TEXT: Apache Tactics 1830–86 
  ROBERT N. WATT
  ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Elite • 119
  Apache Tactics 1830–86
  ROBERT N. WATT 
  ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK
  Series editor Martin Windrow
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  CONTENTS
  INTRODUCTION
  4
  The historical background – the Apaches and Spain, Mexico, and the United States 
  The scope of this text 
  The scale of Apache warfare
  CHRONOLOGY
  8
  ENVIRONMENT AND CULTURE
  13
  Apacheria 
  The role of raiding in Apache life 
  Training 
  Leadership
  GUERRILLA STRATEGIES & TACTICS
  16
  THE RAID
  Raiding ranches and villages 
  EVASION
  18
  Victorio’s evasion strategy 
  THE AMBUSH
  23
  The planned ambush: Ojo Caliente, September 4, 1879 – Cuchillo Negro River, September 30, 1879 –
  Santa Cruz Mountains, May 15, 1886 
  The killing ambush: Candelaria Mountains, November 1879
  Ambush by decoy and deception: Horseshoe Canyon, October 24, 1871 – Las Animas River, September
  18, 1879 – Sierra Madre Mountains, April 1883 – McEvers Ranch, September 10–11, 1879 – Whetstone
  Mountains, May 5, 1871 – Caballo Mountains, January 30, 1880 
  The ad hoc ambush: the Apache
  “roadside bomb” – Las Palomas, March 1880 – Goodsight Mountains, September 7, 1880 – Carrizo
  Canyon, August 12, 1881
  THE ATTACK
  44
  The rarity of direct attack 
  Attack after successful ambush: Cerro Mata Ortiz, November 13, 
  1882 – Conline’s skirmish, April 5, 1880
  Combined tactics: Hembrillo Basin, April 6–7, 1880 
  OTHER ASPECTS OF APACHE WARFARE 
  53
  Targeting horses and mules 
  Reactions to American technology 
  Terror tactics 
  THE FAILURE OF APACHE RESISTANCE 
  59
  The Apache scouts 
  Shortage of ammunition 
  Numerical weakness 
  Defeats
  FURTHER READING
  62
  INDEX
  64
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  INTRODUCTION
  In the middle to late 19th century, Apaches often out-fought their Mexican
  and American opponents by deploying a wide range of skilfully developed
  guerrilla strategies and tactics. By 1876 Apache guerrillas had adopted,
  through trade and capture, modern breech-loading rifles, which allowed them
  to develop a more aggressive style of warfare than their earlier hit-and-run
  tactics, which had been limited by the use of bows and muzzle-loading
  muskets. During the 1870s and 1880s their guerrilla skills proved so effective
  that the US Army ultimately had to “become Apaches” in order to defeat
  them, relying heavily on large numbers of Apaches enrolled in the companies
  of Indian Scouts.
  During the 17th and 18th centuries the Spanish colonists of Mexico and
  the old Southwest had variable success against the Apaches. Their policies
  veered back and forth, between outright extermination by the use of military
  force, and attempted assimilation by the use of the presidio system – the
  establishment of scattered centers that combined the characteristics of
  colonial forts, Catholic missions and civil settlements. It was argued that this
  system, though expensive, would gradually undermine the Apaches’ ability to
  resist: attracted to settle around these sources of food and trade goods, they
  would become so dependent upon such resources that they would lose their
  ability to survive independently. The goods supplied to them included not
  only beef and alcohol, but also sub-standard muskets, which only the Spanish
  would be able to repair for them.
  In the later 18th century the Spanish combined this approach with
  pressure to “assimilate, or be exterminated,” which, although not wholly
  successful, did produce a period of relative peace in the early 19th century.
  However, this did not long survive Mexico’s achievement of independence
  from Spain in 1821. By the 1830s the Mexicans were unable or unwilling
  to continue funding and administering the presidio system, and relations with
  the Apaches broke down into a relentless cycle of war, temporary truce, and
  renewed war. The authorities in the Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua
  – with little Federal control, and often sunk in near-anarchic internal rivalries
  – resorted to offering cash bounties for the scalps of Apache men, women
  and children. Inevitably, atrocity begat atrocity, and some areas became
  actually uninhabitable by Mexicans – for example, the mining center of Santa
  4
  APACHE TACTICS 1830–86 
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  Rita near the Pinos Altos Mts, abandoned under the attacks of the Mimbreno
  Apaches led by the vengeful chief Mangas Coloradas.1 Nevertheless, at the
  same time the current governors of each state were capable of reaching
  temporary truces with the Apaches. The latter often turned this to their
  5
  This posed study of an Apache
  warrior (whose name is given
  phonetically as “Goodygouye”)
  is a good deal more convincing
  than most. It shows a short,
  muscular man wearing a
  headband, breechclout and
  knee-length moccasins – the
  preferred fighting dress of an
  Apache. He is armed with a
  .45/70 Springfield M1873 rifle,
  and a revolver holstered butt-
  forwards on his left hip from his
  cartridge belt. Handguns
  appear in a number of photos
  of Apaches, and an account of
  an action by a detachment
  from the 9th US Cavalry in 1879
  mentions one of their Navajo
  scouts being killed by a warrior
  with a revolver. (Courtesy
  Arizona Historical Society, 
  no. 41255) 
  1 For notes on the different Apache tribes and groups, and aspects of Apache culture, see
  Osprey Men-at-Arms 186, The Apaches, by Jason & Richard Hook. The most basic tribal
  divisions were as follows: Jicarilla (Olleros/Hoyeros & Llaneros groups; NE New Mexico
  & S Colorado); Mescalero (Sacramento, Guadelupe & Davis Mts of SE New Mexico,
  & W Texas); Chiricahua (Eastern – Mimbreno & Warm Springs groups, SW New Mexico;
  Central – Chokonen or “Cochise” group, SE Arizona, New Mexico & Mexico; Southern –
  Nednhi or “Bronco,” Sierra Madre Mts of Mexico); and Western Apaches (White
  Mountain/Coyotero, Cibecue, San Carlos, N & S Tonto groups, Arizona)
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  advantage: if they were at peace with Sonora, they would raid in Chihuahua
  and trade their plunder back in Sonora, and vice versa. 
  The regional authorities of the United States became embroiled in this
  situation after the USA annexed a huge segment of Mexican territory
  following victory in the Mexican-American War (1846–48). The Apaches took
  similar advantage of the international frontier as they did of regional borders,
  and the cycle of “trade/hate” relations continued until Geronimo’s surrender
  in September 1886. (As Geronimo was being escorted out of Mexico during
  that month by Apache scouts and US troops, a large body of Mexican troops
  shadowed them. Much to the US officers’ consternation, their Indian Scouts
  prepared for a fight, and Geronimo made it known that he and his warriors
  would side with the Americans if the Mexicans attacked. Hostilities
  were avoided only after a tense round of negotiation between the US and
  Mexican officers.)
  There were a number of violent incidents between Americans and Apaches
  in the 1840s and 1850s, and an influx of American miners and settlers
  6
  In most studio photographs –
  as here – Apaches are shown
  wearing their best clothing.
  This scout also holds a single-
  shot M1873 Springfield, the
  most common model of rifle
  and carbine carried in the later
  Indian Wars. (Courtesy Arizona
  Historical Society, no. 50136) 
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  Parts of Apacheria are far from
  the Hollywood image of arid
  desert. This scene gives an idea
  of the dense vegetation that
  can be found near water or
  higher in the mountain ranges.
  (Courtesy Arizona Historical
  Society, no. 14896)
  7
  By contrast, this bleak view
  shows the buildings at the
  San Carlos Indian Agency,
  between the Salt and Gila
  rivers. The Chiricahuas who
  were sent to San Carlos in the
  mid-1870s were settled on the
  barren and unhealthy land that
  was not already occupied by
  the Western Apaches – whom
  they regarded with suspicion,
  or outright hostility. (Courtesy
  Arizona Historical Society,
  no. 19864) 
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  into New Mexico led to new tensions with the Chiricahua Apaches. Mangas
  Coloradas was provoked into war by encroachments into his territory
  and an attack on an Apache camp in December 1860. Early in 1861 his ally
  Cochise was wrongly accused of raiding and kidnapping, and was held by
  US troops while under a flag of truce. Cochise managed to break free, but his
  brother and five other Apache warriors were detained; Cochise in turn took
  four Americans hostage, and when negotiations broke down both sides killed
  their prisoners. Between 1860 and 1886, the Apaches would pursue the
  traditional cycle of alternating war and truce with the USA. The situation was
  aggravated during the early 1860s by the simultaneous American Civil War,
  which left regional security in the hands of local volunteers rather than regular
  Federal troops.
  * * *
  This book’s title refers to the whole period 1830–1886, because the essential
  nature of Apache strategies and tactics was unchanged throughout that
  half-century. (In this context “strategy” is used to mean maneuvers undertaken
  out of sight of the enemy, and “tactics” refers to maneuvers on the battlefield,
  within sight of the enemy.) Although it largely relies upon illustrative examples
  from the warfare orchestrated by two of the most able Chiricahua Apache
  leaders, Victorio (Bi-du-ya) and Nana (Kas-tziden), principally in New Mexico
  and Chihuahua from 1879 to 1881, incidents from the earlier Apache wars
  and the period 1882–86 are also mentioned where appropriate.
  An essential point to note is the relatively small scale of this type of
  warfare. This was not war conducted in the grand manner, but a classic “small
  war,” where it was unusual for the total number of fighting men to exceed
  3,000 at any one time. The Apaches of the 1830s to 1860s could sometimes
  mount expeditions involving several hundred warriors, but the long war of
  attrition with the Mexicans and then the Americans took a steady toll. By the
  climactic period between 1879 and 1883 Apache leaders rarely directed more
  than a hundred warriors at a time; yet their tried and tested guerrilla strategies
  and tactics often left their far more numerous US and Mexican opponents
  confounded, while the threat that they were believed to present paralyzed
  economic activity in northern Mexico, Arizona and New Mexico. The last
  resistance mounted in 1885–86 by Geronimo, Naiche, Nana, Ulzana and his
  brother Chihuahua (his Mexican name – not to be confused with the Mexican
  state) involved fewer than 50 warriors. Yet this band was still able to ambush
  and defeat at least one US Army detachment less than four months before
  they finally surrendered in 1886. The aim of this book is to give readers an
  idea of why and how such small numbers of fighting men managed to hold out
  for so many years before finally succumbing to the vastly greater manpower
  and firepower of the United States. In the process, it is hoped to suggest wider
  lessons to be learned from one of modern history’s most impressive examples
  of “classic” guerrilla tactics.
  CHRONOLOGY
  1821 Mexico gains independence from Spain.
  1830s–1850s Intermittent warfare between the Mexicans of Chihuahua and
  Sonora states and the Apaches is characterized by raid and counter-raid,
  massacre and retaliation, punctuated by temporary and unreliable truces.
  8
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  Periodically, both Mexican states resort to uncoordinated policies of
  extermination, by offering bounties for Apache scalps.
  1848 A large tract of “Apacheria” passes into the jurisdiction of the USA
  at the end of the Mexican-American War.
  Dec 1860 An unprovoked attack on an Apache village by a party of miners
  provokes Mangas Coloradas of the Eastern Chiricahua into war with
  the Americans.
  Feb 1861 A false accusation of raiding and kidnapping, and the mutual
  killing of hostages, provoke Cochise of the Central Chiricahua into open
  warfare with the USA, in collaboration with Mangas Coloradas.
  1861–62 On the outbreak of the Civil War the few Federal troops based in
  Arizona depart, and the citizens of the territory find themselves in a state
  of siege by the Apaches.
  1862 As part of an effort to drive Confederate forces out of Arizona and
  New Mexico, Gen Carleton marches east at the head of volunteer Union
  troops raised in California. July 14: The advance guard is ambushed
  in Apache Pass by large numbers of Apaches directed by Cochise and
  Mangas Coloradas. The deployment of two mountain howitzers decides
  the day for the Californians.
  1862–71 A prolonged guerrilla war of attrition ensues between the USA and
  Apaches led by Cochise and Mangas Coloradas. Jan 1863: Mangas
  Coloradas, taken prisoner under a flag of truce, is shot “while trying to
  escape.” Cochise continues the fight; neither side gains the upper hand,
  but both US and Mexican forces inflict steady casualties upon the
  Chiricahuas, which ultimately prove unsustainable. By 1871 Cochise is
  willing to consider peace overtures. Independently, the Western Apaches,
  some of whom had allied with Cochise in the early 1860s, continue
  making periodic raids upon US citizens.
  April 1871 Tucson citizens and Papago Indians slaughter peaceful Western
  Apaches in the “Camp Grant massacre.” A national outcry, and continued
  raids by infuriated Apaches, prompt the appointment of LtCol George
  Crook as commander of the Department of Arizona. He arrives in June
  with a remit to force an end to hostilities, while a peace commission under
  Vincent Colyer and Gen Oliver Howard is sent to establish reservations.
  Sept–Oct 1872 Gen Howard concludes a peace treaty with Cochise, who
  agrees to settle on a reservation based on the Dragoon and Chiricahua Mts
  around Fort Bowie, Arizona. This brings Cochise’s 11-year war with the
  USA to an end, and saves the Chiricahua from being targeted in Crook’s
  forthcoming “Tonto Basin campaign” against the Western Apaches in
  Arizona. Other Chiricahua bands at Old Fort Tularosa reservation remain
  restless, wishing to move to the Ojo Caliente (Warm Springs) reservation
  in New Mexico.
  Nov 1872–April 1873 Crook launches several company-sized columns each
  accompanied by Indian Scouts, and keeps them in the field for long
  periods by use of mule-trains.These tactics take the Western Apaches by
  surprise; they suffer heavy casualties, and the winter campaign destroys
  their will to resist. Key defeats are inflicted at Salt River Cave in Dec 1872,
  and Turret Mountain in March 1873. Most of the Western Apaches agree
  to settle upon reservations around Fort Apache and San Carlos. Crook
  is promoted to brigadier-general.
  1873–74 Gen Crook keeps his troops and scouts in the field against
  uncowed Western Apache bands, launching a second offensive in
  9
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  1
  2
  left flank guard
  advance guard
  right flank guard
  rear guard
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  Jan 1874. This inflicts further serious
  losses, culminating in the killing of
  the remaining militant leaders by
  Aug 1874. In the same year Cochise
  dies of natural causes; and the US
  government agrees to Victorio’s people
  returning to Ojo Caliente.
  1875–76 The Department of the Interior
  adopts a new cost-cutting policy to
  concentrate all Apaches – of mutually
  hostile tribes and bands – on a
  single reservation at San Carlos; this
  disastrous mistake is largely responsible
  for the Apache wars of 1877–86. The
  Chiricahua reservation around Fort Bowie is closed, and its inhabitants
  are moved to San Carlos. 
  1877–79 The concentration policy gathers momentum. May 1877, the Ojo
  Caliente reservation is closed, and Apaches led by Victorio, Loco and
  Nana are transferred to San Carlos. They protest this move, and in
  Sept 1877 they lead warriors in breaking out of the reservation. The
  US government authorizes Gen Edward Ord, then commanding the
  Department of Texas, to mount “hot pursuits” over the Mexican border.
  Between Oct 1877 and Aug 1879, Victorio and Nana fight for a return to
  Warm Springs; Loco chooses to return to San Carlos and pursue the same
  goal peacefully.
  Sept 1879–May 1880 Having caused minimal casualties in the US between
  1877 and 1879, Victorio loses patience, and wages all-out war against the
  USA and Mexico. He outwits or defeats every force sent against him, and
  his warriors inflict heavy casualties upon the citizens and soldiers of both
  countries. He is gradually worn down by a defeat at the hands of Apache
  scouts in May 1880, and by being outmaneuvered by the 10th US Cavalry
  in West Texas during July–Aug 1880.
  Oct 1880 Victorio is finally trapped and killed at Tres Castillos by c.400
  Mexican state troops led by Joaquin Terrazas, supported by a large
  US expedition that enters Mexico by agreement with state authorities
  but without permission from the weak Mexican central government. 
  July–Aug 1881 Nana, Victorio’s successor, regroups survivors of Tres Castillos
  and launches a legendary raid into New Mexico. At the age of about
  75 years, he leads his raiders approx. 1,500 miles in six weeks, holds off
  APACHE “MARCHING FORMATION”
  This illustrates a typical formation for travel – both highly
  practical, and implicitly incorporating the “four sacred
  directions” for protection. Depending upon terrain and
  circumstances, the distance between the main body and its
  advance, flank and rear guards might be measured in yards or
  miles. The Apache party here consists of a small group of
  Mescalero warriors, c.1840 (inset 1), escorting a larger group
  mainly of women and children (inset 2). The formation might
  equally be adopted by a large group of warriors setting out on
  or returning from a raid, or warriors driving captured livestock. 
  Should a threat be detected, then the advance, flank and
  rear guards could exchange their roles depending upon the
  new direction of travel chosen. For example, if a threat from
  the left forced a 90-degree change of direction to the right,
  then the right flank guard became the advance guard, the
  advance guard covered the left flank, what had been the left
  flank guard moved to cover the rear, and the rear guard
  became the new right flank guard. Any adjustments between
  the numbers of warriors in each outlying party could be made
  while on the move in the new direction of travel.
  A
  Apacheria: a view roughly
  southwards from the western
  end of Cooke’s Canyon. The
  Florida Mts are in the middle
  distance approximately
  15 miles away, and the Tres
  Hermanas Mts are visible on
  the horizon, about 35 miles
  off and just short of the
  Mexican border. Note that the
  nearer, “level” ground is in fact
  anything but featureless; it was
  in this valley that Victorio’s
  warriors laid an ambush from
  an almost invisible arroyo and
  cut down five men passing
  on the trail in May 1880.
  (Author’s photo).
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  or defeats at least seven US Army detachments, and inflicts heavy casualties
  among ranching and mining communities in southern New Mexico.
  Aug 1881 Western Apache scouts mutiny when the US Army arrests an
  Apache spiritual leader at Cibecue Creek. This incident provokes Western
  Apaches – alienated by US government failure to honor treaty obligations
  undertaken following Crook’s campaigns – to make a direct attack upon
  Fort Apache on Sept 1, 1881, but they soon withdraw.
  Sept 1881 Alarmed by US Army activity following the Cibecue mutiny and
  the attack on Fort Apache, Juh and many Chiricahuas flee from the
  San Carlos reservation into Mexico. They take refuge in the Sierra Madre
  Mts, and join forces with Nana, recently returned to Mexico from his raid
  into New Mexico.
  April 1882 The Apaches from the Sierra Madre arrive at San Carlos and
  force Loco and his Warm Springs Apaches to return with them to Mexico.
  They are pursued by US Cavalry and Apache scouts, and ambushed by
  Mexican troops. Of the 400 Apaches who leave the reservation, more
  than 100 are killed before they reach the Sierra Madre.
  July 1882 The dissident Western Apaches are finally cornered by US troops
  and Apache scouts at Big Dry Wash/Chevelon Fork, and the survivors
  disperse. General Crook, recalled to Arizona in response to the crisis,
  quickly addresses Western Apache grievances.
  May–June 1883 Crook, with a force mainly made up of Apache scouts,
  penetrates the Chiricahua strongholds in the Sierra Madre Mts. Benefiting
  from his reputation among the Apaches for honest dealing, he persuades
  them to surrender.
  Feb 1884 Geronimo is the last Chiricahua to arrive from Mexico after the
  peace agreement with Gen Crook.
  May 1885 Geronimo, Naiche, Mangus, Nana, Ulzana and Chihuahua flee
  the San Carlos reservation.
  Nov–Dec 1885 Ulzana leads a small party of warriors into the USA and
  causes widespread disruption before returning to Mexico.
  March 1886 General Crook meets with the Apaches at Canyon de los
  Embudos. Nana, Ulzana, Chihuahua and their followers surrender, and
  12
  A typical Apache camp in
  scrubby terrain. Such camps
  were carefully sited to avoid
  detection, in defensible places
  with a choice of escape routes;
  they could be moved quickly
  and quietly, and sometimes
  decoy camps were constructed
  to mislead the enemy. The
  wikiup huts were also widely
  dispersed so that they could
  not be overrun quickly, giving
  most of the women and
  children a chance to escape
  from even a successful surprise
  attack. Captain John Bourke
  was told by Apache scouts that
  for the sake of concealment
  the Chiricahuas did not light
  cooking fires until after 9am,
  when the darkness had
  completely lifted. (Courtesy
  Arizona Historical Society,
  no. 62111)
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  are sent back to the USA, but Geronimo and Naiche flee. Crook resigns
  and is replaced by Col Nelson Miles. The surrendered Chiricahua Apaches
  and those who remained on the reservation are deported to Florida. 
  Sept–Oct 1886 Geronimo and his followers surrender in Skeleton Canyon;
  they are deported to Florida – along with those Chiricahuas who had
  served as scouts. A small separate group led by Mangus returns to the
  USA to surrender, and is also sent to Florida.
  ENVIRONMENT AND CULTURE
  Before examining the techniques of Apache warfare, we should note a
  number of factors that influenced the development of these strategies and
  tactics. One profound influence was, of course, the natural environment of
  what is called today “Apacheria”; another was the Apache culture of warrior
  training, and of leadership gained by merit rather than inheritance.
  The popular image of the Apache guerrilla is one of a hardy desert warrior
  accustomed to surviving in the arid terrain of New Mexico and Arizona. This
  image is not inaccurate, but it fails to take into account that while the
  Apaches certainly knew how to survive in this harsh land, they did not choose
  to live in the desert unless absolutely necessary. All the tribes were essentially
  hunters and gatherers, completely attuned to the natural world of plant and
  animal life in even the most apparently barren areas, but some – particularly
  the Western and Jicarilla Apaches – also practiced agriculture. Apacheria is
  a region of wide extremes, from high mountain peaks to low-lying deserts,
  where temperatures ranged from below freezing in winter to 100°F (38°C) in
  August. If we examine a map of the area, and some of the photos in this
  book, we can see that the terrain is spotted not only with scorched mesas
  rising above the flats and canyons, but also with mountain ranges that are
  often covered in pine forest and have good water. It was in such relatively
  fertile islands in a desert sea that the Warm Springs (Ojo Caliente) division of
  the Eastern Chiricahua Apaches chose to live. 
  The many mountains were also used as landmarks to aid travel between
  water sources in New Mexico and Chihuahua. When traveling between
  campsites the Apaches cached extra supplies of dried food, clothing material
  and ammunition; this practice also helped them to survive if they were
  surprised by an enemy and forced to abandon their possessions and disperse.
  Mountain ranges also provided lookout posts. For example, in September
  1880 the commandant of Fort Bliss, Capt Brinkerhoff, received intelligence
  from his own scouts that they had discovered tracks indicating that Victorio
  had sent small parties to the top of the Potrillo Mountains. From this
  vantage point the Apaches could detect any movement by the troops
  concentrated at Fort Cummings southwards into Mexico towards Victorio’s
  camp near the Laguna de Guzman. The distance between the fort and the
  lagoon is approximately 75 miles (120km), yet lookouts stationed on the
  Potrillo Mts would have been able to scan much of the distance between
  these two points. 
  The locations of camps were carefully chosen, usually upon higher ground
  with a good view of the surrounding area. US Army officers and scouts in the
  1860s and 1870s gave credit to Victorio for his careful selection of camps in
  difficult terrain. If necessary, the Apaches would often construct small rock
  breastworks where the terrain did not provide natural cover.
  13
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  The animals that are found in New Mexico and Chihuahua also influenced
  the manner in which the Apaches engaged their enemies. While night-fighting
  was not unknown, they did not like to fight in darkness. The Apaches themselves
  reported to ethnologists that they feared the ghosts or evil spirits who walked
  the night, but it is equally plausible that these beliefs were fostered to warn
  future generations that to fight at night increased the risks of encountering
  venomous creatures when they were at their most active. The Southwest is a
  home to tarantulas, Black Widow and Recluse spiders, venomous centipedes
  and scorpions. There is also a poisonous lizard called the Gila Monster and,
  last but certainly not least, the Western Diamondback rattlesnake. (An equally
  practical reason for not fighting at night was, of course, to prevent the wasting
  of precious ammunition.)
  Culture
  What any historian has to bear in mind when studying the Apaches is that,
  from a Euro-American point of view, we are confronted by a very different
  culture. Two examples should suffice to give the reader an appreciation of
  Apache views on the role of warfare in their society. A key anthropological
  work on the Apaches, Opler’s An Apache Life-Way (see “Further Reading”),
  reports in great detail their raiding and warfare practices – but in a chapter
  headed simply but significantly “Maintenance of the Household.” Again,
  when the US authorities proceeded to close the Chiricahua reservation in 1876,
  a dispute arose amongst Chiricahua Apaches as to whether to accept removal
  or raise armed resistance. When this debate could not be resolved, it was the
  “peace faction” that gunned down the “war faction.” 
  To understand Apache warriors, we have to grasp how central hunting,
  raiding and warfare were to their culture, and how this shaped their response
  to any perceived threat – be it from other Apaches, other American Indians,
  Spaniards, Mexicans, or Americans. Apache thinking was focused upon the
  hunting and fighting skills that were critical to their survival; however, they
  drew a sharp distinction between raiding to capture property, and war to
  inflict deaths on an enemy. 
  14
  View eastwards from the top
  of Emory Pass in the southern
  Black Range (Mimbres Mts),
  showing the thick pine forest
  that can be found in the
  highest ranges. In the dry, clear
  air one can see long distances
  from such crests. The
  mountains on the furthest
  horizon are the San Andres,
  some 70 miles distant; those
  sloping slightly down from left
  to right on the nearer horizon
  are the Caballo Mts (see map,
  Plate C). In January 1880,
  Maj Morrow’s pursuit of
  Victorio passed from right
  to left in the middle distance,
  through the foothills of the
  Black Range. (Author’s photo)
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  Training and leadership
  The basic principle of Apache warfare – as
  among any people with a relatively small and
  dispersed population – was to inflict maximum
  damage upon their enemy while sustaining the
  minimum of losses. To fit them for life in a harsh
  environment, Apache boys were raised from an
  early age in such a way as to maximize strength,
  stamina, and discipline. Such training started
  young; it included bathing in icy mountain
  streams, and running long distances in rough
  terrain – it is well documented that a warrior
  could run up to 70 miles in a day, and Apache
  women could achieve very nearly the same
  distances. Boys were made to run up and down
  hills with a mouthful of water that was not to be
  swallowed, to teach them both self-discipline and
  breath control. Instruction in hunting had the
  natural consequence of teaching the concealment
  skills and fieldcraft for which the Apaches were
  famous. This training ended only once the
  adolescent boy had successfully completed four
  raids as an apprentice warrior. 
  Apache culture extolled individuals who were
  not only tough but also patient, and successful
  raiders were those who did not take unnecessary
  risks. While an element of hereditary succession
  was not unknown, Apache leadership was based
  upon merit derived from an individual’s record
  of repeated successful application of these
  principles. Apache leaders who were perceived
  to be unsuccessful, particularly if they sustained
  what were judged to be unnecessary casualties,
  soon lost their influence. This respect for proven
  skills explains why Apaches were often found
  being led by men in their fifties and beyond.
  Victorio was believed to be about 50 years old when he was killed at Tres
  Castillos in 1880, and his lieutenant, Nana, was at least 75 when he led his
  famous raid into New Mexico the following year. Other Apache leaders of the
  time such as Juh, Chihuahua and Ulzana (also known as Jolsanny/Josanie) are
  believed to have been still active in their sixties and seventies. Younger men,
  such as Kaytennae, only rose to precocious leadership in their twenties by dint
  of their proven success. 
  Apache training produced not only excellent leaders, but also warriors
  who – even if they did not rise to the leadership of large numbers of men –
  could be trusted to act independently, since they knew exactly what was
  expected of them. Apaches often operated in separated groups under the
  broad direction of their chosen leader; this required warriors who could be
  trusted to act as directed without being directly supervised. Apache warriors
  tended to group together, in the first instance, according to their closest kinship
  links, and thus a man could rise to the leadership of his immediate family.
  If seen as particularly successful, he could gain the allegiance of a number of
  15
  Some of the venomous wildlife
  commonly found in Apacheria:
  a Western Diamondback
  rattlesnake, a tarantula, and a
  scorpion – only visible against
  the pale ground by its shadow
  (the rule of thumb is that the
  smaller their pincers, the more
  dangerous their sting). While
  most active at night, such
  animals may easily be
  encountered by day – whether
  by men seeking cover in the
  1870s, or by those exploring a
  historic battle site today. The
  records of the 6th US Cavalry
  mention losing a number of
  horses to rattlesnake bites.
  (Author’s photos) 
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  kinship groups, and eventually he might even attract followers from other
  tribes. Nevertheless, even highly successful leaders required the presence of
  this network of individual “family” leaders if they were to implement their
  strategy and tactics. What we would call “squad leaders” were an essential
  component of Apache warfare, often being relied upon to make individual
  judgments as to whether to continue a fight or to withdraw in response to
  rapidly changing circumstances. 
  GUERRILLA STRATEGIES & TACTICS
  THE RAID
  Much of the Apaches’ warfare against the Mexicans and Americans from the
  1830s to 1886 involved raids aimed at gathering loot that could be consumed,
  or traded for essential supplies. Captured horses and cattle might be either
  kept or traded, depending upon circumstances. Guns and ammunition might
  be captured by raiding, but were more often acquired
  in exchange for other goods taken in raids.
  While Apache raiding activities sometimes caused
  the Americans serious problems, it was the Mexicans
  of northern Sonora and Chihuahua states who
  sustained the heaviest losses in property and lives.
  As mentioned above, the Apaches defined raiding as
  taking property from an enemy, whereas warfare
  was to take lives. Thus, if Mexican villagers did
  manage to defend themselves successfully and killed,
  wounded or captured any Apaches, they would
  find themselves subject to further attacks inspired by
  vengeance for previous losses. Between 1883 and
  1886, US Army officers serving in northern Mexico
  in pursuit of Chiricahua Apaches noted the ruins
  of Mexican settlements often long abandoned.
  However, this was not usually the result of direct
  assaults upon villages or haciendas (ranches), but of
  the cumulative effects of relentless hit-and-run
  attacks. These made it impossible for such small
  communities to sustain themselves without running
  a high risk of being picked off by hostile Apaches
  as they worked in the fields or on the cattle ranges,
  or made necessary journeys. In time, large areas of
  northern Sonora were effectively depopulated by
  these methods.
  Where occasional ranches or houses were
  actually overrun it is unclear how the Apaches
  accomplished such destruction, since they seldom
  left survivors to tell the tale. Nevertheless, there are
  a number of clues as to how the Apaches might
  storm a building with minimal loss. They would
  usually mount a careful and patient reconnaissance
  of the target before risking a direct attack on any
  building. The most common technique would be to
  This Apache, stripped down
  for action, would have been
  trained from early boyhood
  not only to survive in the harsh
  natural environment, but to
  thrive in it, and to move across
  it with a speed, stealth and
  stamina far beyond those of
  the Mexican and American
  soldiers hunting him. He could
  run and climb for many miles
  between dawn and sunset in
  all weathers, finding water
  and wild food as he went, and
  during a forced march he might
  go without sleep for several
  days. (Courtesy Arizona
  Historical Society, no. 50132)
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  employ their legendary stealth of movement to reach the building undetected,
  and burst in on unsuspecting victims. If there was enough flammable material
  all they needed to do was to creep close enough to set the building alight, and
  kill the occupants as they broke out. Apaches could also approach buildings
  professing friendship and then open fire from point-blank range. Finally,
  there were occasions where Apaches would stealthily approach a building
  and fire shots through the doors and windows to test the level of resistance
  before deciding whether to close in or withdraw. Once the Apaches had
  access to breech-loading weapons they could change their positions while
  keeping up a rapid fire, in an attempt to panic the defenders into fleeing
  the building. 
  In truth, direct assaults on buildings were very rare, because of the high
  risk of sustaining unacceptably high casualties. Accounts of Apache attacks
  upon settlements in northern Mexico fall into two categories. The first were
  raids aimed at stealing horses or cattle, where any casualties inflicted were
  incidental to that primary goal. The second were when Apaches were looking
  to inflict casualties in revenge for previous losses, but their approach was
  usually detected before they could strike an effective blow. In both cases there
  A posed portrait of a Chiricahua
  named Ze-Le and his wife;
  the carbine seems to be a
  photographer’s prop. The
  Apaches made great use of
  trade cloth, and at least one
  supply-cache containing bolts
  of calico was discovered during
  military operations in New
  Mexico. (Courtesy Arizona
  Historical Society, no. 50134) 
  17
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  would be enough Mexican survivors to leave a record of their experiences.
  If an alerted populace managed to reach solid and relatively non-flammable
  buildings, they would normally be safe from the Apaches until the next attack.
  The richer Mexican ranchers in the area built their ranches with defenses
  designed to frustrate Apache raiding, and the photos above show a surviving
  example of a fairly massive complex with stables and living quarters built in
  an easily defensible hollow square. 
  Apache raiding would often provoke a reaction from the Mexicans and
  Americans, and the Apaches developed a number of responses. These can be
  divided broadly into evasion, ambush, and attack, and this text is arranged
  to consider them in turn.
  EVASION
  One of the greatest challenges when attempting to counter Apache guerrillas
  was intercepting them in the first place. The Apaches used a number of tricks
  to coordinate their own movements and evade enemy activity. For signaling
  between parties they used mirrors during the day and fires at night. When
  moving from one area to another they put out advance scouts, flanking scouts
  and rearguards to prevent their being surprised (see Plate A). It would be
  routine for a rendezvous point to be decided each day in advance of leaving
  ABOVE LEFT
  Exterior of an abandoned
  quadrangular complex of
  living quarters and stables at
  El Carmen, Chihuahua State,
  Mexico. One of the two main
  entrances, boarded up, is
  visible at the right. Such
  strongly protected buildings
  were normally invulnerable
  to Apache raids provided the
  ranchers got warning of their
  approach, but only the
  wealthiest haciendas could
  afford such stout defenses.
  (Author’s photo)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  The interior of the abandoned
  buildings at El Carmen in
  northern Chihuahua; the living
  quarters are on the left and
  the stables on the right of the
  entrance visible on the far side.
  (Author’s photo) 
  FROM EVASION TO AMBUSH 
  Another hypothetical scenario, here from the 1860s, imagines
  the interception by Mexican Rurales (1, and inset 1) of a White
  Mountain Apache raiding party traveling home with stolen
  cattle. The Mexicans’ approach is detected by the left flank
  guard (2), who raise the alarm. When an Apache party were
  intercepted they might often choose to scatter, and
  rendezvous later at a pre-arranged location; but on this
  occasion, with the cattle to protect, they attempt to draw their
  pursuers into an ambush. At the first alarm the left flank guard
  join the main body (3), and helps screen its retreat towards a
  pass in the mountains. The advance guard (4) and right flank
  guard (5) race ahead of the main body to reach a suitable spot
  to spring an ambush once the main body has passed,
  doubling back across high ground to get into position (6, and
  inset 2). Armed at this date with muzzle-loading weapons or
  bows and arrows, they find firing positions as close to the trail
  as possible, but their skill at concealment in even moderate
  cover is legendary. The rear guard (7) confuse the pursuers by
  taking a different route, but then head for the nearer flank of
  the defile chosen for the ambush (8), to bring the pursuers
  under fire from both sides. 
  B
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  1
  2
  3
  1
  2
  4
  5
  6
  8
  7
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  their camp; the standard response to the appearance of an enemy force was to
  scatter in order to break contact, and to re-group later at this rendezvous
  point. Equally, however, if the terrain favored such tactics, then the Apaches
  might give the appearance of fleeing while in reality leading their pursuers into
  an ambush (see Plate B). This inclination to evade their enemies unless the
  conditions for fighting were very favorable proved to be a major headache for
  the US Army. A deeply frustrated Gen Philip Sheridan noted on October 22,
  1879 that:
  their tactics being to attack and plunder some given point, then to
  scatter like quails and meet again at some other distant point
  previously understood, for plunder and again scatter [sic], therefore it
  is exceedingly difficult for our troops to over-take and punish them.
  This technique figures in reports from every level of command in the US Army.
  The Apaches would usually attempt to scatter whether or not their pursuers
  had spotted them; on at least one occasion they fired dry grass and scrub to
  hinder the pursuit. However, they would sometimes fight a rearguard action,
  buying time to allow for the escape of their dependants or of warriors driving
  stolen livestock. 
  On August 16, 1881, Lts G. Valois and G.R. Burnett with a small
  detachment from Company I of the African-American 9th US Cavalry were
  halted near Canada Alamosa, New Mexico, as one of a number of detachments
  from that regiment charged with intercepting Apache raiders led by Nana. They
  were watering their horses at the Rio Alamosa when they received a report
  that the Chavez ranch downstream had been attacked. Lieutenant Burnett
  left immediately with a few men, while Lt Valois mustered the rest of the
  detachment and followed. Arriving at the ranch, Burnett joined forces with a
  posse of Mexicans intent on avenging those recently killed by the Apaches.
  As this force mounted a bluff above the ranch they spotted what they took at
  first to be more mounted Mexicans, dressed in serapes and sombreros. These
  men waved to them, but it soon became apparent that these were the very
  Apaches they sought, and both sides opened fire. 
  Having failed to deceive their pursuers, the Apaches split into two groups.
  The first group drove their stolen stock towards the Cuchillo Negro Mts
  approximately 10 miles away. The other Apaches dismounted behind a very
  gentle rise, and opened fire. They continued this fire until Sgt Williams’ party
  threatened to outflank them on their left, whereupon they remounted and
  retreated to the next slight fold in the terrain, where they again dismounted
  and opened fire (see diagram opposite). They successfully repeated these
  delaying tactics until they reached the Cuchillo Negro Mts, where they
  occupied a ridge from which they eventually drove off their pursuers.
  Victorio’s evasion strategy
  Victorio used an extended variation of the basic traveling formation as a
  strategic decoy, to cripple his enemies’ ability to pursue the Apaches while
  simultaneously protecting his families and logistic support. He would take
  the majority of his warriors and launch raids in one part of the country,
  allowing another group of mainly women and children with a small warrior
  escort to move from their current camp to a new site many miles from the
  area being attacked by Victorio. Thus the Apaches preserved the integrity of
  their own “logistic base,” while targeting the logistics of their opponents.
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  In January 1880, when Victorio and his followers returned to New
  Mexico from Chihuahua, they were faced with the problem of evading the
  US troops that had been stationed in southern New Mexico to intercept the
  Apaches should they attempt to return to their strongholds in the US. During
  November and December 1879, Victorio’s warriors had stolen hundreds
  of horses and cattle in Chihuahua, and in January 1880 he had to get these
  through to the Mescalero Apache reservation, about 30 miles east of the
  White Sands, where they could be sold to unscrupulous traders in exchange
  for rifles and ammunition. Victorio now employed the same strategic-decoy
  method to draw a US force under Maj Albert P. Morrow, 9th Cavalry, into
  pursuing his band of warriors north, from the Goodsight Mts up between
  the Black Range and the Caballo Mts, as far as the Cuchillo Negro Mts and
  beyond (see Plate C). On January 16, Victorio had a brief parley at Canada
  Alamosa with one Andrew Kelley, who would report that the chief was
  leading approximately 60 well-armed and well-mounted warriors. (Kelley
  had been an interpreter at Victorio’s old reservation at Ojo Caliente, and had
  also acted as an intermediary between Victorio and the US Army in February
  1879.) Once Morrow’s pursuit was well underway, a second Apache group
  drove their large and vulnerable looted herd northeastwards through the area
  just vacated by the Army, to reach their destination safely. 
  There was another dividend to be gained from this ploy: drawing the
  available US troops into a long pursuit over very rough terrain wore out
  21
  The general area of the Burnett
  skirmish, with the Cuchillo
  Negro Mts on the western
  horizon. Although the terrain
  appears to be flat, there are
  very gentle undulations in the
  plain; these gave the Apaches
  enough cover to mount a
  running rearguard action
  against their pursuers until
  they reached the cover of the
  mountains. (Author’s photo) 
  Sketch plan of Lt Burnett’s
  skirmish against Nana’s
  warriors on August 16, 1881.
  Mexican flank
  guard
  Lt Burnett’s
  force
  Sgt Williams’ flanking
  detachment
  As Sergeant Williams’ detachment works around the flank, the
  Apache rearguard withdraws to the next elevation
  Apache rearguard
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  the men and mounts of these overstretched units. The Apaches could keep
  ahead of the soldiers on foot if needs be, but if they were on horseback it was
  well-nigh impossible to maintain a successful pursuit. During this strategic
  movement Victorio chose to fight several skirmishes, which Maj Morrow
  interpreted as rearguard actions to protect Apache dependants – yet Victorio
  was apparently completely unencumbered with either families or loot. The
  reason for allowing the 9th Cavalry to get within range to fight these
  skirmishes was to foster an illusion among the pursuers that, with a little
  extra effort, victory would be within their grasp. Having achieved both their
  aims – to decoy the cavalry away from the route of the Apaches’ plundered
  herd, and to tire them out – the warriors broke contact at a time of their own
  choosing. By the end of this pursuit, the editor of The Grant County Herald
  reported on February 21, 1880 that:
  [Morrow’s] men were ragged, many of them barefooted, and nearly
  one half without horses. All were hungry and jaded. Officers and men
  had been messing in common, and the sick list was increasing daily. In
  short the command, which had been kept on the move almost
  constantly for six weeks, was in no condition to continue the
  campaign.
  The last sentence is of special significance. Major Morrow was highly praised
  for his and his men’s perseverance during several long pursuits of Victorio in
  1879 and 1880 – but in fact, these displays of dogged stamina to the point
  of exhaustion were exactly what the Apache leader wanted to provoke.
  THE AMBUSH 
  The basic aim of the ambush was to cripple the enemy’s ability to respond to
  the first volley. The ambush site would often be chosen so as to allow the
  Apaches to fade back into rough terrain should this first volley fail to be
  crippling – if the target either detected the ambush in time, or elected to stand
  and fight rather than flee. The ambush would ideally be delivered from close
  THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS, 1879–81
  This sketch map of southern New Mexico and northern
  Chihuahua, with parts of Arizona to the west and West Texas
  to the east, shows only major terrain features, the US Army
  posts and settlements mentioned in the text, and the
  approximate sites of the actions described. The Fort Apache
  reservation, north of the Salt River, and the San Carlos agency,
  south of that river, are off the map to the west – Ft Apache
  was perhaps 80 miles northwest of Old Fort Tularosa. The
  Mescalero reservation is off the map to the east, about 20 miles
  northeast of La Luz, in the edge of the Sacramento Mountains.
  Tres Castillos, where Victorio was killed, is about 20 miles east
  of the bottom right hand corner of the map. (Other Army posts
  briefly mentioned in the text are Fort Wingate, which is far
  to the northwest of the map; and Fort Stanton, which is off
  the map about 100 miles east of Fort Craig.) 
  The two US Army regiments that provided the permanent
  garrisons in New Mexico – the 9th Cavalry and 15th Infantry – 
  were understrength, and usually had to operate in very
  modest dispersed detachments often of fewer than 30 soldiers.
  A cavalry regiment had 12 companies (or “troops”), so was
  divisible into three battalions (or “squadrons”). A company was
  supposed to have about 80 all ranks, but this was never
  achieved on the frontier. For example, in October 1879,
  Maj Albert P. Morrow’s battalion of the 9th Cavalry from
  Fort Bayard consisted on paper of five companies; but Co A
  had 28 enlisted men, Co B counted 23, Co C had 25, Co G
  numbered 32, and Co H had only 15 – a total of just 123 NCOs
  and troopers. On October 23, Maj Morrow also had
  attachments of the 34-man Co A from 6th Cavalry, and about
  the same number of Apache scouts; but by the time Victorio
  and Juh ambushed him on October 27, in the Guzman Mts,
  after leading him across the parched sandhills of northern
  Chihuahua, Morrow had just 81 thirsty troopers of the 9th and
  6th Cavalry, and 18 of Lt Gatewood’s scouts. 
  C
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  range without any warning. The first targets would usually be their enemy’s
  horses, as the minimum aim of the ambush was to hinder the enemy’s ability
  to continue their pursuit. 
  The Apaches were masters of concealment, being able to hide quickly in
  apparently barren terrain – even bare grassland – but when they had time they
  could prepare hidden and protected positions. While the Apaches were, on
  average, poor marksmen, their first shots were usually quite accurate, since
  they generally chose positions that allowed them to rest their firearms and take
  steady aim, at ranges short enough to maximize the effect of the opening volley.
  (It should also be noted that their opponents were usually not particularly
  good shots themselves; the US Army could not afford the extra ammunition
  to provide its troops with regular target practice, and did not begin to discuss
  a remedy to this situation until 1880. Reports of a number of actions also make
  clear that the Apaches sometimes enjoyed superior close-range firepower,
  having Winchester repeaters against the Army’s single-shot Springfield
  “trapdoor” breech-loaders.)
  A number of variations in the type of ambush employed by the Apaches
  in the 1870s and 1880s can be identified. These fall into four broad
  categories: planned, killing, decoy, and ad hoc ambushes – although these
  were not always clearly distinct (for example, an ad hoc ambush might have
  used decoys in order to lure the enemy into position). The following examples
  are grouped according to the principal element of the ambush techniques
  employed on each occasion. 
  Planned ambushes: Ojo Caliente, September 4, 1879
  The Apaches were known to watch their targets for a number of days in order
  to identify any exploitable weaknesses in their routine. On September 4,
  1879, Victorio and a number of warriors attacked the horse herd belonging
  to Company E, 9th Cavalry, then stationed (under Capt A.E. Hooker, an
  officer who was both severe and incompetent) at Victorio’s favorite camping
  ground at Ojo Caliente. They killed the five men guarding the 50 horses and
  18 mules, and drove off the entire herd without alerting the rest of the
  garrison. They were able to do this by watching the horse-herders’ routine
  patiently, and only striking when the herd was out of sight and earshot of
  the rest of the garrison. The Apaches noted that each day the horses and
  mules were taken out to graze further and further up the valley from the post,
  and that as the herd turned back towards Ojo Caliente it passed through an
  area on the far side of a low ridge, which was slashed with a number of
  arroyos (stream-beds) running down to the more level ground. While the herd
  was driven along the side of the ridge and across these arroyos the guards
  appear to have been in the habit of stopping for a rest, and it was at this
  moment that the Apaches struck. 
  When the ground was examined after the attack, it was noted that the
  Apaches had divided into three groups. The first, about 12–15 strong, had
  been tasked with killing the guards, and had concealed themselves around
  the area where the troopers (who were armed only with revolvers) took their
  break. There is some indication that this spot was not fixed, as there were
  signs that these Apaches had quietly fallen back in the face of the advancing
  herd until the guards stopped. Other dismounted Apaches were concealed
  along the flanks of the herd’s advance, to drive the horses and mules down
  an arroyo; and a third group were concealed in another arroyo further down
  the ridge, to head off any animals which tried to return to Ojo Caliente.
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  Three of the five guards were believed to have been dismounted when the
  Apaches opened fire, while the two men still mounted were thought to have
  been shot out of the saddle as the herd stampeded down the arroyo. The
  tracks showed that at least some of the horses had tried to turn back towards
  Ojo Caliente before the mounted Apaches had headed them off, collected
  the herd and driven them away. 
  By the time the herd was missed at Ojo Caliente the Apaches had a
  two-hour start over the now practically dismounted garrison (a courier had
  to be sent for help mounted on the single remaining mule). Company E did
  not receive remounts until December 1879, thus preventing them from taking
  part in the Army’s pursuit of Victorio in September and October 1879. This
  pursuit ended when the Apaches slipped into Mexico, and fought off their
  exhausted pursuers in the mountains near Laguna de Guzman in Chihuahua
  on the night of October 27/28.
  25
  Apaches regarded the horse
  with a good deal less reverence
  than the Plains Indians. They
  rarely fought on horseback,
  and regarded horses simply as
  a way to move rapidly around
  the country – and as food, if
  necessary. A participant in
  one of the 10th Cavalry’s
  engagements in West Texas
  recalled seeing Apaches
  employing classic “mounted
  infantry” tactics – fighting on
  foot, mounting to ride to a new
  position, then dismounting
  to resume firing. (Courtesy
  Arizona Historical Society,
  no. 47493)
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  Cuchillo Negro river, September 30, 1879
  On September 29, 1879, Apache scouts led by Lts Augustus P. Blocksom and
  Charles Gatewood, 6th Cavalry, supported by troopers from Maj Morrow’s
  9th Cavalry command, attacked Victorio’s camp near the Cuchillo Negro
  river. They managed to kill two Apache warriors and one woman before the
  rest made good their escape into the surrounding mountains as darkness fell.
  Gatewood and Blocksom pitched their camp about half a mile up the canyon
  from that set up by Morrow’s 9th Cavalry detachment. Early the following
  morning the Apache scouts fanned out from their camp in search of the
  hostiles, leaving Gatewood and Blocksom in their camp with a detachment
  of 6th Cavalry troopers (the latter being attached to Indian Scout companies
  simply to guard their mule-train). In the meantime, some of Victorio’s
  warriors had infiltrated the heights around Morrow’s camp, and others had
  slipped into positions above the 6th Cavalry detachment. 
  The hostiles waited until breakfast, when Maj Morrow withdrew 11 out
  of 12 men from guard duty on the bluffs surrounding his camp. The remaining
  sentry was shot through the head by an Apache sniper, while the rest of the
  Apaches opened a hot fire from all sides into both camps. Gatewood recorded
  the confusion caused by this attack:
  Early next morning, as we had just finished breakfast, a single shot
  rang out down the canyon, then a volley, suddenly increasing into
  more shots and more volleys, with sounds of command, all doubled
  and trebled in reverberations up the valley, until it was one roar of
  pandemonium that was enough to set a nervous man wild. I didn’t
  believe there was a sane man in the country, except the Corporal, who
  coolly informed me after a while that I was sitting on the wrong side
  of a rock, and pointed out to me the folly of protecting a rock.
  The deadlock was broken by the storming of one of the bluffs by the
  6th Cavalrymen, who then provided covering fire as Maj Morrow led an assault
  on another bluff. At this point the Apache scouts returned, and Victorio’s men
  pulled back into the mountains. Morrow later reported that he had driven off
  the Apaches, but had had to withdraw through lack of water; Gatewood told
  a very different story, however, stating that the hostiles had withdrawn to better
  positions from which they could not be dislodged. When Morrow started to
  withdraw these Apaches returned to the attack, and harassed the command
  BELOW LEFT
  View from a clifftop at the
  foot of a mountainside, looking
  down on a trail leading into the
  Black Range/Mimbres Mts of
  New Mexico. Rocky outcrops
  provided perfect ambush
  positions, and could be
  improved easily – and invisibly
  – by piling a few more rocks
  into simple breastworks .
  (Author’s photo)
  BELOW RIGHT
  The same feature, seen
  from the opposite side of the
  canyon. Despite having walked
  the ground, the author was
  unable to distinguish the exact
  clifftop position from which
  he took the previous picture.
  (Author’s photo) 
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  until it reached more open ground. The key point to note is that the hostile
  Apaches were familiar enough with US Army routine to strike the command
  when it was at its most vulnerable.
  Santa Cruz Mountains, May 15, 1886
  This was another occasion when monitoring of their enemy’s routine paid
  handsome dividends for the Apaches. On May 14, 1886, Apache raiders stole
  30 horses from a ranch near the Santa Cruz Mts in Sonora, Mexico. The
  raiders struck in the mid-afternoon, and as darkness approached one of the
  ranch hands contacted Company D, 4th US Cavalry, commanded by Capt
  Charles Hatfield. This detachment – consisting of the captain, 37 cavalrymen,
  and two Mexican guides named Moreno and Mendez – set out in pursuit,
  following the trail into the mountains until darkness fell. The following day
  Hatfield’s detachment neared the top of the mountains, and discovered the
  Apache camp. The nature of the terrain meant that much of the pursuit had
  been conducted by dismounted men leading their horses. Hatfield now
  assigned double the usual number of mounts to his horse-holders (seven or
  eight each, instead of the usual four), while the rest of his men charged into
  the camp. The Apaches scattered, and Hatfield reported capturing 21 horses
  and camp equipment. The captain quickly realized that getting his command
  and their recaptured horses out of the mountains would be difficult should the
  Apaches choose to counterattack.
  By throwing out a dismounted skirmish line to the front, and assigning
  a few men to guard the captures and the troops’ own mounts and mules, he
  managed to get clear of the mountains without further contact with the
  hostiles. Once back on more or less level terrain, Hatfield reorganized his
  small command into three groups. A sergeant and 14 dismounted men took
  the lead in skirmish order. These were preceded by a single mounted man, and
  flanked by a mounted trooper at each end of the line; this group was also
  accompanied by Moreno and Mendez. Hatfield himself, with 12 troopers,
  took charge of the led troop horses; he was followed by seven men driving the
  mule-train and the captured horses. The detachment had to pass through
  some more rough terrain before they could reach the relative safety of the
  town of Santa Cruz. Passing through a narrow canyon, the advance guard
  found a spring sufficient to supply the needs of both men and animals, the
  latter having been without water for more than 24 hours.
  The reason for the lack of contact during the descent out of the mountains
  was that the Apaches had moved ahead of the command, watching Hatfield’s
  movements, and had set up positions above and beyond this spring in
  anticipation that he would have to use it. They let the advance element take
  water and then move on – doubtless noting that this group had drawn ahead
  of the two parties with the horses (in spite of explicit orders from Hatfield to
  his sergeant not to allow such a gap to develop). The Apaches allowed Hatfield
  to water the troop horses, and only struck when the last group of seven men
  with the mule-train and captured horses reached the spring. 
  They opened up a withering fire from the rocks, causing a momentary panic
  among the troopers when their sergeant was wounded. Both Hatfield’s and
  the final group were then pinned down for half an hour, before some of the
  advance detachment returned and helped to extricate the trapped men. This
  involved a further vigorous exchange of fire, during which a trapped and
  wounded man was shot dead by the Apaches at the very moment of his rescue.
  The captain then ordered the survivors to withdraw. Hatfield suffered two men
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  killed and two sergeants wounded, and lost his mules (which would have been
  carrying food and probably extra ammunition), and the Apaches recaptured
  their horses. The captain also lost his own personal mount, and three troop
  horses which were forgotten in the heat of the action. There was no indication
  of any casualties sustained by the Apaches.
  Here we can see the rapidity with which Apaches could size up a situation
  and plan an effective ambush at relatively short notice. It also shows the
  discipline exercised by the warriors in not opening fire until the optimum
  moment. Such discipline was crucial to the success of a ruthlessly efficient double
  ambush executed by Victorio in the Candelaria Mountains of Mexico.
  The killing ambush: Candelaria Mountains, November 1879 
  (see Plate D)
  We are lucky to have reports of this incident – which virtually exterminated
  two parties of Mexican militia from the village of El Carrizal – from
  Mexicans and Texas Rangers who reached the scene less than two weeks after
  the event, and later recollections from James Kaywaykla, who as a very young
  Warm Springs Apache warrior took part in the first phase of the double
  ambush. Kaywaykla clearly describes how Victorio assigned leadership of
  different elements of this ambush to various senior members of his following.
  Both the Apaches and Texas Rangers state that there were no survivors from
  this first party of 14 militiamen (though a Mexican source implies the survival
  of one wounded man). 
  While the first phase was accomplished by skillful positioning and
  concealment and good fire-discipline, the second not only reinforces the
  impression of Victorio’s control over his warriors, but also suggests
  his exploitation of a knowledge of his opponents’ culture, and of their
  supposed understanding of Apache tactics. As reconstructed by the Texas
  Rangers who helped recover the bodies, the Apaches – most unusually – did
  not immediately withdraw after wiping out the first party of El Carrizal
  irregulars, but remained at the ambush site over two nights. Victorio
  apparently anticipated that a second party of Mexicans would come looking
  for their comrades, and that they would be confident that the Apaches had
  left the area. (If the Mexican source is correct that a wounded survivor was
  discovered, that would have reinforced this belief.) The second party gathered
  up the bodies of their fellow villagers, and dug a grave; and it was only when
  the men were grouped around the grave that the Apaches opened fire. The
  author would suggest that this indicates that Victorio knew enough about
  how Mexicans would react on discovering the bodies to catch them at their
  most vulnerable. Most of the second party were killed; a number of them
  managed to break out of the trap and some of these escaped completely,
  but one was found to have been cut off and killed after getting 600 yards
  into open country, and two others were never found. A local Mexican source
  writing within days of the event acknowledged the loss of a total of 33 men
  in the double ambush.
  This ambush underlines the patience and discipline exercised by the
  Apaches. In all likelihood, most if not all of them were in position during the
  whole time the second group of Mexicans were gathering up their dead for
  burial, and not one of these warriors betrayed his presence. In comparison with
  the “coup-counting” Plains Indian culture of the 1860s–70s, Apache culture did
  not reward displays of individual boldness, but rather the ability to follow the
  directions of a respected leader. A young Apache who opened fire prematurely
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  and ruined an ambush would be marked as unreliable, even dangerous, and
  would be shunned by his peers. 
  Evidence reported by the Texas Rangers also showed the Apaches’
  adherence to the principle of minimum exposure to risk. One Mexican had
  crawled into a crevice from which he could shoot anyone coming at him from
  either east or west, and was hidden from warriors on the cliffs above him.
  However, his legs were exposed to Apache riflemen on the opposite (north)
  side of the canyon, and – instead of rushing him, which would certainly have
  allowed him to shoot down at least one of them – the latter had aimed at his
  legs and “literally shot them off up to his knees.” The Apaches probably
  sustained few, if any casualties in either of these ambushes.
  Ambushes by decoy
  This term needs to be defined with some care. Apaches often used decoy tactics
  of one sort or another to lull their targets into a false sense of security, and
  these were usually more subtle than those used by the Plains Indians. A classic
  Plains Indian ploy was to send out a small party of warriors to draw the enemy
  into a pursuit of this visible target, which then tried to lead the pursuers into
  an ambush by a far larger force. The obvious example of this technique is the
  destruction of Capt William J. Fetterman’s command near Fort Phil Kearny on
  December 21, 1866 by Lakota, Cheyenne and Arapaho warriors.
  While Apaches did occasionally employ this type of tactic (e.g. at Cerro
  Mata Ortiz in November 1882 – see below), their techniques were usually
  more indirect. In the “Fetterman massacre,” the decoys and the intended target
  were both aware of each other’s presence, and the aim was to draw Fetterman’s
  detachment on, by the promise of an easy victory, into a deadly trap. By
  contrast, the aim of Apache decoys was usually to lull the enemy into a false
  sense of security just prior to the ambush. The tracks of their horses could be
  laid in such a manner as to deceive the enemy into thinking that there were no
  Apaches in the near vicinity. Noise, such as gunfire, could be used to draw the
  enemy through a prepared ambush. Closer to the classic Plains technique was
  the encouragement of an enemy to launch an attack by allowing him to sight
  Apaches who were acting as if they were unaware of his presence, thus
  encouraging him to follow them into terrain that he would normally have
  avoided. Likewise, decoys might also simulate sudden panic upon apparently
  sighting their foes, to provoke a charge that would spring an ambush laid
  between the decoys and the enemy. 
  Decoys by tracks: Horseshoe Canyon, October 24, 1871 
  (see Plate E2)
  On October 21, 1871, Apaches attacked a small ranch about 25 miles from
  Camp (later Fort) Bowie in the San Simon Valley in southern Arizona.
  Two men, Richard Barnes and R.M. Gilbert, were in one of the two adobe
  buildings; some of the Apaches quietly occupied the vacant building during
  the night, and fatally wounded Barnes the following morning when he
  emerged from the other building. Gilbert, though suffering from fever,
  temporarily drove the Apaches back into cover with his Henry repeating rifle,
  and managed to drag his comrade back into the house. The Apaches then
  placed the building under siege, and managed to wound Gilbert. When they
  subsequently set the roof on fire, Gilbert, realizing that Barnes was beyond
  aid, blasted his way free and managed to reach good cover. The Apaches knew
  where he was, but could not finish him off without great risk from his
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  rapid-fire weapon, so they left him to the mercy of the terrain. The following
  day Gilbert managed to reach help; that night he was brought into Camp
  Bowie, and the alarm was raised.
  Twenty-five men from the 3rd US Cavalry led by Capt Gerald Russell and
  accompanied by civilian guide Robert H. Whitney set out in pursuit, and
  trailed the Apaches (possibly led by Juh) into the Chiricahua Mountains.
  On October 24, approximately 40 miles from Bowie, Russell’s detachment
  was ambushed in Horseshoe Canyon. The Apaches had used a false trail to
  convince Russell that it was safe to approach the waterhole there; they had
  left a clear trail both into and then out of the box canyon. After traveling
  away from the canyon mouth they had turned up into the mountains,
  and returned to occupy the high ground surrounding Horseshoe Canyon.
  When Russell arrived in the mid-afternoon he found himself pinned down
  until nightfall; Whitney and two horses were killed, and a cavalryman was
  wounded. Russell claimed to have killed many warriors, but withdrew under
  the cover of darkness and saw no bodies. From the Apache point of view, the
  light casualties inflicted on their pursuers were irrelevant – they had succeeded
  in their aim of terminating Russell’s pursuit.
  A more common technique was for the Apaches to lay a trail that passed
  through the ambush zone, and then to simply double back on the flanks to
  take up concealed positions. Captain Russell himself had been caught in just
  such an ambush in the Dragoon Mts in April 1871, six months before and
  some 35 miles west of his action in Horseshoe Canyon (see Plate E1). With
  approximately 30 troops and a guide, he had pursued the trail of a large
  group of Apaches led by Cochise into the Dragoons. Russell’s guide Merejildo
  Grijalva became convinced that the Apaches were waiting to ambush them if
  they proceeded any further. As they commenced their withdrawal, they found
  that Cochise’s warriors had circled around behind the troops and occupied
  both sides of the canyon. Despite the heavy fire opened upon them as they
  rode out, on that occasion Russell managed to extricate his men from the
  trap without casualties. 
  The increased sophistication of the October ambush in Horseshoe Canyon
  even raises the intriguing possibility that at least some of these Apaches had
  earlier been involved in the April skirmish in the Dragoon Mountains. The
  KILLING AMBUSH: CANDELARIA MOUNTAINS,
  NOVEMBER 7 & 9, 1879
  This reconstructs a successful double-stage ambush planned
  and sprung by Victorio. 
  In the first phase, the Chiricahuas were lying in wait, on either
  side of a canyon, for a party of about 14 Mexican irregulars
  from the village of El Carrizal. Once the Mexicans (blue spots)
  had ridden into the canyon, warriors whom Victorio had
  posted each side of the entrance and exit of the killing-ground,
  and others along the slope to the Mexicans’ right (red spots),
  opened fire. The Mexicans’ horses were the primary target of
  this first fusillade. Seeing an apparently obvious source of
  cover, the Mexicans ran to take shelter among the scatter of
  large boulders to their left. At that point the majority of the
  Apaches, who were waiting in concealment along the top of
  that slope (red triangles), opened fire from above and behind
  them. The Mexicans were wiped out.
  In a remarkable example of his hold over his followers,
  Victorio, judging that a search party would come looking for
  the first, did not move off at once – the almost invariable
  Apache practice. Instead, the Chiricahuas remained on the
  spot for 48 hours, and were under cover (inset 1) when, on
  November 9, a second party of 20–30 riders from El Carrizal and
  the Samaniego ranch duly arrived – probably feeling secure in
  the knowledge that Apaches always withdrew immediately
  after a clash. The Mexicans gathered up the bodies of their
  relatives and neighbors, and proceeded to dig a mass grave
  for them. The position of the corpses of men from this second
  party suggested that the Apaches waited until they were
  gathered in a compact group around the grave before
  springing the trap (inset 2). Some of the survivors managed to
  ride out of the canyon and make good their escape, but others
  were ridden down and killed. The total Mexican losses to this
  double ambush were reported as 33 men killed.
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  relatively low numbers involved in this guerrilla warfare meant that quite
  junior leaders in the US Army would have been easily recognized by the
  Apaches, in whose culture the qualities of an individual were important. It is
  tempting to imagine that in October some of the Apaches might have
  recognized Russell, and agreed that since this officer might have learned from
  the earlier ambush, they should try a different variation this time.
  Las Animas river, September 18, 1879
  A third example of a decoy ambush by tracks was that sprung upon two
  companies of the 9th Cavalry in the Black Range around the headwaters of
  the Rio Las Animas on September 18, 1879. Here an obvious trail up into the
  mountains led through and beyond the chosen ambush site; the Apaches then
  took up positions around and above this trail, and waited. About 40 “buffalo
  soldiers” from Companies A & B, 9th Cavalry, led by Capt Byron Dawson
  and accompanied by four Navajo scouts, were following the trail. 
  Despite the Navajos’ unease as to the wisdom of following the trail,
  Dawson pressed on, and in mid-morning the detachment suddenly came under
  fire from above and all around. One of the Navajos was killed in the opening
  volley, but most of the Apache fire seems to have been aimed at Dawson’s
  horses. The troopers took cover as best they could, but found themselves
  pinned down in a murderous crossfire from which they could neither advance
  nor retreat. By noon, Dawson’s men were running low on ammunition; but
  help then arrived in the form of Companies C & G of the 9th, accompanied
  by civilian volunteers from the Hillsboro mining camp. However, these
  reinforcements were soon pinned down in their turn. Although they were only
  able to pull out as darkness fell, the casualties were again surprisingly low –
  two Navajo scouts, one civilian, and two, perhaps three 9th Cavalrymen.
  Their horse casualties were far higher; the regiment’s monthly return
  acknowledged 29 horses killed in action, while the Fort Bayard return stated
  the loss of 28 horses (but admitted that some of these had escaped rather than
  been killed). It was acknowledged that the detachment had to abandon much
  equipment in their withdrawal, and the bodies of those killed were not
  recovered until almost a week later. There is some suspicion that one or
  32
  The left-hand man in this group
  photo of Apache scouts is the
  guide Merejildo Grijalva, a
  Mexican who escaped after
  being captured by Cochise,
  and scouted for the US Army
  for many years. It was he who
  warned Capt Russell,
  3rd Cavalry, of the imminent
  ambush in the Dragoon Mts in
  April 1871. While the Apaches
  carry single-shot Springfield
  M1873 carbines, Grijalva clearly
  has a repeating rifle. (Courtesy
  Arizona Historical Society,
  no. 43387) 
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  two of these men might have been alive and missed in the darkness when the
  detachment withdrew. From the Apache point of view, a simple decoy trail
  into an ambush had crippled the ability of four companies of the 9th Cavalry
  to maintain their immediate pursuit, and forced them to abandon much
  equipment to the Apaches.
  Near Bavispe, Sierra Madre Mountains, April 24 or 26, 1883
  In 1883, Gen George Crook mounted an expedition, spearheaded by a large
  number of Apache scouts, into the Sierra Madre Mts of northern Mexico
  in pursuit of hostile Apaches. However, before Crook’s expedition surprised
  the hostiles and negotiated their surrender, they received news of an ambush
  sprung on local troops. The Apaches had stolen a number of cattle from
  around the villages of Bavispe and Bacerac and had driven them up into the
  mountains. Some 50 men of the Sonora Guardia Nacional from these villages
  took up the trail, and as they were making their way up a steep slope they
  were ambushed. The Apaches had set up small stone breastworks across
  and to either side of the trail; these had been covered over with dry grass,
  and were virtually invisible until the Apaches delivered a volley at point-blank
  range from three sides. Four men were killed and two others severely
  wounded, and the surviving National Guardsmen fell back. They were joined
  by Mexican Federal troops who had been following them up, but by the time
  they returned to the scene of the attack the Apaches were long gone.
  Decoy by gunfire: McEvers Ranch, September 10–11, 1879
  A week after they had taken the horse herd of Company E, 9th Cavalry
  at Ojo Caliente (see above), Victorio’s warriors attacked a Mexican settlement
  at Jaralosa, approximately 56 miles south of Ojo Caliente. Here they killed
  between seven and ten men, women and children. Word of the attack reached
  the mining settlement of Hillsboro approximately 20 miles to the north,
  and men saddled up and rode south to render what assistance they could.
  The pursuit does not appear to have been very well organized; the numbers
  involved are unclear, and the men did not ride together as a single group.
  When the Hillsboro men arrived
  at
  Jaralosa they were outraged
  by what they found there. One
  William Bates, interviewed in 1940,
  recalled that the bodies showed
  evidence of extremely cruel deaths;
  even today, some descendants of
  people who lived in the area at the
  time recall this as an atrocity even
  by Apache standards. 
  Almost 
  before 
  this 
  ghastly
  spectacle had sunk in, the posse
  heard gunfire from the direction
  of McEvers Ranch, some 2 miles
  to the southeast of Jaralosa. The
  haphazard pursuit was continued
  in that direction, and the Hillsboro
  men ran piecemeal into an ambush
  in which between ten and 18 of
  them were reported as being killed.
  Author’s suggested site for
  the McEvers Ranch ambush
  of September 10, 1879; the
  posse’s starting point at
  Jaralosa is off the top of the
  sketch map, and their
  destination at the ranch is a few
  hundred yards off the bottom
  left. Riders following the road
  (double broken lines) roughly
  southwards would pass on
  their left a stretch of marshy
  cienega, and on their right
  some hills and ridges – only
  about 50ft high, but steep, and
  offering many natural firing
  positions close above the trail
  at (B), (C) and (D). Once the
  posse reached (A) the Apaches
  could bring them under fire
  from three directions at close
  range. Any survivors could have
  found cover in the marshland,
  but if the Apaches had placed
  riflemen at (E) they would have
  been pinned down there. Point
  (F) would have provided an
  excellent vantage point, from
  which Victorio or whoever else
  directed this ambush could
  signal instructions to his
  warriors. 
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  Russell
  Apaches
  Apaches
  2
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  The actual site of the ambush is unknown, but, having examined the terrain,
  the author believes the most likely spot to be just outside the ranch.
  The number of fatalities inflicted suggests that the ambush must have been
  sprung from very close range. There is a ridge further away from the ranch
  that is said to be the ambush site; however, the terrain there does not offer
  easy escape routes from positions close to the trail, and if the Apaches had
  been deployed along the ridgeline itself they would have been too far away
  to inflict such casualties. The spot where we believe the ambush occurred
  allows good concealment close to the road, with good escape routes. The
  killing ground is just beyond a blind corner, and the terrain does not look
  Cave Creek Canyon, looking
  roughly westwards into the
  Chiricahua Mountains. This
  gives a good idea of the
  difficulty US Army detachments
  faced in remaining undetected
  by Apache lookouts, and of the
  heavy cover on the lower
  slopes that masked any
  number of ambush positions.
  (Photo courtesy Catherine
  Edwards)
  AMBUSH BY DECOY TRAILS
  1: Dragoon Mountains, April 1871
  Captain Gerald Russell of the 3rd US Cavalry, with about
  30 troopers and a Mexican guide, was following the trail of
  a large group of Chokonen Chiricahua led by Cochise. As they
  followed the trail along a canyon in the Dragoon Mts, the scout
  Merejildo Grijalva became convinced that if they proceeded
  any further they would run into an ambush. Russell heeded his
  advice, and the troop began to retrace their steps. The scout
  had been right: a little further ahead, Cochise had divided his
  band and sent them doubling back over the high ground to
  lay an ambush on both sides of the canyon. In fact, he had
  been hoping to catch Russell from three directions, but the
  latter’s withdrawal after becoming suspicious of the terrain
  directly ahead of him foiled that part of the plan. Despite
  heavy fire from both flanks, Russell managed to extricate his
  men without casualties.
  2: Horseshoe Canyon, October 1871
  On this occasion Capt Russell was again following the trail of
  Apache raiders, with 25 troopers and the scout Robert H.
  Whitney. Seeking to water the horses and men in Horseshoe
  Canyon in the Chiricahua Mts, Russell and Whitney were
  deceived by a false trail. The Apaches had also used the
  waterhole, but had then left clear tracks emerging from the
  canyon again. Convinced that it was safe, Russell proceeded
  to the waterhole – unaware that the Apaches had later turned
  away from their direction of march and up into the high
  ground, following the upper slopes and dropping off at
  intervals to lay an almost circular ambush above and around
  the waterhole. When Russell arrived at mid-afternoon they
  opened fire, and the troopers were pinned down until Russell
  managed to lead them out after nightfall. Whitney was killed,
  as were two horses, and a trooper was wounded; but despite
  these light casualties, Russell had to give up his pursuit – which
  had been the Apaches’ primary motive. 
  Inset: Before the enrolment of the Indian Scout companies
  was promoted by Gen George Crook for his 1872 Tonto Basin
  campaign, and even afterwards, the experienced advice of
  local civilian guides, both Mexican and American, was of
  crucial value. US Army officers new to the Southwest were
  unfamiliar with the terrain, and anyway lacked any
  professional grounding in counter-guerrilla tactics. Part of the
  continued value of white or mixed-blood guides was as
  interpreters with the Indian Scouts. 
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  particularly threatening until you are well
  inside the danger area (see sketch map on
  page 33). 
  The Apaches’ use of decoy techniques
  is crucial to the understanding of this
  ambush. A decoy in this sense is any ploy
  to attract the attention of the target and
  then draw him into the arranged ambush.
  In this case the attack upon Jaralosa
  attracted the attention of the armed
  civilians at Hillsboro, and what they
  found when they arrived there enraged
  them (as the Apaches no doubt intended).
  Angry men bent on revenge do not think
  as clearly as they should, and once they
  had been drawn into the general area, the
  firing from McEvers Ranch then drew the
  posse incautiously down the road and
  into the ambush that had been prepared
  to receive them. Here the Apaches did not
  simply monitor the targets’ movements
  and then arrange an ambush in their
  path; they thought out the sequence of
  events in advance, and arranged them to
  manipulate their quarry’s reactions.
  Having sited the ambush in the most
  advantageous terrain along the posse’s
  predicted line of travel, they fired the
  decoy shots. These gave the Hillsboro
  men the impression that another group
  of settlers might still be rescued from
  the horrors they had found at Jaralosa,
  and also that their own approach was
  undetected – past experience would have
  suggested that the Apaches tended to flee in the face of substantial and
  aggressive armed parties. The local newspapers were periodically full of
  stories about the “cowardly” manner in which Apaches fought; at McEvers
  Ranch the Apaches apparently took advantage of this reputation and turned
  it back upon their enemies.
  Decoy by simulated innocence: Whetstone Mountains, May 5, 1871
  Another form of decoy was to send out one or two men – or, in at least one
  instance, women – into the open where they knew the enemy would see them.
  Acting as if unaware of the presence of danger, the decoys would saunter
  casually into and beyond the killing ground, hoping that they would be
  followed. Even experienced Indian-fighters could be taken in by this ploy.
  On May 5, 1871, Lt Howard B. Cushing’s detachment was hunting for
  Cochise when they found a fresh trail left by an Apache woman meandering
  up a canyon. Though suspicious, they still entered the trap; when they came
  under fire from Apaches led by Juh, most of the detachment managed to
  extricate themselves, but Cushing was killed. Sergeant John Mott recorded
  the quiet discipline of the Apache warriors who attacked them:
  36
  An Apache scout poses with
  what appears to be a
  Winchester repeater, and a
  revolver and “butcher knife”
  at his belt. By the late 1870s
  many hostile Apaches had also
  acquired repeating weapons.
  Lieutenant Charles Gatewood
  of the Scouts recalled that
  during the fight against
  Victorio in the Guzman Mts on
  October 27, 1879, “The whole
  top of the mountain was a
  fringe of fire flashes… the
  reports from their Winchesters
  above were so frequent as to
  be almost a continuous roar.”
  (Courtesy Arizona Historical
  Society, no. 43391)
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  The Indians were well handled by their chief, a thick, heavy-set man,
  who never dismounted from a small brown horse during the fight. They
  were not noisy or boisterous as Indians generally are, but paid great
  attention to their chief, whose designs I could guess as he delivered his
  instructions by gestures.
  Decoy by simulated panic: Caballo Mountains, January 30, 1880
  Women were also to play a key role in the ambush of Capt Louis B. Rucker
  in the Caballo Mts during Maj Morrow’s pursuit of Victorio in January 1880.
  Captain Rucker, leading a detachment drawn from Companies B & M,
  9th Cavalry, accompanied by civilian volunteers, crossed the Rio Grande
  following a trail into a canyon (probably Mescal Canyon) at the northern
  end of the Caballo Mountains. About a mile up the canyon they came upon a
  herd of livestock guarded by three or four Apache women, who immediately
  “panicked” and tried to drive the herd up the canyon, thus encouraging
  Rucker’s men into a rash pursuit. As they charged towards the herd they were
  caught in a crossfire from Apache warriors above and all around them.
  One Navajo scout was killed and three cavalrymen were wounded. Some of
  the detachment themselves panicked, and fled all the way back to the other
  side of the Rio Grande. Rucker, with another officer and ten men, fought a
  rearguard action back down the canyon, with the Apaches harassing them
  from the high ground throughout their retreat to the river. 
  The reporting of this skirmish in the monthly regimental return and the
  bi-monthly company muster roll is interesting. In the former it is
  acknowledged that Rucker lost five horses killed in this ambush. The latter
  claimed that four horses were shot by order due to their exhaustion prior to
  the ambush, and admitted to only one horse lost. Both sets of records note
  that three troopers were wounded in action, but give no further detail.
  However, The Grant County Herald reported the details of this skirmish
  on February 21, 1880. This publication was not particularly well disposed
  towards the African-American 9th Cavalry, but a private letter from one
  of Morrow’s lieutenants also confirmed that a small detachment had been
  defeated in the Caballo Mts on January 30.
  37
  Mescal Canyon, at the northern
  end of the Caballo Mts; this is a
  likely spot for the ambush of
  Capt Rucker’s detachment of
  the 9th Cavalry on January 30,
  1880. This photo was taken
  about a mile up the canyon
  from the bank of the Rio
  Grande; the canyon opens up
  into a natural amphitheatre
  before narrowing again,
  making it an ideal place to
  station the decoy herd.
  (Author’s photo) 
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  Ad hoc ambushes: the Apache “roadside bomb”
  The rapidly arranged ad hoc ambush would be sprung either upon the
  unexpected appearance of a tempting target, or in an attempt to slow down
  or cripple a pursuing enemy. One of the things that quickly becomes apparent
  when traveling in Apacheria is the Apaches’ selection of potential ambush
  sites to catch their enemies off guard. They knew that when passing through
  a canyon their targets would almost certainly be on the alert for trouble.
  But by selecting positions in apparently flat terrain, the Apaches could catch
  their targets off guard, either just before the soldiers increased their state of
  alertness on entering difficult terrain, or as they breathed a sigh of relief after
  negotiating it safely. What we might term the Apache “roadside bomb”
  technique – by analogy with today’s IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan – is typical
  of the use of apparently innocuous terrain for ambushes.
  One ambush of this type was sprung in the aftermath of a major defeat
  inflicted upon Victorio by Apache scouts on May 24, 1880, in the Black
  Range in the vicinity of the Palomas
  river. Several groups of Apaches
  fled southwards to Mexico, and on
  May 29 one of these groups spotted
  a party of five men with a wagon
  moving towards Cooke’s Canyon.
  Before the entrance to the canyon itself
  the Apaches occupied a small, narrow
  arroyo, washed out by the heavy
  rainfall that periodically strikes the
  region. These narrow gulleys may be
  deep enough to conceal a standing
  man, and are virtually invisible until
  one stumbles upon them. Where these
  arroyos converge with or run parallel
  Some of the natural cover
  along Mescal Canyon, above
  the natural arena where Capt
  Rucker is believed to have been
  ambushed – with such success
  that some of his troopers fled
  all the way back and over the
  Rio Grande. (Author’s photo)
  An ambush on flat, apparently
  featureless ground could be
  even more shocking than a trap
  laid in a canyon. This is a
  temporary arroyo in Cooke’s
  Canyon, caused by the heavy
  rains of late July and August;
  it is close to the trail, and deep
  enough to shelter a standing
  man. This gulley is almost
  invisible from a few yards away,
  and Apaches often employed
  such ground for point-blank
  ambushes on unwary travelers.
  Five men were killed in this
  immediate vicinity on May 29,
  1880 by Victorio’s warriors,
  who were on their way to
  Mexico via the Florida Mts,
  visible on the horizon to the
  left. (Author’s photo) 
  38
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  to the trail, they provide excellent positions from which to open fire at point-
  blank range without warning. On this occasion the burned wagon and
  corpses were later found by US troops from Fort Cummings. 
  Victorio was not the only Apache war chief to use this technique. In
  November and December 1885 the leader known as Ulzana (Jolsanny/ Josanie)
  led a small group of warriors up from Mexico to cause havoc in southern
  New Mexico and Arizona. During the raid he used the “roadside bomb”
  technique twice: at Soldier Hill on December 19, 1885, and in the Chiricahua
  Mts on December 27. At Soldier Hill (so-named after the attack), Ulzana’s
  warriors ambushed a detachment from the 8th US Cavalry, killing Surgeon
  Maddox and four soldiers. The ambush was sprung as the cavalrymen followed
  a road that curved steadily up a ridgeline towards its summit. The Apaches
  waited until the detachment had almost reached the top before opening fire,
  from positions along the crest above and flanking them. 
  Eight days later, the same Apaches killed two men, William Reese and
  Caspar Albert, in the eastern foothills of the Chiricahua Mts as they drove
  a wagon towards Galeyville. There are two possible reconstructions of this
  ambush. The first is that the wagoners were caught in a close-range crossfire
  in the riverbed at the bottom of a slope; the other is that they were caught as
  they rounded a bend and descended towards the ford, by warriors in
  positions immediately beyond the outer curve of the road. In the latter case,
  one of the two men would have been wholly occupied with controlling the
  vehicle, and thus unable to return fire.
  This type of ambush was also employed by Apaches in the 1860s when
  they were more reliant upon bows and muzzle-loading firearms. Cochise
  used this technique to devastating effect in 1862 near Apache Pass in the
  Chiricahua Mts, and again at Dragoon Springs in 1869. On July 13, 1862,
  nine miners traveling west towards Apache Pass were ambushed from close
  range by a large group of Apaches concealed in a small gulley running parallel
  to the trail. When the bodies were discovered by US troops it appeared
  39
  The grave of the victims of
  Ulzana’s ambush in the foothills
  of the Chiricahua Mts on
  December 27, 1885; the rough
  inscription reads “Killed by
  Indians William Reese and
  Casper Albert Dec 1885.”
  Monuments to soldiers were
  also sometimes raised, perhaps
  partly as a warning to recruits;
  one that can still be seen at
  Fort Cummings reads: “Sacred
  to the Memory of Thos Ronan
  aged 45 LS Hunter aged 33
  Chas Devlin aged 28 Thos Daly
  aged 28 late Privates of Co G
  1st Veteran Infantry Cal. Vols.
  Killed by Apaches at Oak Grove
  NM Jan 17 1866.” (Author’s
  photos)
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  that all nine men were taken completely unawares by the
  opening volley, presumably assuming that they were safe on
  flat, open ground. All were hit, and those not killed outright
  were quickly finished off, though one man was reported to
  have been taken alive and burned to death.
  At Dragoon Springs, Cochise not only took advantage of
  the terrain but also used the time of day to lull his target into
  a false sense of security. As the sun set on October 5, 1869,
  a coach with six men – the driver, four soldiers from the
  21st Infantry, and mine owner John F. Stone – was driving
  towards Dragoon Springs in the Sulphur Springs Valley. The
  ground was deceptively flat, and since twilight was drawing
  in the coach party assumed that they were safe (as mentioned,
  Apaches did not usually attack at night). Once again, Cochise
  used a small arroyo close to the road to conceal most of his
  men. These warriors opened fire as the coach drove past
  them, killing the driver and three soldiers; Stone and the
  surviving soldier were cut off and killed by mounted Apaches
  when the coach team bolted off the road.
  Las Palomas, March 1880
  The principle of striking immediately before or beyond an
  obvious ambush point can also be identified in the
  opportunist ambush of two wagons south of Las Palomas
  during March 1880, carried out by a small band of Apaches
  believed to have been led by Nana. (It should be noted
  that this particular attack has been inflated into a story of
  the destruction of a whole wagontrain. However, a letter
  written within a week of the event by an Army doctor
  who accompanied the Apache scouts who discovered the
  remains clearly states that only two wagons were involved,
  and that the Apaches killed five Mexicans and took two
  children prisoner.)
  Once again, their victims were simply in the wrong place
  at the wrong time. During March 1880 several Apache
  raiding parties struck the Rio Grande valley in New Mexico.
  One of these groups of raiders must have spotted these two
  wagons, and also noted an ideal ambush position along the wagon road
  where the trail climbed up out of a large, deep arroyo. The two wagons had
  negotiated the difficult terrain of the riverbed and the steep slope out of it,
  and had entered what they must have thought was a less dangerous stretch
  of some 200–300 yards of level road. This illusion was only dispelled when
  the Apaches opened fire; small hillocks, a ridge only some 20ft high, and a
  small depression alongside the road offer hiding places within point-blank
  range in four directions. Lieutenant Thomas Cruse, 6th Cavalry, who
  commanded the Apache scout detachment that discovered the remains shortly
  afterwards, wrote in his memoirs that the memory of the sight haunted
  his sleep for many years.
  Goodsight Mountains, September 7, 1880
  The more usual ad hoc ambush was employed when Apaches were trying to
  stop or at least slow down an enemy who was in close and vigorous pursuit.
  40
  Naches, of the Central
  Chiricahua, photographed
  in middle age; he holds a
  repeating rifle, apparently a
  Winchester. While the Apaches
  did acquire significant numbers
  of these, usually by trade south
  of the border, some primary
  sources and modern battlefield
  archaeology confirm that in the
  late 1870s and early 1880s
  many appreciated the longer
  effective range of the
  Springfield “trapdoor” or
  Remington “rolling block” rifles.
  (Courtesy Arizona Historical
  Society, no. 20803)
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  Somewhat confusingly, two officers with the same surname figure in two of
  the best examples of this type of action. 
  On September 6, 1880, a stagecoach was ambushed by Apaches in the
  Goodsight Mts, about 18 miles east of Fort Cummings. When word reached
  the fort, Col George P. Buell (CO of the 15th US Infantry, and now in field
  command of operations against the Apaches in southern New Mexico),
  sent Capt Leopold Parker with Company A, 4th Cavalry, accompanied by
  ten Apache scouts, towards the scene of the attack, with orders to pick up
  the trail. Since it was most likely that the raiders would flee into Mexico via
  either the Florida or the Potrillo Mts, a second company of the 4th was sent
  directly south to the Floridas to intercept the Apaches should they go that way;
  41
  While this is obviously a stiffly
  posed studio photo, Apaches
  were known to use the bow
  and arrows into the 1880s,
  when it was still an essential
  weapon for silent hunting.
  Archaeological evidence
  strongly suggests that arrows
  were employed as part of the
  attempt to stampede Lt
  Conline’s troop horses during
  his skirmish of April 5, 1880 –
  see Plate G. (Courtesy Arizona
  Historical Society, no. 3236)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  if no sign of them was found, this
  second detachment was to march
  east to the Potrillo Mountains. 
  Captain Parker found that
  the
  trail of the Apaches ran
  south along the east side of the
  Goodsight
  Mts, and took up
  the chase; unfortunately, he only
  assigned two of his men to flanking
  duty. Towards the southern end
  of the range he was ambushed
  by at least 30 Apaches who had
  concealed themselves along a low
  ridge; where there was no natural
  cover, they had constructed small
  rock breastworks. In the opening
  volley two Apache scouts and one
  cavalryman were killed and three more troopers were wounded (including
  a soldier named Aker, who according to the bi-monthly company muster roll
  was shot “through fleshy part of thigh and scrotum”). Parker fell back,
  dismounted, and attempted to drive the Apaches off the ridgeline by advancing
  in skirmish line with horse-holders to the rear. After several failed attacks he
  retreated for several miles, and sent to Fort Cummings for support. 
  Colonel Buell left the fort with a large detachment of the 9th Cavalry under
  the command of LtCol Nathan Dudley, accompanied by a Gatling gun and a
  Hotchkiss mountain howitzer. By the time this force arrived, the Apaches
  were, of course, long gone, having scattered and re-formed some 20 miles
  further south in the Potrillo Mountains. All Buell saw during the pursuit was
  a distant dustcloud making its way into Mexico, and when he reached the
  Potrillos he found that after using the waterhole at their camp site the Apaches
  had poisoned it with horse entrails. Buell concluded that without a mule-train
  to carry food and barrels of water, further pursuit was futile. The second
  4th Cavalry company, finding no sign of Apaches in the Florida Mts, did not
  reach the Potrillos until the following day. 
  In essence, Buell’s plan had been perfectly sensible: he correctly predicted
  the broad movements of the Apaches, and put a plan in place to cut them off.
  The problem was simply that the speed with which the Apaches could move
  across country when pursued by a larger force made it almost impossible
  for US Cavalry to catch up with them without killing or crippling their more
  An anonymous grave in
  Cooke’s Canyon; these may
  be encountered randomly
  thoughout Apacheria, though
  they are not usually as well
  preserved as this example.
  Lieutenant Thomas Cruse,
  6th Cavalry, recalled that in
  1880 Cooke’s Canyon was
  littered with graves and debris
  from Apache attacks dating
  back to the early 1860s.
  (Author’s photo)
  ATTACK: CONLINE’S SKIRMISH, 
  APRIL 5, 1880 (I)
  Lieutenant John Conline, with two scouts and 29 troopers of his
  Co A, 9th Cavalry, was following a trail roughly westwards up
  Hembrillo Canyon in the San Andres Mountains. Reaching a
  narrowing of the canyon at about 4.30pm, he halted and sent
  out videttes – (2 & 3) forward to reconnoitre for a possible
  ambush, and (1)to the left and up-slope, to watch that flank and
  the rear. At some point Conline formed a skirmish line (4), with
  the horse-lines behind and below him (5). Atc.5.30pm Apaches
  were spotted moving down the left slope, and then anything up
  to 50 more coming fast down the canyon (6). The videttes
  skirmished with the Apaches on the move as they fell back on
  Conline’s main force (7, and inset). A warrior identified by the
  scout José Carillo as Victorio was seen directing his men from
  high on the northern slope (8). A few warriors took up position
  on the northern slopes (9), above and to the right front of
  Conline. Many more of them used the cover of an arroyo cutting
  up the southern slope of the canyon, which was hidden from
  the soldiers, to form a firing line (10–11). From positions above,
  to the left of, and facing the troopers, the Apaches engaged
  them in a fire-fight at a range of some 200 yards. 
  F
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  heavily-laden horses in the process. (And even if Buell’s plan had worked,
  the Apaches would simply have scattered once again.) From the Apache
  viewpoint, they had stopped and fought off the immediate pursuit, allowing
  them time to put enough distance between themselves and further pursuers
  to escape into Mexico.
  Carrizo Canyon, August 12, 1881
  In this case the ad hoc delaying ambush evolved into an attack. Nana had
  come up from Mexico in July 1881, and had commenced raiding far and
  wide across southern New Mexico. From Fort Wingate, Capt Charles Parker
  was leading 19 men from Company K, 9th Cavalry and a Mexican scout, as
  one of a number of detachments of the 9th sent out from Forts Stanton,
  Cummings, Bayard, Craig and Wingate in an attempt to find the Apaches.
  On August 11, Parker received a report that Nana had attacked a party of
  civilians 28 miles to his south and approximately 40 miles from Sabinal,
  between the Sierra Lucero and the Rio Grande. He reached the spot where
  the attack had taken place, and followed the Apaches’ trail eastwards
  towards Sabinal. 
  Despite being covered by a small advance group and flankers, the
  detachment walked straight into an ambush by well-concealed warriors.
  Parker later reported that the Apaches had killed the NCO commanding his
  advance group and flankers with their opening volley. He withdrew some
  yards and attempted to make a stand, but the Apaches, seeing the damage
  they had inflicted, chose to press home their advantage and launched an
  infiltrating attack towards and around his position. Despite losing two killed,
  and three troopers and the Mexican guide seriously wounded, the detachment
  held its nerve and shot it out, and the Apaches eventually withdrew. Once
  again, the important fact for the Apaches was that Parker also lost ten horses
  shot dead, and had to withdraw to Sabinal; in one sudden ambush Nana
  had knocked out one of the 9th Cavalry detachments pursuing him. It would
  be four days before another of these detachments caught up with him (see
  page 21, for skirmish between Nana’s band and Lt Burnett).
  THE ATTACK 
  If Apaches launched a direct attack upon their opponents, it was usually in
  the aftermath of a particularly successful ambush, when the targets were so
  demoralized that the Apaches were confident enough to gamble on moving
  in for the kill. Some Apaches would infiltrate directly towards the enemy,
  making the maximum use of terrain and cover, while others worked their
  way around the flanks. Once the use of repeating rifles became common,
  such attacks could be accompanied by a high rate of fire on the move. This
  was not usually particularly accurate, but was primarily intended to give an
  exaggerated impression of the Apaches’ strength. These attacks were
  launched in such a way that if the enemy rallied stubbornly, the Apaches
  could fade back into cover and disperse with minimal loss – as in the example
  of Nana’s ambush in Carrizo Canyon, cited above. 
  Cerro Mata Ortiz, November 13, 1882
  This was an action between Apaches directed by Juh, Geronimo and Nana,
  and a small party of Chihuahua state troops led by Juan Mata Ortiz. In
  November 1882 those Apaches living in the Sierra Madre Mts of Mexico
  44
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  decided to attack the garrison of
  the small town of Galeana. A later
  account by Jason Betzinez, who
  was present, estimated that at this
  time those Apaches who had left
  the San Carlos reservation between
  1877 and 1882 numbered 75 “first
  line warriors,” plus a large number
  of youths and older men who
  would also participate in hostilities
  if necessary. (It is worth repeating
  that most of the key leaders present
  were in fact numbered among these
  older men.)
  Two warriors volunteered to
  steal horses from the vicinity of
  Galeana, with the aim of leading
  any pursuers into an ambush (as noted, the Apaches were willing, where
  appropriate, to employ such unsubtle Plains Indian-style decoy tactics).
  Small groups of warriors were hidden in a ravine running alongside the road
  out of Galeana towards the mountains, and further from the town a large
  group blockaded the road, hidden by a dip in the terrain. The horses
  were duly stolen and, as hoped, the thieves were pursued, by a detachment
  of 22 mounted soldiers (such Mexican state troops, recruited for the short
  term, were often well armed with Remington carbines and pistols, but
  suffered from lack of numbers and rudimentary logistics). The decoys stayed
  out of range, but close enough to draw the pursuers into the trap. The
  warriors hidden in the roadside ravine let the Mexicans pass, and only opened
  fire when the latter found themselves confronted by the blocking force. 
  Fired upon from front and rear, their leader Mata Ortiz made for a nearby
  low hill or cerro (which was later named after him), where his men
  dismounted and hurriedly raised rock breastworks. The Apaches surrounded
  the hill, and the older men and some of the better marksmen among them
  settled in to keep the Mexicans pinned down by fire. All but eight of the
  remaining warriors started crawling slowly up one side of the hill, while eight
  younger men, who habitually worked as a team, circled to the opposite side
  of the hill and did the same. Both groups pushed rocks slightly larger than
  their heads in front of them to protect themselves from the Mexicans’ return
  fire. Occasionally one of the crawling warriors would pause in his slow
  progress to fire at the Mexicans. Eventually, the Apaches got to within yards
  of the surrounded soldiers, whose firing began to dwindle. The Apaches
  thought that the Mexicans might have run short of ammunition, but
  suspected that they might receive a volley if they rose to charge. At this point
  one of the Mexicans managed to mortally wound the cousin of one of the
  Apaches leading the attack.
  This provoked the final assault by the furious Apache leader. It seems that
  the soldiers were indeed low on ammunition, since the warrior rush was not
  met with a volley. The Apaches killed all but one of the 22 Mexicans,
  including Mata Ortiz. One man managed to break out and make a run for
  Galeana, and Geronimo shouted to let the fugitive go – he might bring out
  more troops to be ambushed… The Apaches lost only two warriors killed in
  this fight. Those who had followed Victorio until his death in October 1880
  45
  Cerro Mata Ortiz, named for the
  Mexican officer killed with 20
  of his Chihuahua state troops
  when they were ambushed
  and then surrounded on this
  low hilltop near the town of
  Galeana on November 13,
  1882. (Author’s photo)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  were particularly pleased with the killing of Juan Mata Ortiz, as he had
  been second-in-command of the Mexican force that finally cornered Victorio
  at Tres Castillos.
  Conline’s skirmish, April 5, 1880 (see Plates F & G)
  As already stated, it was very rare for Apaches to launch a direct attack upon
  opponents unless they caught them unawares, and usually such an attack
  would only be attempted if the odds were stacked in their favor. One example
  was an action fought on April 5, 1880, when Lt John Conline of Company
  A, 9th Cavalry, entered Hembrillo Canyon in the San Andres Mts; there
  he was attacked by a superior force of Apaches, and was probably saved from
  significant losses, or even disaster, only by the onset of nightfall.
  Conline was attached to a battalion of four companies (A, D, F & G) of
  the 9th Cavalry commanded by Capt Henry Carroll. This was part of a
  three-battalion force tasked with trying to trap Victorio, who was then
  believed to be based in the San Andres Mountains. On April 5, Capt Carroll
  had ordered Conline, with 29 soldiers and two guides, to scout ahead towards
  the eastern side of the San Andres. During that afternoon they encountered
  a trail made by about 50 horses and
  100 cattle that led into Hembrillo
  Canyon. Conline followed these
  tracks roughly westwards until about
  4.30pm. The canyon was starting to
  narrow, and, concerned about the
  possibility of an ambush, Conline
  halted and sent out six men to scout
  further ahead. At about 5.30pm,
  Conline spotted two Apaches moving
  down the slope of the left (south)
  side of the canyon – and then saw
  between 35 and 50 more, moving
  rapidly down the canyon towards
  him. His advance videttes carried out
  a fighting withdrawal until they
  The view up Hembrillo Canyon
  from the position of Lt
  Conline’s original skirmish line
  on April 5, 1880 – see Plate F.
  Up to 50 Apaches attacked
  down the canyon towards the
  camera. Some moved up the
  slopes on the left of the 9th
  Cavalry detachment; others
  infiltrated forwards under cover
  of the deceptively rough
  terrain, and a third party
  worked around Conline’s right
  flank along an arroyo, hidden
  by the green vegetation
  running from the center to the
  right of the photograph.
  (Author’s photo) 
  ATTACK: CONLINE’S SKIRMISH, APRIL 5,
  1880 (II)
  The initial skirmish line of Conline’s detachment (1) was
  particularly vulnerable on its right flank. While the troopers
  engaged warriors to their front (2) and above them to the left
  (3), the Apaches then launched an attack on their right flank
  (4), working their way forwards over the rough ground on the
  lower slopes of the canyon’s left (southern) side. Some of
  Victorio’s warriors also got into another dry streambed (5–6),
  which led them all the way around the flank to Conline’s right
  rear (7). From here they opened fire on his horse-lines; at least
  one Apache climbed the north side of the canyon to fire down
  (8), and another got into position directly behind the original
  skirmish line (9). It seems that some troopers from that line,
  and some of those guarding the horses, then formed a second
  skirmish line (10) to face this new threat. At about 7.30pm, the
  determined horseshoe-shaped defense and failing light seem
  to have persuaded the Apaches to withdraw up the canyon
  rather than risk pressing the attack home. 
  Inset: A warrior creeping up from the dry arroyo towards the
  rear of Lt Conline’s right flank; the Apaches were renowned
  for their skill at concealment in the most rudimentary cover. If
  they had time to prepare for battle they often stripped to
  breechclout and moccasins, but would retain items that
  imparted “war medecine,” such as feathered war caps. This
  Chiricahua, who has followed Victorio from the Warm Springs
  reservation, also has a beaded “ration ticket” pouch fringed
  with tin cones. He is armed with an 1873 Winchester carbine;
  tucked under his cartridge belt is a skull-crushing “floppy-
  head” warclub for close combat, and he would also certainly
  be carrying a knife. Despite their fearsome reputation, the
  Apaches were not generally renowned for marksmanship; on
  April 5, Lt Conline’s company suffered only two men
  wounded, one horse killed and a second wounded.
  G
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  reached his command. According to Conline, he blocked the Canyon with
  a skirmish line, and managed to defeat an attempt to turn his flank. The
  Apaches broke off the engagement at about 7.30pm, allowing the detachment
  to withdraw with only two men slightly wounded. 
  The report left by Conline is vivid in its detail; one of his guides,
  José Carillo, knew Victorio personally, and identified the Apache leader as
  directing this attack – which, according to Conline, was pressed home with
  some vigor. This attack was probably born of an attempt to ambush Conline,
  but the ambush was not sprung because the troopers did not go far enough
  up the canyon. However, on seeing the size of the detachment and where they
  had chosen to halt, Victorio must have judged that terrain and numbers were
  in his favor, and moved down the canyon.
  Actual examination of the site revealed that Conline’s account was not
  quite as detailed as it might have been. Conline chose to halt in a less than
  ideal position, where the Apaches were able to dominate his left flank from
  above, and to infiltrate to close range through the rough ground immediately
  to his front. What was worse – and absent from Conline’s report – was the
  fact that they were able to use a dry streambed to turn Conline’s right flank,
  as he did not extend his skirmish line across the whole canyon. Two things
  probably saved Conline and his men. First, they did not panic, and formed
  a horseshoe-shaped defense; this faced the Apaches with the prospect of
  having to move in closer, at the cost of taking too many casualties themselves.
  Secondly, the approach of nightfall probably convinced the Apaches that
  the risks were too great and, being reluctant to fight at night, they used the
  darkness to withdraw.
  A direct attack such as that made on Conline was a rarity, but it does show
  what Apaches were capable of doing if they had superior numbers, modern
  weapons with plentiful ammunition, favorable terrain, and excellent leadership.
  The lieutenant and his men were lucky that they had not encountered Victorio
  earlier in the day. Their calm defense served them well; had they attempted to
  48
  The dry arroyo in Hembrillo
  Canyon used by the Apaches to
  outflank Conline’s troopers on
  the right. The right-hand end
  of his original skirmish line was
  just off the left side of this
  photograph – see Plate G.
  (Author’s photo)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  make a run for it they would have encouraged the Apaches
  to press home their advantage, and would probably have
  suffered considerably heavier losses. But neither was the
  decision to stand fast without its risks: they were hemmed
  in, and without water other than what remained in their
  canteens. The calm defense dissuaded the Apaches from
  moving any closer for fear of taking unacceptable casualties,
  but Conline’s men were exposed to fire from warriors who
  had infiltrated all round them and who occupied far better
  protected positions. Had this been earlier in the day, the
  Apaches would have had the time to sit secure and punish
  the troopers from safety. Once the Apaches had turned the
  right flank they were within arrow-range of Company A’s
  horses; at the very least, Conline’s horse casualties would have
  been far more dramatic had this Apache encirclement been
  achieved earlier in the day.
  Hembrillo Basin, April 6/7, 1880 (see Plate H)
  The Apaches could also combine ambush, attack, and evasion techniques,
  depending upon the way that events unfolded. Victorio’s mixed band of
  Warm Springs Chiricahua and Mescalero warriors would demonstrate this
  full range of Apache tactics in the two days following Lt Conline’s skirmish. 
  Late on the evening of April 5, Conline rejoined Capt Carroll’s battalion.
  The latter decided that simply to enter Hembrillo Canyon by the same route
  was too predictable. He remained unsure as to the location of Victorio’s base,
  but he had to act immediately, since the Apaches might have decided
  to scatter as a precaution. The following day he sent Lt Patrick Cusack with
  Companies A & G of the 9th Cavalry back in the direction taken by Conline
  the previous day. Carroll himself, with the 71 men of Companies D & F,
  entered the San Andres Mts to the north of Hembrillo Canyon; they followed
  a roughly parallel canyon, that eventually led them into what is now known
  as Hembrillo Basin – a wide area high in the San Andres, where Victorio was
  in fact camped. 
  49
  View of the Hembrillo Basin
  battlefield looking north from
  Victorio Ridge, showing the
  overnight position of Capt
  Henry Carroll’s two companies
  of the 9th Cavalry on April 6/7 –
  see Plate H. The lower Apache
  position on the right represents
  the infiltrating attacks early on
  the morning of April 7. Victorio
  Ridge formed the main position
  from which Victorio’s warriors
  fought their rearguard action
  during that day, when US Army
  reinforcements arrived to
  relieve Carroll. His command
  had probably entered
  Hembrillo Basin somewhere
  on the center-left horizon.
  (Author’s photo)
  A cartridge case from a .45/70
  Springfield rifle found on the
  Hembrillo Basin battlefield. The
  last time it was handled was by
  one of Victorio’s warriors as he
  closed in on Carroll’s troopers
  early on the morning of April 7,
  1880. (Author’s photo) 
  Apache positions
  Apache positions
  Carroll’s position
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  4
  2
  3
  1
  2
  2
  6
  5
  7
  8
  Victorio’s camp
  Carroll, April 6
  Apache ambush
  Rock House spring
  Carroll, overnight
  Apaches, overnight
  Cusack, April 7
  McLellan, April 7
  Apaches fall back
  Apache rearguards
  Apaches disperse
  N
  S
  W
  E
  ^
  Apache 
  lookout
  Apache Ridge
  Geronimo Peak 
  Victorio Ridge
  Carroll’s Ridge
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Carroll’s approach from the
  north, by a less than obvious route,
  seems to have taken the Apaches by
  surprise. Nevertheless, they had time
  to set up an ad hoc ambush designed
  to stall his advance, and this worked
  better than expected. Carroll’s
  command found themselves trapped
  overnight on a low ridge dominated
  by higher ground, from which the
  Apaches harassed them thoughout
  the hours of darkness. The Apaches
  also stationed men between the
  soldiers and a small stream that ran
  below their position, and during the
  night a number of troopers were
  wounded during attempts to reach
  the water. 
  In the early morning of April 7, the Apaches started to close in on Capt
  Carroll’s men, and their calculation of the odds encouraged them to attempt
  infiltrating attacks.
  It was only the fortuitous and simultaneous arrival of both Capt
  McLellan, with two companies of Apache scouts and a company of the 6th
  Cavalry from another battalion, and of Lt Cusack with the balance of
  Carroll’s battalion, which saved the day. Even so, the Apaches made a steady
  fighting withdrawal, buying time for their dependants to escape from
  Hembrillo Basin before they finally dispersed into the mountains. Captain
  Carroll and seven of his men were seriously wounded (three of the latter later
  died from their wounds), and it was reported that the Apaches also killed 25
  horses and mules and captured four others.
  COMBINED TACTICS: HEMBRILLO BASIN,
  APRIL 6–7, 1880
  (1) Late afternoon, April 6: Capt Carroll, with Cos D & F,
  9th Cavalry, advances into Hembrillo Basin and towards
  Victorio’s camp from the north. Lookouts alert the Apaches
  in time for them to set a defensive V-shaped ambush from
  positions on Carroll’s Ridge and Apache Ridge; these open fire,
  blocking Carroll’s advance and his access to Rock House
  Spring. Carroll drives the warriors off the eastern slopes of
  Carroll’s Ridge, but then becomes trapped, and has to form
  a defensive overnight position.
  (2) Victorio’s warriors close in around Carroll’s command,
  sniping, and preventing the troopers from fetching water from
  Rock House Spring. At first light they launch infiltrating attacks,
  to such close quarters that some troopers have to defend
  themselves with their revolvers.
  (3) At daybreak on April 7, Lt Cusack arrives with Cos A & G,
  9th Cavalry, and relieves Carroll’s encircled command. 
  (4) Almost simultaneously, Capt McLellan arrives by another
  route, with a detachment of 6th Cavalry and two companies
  of Apache scouts.
  (5) Under attack by both Cusack and McLellan, the Apaches fall
  back to Victorio’s Ridge, where they take up rearguard
  positions.
  (6) McLellan’s company of 6th Cavalry attacks the left half of
  Victorio’s line, and the Apache scouts push ahead to hook
  around behind the hostiles’ left flank. 
  (7) Cusack’s companies of 9th Cavalry attack the right half of
  the Apache rearguard line.
  (8) After conducting a steady fighting withdrawal to give their
  dependants time to escape from the camp area, during the
  late afternoon of April 7 the Apaches break contact and
  disperse. Some escape north of Geronimo Peak on horseback,
  but most move southwards and eastwards into the mountains,
  switching to the tactics of evasion. 
  Inset: US Cavalry officer on detachment to lead Indian Scouts,
  with his Apache corporal. Many officers adopted convenient
  non-regulation dress when in the field; the Scouts – often
  identified by red headcloths – favored a mixture of their own
  dress and US Army issue, and were armed with the same
  Springfield weapons as the soldiers. The contribution of these
  scouts to the US Army’s campaigns was essential to success,
  and a number of American officers who served with them
  became skillful frontier fighters. 
  H
  Apache breastwork in
  Hembrillo Basin, about 2 feet
  high and offering good
  protection for a kneeling
  rifleman. The viewpoint is
  roughly from west to east;
  Carroll’s command was pinned
  down off-camera to the left,
  and the darker line at top right
  marks Victorio Ridge, where the
  warriors held off the US Army
  reinforcements until their
  dependants had escaped from
  the camp site further south.
  (Author’s photo)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  In this action we see the combination of ambush, attack and evasion
  techniques. Despite being taken by surprise the Apaches quickly organized an
  ambush. When this worked better than expected, they surrounded Carroll’s
  force and harassed them throughout the night, denying them access to water.
  At first light they launched infiltrating attacks. When suddenly confronted
  with a large number of reinforcements, the Apaches quickly fell back,
  fought a rearguard action, and scattered. The speed with which the various
  Apache groups surrounding Carroll evaluated a rapidly changing situation is
  also noteworthy. 
  Finally, it is worth adding that – like Conline the previous day – Carroll
  was probably lucky that he was pinned down in the late afternoon rather
  than earlier in the day. By the time the Apaches had positioned themselves
  more securely around his exposed position, darkness was gathering. Their
  night-time sniping was unnerving but quite inaccurate; the moon did not rise
  until approximately 4.30am on April 7, and even then it was little more than
  a thumbnail, giving little light. Had Carroll been trapped earlier in the day,
  or had reinforcements not arrived early the following morning, his men and
  horses would have become sitting targets for the better-positioned Apaches.
  He would have been faced with the choice of either attempting a break-out,
  storming one of the surrounding ridges, or digging in to hold out as best
  he could – short of water, and outnumbered by the rifles of approximately
  a hundred Apaches, most of them on higher ground. 
  52
  A faded but interesting photo
  of a group of Apache scouts
  with a white or mixed-blood
  guide and an Army officer. The
  white man, wearing a slouch
  hat, has a Winchester carbine;
  in front of him note one of the
  Apaches wearing a US Army
  M1872 dress helmet. The
  Apaches carry M1873
  Springfield infantry rifles, and
  the officer – who has a
  flamboyantly non-regulation
  hat, and fringed leggings –
  holds a Springfield carbine.
  A decisive right hook around
  Victorio’s line of resistance in
  the Hembrillo Basin was made
  by Apache scouts led by
  Lts Gatewood and Cruse of the
  6th Cavalry. (Courtesy Arizona
  Historical Society, no. 19841) 
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  OTHER ASPECTS OF APACHE
  WARFARE
  The targeting of horses and mules
  One of the most effective Apache tactics was their targeting of their enemies’
  mounts and pack animals. As noted, horses were the primary target in the
  opening seconds of an ambush. Moreover, the Apaches also killed and
  crippled hundreds of US Army horses and pack mules by deliberately leading
  the Cavalry over the roughest terrain imaginable for weeks or even months
  at a time. The 9th Cavalry – just one of ten US Cavalry regiments – sustained
  34.4 percent of the Army’s overall losses of horses (died, lost and stolen)
  between July 1879 and June 1880. The Apache strategy of encouraging the
  9th Cavalry to engage in long pursuits produced the situation that in May and
  June 1880 the regiment had fewer serviceable than unserviceable horses. 
  The numbers of Army mules died, lost and stolen during the financial
  years July 1876–June 1881, and the numbers purchased to replace them, also
  tell an eloquent story:
  These figures make a good argument that Victorio’s Apaches were having an
  appreciable effect upon the US Army’s overall supply of mules. The key year
  is 1879–80, when the only major conflict with American Indians was that
  with the Apaches in New Mexico. The large numbers of mules purchased
  in that year may reflect a realization by the US Army that a doubling of the
  inventory of pack mules was essential for the logistic support of troops
  engaged in this campaign. Indeed, at the end of May 1880, the equine
  casualties inflicted both directly and indirectly by the Apaches led General
  of the Army William T. Sherman to inform Col Edward Hatch (commanding
  the 9th Cavalry, and the District of New Mexico) that there was no more
  money available for the purchase of fresh horses and mules until Congress
  approved the Army’s next annual budget.
  1876/77
  1877/78
  1878/79
  1879/80
  1880/81
  Mules lost 
  696
  781
  758
  918
  687
  Bought
  842
  1,162
  1,149
  2,265
  1,006
  Mule-packers at work.
  Mule-trains were essential for
  keeping US Army detachments
  supplied in the field during
  their long pursuits of hostile
  Apaches, and losses among the
  Army’s mule herd could be a
  significant drag on operations.
  (Courtesy Arizona Historical
  Society, no.19510)
  53
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Apache reactions to American technology
  The Apaches quickly learned to appreciate the threat of the telegraph, and
  reacted by destroying sections of the wires. This might have the two-fold
  benefit of hampering US Army communications, while drawing Army
  attention and personnel to a particular place. In January 1880, when Victorio
  needed to distract attention from the rustled herd of livestock being driven
  from the Mexican border to the Mescalero reservation (see above, “Victorio’s
  evasion strategy”), Maj Morrow’s attention was attracted in the first place
  by the destruction of a long section of telegraph line between Fort Cummings
  and La Mesilla. When repair teams arrived on the scene they reported
  the discovery of a large trail left by the Apaches, and Morrow set his forces
  in motion.
  Victorio may also have employed a more subtle variation in 1880, and it
  was certainly known to the US Army in 1885–86. The telegraph wire would
  be cut at the top of the pole or in any trees through which the line passed,
  and the two ends would then be tied back in place with strips of rawhide.
  This obliged the Army’s repair teams to take the time to check every pole and
  tree until they discovered the break. 
  Examination of the Hembrillo Basin battle site suggests that the Apaches
  deployed different types of breech-loading rifles to maximize their advantages.
  Winchester and Henry lever-action repeating rifles – with their high rate of
  fire, but shorter effective ranges – were deployed closer to the US Cavalry
  positions, while Apaches with Springfield and Remington single-shot rifles
  were deployed to take advantage of their longer effective range. A number
  of the ambushes discussed above also show that the Apaches appreciated the
  value of catching their enemies in a crossfire from well-protected positions
  surrounding the target; the riflemen would also be sited slightly above the
  killing-ground, to avoid “friendly fire” from other Apache positions.
  The Apaches were also aware of the psychological effect of breech-loading
  weapons. At the end of April 1880, Victorio’s warriors struck the mining
  and ranching communities along the southern edge of the Mogollon Mts of
  New Mexico. It was reported that when the Apaches attacked some families
  who had “forted up” on one ranch near present-day Alma:
  The Indians were able to keep up a constant fire as fifteen warriors
  would drive up and fire then drop back to reload their guns and
  another fifteen would take their place thereby keep up [sic] a constant
  fire as they were always moving in a circle. There were two-hundred
  thirteen warriors counted.
  In truth, this raiding party was probably made up of no more than 25 to
  30 warriors, and the attack may have been carried out by as few as ten to
  15 men. The Apaches would habitually use the terrain for “fire and
  movement,” giving an exaggerated impression of their numbers. If the enemy
  did not flee, then the attack would be abandoned, but it might be repeated
  several times to test the morale of their opponents. What the Apaches were
  trying to do was to get the besieged party to abandon the ranch so that it
  could be ransacked in safety. When this failed, a rearguard was left to pin
  down the defenders of the buildings while the rest of the Apaches moved on
  to tackle fresh targets.
  The deployment of artillery – particularly mountain howitzers, which
  could easily be concealed in wagons, or broken down and transported by
  54
  OPPOSITE
  The Sharps carbine, which was
  manufactured and issued in
  great numbers to the US
  Cavalry during the Civil War,
  was one of the earliest single-
  shot breech-loading weapons
  that became available to the
  Apaches through trade and
  raiding. It started its career as a
  percussion-lock weapon taking
  a paper cartridge and separate
  percussion cap, but from 1863
  it was converted to take a
  metal cartridge with an integral
  cap; this made reloading
  quicker, and ammunition
  simpler to store and carry.
  While some longer Sharps rifles
  were renowned for their range,
  modern trials have shown that
  this short-barreled carbine was
  not accurate enough to hit a
  man-sized target consistently
  at more than 200 yards.
  However, in actual combat
  conditions that often sufficed,
  and the soft lead bullet with
  a caliber of up to .56in had
  a devastating impact. It is
  believed that Pvt John Teal,
  who wounded Mangas
  Coloradas at Apache Pass in
  1862, was carrying a Sharps.
  (Courtesy Earl Robinson, Lake
  Forest California)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  mule – would invariably prompt the Apaches to scatter. Their effect was thus
  primarily psychological, since by the time these guns were brought into
  action the Apaches would have had time to break off the engagement.
  In December 1879, at Fort Marcy, New Mexico, a howitzer was test-fired at
  a ridge 1,400 yards distant. It was found that with zero elevation the shell
  range was 300 yards; with 5º and 3º elevation, the shell passed over the target
  ridge; and the fourth and fifth shots, at 1º elevation, achieved impacts at
  550–575 yards’ range, though the effectiveness of the shellburst depended
  upon whether the ground was soft or hard – the best result was a 40-yard
  radius of fragmentation. 
  These results suggest that it would take some time to range a howitzer on
  target, but that once the range was found – and terrain permitting – the
  weapon had the potential to inflict significant casualties even among
  concealed and dispersed Apache warriors.
  In one skirmish between the 9th Cavalry and Apaches on January 12,
  1880 a mountain howitzer was eventually brought into action, and the
  Apaches withdrew. However, the only man killed in this skirmish was
  the sergeant directing the deployment of the howitzer – which suggests
  that the Apaches spotted the threat, tried to counter it, and then withdrew
  before it could inflict casualties.
  The most famous encounter between artillery and Apaches was at
  the “Battle of Apache Pass” in the Chiricahua Mts on July 14, 1862.
  Brigadier-General James H. Carleton’s volunteer California Column had been
  organized to counter the Confederate invasion of New Mexico in 1862.
  An advance party of 140 men of the 1st California Cavalry led by Col
  55
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Edward Eyre reached Apache Pass on June 25, and held a parley with
  Cochise, whose followers had already killed three of Eyre’s stragglers. Eyre
  informed Cochise that he was only passing through, that more troops were
  camped at Tucson, and that his commander only desired peace with the
  Apaches. Not realizing that Cochise was at war with the US Army since he
  had been falsely accused and held in early 1861, Eyre warned the Chiricahua
  chief that more US troops would be coming west through the pass. More
  inexplicably, given that Eyre had been ordered to scout the area, he sent no
  word back to Tucson concerning Apache hostility – even after the discovery
  of the bodies of his three missing troopers, and after some night-time sniping
  into Eyre’s camp.
  The next US troops to enter Apache Pass, three weeks later, were an
  advance detachment of 60 infantry, eight cavalrymen and two howitzers led
  by Capt Thomas L. Roberts. He had left Tucson with 102 infantry,
  24 troopers, the two howitzers, and 25–30 civilian teamsters. Roberts had
  detached 13 men to guard a supply dump for following detachments of
  Carleton’s force, and directed 25 soldiers and 20 teamsters to escort his
  wagons and ration cattle while he moved ahead with the balance of his force
  towards Apache Pass. 
  The numbers of Central and Eastern Chiricahuas led by Cochise and
  Mangas Coloradas are unclear, but they certainly heavily outnumbered
  Roberts’ detachment, and had time to prepare their positions. The soldiers
  were first ambushed at an abandoned stage station; they had started to relax
  on arriving there when they were attacked from the rear, and were only able
  to beat off the Apaches when they deployed the two howitzers. The troops
  were still several hundred yards from the spring inside Apache Pass; on
  advancing towards the water, they saw the surrounding ridges well fortified
  with rock breastworks, from which the concealed Apaches opened a heavy
  fire. A first attempt to capture the spring, supported by howitzer fire, was
  driven back. Captain Roberts changed his tactics, and a group of his men led
  by Sgt Albert Fountain stormed the highest of the ridges. This allowed the rest
  of the soldiers to seize the spring, while the howitzers were moved to higher
  ground and shelled the remaining Apache positions. This, combined with
  the rifle fire of Fountain’s men,
  finally obliged the remaining
  warriors to withdraw. 
  The strength of the resistance
  prompted Roberts to send seven
  of his cavalrymen back to warn
  the detachment escorting his
  wagons and stock. However,
  this party were seen to be pursued
  out of the mountains by a large
  number of Apaches, so, assuming
  the worst, Roberts decided
  to return to his supply train
  himself. There he found that his
  seven troopers had evaded the
  Apaches (including Pvt Teal who,
  unhorsed, had saved himself by
  wounding Mangas Coloradas).
  In the meantime the Apaches
  Looking eastwards up
  Diamond Creek in the Black
  Range/Mimbres Mts of New
  Mexico. During April–May 1879
  Victorio led a number of
  pursuing US Army
  detachments over difficult
  terrain in order to exhaust their
  horses. On May 29, these
  Chiricahuas fought a rearguard
  action against Capt Charles
  Beyer’s 9th Cavalry detachment
  after leading them up Diamond
  Creek and over the Black Range
  to a location that came to be
  known as Beyer’s (or Byer’s)
  Run. (Author’s photo)
  56
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  had re-occupied their positions above
  the spring in Apache Pass. The next
  day, Roberts deployed his infantry
  in a skirmish line across the canyon
  backed by his cavalrymen, with the two
  howitzers in the center, and in the event
  he had little difficulty in driving the
  warriors from their positions.
  Captain Roberts estimated that his
  men had killed nine Apaches, while
  he had lost two men killed and two
  wounded. Both sides agreed that it
  was the deployment of the howitzers
  that had been decisive; they had not
  done much actual damage, but only
  because the Apaches had chosen to
  withdraw before they were ranged in
  on their targets. 
  Terror tactics
  The Apaches had a fearsome reputation for the torturing of captives, and,
  while certainly exaggerated by their foes, this was not without foundation.
  One can find lurid tales in the local press, but these stories are, at best, usually
  second-hand. However, when interviewed by anthropologists and historians
  in the 1930s–50s the Apaches themselves sometimes acknowledged this
  reputation. Daklugie, son of Juh, stated that “We had the Sioux beat [for
  cruelty], especially the Nednhi and Chiricahua. The Warm Springs too. They
  were brave warriors and real fighting men.” 2
  We have noted the deliberate use of cruelty to manipulate white reactions,
  at Jaralosa in 1879 (see “McEvers Ranch,” above). The widespread fear
  created by such terror tactics could sometimes defeat an opponent before
  hostilities even commenced; in this sense, inflicting death by torture upon
  captives fitted in with the Apache principle of minimizing their own casualties. 
  Dan L. Thrapp (see “Further Reading”) argues that the Apache wars with
  the US can be divided into two phases. The first was the 1860s and early 1870s,
  when the Apaches were trying to prevent US and Mexican encroachment
  into their territory; this period ended with the creation of a number of Apache
  reservations in the Southwest. The second period of warfare, from the
  mid-1870s to 1886, featured a number of breakouts from these reservations
  by Apache leaders such as Victorio, Nana, Juh and Geronimo. One suspects
  that the use of torture was more common in the first period, when it can
  logically be seen as part of an attempt to warn other potential victims to avoid
  Apache territory. It seems to have been less prevalent during the second half
  of the Apache wars, simply because the Apaches often had to move constantly
  to evade their pursuers, and delaying their movements in order to torture
  captives only increased their danger of being caught. However, some individual
  incidents seem well attested, and the reputation for cruelty survived throughout
  the Apache wars.
  57
  A muzzle-loading Hotchkiss
  120mm mountain howitzer,
  photographed at Fort Bowie.
  This Napoleonic-looking little
  cannon, essentially unchanged
  since the French original
  appeared in 1827, was light
  enough to be disassembled
  and carried into rough terrain
  in pack-mule loads. Two of
  these were the decisive factor
  in the Battle of Apache Pass in
  July 1862. (Author’s photo) 
  2 Juh (pronounced “Whoo”) was a leader of the Southern Chiricahua or Nednhi. A
  successful war leader and contemporary of Victorio and Nana, he had a particular
  reputation for cruelty.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Victorio, in particular, has been
  left with a popular reputation
  for
  extreme cruelty that is not
  generally supported by the primary
  records (notwithstanding the Jaralosa
  incident). However, these records
  do suggest a reason why Victorio’s
  enemies may have labeled him in this
  way. Whether or not the Apaches
  used torture, they very rarely took
  adult males prisoner. Such captives
  could not be adopted into Apache
  society, and so were killed if taken
  alive – and if the Apaches feared
  detection, they would also kill any
  women and children who fell into
  their hands. The warriors fighting
  under the direction of Victorio and his successor Nana did not draw any
  European distinctions between combatants and non-combatants, and inflicted
  very heavy casualties amongst miners, prospectors, sheepherders and ranch
  hands on both sides of the border between 1879 and 1881. (Indeed, since
  many of these men would routinely have been armed, the distinction between
  “combatants” and “non-combatants” was fairly meaningless.) 
  The treatment suffered at Apache hands depended upon circumstance.
  James Kaywaykla of the Warm Springs Apaches described an occasion when
  four Mexicans, including a woman and child, had been killed. Despite his
  obvious horror when recalling the event many years later, Kaywaykla also
  pointed out that the Apaches were being closely pursued by US troops, and
  that any live witnesses could jeopardize their own safety. When Apaches were
  not feeling threatened they usually would not harm women and children.
  Kaywaykla recalled an incident when a party led by Nana caught two
  adolescent boys in New Mexico. Nana ordered his second-in-command,
  Kaytennae, to get rid of the two captives, as they might alert the authorities
  to the location of the raiders. However, Kaytennae, as the leader of the
  rearguard party, chose to release them – a decision that Nana accepted without
  comment. In this case the Apaches were on the move, and by the time any
  alarm was raised they would have been far away. 
  There was even an incident when Nana and his warriors took adult males
  prisoner and then released them. This occurred at Monica Springs on
  August 2/3, 1881 when, despite being pursued by a detachment of the
  9th Cavalry and Apache scouts, the captives were held while their ranches
  were ransacked and then released. The reason for this was that most of the
  men involved were ex-reservation employees with whom Nana had been
  acquainted in the early 1870s, and with whom – since they survived the
  experience – he must have enjoyed good relations. Apache warriors, while
  ruthless, usually had a clear sense of honor.
  The fear of hostile Apaches had a far wider effect upon economic activity
  than was warranted by the losses they actually inflicted. Although Apache
  raids by small numbers of warriors caused relatively heavy local casualties,
  these were a fraction of the local population. Yet those who survived would
  understandably “fort up,” and most economic activity by miners, freighters
  and traders would cease while the threat was perceived to be high. 
  58
  One of the Apache positions in
  Apache Pass, seen from the
  viewpoint of the attacking
  California Volunteers; this is
  probably Overlook Ridge,
  successfully stormed by Sgt
  Fountain’s men. The defensive
  positions on different features
  combined to form a horseshoe-
  shaped line around the spring,
  which is further up the canyon
  to the right of this picture.
  (Author’s photo) 
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  THE FAILURE OF APACHE RESISTANCE
  The three key weaknesses of the Apache guerrillas were the willingness of
  other Apaches to serve in the US Army as scouts; the difficulty of maintaining
  a secure supply of rifles and ammunition; and simple lack of numbers –
  despite the well-documented ability of small war parties to achieve effects
  out of all proportion to their strength. 
  Beginning with Gen Crook in 1871–72, US commanders were able to
  exploit inter-tribal rivalries to enlist hundreds of Apache scouts, whose
  deployment was usually decisive – particularly their tracking skills. Victorio’s
  only major defeat in US territory was inflicted by 62 Apache scouts led by
  Capt Henry K. Parker, on May 23/24, 1880, at an unknown location in the
  Black Range somewhere between present-day Winston and Kingston. During
  the night the Apache scouts surrounded the camp on three sides, and at
  daybreak they opened fire. Victorio had stationed a single sentry above his
  camp, and this man was picked off by one of the Apache scouts while the
  rest of this group volleyed into the camp. Victorio’s followers, completely
  surprised, attempted to flee; blocked by a second group of scouts, they then
  tried to escape in another direction, only to be blocked once more by Parker’s
  third group. Finding all avenues of escape cut off, the survivors took refuge
  among boulders, and a long stalemate ensued. Victorio was wounded in the
  leg during the attack, and he and his surviving followers were only able to
  escape when the Apache scouts – almost out of ammunition – had to
  withdraw, since expected US Army reinforcements failed to materialize.
  Victorio was reported to have lost 55 of his followers on this occasion,
  although many of these were women and children. 
  When Nana launched his famous raid into New Mexico in July and
  August 1881 he and his men fought a number of skirmishes with US troops.
  When faced by Army detachments accompanied by Apache scouts the
  A group identified as
  “Crawford’s Scouts,” so
  presumably from the battalion
  of about 100 White Mountain
  and Chiricahua Apaches of
  Indian Scout Cos A, B & C that
  were led into Mexico in January
  1886 by Capt Emmet Crawford,
  in pursuit of Geronimo.
  Crawford and his chief scout
  Tom Horn were among seven
  men wounded – Crawford
  mortally – when they were fired
  upon in error by Mexican state
  troops. Note the blue US Army
  “sack coats” worn by nearly all
  these men, some with NCO
  chevrons, and their long
  Springfield M1873 infantry
  rifles. (Courtesy Arizona
  Historical Society, no. 63674) 
  59
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  hostiles would immediately try to
  break contact with their pursuers.
  On
  three
  occasions during this
  expedition Nana’s raiders stood their
  ground and defeated detachments
  from the 9th Cavalry; none of these
  three patrols was accompanied by
  Apache scouts.
  General Crook’s 1883 Sierra
  Madre expedition, which persuaded
  the Apaches to surrender, was only
  successful because of his predominant
  use of Apache scouts; the only US
  troops present were a single company
  of cavalrymen who acted as escort
  to the expedition’s mule-train. It was
  the pressure and persuasion applied
  by Apache scouts, not the deployment
  of thousands of US troops, which
  persuaded Chihuahua, Nana, Ulzana,
  Naiche and Geronimo to surrender
  in 1886.
  * * *
  The adoption of modern weapons
  did allow the evolution of Apache
  guerrilla tactics into a more aggressive
  form than the hit-and-run warfare
  characteristic of the 1860s, but these
  more aggressive tactics could only
  be sustained if there were plentiful
  and secure sources of rifles and
  ammunition. Such security of supply
  was rarely, if ever, established, and
  was a constant source of concern for
  Apache leaders. The ammunition that
  could be picked up by raiding was
  never enough to keep them adequately
  supplied. They had to engage with
  illegal traders on both sides of the border in order to replenish their stocks
  of weapons and cartridges, and – despite their own formidable reputation –
  the Apaches had to remain vigilant for treachery during such trading sessions.
  There were a number of occasions when, having concluded their trade
  in Mexican towns, warriors were persuaded to get drunk with their hosts,
  and were then killed for the scalp bounty.
  A major contributing factor to Victorio’s death at Tres Castillos in
  northern Chihuahua on October 14/15, 1880 was his band’s shortage of
  ammunition due to US Army initiatives. In the immediate aftermath of the
  Hembrillo Basin battle the Mescalero Apache reservation was placed under
  close guard by the Army. The attempt to disarm and dismount the Mescaleros
  was botched, but the effective closing of the reservation shut down Victorio’s
  surest source of ammunition. When he tried to bypass troops in New Mexico
  60
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  by traveling through West Texas in an attempt to reach the Mescalero
  reservation, he was outmaneuvered by detachments from the 10th Cavalry
  (then commanded, along with the District of the Pecos, by the famous
  Civil War hero Col Benjamin H. Grierson). Starved of ammunition, and
  pursued by Chihuahua state troops led by Col Joaquin Terrazas, assisted by
  troops from New Mexico led by Col George P. Buell, Victorio had to disperse
  many of his warriors in search of fresh ammunition. These men were absent
  when Terrazas trapped Victorio and his remaining followers at Tres Castillos. 
  * * *
  It must be remembered that although Victorio, Nana, Juh, Ulzana,
  Chihuahua and other Apache leaders sometimes achieved a temporary
  tactical superiority, they generally had the numbers stacked against them.
  They very rarely directed more than 150 men against a far more numerous
  array of forces. In Victorio’s case, the Army effort was spearheaded by the
  9th Cavalry supported by the 15th Infantry, but by the time he was killed
  he had also faced strong detachments from the 4th, 6th and 10th Cavalry,
  with support from the 13th and 16th Infantry regiments. This opposition was
  intermittently enhanced by civilian volunteers recruited to protect settlements
  in New Mexico, by Mexican state troops from Chihuahua and Sonora,
  and – from late 1879 – by occasional Mexican Federal Army operations,
  such as those led by Gen Geronimo Trevino. In the final pursuit of Geronimo
  in 1885–86 almost a quarter of the US Army – about 5,000 men – were
  deployed in the search for fewer than 50 warriors. 
  Finally, while we have seen that the Apaches were superbly adept
  guerrillas, they were not perfect. Occasionally they could be caught off their
  guard, and, given their small numbers, these occasions could have decisive
  consequences. (In a reversal of a modern comment on counter-terrorist
  warfare, we might say that the Apaches had to be lucky every time, while
  the US Army only had to get lucky once or twice.) In his defeat by Apache
  61
  The famous photo taken by C.S.
  Fly of Tombstone at Canyon de
  los Embudos in Mexico in
  March 1886, during Gen
  Crook’s negotiations with the
  hostile Apaches. Geronimo is
  mounted on the left, Naiche
  on the right. (Courtesy Arizona
  Historical Society, no. 7816)
  OPPOSITE
  A scout named Esh-kin-tsay-
  gizah, in a mixture of traditional
  and Euro-American dress and
  carrying a Springfield rifle. The
  willingness of Apaches to assist
  the US Army may seem
  puzzling to some, but it was
  nothing extraordinary. In many
  19th and early 20th-century
  colonial wars, the eventual
  success of white armies
  depended upon their
  successful employment of
  native irregulars. With our
  modern sensibilities colored
  by simplistic images of
  “patriots” and “collaborators,”
  we often fail to understand the
  nature of tribal, pre-national
  societies. In such communities,
  often faced by a daily struggle
  to survive in a marginal natural
  environment, the meaningful
  sense of identity was more or
  less local, and the course of
  action chosen was governed
  by calculation of the immediate
  interests of each particular
  group. (Courtesy Arizona
  Historical Society, no. 25647)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  scouts in May 1880, Victorio had camped on a site that turned into a
  death-trap. He had correctly assumed that he had shaken off the 9th Cavalry,
  but apparently he had not factored the Apache trackers into the equation,
  and he suffered the grievous consequences.
  One of the most serious defeats inflicted upon Apaches was a consequence
  of the failure of the advance guard in their standard “marching formation”
  (as outlined in Plate A). On or about April 18, 1882, some 60 Apaches from
  the Sierra Madre Mts appeared on the San Carlos reservation, and forced
  a large number of Warm Springs Apaches under Loco to return with them
  to Mexico. During their flight they suffered a few losses when an element
  of the 4th Cavalry caught up with them in Doubtful Canyon on April 23. By
  April 27 the fugitive Apaches were in Mexico, and, assuming that US troops
  would not follow them over the border, they halted for a victory celebration
  on the edge of the Sierra Enmedio. They were unaware that two Apache scout
  companies backed up by two companies of the 6th Cavalry were closing in on
  them. The Apache scouts tried to surround the camp, but were discovered
  prematurely; while suffering some casualties in a fierce fire-fight, the hostiles
  held off the scouts and troopers and escaped at sundown. 
  It was as they were fleeing further south on the following day, with one
  eye over their shoulders for pursuing US troops, that they ran into a force
  of Mexican soldiers. Apparently the Apache advance guard had passed
  the Mexican ambush before they spotted it, and then inexplicably failed to
  alert the main group, comprising mainly women and children. The Mexicans
  attacked this party, doing fearful execution among the Apache families before
  the rearguard of warriors arrived. These Apaches held the Mexicans off in a
  particularly savage battle, but the damage had been done. Shapard estimates
  that about 400 Apache men, women and children had left San Carlos. By the
  time the Apaches reached the Sierra Madre over 100 had been killed, and
  a further 33 women and children had been captured by the Mexicans.
  Had the Apache advance guard done its job properly, this disaster might have
  been avoided.
  FURTHER READING
  There is a large amount of literature on the Apache Wars, but some of the more
  easily accessible and available material is listed below. The archaeological
  works by Laumbach et al (2001 & 2005) are detailed investigations of
  two key actions in 1880.
  Ball, E., In the Days of Victorio: Recollections of a Warm Springs Apache
  (University of Arizona Press; Tucson, 1970)
  Ball, E., Indeh: An Apache Odyssey (University of Oklahoma Press; Norman,
  1980)
  Betzinez, J., I Fought with Geronimo (Stackpole, Mechanicsville, 1959; r/p
  University of Nebraska Press, London, 1987) 
  Cozzens, P., Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars 1865–1890, Vol I: The Struggle
  for Apacheria (Stackpole; Mechanicsville, 2001)
  Cozzens, P., Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars 1865–1890, Vol V: The Army
  and the Indian (Stackpole; Mechanicsville, 2005)
  Cruse, T., Apache Days and After (Caxton Printers Ltd, London, 1941; r/p
  University of Nebraska Press, London, 1987)
  62
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  Goodwin, G., Western Apache Raiding and
  Warfare (University of Arizona Press;
  Tucson, 1998)
  Haley, J.L., Apaches: A History and Culture
  Portrait (University of Oklahoma Press,
  Norman, 1981)
  Hook, J., The Apaches (Men-at-Arms 186;
  Osprey, London, 1987)
  Laumbach, K.W., Hembrillo, An Apache
  Battlefield of the Victorio War: The
  Archaeology and History of the Hembrillo
  Battlefield (Prepared for the White Sands
  Missile Range, New Mexico by Human
  Systems Research Inc; 2001)
  Laumbach, K.W., D.D. Scott & J. Wakeman,
  Conline’s Skirmish: An Episode of the
  Victorio 
  War. 
  Archaeological 
  and
  Historical Documentation of an 1880s
  Skirmish Site on White Sands Missile
  Range (Prepared for The Directorate of
  Public Works, White Sands Missile Range,
  New 
  Mexico, 
  by 
  Human 
  Systems
  Research Inc; 2005)
  Opler, M.E., An Apache Life-Way: The
  Economic, Social, & Religious Institutions
  of the Chiricahua Indians (University of
  Chicago Press, 1941; r/p University of
  Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1996) 
  Roberts, D., Once They Moved Like The
  Wind: Cochise, Geronimo and the Apache Wars (Pimlico; London, 1998)
  Robinson, S., Apache Voices: Their Stories of Survival as Told to Eve Ball
  (University of New Mexico Press; Albuquerque, 2000)
  Shapard, B., Chief Loco: Apache Peacemaker (University of Oklahoma Press;
  Norman, 2010)
  Sweeney, E.R., Cochise: Chiricahua Apache Chief (University of Oklahoma
  Press; Norman, 1991)
  Sweeney, E.R., From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apaches
  1874–1886 (University of Oklahoma Press; Norman, 2010)
  Sweeney, E.R., Mangas Coloradas: Chief of the Chiricahua Apaches
  (University of Oklahoma Press; Norman, 1998)
  Thrapp, D.L., The Conquest of Apacheria (University of Oklahoma Press;
  London, 1967)
  Thrapp, D.L., Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches (University of Oklahoma
  Press; London, 1974)
  Worcester, D.E., The Apaches: Eagles of the Southwest (University of
  Oklahoma Press; Norman, 1979)
  63
  An archetypal image of an
  Apache scout, wearing almost
  completely Euro-American
  clothing and holding a
  Winchester. (Courtesy Arizona
  Historical Society, no. 35)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  64
  References to illustrations are shown in bold.
  Plates are shown with page locators in brackets.
  Albert, Casper  39, 39
  ambushes: aims  23; avoidance  32; division 
  of attackers by task  24; escape routes  35; firing
  positions  18, B(19), 23, 24, 26, 27, D(30), 31,
  33, E(34), 35, 35, 39, 40, 42, F(43), H(50), 51,
  54; first targets  23, 24; importance of fire-
  discipline  28, 29, 36–7; laying of  18, B(19),
  E(34), 35, H(50), 51; leading enemy into  18,
  B(19), 20, 45; monitoring enemy’s routine 24,
  26, 27; siting of  23, 36, 38–9, 40, 41;
  techniques used  49, 52: ad hoc 24, 38–43, 44,
  51, 52; decoy  24, 29, 31–3, 34–7, D(35); killing
  24, 28–9, D(30), 31, 33; planned  24–8; use of
  terrain for concealment  24, 26, 28, 29, 33,
  35-6, 35, 37, 38–9, 38, 40, 41, 42, F(43), 45,
  46, H(50), 51, 52, 54
  animals (venomous), threat from  14, 15
  Arizona, fighting in  8, 9, 12, 29, 31–2, 32, E(34),
  35, 39–40, 54, 55–6, 57, 57, 58
  attacks: influence of time of day  48, 49, 52;
  launching of  44, 45; rarity of  46; tactics used
  42, F(43), 46, G(47), 49, 51, 52; use of terrain
  44, 48, 52
  Battle of Apache Pass (1862)  9, 39–40, 54, 55–6,
  57, 57, 58
  Beyer, Capt Charles  56
  Bourke, Capt John  12
  boys, training of as warriors  15, 16
  Buell, Col George P.  41, 42–3, 61
  Burnett, Lt G.R.  20, 21, 44
  camps/campsites  20, 49: attacks on  8, 26, 27, 59;
  escape from  26, 51; siting of  12, 13
  captives/prisoners, treatment of  8, 40, 57, 58
  Carillo, José  42, F(43), 48
  Carleton, Brig-Gen James H.  9, 55, 56
  Carroll, Capt Henry  49, H(50), 51, 51
  cattle/livestock, stealing of  16, 17, 18, B(19), 20,
  21, 23, 33, 54   
  Central Chiricahua Apaches  9, 40
  Chihuahua (leader)  8, 12, 15, 60, 61
  Chiricahua Apaches  7, 12, 17: actions involving  8,
  12, 16, D(30), 31, 46, G(47), 56, 56, 57;
  casualties  9; deportation to Florida  13;
  leave reservations  12, 14; as scouts  59;
  surrender of  12
  Chokomen Chiricahua Apaches  E(34), 35
  clothing  5, 6, 13, 46, G(47), H(50), 51, 52, 59, 63
  Cochise (leader)  8, 9, 11, 31, 36, 39–40, 56
  combined tactics, use of  H(50), 51
  Conline, Lt John  41, 42, F(43), 46, 46, G(47),
  48–9, 48, 52
  Crawford, Capt Emmet  59
  Crook, Gen George  9, 11, 12, 13, 33, 35, 59,
  60, 61
  cruelty/torture, use of  33, 40, 57–8
  Cruse, Lt Thomas  40, 42, 52
  Cusack, Lt Patrick  49, H(50), 51
  Daly, Thomas  39; Devlin, Chas  39
  decoys/decoy tactics, use of  20, 24, 36, 45: camps
  12; herds  37; gunfire  33, 35–6; tracks/trails  29,
  31–2, 33, E(34), 35, 36; traveling formation  20
  delaying tactics, use of  20, 21
  disguise, use of for deception  20
  Eastern Chiricahua Apaches  9, 13
  evasion, use of  18, 20–1, 49, H(50), 51, 52 
  fighting withdrawal, use of  H(50), 51
  forts (US Army): Apache  9, 12, 23; Bayard  23, 32,
  44; Bliss  13; Bowie  9, 11, 29; Craig  C(22), 23,
  44; Cummings  13, 39, 39, 41, 42, 44, 54;
  Macy 55; Phil Kearny  29; Stanton  23, 44;
  Wingate  23, 44
  Fountain, Sgt Albert  56, 58
  Gatewood, Lt Charles  23, 26, 36, 52
  Geronimo (leader)  6, 8, 12, 13, 44, 45, 57, 59, 60,
  61, 61
  ghosts/evil spirits, fear of  14
  Grijalva, Merejildo  31, 32, E(34), 35
  haciendas, attacks on  16–17, 18, 29
  headwear  5, 46, G(47), H(50), 51, 52
  horses: exhaustion of  29, 56; killing of  15, 24, 31,
  32, E(34), 35, 37, 44, 46, G(47), 49, 51, 52, 53;
  regard for  25; stealing of  16, 17, 21, 24, 25, 27,
  28, 32, 33, 41, 45
  Hunter, L.S.  39
  infiltrating attacks, use of  44, H(50), 51, 52
  Juh (leader)  12, 15, 23, 31, 36, 44, 57, 61
  Kaytennae  15, 58; Kaywaykla, James  28, 58
  landmarks, use of in travel  13
  leaders/leadership  16: age of  15; by merit  13, 15;
  and kinship allegiance  15–16; reward for
  following  28
  Loco (leader)  11, 12, 62
  lookouts, use of  13, 35
  Mangas Coloradas (leader)  5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 54, 56
  “marching formation”  A(10), 11, 62
  Mata Ortiz, Juan  44, 45, 46
  McLellan, Capt  H(50), 51
  Mescalero Apaches  A(10), 11, 21, 23, 49, 60
  Mexico  4–5, 11: Apaches in  25, 39, 44, 62;
  federal/state troops  6, 9, 11, 12, 33, 44, 45,
  45, 46, 59, 61, 62; fighting in  4–6, 9, 11, 12–13,
  14, 16–18, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27–9, D(30), 31,
  33, 36, 40, 44–5, 45, 46, 58, 59, 60, 61, 61, 62
  Mimbreno Apaches  5, 56
  miners/mining centers, attacks on  5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 32,
  33, 36, 39, 54, 58 
  Morrow, Maj Albert P. 14, 21, 23, 26, 37, 54
  “mounted infantry” tactics, use of  25
  mules/mule-trains  27, 53, 60: guarding of  26;
  importance of  9, 28, 42, 53, 57; killing of  28,
  51, 53; stealing of  24, 28, 53
  Naiche (leader)  8, 12, 13, 60, 61
  Nana (leader)  8, 11–12, 15, 20, 21, 40, 44, 57, 58,
  59–60, 61  
  New Mexico  8, 13, 14: fighting in  9, 11–12, 11,
  14, 15, 20, 21, 21, 26, 32–3, 33, 35–6, 37, 37,
  38–9, 38, 39, 40–3, 41, 42, F(43), 44, 46, 46,
  G(47), 48–9, 48  49, H(50), 51–2, 51, 52, 54,
  56, 57, 59–60, 62
  night-fighting  14, 48, 51, 52
  Parker, Capt Leopold  41, 42
  Plains Indians  25, 28, 29, 45
  pursuits, problems associated with  21, 23, 29
  raiding/raids: defense against  18, 18;
  definition/purposes of  14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 27;
  importance to Apache culture  17; strength of
  54; tactics used  17, 18, B(19), 54
  ranches, raids on  12, 17, 18, 18, 20, 27, 29, 54, 58
  rearguard actions  18, 20, 21, 23, 37, 49, H(50),
  51, 52, 54, 56, 62
  Reese, William  39, 39
  rendezvous points, use of  18, 20
  reservations/camps: closure of  11, 14; creation of 9,
  57; departures from  12, 45, 57; Ojo Caliente  9,
  11, 21, 24, 33; Old Fort Tularosa  9, C(22), 23;
  San Carlos  9, 11, 12, 13, 45, 62
  Roberts, Capt Thomas L.  56, 57
  Ronan, Thomas  39; Rucker, Capt  37, 38
  Russell, Capt Gerald  31, 32, 32, E(34), 35
  scouts/guides  52: Apache  6, 11, 12, 13, 26, 32, 33,
  36, 38, 40, 41, 42, H(50), 51, 52, 58, 59–60, 60,
  61–2, 63; Indian Scouts  4, 6, 9, 26, 35, H(50),
  51, 59; Mexican  27, 31, 32, E(34), 35, 42,
  F(43), 44, 46, 48; mixed-blood  35; native
  irregulars  60; Navajo  32, 37; use of  6, 11, 12,
  13, 18, 26, 27, 31, 33, E(34), 35, 38, 41, 46, 48,
  H(50), 51, 52, 59–60, 61–2
  settlements/settlers, attacks on  6, 8, 16–18, 33
  signaling (devices), use of  18
  skirmish lines, formation/positioning/use of  27, 42,
  F(43), 46, G(47), 48, 57 
  skirmishes  37: as illusion of victory within grasp
  23; reasons for fighting  23
  snipers/sniping, use of  26, 51, 52
  Teal, Pvt John  54, 56
  telegraph lines/wires, destruction of  54
  terrain, use of for concealment  13, 15, 18, B(19),
  21, C(22), 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, D(30), 31, 33, 38,
  44, 46, 48: arroyos 11, 24, 38–9, 38, 40, 42,
  F(43), 46, 46, G(47), 48; breastworks (rock)  13,
  26, 33, 42, 45, 51, 56; canyons  42, F(43), 46,
  48; cerros 45; gulleys  38, 39; higher ground
  21, 31, 48, 52; outcrops  26; ridges/hills  20, 33;
  rocks  45; stream-beds  48
  Ulzana (leader)  8, 12, 15, 39, 39, 60, 61
  US Army: Cavalry regiments: 1st California 
  55–6; 3rd  31–2, 32, E(34), 35; 4th  27–8, 41–3,
  61, 62; 6th  15, 23, 26, 40, 42, H(50), 51, 52,
  61, 62; 8th  39; 9th  5, 20, 21, 21, 23, 24–5, 26,
  32–3, 37, 37, 38, 42, F(43), 44, 46, 46, G(47),
  48–9, 49, H(50), 51–2, 53, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61,
  62; 10th  11, 25, 61; 15th  23
  US Army: Infantry regiments: 1st Veteran
  (California Volunteers)  9, 39, 58; 13th  61; 15th
  41, 61; 16th  61; 21st  61
  Victorio (leader)  8, 11, 15, 53, 60–1: attacks
  involving  11, 11, 23, 24–5, 28–9, D(30), 31, 33,
  33, 35–6, 36, 38, 42, F(43), G(47), 48, 49, 49,
  H(50), 51, 51, 52, 54; breakout from reservation
  57; death of  11, 15, 23, 45–6, 60, 61; defeat by
  Apache scouts  11, 38, 59, 62; pursuit of  14,
  20–1, 25, 37, 46, 61, 62; reputation for cruelty
  58; tactics used  11, 11, 13, 20, 21, 23, 28–9,
  D(30), 31; understanding of opponents  28
  warfare: Apache definition of  14, 16, 17;
  importance of to Apache culture  14; principles
  of  15; reasons for  16, 17; role of in Apache
  society  14; scale of  8
  Warm Springs Apaches  12, 13, 28, 49, 51–2, 57,
  58, 62
  weaponry  24, 48, 60: bows and arrows  4, 18,
  B(19), 39, 41; carbines  17, 32, 45, 46, G(47),
  52, 55; “floppy-head” warclub  46, G(47);
  Gatling gun  42; knives  36, 46; mountain
  howitzers  9, 42, 54–5, 56, 57, 57; muskets  4;
  pistols/revolvers  5, 24, 36, 45; rifles  4, 5, 6, 17,
  21, 24, 29, 32, 36, 40, 44, 49, H(50), 51, 52, 54,
  59, 59, 60, 60, 63
  Western Apaches  7, 9, 11, 12, 13
  White Mountain Apaches  18, B(19), 59
  Whitney, Robert H.  31, E(34), 35
  Williams, Sgt  20, 21
  women and children  17, 40: killing of  26, 33, 58,
  62; protection of  A(10), 11, 12, 20; role in
  decoy ambushes  36, 37
  INDEX
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
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  First published in Great Britain in 2012 by Osprey Publishing,
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  Front cover: Geronimo (left) and Naiche (right) on horseback,
  photographed during their negotiations with General Crook at Canyon de
  los Embudos in March 1886. (Photo C.S. Fly; courtesy Arizona Historical
  Society, no. 78163)
  Title page: A faded but interesting photo of a US Army officer with a group
  of Apache scouts. One of the latter wears a US Army M1872 dress helmet,
  and the officer has adopted a non-regulation hat and fringed leggings.
  (Courtesy Arizona Historical Society, no. 19841)
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