defensive positions. The Germans were adept at 
  withdrawing troops securely, with all units completing a phased, 
  planned withdrawal to the surprise of the enemy. 
  However, the German retreat on the eastern front was often the 
  result of far superior numbers of Russians attacking; furthermore the 
  Russians developed their own form of the war of movement, and were 
  very successful in pushing the Germans back. Russian guns, tanks and 
  infantry worked together extremely efficiently, with the tanks 
  penetrating the German line and flooding towards the rear areas; 
  following them were the infantry, who mopped-up German defences as 
  they were met (or merely bypassed them). The attack was always 
  supported by ever-increasing artillery firepower, from the outset to the 
  limit of the tank advance and beyond. The Germans were 
  understandably respectful of the Russian artillery, which made their lives 
  
  This rest area is the result of 
  homesickness, with its wooden 
  bank of seats and the flowers 
  in the foreground. However, it 
  has a military purpose as well, 
  for beneath the bench is the 
  entrance to the covered bunker 
  on the right of the picture. 
  Unfortunately nothing is known 
  of the purpose of the bunker, but 
  it may well be a headquarters. 
  hell, as one German soldier who fought at Kursk recounted: 'first came 
  a dreadful barrage. I knew in advance what it was going to be like, 
  because my father, who had been injured at Verdun in the First World 
  War, described it to me. He knew what it was like to be at the mercy of 
  the big guns - and in 1943 the Russians had many big guns. My father 
  said that he had had to jump into shell holes. The ground looked as if 
  it had been ploughed up. It was the same for us in Russia. You saw on 
  the left or the right of you that there was a new shell crater, so you 
  jumped into that one and then the next one. This went on for three 
  hours before the actual fighting began.' 
  An armoured forces task force seizes two vital bridges 
  (August 1944) 
  The Germans became aware quite soon during the war in the east that 
  tank-infantry cooperation was vital to any success, and in those isolated 
  instances in which German armoured forces units were at full strength, 
  they were still able to attain local successes, even in the summer of 1944. 
  During the nights of 13 and 14 August 1944, the infantrymen of 3 
  Panzer Division detrained at Kielce in southern Poland. Their mission 
  was to stop the advance of Russian forces that had broken through the 
  German lines during the collapse of Army Group Centre and to assist 
  the withdrawing German formations in building up a new defence line 
  near the upper Vistula. 
  In order to allow all units of the division the time needed to prepare 
  for their next commitment, and at the same time secure the route of 
  advance, the division commander decided to form an armoured forces 
  task force from the units that had detrained first. The force was to be led 
  by the commander of II Tank Battalion and was to consist of 5 and 6 
  Tank Companies, equipped with Panther tanks, one armoured infantry 
  company mounted in armoured personnel carriers, and one artillery 
  battery equipped with self-propelled 105mm howitzers. The task force 
  was to launch a surprise attack on Village Z, situated approximately 
  48km (30 miles) east of Kielce, and seize the bridges south and east of 
  the village in order to permit the main body of the division to advance 
  along the Kielce-Opatow road toward the Vistula. 
  The attack was to be launched at dawn on 16 August. According to air 
  reconnaissance information obtained at 1800 on 15 August, Village Z was 
  
  A knocked out T34 tank. The 
  vehicle has been hit on the far 
  side and subsequently 'brewed 
  up', as the deposits in front of 
  the turret show. The T34 tank 
  turned the fortunes of the 
  Russians around, and was highly 
  mobile and very effective against 
  the German Mk III and Mk IV 
  tanks. 
  held by relatively weak Russian forces and no major troop movements 
  were observed in the area. The only German unit stationed in the area 
  between Kielce and Village Z was 188 Infantry Regiment, which occupied 
  the high ground east of River A and whose HQ was in Village X. 
  The country was hilly. Fields planted with grain, potatoes and root 
  crops were interspersed with patches of forest. The weather was sunny 
  and dry, with high daytime temperatures and cool moonlit nights. The 
  hours of sunrise and sunset were 0445 and 1930, respectively. 
  The task force commander received his orders at 2000 on 15 August 
  and immediately began to study the plan of attack. Since the units that 
  were to participate in the operation had not yet been alerted, the entire 
  task force could not possibly be ready to move out before 2300. The 
  maximum speed at which his force could drive over a dusty dirt road 
  without headlights was 10km/h (6mph). The approach march to Village 
  Z would therefore require a minimum of five hours. Taking into account 
  the time needed for refuelling and deploying his units, the commander 
  arrived at the conclusion that the attack could not be launched before 
  dawn. Since the operation might thus be deprived of the element of 
  surprise, he decided to employ an advance guard that was to move out 
  one hour earlier than the bulk of his force, reach Village X by 0200 at 
  the latest, and cover the remaining 15km (9 miles) in 11/2 hours. After 
  a short halt the advance guard could launch the attack on Village Z just 
  before dawn. 
  At 2020 the task force commander assembled the commanders of the 
  participating units at his HQ and issued the following verbal orders: 
  6 Company, 6 Tank Regiment, reinforced by one platoon of 
  armoured infantry, will form an advance guard that will be ready 
  to move out at 2200 in order to seize Village Z and the two bridges 
  across River B by a coup de main. A reconnaissance detachment 
  
  will guide the advance guard to Village X. Two trucks loaded with 
  fuel will be taken along for refuelling, which is scheduled to take 
  place in the woods two miles west of Village Z. 
  The main body of the task force will follow the advance guard 
  at 2300 and form a march column in the following order: 
  2 Tank Battalion Headquarters, 
  5 Company of 6 Tank Regiment, 
  A Battery of 75 Artillery Regiment, 
  and 1 Company of the 3 Armoured Infantry Regiment (less 
  one platoon). 
  After crossing River A, the tank company will take the lead, 
  followed by battalion headquarters, the armoured infantry 
  company, and the artillery battery in that order. 
  The task force will halt and refuel in the woods two miles west 
  of Village Z. Radio silence will be lifted after River A has been 
  crossed. 
  The commander of 6 Company will leave at 2100 and 
  accompany me to the HQ of 188 Infantry Regiment and establish 
  contact with that unit. 5 Company's commander will take charge 
  of the march column from Kielce to Village X. 
  Upon receiving these instructions the commander of 6 Company, 
  Lieutenant Zobel, returned to his unit, assembled the platoon leaders, 
  the company sergeant major, and the maintenance section commander 
  and briefed them. He indicated the march route, which they entered on 
  their maps. For the march from Kielce to Village X, the headquarters 
  section was to drive at the head of the column, followed by the four tank 
  platoons, the armoured forces infantry platoon, the fuel trucks, and the 
  rations and maintenance sections. The senior platoon commander was 
  to be in charge of the column until Zobel joined it in Village X. Hot 
  coffee was to be served half an hour before the time of departure, which 
  was scheduled for 2200. The reconnaissance detachment was to move 
  out at 2130 and post guides along the 
  road to Village X. 
  After issuing these instructions to his 
  subordinates, Zobel rejoined the task 
  force commander, with whom he drove to 
  Village X. When they arrived at the HQ of 
  188 Infantry Regiment, they were given 
  detailed information on the situation. 
  They learned that, after heavy fighting in 
  the Opatow region, the regiment had 
  withdrawn to its present positions during 
  the night of 14-15 August. Attempts to 
  establish a continuous line in conjunction 
  with other units withdrawing westward 
  from the upper Vistula were under way. 
  The Russians had so far not advanced 
  beyond Village Z. Two Polish civilians who 
  had been seized in the woods west of the 
  village had stated that no Russians were to 
  be seen in that forest. 
  A corduroy road made of small 
  tree trunks, absolutely vital in 
  keeping transport moving to and 
  from the front. The detail in this 
  photograph shows a road junction 
  and a horse-drawn trailer, suitably 
  camouflaged in the wider passing 
  place on the right. 
  
  German route 
  German positions 
  ABOVE German counter-attack 
  The task force commander thereupon ordered Zobel to carry out 
  in southern Poland. 
  the plan of attack as instructed. Zobel awaited the arrival of the advance 
  guard at the western outskirts of Village X. When the column pulled in 
  at 0145, Zobel assumed command and reformed the march column with 
  1 Tank Platoon in the lead, followed by the headquarters section, 2 and 
  3 Tank Platoons, the armoured infantry platoon, the wheeled elements, 
  and 4 Tank Platoon. 
  A guide from 188 Infantry Regiment rode on the lead tank of 1 
  Platoon until it reached the outpost area beyond River A. The column 
  arrived at the German outpost at 0230. The sentry reported that he had 
  RIGHT The entrance to a 
  company battle headquarters. 
  From this position the company 
  commander could control his 
  men and be protected from shell 
  and bomb. The unit is 2 Company 
  of 34 Fusilier Regiment, which 
  was part of 35 Infantry Division. 
  The unit was retreating towards 
  Danzig when this photograph 
  was taken. 
  German counterattack in southern Poland 
  (16 Aug 1944) 
  ABOVE German counter-attack 
  in southern Poland. 
  
  not observed any Russian movements during the 
  night. Zobel radioed the task force commander 
  that he was going into action. 
  To permit better observation, the tanks drove 
  with open hatches. The tank commanders stood 
  erect with their heads emerging from the cupolas, 
  listening with a headset. The other tank hatches 
  were buttoned up. Gunners and loaders stood by 
  to open fire at a moment's notice. In anticipation 
  of an encounter with Russian tanks the guns were 
  loaded with armour-piercing shells. 
  At 0845 the advance guard reached the 
  wooded area in which it was to halt and refuel. 
  The tanks formed two rows, one on each side of 
  the road, while armoured forces infantrymen 
  provided security to the east and west of the 
  halted column. Sentries were posted at 50m 
  (164ft) intervals in the forest north and south of 
  the road. Trucks loaded with fuel cans drove 
  along the road between the two rows of tanks, 
  stopping at each pair of tanks to unload the full 
  cans and picking up the empties on their return 
  trip. The loaders helped the drivers to refuel and 
  check their vehicles. The gunners checked their 
  weapons, while each radio operator made coffee 
  for his tank crew. Zobel gave the platoon 
  commanders and tank commanders a last 
  briefing and asked one of the returning lorry 
  drivers to carry a message on the progress of the 
  operation to the task force commander in 
  Village X. 
  According to Zobel's plan of assault, the advance guard was to 
  emerge from the woods in two columns. The one on the left was to 
  consist of 1 Tank Platoon, the headquarters section, and 4 Tank Platoon, 
  whereas the right column was to be composed of 2 and 3 Tank Platoons 
  and the armoured infantry platoon. The plan was for 1 Platoon to take 
  up positions opposite the southern edge of Village Z, with 2 Platoon at 
  the foot of the hill to the south of it. Under the protection of these two 
  platoons 3 and 4 Platoons were to seize the south bridge in conjunction 
  with the armoured infantry platoon, drive through the village, and 
  capture the second bridge located about half a mile east of the village. 
  Then 2 Platoon was to follow across the south bridge, drive through the 
  village, and block the road leading northward, while 1 Platoon was to 
  follow and secure the south bridge. The tanks were not to open fire until 
  they encountered enemy resistance. 
  Zobel did not send out any reconnaissance patrols because he did 
  not want to attract the attention of the Russians. In drawing up his plan 
  Zobel kept in mind that the success of the operation would depend on 
  proper timing and on the skill and resourcefulness of his platoon 
  commanders. Because of the swiftness with which the raid was to take 
  place, he would have little opportunity to influence the course of events 
  once the attack was under way. 
  A treetop observation post. 
  These positions were used 
  frequently to enable long-range 
  observation of the enemy, and 
  were very valuable as long as 
  they were well concealed. 
  
  Here soldiers are preparing the 
  defences of a village during the 
  long retreat. Morale is still 
  relatively good, as can be seen 
  from the smile on the face of the 
  man on the left. The small wooden 
  causeway bridge is of interest. 
  At 0430, when the first tanks moved out of the woods, it was almost 
  daylight and the visibility was approximately 1,000m (3,300ft). As 1 and 
  2 Platoons were driving down the road toward Village Z, they were 
  suddenly fired on from the flank by Russian tanks and anti-tank guns. 
  Three German tanks were immediately disabled, one of them catching 
  fire. Zobel ordered the two platoons to withdraw. 
  Since the element of surprise no longer existed and the advance 
  guard had lost three of its tanks, Zobel abandoned his plan of attack and 
  decided to await the arrival of the main body of the task force. He 
  reported the failure of the operation by radio, and at 0515 his units were 
  joined by the main force. After Zobel had made a report in person, the 
  task force commander decided to attack Village Z before the Russian 
  garrison could receive reinforcements. This time the attack was to be 
  launched from the south under the protection of artillery fire. 
  The plan called for Zobel's company to conduct a feint attack along 
  the same route it had previously taken and to fire on targets of 
  opportunity across the river. Meanwhile 5 Company and the armoured 
  infantry company were to drive southward, skirt the hill, and approach 
  Village Z from the south. While 3 and 4 Platoons of 5 Company, the 
  armoured infantry company and 6 Company were to concentrate their 
  fire on the southern edge of the village, 1 and 2 Platoons of 2 Company 
  were to attack across the south bridge, drive into the village, turn east at 
  the market square and capture the east bridge. As soon as the first two 
  platoons had driven across the bridge, the other tanks of 5 Company 
  were to close up and push on to the northern edge of the village. The 
  armoured infantry vehicles were to follow across the south bridge and 
  support 1 and 2 Platoons in their efforts to seize the east bridge. The 
  soldiers of 6 Company were to annihilate any Russian forces that might 
  continue to offer resistance at the southern edge of the village. The 
  artillery battery was to go into position at the edge of the woods and 
  support the tanks. 
  No more than two tank platoons could be employed for the initial 
  attack because the south bridge could support only one tank at a time. 
  All the remaining firepower of the task force would be needed to lay 
  
  A 15cm s FH 18 emplacement. 
  The crew are relaxed, but shells 
  are being fused, so presumably 
  the gun will soon go in to action 
  against an impending Russian 
  attack. 
  down a curtain of fire along the entire southern edge of the village. This 
  was the most effective means of neutralising the enemy defence during 
  the critical period when the two tank platoons were driving toward the 
  bridge. To facilitate the approach of the tanks to the bridge, the artillery 
  battery was to lay down a smoke screen south of the village along the 
  river line. Having entered the village, the two lead platoons were not to 
  let themselves be diverted from their objective, the east bridge. The 
  elimination of enemy resistance was to be left to the follow-up elements. 
  The attack was to start at 0600. 
  The tanks of 2 Company refuelled quickly in the woods, and the 
  battery went into position. The task force was ready for action. 
  At 0600, 6 Company began to move. The task force commander and 
  an artillery observer were with the company - the battery gave fire 
  support against specific targets. At 0610 the tanks of 5 Company 
  emerged from the woods in columns of two, formed a wedge, turned 
  southward, and made a wide circle around the hill. The vehicles of the 
  armoured forces infantry 6 Company followed at close distance. As the 
  tanks and armoured forces personnel carriers approached the hill from 
  the south, they were suddenly fired on by Russian machine guns and 
  anti-tank rifles from the top of the hill. The commander of 2 Company 
  slowed down and asked for instructions. The task force commander 
  radioed instructions to engage only those Russians on the hill who 
  obstructed the continuation of the attack. The tanks of 2 Company 
  thereupon deployed and advanced on a broad front, thus offering 
  protection to the personnel carriers which were vulnerable to anti-tank 
  grenades. Soon afterward 5 Company reported that it had neutralised 
  the Russian infantry on the hill and was ready to launch the assault. The 
  task force commander thereupon gave the signal for firing the artillery 
  concentration on the southern edge of the village. Three minutes later 
  1 and 2 Platoons drove toward the bridge and crossed it in single file, 
  while 6 Company's tanks approached the crossing site from the west. 
  As soon as the last tank of 1 and 2 Platoons had crossed the bridge, 
  the other two platoons of 5 Company and the armoured personnel 
  carriers closed up at top speed. The two lead platoons drove through 
  
  German signals lorries. These 
  two vehicles are from divisional 
  headquarters. 
  26 
  the village and captured the east bridge without encountering any 
  resistance. Russian infantry troops trying to escape northward were 
  overrun by 3 and 4 Platoons and knocked out two retreating Russian 
  tanks at the northern edge of the village. Soon afterward all units 
  reported that they had accomplished their missions. 
  The task force commander then organised the defence of Village Z, 
  which he was to hold until the arrival of the main body of 3 Panzer 
  Division. Two tank platoons blocked the road leading northward, two 
  protected the east bridge, two armoured infantry platoons set up 
  outposts in the forest east of River B, and the remaining units constituted 
  a reserve force within the village. The artillery battery took up positions 
  on the south bank of the river close to the south bridge. Its guns were 
  zeroed in on the northern and eastern approach roads to the village. 
  In this action the task force commander made the mistake of 
  ordering Zobel's advance guard to halt and refuel in the woods 3km 
  (2 miles) west of Village Z. In issuing this order he applied the principle 
  that tanks going into combat must carry sufficient fuel to assure their 
  mobility throughout a day's fighting. Although this principle is valid in 
  general, it should have been disregarded in this particular instance. Since 
  the element of surprise was of decisive importance for the success of the 
  operation, everything should have been subordinated to catching the 
  Russians unprepared. If necessary, the advance guard should have 
  refuelled as far back as Village X or shortly after crossing River A. Since 
  the woods actually used for the refuelling halt were only 3km (2 miles) 
  from Village Z, the German commander should have foreseen that the 
  noise of starting the tank engines would warn the Russian outposts, 
  which happened to be on the hill south of the village. Moreover, the task 
  force commander should not have stayed behind in Village X, but should 
  have led the advance guard in person. By staying up with the lead 
  elements, he would have been able to exercise better control over both 
  the advance guard and the main body of his force. However, in general 
  the attack by the fully assembled task force was properly planned and its 
  execution met with the expectedly quick success. 
  
  FIGHTING IN TAIGA AND TUNDRA 
  Although the German Army on the eastern front was generally 
  conducting a fighting retreat following the winter of 1942/43, German 
  soldiers in some sectors fought a quite different type of war until the 
  very last stages of 1945. During the summer of 1941 German forces 
  advancing through northern Finland toward Kandalaksha and 
  Murmansk failed to reach their objective, the Murmansk-Leningrad 
  railway line. After an unsuccessful Russian offensive in the spring of 
  1942, there followed a period of stalemate which lasted for 21/2 years. 
  During this time the German forces north of the Arctic Circle opposed 
  the Russians along two widely separated fronts. The Kandalaksha front 
  to the south was held by two infantry divisions under the command of 
  XXXVI Infantry Corps, and the Murmansk front to the north was held 
  by one coastal defence and two mountain infantry divisions under XIX 
  Mountain Infantry Corps. Patrols secured the intermediate country. 
  Immediately after the Russo-Finnish armistice, which was concluded 
  in the beginning of September 1944, the Russians launched an offensive 
  on the Kandalaksha front, followed by another in the Murmansk area a 
  month later. 
  The country factors and weather conditions had a decisive effect on 
  the German soldier operating in these regions. Moreover, the assistance 
  given to the Germans by their allies, the Finns, proved to be extremely 
  valuable. Not only did the Finns fight side by side with the Germans, they 
  also assisted in the training of newly arrived troops and helped them get 
  adjusted to the peculiarities of the theatre. When the Finns dropped out 
  of the war the position of the Germans in the area became untenable. 
  A German sergeant inspects the 
  breech mechanism of a Russian 
  light gun, destroyed by the 
  Russian gunners who wedged 
  a shell in the muzzle and fired 
  a second shell in the breech. 
  Many Russian weapons were 
  taken over by the Germans 
  for their own use. 
  
  The Russians were thoroughly familiar with the requirements of 
  combat in taiga and tundra. During the stalemate they defended 
  themselves with great skill. In 1944 they demonstrated an extraordinary 
  ability to move across trackless country and to adapt themselves to its 
  features. Even tanks and artillery travelled over roads that the Germans 
  had previously considered impassable for any vehicle. No less surprising 
  to the Germans was the speed of the Russians in overcoming or 
  bypassing man-made obstacles and barriers. The tactics they used most 
  frequently were enveloping manoeuvres. When pursuing withdrawing 
  German units, they often sent encircling forces around one or both 
  flanks of the retreating Germans. 
  German raid on a Russian strongpoint in northern 
  Finland (February 1944) 
  During the winter of 1943-44, the XIX Mountain Infantry Corps, 
  occupying the northern sector of 20 Mountain Army, was composed of 
  two mountain divisions and one coastal defence division. The 
  unfortunate German troops faced numerically superior Russian forces. 
  Both the Germans and Russians were holding fairly well-constructed 
  positions for the third successive winter. 
  One of the two mountain infantry divisions, reinforced by special 
  troops, occupied positions in the rocky tundra country about a mile west 
  of the Litsa River, which was completely frozen over during the winter 
  and therefore constituted no serious barrier. The tundra region 
  combines the features of sub-alpine mountain tops and hilly country. 
  The relatively minor heights afford 
  good observation of the 
  intermediate country. Bare, rocky ground alternates with mossy patches. 
  With the exception of some scattered, stunted birches the vegetation 
  offers little cover. 
  The German front-line consisted of a chain of unevenly spaced 
  strongpoints, each organised for all-round defence. In some sectors the 
  intervals between strongpoints was as much as a mile. These gaps were 
  protected by an intricate defence system involving mutual fire support 
  from the strongpoints and, if necessary, the commitment of local 
  28 
  A fine picture of an MG34 on the 
  sustained-fire tripod. For more 
  details of this weapon, see 
  Warrior 59. 
  
  reserves. In general, the Forward Defence Line (FDL) was an imaginary 
  line connecting the positions that had been prepared for defensive 
  weapons. Along this line stood chilled sentries, and additional listening 
  posts were manned at night and during bad weather. Only during a state 
  of alert were the positions fully occupied. The distance between the 
  German and Russian lines varied between 1,000m (3,300ft) and 1.6km 
  (1 mile). 
  In freezing arctic conditions, the German infantry limited their 
  activities to intensive patrol actions, and operations in greater than 
  section strength were a rarity during the winter. In addition to the 
  constant close-range reconnaissance, which was essential for security, 
  especially during the long winter nights and during snowstorms, both 
  sides carried out raids and probing attacks to gather information, 
  disrupt supply traffic and maintain the aggressiveness of their troops. 
  Early in January 1944, I Battalion, 143 Mountain Infantry Regiment, 
  received orders to prepare and carry out a raid against the Russian 
  strongpoint on Hill 856. The objective of this raid was to take prisoners 
  and to destroy as many of the enemy defensive installations and shelters 
  as possible. To assure success, the raid was to be preceded by meticulous 
  preparations, for which the soldiers were allowed a maximum of four 
  weeks. Hill 856 had been selected because it had not been attacked by 
  the Germans since 1941. The steep western and southern slopes of the 
  hill had been considered insurmountable, especially in winter. The 
  Germans therefore assumed that the Russian garrison, whose outposts 
  controlled the northern and eastern approaches of the hill, felt quite 
  safe in its bastion and would consequently be more liable to relax its 
  guard than troops in other sectors. On the basis of aerial photographs 
  and close reconnaissance, it appeared that wire obstacles had been set 
  up only along the northern and eastern perimeter of the strongpoint. 
  Another factor that influenced the choice of this objective was that 
  German heavy weapons and reserve elements would be able to lend 
  effective support from Hills 742, 791 and 783, which were located in the 
  no-man's land between the German strongpoints and Hill 856. 
  According to air and ground reconnaissance, the Russian 
  strongpoint was held by one reinforced platoon. The German battalion 
  commander decided to select a correspondingly small assault force, 
  consisting of one platoon sergeant, three section commanders and 24 
  men. This force was to be subdivided into an assault section, composed 
  of the sergeant, one section commander, and ten men, and two 
  supporting sections, each composed of a section commander and seven 
  men. The assault force was assisted by reconnaissance elements, a 
  medical team, a machine-gun section with two heavy machine guns, and 
  a mortar section with one 80mm mortar. 
  The German strongpoint located closest to the objective was 
  designated Base Camp 2, where one mountain infantry and one field 
  engineer platoon were ordered to stand by as reserve forces. Artillery 
  support would be provided upon request. 
  The raid was to be directed from a forward HQ to be established on 
  Hill 783. Between Base Camp 2 and the forward HQ contact was to be 
  maintained by telephone and radio. Wire lines would be extended to 
  the assault force's jump-off line just southeast of the objective. Radio 
  silence was to be imposed during the initial phase of the raid. 
  
  Hofer, a battle-tested senior sergeant who had proven his ability to 
  lead such raids on previous occasions, was placed in command of the 
  assault section. He was an excellent mountaineer from the Tyrol and 
  volunteered for this mission. In his mind there was little doubt that, 
  given the right weather and sufficient time for preparation, it would be 
  possible to climb the steep slopes leading to the Russian strongpoint. 
  Plans called for the assault section to be armed exclusively with 
  captured Russian submachine guns, and each man was to carry six 
  magazines of ammunition. The supporting sections were to be equipped 
  with two rifle-grenade launchers and 60 grenades, a medium mortar 
  with 43 rounds, and a heavy machine gun with 3,000 rounds. The men 
  were also to carry mines and demolition charges to blow up the Russian 
  installations. In addition, the assault section was to be issued with three 
  Very pistols and flares. 
  All men were to wear padded winter uniforms and felt boots, except 
  for the members of the assault force, who were to be issued ski boots, the 
  heavy rubber soles of which afforded extra traction. Each man was to wear 
  a long white parka with hood, white outer trousers, a woollen cap and 
  woollen mittens with a hole for the trigger finger. The ammunition was to 
  be carried in the outside pockets of their parkas, and a Finnish dagger was 
  to be kept handy. After careful deliberation, it was decided not to use skis 
  or wear coloured brassards for identification as had been customary on 
  patrol, because speed was less important than remaining unobserved. 
  The emergency-type rations carried by the assault force included 
  combination chocolate and sweet bars, dried meat, bacon and dextrose. 
  Attack on strongpoint east 
  of River Litsa. 
  
  In addition to the usual supplies, the medical 
  team was to take along a dog sled, two collapsible 
  ski sleds, several reindeer-skin-lined sleeping bags 
  and some vacuum bottles filled with hot tea. 
  Before the operation was launched, recently 
  taken aerial photographs were compared with 
  older ones. Apart from a few hitherto unobserved 
  shelters, they revealed no substantial changes in 
  the Russian dispositions. Each man of the assault 
  force was given an opportunity to familiarise 
  himself with the land and the disposition of the 
  Russian outposts by observation from Base Camp 
  2 and the observation posts (OPs) on Hills 791 
  and 742. The information thus obtained was 
  collated and formed the basis for panoramic 
  sketches, which were then studied and evaluated 
  in the light of the most recent aerial photographs. 
  In the German rear area, physical features 
  resembling the Russian held strongpoint were 
  used by the engineer platoon to build a replica of 
  the Russian installations. For almost two weeks 
  the assault force carried out a series of rehearsals, 
  some of them with live ammunition. During this 
  intensive training period weapons, clothing and 
  equipment were tested, as were also the various 
  tactical solutions to achieve perfect coordination 
  among the different elements. 
  ABOVE The hard way to cut 
  timber: the issue double-ended 
  saw, here being used to cut 
  timber for shoring up trenches 
  and dugouts. 
  LEFT A destroyed Russian field 
  gun. This older-pattern weapon, 
  found on the retreat, was being 
  replaced by much more effective 
  and longer-ranging guns. 
  
  Long after this tank (a T34) 
  was destroyed, the soldier in 
  the picture and the photographer 
  found it again. The turret has 
  been blown off the hull (on the 
  left) and the rather gruesome 
  skull of an occupant stares 
  sightlessly at the camera as the 
  German soldier looks at it with 
  sombre mien. 
  The original plan of dividing the force into three separate sections 
  appeared to be the most effective and was finally adopted. During the 
  approach the assault section was to be split and each half was to be 
  guided to the start line by one of the supporting sections. The 
  supporting sections were then to occupy their designated positions on 
  the southern and southeastern slopes of Hill 856, while the assault 
  section reassembled and prepared to move out. Naturally, every man 
  had to be given precise instructions as to the part he was to take in the 
  raid, the success of which depended on maximum precision in timing. 
  The battalion commander ordered all participating leaders to attend 
  map exercises, where different phases of the adopted and alternate plans 
  of action were reviewed, including possible enemy countermeasures. The 
  nearest major Russian strongpoint was 1.6km (1 mile) to the rear of Hill 
  856, so that the intervention by reserves was not expected less than 
  45 minutes after an alert had been sounded. The powdery snow, averaging 
  over 1m (3ft) in depth, would prevent these reserves from making 
  better time. 
  After a prolonged freezing spell, during which the temperatures. 
  dipped as low as -40°C (—40°F), the sky was overcast and toward noon 
  of 1 February light snow flurries began to fall. By evening the flurries 
  turned into a regular snowstorm. This was ideal weather for the 
  execution of the planned raid and, since all preparations had been 
  made and the men were well rested, the assault was set for that night. 
  At 0030 the raiding party left Base Camp 2. The reconnaissance 
  elements led the way. Following in sequence were the officer in charge 
  of the operation with headquarters personnel to man the forward HQ. 
  the medium mortar section, the assault force proper, the medical team, 
  and the heavy machine-gun section. 
  Each element kept within sight of the one ahead. Part of the way up 
  the southern slope of Hill 791 the machine-gun section fell out and 
  moved to a previously designated 
  point from which it covered the 
  advance of the other elements. 
  Shortly after the raiding party had 
  set out, the snowstorm let up - soon 
  only a few clouds obscured 
  an 
  otherwise clear, moonlit sky. The 
  improved visibility was expected to be 
  unfavourable for the execution of the 
  raid. However, the raiding party 
  continued its march, knowing that 
  once the moon was down, visibility 
  would again be poor. Despite the 
  excellent visibility for the Russians, 
  Hill 783 was reached safely at 0115. 
  As soon as the command post had 
  been established and sentries posted, 
  the assault force 
  proceeded 
  on 
  toward Hill 856. By 0300 the moon 
  had set, and soon thereafter, despite 
  the deep snow and occasional Russian 
  flares, the assault force arrived at the 
  
  A: The Nebelwerfer 
  > 
  
  B: New weapons for the infantry 
  
  C: The MP 44/StG 44 
  
  c C - ^ O ^ 
  
  E: Infantry support: the Sturmgeschutz 
  
  F: Hitler Youth with Panzerfaust 
  
  G: Mounted Reconnaissance 
  
  H: Berlin - April 1945 
  
  foot of Hill 856, apparently without being 
  observed. Over the steepest portion of the hill's 
  slope the men had to crawl and climb in two single 
  files, a feat that required great effort and skill. 
  By 0345 all the men were assembled on the start 
  line. The two supporting sections took up their 
  assigned positions without making contact with the 
  enemy. Hofer and his section began to work their 
  way toward the road leading to the objective from 
  the east. Concealed by the snow that was banked 
  high on both sides of the road, Hofer hoped to 
  gain access to the Russian compound. When he 
  reached a point about 35m (115ft) from the 
  communication trench that connected the various 
  shelters and emplacements, Hofer saw a Russian 
  emerging from a shelter and walking toward the 
  northeastern part of the compound. Without 
  having 
  noticed 
  the 
  Germans, 
  the 
  Russian 
  disappeared in another section of the trench. 
  Without hesitation Hofer decided to capture 
  the bunker. Just as his section was getting ready for 
  the assault, Hofer discovered that he had mistaken 
  a stone reinforced section of the trench for a 
  bunker. He quickly changed his mind, regrouped his section, and 
  advanced in the direction of the shelters at the northeast end of the 
  compound by moving along the communication trench. One of his men 
  noticed a cable lying in the trench and cut it. Suddenly the section 
  commander heard the steps of a man coming toward him in the dark. 
  At a given signal the Germans pounced on him and overpowered him. 
  While the section commander and his men were trying to hold down the 
  struggling Russian in the narrow trench, a second Russian approached 
  unobserved. He saw the scuffle and, shouting for help, made a dash for 
  the nearest shelter before any German could stop him. Since these 
  shouts were bound to alert the Russian garrison and since he had at least 
  captured one prisoner, Hofer decided to pull his men back at once and 
  leave the neutralisation of the strongpoint installations to heavy 
  weapons and artillery fire. With the information he had obtained, he 
  would be able to pinpoint their targets. 
  The withdrawal took place according to plan. First the assault section 
  evacuated the area, taking along the prisoner, then the supporting 
  section on the left, and finally the one on the right abandoned their 
  positions. The supporting section on the left did not have time to mine 
  the communication trench and thereby obstruct it as intended. The 
  Russians who had emerged from their shelters on the double were 
  pinned down by grenade-launcher and submachine-gun fire from the 
  German rearguard, which inflicted heavy losses before following the 
  main body. Hofer was the last man to leave the hill. 
  As soon as the Russians realised that the Germans were pulling out, 
  they recovered from the initial shock and began to fire light and 
  medium mortars in the presumed direction of the German withdrawal. 
  Since the Russians were unaware of the route the Germans had taken, 
  their fire missed the single-file column retracing its steps down Hill 856. 
  This sign warns that the road 
  ahead is under enemy 
  observation, and that it is closed 
  to movement on account of 
  the heavy enemy fire that can 
  be delivered against travellers. 
  The Germans began to realise 
  that the Russians of 1943, 1944 
  and 1945 were a much more 
  professional enemy than they 
  had faced in the advances 
  of 1942 and 1943. 
  
  A Russian 85mm M1939 
  anti-aircraft gun captured 
  and used by the Germans. The 
  good ballistics of this weapon 
  appealed to the Germans, 
  who were happy to use 
  captured stock. 
  At 0440 the assault force reached a point about midway between Hills 
  858 and 783. The sergeant fired a red flare, which both indicated his 
  position and requested fire on Hill 856. The Germans on the 
  surrounding hills were just waiting for this signal. With sudden 
  vehemence the prepared fire of combined heavy weapons and artillery 
  was unleashed, thus facilitating the further withdrawal of the assault 
  force. The Russians also fired flares and lit up no-man's-land between 
  the German and Russian strongpoints with long-burning signal rockets. 
  In addition to the Russian mortars firing from Hill 856, heavy machine 
  guns on Hill 766 now joined in and raked the Litsa Valley. Their fire was 
  well adjusted and German counter fire failed to silence them. The 
  Russian mortars also directed well-aimed fire on Base Camp 2. 
  The withdrawing assault force took advantage of every physical 
  feature while traversing the northern slope of Hill 783 and crossing the 
  Litsa. Up to that point it had not suffered a single casualty. When it was 
  moving up the slope of Hill 791 from the bottom of Litsa Valley, the end 
  of the column was suddenly hit by a hail of machine-gun fire from Hill 
  766. Five men were wounded, and when a 120mm mortar bomb scored 
  a direct hit on the machine-gun section on the south slope of Hill 791, 
  the Germans suffered six additional casualties. 
  The last elements of the assault force reached Base Camp 2 at 0530, 
  by which time all the wounded had been brought back safely and given 
  first aid. Fifteen minutes later the Germans ceased firing and the 
  Russians followed suit soon afterward. 
  This action is typical of the small-scale fighting that took place in 
  northern Finland from 1941 to 1944. Meticulous preparations and 
  painstaking efforts usually led to negligible results. In this instance the 
  German raiders did achieve surprise and were able to capture a prisoner, 
  but they found out that the Russians on Hill 856 were on the alert, despite 
  the fact that this strongpoint had not been attacked in three years. 
  Interrogation of the prisoner provided little information, except that the 
  garrison on the hill had recently been relieved by fresh troops. If a lesson 
  was to be learned from this raid, it was that even the most careful 
  preparation could not guarantee the success of such an operation. 
  
  Although obsolete, this 7.5cm 
  light infantry gun was still on 
  issue late in the war, particularly 
  to rear-area units and the 
  Volkssturm support units. 
  Further details are to be found 
  in Warrior 59. 
  In the late summer of 1944 the Germans were preparing to evacuate 
  their forces from northern Finland. The Russians, who anticipated such 
  a move, brought up new divisions with the intention of cutting the 
  Kandalaksha-Rovaniemi railway line and highway west of Alakurti and 
  the vital Alakurti-Vuorijarvi-Salla road. The German 163 Infantry 
  Division, forming part of the XXXVI Corps, was responsible for the 
  defence of a large salient extending from a point approximately 18km 
  (11 miles) northeast of Alakurti to the primeval forests west of Lake On. 
  The division's task was to secure the vital German lines of 
  communication during the impending withdrawal. The German defence 
  line was formed by a number of fortified strongpoints consisting of 
  blockhouses and bunkers protected by wire entanglements. Each 
  strongpoint was manned by one or two rifle platoons supported by 
  mortars and heavy machine guns. Roving patrols of up to section strength 
  maintained contact between the strongpoints, and several intermediate 
  sentry posts were established. The Russians had developed a similar 
  defence system opposite the German positions. 
  The country across which this German front extended featured 
  lakes, swamps, deep forests, rocky plateaux and occasional dominating 
  hills. The wooded areas, consisting in this region primarily of tall firs 
  and stunted pines, are relatively sparse. On the other hand there is a 
  dense growth of blueberry and cranberry shrubs over wide areas. Huge 
  boulders and decaying tree trunks make the region even more difficult 
  to negotiate. Inhabiting the forests are bison, elk, reindeer, bear and 
  grouse. The few inhabited localities in this region were many miles 
  behind the German lines. 
  During the winter the German soldiers had relatively little difficulty 
  in maintaining security in this region since new tracks were immediately 
  recognisable in the virgin snowscape, but they were unable to keep the 
  area under observation during the summer. An encounter with a 
  Russian patrol had to be expected anywhere at any moment. 
  Digging a foxhole was almost impossible because only a thin layer 
  of soil covered the rock beneath. As an expedient blockhouses and 
  bunkers were built, but these made inviting targets for anti-tank guns. 
  
  The engine of a Russian Yak-2 
  aircraft which has been shot 
  down by flak. The aircraft was 
  one of the most successful 
  ground-attack aircraft used by 
  the Russians and was fitted with 
  two 23mm cannon and three 
  machine guns and could carry 
  600kg (1,322lb) of bombs. 
  44 
  Stone parapets offered little protect-
  ion against any but the smallest-
  calibre projectiles and greatly increased 
  the number of casualties from rock 
  fragmentation. 
  In this region every movement a 
  soldier made took a disproportionate 
  amount of time. Weapons, equipment 
  and every other item of supply had to 
  be carried over narrow trails that had 
  been gradually established across the 
  wilderness. Two-wheeled carts could 
  be used only over stretches where 
  roads had been laboriously cut. It took 
  hours to evacuate casualties to the 
  nearest first-aid station, and as many as 
  12 men were needed to escort one casualty: four stretcher bearers, four 
  relief bearers acting as guards and four others to carry the rations, 
  equipment and other baggage. The old Finnish proverb, 'At the 
  creation of time the good Lord did not think of hurrying', is 
  characteristic of the nature of human activities in this region. 
  Most of the time the German company commanders, platoon and 
  even section commanders were completely on their own; any mistake on 
  their part was all the more costly. The implementation of an order took 
  an infinitely long time and it was equally time-consuming to carry out 
  any change in plans. The responsibility of junior commanders went far 
  beyond what was generally expected of men of their rank. 
  When properly clothed, the German soldier bore up fairly well in 
  winter, even when temperatures dropped to -40°C (—40°F). In the 
  summer, however, when the temperature occasionally rose to 35°C 
  (95°F) in the shade, any activity at all in those humid swamps was sheer 
  torture. The Germans therefore preferred to occupy high ground, 
  where there was some relief to be had from the heat and the swarms of 
  mosquitoes that plagued them everywhere else. The Russians were 
  apparently little affected by temperature or insects and could spend 
  many days in the swamp land without reducing their effort. 
  On 13 August, after all had been quiet along 307 Regiment's front for 
  several months, Russian riflemen supported by mortars suddenly attacked 
  Yelchen, a well-fortified German strongpoint named after tiny Lake Yelchen 
  near the northwestern tip of Lake On. One of the Russian prisoners taken 
  during the inconclusive action that ensued disclosed that he belonged to 67 
  Rifle Division and that his unit had only recently moved into this area. 
  Lieutenant Colonel Schmitt, commander 307 Infantry Regiment, 
  responsible for the defence of this sector, decided to improve his 
  positions before the Russians could launch an offensive. For this 
  purpose he concentrated some of the forces at his disposal for an attack 
  on Hill 285, which dominated the area between Lakes Tolvand and On. 
  With the Germans entrenched on top of the hill, a Russian attack 
  between the lakes could be delayed until reinforcements were brought 
  up from another sector. 
  Schmitt had no detailed information regarding Russian strength and 
  dispositions on Hill 285. German reconnaissance patrols probing the 
  
  hill defences had recently been repulsed. 
  No hostile artillery fire had so far been 
  encountered in the area. 
  On 16 August, I Battalion of 307 
  Regiment reached Strongpoint Yelchen 
  according to plan. The artillery battalion, 
  which was supposed to support the attack 
  with its light howitzers, experienced great 
  difficulty with the road and was forced to 
  stop more than 3km (2 miles) short of its 
  objective. 
  Instead 
  of occupying 
  its 
  designated emplacements just west of 
  Yelchen, the guns went into position in an 
  area only just within range of Hill 285. 
  During the night of 16/17 August, I 
  Battalion moved out under cover of 
  darkness and reached the immediate 
  vicinity of Hill 285 just before dawn. Since the artillery battalion was not 
  ready for action and the attack could not be postponed without losing 
  the element of surprise, Schmitt ordered the battalion commander to 
  launch the assault without artillery preparation. The Russians were taken 
  completely by surprise, but rallied quickly and defended themselves 
  fiercely. It was not until Schmitt had moved up reinforcements that a 
  report reached him at his OP at Yelchen that the Russians had been 
  driven back from Hill 285 after leaving behind 89 dead. 
  During the next two days Schmitt could not obtain a clear picture of 
  the situation on Hill 285 because signal communication between there 
  and Yelchen had broken down. He therefore decided to join a supply 
  column that was bound for the hill. This column comprised no fewer 
  than 170 pack carriers and escorts, the minimum needed to provide 
  I Battalion with ammunition and a two-day supply of tinned rations. 
  During the afternoon of 20 August, after several hours of strenuous 
  marching, Schmitt arrived at I Battalion's OR There he found out that 
  the summit of the oval, shrub-covered hill was in Russian hands and that 
  the Germans were pinned down in shallow hollows, behind rocks and 
  behind the sparse growth of trees on the west side of the hill. He was 
  told that the battalion had been unable to flush out the Russians during 
  the initial attack. Unable to dig into the rocky ground, the hapless 
  German infantrymen were exposed to mortar fire and ricochets from 
  the ground and trees. 
  There was no doubt in Schmitt's mind that another attempt had to 
  be made to clear and secure the hilltop. Reconnaissance patrols were 
  then sent out. The information they brought back served as a basis for 
  discussion of the assault plan between Schmitt and the battalion 
  commander. The next day Schmitt returned to Yelchen to coordinate 
  the artillery fire that was to precede the attack. During the evening 
  hours the howitzers adjusted their fire by high-burst ranging. 
  After a brief but intensive preparation the infantrymen jumped off at 
  0500 on 22 August. In the difficult country they had to cross to reach the 
  hilltop, the infantrymen made slow progress and were thus unable to 
  take full advantage of the softening up achieved by the artillery fire. They 
  failed to make a single penetration into the Russian defence system. 
  The long march back! Here 
  infantry are in retreat towards 
  the German border, having 
  brought with them a captured 
  Russian pony and sleigh. The 
  men are still in the standard 
  uniform, which suggests that 
  they are troops recently sent 
  to the front. 
  
  Instead, they were forced to withdraw to their line of departure. The 
  battalion commander himself was among the seriously wounded. The 
  attack on Hill 285 was the last German offensive operation in this region. 
  This photograph shows a late 
  development in artillery - the 
  highly effective (if somewhat 
  inaccurate) 28/32cm Schweres 
  Wurfgerat 40. The picture shows 
  the wooden rails and frames 
  upon which the carrying case 
  and rocket were mounted. The 
  rockets (seen on the left in their 
  cases) were fired electrically and 
  stabilised in flight by a number 
  of jets which were set at an 
  angle. The frames could fire 
  either 28cm or 32cm rockets. 
  The rockets themselves were 
  HE or incendiary, with the 28cm 
  weighing 83kg (185lb) and the 
  32cm weighing 78kg (173lb). 
  Maximum range was 2,000m 
  (6,561ft) or 2,200m (7,217ft). 
  As can be seen from the rail 
  arrangement, the rockets were 
  intended to be fired in salvos 
  so that the area effect was 
  intensified. Later rails were 
  made of tubular steel, although 
  the wooden versions were also 
  found mounted on half-tracked 
  vehicles. The rate of fire is not 
  known exactly, but was probably 
  about two rockets per minute. 
  German withdrawal through the taiga (September 1944) 
  During the last days of August and the beginning of September there 
  was little change in the situation along 307 Infantry Regiment's sector 
  between Lakes Tolvand and On. The men of I Battalion were clinging to 
  their precarious positions on the west side of Hill 285, facing the 
  well-entrenched Russians on the summit. German patrols observed 
  feverish construction work and the felling of trees on the Russian side of 
  the hill, but were unable to obtain any clues as to Russian intentions, 
  since all of the enemy's activities were carried on by night. 
  On the morning of 9 September, Russian artillery suddenly opened 
  fire on the German hill positions. Consternation and surprise in the 
  German ranks was great because in more than two years of localised 
  warfare the Russians had never used artillery in this region. After a short 
  preparation, three tanks emerged from the Russian fortifications on the 
  hill, their guns firing pointblank at the German infantry. Helplessly 
  exposed to this new threat, the Germans abandoned the hill without 
  waiting for orders. In the process the battalion suffered few casualties, 
  but its radio set and other valuable items of equipment were lost. 
  The news of the loss of Hill 285 did not reach Schmitt until the battalion 
  turned up at Strongpoint Yelchen in the late afternoon. He immediately 
  requested division headquarters to send some anti-tank weapons, which had 
  hitherto been considered excess baggage in this theatre. 
  On 11 September, Russian forces began to attack Yelchen with small 
  arms and mortar fire. Instead of maintaining strict fire discipline the 
  German garrison expended its ammunition so fast that it was forced to 
  abandon the well-constructed position much sooner than intended. 
  Encouraged by these unexpectedly quick successes, Russian assault 
  detachments in platoon strength tried to keep the retreating Germans 
  off balance. One of these detachments caught up with the march 
  46 
  
  Situation of 307 Inf Regt 
  (15 Aug-13 Sep 1944) 
  Map 37 
  Situation of 307 Infantry 
  Regiment. 
  column of the artillery battalion that was moving from Yelchen to the 
  strongpoint on Mount Voyti. After some initial confusion 
  the 
  artillerymen put up a staunch defence, firing on the approaching 
  Russians at only 50m (164ft) range. The battalion thus escaped 
  annihilation, its only materiel losses being two guns that had to be 
  destroyed during the brief engagement to prevent their capture. 
  By evening Voyti was the only strongpoint east of the Tumcha River 
  still in German hands. The blockhouses at the foot of Mount Voyti were 
  held by the weakened troops of I Battalion, who had fought their way 
  back from Yelchen during the day. The garrison was equipped with small 
  arms and heavy weapons, but had neither artillery nor any of the 
  recently requested anti-tank guns. All other regimental units had safely 
  crossed the Tumcha and were moving toward Vuorijarvi. Every hour 
  counted since the slow German march columns would never reach Salla 
  intact unless the men at Voyti could hold off the mobile Russian assault 
  detachments. After the premature evacuation of Yelchen the fate of the 
  entire 163 Division hinged upon the sustained defence of Voyti and the 
  approaches to the Tumcha River. 
  
  Two German 
  Abwehrflammenwerfer 
  42. This 
  device was a static flamethrower 
  with a capacity of 36lt 
  (8 gallons). This gave a flame of 
  11/2 seconds, 4.5m (15ft) wide 
  and 2.7m (9ft) high. Ignition was 
  by command or trip wire. They 
  were normally used within 
  minefields to disrupt attempts 
  to clear paths through the mines, 
  or to cover roadblocks, and on 
  landing beaches and harbour 
  walls. They were buried at 
  intervals of about 20m (65ft), 
  leaving only the discharge tube 
  above ground. 
  That night the Russians made their first attempts to seize Voyti. Once 
  again the Germans were amazed to see Russian tanks driving across 
  country they had considered tank proof for the last three years. 
  The Russian tanks broke through the outer defence ring, and the 
  battle for the blockhouses raged by the light of burning sheds. Three of 
  the tanks were disabled by mines, but their guns continued firing at the 
  German defenders. Calling over the telephone from his HQ on the west 
  bank of the Tumcha, Colonel Schmitt asked the battalion commander 
  to hold out, promising the early arrival of a relief force which he had 
  dispatched upon being notified that the Voyti garrison had come under 
  attack. The relief force, a reinforced field engineer platoon, reached 
  Voyti just in time to rescue the garrison and conduct it safely to the 
  Tumcha River. To block the only road leading to the river, the engineers 
  emplaced roadblocks and mines that they had prepared for this purpose 
  during the preceding months. Schmitt hoped to delay the advancing 
  Russians long enough to permit the main body of his regiment to 
  withdraw beyond Vuorijarvi. 
  When the engineer platoon reached the Tumcha at dawn, it joined 
  the other German elements which had previously crossed to the west 
  bank. The engineers thereupon blew up the only bridge that spanned 
  the deep and rapid river. As Schmitt and the rearguard watched the 
  demolition, they suddenly came under the fire of two Russian tanks 
  which had somehow managed to keep up with the Germans despite 
  roadblocks, mines and demolitions. 
  During the next few days 307 Infantry Regiment withdrew beyond 
  Vuorijarvi according to plan. The Russians crossed the Tumcha and 
  gained access to the roads west of the river. They were thus in a favorable 
  position to envelop and destroy major elements of the withdrawing 
  German columns. As a countermeasure Schmitt decided to employ 
  rearguard units to defend improvised delaying positions at favourable 
  points along the escape route to Salla and Rovaniemi. 
  One such delaying position was established at 'Esche' near the chain 
  of lakes that extends southeastward from Kairala. The position was held 
  
  by 2 Company of 307 Regiment. The company commander had orders 
  to remain in place until he received specific instructions to withdraw. 
  When the Russians reached 'Esche' on 16 September, they 
  enveloped the position on both sides and one infantry battalion 
  supported by tanks began a siege of the German garrison. In the course 
  of the afternoon and night the Russians launched no fewer than seven 
  separate assaults, but each time they were thrown back with heavy losses. 
  Upon being notified that the strongpoint was surrounded and hard 
  pressed, Schmitt organised the men of III Battalion into a relief force. 
  Because of the necessary preparations the battalion's departure was 
  delayed until evening, by which time radio communication with 'Esche' 
  had broken off. Schmitt sent out a patrol, but it failed to get through to 
  the encircled force. After every other means of communication had 
  proved unsuccessful, a reconnaissance plane attempted to drop a 
  message to the embattled company, ordering it to try to break out. 
  When the relief force got to within a mile of 'Esche', it clashed with 
  Russian advance elements that had managed to bypass the German 
  position. Instead of relieving the 'Esche' garrison, III Battalion was 
  forced to withdraw in the face of superior Russian forces. Schmitt had 
  given up all hope of rescuing 2 Company when, shortly after dawn on 
  17 September, he was notified of the contents of an intercepted Russian 
  radio message revealing that the company had broken out. This 
  unexpected news was confirmed early that afternoon when the 
  A German propaganda poster 
  proclaiming 'Hitler is the 
  liberator'. Needless to say the 
  ideal was not backed by Russian 
  experience! 
  49 
  
  exhausted men reached the German lines. The company commander 
  reported that 16 men had been killed and 25 wounded. 
  The company commander told how by a stroke of luck the air-dropped 
  order to break out had fallen within the lines of the beleaguered unit. 
  After waiting for darkness to set in, 2 Company made a diversionary attack 
  to the northeast and, taking advantage of the initial Russian confusion, 
  had slipped out of the pocket and escaped to the west. 
  During the second half of September, while the main body of 163 
  Division was withdrawing along the main highway, 307 Regiment was 
  ordered to use a path that traversed the otherwise impassable forest from 
  a point southeast of Lampela to Kallunki. However, since this path could 
  not sustain any vehicular traffic, all regimental vehicles were dispatched 
  to Salla. Reinforced by a bicycle company and a field engineer platoon, 
  those elements of 307 Division that were to follow the forest path were 
  ordered to set up obstacles along the way and establish a defensive 
  position northeast of Kallunki upon their arrival in that village. 
  On 25 September, the regiment started its march along the barely 
  visible path that twisted its way through the boulder-strewn forest. The 
  troops of the field engineer platoon, at the rear of the column, did what 
  they could to make pursuit difficult for the Russians. 
  Upon arriving at Kallunki in the late afternoon of 26 September, 
  Schmitt set up his HQ and reported by radio to division headquarters. 
  To his message he added that he would eat his hat if the Russians 
  reached the Onkamo position within the next 72 hours. It turned out 
  that his optimism was unjustified, for the very next morning Russian 
  advance elements attacked the German delaying position with mortars 
  and light mountain howitzers. Schmitt thereupon requested that an 
  artillery battalion be dispatched from Maerkejaervi to bolster his 
  weakened force. 
  During the following night an incident occurred that illustrates the 
  sort of nervous strain to which the German soldiers were subjected 
  during their withdrawal through the taiga. The bicycle company, 
  previously reduced to platoon strength in a series of tough engagements 
  during which it lost its commanding officer, was holding an outpost line 
  in the forest in front of the Onkamo position. At 0200 the acting 
  commander and his men suddenly turned up in the battle position, 
  reporting that they had been outflanked by strong Russian forces, 
  According to the lieutenant, all indications pointed to a Russian 
  enveloping attack in battalion strength. However, combat reconnaissance 
  patrols, sent out that night and the following morning to verify this 
  alarming report, failed to locate any Russian forces at the points he had 
  indicated. The only traces of activity that could be found were numerous 
  reindeer tracks, which led to the final conclusion that the battle-tested 
  men had fled from a herd of reindeer. 
  During the entire withdrawal through the taiga, the Germans were 
  amazed at the ease and speed with which the Russians surmounted 
  natural and man-made obstacles. Along paths which, according to 
  German unit commanders who had spent several years in the taiga and 
  tundra, could be negotiated only by infantry forces, Russian tracked and 
  wheeled vehicles would suddenly make their appearance and surprise 
  the German rearguards. Against harassed German troops who had lost 
  most of their equipment during the difficult withdrawal across northern 
  
  Finland, the fresh Russian troops launched a series of limited flanking 
  thrusts, alternating them with bold wide enveloping manoeuvres. By the 
  beginning of November 1944 the last German troops had either escaped 
  to Norway or had been taken prisoner in Finland. 
  The Swamp Bridgehead (June 1944) 
  In this action, which took place during the summer of 1944, the 
  Russians displayed their ability to cross rivers unobtrusively. Starting with 
  the infiltration of individual soldiers, they would gradually form a 
  bridgehead, almost unnoticed by the Germans - they chose the most 
  unfavourable point for such an operation, and as a result the Germans 
  tended to ignore their presence on the near shore. Persisting in their 
  preparations for several weeks, the Russians created the prerequisites for 
  enlarging their initial bridgehead. When the Germans finally realised 
  the danger, it was too late for effective counteraction. Confronted by 
  insurmountable country difficulties, German soldiers were unable to 
  drive the Russians out of the area. Several weeks later the Russians used 
  the bridgehead as a jump-off position for an all-out offensive. 
  During June 1944, a German infantry division had taken up defensive 
  positions along the north bank of the Pripyat River. The sector between 
  two villages, A and B, was defended by an infantry battalion. In this area 
  the Pripyat River was bounded on both sides by extensive swamps and a 
  maze of small streams and tributaries, stagnant pools and lakes. Marshy 
  river banks were overgrown with reeds and underbrush up to 2m (6ft) in 
  height. Only in the area near the road leading south from Village A 
  across the Pripyat were the banks dry and relatively devoid of vegetation. 
  The road bridge was destroyed, but since the river at this point was 
  shallow and the bed was sandy, it could be forded with comparative ease. 
  The 15cm schweres 
  Infanteriegeschutz 33 was the 
  heaviest German infantry gun, 
  firing a 38kg (84lb) HE shell or 
  a 24.6kg (55lb) hollow-charge 
  shell. It weighed some 1,700kg 
  (3,743lb) in action, had a range 
  of 4,700m (15,420ft) and it could 
  also fire smoke. It was also 
  found mounted on tank chassis 
  as an assault gun for close 
  support. The sights and breech 
  are covered to protect the 
  weapon from the weather. 
  
  Originally the German FDL was to run close to the north bank. 
  However, as terrain conditions did not allow for establishing 
  fortifications and the vegetation obstructed a clear field of fire and 
  since, furthermore, the Germans believed that no human being could 
  stay for any length of time in the stagnant swamp, the FDL was set up 
  further back. Near the river bank proper, outposts manned by three or 
  four men were established on platforms built on piles driven into the 
  murky swamp. 
  At first the Germans observed only weak Russian patrols. However, 
  these patrols gradually grew in strength and number. The Germans 
  expected that the Russians would attempt a crossing at the bridge site, 
  where country conditions favoured such an undertaking. However, 
  realising that German resistance would be strongest on both sides of the 
  bridge site, the Russians decided to establish a bridgehead at the most 
  unlikely point - in the worst swamps east of the bridge. At the outset the 
  Russians established a foothold on two small islands that the German 
  infantry had left unoccupied because they were too swampy. Several days 
  passed. Then, one morning, the Germans observed a few Russians along 
  a strip of the north bank opposite the islands. They infiltrated into the 
  undergrowth and reeds, although the water reached their chests. The 
  Germans did not attach much importance to this discovery because they 
  thought the Russians could not possibly stay there, and therefore they 
  saw no threat from that direction. 
  Russian bridgehead on the R Pripyat 
  (Jun 1944) 
  German FDLs 
  German outpost 
  Initial Russian line 
  Final bridgehead line 
  Russian bridgehead on the 
  River Pripyat. 
  
  This assumption turned out to be a serious mistake. The Russian 
  bridgehead was gradually reinforced, and three or four nights later the 
  Russians seized the nearest German outposts. German troops launched 
  themselves into a counter-attack, but this failed because the swamp was 
  extremely difficult to approach. Moreover, the German soldiers making 
  the counter-attack were placed under very accurate flanking fire by 
  Russian snipers sitting in trees on the river islands. Since the Russians 
  could not be dislodged from the north bank by small-arms fire, the 
  Germans tended to accept the situation as inevitable. The general 
  feeling persisted that no major danger threatened the German positions 
  from that direction. 
  The subsequent conduct of the Russians in their tiny bridgehead was 
  typical of Russian combat methods of 1944. Mostly under cover of 
  darkness, they made persistent efforts to improve their bridgehead 
  positions by building corduroy roads, high observation posts and 
  wooden platforms. Exposed to German fire, the Russian soldiers moved 
  around in the swampy country, often with water up to their chests. 
  Within the limits imposed by the shortage of ammunition, the Germans 
  did their best to make the position untenable and to dislodge the 
  Russians from their bridgehead. However, the dense vegetation 
  favoured infiltration tactics and hampered observed fire. 
  At that time the Russians began to build an underwater footbridge. 
  This bridge, about 2m (6ft) wide, consisted of previously assembled 
  trestles. During the night these were put in place in the river, with the 
  planking about 10cm (4in) below the surface of the water. This 
  presented no technical difficulties because of the very slow current of 
  the Pripyat River. The bridge was thus invisible to the German observers. 
  Its existence was not suspected by the Germans until a few Russian 
  anti-tank guns suddenly appeared on the north bank of the river. 
  Russian prisoners subsequently confirmed the existence of an 
  underwater bridge and supplied information about its construction. 
  Despite repeated attempts, the Germans failed to destroy this bridge. 
  As the war in the east 
  progressed, Russian aircraft 
  became more and more 
  a part of life, and this picture 
  shows an MG34 mounted 
  in the anti-aircraft role. 
  
  In two weeks the Russians had thus created an adequate jump-off 
  base for further operations. One foggy morning they attacked the 
  German outposts in the immediate area of the river bend. They 
  suddenly employed artillery and a few close-support aircraft to 
  neutralise positions in the German FDL and to prevent movement of 
  reserves. Thus far, Russian artillery had been conspicuous by its absence 
  in the fighting along the river probably because the Russians wished to 
  draw as little attention as possible to the bridgehead operation. 
  As a result of this attack, the Germans were pushed back to the edge 
  of the swamp. Content with this success, the Russians took up defensive 
  positions along the perimeter of their newly won bridgehead, which was 
  protected in part by a river inlet and a body of stagnant water. Since 
  neither tanks nor assault guns could be employed in the swampy 
  country, all German counter-attacks were unsuccessful. The Russians 
  consolidated the bridgehead during the following days, and then used 
  it as one of the jump-off bases for their large-scale summer offensive. 
  Rubber rafts were used to move 
  men across water too deep to 
  wade. During the retreat they 
  were important in moving the 
  men to new positions behind 
  rivers so that they could 
  prepare defensive strongpoints 
  on the western side. 
  THE BATTLE FOR GERMANY 
  The battle for Germany was the disastrous climax to the German Army's 
  adventure into Russia. Having reached the gates of Moscow in the winter 
  of 1941, the Wehrmacht was now driven back across the Oder to fight on 
  home soil. The intensity of the fighting on the eastern front in 1945 
  showed that the German infantryman, despite belonging to shattered ad 
  hoc formations short on vehicles and many types of weaponry, was still a 
  powerful military entity. Unfortunately for Germany, that same 
  infantryman was not capable of stopping the inexorable juggernaut of 
  the Russian advance. 
  The Oder Crossings 
  The following action, which took place during the last phase of the war, 
  led to the formation of a Russian bridgehead which was to assume 
  
  decisive importance a few weeks after its buildup. The procedure 
  followed by the Russians was at variance with that in the preceding 
  example. In this instance the Russians formed the bridgehead in a single 
  day by executing a well-timed pincer attack. Before the main crossing, 
  strong Russian elements made a diversionary assault farther up the river. 
  This secondary attack achieved the double purpose of forcing the 
  Germans to commit their reserves and of compelling them to fight on 
  two fronts as soon as the main attack force had crossed the river. In this 
  instance the two attack forces coordinated their operations and received 
  effective ground and air support. 
  In evaluating this action it should be remembered that the German 
  troops facing the Russians were improvised units organised in times of 
  extreme emergency. The typical German fighting unit would, in 1945, 
  often contain previously rear echelon troops scraped together into 
  hastily trained fighting formations, everyone from typists to chefs. The 
  deterioration in fighting quality and the rapid influx of replacements 
  had a detrimental impact on morale, and heightened the sense of a 
  nation on the verge of military collapse. 
  In early February 1945, after the collapse of the German front in 
  Poland in January, the Russian advance ground to a temporary halt east 
  of the Oder River. An improvised German infantry division was deployed 
  on the west bank south of Frankfort an der Oder. The 2 Grenadier 
  Regiment of this division, composed of such diverse formations as 
  security guards, SS units, Volkssturm battalions as well as training classes 
  from a military school, was assigned a 6km (4-mile) sector along a river 
  bend that formed a salient approximately 16km (10 miles) south of 
  Frankfort. I and II Battalions took up positions directly behind the river 
  bank, while III Battalion was committed along a dike that formed the 
  chord of the salient and dominated the open country between the dike 
  and the river bend. The 2 Grenadier Regiment was supported by a light 
  artillery battalion, two field howitzer batteries and one rocket-launcher 
  battalion. Their observation posts were located in the forward positions, 
  near the battalion HQs and on the dike. 
  In mid-February Russian tank and motorised spearheads attempted 
  a surprise crossing of the Oder River near Frankfort but failed. After 
  that, the Russians waited until their infantry was able to close up to the 
  mechanised units. On the night of 22 February several Russian 
  reconnaissance patrols attempted to cross the river unobserved, but 
  were intercepted and repulsed by the two battalions on the west bank. A 
  series of small-scale engagements took place during the following 
  nights, but the German regimental commander felt certain that no 
  Russian patrols had infiltrated his sector and that the enemy did not 
  intend to force a crossing in that area. 
  The night of 27-28 February was marked by poor visibility, rain and 
  strong west winds. Despite the bad weather, Russian reconnaissance 
  aircraft were exceptionally active, and the droning of their engines 
  could be heard throughout the night. The entire regimental sector up 
  to the dike received sporadic harassing fire. At 0300 a strong Russian 
  patrol crossed the river at the north end of the salient on pneumatic 
  rafts without being observed by the Germans, broke into the positions of 
  II Battalion's left wing, silenced the defenders, and sealed off both flanks 
  of the 200-yard penetration. The storm and the noise of the aircraft 
  
  Winter 1944/45. Russian artillery 
  pounds the ridge line in the 
  distance and a truck stands in 
  the foreground. The light snow 
  covering shows signs of tracks 
  where the truck is, suggesting 
  that the occupants of the truck 
  have got out to take the 
  photograph. As the photograph 
  has survived it is clear that they 
  got away with it this time. 
  engines drowned out the sounds of the fighting, so that neither the 
  adjacent units nor the staff at the battalion HQ were aroused. 
  Within the hour a Russian rifle battalion with anti-tank guns, 
  howitzers and five light tanks was put across at the same point on 
  pontoon ferries. The Germans were unaware of the existence of the 
  bridgehead until 0400, when they suddenly heard the noise of Russian 
  tanks starting their engines. II Battalion commander alerted his 
  reserves, but their counter-attacks against both flanks of the bridgehead 
  failed to dislodge the Russians. 
  To block any further advance of the bridgehead force, the 
  regimental commander ordered 9 and 10 Companies to assemble near 
  the centre of local woods while it was still dark. At 0530 the two 
  companies were suddenly attacked by a force driving from the north. 
  The five tanks had broken out of the bridgehead and, supported by 
  infantry, were advancing on the west side of the dike. In their attempt to 
  block the Russian attack, the two German companies suffered heavy 
  casualties in bitter hand-to-hand fighting. Although the fire from the 
  Russian tank guns was far from accurate, it paralysed the resistance of 
  the inexperienced German troops. At 0600 a platoon of Russian infantry 
  turned eastward and attacked II Battalion OP from the rear, forcing the 
  German staff to evacuate in haste. 
  At dawn the regimental commander evaluated the situation. The 
  Russians held the eastern half of the woods. A few German pockets of 
  resistance were holding out directly south of the woods. Sporadic bursts 
  of fire were still heard from the woods. The remnants of 9 and 10 
  Companies were out of contact with regimental headquarters. At its new 
  HQ II Battalion officers had no control over its subordinate units in the 
  river positions. 
  In this emergency the regimental commander ordered 12 Company, 
  the only unit still in reserve, to move from its position near the southern 
  end of the salient and block any further Russian advance. He notified 
  division headquarters of the critical situation and was promised 
  reinforcements. One battalion was to be moved to his sector to launch a 
  counter-attack against the Russian bridgehead, but its arrival could not 
  
  Russian crossing of the R Oder 
  south of Frankfort a.d. O 
  (22 - 28 Feb 1945) 
  German positions 
  German counterattacks 
  Russian attacks 
  Dyke 
  Russian crossing of the River 
  Oder south of Frankfort (22-28 
  February 1945). 
  be expected before noon. Meanwhile, the regimental commander 
  directed the artillery battalion to shell the Russian forces assembled in 
  the woods. 
  While the attention of the Germans was diverted to the threat from 
  the north, the main Russian attack force was preparing to cross the river 
  opposite the I Battalion soldiers. At 0700 approximately 25 Russian 
  batteries opened fire on the positions of the I and II Battalions on the 
  west bank, on the German observation post at the top of the dike, on 12 
  Company moving north, and on the artillery positions in the rear. At 
  0740 the main attack force, consisting of two infantry regiments, began 
  
  This regrettably blurred shot 
  shows two vehicles in flames in 
  a village not far from the German 
  border. Whether the vehicles are 
  Russian or German is impossible 
  to say. 
  to cross the Oder and gained an immediate hold on the west bank. 
  Simultaneously, the force that had made the initial assault assembled in 
  the woods and attacked southward, effectively supported by artillery fire 
  from the east bank of the river. The Russian forces pushed back the 
  remnants of III Battalion, including 12 Company, eliminated those 
  German observation posts on the dike that had survived the artillery 
  preparation, and cut off the German forces holding out in the positions 
  along the river bank. This attack prevented the two battalions from 
  withdrawing to previously prepared positions along the dike. 
  Under these circumstances the main attack force had no difficulty in 
  clearing a one-mile stretch of the west bank and mopping up the area 
  east of the dike. During the following days the Russians consolidated the 
  bridgehead, which became one of their principal assembly areas for the 
  last major offensive of the war. 
  Fighting in Berlin 
  The battle for Berlin, while the ultimate expression of Hitler's final 
  delusion and madness, was none the less incredibly costly for the Soviet 
  forces. That this was so was testament not only to the military talents of 
  the German infantryman, but also to the desperation born of fighting 
  alongside homeland civilians. One German soldier, Helmut Altner, was 
  only recruited and trained in 1945, but was soon thrown into the thick 
  of the battle for Berlin. His accounts (see Helmut Altner, Berlin - Dance 
  of Death, Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2002) show how the German 
  infantryman now descended to the level of little more than hunted 
  street fighter: 
  The street ends and a big road junction appears with house facades 
  and ruins, in which hundreds of people are crowding. On the left 
  the street rises gradually up to the bridge. The street looks swept 
  clean, but people are crouching on the steps leading up to the 
  bridge, and soldiers are pressed behind the walls of the ruins 
  leading to the Havel embankment. Occasionally a few people jump 
  up out of the shelter of the steps and run across the bridge. The 
  
  The Russians attacked at night 
  or just before dawn, and used 
  searchlights to improve visibility 
  and to blind the Germans. This 
  remarkable picture shows the 
  Russian lights which were put 
  on just before the attack on 
  Seelow Heights in 1945. 
  mass of people growing behind us in the dead angles begins to spill 
  over. Beside me among the soldiers are women with babies in their 
  arms, old women, children and young teenagers of both sexes. I 
  look carefully over the top step. Shots are racing across the bridge, 
  and the horror hits me for the bridge is swimming in blood. 
  They are calling from below and pressing forward. I take 
  another deep breath and j u m p up and run into the tacking of the 
  machine gun bursts, throwing myself into the death mill as the 
  bullets strike all around. The road surface is slippery with blood 
  and there are bodies lying around and hanging over the bridge 
  railings. Vehicles and tanks race across grinding the bones with a 
  crack. I dive forward, not seeing any more, just driven by the 
  thought of finding cover. 
  Despite the evident desperation of this account, it is clear that there 
  was an ingrained belief that restoration might be possible. 'Lieutenant 
  Stichler pulls a map out of his pocket and explains to us what we are 
  going to do. We have to get through Staaken to the Doberitz Training 
  Area. The Wenck Army is behind Doberitz village, where they have 
  taken up positions to wait for us. We will then get several weeks' rest and 
  be accommodated in huts that the Wenck Army has set up for us. Reichs 
  President Donitz himself with his staff will explain the situation to us in 
  the hutted camp. The towns of Potsdam and Nauen should already have 
  been retaken by the Relief Army.' Hindsight and military history allows 
  us to see that the Wenck relief was a forlorn hope, but in the last days of 
  the Third Reich, after so many years of war, the idea that the fighting 
  might finally cease seemed unreal. 
  This dramatic picture of the fighting in Berlin is made more striking 
  by the fact that the author had had only five weeks' training, and yet was 
  facing troops with months if not years of battle behind them. The last-
  ditch attempt to put every able body onto the streets with some sort of 
  weapon saw the use of the old men of the Volkssturm and the teenagers 
  of the Hitlerjugend. A soldier who saw the latter in action later wrote: 
  'The Hitler Youth press themselves anxiously behind the walls of the 
  trenches. They have mostly rifles seized from France and Italy with a few 
  cartridges which are scarcely usable. The youngest have never had a rifle 
  in their hands and are now expected to know how to use them. The 
  
  recoil alone would be enough to knock most of them over. Not many of 
  them will be left when the attack starts. [...]To fifteen, yes, sometimes 
  even to twelve-year-old boys, scanty instruction was given in the use of 
  the Panzerfaust, evidently the only weapon with which Berlin was to be 
  defended. They were told that it was only a matter of holding out for a 
  few hours. In the pale, nervous faces of the undernourished children a 
  fire would begin to glow which consumed them in their thousands.' 
  The Hitler Youth and Volkssturm were a futile last attempt to create 
  meaningful numbers of troops, this in turn allowing Hitler to cling to 
  delusions of divisional operations when major units in reality only 
  existed on paper. The Russians took Berlin, Hitler shot himself, 
  Germany surrendered. The hubristic operation that began in 1941 took 
  nearly four years to come full circle, and millions died, soldiers and 
  civilians. The fighting was bad, the aftermath was horrendous. German 
  killing groups (the Einsatzgruppen and other SS units) and the German 
  forces killed thousands upon thousands of civilians and prisoners of war, 
  in battle and out. The Russians had no mercy; when they advanced on 
  Berlin from Stalingrad no quarter was given. Hitler unleashed a war 
  which was medieval in its conduct, and which left Germany divided for 
  forty years. The German infantryman did his duty, but duty was too 
  much of a burden in the face of an outraged and increasingly effective 
  Russian Army which was fighting for revenge. 
  BIBLIOGRAPHY 
  There are innumerable books on the subject of the war in the east from 
  Stalingrad in 1943 to the end in 1945, but the ones mentioned below 
  benefit from taking a close view of individuals rather than the grand 
  strategic overview, which is dealt with elsewhere. 
  Anthony Beevor's Berlin - The Downfall 1945 (London, Viking, 2002) is 
  an excellent starting point for the final battle, as is Anthony Read and 
  David Fisher's The Fall of Berlin (London, Pimlico, 1999). Gottlob 
  Bidermann's In Deadly Combat (Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 
  2001) gives a good insight into the individual in the fighting, as do 
  Helmut Altner's Berlin - Dance of Death (London, Spellmount, 2002), 
  Simon Trew's Servants of Evil (London, Andre Deutsch, 2001) and 
  Gunter Koschorrek's Blood Red Snow (London, Greenhill, 2001). 
  Stephen Fritz's Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II 
  (Lexington, KY, University of Kentucky, 1995) is a first-class general view 
  of German soldiers throughout the period, and Tony Le Tissier's With 
  Our Backs to Berlin (Stroud, Sutton Publishing, 2003) gives further details 
  of the last days. H.W. Koch's Hitler Youth: Origins and Development 
  1922-45 (New York, Stein 8c Day, 1975) has much detail of value, as do 
  Hans Holztrager's In a Raging Inferno (Solihull, Helion 8c Co., 2002) and 
  Karl Bahm's Berlin 1945 - The Final Reckoning (Osceola, WI, Motorbooks, 
  2002). Those needing an analysis of the second part of the campaign in 
  the east could do no better than read John Erikson's masterly The Road 
  to Berlin (New York, Harper 8c Row, 1983), Kurt Mehner's Geheime 
  Tagesberichte (Onasbruck, Biblio Verlag, 1984) and David Westwood (ed.) 
  German and Russian Tactical Operations (Buxton, MLRS Books Ltd, 2004).
  
  Wired for destruction. German 
  engineers have set up explosive 
  charges in the building, and these 
  wires lead from the detonators 
  to the firing control box. 
  COLOUR PLATE COMMENTARY 
  A: THE 
  NEBELWERFER 
  The war in Russia showed the Germans that they needed 
  artillery; the heavy horse- and tractor-drawn pieces were all 
  very well in normal operations, but they were very slow in the 
  advance in comparison with armour, and when things 
  happened fast artillery was needed to attack advancing 
  Russian troops quickly and effectively. The six-barrelled 
  Nebelwerfer 41 was one of the answers. This weapon was 
  designed and brought into use very quickly, being first 
  issued to Werfer-Abteilungen in 1941. It was built on the 
  standard 3.7cm Pak 35/36 carriage, of particular reuse value 
  since the Pak 35/36 gun was already outdated and 
  increasingly ineffective against Russian armour. 
  The calibre was actually 15.85cm, and the length of the 
  barrels was 1.3m (3ft 3in). Travelling weight was 590kg 
  (1,298lb), allowing it to be manhandled by its crew of four. It 
  had a traverse of 24° and elevation from -5° to +45°. The 
  muzzle velocity was 340mps (1,118fps), and shell weights 
  were: HE 34.15kg (75lb), Smoke 35.48kg (78lb). Range was 
  6900m (27,640ft) maximum. 
  The rate of fire, most important later in the war when large 
  masses of Russian soldiers were involved in attacks, was six 
  rockets in ten seconds, and three salvos of six rockets in five 
  minutes. Later, the Germans developed the larger 21cm 
  version (the Nebelwerfer 42) which came into full service in 
  1943, but did not replace the 15cm version. Due to the fact 
  that the weapon fired a rocket from an open barrel, there was 
  little or no recoil, and the weapon was easily moved from 
  position to position either by its tractor or by its crew. 
  Loading was simple: the rockets were pushed into the 
  barrels from the rear, and fired electrically in a ripple salvo. 
  B: NEW WEAPONS FOR THE INFANTRY 
  1. Anti-tank warfare on the eastern front was a fact of life. 
  The growing number of Russian tanks and the Russian habit 
  of throwing tanks into any battle situation meant that more 
  than just standard anti-tank weapons were needed. Often 
  the situation demanded that the infantry had their own 
  anti-tank weapon in addition to the regimental guns. 
  1. The solution was the Panzerfaust, which was a throwaway 
  weapon designed by Dr H. Langweiler of HASAG in Leipzig. 
  Research in 1942 was followed by troop trials from July 1943 
  onwards. The original designs included versions effective at 
  30m (100ft) up to 250m (820ft), but only the 30, 60 and 100m 
  (100, 200 and 320ft) versions were finally produced. 
  The version in this illustration is the production 60m (200ft) 
  weapon. It weighed 6.8kg (15lb), with a bomb weight of 3kg 
  (6lb 9oz). Although having a very low muzzle velocity - just 
  45mps (150fps) - because it was a shaped-charge weapon, 
  the bomb could penetrate 200mm (8in) of armour at 30°. It 
  was an extremely effective weapon which was simple to use, 
  and was much feared by Allied tank crews. 
  2. The Gewehr 98k was issued as the standard infantry 
  rifle, but was also fitted with telescopic sights for sharp 
  shooting and sniper work. This rifle is fitted with the 
  high-turret telescope mounting, and has a modified safety 
  catch which allows operation despite the telescopic sight, 
  which would interfere with the normal safety-catch fitting. 
  3. The Germans had no equivalent for the American 
  Garand M1 semi-automatic rifle, and seemed to have little 
  interest in the development of an assault rifle until they met 
  the Russian Tokarev. At that time they immediately went into 
  design and development and the first to appear was the 
  41W/Gew 41/41 M range of weapons. The 41 W rifle (3a) 
  was a semi-automatic rifle which used the muzzle blast to 
  operate the mechanism via a rod mounted on the top of the 
  barrel. It was chambered for the standard German service 
  calibre 7.92mm, but was both heavy 4.65kg (10lb 4oz) and 
  clumsy. The design was by Walther. The second design, the 
  41 M by Mauser, later became the Gewehr 43 or Kar 43 (3b). 
  This weapon was again chambered for the full-size German 
  service cartridge, but weighed only 4.03kg (8lb 14oz) It had 
  a 10-round detachable magazine. It was very similar to the 
  Russian Tokarev weapon, and the design was good, 
  
  although manufacture was crude. It could also be fitted with 
  a telescopic sight for sniper use. 
  4. The true assault rifle emerged in the MP43 and MP44 
  weapons, which were designed to fire the short 7.92 x 33mm 
  intermediate military cartridge, rather than the more powerful 
  7.92 x 57mm fired by standard German infantry weapons. 
  The short cartridge had the advantage that the weapon firing 
  it, although having a reduced effective range, could be fired 
  semi-automatically with the user maintaining aim during 
  firing. The MP44 shown (also known as the StG 44) was a 
  very effective short- to medium-range weapon, and the 
  lighter cartridge meant that users could carry more 
  ammunition, which was supplied via 30-round pressed steel 
  magazines. One disadvantage of the long magazine was that 
  firing in the prone position was difficult. The rifle was, almost 
  certainly, the precursor of the Kalashnikov AK47 (see also 
  Plate C). 
  C: THE MP 4 4 / S T G 44 
  This rifle was designed to replace the standard German Kar 
  98k. It fired the shorter, lighter 7.92 x 33mm kurz (short) 
  round, created originally by the Polte Werke in Hamburg in 
  1941. The designers were aware that Hitler would not have 
  approved the redesign of the standard cartridge, and so the 
  rifle was initially known as an MP (Maschinenpistole -
  submachine gun). Two initial designs, by Haenel in Suhl and 
  Walther at Zella-Mehlis, eventually combined to produce the 
  final weapon. 
  The weapon is shown here stripped and assembled. 
  1. The butt and the return spring. The return spring was 
  compressed after firing as the working parts were forced to 
  the rear by the piston. It then pushed the breech block and 
  the piston forward to reload the weapon. 
  2. The breech block contained the firing pin and the 
  extractor. It was carried by the movement of the piston, and 
  extracted empty cases, pushed new cartridges from the 
  magazine into the breech, and fired each cartridge when the 
  trigger was pressed. 
  3. The piston: the piston was operated by gas pressure 
  after firing (via a small gas port in the barrel), and when 
  pushed back it unlocked the breech block which, in turn, 
  extracted the spent case. It returned to its position of rest 
  (forward) between shots, having reloaded the weapon during 
  its forward movement 
  4. The gun body: the pistol grip and trigger mechanism 
  could be moved down (after the butt and return spring were 
  removed) to the position shown to allow the weapon to be 
  field stripped. A simple locking pin held the grip in position 
  when fully assembled. 
  5. The lower barrel cover: this was a light, steel fitting 
  which protected the user's left hand from burns when firing. 
  6. The 30-round box magazine. 
  7. A five-round clip of 7.92 x 33mm cartridges for the 
  weapon. 
  D: UNIFORMS 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 
  By 1944 German uniforms and equipment were altering to 
  reflect the new weapons and equipment available, and the 
  need to carry ammunition effectively. Further, leather 
  supplies were getting scarcer, as were supplies of good 
  quality cloth, and these shortages were reflected in the kit 
  issued to the front-line soldier. 
  The man on the left wears the new gaiters (similar to the 
  British issue) in place of the old full boot, but the rest of his 
  equipment is as it would have been in 1940. He carries a 
  Panzerfaust and a G43 rifle. Next to him stands a soldier 
  issued with the hooded combat jacket which appeared later in 
  the war. Sometimes these had camouflage patterns, 
  sometimes not. He is also wearing cold-weather boots, and is 
  armed with a StG 44 rifle. The man holding the map is wearing 
  a waterproof combat jacket, and also wears cold-weather 
  boots. The officer, pointing at the map, has a similar combat 
  jacket, and carries binoculars and a set of MP44 pouches, 
  designed to carry the long magazines for the StG/MP44. The 
  soldier on the right wears standard equipment and is armed 
  with a Gewehr 98k, but is also wearing gaiters. 
  E: INFANTRY SUPPORT: THE 
  STURMGESCHUTZ 
  German infantry artillery support was initially horse- or 
  vehicle-drawn, and this method of providing support was 
  adequate in the campaigns in the west and southeast. 
  However, the appearance of the Russian T34 and the hordes 
  of Russian infantry meant that more immediate local support 
  was needed. The Germans saw the value of fitting infantry 
  guns to tank chassis, and many versions of the 
  Sturmgeschutz or assault gun were produced. Captured 
  tanks were fitted with field guns up to 15cm, as were German 
  chassis, but the need for mobile, armoured, anti-tank 
  defence became acute on the eastern front. One of the 
  successful assault/anti-tank SP (self-propelled) guns was 
  the Sturmgeschutz III. 
  Seen in the illustration is the later version, fitted with a 
  7.5cm Pak 40 gun, and known as the Sturmgeschutz II Ausf 
  F or G. 
  The gun was fitted with a limited traverse, which meant 
  that the vehicle had to be turned to allow increased traverse 
  for the gun, but the gun itself was second only to the 8.8cm. 
  It fired an anti-tank shell weighing 10kg (22lb) at a muzzle 
  velocity of 600mps (2,300fps), a HE shell weighing 12kg 
  (27lb) at 550mps (1,800fps), hollow-charge ammunition at 
  450mps (1,500fps) and smoke at 360mps (1,770fps). 
  The vehicle had frontal hull armour of 81mm (3in) at 52°, 
  31mm (11/2in) plate on the sides (and the vehicle shown also 
  has extra plates fitted against attacks by hollow-charge 
  rocket) and 51 mm (2in) at rear. The engine was the Maybach 
  HL 120 TRM petrol engine developing 295hp at 3,000rpm. 
  Performance was quite impressive, with the vehicle able to 
  cross a 2.6m (8ft 6in) trench, to ford to 0.8m (2ft 9in), and to 
  climb a 30° gradient. Maximum speed was 32km/h (20mph). 
  Also in the illustration are the accompanying infantry, 
  without whom the vehicle was extremely vulnerable to 
  close-quarter attack. The man in front carries a PzB 39 
  anti-tank rifle which, although ineffective against Russian 
  T34s, was useful in the anti-sniper role and against 
  soft-skinned vehicles. 
  F: HITLER YOUTH WITH 
  PANZERFAUST 
  The Panzerfaust as an anti-tank weapon is described in Plate 
  B1. It was very effective against tanks at short ranges, and in 
  trained hands would destroy most battle tanks, or damage 
  them sufficiently to remove them from operations. Here a Hitler 
  Youth waits behind cover in Berlin to get a shot at his target. 
  The Hitler Youth were imbued with the spirit of Nazism, 
  and could have been a significant obstacle to the Russians 
  
  • 
  had they been well trained. However, the majority of the 
  members of the organisation were not entirely willing 
  volunteers and, even in the last battle, were prone to go 
  home at the earliest opportunity. Older members (such as 
  this young man) were trained in the basics of combat, and 
  had had some urban operations training from members of 
  the army and the Waffen-SS. 
  The uniform is the standard dark grey/black, and he also 
  wears a Volkssturm armband, which might protect him as a 
  combatant before he fired the Panzerfaust, but not 
  afterwards. The fanaticism of the few in the Hitler Youth who 
  fought led to thousands of casualties to no real avail, for 
  these boys of 14 to 18 years had no battlefield experience, 
  were abysmally led and were shoved straight into the 
  front-line with no hope of real success. They were one of the 
  many sacrifices the Germans made to Hitler's opportunism. 
  G: MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE 
  Mounted reconnaissance was still very much a part of 
  German operational technique in the east. Here a Waffen-SS 
  rider observes the enemy with his binoculars. Mounted 
  infantry became few and far between as the war progressed, 
  but the value of fast-moving horsed observers was never 
  forgotten. The horse wears a standard Wehrmacht double 
  bridle, and has 1934-pattern leather pouches for the man's 
  personal kit either side of the withers of the horse. Military 
  horses were, of course, extremely costly in terms of the time 
  taken to maintain them, and feeding was always a demand 
  on railway cars for fodder in the winter. 
  H: BERLIN - APRIL 1 9 4 5 
  The situation that Germany was in could no longer be hidden 
  behind the bravado and bragging from Joseph Goebbels as 
  This picture shows the impressive range of the hand-held 
  flame-thrower, the Flammenwerfer 41. This was an assault 
  engineer equipment, which was modified when the effect 
  of cold upon it in Russia was realised. The new version 
  was a ten-shot weapon, firing a 11/2 second burst of flame 
  on each trigger pull. It was an exceptional weapon for house 
  and bunker clearing, but the backpack made operators 
  very vulnerable. 
  the Russians closed in on their main target. The city was 
  increasingly under siege as massive Russian formations 
  strove to enter it and to bring an end to the war. The 
  inhabitants were short of food, lied to by their government, 
  and increasingly aware of the desperate military situation. 
  Although many were still convinced that Hitler would lead 
  them out of the 'jaws of defeat', many others were more 
  realistic. Those with members of their family in the armed 
  forces were seeing the frightfulness of war close at hand, 
  and some, as the mother in this illustration, were faced with 
  their husband's murder by SS flying courts. 
  The General SS {Allgemeine SS) and the various security 
  branches of the armed forces and the German police were 
  operating in the city in 1945, and any serviceman without 
  cast-iron evidence that he was where he was intended to be 
  risked his life. The man here was strung up to a lamppost 
  because he had no proof that he was on his way back to his 
  unit. His wife and children, to their total shock, have come 
  upon his body, and the two infantrymen are explaining why he 
  has been executed. Such scenes were commonplace in the 
  Third Reich of 1945. In the background the Brandenburg gate 
  shows damage caused by Russian shelling, and the smoke 
  drifting over the scene comes from burning buildings in the 
  east of the city, where Russian forces are already advancing. 
  
  INDEX 
  Figures in bold refer to illustrations 
  aircraft 5, 44 
  Alakurti 43 
  Altner, Helmut 58 
  Arctic Circle, German forces north of 27 
  artillery, Russian 18-19 
  Beer, Major 7,8,9-10 
  Berezina Valley 7, 8 
  Berezino 7, 8, 9 
  Berlin 58-60, H 
  Borisov 7, 8 
  combat, urban 17-18 
  corporal, German 7 
  Daliki, partisan headquarters 7-12, 11 
  defence, German tactical 15-26 
  anti-tank 17 
  armoured forces task force seizes two 
  bridges 19-26, 22 
  battle headquarters, company 22 
  defensive positions 5, 15-16, 16, 17, 19 
  towns and villages used for 17, 18, 24 
  Doberitz 59 
  Donitz, Reichs President Karl 59 
  equipment 
  chain saw, light electric 8 
  explosive charges 61 
  saw, double-ended 31 
  rafts, rubber 54 
  searchlights, Russian 59 
  'Esche' delaying position 48-49 
  Finland, northern 27, 43-51, 47 
  German raid on Russian strongpoint (Feb 
  1944) 28-32,30,41-42 
  Russian raid on German strongpoint, and 
  response (Aug 1944) 43-46 
  Finns 27 
  Frankfort an der Oder 55, 57 
  German Army 27 see also Wehrmacht 
  Armoured Infantry Regiment, 3, 1 
  Company 21 
  Army, 6 4 
  Army Group Centre 19 
  Artillery Regiment, 75 21 
  Einsatzgruppen 60 
  Fusilier Regiment, 34, 2 Company (35 
  Infantry Division) 22 
  Grenadier Regiment, 2 55-58 
  Hitler Youth {Hitlerjugend) 59-60, F 
  infantry 10, 45, 58-59 
  Infantry Corps, XXXVI 27, 43, 47 
  Infantry Division, 163 (XXXVI Corps) 43, 
  47,50 
  Infantry Regiment, 188 20, 21, 22 
  Infantry Regiment, 307 44-46, 47, 47, 
  48-50 
  Mountain Infantry Corps, XIX 27, 28 
  Mountain Infantry Regiment, 143,1 
  Battalion 29-32,41-42 
  Panzer Corps, XL 12 
  679 Regiment (333 Infantry Division) 
  12, 13-15 
  Panzer Division, 3 19, 26 
  Relief Army 59 
  Tank Regiment, 6 
  2 Company 24, 25 
  5 Company 21, 24, 25-26 
  6 Company 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 
  Volkssturm 59, 60 
  Waffen-SS 4, 16, G 
  Wenck Army 59 
  German counterattack in southern Poland 
  19-26, 22 
  Germany, battle for 54-60 
  fighting in Berlin 58-60 
  Oder crossings 54-58, 57 
  Goebbels, Joseph 63 
  Hauen 59 
  Hill 285 44-45,46 
  Hill 742 29,31 
  Hill 766 42 
  Hill 783 29,32,42 
  Hill 791 29,31,32,42 
  Hill 856 29, 30, 32, 41, 42 
  Hitler, Adolf 49, 58, 60, 62 
  Hofer, senior sergeant 30, 41, 42 
  infantry, German 10, 45 
  infantryman, German 58-59 
  Ivan Bor 10 
  Kallunki 50 
  Kandalaksha front 27 
  Kielce 19,20,21 
  Konstantinovka 12, 13 
  Koschorrek, Gunter 12-13 
  Krasnotorka 13, 14, 15 
  Kursk, battle of 19 
  Lake On 43, 44, 46 
  Lake Tolvand 44, 46 
  Lake Yelchen 44, 45, 47 
  leave 4 
  Lepel 7,8,9 
  Litsa River 28, 30, 42 
  Mount Voyti 47, 48 
  mounted reconnaissance G 
  Murmansk front 27 
  observation post, treetop 23 
  Oder River crossings 54-58, 57 
  Onkamo position 50 
  partisans, warfare against 5-12 
  attack on partisan headquarters (June 
  1943) 6-12, 11 
  tactical lessons learnt, first 6 
  Poland, southern, German counterattack in 
  19-26, 22 
  Pospach 10 
  poster, propaganda 49 
  Potsdam 59 
  Pripyat River 51, 52, 52, 53, 54 
  reconnaissance, mounted G 
  rest and relaxation 5, 19 
  road, 'corduroy' tree trunk 21 
  road under enemy observation 41 
  Russian Army 5, 60 
  artillery 18-19 
  Rifle Division, 67 44 
  Russian prisoners 6 
  Russo-Finnish armistice 27 
  Schmitt, Lieutenant Colonel 44, 45, 46, 48, 
  49,50 
  Seelow Heights 59 
  sergeant, German 27 
  Slavyansk 12, 15 
  Stalingrad, battle of 4 
  Stichler, Lieutenant 59 
  Swamp Bridgehead (June 1944) 51-54, 52 
  tactical defence, German see defence, 
  German tactical 
  taiga, German withdrawal through (Sept 
  1944) 27-32,46-51,47 
  Tumcha River 47, 48 
  tundra, fighting in 27-32, 41-54 
  German raid on Russian strongpoint in 
  northern Finland (Feb 1944) 28-32, 
  30, 41-42 
  German withdrawal through taiga (Sept 
  1944) 27-32,46-51,47 
  Russian raid on German strongpoint in 
  northern Finland, and response (Aug 
  1944) 43-46 
  Swamp Bridgehead (June 1944) 51-54, 52 
  uniforms, German D 
  vehicles 58 
  ambulance, German field 14 
  assault gun (Sturmgeschutz) 5, E 
  lorry, German signals 26 
  tank, Panther 19 
  tank, T34 12-13,20,32 
  trailer, horse-drawn 21 
  truck, German 56 
  Verdun 19 
  Vistula River, upper 19, 21 
  Voyti Strongpoint 47, 48 
  Vuorijarvi 47, 48 
  weapons 4-5 see also equipment: explosive 
  charges 
  anti-aircraft gun,, Russian M1939 85mm 
  42 
  anti-tank, Panzerfaust 17, 60, Bl, D, F 
  flamethrowers 48, 63 
  gun, anti-tank, Flak 36 88mm 12 
  gun, anti-tank, Russian 76.2mm 9 
  gun, field, Russian 31 
  gun, Flak 38 2cm 13 
  gun, infantry, Schwere Infanteriegeschutz 33 
  15cm 51 
  gun, light, Russian 27 
  gun, light infantry 7.5cm 43 
  gun, s FH 18 15cm 25 
  infantry, German B 
  machine gun, Maxim water-cooled Russian 
  18 
  machine gun, MG34 28, 53 
  machine gun, MG42 4, 15 
  mortar, Granatwerfer 34 8cm 15 
  Nebelwerfer A 
  rifle, 41 M (Gewehr 43/Kar 43) B3b, D 
  rifle, 41 W B3a 
  rifle, Gewehr 98k 4, B2, D 
  rifle, MP 44 (StG 44) assault 4, B4, C, D 
  rocket, Schweres Wurfgerat 40 28/32cm 46 
  Wehrmacht 16, 54 see also German Army 
  Wily 7, 10 
  winter combat 12-15, 43-44 
  Yelchen, Strongpoint 44, 45, 46, 47 
  Zobel, Lieutenant 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 
  
  Insights into the daily lives of history's fighting men and 
  women, past and present, detailing their motivation, training, 
  tactics, weaponry and experiences 
  Full colour artwork 
  Unrivalled detail 
  OSPREY 
  PUBLISHING 
  www.ospreypublishing.com 
  Photographs 
  German 
  Infantryman (3) 
  Eastern Front 
  1943-45 
  This third volume of a successful 
  mini-series examines the German 
  infantryman in the latter part 
  of World War II. The German 
  infantryman on the Eastern 
  Front was constantly in retreat, 
  often short of equipment, 
  sometimes hungry, cold and wet. 
  Nevertheless, and despite 
  the overwhelming numbers 
  of Soviet troops and armour 
  facing them, these soldiers' 
  resistance was always fierce, 
  and cost the Russians dearly. 
  During this period, defensive 
  tactics involved close artillery 
  and tank cooperation, even 
  at small unit level. Containing 
  previously unpublished 
  photographs and poignant 
  first hand accounts, this book 
  explores in superb detail the 
  infantryman's daily life, duties 
  and combat action. 
  
SOURCE: textdata/thevault/Osprey System/Warrior Series (WAR)/Osprey - WAR 093 - German Infantryman (3) Eastern Front 1943-45.pdf