TEXT: Martin Windrow
  French Foreign Légionnaire
  Viet Minh Insurgent
  North Vietnam 1948–52
  VERSUS
  
  French Foreign Légionnaire
  Viet Minh Insurgent
  Martin Windrow
  Illustrated by Johnny Shumate
  North Vietnam 1948–52
  
  INTRODUCTION 
  4
  THE OPPOSING SIDES 
  8
  Origins and combat roles • Recruitment and training • Morale and logistics 
  Armament and tactics • Leadership and communications
  PHU TONG HOA 
  33
  25–26 July 1948
  DONG KHE 
  46
  16–18 September 1950
  NA SAN 
  63
  23 November–2 December 1952
  ANALYSIS 
  74
  Phu Tong Hoa • ‘Second Dong Khe’ • Na San
  UNIT ORGANIZATIONS 
  77
  BIBLIOGRAPHY 
  79
  INDEX 
  80
  
  4
  The Communist insurgency of 1946–54 against the government of French 
  Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) was unique among the wars fought 
  between nationalist rebels and European colonial powers in the aftermath 
  of World War II. Thanks to the support, from late 1949, of Communist 
  China on the other side of a long and porous frontier in forested mountain 
  terrain, the cockpit of the war in Tonkin (North Vietnam) saw the gradual 
  development of localized guerrilla forces into a conventional army. By 1952–
  53 this could field several light-infantry divisions, with some artillery support, 
  which proved capable of mobile campaigns over long distances. No other 
  insurgent movement achieved such a transformation.
  The tactical engagements that punctuated the war were confrontations 
  between very different types of soldier. Despite its large numbers of 
  Vietnamese and African troops, the core of the French Far East Expeditionary 
  Corps (CEFEO) – of which the Foreign Legion provided some 35 per cent of 
  European personnel, and the majority of the white infantry – was essentially a 
  European professional army based on the pre-World War II model, tempered 
  by recent experience of fighting the German Wehrmacht. It depended for 
  its effectiveness upon formal discipline, leadership and training, and upon 
  natural unit loyalties for its cohesion. Though sorely under-equipped before at 
  least 1951, its regimental officers and soldiers made the best of what they had, 
  and focused on specific operations. They fulfilled their orders as far as their 
  resources and circumstances allowed, and hoped to survive with honour until 
  the end of their tour of operations. Few rankers were politically motivated – 
  particularly among the foreign légionnaires, whose loyalty was explicitly to the 
  Legion rather than to France.
  Their opponents followed the politicized pattern of Mao Zedong’s 
  Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Essentially guerrillas for the first 
  half of the war, their relative lack of resources obliged them to exploit to the 
  utmost local knowledge and support, patience and ingenuity. They were the 
  Introduction
  
  5
  sons of an Asian ‘shame’ culture, in which the approval of others was of great 
  psychological importance, and they were subject to political indoctrination 
  and supervision. They were motivated essentially by patriotism – by a 
  powerful appeal to individual effort and sacrifice for the future good of their 
  people. Their training before 1950 was superficial, and even by 1954 their 
  battle tactics were less sophisticated than those of the Western Front in 1918; 
  but they were politically engaged in the cause of national liberation and, 
  fighting against foreigners in their own country, they enjoyed the support of 
  many among the local population. Individually, they were recruited for the 
  duration of the war; collectively, their commitment was open-ended.
  The struggles in the widely differing environments of North, Central and 
  South Vietnam were to a certain extent separate wars; this book concentrates 
  on the North, where the transformation of the Viet Minh (VM) from a 
  A photo dramatizing one 
  basic contrast between 
  the Foreign Legion and the 
  Viet Minh, taken during the 
  Franco-VM talks at Trung Gia 
  after the ceasefire in 1954. 
  The average height of a 
  Vietnamese man was 1.57m 
  (5ft 2in), with a slight build. 
  Note that this bo doi has a 
  captured M1 carbine, the 
  same weapon as the French 
  military policeman. The latter 
  wears the ubiquitous bush 
  hat, sand-khaki shirt and 
  shorts, and ‘Far East’-type 
  canvas and rubber boots. 
  The VM soldier has received, 
  since the battle of Dien Bien 
  Phu earlier in the year, a new 
  Chinese-supplied grey-green 
  uniform. (Bettmann/Getty 
  Images)
  
  6
  guerrilla force into an army took place, and on the VM ‘main force’ rather 
  than the clandestine insurgency inside the Red River Delta. The author 
  regrets that, for lack of space, the connecting events between the three actions 
  selected for description must be so briefly summarized.
  Before gaining the support of Communist China in late 1949, 
  the greatest advantage enjoyed by Ho Chi Minh’s government-
  in-waiting, and the Vietnamese People’s Army (Quan Doi Nhan 
  Dan) led by Vo Nguyen Giap, was the power-vacuum left by 
  two events in 1945. The first was the imprisonment of the Vichy 
  French garrison and administration by the occupying Japanese 
  in March, and the second, Japan’s surrender to the (distant) 
  Allies in August.
  During 1941–44 Giap had created an intelligence 
  organization and guerrilla bases in the inaccessible jungle 
  hills of northern Tonkin. In 1945 the Viet Minh moved with 
  remarkable speed to exploit their opportunities; they seized 
  large arsenals of French and Japanese weapons, and extended 
  their political control by every means. On 28 August 1945 
  Giap’s best ‘regular’ troops entered the Tonkinese capital, 
  Hanoi, where, on 2 September, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the 
  independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
  The Allied powers gave the tasks of disarming Japanese 
  forces, releasing prisoners and restoring public order to the 
  Chinese Nationalists (Kuomintang) in North Vietnam, and to 
  the British Fourteenth Army in the South. Despite American 
  hostility to colonialism, the French were determined to re-
  establish their rule over the whole country, and landed troops 
  in Saigon in October 1945 to begin pacification of Cochinchina 
  (South Vietnam). In the North, the Viet Minh reached an 
  accommodation with the corrupt Chinese, who turned a blind 
  eye to their activities and sold them weapons. Ho Chi Minh 
  entered negotiations with a French government that was 
  impatient to land troops in Haiphong, Tonkin’s main port, 
  but that was frustrated by the refusal of the Kuomintang to 
  withdraw until after the lucrative opium harvest.
  French forces arrived in Haiphong and Hanoi in February–
  March 1946, marking the start of eight months of mutually 
  suspicious co-existence with VM units in the French colonial 
  heartland of the Red River Delta. During that period Ho’s 
  government negotiated with Paris over the terms of a political 
  settlement that could never happen, since their goals were 
  mutually exclusive. Meanwhile, Giap strengthened the Viet 
  Minh’s existing Viet Bac home region in mountainous terrain 
  east of the Red River (the provinces of Ha Giang, Tuyen 
  Quang, Thai Nguyen, Bac Kan, Lang Son and Cao Bang), and 
  established a second ‘South Delta Base’ (the provinces of 
  Than Hoa, Nghe An and Ha Tien). Here, among a loyal or at 
  least obedient civilian population, Giap installed headquarters, 
  base camps, training facilities, hospitals, stores, arsenals, 
  workshops and arms factories. When the Chinese Nationalists 
  began withdrawing in May 1946, French troops from the south 
  advanced northwards through Annam (Central Vietnam), but 
  in the rainy season the Viet Minh won the race to reach and 
  establish their authority over many towns, ruthlessly eliminating 
  all non-Communist elements of the provisional administration. 
  Giap was then appointed as the new government’s minister of 
  defence.
  After several violations of the ceasefire during 1946, 
  the French Indochina War proper broke out in Haiphong on 
  23–28 November 1946, spreading to Hanoi on 19–21 December. 
  Supported by naval gunfire and air strikes, French forces took 
  over the Delta cities. Giap ordered his 20,000-odd regular troops 
  back up into the hills, to rejoin their 10,000 comrades in the 
  base areas; meanwhile, in the regions reoccupied by the French, 
  the VM’s political and administrative machine simply went 
  underground.
  The VM ‘regular’ army, popularly called the Chu Luc, was 
  Giap’s main force intended for mobile operations, while 
  supported by weaker ‘regional’ units that operated only on 
  their home ground. French control was secure only in major 
  towns and on main roads during daylight, so the VM regionals 
  launched guerrilla attacks in many areas during 1947, while the 
  main force consolidated in the base areas.
  In October–December 1947 the French Gen Valluy carried 
  out Operations Lea and Ceinture, combining road columns, 
  river convoys and paratroop drops in attempts to surround and 
  eliminate the Viet Bac. Paratroopers only narrowly failed to trap 
  the VM leadership, and the French inflicted serious casualties 
  and logistic losses; but Valluy had too few troops, moving too 
  slowly over too difficult country, to do any lasting damage, 
  and the far more agile Chu Luc withdrew and regrouped 
  successfully.
  What Operation Lea did achieve was the return of French 
  troops to a wishbone-shaped area of north-east Tonkin: north-
  west along Route Coloniale 4 (RC 4) running in parallel with the 
  Chinese border between Lang Son and Cao Bang, and south-
  west along RC 3 and RC 3bis linking Cao Bang with Bac Kan. 
  Chains of small posts were built along these narrow dirt roads 
  running through thickly wooded highlands, but while the French 
  might shade in areas of unit responsibility on their maps, any 
  real control was illusory. The Viet Minh were preparing for a 
  long, patient ‘battle of the roads’ to restore unhindered access 
  between the Viet Bac and the Chinese frontier.
  Prominent among the units tasked with defending these 
  roads and posts in early 1948 were the three battalions of the 
  Foreign Legion’s 3rd Foreign Infantry Regiment (3 REI).
  The historical context
  
  7
  HANOI
  Bac Ninh
  Red River
  Thai Nguyen
  Cho Moi
  Bac Kan
  Cho Ra
  Ngan Son
  Phu Lang Thuong
  Luc Nam
  Nha Nam
  Chu 
  Sept Pagodes
  Thai Moi
  Dong Trieu
  Moncay
  Binh Lieu
  Dinh Lap
  Tien Yen
  CAO
  BANG
  Bao Lac
  Soc Giang
  Tra Linh
  Quang Uyen
  Phuc Hoa
  Dong Khe
  Po Ma
  Nguyen Binh
  Ban Cra
  That Khe
  Bi Nhi 
  Lung Vai
  Na Cham
  LANG SON
  Loc Binh
  Dong Dang
  C H I N A
  V I E T  B A C
  RC 2
  RC 1
  RC 3
  RC 3bis
  RC 4
  Gia Lam
  N
  0
  20 miles
  0
  20km
  Bang Giang 
  Ky Cong
  NORTH-EAST VIETNAM (TONKIN), 1948
  H
  G
  F
  A
  C
  B
  D
  E
  CAO BANG
  Bang Giang
  Coc
  Long
  Vo Chang
  Nguyen
  Binh
  Hill 650
  Na Nam
  Khuoi Sao
  BAC KAN
  Ngan Son
  Ban Cao
  Belair
  Na Fac
  Phu Tong Hoa
  RC 3
  RC 3bis
  RC 4
  N
  0
  5 miles
  0
  5km
  Posts held by I/3 REI on RC 3bis, July 1948
  A. Bn HQ & 1st Co, I/3 REI; platoon, 
  2nd Co, I/3 REI; 5th Sqn (-), RICM; 
  section, RACM
  B. 2nd Co (-), I/3 REI; section, 9th Bty, 69 RA
  C. 3rd Co, I/3 REI; gun, 9th Bty, 69 RA; 
  73rd Ptn, 2 RG
  D. Platoon, 4th Co, I/3 REI
  E. 
  Co HQ & platoon, 4th Co, I/3 REI
  F. 
  Platoon, 4th Co, I/3 REI
  G. Platoon, 4th Co, 23 BTA
  H. Regt HQ, 3 REI; Bn HQ, 2nd and 3rd Cos, 
  23 BTA; 5th Sqn (-), RICM
  
  8
  ORIGINS AND COMBAT ROLES
  Foreign Legion
  During 1945–49 the French Foreign Legion was reorganized into seven 
  infantry and two light-cavalry regiments, plus two parachute battalions. With 
  most of the French Army committed to NATO in Germany, and (after 1947) 
  a legal bar on most French conscripts being deployed to the colonies, the 
  volunteers of the Legion and the Colonial and North African units bore the 
  main burden of the war. Most of the Legion’s units arrived in Vietnam between 
  February 1946 and November 1949, and many independent technical 
  companies were also formed in-country; this war would see the Legion grow 
  to its greatest size, of some 30,000 men. However, an Expeditionary Corps 
  that at its peak in late 1951 approached 200,000 strong was hamstrung from 
  the outset by a French failure either to recognize the type of enemy they faced, 
  or to formulate a coherent plan for defeating them – a failure that dictated the 
  combat role of Legion units before 1951.
  In 1947–50 most Legion battalions were widely dispersed in small posts 
  to provide local security as anti-guerrilla ‘sector units’, with few available 
  for a mobile ‘intervention’ role. Vietnam had only rudimentary networks 
  of dirt roads through its forested hills and swampy plains, and was subject 
  to extremes of weather including a six-month rainy season. In all seasons 
  French movements were constantly hampered by the Viet Minh’s nightly 
  sabotage of roads. In the heavily populated Delta lowlands most counter-
  insurgency operations were frustrated by the guerrillas’ skill at concealment 
  and the support they received from the ever-watchful civilian population. In 
  the sparsely inhabited hills the garrisons’ role was unavoidably reactive – units 
  spent most of their time trying to ensure the security of isolated posts and of 
  the roads on which they depended. The terrain off-road was very difficult to 
  The Opposing Sides
  
  9
  penetrate, and attempts to locate VM bases or to intercept guerrillas on the 
  move rarely succeeded.
  The combat role of the Legion units changed markedly after the loss 
  of the whole Chinese border region in October 1950 (see pp. 61–62). An 
  energetic new C-in-C, Gen de Lattre – provided with reinforcements and 
  unprecedented freedom of action – rebalanced the CEFEO during 1951–52. 
  He oversaw the construction of a chain of concrete posts around the Delta, 
  and garrisoned them with the least valuable troops. He also increased the 
  enlistment of locals, for what would in time become the Vietnamese National 
  Army. These steps allowed De Lattre to assemble the strategic reserve that 
  the CEFEO had always lacked, using units freed from ‘sector’ duties to form 
  three-battalion Mobile Groups (GMs) with integral artillery, armour, engineer 
  and signals support.
  The other and most essential key to progress was a vastly increased flow 
  of financial and material aid from the United States, which was sufficiently 
  startled by China’s intervention in Korea in November 1950 to recognize 
  France’s war as a parallel campaign against a coordinated Communist threat. 
  Consequently, the CEFEO at last got new trucks, armoured vehicles, radios, 
  weapons and aircraft.
  The GMs in the Delta smashed a premature offensive launched by 
  Giap in January-June 1951, and, although they were still roadbound, they 
  brought a more aggressively ‘proactive’ approach to the battles of 1951–53. 
  Legion battalions were incorporated into the GMs, and proved themselves 
  in the ‘heavy infantry’ role that suited them best. Finally, in 1952–53, the 
  latest French operational concept of the ‘air-ground base’ (base aéroterrestre) 
  saw Legion battalions airlifted into remote locations to construct and hold 
  strongly defended positions against Giap’s now widely manoeuvring divisions.
  ABOVE LEFT
  This unidentified légionnaire 
  of 3 REI, posing in cold-season 
  parade dress, is clearly of 
  an age to be a World War II 
  veteran. In 1953 approximate 
  CEFEO regular troop strengths 
  were: 53,000 Vietnamese, 
  52,000 French, 30,000 North 
  African, 19,000 Foreign Legion 
  and 18,000 West African. 
  Additional to this total of 
  c.172,000, approximately 
  55,400 Indochinese irregulars 
  were serving under French 
  leadership. (Carl Mydans/The 
  LIFE Picture Collection/Getty 
  Images)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  The Legion’s traditional 
  smartness on parade, 
  symbolic of strong esprit de 
  corps, is demonstrated by 
  the colour party of 3 REI in 
  Hanoi. The regimental flag 
  bears the many decorations 
  awarded to 3 REI’s lineal 
  predecessor, the Foreign 
  Legion Marching Regiment 
  (RMLE) in both World Wars. 
  (Private collection, courtesy 
  Indo Éditions)
  
  10
  Légionnaire, III/5 REI
  This légionnaire of 11th Co, 
  III/5 REI is responding to the alarm 
  in strongpoint PA 8 in the inner 
  perimeter of the Na San ‘air-ground 
  base’ on the evening of 23 November 
  1952. Two platoons from Viet Minh 
  Bn 322/Regt 88 have employed a 
  ruse to break in, and any second now 
  the légionnaire will join in trench 
  combat with point-blank automatic 
  fire and grenades (an LMG gunner 
  named Skinder distinguished himself 
  during this fight). He has been 
  in Tonkin for 18 months, and has 
  been hardened by the tense and 
  frustrating counter-insurgency war in 
  the Delta – a pitched battle against 
  visible opponents may be almost a 
  relief to him.
  1
  2
  5
  7
  13
  4
  
  11
  12
  8
  3
  6
  9
  10
  11
  PA 8, Na San, 23/24 November 1952
  Weapons, dress and equipment
  His weapon is the old but reliable French 7.5mm fusil-mitrailleur 
  modèle 1924/29 (1); it weighs just over 11kg (24.5lb), so is supported 
  on its sling for firing from the hip. Fed by 25-round magazines, it has 
  two triggers – the front trigger for single shots, the rear for bursts. He 
  has snatched up a US-surplus ‘30-round magazine carrier’ (2) – his 
  ‘No. 2’ may not be able to reload instantly in close-quarter combat in 
  the confined trench. For self-defence, on his US-surplus M1936 pistol 
  belt he also carries a French M1950 web holster holding a 7.65mm 
  M1935 semi-automatic pistol (3) with an eight-round magazine, at 
  right front a French skeleton carrier with a US Mk IIA1 fragmentation 
  grenade (4), and at left front a US-supplied M3 knife (5).
  He wears the olive-coloured French M1947 treillis toutes armes 
  field fatigues which became common in 1952, here with a ‘lightened’ 
  two-pocket shirt (6) rather than the four-pocket field jacket; the 
  trousers (7) have large cargo pockets on the thighs. Shirt and trousers 
  were often of different shades, and his uniform shows evidence of 
  the three weeks he has spent digging and building fortifications since 
  being flown in from the Delta. No insignia were worn in the field. 
  His locally made ‘Far East’ boots are of canvas and rubber (8), and he 
  chooses to confine his trousers with home-made leather anklets cut 
  from old US ‘double-buckle’ boots.
  Even at this date, photos suggest that no two men wore exactly 
  the same combination of personal equipment. The British 44 Pattern 
  water canteen and cup in its capacious ‘jungle-green’ web carrier 
  (9) was popular, and British ‘universal’ pouches (10) were still often 
  used by LMG crews to carry tools and accessories. He also has the 
  cleaning rod for the FM24/29 LMG in a tubular carrier (11). Although 
  he would dump it when in the strongpoint, we also show the M1924 
  haversack for eight LMG magazines (12), with a tent-cloth roll 
  attached for marching order.
  The US-supplied M1 steel helmet (13) was by now general issue, 
  here complete with small-mesh camouflage net and elasticated 
  band. Small items such as US ‘Carlisle’ first-aid kit tins and bottles of 
  Halozone water-purification tablets might be slipped under the band.
  
  12
  Viet Minh
  At the base of the Viet Minh’s pyramidal structure were the ‘popular 
  forces’ (Tu Ve), comprising both the Dan Quan, a general revolutionary 
  organization of the civilian population, and the Du Kich part-time 
  village militia. The Dan Quan provided look-outs, guides, messengers, 
  and above all the porters upon which the VM’s logistics relied. With 
  rudimentary armament, the Du Kich was limited to low-level sabotage, 
  but promising men were then recruited into the next level up. These full-
  time regional troops (Bo Dai Dia Phuong) formed district companies that 
  waged local guerrilla warfare from hidden camps; each province also had a 
  regional ‘mobile battalion’ for more ambitious operations. Regionals were 
  subordinated to the needs of the top layer of the structure – independent 
  battalions of regular troops posted into (or passing through) their regions. 
  At every level, all activities were tightly coordinated by an integrated chain 
  of political and military command.
  For instance, in June 1948 regional Regt 11 (Lang Son province) 
  was renamed regional Regt 28, commanded by Dang Van Viet and 
  headquartered at Bin Ghia. This ‘regiment’ had only one active battalion, 
  newly redesignated Bn 249, with reconnaissance, communications and 
  other support provided by assembled district companies. The unit’s role 
  was to carry out ambushes along RC 4. In August 1949, a new independent 
  regular Regt 174 (Trung Doan Doc Lap 174) was created under Dang Van 
  Viet’s command, incorporating the men of regional Regts 28, 72 (Bac 
  Kan province) and 74 (Cao Bang province). It took some time before a 
  new regular regiment could actually field three battalions with common 
  VM parade in Hanoi, April 
  1946, smartly uniformed and 
  drilled to reflect their status 
  as regular soldiers of Ho Chi 
  Minh’s Democratic Republic 
  of Vietnam. They seem to 
  wear dark-blue sidecaps with 
  small VM badges, and French 
  khaki M1935 tenue d’exercise 
  d’été  with M1916 leather 
  belt equipment. The rifles are 
  French 8mm M1902 fusils de 
  Trailleur Indochinois, but the 
  two LMGs in the second rank 
  are Brens, rather than the 
  Japanese Type 36s that one 
  might expect. The officers 
  (right) have tunics of a darker 
  shade, with rank patches on 
  the turn-down collars in the 
  form of yellow bars on red. 
  Though illustrated in a French 
  manual of 1949, the system 
  of VM rank insignia was 
  rarely seen, and seems to 
  have disappeared after 1950. 
  (Keystone-France/Gamma-
  Keystone via Getty Images)
  
  13
  organization and levels of equipment. On 
  paper, Regt 174 had three ‘shock battalions’ 
  numbered 249, 251 and 23 (the last of these 
  was already a regular unit, originally from 
  Dong Trieu). In 1949, such battalions had 
  only about 350 armed men; by January 1950 
  strengths had grown to 400–500, and by that 
  autumn to 700-plus. Regt 174’s combat role 
  in 1949 was to step up its interdiction of 
  French traffic on RC 4, but in 1950 it was 
  committed to attacks on the French post of 
  Dong Khe, eventually succeeding but only at 
  very heavy cost.
  Giap’s success on RC 4 in October 1950 
  coincided with the start of the Chinese-aided 
  expansion of his main force into three-
  regiment, nine-battalion divisions (sing., 
  Dai Doan). This was achieved by a general 
  mobilization of conscripted manpower, while 
  transforming some 25,000 regionals into 
  regulars. The first division, Div 308, returned 
  from Chinese training to bases around Thai 
  Nguyen from August 1950, when its units 
  were Regts 36, 88 and 102. Between January 
  1950 and March 1951 four more infantry 
  divisions (304, 312, 320 and 325) and one 
  of artillery and engineers (351) were created; 
  and finally, on 1 May 1951, the formation of 
  the ‘highland’ Div 316 was announced, with 
  Dang Van Viet’s rebuilt Regt 174 joining 
  Regt 176 from Lang Son province, and 
  Regt 98 from the far north-east.
  On paper, therefore, by May 1951 Giap had six infantry divisions, 
  but turning them into formations worthy of that term ‘on the ground’ 
  would take time. This effort suffered an immediate setback when Giap 
  threw away at least one-third of his new army, and much of the prestige 
  won in 1950, in a premature offensive against the Delta. Giap states that 
  at the turn of 1950/51 he had about 60,000 main-force troops in Tonkin. 
  French sources plausibly estimate that the battles of Vinh Yen in January–
  February 1951, Mao Khe/Dong Trieu in March–April, and the Day River 
  in May–June cost Giap perhaps 17,000 men killed or captured.
  It was at Mao Khe that Regt 174 experienced for the first time 
  conventional, mobile operations in open country – on foot, facing a 
  motorized enemy which was able at last to manoeuvre against its attackers’ 
  flanks supported by tanks, massed artillery barrages, and aircraft dropping 
  bombs and napalm. For the rest of the war Regt 174 would continue to be 
  sent hundreds of kilometres from its home hills, and to be committed to 
  sacrificial frontal assaults in positional battles, culminating at Dien Bien 
  Phu in spring 1954.
  The very different silhouette 
  of the divisional bo doi of 
  1951–54: woven rattan 
  helmet with cloth cover and 
  string netting, Chinese-made 
  uniform in some pale-drab 
  shade, minimal canvas 
  personal equipment, and the 
  Chinese Type 50 (to the Viet 
  Minh, K50) copy of the Soviet 
  PPSh41 SMG, with 35-round 
  ‘banana’ magazine. By early 
  1954 the standard VM rifle-
  battalion establishment had 
  dropped to 635 all ranks, and 
  by then as many as one man 
  in every three-man fire team 
  may have carried an SMG. 
  (Private collection, courtesy 
  Indo Éditions)
  
  14
  This young Chinese-trained bo doi 
  serves with a unit of Div 308 – Gen 
  Vo Nguyen Giap’s most trusted 
  formation. He leads a three-man 
  fire team in a platoon which has 
  just broken into the entrenched 
  French strongpoint PA 8 in a surprise 
  evening attack. He is reaching for 
  a grenade, which he will follow up 
  with bursts from his SMG as he 
  fights his way along a deep trench 
  in close-range combat. A survivor 
  of many actions during three hard 
  years, he has just marched hundreds 
  of kilometres during an exhausting 
  three-month campaign in forested 
  hills, among a resentful population, 
  and he has been on short rations for 
  weeks.
  1
  5
  10
  2
  6
  Bo doi, VM regular Regt 88
  
  15
  7
  8
  4
  9
  3
  PA 8, Na San, 23/24 November 1952
  Weapons, dress and equipment
  As a fire-team leader he is armed with an SMG and grenades. This 
  Chinese-made Type 36 copy of the US .45-calibre M3A1 ‘grease gun’ 
  (1) is one of several different types of SMG recovered at Na San; note 
  its unusual browned metal finish, contrasting with the black 30-round 
  magazine. Weighing about 4kg (8.8lb) empty, it fired fully automatic 
  only; for safety, the dust cover over the ejection port had to be opened 
  manually to release the locked bolt. The other essential VM assault 
  weapon was the grenade; he has a couple of Chinese stick-grenades 
  (2), crude copies of the Soviet RGD 33, tied into an open carrier slung to 
  his hip. To use them, the metal safety cap was unscrewed to release a 
  ceramic bead on a cord; a tug on this ignited a friction time-fuze. Smooth-
  cased ‘concussion’ grenades with little fragmentation effect, they were 
  useful in close-up assaults. The machete (3) – again, copied from a 
  recovered example – carried on his old French M1916 leather belt is as 
  much a sidearm as a tool; face-to-face combat was not unusual.
  Impressions of VM uniform based on photos taken after the 1954 
  ceasefire are misleading; earlier photos show much variation in 
  shades even after Chinese resupply, since PLA-made uniforms varied 
  between dark green, lighter yellowish-green, or even cu nau brown 
  due to dispersed manufacture. This shirt (4) is of military cut, its 
  breast pockets hidden here by the quilted vest (5). These were worn 
  for warmth in the Tonkin highlands well before Chinese supplies 
  became available, and varied in colour and design (a long-sleeved 
  quilted jacket with a turn-down collar was also used during the 
  Dien Bien Phu campaign). The trousers (6), here of a type gathered 
  by loops and buttons on the seams, are an old spare pair in cu nau 
  brown; Regt 88 had been on the march for a good three months, and 
  standing orders called for clothing to be changed regularly. His boots 
  (7) are French battlefield finds, showing hard wear.
  In combat he carries minimal personal equipment: an old French-style 
  musette (8) as a general-purpose and ammunition haversack, and a 
  Chinese PLA canteen (9). His helmet (10), of woven rattan (plant fibres), is 
  covered with hessian, and string netting garnished with rags, rice straw 
  and leaves for camouflage. It protects him from nothing but the weather.
  
  16
  RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING
  Foreign Legion
  Any man could apply to enlist for five years in the Legion by simply 
  walking into any Gendarmerie station in France, and in the aftermath of 
  World War II there was no shortage of displaced Europeans, of some 40 
  nationalities, with no skills to sell except military experience. Policy was 
  to limit Frenchmen in the ranks to about 10 per cent, but many enlisted 
  as Belgians or Swiss. After 1950 most of the original Wehrmacht veterans 
  had served out their contracts; thereafter the Legion in Indochina was still, 
  at a guess, about 50 per cent German, but most were too young to have 
  seen war service. However, a proportion of the wartime veterans had re-
  enlisted, and now provided the backbone of the NCO corps alongside the 
  traditional Bretons, Alsatians and Lorrainers, Corsicans, and Europeans 
  from Algeria.
  In 1949 the British ex-officer ‘Colin John’ reckoned that a high proportion 
  of his fellow recruits had previous military experience. Simply as one example, 
  we may cite Cpl Chief Pierre Polain, killed at Phu Tong Hoa in July 1948. 
  The son of a Belgian diplomat, he had joined the Legion in the 1930s, and 
  won the Croix de Guerre in 1943 at Pont du Fahs in Tunisia. When his time 
  expired he joined the Independent Belgian Squadron of the British Army’s 
  SAS Brigade and fought in North West Europe in 1944, before re-enlisting 
  in the Legion after VE Day. (Incidentally, there were very few légionnaires 
  from English-speaking countries; Eric Morgan, a Welsh veteran of 2 REI, 
  told the present author that he never met another during his Indochina tour 
  in 1951–53.)
  In the field, légionnaires 
  presented a purely practical 
  appearance. This squad 
  photographed in 1946 wear 
  Indian-made World War II-
  surplus British tropical 
  uniforms in ‘jungle green’ 
  mixed with ‘khaki drill’, with 
  British web equipment and 
  weapons. Many photos 
  suggest that the nationality 
  of foreign clothing and 
  web equipment issued to 
  battalions often matched 
  that of the weapons they 
  were issued, though French 
  M1916 leather belt kit was 
  also widespread. (Rikli/Roger 
  Viollet/Getty Images)
  
  17
  Recruit training at Sidi-bel-Abbès or Saida in Algeria lasted six weeks. 
  Recruits had to learn basic French quickly, though instruction was also 
  given in German. Divided into 15-man squads each under a sergeant and 
  three corporals (thus guaranteeing individual attention), they were taught 
  by demonstration, imitation and repetition. The emphasis was on physical 
  fitness, drill and small-arms handling. During long route-marches with full 
  packs the recruits were taught songs to build esprit de corps. A very demanding 
  obstacle course included cliff-climbing and water-crossing. Discipline was 
  harsh, with any misdemeanour bringing collective punishments. The Legion’s 
  tactical mantra might be summed up most simply as: ‘any contact must 
  initiate immediate aggression; we fight to the last man; and if we have to 
  retreat, nobody is left behind’.
  A French peculiarity was to select potential corporals immediately from 
  basic training, for a four-month advanced course in map-reading and the 
  handling of French, US and British weapons. The best were awarded their 
  green chevrons after passing two competitive exams, and then acted as 
  instructors until the next four-month sergeants’ course opened. Passing for 
  sergeant depended not only on marks in exams but also on character, assessed 
  by veterans from the ranks. The new NCO might spend his whole enlistment 
  as an instructor in North Africa, but most would apply for a well-paid combat 
  posting in Indochina.
  Any more relevant training had to be acquired ‘on the job’ after a 
  légionnaire reached his unit in-country, and naturally suffered from the wide 
  dispersal of companies in the ‘sector troops’ role. In many cases it was only 
  from about 1951, when infantry battalions could be assembled for collective 
  training under supervision by all their officers and NCOs, that a consistently 
  better standard was attained.
  Viet Minh
  The basic machinery of recruitment through three levels has been described 
  above. Among the rural peasantry and the urban poor alike, Communist 
  Party cadres patiently preached an appeal to patriotism, to resentment of 
  the colonialists who had ‘stolen’ the 1945 Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
  and to hatred of the corrupt native ‘puppets’ of the French who crushed 
  the hopes of the poor for social justice. This basic sermon was adjusted for 
  particular audiences. The specifically Communist aspects of the revolution 
  were presented in digestible forms, promising mutual respect and eventual 
  rewards, but first demanding hard work, sacrifice and dedication.
  Beyond the first – and sometimes only – step of joining the clandestine 
  village guerrillas while continuing with their daily lives, the idea of taking to 
  the hills to join the ‘regionals’ was daunting for Delta lowlanders, despite the 
  historical folklore which romanticized some bandit gangs as ‘Robin Hood’ 
  leaders of resistance against the Chinese Empire. The sturdier Tho and Nung 
  montagnard tribesmen made more immediately effective soldiers; they needed 
  a lot more persuasion by the smooth-tongued Delta intellectuals before they 
  would commit to giving up their traditional neutrality, but those who did so 
  were valued for their familiarity with the terrain and fearless hunting culture. 
  Regional companies were taught the fundamentals of French and Japanese 
  
  18
  weapons by veterans of the pre-war French Colonial native regiments or 
  armed gendarmerie, or by some of the 3,000-odd Japanese deserters who had 
  joined the Viet Minh rather than surrender (though in 1946–50 there was too 
  little ammunition for serious target practice).
  Guerrilla war in dense terrain classically involves careful reconnaissance 
  before stealthily approaching a locally weaker group of enemies, killing 
  them, and taking their weapons and ammunition. Its skills, however well 
  developed, have obvious limitations when attacking heavily armed soldiers 
  in prepared positions. Unless new capabilities and attitudes can be acquired, 
  a guerrilla force cannot progress to the mobile and positional warfare upon 
  which final victory depends. In May 1950, the Party announced that all 
  males between the ages of 16 and 55 in Tonkin were henceforth liable for 
  conscription to serve the cause, including compulsory enlistment in the 
  Vietnamese People’s Army.
  It was April 1950 when the regional officer Dang Van Viet recorded a 
  general pause in guerrilla operations to undertake systematic instruction. At 
  Cao Binh his Regt 174 was trained in individual combat, the use of explosives 
  for breaching, leadership in assaults on fortified places, the coordination of 
  attacks on posts with road ambushes (Giap’s long-favoured method), and even 
  cooperation between infantry and artillery. Giap himself wrote of this period 
  (surely not literally) that it was the ‘first time shock units had been trained 
  with anything better than spears and machetes!’ Even by the end of that year 
  of victories he would record that Divs 308 and 304, although trained in 
  China in assault tactics, were not yet ready for attacks ‘against solid defences’.
  From 1951, when this 
  column carrying ammunition 
  boxes was photographed, 
  conscripted Dan Cong porters 
  were central to Vo Nguyen 
  Giap’s ability to begin his 
  progression from guerrilla 
  to mobile warfare. They not 
  only had to accompany the 
  VM divisions on campaign in 
  their tens of thousands, but 
  also to cut tracks in advance, 
  and install caches of food and 
  ammunition along the planned 
  routes of march. Usually these 
  men and women were called 
  up in relays along the line of 
  march for a period that did 
  not take them away from their 
  equally vital agricultural work 
  for more than two weeks, 
  allowing time to travel from 
  and back to their villages. 
  (Keystone-France/Gamma-
  Keystone via Getty Images)
  
  19
  MORALE AND LOGISTICS
  Foreign Legion
  The Legion had long excelled in dissolving mutual national resentments by 
  the inculcation of esprit de corps, and the légionnaires’ shared isolation and 
  danger in an alien environment provided natural ‘glue’. Most légionnaires 
  were reasonably mature, in their mid- to late twenties and with NCOs in 
  their thirties. As always, the soldier’s morale was governed by his immediate 
  relationships within the platoon and company, especially by his degree of trust 
  in his NCOs and officers. On active service the pettier aspects of the Legion’s 
  rigid discipline were relaxed.
  The annihilation of Legion units on RC 4 in October 1950 was a severe 
  blow, provoking one combat officer to dismiss the previous high command as 
  a ‘gang of sinister imbeciles’. However, within six months Gen de Lattre’s firm 
  hand on the tiller, his attractive command style, and his victories in the Delta 
  battles of spring 1951 restored the CEFEO’s spirits. Professional standards 
  and morale both improved when the previously dispersed ‘sector’ battalions 
  were reassembled from 1951 onwards. Though pay for ranks below sergeant 
  was niggardly, the Legion’s ethos of unit pride, self-sufficiency and dedication 
  to the mission still set the men in the képi blanc apart, in their own and the 
  world’s eyes.
  In ‘sector’ posts légionnaires planted vegetables and bought chickens 
  and pigs in local villages, but Eric Morgan of 2 REI recalled that while on 
  long jungle operations they ‘lived on rubbish – fish-heads and rice. We were 
  parachuted in some food once … the tins had been overpainted … I scraped 
  off this painted layer, and [underneath] it said in French “For Arab Troops – 
  1928”’. During tours of at least two years and often 30 months, some men 
  inevitably found it hard to adapt to the punishing tropical climate. Medical 
  BELOW LEFT
  Vehicle movements on dirt 
  roads such as RC 3bis and 
  RC 4 were difficult and risky 
  all year round, but became 
  almost impossible in the rainy 
  season that lasted from May 
  to October. Here, in October 
  1950, what looks like an entire 
  French squad struggle to free 
  a 2½-ton truck that has lost 
  traction on a churned-up slope 
  of mud. (ullstein-bild via Getty 
  Images)
  BELOW RIGHT 
  French units employed 
  interned military prisoners 
  (PIMs) as labourers and 
  porters, including for 
  carrying heavy equipment 
  and ammunition on active 
  service. While they were 
  worked hard, their treatment 
  was supervised by the 
  International Red Cross, and 
  some became so loyal to 
  ‘their’ unit that they even 
  changed sides to join its 
  attached ‘partisans’. (Howard 
  Sochurek/The LIFE Picture 
  Collection/Getty Images)
  
  20
  problems ranged from simple heat-exhaustion to dangerous diseases such as 
  malaria, bush typhus and dengue fever. The chafing of equipment straps on 
  damp clothing caused ulcerating skin disorders, while cuts and insect bites 
  refused to heal. Despite constant warnings, the drinking of untreated water 
  accounted for 40 per cent of all medical cases. A much heavier burden on 
  morale during operations up-country was the sheer impossibility of carrying 
  serious casualties for many days through almost trackless hills. Routinely, 
  unfortunates who suffered serious head or belly wounds were given a merciful 
  overdose of morphine, rather than being abandoned alive to the soldier-ants 
  and jungle rats.
  The infantryman’s load was as light as possible when on patrol – rations, 
  water, arms, ammunition, a poncho, and on overnight missions a blanket 
  and sometimes a mosquito net – but weighed about 15kg for longer cross-
  country marches. While mules or ponies might sometimes be available to 
  carry heavy weapons, their ammunition, and radios, every unit made use of 
  interned military prisoners (PIMs) as porters.
  As for logistics: in 1946–51 the CEFEO looked as if it had been 
  fitted out from an international ‘lucky dip’ of old World War II (and 
  earlier) equipment. Units received a variety of British ‘khaki drill’ and 
  ‘jungle green’, US ‘olive drab’, and locally made clothing. Worse, France’s 
  NATO army in Germany had first choice of everything, and before 1951 
  the United States forbade France to ship out to the CEFEO anything 
  it supplied for the NATO contingent. Apart from weapons (described 
  below), the most damaging shortages were those of serviceable vehicles, 
  radios and aircraft. However, greatly increased US aid from 1951 eased 
  many of these problems.
  Viet Minh
  In contrast to the well-travelled and cynical légionnaires, their opponents 
  were mostly illiterate 18–20-year-olds whose mental world was limited to 
  village life among the rice-paddies. They felt a natural awe for the educated 
  cadres, whom they called ‘older brothers’, and were receptive to the 
  repeated lectures urging obedience, patience, and sacrifices for the cause. 
  Down to company level, political commissars provided indoctrination 
  – interpreting events according to the ‘Party line’, inspiring, and when 
  necessary rebuking. The regime was certainly ruthless, regarding the 
  individual simply as cannon fodder, but discipline was enforced more 
  by exhortation than brutality – an approach that suited an Asian ‘shame’ 
  culture. Soldiers who were Communist Party members both encouraged 
  and monitored their comrades.
  From 1950 onwards, French propaganda tried to explain away their 
  opponents’ stunning courage in battle by calling them brainwashed 
  slaves – but slave-soldiers will not keep charging into machine-gun fire 
  day after day. The bo doi was a simple man who wanted his country 
  back, and who was motivated day-to-day by soldierly comradeship. In 
  battle he was as frightened of death and maiming as anyone would be, 
  and as shocked and disheartened by the loss of friends; nevertheless, he 
  ran forward.
  
  21
  For homesick lowlanders, adapting to life in the hills was hard, and they 
  suffered as badly as the Europeans from diseases and the harsh extremes of 
  climate. They might march hundreds of kilometres at 30km a day for three 
  or four days at a time, carrying heavy packs and sleeping in the open. Their 
  medical care was extremely limited, and while they were ordered to boil 
  drinking water, change their clothing and bathe their feet regularly this was 
  often impossible in practice.
  Neither regional nor regular soldiers received any pay, but they were fed 
  and clothed, being provisioned by networks of local villages when settled in 
  the hills. When on the march their cloth rice-rolls carried from four to ten 
  days’ rations, at a scale of 680g daily; by 1952 this had increased to 800g, plus 
  400g of vegetables, dried fish, or very occasionally meat. However, during 
  mobile campaigns a man was often lucky to have fish sauce to flavour his rice, 
  and sometimes only salt and chance-gathered leaves. The thin blue or brown 
  peasant clothing was often inadequate in the early years, without enough 
  quilted vests in winter; the far-ranging December 1949 campaign against the 
  Chinese Nationalists reduced uniforms and shoes to rags. From 1950 China 
  provided uniforms and personal equipment, gradually ‘turning the Viet Minh 
  green’ by mid-1952.
  The vital backbone of the logistic system was provided by civilians who 
  were called up periodically to support local military operations. These 
  men and women ‘prepared the battlefield’ by clearing tracks, carried 
  burdens for the soldiers, and removed the dead after battle. Above all, 
  they had to provide the Dan Cong porters who actually accompanied VM 
  forces on operations. Giap’s thrust at Mao Khe and Dong Trieu in March 
  1951 involved 26,000 main-force troops each carrying a 30kg pack, plus 
  30,000 porters with even heavier loads. In the Hoa Binh campaign of 
  1951/52, Divs 304, 308 and 312 needed 150,000 porters to sustain them 
  for three months. (This does not mean that there were five porters per 
  soldier at any one time: groups were mobilized in relays, to work for 
  7–10 days each.)
  ABOVE LEFT
  Villagers preparing rice for the 
  Viet Minh. When Regt 174 
  left its Binh Gia base for an 
  operation, the local leader of 
  the Women’s Union (part of the 
  Dan Quan system) organized 
  deliveries from dispersed 
  villages. An order for 1,000 
  sticky-rice balls, or 1,000 ‘boxes’ 
  (the recycled condensed-milk 
  cans used as measures of 
  volume) could be delivered 
  in 24 hours, the rice perhaps 
  enlivened with sesame seeds or 
  grilled salted peanuts. However, 
  the Viet Bac had little cultivable 
  land and a sparse population, 
  and in 1949–50 it was badly 
  starved by a French blockade 
  preventing food coming up from 
  the Delta. In September 1949 
  Dang Van Viet mentions having 
  to ‘persuade’ villagers to give up 
  their precious seed rice to feed 
  his unit. (SeM/UIG via Getty 
  Images)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  When the VM divisions began 
  large-scale campaigns of 
  manoeuvre in the hills far from 
  their base areas, complete with 
  light artillery, they transported 
  heavy weapons on mules or 
  Thai ponies whenever these 
  were available. (Private 
  collection, courtesy Indo 
  Éditions)
  
  22
  ARMAMENT AND TACTICS
  Foreign Legion
  Before about 1951, Legion units were issued a variety of small arms due to 
  shortages of the French 7.5mm MAS36 rifle (though less, apparently, of 
  the 7.5mm FM24/29 LMG). Battalions achieved some but not complete 
  commonality: for instance, those of 2 REI and 3 REI received British .303in 
  Lee-Enfield rifles and Bren LMGs with 9mm Sten SMGs, while 13 DBLE 
  had US .30-calibre M1903 Springfield rifles and .45-calibre Thompson 
  M1A1 SMGs – but also Brens (the American BAR was not then available 
  in any numbers). In fact Thompsons might be seen in any unit, and this 
  variety of at least three calibres within a battalion naturally caused logistic 
  difficulties.
  While squad LMGs seem to have been fairly plentiful, heavier crew-served 
  weapons were not. An infantry battalion might have ten machine guns – two 
  in the HQ Co and two in each of the four rifle company HQs – but there was 
  always a shortage of the effective Browning .30-calibre M1919A4. Infantry 
  were routinely issued with 7.5mm M1931A Reibel machine guns stripped 
  from casemates in the Maginot Line or from old tank hulls, fed by drum 
  magazines and mounted on a copy of the Browning tripod. Of a battalion’s 
  10–12 mortars, similarly distributed, up to eight might be light 60mm tubes, 
  and only four at most the 81mm.
  From 1951 onwards the French began to standardize on the MAS36 rifle 
  and FM24/29 LMG, and would receive increasing numbers of the 9mm 
  MAT49 SMG. The US provided .30-calibre M1 carbines and M1919A4 
  and A6 machine guns in quantity, and in addition to their ‘organic’ machine 
  guns, mortars and (latterly) 57mm M18 ‘recoilless rifles’, units holding 
  defensive positions often received a couple of .50-calibre M2 HMGs. The 
  older foreign weapons were then turned over to ‘partisan’ companies and 
  allied irregulars.
  During the first years in Tonkin, ‘tactics’ simply meant trying to keep 
  the roads secure along the chains of company posts. Writing of an ambush 
  on RC 4 in February 1948, Dang Van Viet describes a French convoy being 
  headed by an infantry squad in a halftrack, who dismounted to clear both 
  flanks with ‘reconnaissance by fire’ – occasional Thompson SMG bursts into 
  the bush to provoke a response. When the trucks halted for sappers to use 
  mine-detectors, the VM opened fire; the ‘légionnaires’ (to Dang, all French 
  troops were ‘légionnaires’) charged up the slopes, firing, but in close cover 
  the ambushers had the advantage. As always, Dang exaggerates the results, 
  boasting of ‘wiping out’ the convoy and capturing six prisoners, 60mm 
  mortars, plus a rare .50-calibre HMG and a radio.
  The French side of this story is more interesting. There were actually two 
  ambushes on RC 4 on 5 February 1948. First, road-openers from 8th Co, 
  II/3 REI moving south from Dong Khe were indeed ‘partly overrun’ in an 
  hour-long fight before the VM withdrew after artillery fire was called down. 
  Meanwhile, another patrol from 5th Co, coming north, was hit at Lung Phai 
  Pass; this withdrew successfully, thanks to support by a mechanized platoon 
  from 4th Sqn/RICM. No convoy was destroyed, since both actions were 
  
  23
  triggered by the road-opening patrols – as intended. (Nevertheless, together 
  that day’s two actions cost 21 French killed or missing and 11 wounded.)
  Typically, convoys travelling northward on RC 4 would spend the night 
  at the halfway point, the valley-bottom post of That Khe. From the south 
  end of Lung Phai Pass a reinforced company from a Legion or North African 
  battalion’s post garrisons would move out before dawn to picket the heights, 
  and another from Dong Khe, usually supported by light armour, would come 
  south to ‘open the road’. When all was reported safe, the convoy would leave 
  Mid-war French infantry 
  fighting in open paddy-fields, 
  using classic fire-and-
  movement tactics – here the 
  crew of a squad’s FM24/29 
  LMG prepare to cover an 
  advance by the grenadier-
  voltigeurs. (Keystone-France/
  Gamma-Rapho via Getty 
  Images)
  Infantry dismounted from 
  their trucks to fight among the 
  paddy-dykes of the Delta. By 
  1952 the pioneer platoons of 
  battalion HQ companies were 
  receiving 57mm recoilless 
  rifles (centre background), 
  which were usually devolved 
  down to the rifle companies 
  to beef up their firepower. 
  These soldiers appear to be 
  Indochinese; in 1951–53 one 
  of the four rifle companies in 
  most French units, including 
  those of the Legion, was 
  locally recruited. (Keystone-
  France/Gamma-Rapho via 
  Getty Images)
  
  24
  That Khe; the classic spacing in 1949 was trucks at intervals of 300m, in 
  groups of ten separated by 2km. A weakness was that AFV escorts, usually 
  open-hulled, were placed at the head and tail, and could seldom manoeuvre 
  on the narrow road when attacked. Preliminary shelling or aerial strafing of 
  the thick cover in suspected ambush sites had limited results.
  During the open-field fighting in the Delta as part of GMs, units 
  employed conventional World War II fire-and-movement tactics which 
  need no explanation here, but Sgt Chief John has some notes about 
  movement on foot through dense country. This was only possible in 
  single file along narrow buffalo tracks; visibility each side was limited to 
  about 1m, and tracks meandered so freely that men separated by more 
  than a 5m interval lost sight of one another. In these conditions numbers 
  meant nothing, so a single-squad patrol with an automatic weapon and a 
  few riflemen was just as effective as a platoon. Typically, one or two VM 
  would booby-trap both edges of the path with grenades, hiding a few 
  paces into the jungle while holding strings to the pins. They could not 
  see the patrol, any more than they could be seen themselves, but when 
  they heard movement they would fire a few shots to make the patrol take 
  cover, then pull the strings to detonate the grenades. (Thankfully, their 
  old No. 36 Mills bombs had often deteriorated through age and damp, 
  reducing the blast radius.) The only counter that might occasionally work 
  was for every alternate légionnaire to face the jungle left and right the 
  instant the first shot was fired, and charge ahead firing into the cover – 
  this might achieve a lucky hit.
  Viet Minh
  In 1945 the regulars had Japanese 6.5mm or 7.7mm rifles and LMGs, or 
  elderly French 8mm small arms confiscated by the Japanese. The Nationalist 
  Chinese sold them everything from Russian 7.62mm M1891 Mosin-Nagant 
  rifles, through more modern Czech-designed but Chinese-made 7.92mm 
  Mauser rifles and ZB26/30 LMGs, to US .30-calibre P17 rifles and .45-calibre 
  ABOVE LEFT
  Truck-mounted 40mm Bofors 
  guns were sometimes 
  employed for road-opening 
  and escorts on RC 4; this 
  example seems to serve with 
  III/RACM, whose 7th Battery 
  had Bofors guns at Cao Bang 
  and That Khe in early 1949. 
  (ullstein-bild via Getty Images)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  Before the construction of the 
  ‘De Lattre Line’ around the 
  Red River Delta in 1951–52, 
  concrete-built defensive 
  posts capable of withstanding 
  artillery fire were virtually 
  unknown. However, the 
  brick tower from which this 
  légionnaire keeps watch at 
  the riverside post of Tu Vu 
  in November 1951 would at 
  least give protection from 
  the weapons then available 
  to most VM regional units. 
  (Keystone-France/Gamma-
  Rapho via Getty Images)
  
  25
  Thompson SMGs. This brought the total arsenal in 1946 up to some 60,000 
  rifles, 3,000 light and medium machine guns, 200 mortars, 40-plus light 
  cannon and half a dozen artillery pieces. Funded partly by drug trafficking, 
  they were also able to buy through Chinese intermediaries a wide variety of 
  small arms and machine guns on the Asian ‘black market’, particularly in 
  Thailand, the Philippines, Hong Kong and later Taiwan.
  The regional units were much less well armed before 1951. In 1947–48 
  a regional ‘battalion’ might have only some 250 old carbines and rifles, and 
  only a single LMG. In 1948 Dang Van Viet of regional Regt 28 lamented the
  dilapidated state and shortage of rifles; both they and our grenades were subject 
  to misfires, but this was the common lot of our units since the beginning, and we 
  did not complain … For now we were simply happy to have any firearms, even if 
  they did date from World War I or earlier – the ‘shorty carbine’ [M1892/16] or 
  long Russian rifle.
  However, Dang later claimed that by mid-1950 repeated ambushes had 
  captured useful numbers of Brens, Stens and Thompsons (so presumably Lee-
  Enfields as well), and Giap confirms that Dang’s regiment retained some US 
  and British weapons during their first campaign as regulars in 1950. During 
  that year even most regional battalions were reported to have ten LMGs each.
  As the regulars received newer Chinese weapons in 1950/51 – large further 
  supplies of Chinese-made Mauser rifles and ZB26/30 LMGs, and Chinese 
  copies of Soviet ‘short’ 7.62mm PPSh-41 and -43 and US .45-calibre M3 
  SMGs – their older French, Japanese and miscellaneous arms were steadily 
  turned over to the regionals. A photo taken as late as October 1953, showing 
  the results of a French sweep inside the Delta, reveals a mixture of Chinese-
  made Mausers, US P17s, old French M1902 ‘Tirailleur Tonkinois’ rifles, 
  Japanese Arisakas, Thompsons, Brens, BARs, ‘Skoda’ LMGs, and 60mm 
  and 81mm mortars of uncertain parentage. The wide variety of small-arms 
  calibres was always a handicap, and locally made munitions were very prone 
  to duds and misfires.
  Handguns were a status symbol for cadres; the most common were French 
  pre-war revolvers, but more coveted were semi-automatic pistols such as the 
  .45-calibre Colt M1911A1 and the 9mm Canadian-made Browning Hi-
  Power. Village militia and the less fortunate regionals had to make do with 
  VM-made pieces, such as a crude copy of the Colt chambered for the French 
  7.65mm ‘long’ cartridge, but smooth-bored. However, the VM factories were 
  also capable of turning out simple but practical mortars and SMGs, from 
  1947 ‘bazookas’, and from 1950 heavier, smoothbore recoilless guns (the two 
  latter both being confusingly termed ‘SKZs’ in VM sources), plus grenades, 
  mines and ‘bangalores’ (bamboo tubes packed with explosive), although few 
  bolt-action rifles.
  The first Chinese arms deliveries agreed in April 1950 were reportedly 
  some 40,000–50,000 rifles, 200 LMGs, 100 each MMGs and mortars, 
  and a few Czech P27 ‘bazookas’ and DKZ ‘recoilless rifles’. In parallel, the 
  Viet Minh continued to acquire weapons by means of overseas purchases, 
  enemy captures and home production. The booty from Lang Son (see 
  page 62) allowed some regular units to be fully equipped with French 
  
  26
  rifles and LMGs in 1951, and French captures continued to be significant 
  throughout the war despite ever-increasing Chinese aid (which reached 
  450 tons per month by the time of Na San in late 1952). Giap’s defeats 
  on the borders of the Delta in January–June 1951 cost his main-force 
  divisions thousands of weapons, but he states that the last, Div 325, was 
  fully re-armed by May 1952. By the end of that year China had provided 
  about another 58,000 rifles and 5,200 machine guns with 10 million 
  rounds, 600-plus mortars, perhaps 170 Czech DKZ rifled recoilless 
  weapons, and at least 35 75mm artillery pieces (some of them US pack 
  howitzers) with 10,000 shells.
  The first artillery unit formed in June 1946 had a few old ‘French 75s’ and 
  more examples of Japanese 75mm mountain guns, backed by French 37mm 
  trench guns and 25mm anti-tank cannon, plus a handful of Japanese 20mm 
  automatic cannon. In 1950 some regular infantry regiments received a few 
  guns for integral heavy-weapons companies, but the subsequent formation of 
  Heavy Div 351 from spring 1951 saw the VM’s artillery assets and trained 
  personnel concentrated under General Staff control. This reduced infantry 
  regimental heavy companies to smoothbore recoilless ‘SKZs’ of various 
  calibres less than 75mm, and 81mm mortars.
  As for tactics: in 1948 Dang Van Viet writes that ‘the enemy are 
  professionals, veterans of World War II. We have not had regular training, 
  and they know it – the légionnaires despise our combat capacity. We are even 
  short of rifles and grenades, let alone anything heavier. At the first shot they 
  will counter-attack, trying to submerge us with firepower.’
  A US .50-calibre M2 HMG, 
  three Chinese-made 7.92mm 
  Type 26 (Czech ZB26) ‘Skoda’ 
  LMGs, a 60mm and three 
  81mm mortars take pride of 
  place in this display of VM 
  weapons captured during 
  Operation Lea in October 1947. 
  The rifles in the background 
  are Chinese-made Mausers. 
  Other weapons captured 
  in this campaign included 
  Hotchkiss machine guns; 
  Japanese, Soviet and Lewis 
  LMGs; a PIAT, and Japanese 
  grenade-launchers. Among 
  the 640 tons of munitions 
  captured were 30,000 rounds 
  of Soviet 7.62mm and 25,000 
  French 8mm; 7,500 grenades, 
  420 mortar bombs, 200 shells 
  of various calibres, 250 aerial 
  bombs (whose explosive the 
  VM recycled into grenades 
  and mines), and 34 tons of 
  explosives. (Private collection, 
  courtesy Indo Éditions)
  
  27
  Even the simplest road ambush had to be preceded by several days’ careful 
  reconnaissance and preparation. The classic method was to disable a leading 
  vehicle so that it blocked the road, and then another near the tail of the 
  convoy, thus trapping the remaining trucks and preventing the escorting AFVs 
  from manoeuvring. After employing maximum firepower the main attackers 
  would retreat along carefully planned routes, covered by a second force which 
  engaged any dismounted infantry. Dang’s most successful ambush, on a 
  north-bound convoy of about 100 vehicles in Lung Phai Pass south of Dong 
  Khe on 3 September 1949, was in four-battalion strength, so could employ 
  more refined tactics.
  The road was flanked by a ridge on the west, on the summits of which 
  the French routinely placed pickets. On the east side a steep wooded ravine 
  dropped down from the edge of the road, with another line of wooded 
  heights rising beyond it. On this eastern ridge, Dang had concealed 
  positions dug for his few 75mm and 37mm guns, but not occupied until 
  the last night. Telephone cables were strung between the different battalion 
  command posts; caltrops were spread on the road to burst tyres, and great 
  care was taken to hide all signs of preparation. The troops then waited in 
  camouflaged positions for no less than two days (an ordeal demanding great 
  patience and discipline), including a battalion on the western slopes below 
  the summits where the French pickets would be placed. When the ambush 
  was sprung, the 75mm guns engaged the escorting AFVs by direct fire, 
  cutting the convoy in two places; over their heads, the 37mm guns hit the 
  pickets on the facing crests, who were then dispersed by an up-hill charge 
  by the battalion hidden below them. A second battalion surged up out of 
  the eastern ravine and overran the stalled convoy, while other units attacked 
  from the head and tail. More than 50 of the central vehicles were looted 
  and burned and about 100 soldiers killed (and many civilian travellers were 
  also butchered).
  ABOVE LEFT
  During 1946–50 VM tactics 
  were based mainly on 
  ambushes. These employed 
  the instinctive skills of 
  boyhood games of ‘hide-and-
  seek’ or of animal-hunting, 
  but raised to a lethal new 
  level. Careful advance 
  observation and patience in 
  preparation were paramount, 
  coupled with concealment 
  both of positions and of 
  movement. (Private collection, 
  courtesy Indo Éditions)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  During 1949–50 VM attacks 
  on posts employed more 
  heavy weapons, forcing 
  garrisons to improvise 
  defences. On 18/19 November 
  1949 this tree-trunk 
  ‘blockhouse’ at KM 41 West 
  on RC 4, held by a platoon 
  of II/3 REI, would be levelled 
  to waist height by direct 
  fire from two Japanese 
  75mm guns. Even so, the 
  légionnaires successfully 
  fought off assaults in 
  battalion strength. (Private 
  collection, courtesy Indo 
  Éditions)
  
  28
  Meticulous preparations also preceded assaults when the VM graduated 
  to attacking French posts. Ideally, time was taken to gather local intelligence, 
  assassinate any likely informers, and enlist porters for the approach march and 
  ‘preparation of the battlefield’. Reconnaissance teams plotted the post’s layout 
  and watched comings and goings, exactly locating weapon strongpoints, 
  command posts, radios and barracks. The attackers must preferably outnumber 
  the defenders by a factor of up to 6 or 7 to 1. The roles of fire-support and 
  assault parties (in VM terms, the ‘face’ and the ‘point’, each of which might 
  deploy both primary and secondary teams) were clearly defined, and both were 
  briefed with ‘sand-table’ models of the defences. When the mortars, RCLs 
  (and guns, if available) blasted their assigned targets, the assault column hit 
  a selected section of the wire, in the order: explosives group (satchel charges, 
  bangalores); ladder group (ladders, mats, cutters and other tools); fire group 
  (LMGs); assault group (SMGs leading riflemen, grenades); and reserve group. 
  Once inside, they spread out to destroy designated objectives; and meanwhile, 
  both up and down the road, ambush parties lay in wait for the expected relief 
  columns, which were as important targets as the objective itself.
  In the second half of the war, when former guerrillas were turned into 
  infantrymen in PLA training camps in China, their tactics changed radically. 
  Far from introducing any tactical sophistication, however, this training relied 
  upon the concept of sacrificial mass assaults as employed by the Chinese in 
  Korea. The following summary is partly drawn from a US analysis of the 
  latter, combined with observed VM behaviour in 1951–54:
  A battalion committed to a night attack would march at dusk to an 
  assembly area (A) about 1–2km from the objective, rest, and eat, while the 
  battalion CO briefed company commanders on their objectives, timings, and 
  methods of attack – in inflexible detail. With a bazooka platoon attached, the 
  companies then advanced in column to a still-sheltered position (B), where 
  they deployed into line and dug foxholes over an area about 300m wide and 
  400m deep. After dark, the picked main assault company advanced, with the 
  bazooka platoon roughly in the centre, while the flanking companies kept 
  abreast out on either side, until 
  all reached a line (C) some 500m 
  short of the objective. There, 
  each of the assault company’s 
  three platoons formed into a 
  column; in parallel, these then 
  advanced to the final jumping-
  off line (D), about 200m 
  from the objective. Here they 
  might halt for hours, while 
  the bombardment softened 
  up the previously observed 
  ‘blockhouses’ and bunkers on 
  the objective and the selected 
  narrow section (perhaps only 
  100m) of the perimeter.
  When the final order was 
  given, the three platoons 
  In VM assaults on fixed 
  positions from 1950 onwards, 
  the attackers were led by 
  sapper teams with bangalores 
  and satchel charges to cut 
  gaps in the barbed wire and 
  set off anti-personnel mines, 
  with close covering fire 
  from submachine-gunners. 
  Casualties were inevitably very 
  heavy, and French accounts 
  occasionally mention deliberate 
  ‘suicide-bombings’. This sapper 
  was killed at Xam Pheo in 
  January 1952; he appears to 
  have been carrying a satchel 
  charge mounted on a short 
  bamboo pole, for placing rather 
  than throwing. Detonation of 
  satchel charges was often 
  initiated by a stick grenade 
  with its cap protruding from the 
  wrapped charge. (Keystone-
  France/Gamma-Rapho via Getty 
  Images)
  
  29
  advanced in nine parallel squad columns made up of three-man fire teams, 
  perhaps crawling until the last 50m. The ‘bazookas’ then fired on the 
  defences, while sapper squads armed with satchel charges, bangalores, SMGs 
  and grenades attempted to cut the wire and lead the break-in, followed closely 
  by LMG teams. Shortly afterwards, the flanking companies curled in from 
  left and right to divide the defenders’ fire. Any company that penetrated the 
  defences then spread out to silence the French positions one by one. Such 
  tactics were always costly, and had to be repeated until the objective was taken.
  However, a single night during the Hoa Binh campaign – 7/8 January 
  1952 – threw up two interesting examples of unorthodox conduct at unit 
  level: one of cocky carelessness, and the other of unusual tactical initiative. In 
  the first instance, when attacking the Legion’s II/13 DBLE in the Pheo Hills, 
  Regt 102 from Div 308 chose to avoid the burden of carrying enough spare 
  ammunition, and suffered for it. In the second, Bn 84 of the same division’s 
  Regt 36 suggested a counter for the problem of French artillery posted well 
  back from the front line being able to devastate assaults while remaining 
  invulnerable. The unit’s Co 41 formed a picked ‘commando’ with satchel 
  charges, grenades and SMGs, which infiltrated Hoa Binh town to hit the 
  French gun line. It successfully disabled four 105mm howitzers, just before 
  the parent regiment launched several coordinated assaults.
  LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNICATIONS
  Foreign Legion
  The Legion’s regimental and battalion commanders, and many captains, 
  had seen World War II service in North Africa and Europe. They were 
  The sapper teams leading 
  assaults were usually followed 
  by LMG crews to exploit any 
  initial break-in and try to 
  silence the nearest French 
  strongpoints, thus allowing 
  the platoon columns flooding 
  in behind them to spread out 
  over the objective. The sappers 
  leading attacks on PA 26 at 
  Na San on 1/2 December 
  1952 were reportedly followed 
  by two successive waves 
  each with a battalion’s total 
  allocation of 20–30 LMGs, 
  each followed by a distinct 
  wave of ammunition-bearers. 
  These regulars have a captured 
  MAS36 rifle and an FM24/29 
  LMG, which after 1950 seem 
  to be as common in photos as 
  the Czech-designed small arms 
  acquired from China. (SeM/UIG 
  via Getty Images)
  
  30
  battle-hardened leaders whose performance in combat in Vietnam was 
  impressive, even though their experience had not prepared them for this 
  kind of war.
  As for the lieutenants, the Legion had always been a sought-after posting, 
  and apart from graduates of St Cyr it also benefited from the French Army’s 
  practice of promoting a proportion of junior officers from the NCO ranks. 
  The corps favoured officers who aspired to regimental service rather than box-
  ticking careerists, and a reputation as a baroudeur (‘brawler’) was no handicap 
  for a Legion officer. He was expected to lead in combat, and to exercise a 
  paternal discipline over his ‘hard cases’ when they stepped out of line.
  However, the CEFEO suffered from a chronic shortage of suitable 
  battalion officers, which got worse as the war dragged on. Limited by the 
  absence of those who saw their professional future in the modern world of 
  NATO, the pool was further reduced by a steady drain of casualties with 
  which the replacement system could never keep up. In the Expeditionary 
  Corps as a whole, by 1953 a battalion often had little more than half its 
  officer establishment (11 or 12, instead of 18), and many were old for their 
  ranks (e.g. lieutenants averaging 33 and captains 38). After 1950 increasing 
  numbers of non-infantry officers were ‘converted’ and posted to combat units 
  with inadequate training, and Sgt Chief John writes that even in the Legion 
  this became worrying.
  A battalion should have had 60–80 sergeants and other senior NCOs, 
  but this might fall as low as 40. Apart from battle casualties, many of this 
  most essential category were always being creamed off for leadership roles 
  March 1952: a French officer 
  and his radio operator with 
  the standard American-
  supplied SCR-300, a 
  ‘tropicalized’ backpack FM 
  set with a range of up to 5km. 
  Radios only became available 
  to most company commanders 
  from 1951. Only echelons 
  above unit level had the SCR-
  694, a heavy AM set with 
  ranges of 24 to 48km for voice 
  and Morse code respectively. 
  Many radios used by both 
  sides were heavy, fragile, 
  short-ranged, unreliable in 
  mountainous terrain, and 
  dependent on short-lived 
  batteries or separate hand-
  cranked generators. Most 
  were AM sets, requiring a 
  jeep or at least two men 
  to carry them, and needed 
  long aerials to be strung 
  up in particular directions. 
  (Keystone-France/Gamma-
  Rapho via Getty Images)
  
  31
  in specialist companies, or in Indochinese units created from 1951 under 
  De Lattre’s programme of expanding locally recruited forces. The original ‘old 
  sweats’ might be creaking a bit as they neared the end of a second tour, after 
  perhaps five years in-country. Younger men could rise quickly through the 
  ranks, but the system of recruit training could be a drawback. If he had been 
  plucked from the ranks for NCO courses immediately after basic training, a 
  sergeant might come down the gangplank with good theoretical knowledge 
  of his trade, but lacking the local or recent combat experience to give him 
  confidence and authority.
  Practical leadership above platoon level depends upon communications. 
  Until the United States increased its support from 1951 onwards the 
  American SCR-300 backpack FM radio was only available to isolated posts 
  and down to battalion level, so communication with and between companies 
  was normally reliant upon field telephones, the cables of which were easily 
  cut (and carefully gathered up) by the VM. Even when more radios became 
  available, local atmospheric conditions in the highlands made communication 
  difficult; for instance, for a vital hour before sunset and after sunrise reception 
  was notoriously bad. A ‘wire net’ using field telephones is slow to install and 
  impossible to protect, but it is secure; radios are not. At higher command 
  levels both sides gathered intelligence by radio interception, and Giap states 
  that during the crisis of October 1950 much French traffic was sent in ‘clear’. 
  By 1952, at least, the VM could sometimes listen in to tactical traffic over 
  French battalion and company radios.
  Viet Minh
  In a population that was 90 per cent illiterate, the original VM ‘cadres’ 
  were inevitably drawn from former junior officials, academics and office 
  clerks, leavened in the Vietnamese People’s Army with former Colonial 
  soldiers. Thereafter, potential leaders who proved themselves in the 
  ranks were sent on short NCO and officer courses held in the Viet Bac. 
  From 1950 regular officers were trained in China, and their instruction 
  continued by means of refresher courses and postings to regional units to 
  gain combat experience.
  The talents required by a guerrilla leader were local knowledge, fieldcraft, 
  shrewd judgement of character, personal charisma, and the tactical instincts 
  to set an ambush, coordinate its execution and withdraw safely. The more 
  complex tasks required of an officer in an organized army demanded 
  obedience and patient application; some successful guerrillas failed to make 
  the transition to a disciplined hierarchy, or to master the ‘staff work’ needed 
  for coordinating the movements of a military force.
  A more general problem was a basic lack of understanding of military 
  culture or technology, so instruction had to be rigidly schematic, with 
  every lesson copied down for rote-learning. This robbed junior officers of 
  the initiative and mental courage to ‘throw away the book’ when things 
  went wrong. Coupled with the Asian sensitivity about ‘losing face’, which 
  discouraged accurate reports up the chain of command, this naturally led 
  to failures to respond imaginatively to unexpected threats or opportunities. 
  The Vietnamese People’s Army was well aware of this problem: documents 
  
  32
  captured in spring 1952 criticize junior officers for acting ‘like machines 
  stripped of all intelligence’.
  It might be thought that the Communist system of unit command being 
  shared with a political commissar must have had disastrous consequences, 
  but that was certainly not always the case. These Communist Party 
  appointees shared all the hardships and danger of life on campaign, 
  and some forged good relationships with their co-commanders. When 
  commanding Regt 174, Dang Van Viet consistently writes of his commissar 
  Chu Huy Man as a trusted partner in battle (though admittedly the latter’s 
  background as field commander of a regional battalion may have set him 
  apart from the usual run).
  We may guess that apart from French (i.e. US) captures, the few radios 
  available to the Viet Minh must have been older Japanese or Soviet types. The 
  senior echelons had radio contact with regimental HQs, but below that level 
  communication depended upon extensive use of field telephones (so at least 
  tactical communications were usually secure from French interception; high-
  level traffic was not). Entrusting messages to runners or couriers on horseback 
  was common; for example, the regimental commander Dang Van Viet recalls 
  that in October 1950 he received by radio a high-command order to detach 
  one of his battalions, but had to send a runner to the battalion commander. 
  Even company HQs each had a squad of 12 runners.
  VM cadres apparently posed 
  for a propaganda photo to 
  show them being briefed 
  before the assault on Dong 
  Khe in September 1950, using 
  a ‘sand-table’ model of the 
  terrain and defences. It is 
  oriented with north to the 
  right (see the map on page 
  51), so the east side of the 
  Citadel hill is towards us with 
  the dark line of RC 4 and the 
  built-up Quartier Dubouchet 
  behind it. (Private collection, 
  courtesy Indo Éditions)
  
  33
  BACKGROUND TO BATTLE
  From the CEFEO’s first return to the frontier country, where the Viet Minh 
  were secure in the Bac Son mountains, all movements between the isolated 
  posts were vulnerable. In these thickly forested hills the narrow dirt roads 
  wound around hairpins and climbed over switchbacks, only occasionally 
  dropping into small, cultivated river valleys dominated by ramparts of calcaires 
  – abrupt rocky outcrops, covered with thick brush and riddled with caves. 
  Although this inhospitable terrain was much more sparsely populated than 
  the Delta lowlands, French activity was so closely watched by VM agents that 
  surprise was impossible. While most of the montagnards tried to avoid both 
  armies of intruders, in the Cao Bang region one Tho chief had – unusually – 
  sided some years previously with the Viet Minh, who carried out reprisals on 
  any ‘villages ralliés’ (villages friendly to the French).
  The Viet Minh were relatively weak in numbers and equipment, but 
  always enjoyed the initiative. They knew that any ambush or attack would 
  provoke a French reaction, and since the possible routes for this were so 
  few and predictable the reaction force could always be ambushed in its 
  turn. Exploiting this advantage to both tie down and wear down the French 
  became Vo Nguyen Giap’s fundamental tactic before 1950. Such clashes 
  might cost the French anything between half a dozen and 50 casualties, 
  plus a few irreplaceable vehicles; during 1948 there were 28 major ambushes 
  on RC 4 alone, inflicting a steady haemorrhage of losses. The few French 
  mechanized units with light armour were confined to the road itself, and 
  off-road infantry movement among the wooded ridges and crags – whether 
  to picket the high ground along the roads, or to try to outflank an ambush 
  – was slow and exhausting.
  Phu Tong Hoa
  25–26 July 1948
  
  34
  Artillery was dispersed singly or in two-gun sections in some posts, but 
  since maps and target observation were both inadequate effective supporting 
  fires were difficult to achieve. Air support, based at Hanoi, consisted of a 
  single squadron of Supermarine Spitfire IX fighters and two of Amiot 
  AAC.1 Toucan (Junkers Ju 52/3m) trimotor transports, though Morane-
  Saulnier MS 500 Criquet (Fieseler Fi 156 Storch) spotter/liaison aircraft 
  could use a few rudimentary local airstrips. There were, of course, no tactical 
  helicopters at this date. Air operations were limited by the highland weather, 
  characterized by thick low-lying fog in the morning hours, and the rainy 
  season between May and October greatly hampered all activity (both by air 
  and road). Forward air control was in any case rudimentary, and although the 
  VM were always highly nervous of air attack their concealment in wooded 
  terrain usually saved them.
  During winter 1947/48 the north-western loop of RC 3 between Cao 
  Bang and Na Fac was abandoned in favour of the more direct RC 3bis to 
  the south of it. Responsibility for this road between Cao Bang and Bac 
  Kan lay with I/3 REI, and the southernmost of its posts between the two, 
  held by 2nd Co, was Phu Tong Hoa. As the crow flies (but not on the ever-
  twisting road) it lay about 12km south of Na Fac post, held by 3rd Co plus 
  a single 105mm howitzer, and some 20km north of Bac Kan. The latter was 
  a symbolic objective for the Viet Minh, since it had housed Ho Chi Minh’s 
  headquarters before he was driven out by Operation Lea. Bac Kan was held 
  by I/3 REI’s HQ Co and 1st Co, with two 105s, and part of 5th Sqn of the 
  mechanized Morocco Colonial Infantry Regiment (RICM).
  Since early April 1948 movements on RC 3bis had been harassed 
  increasingly. On 12 July Capt Cardinal’s 2nd Co at Phu Tong Hoa lost 
  five killed and 17 wounded to an ambush south of the post. On 16 July, 
  French intelligence reported a major concentration in that area by VM 
  regional Regt 72 and ‘Brigade Thu Do’ (later identified as Regts 74 and 121), 
  ABOVE LEFT
  The chaotic terrain of north-
  east Tonkin; this aerial 
  photo shows (foreground) 
  the isolated post of Dong 
  Dang, the nearest one to the 
  Chinese border, which would 
  be held in 1950 by troops from 
  I/3 REI, and later occupied 
  briefly by VM Regt 174. 
  (Private collection, courtesy 
  Indo Éditions)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  French trucks spaced out 
  as they negotiate a narrow 
  stretch of RC 4 approaching 
  Lung Phai Pass from the 
  south; the road is a mere 
  ledge between a cliff on the 
  left and a ravine on the right. 
  At such bottlenecks the Viet 
  Minh habitually buried mines, 
  cut or blocked the road, and 
  mounted ambushes. (Private 
  collection, courtesy Indo 
  Éditions)
  
  35
  supposedly under the direction of Giap in person. In fact he had dispersed 
  about 1,000 men along the road all the way from Ban Cao down to Bac 
  Kan, in order to isolate Phu Tong Hoa for an assault by probably twice that 
  number from the best elements of the three units. (In VM sources pre-1950 
  at least, and French reports quoting them, mention of ‘regiments’ cannot be 
  taken at face value as formations fielding three infantry battalions. The force 
  assembled for the actual assault on Phu Tong Hoa is variously estimated at 
  two or three battalions.)
  M3 White scout car of the 
  Morocco Colonial Infantry 
  Regiment (RICM); note the 
  anchor badge of the Colonial 
  ‘marsouins’ (‘porpoises’) on 
  the hull side. The RICM’s 
  2nd, 4th and later 5th Sqns 
  provided post garrisons 
  on RC 3bis and RC 4 with 
  mechanized support at various 
  times in 1948–49, each 
  squadron having an HQ and 
  three large subunits termed 
  pelotons. Each of these 
  comprised: a reconnaissance 
  troop, with four armed 
  jeeps, four scout cars, one 
  M3 halftrack and an M8 
  75mm HMC; and a motorized 
  infantry troop with 2½-ton 
  trucks. (Private collection, 
  courtesy Indo Éditions)
  Distant but rare photo of 
  the post at Phu Tong Hoa, 
  looking northwards from the 
  native village south of the 
  fort. Under magnification, the 
  outer bamboo barricade can 
  be seen just above the Dodge 
  ambulance and below the 
  white blemish on the photo 
  (left); a pale earth track leads 
  up the hillock to the gate in 
  the south wall (centre left); 
  and immediately above the 
  trucks (right) is the wrecked 
  house marked on our map 
  as ‘N’ (see page 37). Above 
  it, reflections highlight some 
  of the oblique timber props 
  bracing the fort’s plank-
  and-earth rampart. (Private 
  collection, courtesy Indo 
  Éditions)
  
  36
  Two conflicting versions of a sketch-map have been published: 
  one prepared for LtCol Simon’s after-action report, and the other 
  (unattributed) in Képi Blanc, Nos 734 & 735; neither includes an 
  exact scale line. For the fort plan we have mainly followed the 
  former, and for the course of the action the latter.
  1 1930hrs: Two 75mm shells destroy the main gate.
  2 c.2000hrs: A shellburst kills Légs Hergessel, Mahaut and 
  Veran and wounds Capt Cardinal; wounded a second time 
  by a grenade thrown into the radio room, Cardinal will bleed 
  to death in the early hours of 26 July. At perhaps 2015hrs Lt 
  Charlotton will also be killed by a shellburst.
  3 1930–c.2045hrs: Continuing bombardment falls mainly 
  on the central range of buildings, the armoury and stores by 
  the north wall, and the west wall, creating a 15m breach in the 
  latter. Blockhaus I is also damaged.
  4 c.2045hrs: VM assault columns reach the outer defences, 
  and begin to breach them.
  5 c.2115hrs (?): VM assault troops penetrate the west and 
  north walls.
  6 c.2200hrs: VM assault troops have now occupied almost 
  half of the post.
  7 c.2200–2230hrs: QM Sgt Guillemaud leads counter-
  attacks to clear the north wall, later recapturing Blockhaus III. 
  Sgts Andry and Fissler lead a counter-attack on the partly 
  occupied eastern barrack, before linking up with S/Lt Bevalot’s 
  party in the south courtyard.
  8 c.2300–2330hrs: Cpl Camilleri and Sgts Andry and Fissler 
  lead counter-attacks on the main buildings and the breach in 
  the west wall, covered by fire from Cpl Chief Jaeckel on the 
  mound of Blockhaus IV.
  9 c.2330hrs (?): S/Lt Bevalot leads a counter-attack to 
  recapture Blockhaus I.
  Phu Tong Hoa, 25 July 1948
  Battlefield environment
  The post at Phu Tong Hoa was situated on a hillock on the west 
  side of the road, divided from it by a wooded ravine. It had 
  already been almost overrun once by elements of regional VM 
  Regts 72 and 74 when it was held by a company of Colonial 
  Infantry in early December 1947, and had been rebuilt when 
  taken over by I/3 REI in January 1948. Engineer materials were 
  in as short supply as everything else, and consequently the 
  post’s defences were fairly primitive. Enclosing a rectangle 
  about 90m north-to-south by some 60m across, the 3m-high 
  walls had a double skin of long, heavy planks infilled with 
  earth, supported by timber uprights and props. Parapets were 
  allegedly loopholed for rifles and some of the garrison’s 14 
  Bren LMGs, although photos do not show this. At each corner 
  was a numbered bastion (the Legion used the German term 
  Blockhaus); Nos I and III, at the south-western and north-
  eastern corners respectively, were enclosed and mounted 
  LMGs, while Nos II and IV (north-west and south-east corners) 
  were open, each housing a British 3.7in mountain howitzer.
  Inside, the area was divided into two courtyards by a 
  west-to-east central range of mud-brick buildings housing the 
  cookhouse (A), mess room (B), NCOs’ quarters (C), orderly 
  room and officers’ quarters (D) and radio room (E). Along but 
  slightly separated from the north wall of the northern yard, on 
  slightly raised ground, was a brick building housing the stores 
  and armoury (F). Timber barracks stood against the east (G; 
  1st and 2nd platoons) and west (H; 3rd and 4th platoons) side 
  walls of both courtyards, the south-western barrack housing the 
  company office (I) and senior NCOs (J), and the south-eastern 
  barrack incorporating both the gunners’ quarters (K) and a small 
  sickbay (L). In the north-western part of the northern yard stood 
  an open-sided thatched shelter (M) for al fresco eating, and in 
  its north-eastern corner was a 60mm mortar position. In the 
  north-western part of the southern yard were a second 60mm 
  and an 81mm (3in) mortar; the latter, at least, had a substantial 
  brick parapet.
  The exterior defences included sparse fields of anti-personnel 
  mines and tripwire flares outside the west and north walls, 
  and, for lack of enough barbed wire, triple bamboo barricades. 
  The inner layer is described as a ‘Japanese palisade’, while the 
  two outer layers were thick chevaux-de-frise of X-shapes of 
  sharpened stakes – the traditional local form of anti-personnel 
  defence, strong and flexible, so still effective unless attackers 
  had serious artillery support. The fort’s gate was in the south 
  wall, and beyond it was a small native village, of which one 
  ruined house (N) stood close to the barricades. The post was 
  overlooked by wooded hills to the west, north and east.
  
  37
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LL
  LL
  L
  LL
  LL
  LLLL
  LLLLLLLL
  LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL
  LLLLLLLLLL
  LLL
  LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL
  LLL
  LLL
  LL
  LL
  LL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
   
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  I
  K
  L
  N
  G
  M
  H
  F
  A
  B
  C
  D
  D
  E
  J
  2
  1
  3
  3
  3
  4
  4
  4
  5
  5
  5
  6
  7
  8
  9
  to Cho Ra
  to village
  to Bac Kan
  to Deo Gang
  N
  0
  20yd approx.
  0
  20m approx.
  R a v i n e
  I
  IV
  II
  III
  Mines
  ‘Blockhaus’ numbers
  RC 3bis
  RC 3bis
  IV
  GATE
  60
  60
  81
  81
  60
  Bamboo chevaux-de-frise
  ‘Japanese palisade’
  PIAT rocket launcher
  Bren gun
  Mortar pit
  81mm mortar
  60mm mortar
  3.7in howitzer
  Loopholed timber & earth wall
  
  38
  INTO COMBAT
  The behaviour of civilians at Phu Tong Hoa suggested to Capt Cardinal that 
  an attack might be imminent, so by night, to avoid prying eyes, his second-
  in-command Lt Fernand Charlotton had the ammunition reserve moved 
  out of the easily identifiable armoury and into a cellar beneath the main 
  building. On 18 July a third officer, S/Lt Jacques Bevalot, arrived with eight 
  other equally green replacements for the recent ambush casualties, ‘straight 
  off the boat’. On 21/22 July, 4th Co from Ngan Son to the north was sucked 
  into an action against VM Bn 61/Regt 74; a medevac party to Cao Bang was 
  then ambushed south of Belair, and a relief from Cao Bang was halted by 
  road sabotage. On 23 July Cardinal received an order to evacuate his post on 
  the 25th, but this was cancelled the following day. Instead, for the night of 
  24/25 July the CO of I/3 REI, Maj Sourlier, planned sorties in strength up 
  the road from Bac Kan and down from Phu Tong Hoa, but heavy rain and 
  fog forced their postponement. None of this can have increased Cardinal’s 
  faith in I Bn HQ.
  On Sunday 25 July, 2nd Co was missing one of its three platoons, 
  detached for security duty with Bn HQ at Bac Kan; the post was held by three 
  officers and 97 men, plus four North African gunners from 69 RA. It was 
  still raining, and after early-evening parade most were resting indoors when, 
  at about 1930hrs, two 75mm shells landed without warning, destroying the 
  main gate.
  The garrison began to return fire with LMGs and mortars, more or less 
  blind, on the surrounding high ground; at first they expected only a brief 
  harassing bombardment, and husbanded their ammunition. Shells continued 
  to fall at a rate of at least one every 2 minutes, apparently from two guns: 
  a Japanese 75mm mountain gun to the south-west, and a French 37mm 
  M1916 infantry gun from the north. The British 3.7in mountain howitzer in 
  Blockhaus IV began searching for the former while the 81mm mortar traded 
  fire with the latter, and the 60mm tubes lobbed bombs onto obvious assembly 
  areas. The accurate VM fire was clearly based on long observation; most of 
  it fell on the main building, the stores and the corner bastions. Early in the 
  action three men were killed and Capt Cardinal was seriously wounded by 
  a shellburst; he was carried into the radio room, and got a message through 
  to Bn HQ at Bac Kan before enemy fire destroyed the aerials. The barrage 
  continued for perhaps 75–90 minutes, and one account also mentions heavy 
  mortar fire and ‘rockets’; Blockhaus I was silenced, and a 15m stretch of the 
  west wall beside the main building was breached. Only about 15 minutes after 
  taking over command Lt Charlotton was also mortally wounded, leaving the 
  inexperienced S/Lt Bevalot to lead the defence from about 2030hrs.
  Apart from fires started in the main building the misty night was pitch-
  black, and rain was still falling at about 2045hrs when movements were 
  heard outside. After a last flurry of shellfire, the defenders heard trumpet 
  calls rousing two VM ‘shock’ battalions from trenches about 800m to the 
  west and north (later to be reinforced by a second wave), and three assault 
  columns reached the defences. Most of the mines had already been set off by 
  shellfire, but the bamboo entanglements had to be breached under fire by 
  pioneers using machetes. This delayed the assaults, but nevertheless the Viet 
  
  39
  Minh got footholds inside both the west and north walls by perhaps 2115hrs 
  (sources differ). Both the north-eastern and south-western blockhouses were 
  lost, and soon afterwards the majority of the central building, virtually cutting 
  the post in half and separating the defenders. Dispersed groups of légionnaires 
  defended themselves at point-blank range, and the condition of corpses later 
  proved that it had sometimes come down to hand-to-hand blade fighting (as 
  well as machetes, some of the attackers carried pikes and bills).
  By 2200hrs it seemed that the légionnaires were about to be overwhelmed, 
  but NCOs seized the initiative wherever they could, greatly aided by the 
  fact that at about that time the rain stopped, the sky cleared, and moonlight 
  helped men to get their bearings. Their stories are inevitably confused, but it 
  seems that three main hubs of resistance emerged.
  The smallest was the radio room, where two wounded légionnaires were 
  still holding out with the CO; Capt Cardinal would be wounded there 
  a second time, and would later bleed to death. In the north courtyard, 
  QM Sgt Guillemaud led a party from the armoury with grenades and a 
  Bren gun to clear the enemy who had penetrated behind it, and to save the 
  60mm mortar; they would later retake Blockhaus III. Sergeants Andry and 
  Fissler led three other men against infiltrators in the east wall barracks, later 
  moving into the southern yard to join a counter-charge led by Cpl Camilleri 
  towards the western breach from Blockhaus IV. That was the other main 
  base of resistance, under S/Lt Bevalot, who also successfully defended the 
  sickbay. From this south-eastern bastion Cpl Chief Jaeckel concentrated fire 
  on the captured Blockhaus I, while the two mortars – which had been taken 
  from their pits and manhandled up the mound – fired almost vertically 
  to drop bombs among the VM reinforcements in the breach. After the 
  Looking roughly south over 
  the native village from Phu 
  Tong Hoa’s south-eastern 
  bastion. This open-topped 
  ‘Blockhaus IV’ enclosed 
  a high earth mound; in 
  addition to the visible British 
  3.7in mountain howitzer, 
  it was also armed with a 
  PIAT rocket-projector. The 
  successful defence of this 
  bastion provided a base of 
  fire for the counter-attacks in 
  the southern courtyard on the 
  night of 25 July 1948. (Private 
  collection, courtesy Indo 
  Éditions)
  
  40
  
  41
  
  42
  courtyard was cleared and S/Lt Bevalot led the recapture of Blockhaus I, 
  Cpl Camilleri’s team finished clearing the central range of buildings, and  
  S/Lt Bevalot and Sgt Andry led men to relieve those still holding out in the 
  east barracks.
  Metre by metre, the close-quarter counter-attacks recaptured the lost 
  ground over about an hour and a half, and at around 2330–2345hrs VM 
  trumpets were heard sounding the retreat. The garrison harassed their 
  departure with LMGs and mortars, and by midnight the enemy seemed to 
  have withdrawn from the whole perimeter (though taking with them five 
  captured Bren guns).
  S/Lt Bevalot re-established radio contact with Bn HQ at Bac Kan 
  at daybreak on 26 July, reporting that in addition to Capt Cardinal and 
  Lt Charlotton 21 others of the garrison had been killed and 33 wounded 
  (more than 50 per cent casualties). The Viet Minh left 40 dead inside the 
  fort and another 22 in the nearest defences, with perhaps 100 visible further 
  off. During 26–27 July the garrison remained on high alert while carrying 
  out the most urgently necessary tasks. On the 27th two Spitfires flew over, 
  shortly followed by an AAC.1 airdrop of ammunition and medical supplies; 
  the same day an MS 500 managed to land and take out a couple of the most 
  gravely wounded. Bevalot also had one of his légionnaires blow a bugle found 
  among the enemy dead, and a VM unit coming south down RC 3bis showed 
  Counter-attack in Phu Tong Hoa
  This recreates a moment some time around 2300hrs on the night 
  of 25 July, in the south courtyard of the post; the rain has stopped 
  and the moon has come out. We are looking from roughly south-
  east to north-west, at the 81mm mortar position and along the 
  south face of the central range of brick buildings, at this stage 
  mostly occupied by the Viet Minh. Inspired by veteran NCOs, an 
  ad hoc squad of légionnaires are charging with rifles, an LMG and 
  grenades to engage both those inside the building and, ahead 
  of them, enemy reinforcements still coming in over the large 
  breach in the western wall. ‘Behind us’, S/Lt Bevalot and Cpl 
  Chief Jaeckel’s party on the mound of the south-eastern bastion 
  – Blockhaus IV – are firing overhead in support of this counter-
  attack, including dropping mortar bombs vertically on the breach.
  At this period I/3 REI were wearing British Army-surplus 
  tropical shirts and BD trousers in ‘khaki drill’ and/or ‘jungle 
  green’, some with locally tailored ‘bush jackets’. Standard 
  headgear was the French stitched-fabric bush hat, but note 
  at right a sergeant wearing the red-topped green calot of the 
  Legion with the gold diagonal galon of his rank on the left front. 
  Weapons were British .303in No. 4 Mk 1 rifles, Sten SMGs and 
  Bren LMGs. Photos show French M1916 leather equipment, 
  though British 37 Pattern webbing items were also used, 
  particularly to hold Bren magazines; issued US web leggings 
  were seldom worn in the field.
  Photos of early VM troops show a mixture of clothing 
  apparently in khaki, dark blue, grey or brown; this included 
  ‘sidecaps’ worn square on the head, blouson jackets, shirts, and 
  wide three-quarter-length trousers, often worn rolled up above 
  sandals. The cloth roll for carrying rice rations was already 
  common, and many cartridge pouches (probably both Japanese 
  and French) were found on casualties at Phu Tong Hoa. Some 
  officers wore captured French items such as the M1931 sun 
  helmet (with the VM badge of a yellow star on a red disc), and a 
  revolver belt. A large VM banner and three company flags were 
  recovered.
  Weapons recovered at Phu Tong Hoa were a Czech-designed 
  ZB26 LMG (Chinese Type 26, called by the French the ‘Skoda’); 
  13 Russian M1891 Mosin-Nagant rifles (with bayonets ‘wired 
  on’), and four old French mousquetons (M1892 or M1916 
  carbines); a Thompson and a Sten SMGs; two ‘grenade launchers’ 
  (unspecified – probably Japanese 50mm Type 89); and 12 long 
  bamboo lances, with notched or billhook blades. Munitions 
  recovered included 280 hand grenades, five rifle grenades, three 
  bazooka rounds, three rounds for a ‘rocket gun’ (unspecified), and 
  1,500 rounds for small arms – the variety of weapons suggesting 
  that five different calibres had to be provided.
  
  43
  themselves before being quickly dispersed with a howitzer shell and LMG 
  fire. Sporadic shell and mortar fire that night caused no casualties. However, 
  it was not until the evening of 28 July – three full days and nights after the 
  first report of the attack – that a relief column arrived, led by the regimental 
  commander LtCol Simon from Cao Bang. He was impressed to be greeted by 
  Sgt Jean Andry’s honour guard turned out in white képis, but the significant 
  point was the long delay in his arrival.
  The first report on the evening of 25 July was heard by all posts on the 
  battalion radio net, but the mounting of relief attempts was hampered by 
  Poor-quality VM photo of 
  an unidentified unit in the 
  late 1940s, apparently being 
  addressed by Gen Giap (far 
  left). French intelligence 
  reported that Giap personally 
  supervised the concentration 
  of units to attack Phu Tong 
  Hoa, but whether or not the 
  photo is associated with that 
  operation this group probably 
  reflect more or less the 
  appearance of the attackers 
  of Capt Cardinal’s post. 
  (Private collection, courtesy 
  Indo Éditions)
  Photographed after the long-
  awaited arrival of the relief 
  column at Phu Tong Hoa,  
  S/Lt Bevalot (left foreground, 
  head turned away) reports to 
  LtCol Simon (facing camera). 
  Around them, the légionnaires 
  of 2nd Co sport the white-
  covered képis and regimental 
  lanyards in which a sergeant’s 
  guard turned out to salute 
  the regimental commander. 
  (Private collection, courtesy 
  Indo Éditions)
  
  44
  diversionary firing on Ban Cao, Ngan Son, Na Fac and Bac Kan. Major 
  Sourlier’s column from Bac Kan on the night of 25/26 July ran into 
  resistance after 5km, and was forced to turn back after firing some 105mm 
  rounds into the hills around Phu Tong Hoa. At dawn on the 26th, Lt 
  Faulques led a platoon south from Na Fac, but was stopped half way by Viet 
  Minh who had been dug in for 48 hours on the crest of the Deo Gang pass. 
  That morning Capt Grand D’Esnon led another attempt up from Bac Kan, 
  but was turned back with 19 casualties after a two-hour fight. Alerted by 
  I Bn HQ, LtCol Simon at Cao Bang – some 87km by road from Phu Tong 
  Hoa – led out a truck column of Legion and Algerian infantry, RICM light 
  armour and Engineers on the morning of 26 July. It was seriously delayed 
  by mines and 114 cuts across the road, and by having to fight through two 
  ambushes – the first as far north as Vo Chang, in testament to the extent 
  of Giap’s cordon.
  The aftermath
  In October 1948 the French abandoned RC 3bis, ceding control of almost the 
  whole pre-1947 Viet Bac region to the Viet Minh. Giap’s home bases would 
  never again be seriously threatened.
  The 3 REI was then transferred to posts along RC 4, sharing security duty 
  with one Algerian and four Moroccan battalions. During 1949 the VM regional 
  Regts 28 and 74 carried out increasingly frequent and damaging ambushes, and 
  also sometimes destroyed small outposts held by French-led local auxiliaries 
  of the Light Military Auxiliary Companies (CLSMs). From October 1949 
  onwards, RC 4 north of Na Cham was effectively a permanent combat zone; 
  this reduced French prestige, and thus support, among the population.
  From November 1949 the North-East Frontier Zone (ZFNE) came 
  under LtCol Constans, the new CO of 3 REI, now headquartered down at 
  Lang Son. ZFNE’s assets were 11 battalions (four Legion, four Moroccan, 
  two Colonial Infantry and one Algerian) plus four mechanized squadrons 
  and about ten local CLSMs. Most were thinly strung out in multiple small 
  posts, and even those units nominally tasked with ‘intervention’ were widely 
  dispersed between Cao Bang and well south-east of Lang Son; the only true 
  strategic reserves were three paratroop battalions based at Delta airfields. It 
  was the Delta that mostly occupied the attention of the new commander 
  of the whole Tonkin Operational Zone (ZOT), Gen Alessandri, who that 
  winter had considerable success in cutting the supply of rice into the Viet 
  Bac, where its price increased fivefold that year.
  In China, meanwhile, the PLA’s final victorious campaign in June–
  December 1949 initially led to both French and VM frontier units being 
  completely distracted in December by the retreat into Tonkin of some 
  35,000 Chinese Nationalist troops. In January 1950 both Mao Zedong’s 
  new Communist government and that of the Soviet Union recognized 
  that of Ho Chi Minh, and Mao agreed to provide supplies, weapons and 
  training for the Viet Minh; a 280-strong Chinese military mission would 
  later arrive in Tonkin headed by Gen Wei Guoqing. 
  This marked the first great turning-point in the war, and would 
  eventually prove decisive. During spring 1950 training camps and arsenals 
  
  45
  were opened across the borders in Guangxi and Yunnan provinces, to 
  begin forming and equipping three divisions organized on the Chinese 
  PLA model. The first four regiments (from Divs 308 and 312, plus an HQ 
  defence unit) were re-armed during the early spring, and by June more 
  than 3,000 VM infantry, artillery and signals officers had already been 
  trained in China. When these men returned they had to pass on what they 
  had learned to their men, but between October 1951 and December 1952 
  some 10,000 more cadres and 40,000 rankers would be trained in China.
  On paper, the first ‘Regimental Group’ (Div) 308 was created as early 
  as August 1949; commanded by the veteran Vuong Thua Vu, it was first 
  blooded in the upper Red River valley against modest French ‘sector’ forces. 
  By August 1950 it had been trained in China, and in time it would grow to 
  about 9,600 all ranks of whom 7,200 were actual riflemen. By September 
  1950 it could field three infantry regiments, a small artillery unit and an 
  anti-aircraft battalion.
  The 3 REI’s brothers-in-arms 
  in the battles on RC 4 in 
  1949–50 were a battalion of 
  the 8e Régiment de Tirailleurs 
  Marocains – literally ‘Moroccan 
  Skirmishers’, usually translated 
  as ‘Rifles’ – and the light-
  infantry goumiers of the 3e, 8e, 
  10e and 11e Tabors Marocains. 
  Here, Tirailleurs are crammed 
  into an AAC.1 Toucan  
  (Ju 52/3m) – the only transport 
  aircraft available in that period. 
  Note their British Lee-Enfield 
  SMLE rifles, older than the 
  No. 4 Mk 1s issued to some 
  Legion units. (Bettmann/Getty 
  Images)
  
  46
  BACKGROUND TO BATTLE
  Since November 1949 it had been clear that the garrison at Cao Bang – soon 
  to be dependent solely on an ‘air bridge’ of AAC.1 trimotor transports – was 
  no longer sustainable. However, disagreements between Paris, Saigon and 
  Hanoi prevented any decision before the spring 1950 monsoon rains. In the 
  meantime Dang Van Viet, whose new regular Regt 174 was resting north-
  west of Cao Bang, sought General Staff approval for an attempt to take Dong 
  Khe. This important post on RC 4 guarded a road junction and an airstrip 
  in a narrow valley about one-third of the way down from Cao Bang to Lang 
  Son. (Dang’s memoir claims that he received permission via Phan Phac, the 
  VM deputy chief-of-staff; Giap’s account condemns the attack as ‘outside the 
  auspices of the High Command’.)
  After a long, difficult cross-country march in torrential rain, Dang 
  established his observation post on heights east of Dong Khe. The fort, which 
  had two howitzers, was held by two companies of the 8e Tirailleurs Marocains 
  (BM/8 RTM) and a local CLSM. At its heart was a ‘Citadel’ of substantial 
  colonial brick buildings on a north–south hog’s-back hill, above the east side 
  of a small town, the Quartier Dubouchet. An outlying post, ‘Montmartre’, 
  was planted on Cam Phay hill (see map on page 51) north of but separate 
  from the Citadel, and the airstrip lay about 1km to the west.
  Dang had 75mm guns emplaced on surrounding heights (he mentions 
  two at Yen Ngua; the French would report five or six within 2km, plus 
  eight 81mm mortars), and these opened up at 0645hrs (French time) on 
  25 May 1950. Space prevents a detailed account of the action; briefly, the 
  inexperienced gunners fired short, soon expending half their ammunition 
  with little visible result, and the infantry were unable to reach the wire. 
  Dong Khe
  16–18 September 1950
  
  47
  Clearly, Dang’s successes in ambush warfare had led him to underestimate 
  the difficulty of assaults on defended positions. Badly shaken, his infantry 
  had to take cover from bombing and strafing by Bell P-63 Kingcobras, but 
  by that evening the garrison’s two howitzers had been virtually silenced and 
  buildings were on fire. Under cover of darkness ‘Montmartre’ was finally 
  taken, but Dang had to wait until the next night before launching the final 
  assault. We should recall that all previous VM attacks on posts had been 
  deliberately planned to take only a single night, so this failure, and being 
  forced to wait out a day on the battlefield under a hostile sky, was a real 
  psychological setback.
  After the ordeal of further air attacks on the afternoon of 26 May, 
  on the night of the 26th/27th assault waves hit the north and north-
  east faces of the Citadel and the positions on the flats, preventing any 
  mutual support. The northern part of the Citadel fell; at about 0200hrs 
  the survivors tried to break out to the south, but only some 50 would 
  reach That Khe. (Remarkably, about the same number from a far southern 
  position managed to hide in woodland until relief arrived.) Giap’s memoir 
  states that the taking of Dong Khe without any possibility of holding 
  it simply encouraged the French to concentrate in fewer, stronger posts 
  along RC 4.
  The valley of Dong Khe, 
  looking south and west, with 
  the surrounding calcaires 
  in the background. The 
  Citadel is on the left, on the 
  hog’s-back hill overlooking 
  the shady streets of the 
  Quartier Dubouchet, with the 
  airstrip on the right; the large 
  black overprinted rectangle 
  indicates the drop zone for 
  parachuted reinforcements 
  or resupply. Below the 
  white overprinting in the left 
  foreground is the overgrown 
  crest of Cam Phay hill, so this 
  shows the field of fire enjoyed 
  by the VM once they had 
  taken that feature. This photo 
  is dated 18 September 1949, 
  well before the attack of May 
  1950 devastated the town. 
  (Private collection, courtesy 
  Indo Éditions)
  
  48
  An advance relief force from 10 TM had set off from That Khe at 1900hrs 
  on 25 May, moving along the crests east of RC 4 (where they had to fight two 
  encounter actions), while a larger truck-borne force of 8 TM was assembled at 
  far-off Lang Son. All but a few VM looters had already left the ruined town by 
  1730hrs on 27 May, when the paratroopers of 3 BCCP were dropped there 
  and quickly reoccupied it. The advance party of LtCol Le Page’s goumiers did 
  not arrive until 1300hrs on 30 May – having taken 4½ days to cover a crow’s-
  flight distance of about 20km – and the main force did not appear until the 
  afternoon of the 31st.
  ‘Second Dong Khe’
  With about 54,000 regulars and 30 battalions now at their disposal in Tonkin, 
  facing 124 French battalions of which only 12 were even nominally mobile, 
  the VM General Staff discussed at length plans for a Bien Gioi (‘border front’) 
  campaign in autumn–winter 1950 to free up access to and from China.
  The first target considered was Lao Cai on the north-western border 
  with Yunnan province, but this was rejected in favour of Cao Bang. In 
  August, Giap took a group of officers to reconnoitre Cao Bang in person, 
  but concluded that it was too strong for a direct assault. (This campaign 
  would see the first real test of the new Chinese-trained and -equipped 
  Div 308, and for reasons of morale it was absolutely imperative that it 
  achieve a significant victory.) On 16 August, at the suggestion of the war-
  hardened Chinese envoy Chen Geng, it was decided to attack – and this 
  time, hold – Dong Khe. A weaker position than Cao Bang, it was ‘the throat 
  through which Cao Bang was fed’. If it fell, the French would be forced 
  to react: either by trying to retake it, or by abandoning the then-cut-off 
  Cao Bang. Either way, their major road movements could be attacked in 
  great strength, exposing them to their heaviest casualties yet. The General 
  Staff committed five main-force regiments plus three main-force battalions, 
  supported by regional units.
  The most dangerous task – the assault itself – would be entrusted to 
  nine battalions of the reinforced independent regular Regts 174 (CO, 
  Dang Van Viet) and 209 (Le Trong Tan). Meanwhile, Div 308’s Regt 36 
  BELOW LEFT
  In mid-August 1950 a historic 
  meeting took place between 
  (left to right) Gen Giap, Ho 
  Chi Minh and Chen Geng, the 
  representative of the Central 
  Committee of the Chinese 
  Communist Party – an old 
  friend of Ho’s from their days 
  at the Whampoa Military 
  Academy in the 1920s, who 
  was sent to advise him (July–
  November 1950) at Ho’s direct 
  request. Chen was renowned 
  for his straight talking and 
  his bantering manner; in July 
  1950 he inspected Div 308 
  under training at Yanshan, 
  and his frank advice was 
  crucial to Ho and Giap during 
  the planning of the autumn 
  1950 ‘border campaign’. 
  During the actual formation 
  of VM divisions in 1950–51 
  Chinese advisors were 
  attached down to company 
  level, but later only to higher 
  echelons. (Private collection, 
  courtesy Indo Éditions)
  BELOW RIGHT
  This VM propaganda photo 
  reportedly shows the colour 
  party and assembled troops 
  of Dang Van Viet’s Regt 174 
  in 1950, around the time of 
  its capture of Dong Khe; see 
  page 58 for note on uniforms. 
  The colour guard carry 
  Thompson SMGs. (Keystone-
  France/Gamma-Keystone via 
  Getty Images)
  
  49
  (Hung Son – with one artillery and three infantry battalions), Regt 88 
  (Thai Dung – one artillery and two infantry battalions) and Regt 102 (Vu 
  Yen – one artillery and two infantry battalions) would await the French 
  reaction immediately south of Dong Khe, and regional Bn 246 further 
  south below That Khe.
  (On 2 September, in great secrecy, the C-in-C Gen Carpentier decided 
  to abandon Cao Bang and the upper RC 4, concentrating troops to the west 
  later that month to retake Thai Nguyen as the western anchor of a new west–
  east defensive front to be constructed north of the Delta. Colonel Constans 
  at ZFNE would be left ignorant of this decision for more than two weeks.)
  The 3 REI’s 2ic LtCol Charton commanded an ‘independent subsector’ 
  from Cao Bang, the garrison of which was built around III/3 REI; II/3 REI 
  was then complete at That Khe, and I/3 REI scattered among posts between 
  there and the Chinese border at Dong Dang. At first Dong Khe was 
  defended by the whole 8 TM, but when that time-expired unit was pulled 
  out on 7–8 September only two companies of II/3 REI replaced it: 5th and 
  6th, commanded by Capt Allioux with half of HQ Co – a total garrison of 
  301, comprising 257 légionnaires, 39 Vietnamese supplétifs (auxiliaries) and 
  five gunners.
  On 16 September, Gen Carpentier issued an order for simultaneous 
  operations to begin on 1 October at the anticipated end of the rains: one 
  to occupy Thai Nguyen, and the other to withdraw from Cao Bang by a 
  ‘collapsing bag’ retreat down RC 4. That same day, Giap would forestall 
  Carpentier’s plans by launching the second attack on Dong Khe.
  Another aerial photo of Dong 
  Khe, this one looking north 
  and east, showing the airstrip 
  in the left foreground and 
  the partly wooded Cam Phay 
  hill left of the pale bulk of 
  the Citadel ridge. This view 
  dates from autumn 1950, 
  after the town had been 
  badly shelled in May and all 
  the trees had been cut down 
  to make fortifications. For 
  the September 1950 battle 
  of ‘Second Dong Khe’ the 
  VM artillery was placed on 
  heights at the top and right of 
  the picture. (Private collection, 
  courtesy Indo Éditions)
  
  50
  Only two very rough sketch-maps have been found, one by 
  Dang Van Viet (in Longeret, et al.) and the other in Bergot, so 
  this attempt does not pretend to be more than an approximate 
  synthesis of the two, collated with aerial photos in Longeret 
  (see Bibliography). The account of the battle in Dang Van Viet’s 
  memoir, and his rudimentary sketch-map, are hard to reconcile 
  with Bergot’s account based on the later recollections of Lt Grue. 
  We follow Dang Van Viet’s and Giap’s timings of most events. 
  Dang’s map uses abbreviations rather than battalion numbers 
  (e.g. ‘d9’ for Bn 249). He shows the unsuccessful attempt from 
  the north-west on the ‘hospital bastion’ on 16/17 September, 
  and the successful attack on 17/18 September, as by Co 316/
  Bn 249, and the occupation of Phia Koa hill to the east as by 
  Co 315/Bn 249. Failed attacks on the Citadel from the north-east 
  on 16/17 September seem to be attributed to ‘CCB/Regt 174’ 
  – the regimental HQ and Services Company – and to Co 671/
  Bn 251. The final assaults from the east on 17/18 September are 
  credited to Cos 671, 673 and 674/Bn 251 plus one company from 
  ‘d5’ – Bn 250? The attacks from the north and finally down the 
  west side of the Citadel on 17/18 September show otherwise 
  unidentified Cos 924 and 925. The planned attack on the Citadel 
  from the west by Regt 209 never took place. Just outside the top 
  right corner of the sketch-map, oriented north-west–south-east, 
  are the Thuong Phi heights, on which most of the VM artillery was 
  emplaced; Dang Van Viet also indicates some guns on Phia Khoa 
  hill after its capture. The airstrip is approximately 750m off the 
  map to the west.
  1 0600hrs, 16 September: The VM artillery is ordered to 
  open fire.
  2 1000hrs, 16 September: Outpost ‘Nguyen’ is taken.
  3 1800–1900hrs, 16 September: Failed attacks on the 
  Quartier Dubouchet (held by 5th Co, II/3 REI), and local 
  counter-attacks.
  4 c.2200hrs (?), 16 September: Failed attack on the 
  ‘hospital bastion’.
  5 c.2200–0400hrs, 16/17 September: Repeated failed 
  attacks on the Citadel, held by 6th Co, II/3 REI plus HQ Co (-), 
  II/3 REI, and local counter-attacks.
  6 c.0400hrs, 17 September: Outpost ‘Montmartre’ is taken.
  7 c.1600hrs, 17 September: Regt 209 penetrates the 
  Quartier Dubouchet.
  8 c.2000–0430hrs, 17/18 September: Repeated attacks on 
  the Citadel from north-west, north and east.
  9 c.2030hrs, 17 September: The ‘hospital bastion’ is taken.
  10 c.0430hrs, 18 September: The Citadel command post is 
  taken; sporadic fighting continues until c.1000hrs.
  Dong Khe, 16–18 September 1950
  Battlefield environment
  Since its fall in May 1950 efforts to refortify Dong Khe 
  had been frustrated by the usual lack of concrete, but the 
  Moroccans had dug and improvised tirelessly. In the Quartier 
  Dubouchet fields of fire were cleared by felling trees; trenches 
  were dug and ground-level bunkers constructed, using tree-
  trunks and the beams and rubble of shelled houses to protect 
  dug-in ‘blockhouses’. (When he later inspected the battlefield, 
  Gen Giap was impressed by the ‘grouped trench positions in 
  mutual support – much better than linear positions, which 
  always had weak points’.) This low-lying area was held by 
  Capt Vollaire’s 5th Co; a covered trench was constructed up 
  the slope to link with the Citadel, which housed Capt Allioux’s 
  command post and Capt Jaugeon’s 6th Company. Here the 
  damaged brick buildings and cellars had also been refortified 
  using rubble, timbers and logs. New trenches were dug in 
  its southern sector, with bunkers and shelters in the western 
  and southern slopes. A cleared glacis was created on the 
  northern face, and the whole hilltop was surrounded by a 
  deep, snaking perimeter trench studded with fortified fire 
  positions. Apart from their company weapons the garrison had 
  at least one PIAT and a .50-calibre HMG; there was a single 
  105mm howitzer in a gunpit on the Citadel, where – oddly – a 
  US 57mm/6pdr anti-tank gun in a blockhouse also commanded 
  the approaches (the poverty-stricken CEFEO had to make do 
  with what it happened to have). Outposts were planted on 
  ‘Montmartre/Piton Nord’ on Cam Phay hill, ‘Piton Nguyen’ on 
  the Phia Khoa heights to the east, and at Cau Ang, the lonely 
  ‘Piton SW’ far off at the southern end of the airstrip (not 
  included on map). (Bergot does not state who held these, but 
  presumably it was the local auxiliary platoon.)
  
  51
  A
  B
  C
  D
  M
  L
  K
  J
  I
  H
  G
  F
  E
  Posts on RC 4, September 1950
  A. III/3 REI; 3 TM (from 
  21 September); four CLSMs
  B. Bn HQ (-), 5th and 6th Cos, 
  II/3 REI; platoon, CLSM
  C. Bn HQ (-), 7th and 8th Cos, 
  II/3 REI; 4th Co, I/3 REI 
  (three posts)
  D. 3rd Co, I/3 REI (three posts)
  E. 
  1st Co, I/3 REI (two posts)
  F. 
  2nd Co, I/3 REI (three 
  posts); two CLSMs; 
  1 TM (mobile)
  G. Bn HQ (-), I/3 REI; two 
  CLSMs (ﬁve posts)
  H. Regt HQ, 3 REI; Bn HQ, 
  I/21 RIC; two CLSMs; 
  Regt HQ, GTM (mobile); 
  5th Sqn, 1 RCC (mobile); 
  company montagnard 
  paratroops (mobile)
  I. 
  Company, I/21 RIC; 
  BM/8 RTM (mobile)
  J. 
  Company, I/21 RIC
  K. 3 TM (until 16 September – 
  mobile)
  L. 
  Company, I/21 RIC; 
  11 TM (mobile)
  M. III/21 RIC; 3rd Sqn, 
  1 RCC (mobile)
  Also available were two 
  battalions of the airborne 
  reserve: 1 BEP and 3 BCCP.
  CAO BANG
  Dong Khe
  That Khe
  Song Ky Cong
  KM 45
  KM 41 E
  Ban Be
  Lung Vai
  Bo Cung
  Na Cham
  ‘Ananas’
  KM 41 W
  Pont Bascou
  Dong Dang
  LANG SON
  Loc Binh
  Lang Giai
  Ban Chu
  Dinh Lap
  C H I N A
  An Chau
  RC 4
  RC 1
  RC 13
  LUNG PHAI PASS
  N
  0
  20 miles
  0
  20km
  Bang Giang 
  Ky Cong
  LLL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LL
  LLL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LLLL
  LLLLLL
  LLLLLLL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LL
  LLLL
  LLLL
  LLL
  LL
  LL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LL
  LLL
  LLL
  LLL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LL
  LL
  LL
  L
  LLLLLL
  LLLLL
  LLL
  LL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LL
  LL
  LL
  LL
  LLLL
  LLLLLLL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  II
  251
  174
  II
  250
  174
  II
  166
  209
  II
  154
  209
  II
  130
  209
  II
  249
  174
  III
  174
  I
  925
  174
  I
  316
  174
  I
  671
  174
  I
  673
  174
  I
  ?
  174
  I
  674
  174
  I
  315
  174
  I
  924
  174
  I
  CCB
  174
  1
  8
  2
  8
  7
  3
  7
  4
  9
  6
  8
  5
  10
  to Phuc Hoa
  N
  0
  250yd approx.
  0
  250m approx.
  to airstrip
  to Cao Bang
  Ky Cau
  Yen Ngua
  Cam Phay
  Phia Khoa
  to outpost Po Dinh
  & That Khe
  RC 37
  Approximate French positions
  Approximate French trenches
  Approximate barbed-wire fences
  RC 4
  RC 4
  Hospital
  CITADEL
  NGUYEN
  MONTMARTRE
  QUARTIER
  DUBOUCHET
  
  52
  INTO COMBAT
  On 10 September, Ho Chi Minh and Chen Geng had met at the HQ of 
  the theatre commander, the VM chief-of-staff Gen Hoan Van Thai. Dang 
  Van Viet states that the General Staff reinforced his Regt 174 with regular 
  Independent Bn 426, and Bn 11 withdrawn from Div 308. He would attack 
  from the north and north-east, supported by an artillery battalion with six 
  75mm guns, four 57mm DKZ recoilless rifles provided by Div 308, plus 
  four 75mm guns emplaced to the east (it is unclear if the latter were still 
  integral to his regiment, or attached – see page 78). From the south-west and 
  south, Le Trong Tan’s Regt 209 would attack with the support of the six-gun 
  Artillery Bn 178. Total strength was about 10,000 men and 16–20 guns – 
  the largest numbers yet committed to an attack during the war. Meanwhile 
  Div 308, with nearly the same strength again, would remain further south to 
  await any French response.
  Dang’s scouts reported visible changes since May, including the felling of 
  trees in the Quartier Dubouchet, the remodelling of the slope at the north 
  of the Citadel, and a new and strongly wired outer perimeter. (Apparently, 
  nobody took the time to gather details of the new bunkers on the flats by 
  patient observation – normally VM standard procedure.) It is striking that 
  Dang allocated widely separated objectives to his Bn 249 (CO, Le Hoan): 
  Phia Khoa on the east; Cam Phay on the north, and then the northern face of 
  the Citadel; Yen Ngua to the west of Cam Phay, and the ‘hospital bastion’ at 
  the north-west corner of the defended flats. He entrusted the assault from the 
  east to Bn 251 (Nguyen Huu An), and held Bn 250 (Khai Tam) in reserve, 
  along with the attached Bn 11 and Bn 426 to guard against any interference 
  from north of Dong Khe.
  At 0600hrs on 16 September, Dang gave the order to open the artillery 
  barrage. All morning the guns fired deliberate ranging shots at a rate of a 
  couple of rounds per minute, but at noon the whole artillery opened up, 
  joined by mortars. The impact was considerable; French casualties soon 
  included the 105mm gun crew, and Capt Vollaire, who had to turn command 
  of 5th Co over to Lt Héry. Captain Allioux naturally radioed Cao Bang when 
  the attack began. Reports differ over whether the morning fog kept the P-63 
  Kingcobras from Hanoi away on the first day, but Maj Forget at Cao Bang 
  wrote ten days later that fighters had rotated over the valley between 0930hrs 
  and 1800hrs. If so, they did not much hamper the intense artillery and mortar 
  barrage; this lasted for three hours, killing and wounding dozens of men, 
  cutting field telephone cables and starting fires.
  ‘French time’ seems to have been an hour ahead of ‘VM time’, but the 
  two sides’ accounts still vary considerably over the timing of certain incidents. 
  For instance, Dang claims that his troops took the eastern Phia Khoa outpost 
  at 1000hrs on 16 September; Bergot quotes Lt Grue to the effect that its 
  loss was not reported to Capt Allioux until 2200hrs that night. It is clear, 
  however, that the outposts all came under serious pressure during the day; 
  even if they had no communications, the Citadel garrison could see infantry 
  massing around them. Those attacking Phia Khoa were engaged by Lt Grue 
  with the .50-calibre HMG, and he later fired solid armour-piercing shot (all 
  he had) from the 57mm anti-tank gun at those threatening ‘Montmartre’. 
  
  53
  Importantly, accounts also disagree as to when Bn 249 took ‘Montmartre’: 
  Bergot says 2000hrs, with both ‘Piton Nguyen’ on Phia Khoa and ‘Piton SW’ 
  beyond the airstrip falling silent at 2200hrs, but Dang writes (convincingly) 
  that he did not take ‘Montmartre’ until 0400hrs on 17 September.
  Nevertheless, we do know that on the main perimeters the légionnaires 
  halted the VM night assaults, exacting a bloody price for their enemies’ brave 
  but unimaginative tactics. These were based on exploiting breaches made by 
  the artillery in the outer defences; small parties armed with satchel charges 
  and automatic weapons infiltrated, trying to silence individual ‘blockhouses’ 
  and clear a path for massed charges. On the north face of the Citadel, Adj 
  Chief Oelschlagel’s platoon of 6th Co smashed repeated assaults up the 
  cleared glacis. At about 2200hrs he reported infiltrations by small parties of 
  Viet Minh, each with an LMG guarded by submachine-gunners. From the 
  central sector Lt Grue took men up in support, and from the northern edge 
  of the Quartier Dubouchet Lt Héry also brought mortar and PIAT fire down 
  on the glacis.
  After another hour of close fighting, Oelschlagel reported that he would 
  have to fall back; showers of grenades and thrown charges had destroyed his 
  men’s overhead cover. He coordinated timing with Lt Grue; as soon as the 
  latter saw about 15 légionnaires helping each other across the open ground 
  towards him he opened fire on targets behind them with the 57mm anti-
  tank gun, and he kept firing as Oelschlagel’s exhausted men found themselves 
  loopholes in the central positions.
  At about 0500hrs (French time) on 17 September the warrant officer 
  reported that the attackers had halted, apparently content to hold their 
  captured ground and throw grenades. Oelschlagel then led his men (who had 
  been fighting non-stop for nine hours) in a counter-charge. This recaptured 
  their lost trenches, and brought in an LMG, half a dozen SMGs, 20 rifles – 
  and Légionnaire Gondry, who had hidden when the northern defences were 
  Looking north and east at 
  the dominating Cam Phay 
  hill from the northern edge 
  of the Quartier Dubouchet 
  flats, where French troops 
  are digging in and building 
  defensive works using 
  rubble from the shelled 
  houses. The squared roof of 
  the ‘Montmartre’ outpost 
  can be seen on the centre 
  skyline. Once the Viet Minh 
  captured the outpost and 
  installed heavy weapons, the 
  flats below became more or 
  less indefensible. (Private 
  collection, courtesy Indo 
  Éditions)
  
  54
  abandoned. Dang states that after three failed and very costly assaults on 
  the Citadel his regiment could make no further progress: ‘our second wave 
  of attacks ended with the capture of Cam Phay [‘Montmartre’] at 0400 on 
  17 September’.
  Meanwhile, on the southern perimeter the planned attack by Regt 209, 
  intended to divide the defenders’ fire, had failed. One of its battalions had got 
  lost and failed to reach the jumping-off line, delaying the attack until 1800hrs 
  – far too late to benefit from the artillery barrage. During the following hour 
  it did occupy an outlying objective at Po Dinh, but its attempts to penetrate 
  the Quartier Dubouchet were then fiercely resisted. According to Dang, 
  the new dug-in positions were only detected when they opened mutually 
  supporting fire, and mortaring on pre-registered approaches caused many VM 
  casualties. Some of 5th Co then left their trenches to mount counter-charges 
  which threw the attackers back.
  During the night the theatre commander gave stern orders to Dang Van 
  Viet and Le Trong Tan that they must dig in and hold the positions they had 
  taken, preparing to resume their assaults, at whatever cost, on the night of 
  17/18 September.
  At Cao Bang, 30km to the north (but 45km by road), III/3 REI had been 
  listening to the gunfire all day. Although II/3 REI to the south then had 
  7th Co, 8th Co and the other half of HQ Co in garrison at That Khe, there 
  was (once again) no hope of a timely relief column; the theoretically available 
  ‘intervention’ units were strung out over 60km. ZOT at Hanoi gave the order 
  to assemble LtCol Le Page’s regiment-size Group of Moroccan Tabors (GTM) 
  down at Lang Son, but heavy road sabotage over continuous stretches of 
  3–4km was reported from as far south as Na Cham. A token gesture saw 
  three platoons of Tho and Nung montagnard paratroopers dropped at That 
  Khe that afternoon. Major Forget at Cao Bang would write that it was on the 
  morning of 17 September that a Morane-Saulnier spotter aircraft picked up a 
  faint, garbled message from Capt Allioux that included the phrase ‘40 killed, 
  80 wounded’ – i.e., 40 per cent casualties suffered already.
  The artillery fire resumed at 
  1000hrs on 17 September. While 
  Regt 174 prepared for the coming 
  night’s effort, and traded fire from 
  ‘Montmartre’ with the Citadel’s 
  heavy weapons, it seems that 
  Regt 209 resumed its attempts 
  in the Quartier Dubouchet 
  by daylight. Giap states that it 
  reached the central Phu Thien and 
  Nha Cu area by 1600hrs, before 
  being stopped by mortar fire. It 
  was decided that Lt Héry’s 5th Co 
  would join 6th Co on the Citadel, 
  via the covered trench, but this was 
  done in stages. P-63 Kingcobras 
  appeared in late morning as soon 
  A log-protected improvised 
  ‘blockhouse’ on the Citadel, 
  photographed after the 
  capture of Dong Khe. The 
  apparently dead man leant 
  against the barricade of 
  ammunition crates (centre) 
  gives scale. (Private 
  collection, courtesy Indo 
  Éditions)
  
  55
  as the weather allowed; they forced the VM artillery to cease fire, hitting 
  targets on Cam Phay and along the road from the north, but lost one aircraft 
  to .50-calibre anti-aircraft fire. Three AAC.1s dropped supplies; although 
  most were badly scattered in the soon-to-be abandoned Quartier Dubouchet, 
  Sgt Mahric’s volunteers managed to bring some in, including badly needed 
  high-explosive rounds for the 57mm anti-tank gun.
  When the remaining 60-odd men of 5th Co reached the Citadel, Capt 
  Allioux had about 150 left on their feet; Lt Héry’s légionnaires took over the 
  northern defences from the remains of Adj Chief Oelschlagel’s platoon. From 
  about 1700hrs there was a lull in the firing, and thick mist rose to obscure the 
  top of ‘Montmartre’, cloaking the VM’s emplacement of heavy weapons. The 
  theatre commander had approved a plan for Regt 209 to hit the Citadel from the 
  west while Regt 174 repeated its efforts against the north and east faces. While 
  the Citadel was the vital objective, one element from Regt 174 was still to push 
  southward from Yen Ngua into the north of the Quartier Dubouchet, aiming 
  to link up with Regt 209 for a final attack on the west of the Citadel. (Giap’s 
  memoir credits Regt 174 with taking the ‘hospital bastion’ at about 2030hrs, 
  and then ‘Blockhouse 7’, where Dang reports a link-up with Regt 209. Neither 
  source makes any mention of the fact that 5th Co had supposedly abandoned 
  this sector before the night attacks began – which leaves us wondering who was 
  actually resisting the VM on the flats that evening.)
  The bombardment resumed at 1830hrs on 17 September, resulting in 
  another 20-odd killed and 35 wounded before the infantry assaults began. At 
  2000hrs Lt Héry on the northern face reported VM units approaching from 
  both north-west and north-east, and these struck the defences with sacrificial 
  determination. The légionnaires were pinned down by supporting fires from 
  ‘Montmartre’, while VM squads led by two men with explosives and one with 
  an automatic weapon forced breaches for their comrades, who brought 60mm 
  mortars into action at short range. The defenders were soon down to perhaps 
  50 effectives, and infantry weapons were now being fired directly into their 
  strongpoints.
  This fuzzy but interesting 
  snapshot shows Dang Van 
  Viet (second from right), CO 
  of Regt 174, posing with 
  other cadres by the wreckage 
  of the Bell P-63 Kingcobra 
  shot down over Dong Khe 
  on 17 September 1950 – at 
  this date, an unusual event. 
  The dark-complexioned Dang 
  wears a small civilian-made 
  pith helmet adorned with the 
  VM badge, what seems to 
  be a US M1943 field jacket 
  over khakis, and French 
  boots. Though not visible 
  here, his personal weapon 
  was a Canadian-made 9mm 
  Browning pistol recovered 
  from a French paratrooper 
  in 1947. (Private collection, 
  courtesy Indo Éditions)
  
  56
  
  57
  
  58
  Last stand at Dong Khe
  Viet Minh view: This imagined scene shows a final assault 
  from the east by men from VM Bn 251/Regt 174 on an 
  improvised ‘blockhouse’ somewhere within the Citadel, on the 
  early morning of 18 September. The brick buildings had been 
  hastily fortified with logs, beams and rubble from wrecked 
  houses, earth-filled crates, etc. Although some VM mortars 
  were still firing, careless of casualties to their own infantry, the 
  buildings typically had to be stormed in the face of machine-gun 
  fire. Assault parties were led by men with satchel charges, 
  covered by those with automatic weapons; note the corporal 
  (right) armed with a Thompson SMG. Regt 174 had not yet been 
  re-equipped by the Chinese PLA; they wear woven helmets, pith 
  helmets, or Japanese steel helmets, with a motley mixture of 
  clothing. Personal kit is equally varied, and is mostly covered by 
  net camouflage capes thickly woven with foliage or lengths cut 
  from camouflaged parachute canopies. Their weapons include 
  British and US small arms as well as ex-Chinese Nationalist 
  ‘Zhong Zheng’ Mauser rifles and stick grenades.
  French view: The 7.5mm M1931A Reibel machine gun 
  accepted the 150-round drum magazine on either side, and 
  was provided with a skeleton shoulder stock and a tripod 
  mount; here it is propped on 105mm shell crates. In 1950 
  the légionnaires of 3 REI wore US M1942 HBT fatigues with 
  British 37 Pattern web gear, plus some French items such as 
  M35 canteens. The local supplétifs (auxiliaries) had M1931 
  sun helmets, sand-khaki shirts and shorts, and French M1916 
  leather equipment. The personal weapon was the 7.5mm 
  MAS36 rifle. Ironwood logs gave good protection against small 
  arms, but the overhead cover is vulnerable to mortars, and 
  when an attacker gets close enough to throw a satchel charge 
  into the embrasure the defenders are doomed. Any who are 
  taken prisoner with significant wounds are unlikely to survive 
  captivity, and few of the local auxiliaries – contemptuously 
  termed ‘puppets’ by the VM – were ever taken alive.
  
  59
  When Lt Héry was finally forced to pull back from the north face under 
  cover of a shower of grenades, attackers from the east tried to cut him off, but 
  were blown away by 57mm high-explosive shells at point-blank range. The 
  wounded Héry and about 30 men joined Adj Chief Oelschlagel in the central 
  redoubt. The enemy got close enough to fire into Lt Grue’s blockhouse; soon 
  he had only five men left, of whom two were constantly scuttling in and out 
  of cover to bring up 57mm ammunition from a bunker 50m away. Grue 
  recalled that VM heavy weapons were still firing on the summit, careless of 
  causing ‘own casualties’. When attackers reached his ammunition bunker he 
  fired his last rounds into it, causing a heavy explosion. At 0430hrs (French 
  time) on 18 September the attackers reached Capt Allioux’s command post. 
  Remarkably, Capt Jaugeon and 30 other survivors managed to make their 
  way off the hill to the south, and evaded VM forces all the way to That Khe. 
  At 1000hrs (VM time) Dang Van Viet could finally report that the whole of 
  Dong Khe was in his hands.
  VM propaganda poster 
  showing Japanese 75mm 
  M1908 (Meiji 41) mountain 
  guns. The slogan reads: 
  ‘After Dong Khe, the artillery 
  promises [to lay] new victories 
  before the flag of honour.’ 
  (Private collection, courtesy 
  Indo Éditions)
  This photo supposedly shows 
  Ho Chi Minh inspecting 
  victorious regional troops 
  after the taking of Dong 
  Khe in September 1950; 
  note the typically dramatic 
  backdrop of overgrown 
  calcaires. While Ho no doubt 
  congratulated them, his 
  Chinese advisor Chen Geng 
  was less impressed: ‘Our 
  [VM] army needs to improve 
  its structures, its means of 
  liaison and its discipline. 
  As it currently stands, the 
  Vietnamese army should avoid 
  a direct confrontation with 
  the French forces, contenting 
  itself with attacking some 
  small defensive positions in 
  order to gain more experience 
  of combat and to reinforce 
  their confidence.’ Within a 
  month, Giap’s battalions had 
  achieved a stunning victory on 
  RC 4, but in a context that did 
  not expose the vulnerabilities 
  Chen Geng had identified at 
  Dong Khe. The real price for 
  inexperience would be paid 
  later, in the three battles on 
  the borders of the Delta in 
  January–June 1951. (AFP/
  Getty Images)
  
  60
  Two days later Dang’s troops would be congratulated by Ho Chi Minh, 
  but the judgement of the Chinese veteran Chen Geng would be scathing:
  The battle was a victory in the sense that it threw the French into a panic, and they 
  did not try to retake Dong Khe. But from a tactical viewpoint it was a disaster. The 
  Viet Minh had 10,000 men ... against only 267 French soldiers [sic], but took two 
  days and three nights to beat them [sic – this presumably includes the preparations 
  on 14/15 September]. What’s more, the Viet Minh lost 500 killed, and more than 
  20 French soldiers managed to escape …1
  Chen Geng picked out for criticism the lack of coordination between 
  Regts 174 and 209, a failure of nerve by certain unit commanders, poor 
  liaison with higher command and inaccurate progress reports, and a failure 
  to follow the plan for attacks on the Citadel from both flanks on the second 
  night. Giap himself criticized the prior failure to spot the new bunkers, and 
  bad coordination between the two regiments. He admits that casualties were 
  ‘heavier than expected’; we may estimate from Chen Geng’s franker admission 
  that total casualties may have been as high as 2,000. Dang Van Viet admits 
  failures of coordination, including between artillery and infantry.
  The aftermath
  From 20 September, Giap was anticipating both a paratroop drop to retake 
  Dong Khe, and a push up RC 4 by LtCol Le Page’s Group ‘Bayard’, now at 
  That Khe with three TMs and 1 BEP. When Le Page remained immobile 
  for lack of orders, on 25 September Giap was forced to disperse his hungry 
  Div 308 widely to the east to gather rice. On 30 September, Le Page was 
  ordered to occupy the important points between That Khe and Dong Khe. 
  1 Quoted by Longeret from Xu Beilan & Zheng Peifei (1988), Biography of General Chen Geng (Beijing).
  Dang Van Viet
  Born in 1920 in Nghe An province into a distinguished 
  ‘mandarin’ family, Dang Van Viet was educated partly 
  in France. He joined the Vietnamese People’s Army in 
  1945, and soon saw action on RC 9 against French forces 
  reoccupying Annam from Laos, and on RC 7 against 
  Meo tribesmen. A General Staff officer by October 
  1947, he accompanied Gen Giap to the RC 4 front, 
  where he was successively attached to regular Bn 23, 
  and Bn 374 of regional Regt 11, subsequently becoming 
  regimental commander of the latter. In June 1948 this 
  became Regt 28, and in August 1949 it was upgraded 
  to regular Regt 174, commanded by LtCol Dang Van 
  Viet. He was successful in several important ambush 
  battles along RC 4 during 1948–49. After capturing Dong 
  Khe in September 1950, his regiment was the first into 
  abandoned Lang Son in October. In 1951 Regt 174 was 
  incorporated into Div 316, with which it saw action in 
  the northern Delta (Mao Khe, March 1951), in the Hoa 
  Binh campaign of winter 1951/52, and at Na San in 
  December 1952.
  In December 1953, Dang Van Viet’s wealthy family 
  fell victim to Communist Party zealots; his father was 
  dismissed from a ministerial post, and he himself was 
  demoted and relegated to training duties. Regaining his 
  rank in 1958, after demobilization in 1960 he was given 
  a civil government post. His political rehabilitation was 
  confirmed in 1999, when Gen Giap provided a preface 
  for his memoir. It is unlikely that he is still alive – at the 
  time of writing he would be 98 years old.
  
  61
  Late on 1 October, a shocked Gen Giap learned that ‘Bayard’ had reached the 
  hills south of Dong Khe, so was already beyond Div 308’s intended ambush 
  sites. While Regt 209 held Dong Khe, Div 308’s dispersed battalions were 
  ordered to rush individual ‘flying companies’ back to RC 4.
  On 2 October, Le Page’s attempt to recapture Dong Khe failed. That 
  afternoon he was told – for the first time – that his mission was to meet 
  LtCol Charton’s garrison withdrawing from Cao Bang. (This was typical of 
  the late and unrealistic orders that doomed the whole operation.) Although 
  ad hoc units from Div 308 were already attacking from the east, Le Page had 
  to divide ‘Bayard’ and take two battalions north-west to rendezvous with 
  Charton. Early on 3 October, Charton’s three battalions left Cao Bang via 
  RC 4; on the 4th, he was ordered to abandon the road and take to a vestigial 
  track through the forested hills west of RC 4.
  Thereafter Charton, Le Page and the Viet Minh struggled through virtually 
  unmapped and trackless terrain, fighting a series of encounter actions in dense 
  country. The VM units showed skill and determination – and not only when 
  they had numbers on their side. Piecemeal, they located and tenaciously 
  attacked both of the vulnerable, strung-out French columns, which only 
  managed to make mutual radio 
  contact on 5 October. The following 
  day, at Coc Xa, three VM battalions 
  (Bn 11/Regt 141, Bn 154/Regt 209, 
  and Bn 89/Regt 36 from Div 308) 
  inflicted heavy casualties on Le Page’s 
  force. By the time they finally linked 
  up on 7 October at Hill 477, both 
  columns had already been cut to 
  pieces. Encircled by some 15 VM 
  battalions, they fought desperate 
  last stands before being ordered to 
  abandon their wounded and try to 
  evade in small parties.
  From about 1,500 and 3,500 
  men in the Charton and Le Page 
  A photo used on a VM 
  propaganda poster, of French 
  prisoners taken during the 
  ‘disaster of RC 4’ in October 
  1950; less than half would 
  survive captivity. The 
  abandonment of the whole 
  Chinese frontier region 
  shocked France and the 
  CEFEO, but the new C-in-C 
  Gen de Lattre had largely 
  rebuilt morale by mid-1951. 
  (Keystone-France/Gamma-
  Keystone via Getty Images)
  ‘Partisans’ in the Cao Bang 
  area pose with their French 
  NCO (right). Often recruited 
  from montagnards, the CLSMs 
  are usually unjustly ignored 
  in French accounts. During 
  the retreat from Cao Bang 
  the very last French counter-
  attack at Hill 477 on 7 October 
  was made by 136th CLSM 
  from Capt Tissier’s nominal 
  1st Bn/Indochinese 
  Formations; this battalion 
  was among those annihilated. 
  (Private collection, courtesy 
  Indo Éditions)
  
  62
  columns respectively, only some 660 ever reached That Khe; that post was 
  abandoned on 10/11 October, and other garrisons also fled south if they got 
  the chance. Of the rearguard provided by elements of 3 BCCP and 1 BEP, 
  dropped at That Khe on 8 October, only 14 men out of 400 would reach 
  safety. The total loss from 7,409 French troops engaged was 5,987 killed 
  and missing. In addition to the half of II/3 REI lost at Dong Khe, two other 
  Legion units were among the 8½ battalions wiped out: III/3 REI lost 603 
  from 635 men, and 1 BEP lost 614 from 646.
  At Lang Son, Col Constans (ZFNE) had only one and two half-battalions 
  plus two depleted squadrons remaining, and judged it impossible to hold the 
  town without heavy reinforcement. His request to Gens Alessandri (ZOT, 
  Hanoi) and Carpentier (C-in-C, Saigon) for permission to abandon Lang Son 
  was approved on 11 October – all echelons of command greatly overestimated 
  the VM’s immediate ability to exploit their victory.2 Giap writes that VM 
  medics had treated 1,200 wounded, which implies that he had also lost about 
  400 killed, and the campaign had been costly in ammunition and food. This 
  material investment would soon reap dividends, however.
  Constans planned to abandon the town starting on 16 October, but from 
  the 12th convoys and airlifts evacuated equipment, wounded and survivors 
  of RC 4, rear personnel, and some 5,000 civilians. The timetable was far too 
  rushed to carry off the major military stores, and Constans refused to allow 
  demolitions in advance; engineers simply spread inflammable materials in the 
  arsenals and warehouses, which were intended to be set ablaze by air strikes after 
  the last troops had left. It is undeniable that during the hurried preparations a 
  number of staff officers shamefully failed in their duty. During 18–20 October 
  the last troops withdrew successfully, if in some disorder. Fighter-bomber sorties 
  flown between 18 and 27 October achieved very little in the way of destruction. 
  Including the stores abandoned at Lang Son, the CEFEO reckoned the weapons 
  lost during the two-month ‘battle of RC 4’ at 8,222 rifles, 380 LMGs, 160 
  machine guns, 112 mortars, 13 artillery pieces and perhaps 1,300 tons of 
  munitions; varied figures are quoted by other sources, but the recovered booty 
  was clearly enough to arm an entire VM division. (Giap claims to have captured 
  1,500 tons of equipment and 2,000 tons of supplies, including 10,000 artillery 
  shells and 150 tons of explosives.)
  Since Dong Khe, Dang Van Viet’s weakened Regt 174 had been ordered 
  back and forth at short notice during Giap’s day-by-day responses to events. 
  Dang was at Dong Dang on the frontier on 17 October when he was ordered 
  to force-march to Lang Son; his units outran their supply porters, but picked 
  up abandoned rations on the road. Dang’s was the first regiment into Lang 
  Son, where the riches abandoned by the French prompted him to think back 
  in astonishment to ‘the days when we had to share out cartridges for our 
  carbines and LMGs’.
  2 The present author’s copy of Dang Van Viet’s memoir (see Bibliography) was previously owned by LtCol 
  Roger David, who commanded a company of I/23 RIC at Lang Son, and later 1st Laotian Commando. His 
  marginal annotations are robust (e.g., one officer mentioned is dismissed as a ‘pusillanimous coward’). He calls 
  Col Constans ‘cowardly’ and ‘a pretentious incompetent’, but in all justice the performance of the colonel’s 
  commanding generals must surely count in extenuation.
  
  63
  BACKGROUND TO BATTLE
  After Giap’s sobering defeats at the hands of Gen de Lattre’s GMs and air 
  support in January–June 1951 (see page 13), the campaign season autumn 
  1951–spring 1952 saw the failure of both VM and French attempts to open 
  new fronts that might favour their strengths. In early October 1951, Giap 
  sent a division south-west into the hills between the Red and Black rivers, but 
  his objective, Nghia Lo, was saved by French paratroopers, and his retreat was 
  Na San
  23 November–2 December 1952
  The increasing provision by 
  the United States of Douglas 
  C-47 ‘Dakota’ transports from 
  1950 enabled the CEFEO to 
  respond to Giap’s opening 
  of new fronts in 1952–53 
  by installing ‘air-ground 
  bases’ in his path, complete 
  with artillery and vehicles. 
  Starting on 11 October 1952, 
  building the base at Na San 
  in the Thai Highlands south-
  west of the Black River was 
  a huge logistic task, but it 
  was achieved, and the ‘air 
  bridge’ was maintained 
  successfully for ten months. 
  This typical scene was in 
  fact photographed at another 
  ‘base aéroterrestre’, Luang 
  Prabang in Laos, in February 
  1954. (AFP/Getty Images)
  
  64
  harassed by the French Air Force’s new ‘B-26’ (actually, Douglas A-26 Invader) 
  bombers. For his part, Gen de Lattre, now dying of cancer, bequeathed to Gen 
  Salan in Tonkin an ambitious operation to recapture Hoa Binh, about 40km 
  south-west of the Delta defences. In mid-November paratroopers retook the 
  town and a garrison was installed, linked to Hanoi by RC 6 and a loop of the 
  Black River. This was a scenario that Giap understood; he patiently wove a 
  Several of the units that 
  would defend Na San had 
  first to make an exhausting 
  retreat there, pursued by the 
  Viet Minh. (Private collection, 
  courtesy Indo Éditions)
  
  65
  noose around Hoa Binh and virtually cut it off, while sending other troops 
  to infiltrate the Delta. In February Salan was obliged to withdraw from Hoa 
  Binh, in a lengthy running battle.
  After the 1952 monsoon Giap looked further south-west, towards the Thai 
  Highlands around the middle Black River, some 250km straight-line distance 
  from the Viet Bac. There, small French posts were widely dispersed among 
  a basically friendly Thai montagnard population. If the VM could march an 
  army into these forested hills, which lacked usable roads for the French GMs, 
  Giap could expand the VM’s political network and regional troops, while 
  also threatening the border with weakly defended Laos. (Intriguingly, Giap 
  writes that he did not inform the Chinese advisory mission of this plan in 
  advance, as ‘they were not yet familiar with the Vietnamese battlefield, and 
  might consider it an unwise manoeuvre’.)
  In September 1952, by means of concealed movement supported by 
  brilliant logistics, Giap concentrated more than 30,000 men (Divs 308, 312 
  & 316, plus elements from Div 351 with 75mm RCLs and his first 120mm 
  heavy mortars) on the upper Red River around Yen Bai, and crossed without 
  alerting the French to the scale of the threat. In mid-October he pushed 
  three separate columns southwards; French posts were taken or abandoned, 
  and the survivors and covering parachute and infantry units conducted an 
  exhausting 65km fighting retreat through the hills to crossings on the Black 
  River. Giap did not let himself be distracted by Salan’s narrow and inevitably 
  short-lived French thrust north-west out of the Delta to threaten his base areas 
  (Operation Lorraine), but he was delayed by the difficulty of gathering rice 
  and porters in the Thai Highlands. This gave the French just enough time to 
  plant an airlifted defended camp in his path, at Na San.
  The sites for the inner 
  chain of strongpoints could 
  be cleared of scrub and 
  small trees fairly easily, 
  but some of the outer hills 
  were heavily wooded. The 
  infantry themselves had to 
  fell trees and clear fields of 
  fire with hand tools before 
  they could even dig in, 
  since the Engineers were 
  needed for specialist tasks 
  around the airstrip. In all 
  the strongpoints, however, 
  there was too little time 
  for thorough identification 
  and plotting of the enemy’s 
  probable approach routes, 
  which were hidden by trees, 
  undergrowth and dead 
  ground. By late November 
  1952 it was obvious that 
  the Viet Minh had closed in 
  around the location and were 
  infiltrating reconnaissance 
  patrols. (Private collection, 
  courtesy Indo Éditions)
  
  66
  1 c.2015/2030hrs, 23 November: The first VM attack, 
  during which Lt Durand is killed; after penetrating both 
  west and east trenches, the VM attackers are expelled 
  with difficulty, and at a cost of at least 30 per cent French 
  casualties, by c.2130 hrs. VM mortar fire on southern sector 
  from c.2045hrs prompts Capt Letestu to request supporting 
  fires, bur only mortars can respond. VM infiltration 
  continues.
  2 c.2230hrs, 23 November: Reinforcement by 
  5th Co/3 BPC, from dug-in position of paratroop reserves 
  beside airstrip in centre of camp.
  3 c.2230hrs, 23 November: A second VM attack 
  penetrates the interior of the strongpoint, but is expelled 
  by remaining légionnaires and Colonial paratroopers during 
  perhaps an hour’s fighting.
  4 c.0030hrs, 24 November: The final VM attack, to cover 
  removal of casualties and weapons, is not pressed home.
  The defence of PA 8, 23/24 November 1952
  Battlefield environment
  The concept of the base aéroterrestre (‘air-ground base’) owed 
  something to Maj-Gen Orde Wingate’s plan for his second Chindit 
  operation in Burma in 1944. The idea was to exploit growing French 
  strength in the air to fly troops, artillery, equipment and stores into 
  a suitable location in the wilderness (les grandes vides, ‘the big 
  empties’) in which Giap was now manoeuvring his divisions, and 
  to construct a blocking position strong enough to win a defensive 
  victory with the help of tactical air power. Na San offered a 
  ‘Dakotable’ airstrip 40 minutes’ flying time from Hanoi, in a valley 
  surrounded by protective hill features. Designated ‘Operational 
  Group Middle Black River’ (GOMRN), the force committed was 
  commanded by Col Jean Gilles, a battle-wise paratrooper. It would 
  eventually grow to 12 infantry battalions (three of Colonial and 
  Legion paratroopers, three North African, three Thai (Vietnamese 
  montagnards), two Legion infantry, one Vietnamese), plus three 
  105mm batteries, and a Legion mortar company (CMLE) with six 
  81mm and four 120mm tubes. Its installation from 11 October 
  1952, and its resupply up to the withdrawal of the attacking VM 
  before 11 December, required the airlifting of 1,980 tons of engineer 
  materials, Dodge trucks, jeeps, artillery, and stores of all kinds, plus 
  most of the garrison and 500 PIM labourers, with a Douglas C-47 
  Dakota landing every 10 minutes (for at least six hours every day, 
  after the morning fog lifted).
  The plan was to construct a continuous inner perimeter 
  astride a stretch of dirt road (RP 41), to surround and protect 
  the 1,100m airstrip, HQ, artillery and mortar positions, stores, 
  hospital, and positions from which a paratroop brigade could 
  mount immediate counter-attacks. This inner perimeter, an 
  oval roughly 1,500m east–west by 1,000m north–south, 
  would consist of ten self-contained company strongpoints, all 
  protected and linked by continuous barbed wire and minefields 
  covered by interlocking machine-gun fire. Outside this perimeter, 
  within 1–3km, a series of 16 other hilltop strongpoints were 
  sited within range of the camp’s howitzers and mortars, and 
  capable of mutually supporting fire.
  Major Dufour’s III/5 REI, flown in from the Delta on 
  27–28 October, was entrusted with the north-eastern face 
  of the inner perimeter, comprising strongpoints (PAs) 7, 8, 
  8bis and 9. Captain Letestu’s 11th Co was assigned to PA 8, 
  which he lost no time in constructing for defence. As usual 
  he was short-handed, with only one lieutenant and 110 all 
  ranks, but he gave them detailed orders and drove them hard 
  over the next three weeks. Before World War II the young 
  Marcel Letestu had qualified as a sergeant casemate-chief in 
  146 RIF, and there was nobody at Na San who could teach him 
  anything about planning defensive firepower.
  Company strongpoints were built for defence in depth, with 
  generous allocations of machine guns dispersed around the 
  perimeters, and the trenches, command posts and shelters dug 
  in deeply so that grazing fire could safely sweep across almost 
  the whole defended area in case the enemy broke in. In addition 
  to 11th Co’s nine 7.5mm LMGs and two 60mm mortars, Letestu 
  had six 7.5mm Reibel machine guns plus two .50-calibre HMGs. 
  He did not emplace any of his machine guns in the figure-of-eight 
  perimeter trenches surrounding PA 8, but sited the Reibels (four of 
  them in pairs) in five low, strongly sandbagged ‘blockhouses’ with 
  thick overhead cover of logs and earth, advanced slightly outside 
  the perimeter to sweep every angle of approach. The two heavy 
  ‘douze-septs’ each had their own bunker outside the east and west 
  flanks, to interlock with the fire from the adjacent strongpoints. 
  Each of these ‘blockhouses’ was linked to the perimeter trench by a 
  short zigzag access trench, and in each of these a légionnaire with 
  grenades would be posted to defend the rear entrance. The mortars 
  were dug in close to the command post and other central bunkers, 
  while the squad LMGs were spaced around the perimeter trenches, 
  free to circulate as needed. Each of the machine guns needed a 
  crew of three, reducing rifle strength in the trenches by 24 men. 
  Even so, Letestu maintained two 12-strong reserve squads, one 
  under his hand at the command post for counter-attacks, and the 
  other in a central position, armed with rifle grenades to cover any 
  ‘dead angles’. Inspecting PA 8 on 24 November, Col Gilles would 
  pronounce Letestu’s defences to be ‘masterly’, and ordered other 
  strongpoint commanders to study them.
  By that time Letestu’s preparations had been vindicated. 
  The installation of the garrison was only partially complete 
  (crucially, only one battery of 105s was yet present, and no 
  artillery fire plans had been prepared) when, on the evening of 
  23 November, the first VM attack struck by surprise – at PA 8.
  
  67
  I
  5
  3
  BPC
  I
  11
  5
  REI
  II
  322
  88
  4
  3
  2
  1
  3
  N
  RP 41
  RP 41
  to Son La
  Perimeter wire
  Anti-personnel mines
  Trenches
  Command post and bunkers
  LMG (initial position)
  7.5mm machine-gun position
  .50-calibre HMG position
  60mm mortar
  Riﬂe-grenade squad
  VM recoilless weapon
  
  68
  INTO COMBAT
  During the afternoon of 23 November elements of the three Thai battalions 
  began arriving at Na San, shaken and disorganized by their pursued retreat 
  across country, and Letestu was informed that Maj Michelet’s BT 3 would be 
  assembled between PA 8 and PA 9. Letestu protested that this would interfere 
  with the plotted fields of fire, but agreed with Michelet that if the Thais were 
  attacked they could enter the perimeter and regroup behind PA 8.
  In the darkness at some time between 2000hrs and 2030hrs Letestu heard 
  sudden bursts of firing, and assumed that the Thais were indeed under attack 
  – but only minutes afterwards one of his men shouted to him that ‘the Viets 
  are inside the trenches!’. He later found out that his only subaltern, Lt Durand, 
  commanding in the northern half of the strongpoint, had been alerted by 
  his men firing on what he thought was yet another straggling party of Thais 
  approaching the northern central entrance. He went forward to check; the 
  party’s leader called out in French, asking to come in, and Durand ordered his 
  men to cease fire. By the time the mistake was realized Durand and one of his 
  légionnaires had been shot dead and the first VM infiltrators were bursting into 
  the strongpoint, while others rose up outside and rushed the perimeter trench.
  The practised fire-plan immediately kicked in, stopping the bulk of 
  the attackers, but perhaps two platoons got inside and divided up, quickly 
  penetrating about halfway down the northern loop of the ‘8’ in both east and 
  west trenches. Captain Letestu immediately ordered his reserves into action 
  on both flanks, accompanying the left-hand squad himself. The savage close-
  View from inside a log-
  protected bunker in one of 
  the strongpoints at Na San, 
  here mounting an FM24/29 
  LMG. Such field fortifications 
  usually provided sufficient 
  protection; during the assaults 
  on PA 21bis on the night 
  of 1/2 December 1952 one 
  ‘blockhouse’ was later found 
  to have survived eight direct 
  hits by mortars and recoilless 
  weapons. (Private collection, 
  courtesy Indo Éditions)
  
  69
  quarter combat in the trenches saw automatic fire and grenades being traded 
  at point-blank range, while the combatants stumbled among the dead and 
  wounded. Hampered by the lack of a second officer, separate fights raged to 
  drive the attackers back metre by metre.
  While these struggles continued, at perhaps 2045hrs a flurry of VM 
  mortar bombs began falling on the southern half of the strongpoint, certainly 
  heralding a second attack, and Letestu radioed Bn HQ for supporting fire. 
  He had no artillery forward observation officer (FOO) to direct fires, and 
  without a fire plan the 105s obviously could not fire blind, so it was down to 
  the CMLE’s mortars beside the airstrip. In that company’s HQ the sounds of 
  battle only 750m away, and an influx of panicky Thais, were causing alarmed 
  confusion and some loose small-arms fire, but despite the lack of plotted 
  targets Lt Bart got his 120mm and 81mm mortars into action, dropping 
  bombs close to PA 8’s wire and along gullies which seemed the most obvious 
  approach routes.
  By 2130hrs Capt Letestu had recaptured his trenches, at a cost of 15 killed 
  or missing and many more wounded. Knowing that further attacks would 
  follow, he requested reinforcements and also the battalion medical officer. 
  He was sent the first – Capt Guilleminot’s 5th Co/3 BPC from the paratroop 
  reserve beside the airstrip – but not the doctor. (The MO, Lt Thomas, and his 
  Sgt Chief Rinaldi disobeyed orders and crawled out by themselves, slipping 
  in through the southern wire to start treating the most gravely wounded.) By 
  2230hrs VM infiltrators from the eastern perimeter had got close enough to 
  throw grenades at the command post, but were dealt with by Letestu’s orderly 
  and a few other Co HQ personnel; there were no other riflemen left in the 
  southern trench. At some unrecorded time the PA also came under fire from 
  a recoilless gun sited close to the northern perimeter.
  The paratroop company arrived shortly after 2230hrs, slipping in 
  from the south-west just in time to help drive back a second VM assault, 
  which hit the south-east perimeter. In the darkness VM troops infiltrated 
  much of the interior of the strongpoint, and the fighting to drive them out 
  Marcel Letestu
  Born in April 1918, Letestu enlisted in 1936, and by 
  the outbreak of war was a very young senior NCO with 
  III/160 RIF. On 8 September 1939 he was awarded his 
  first Croix de Guerre citation (mention in despatches 
  – of an eventual 13, eight of them in Army Orders) 
  for aggressive patrolling. Captured on 27 June 1940, 
  Letestu escaped in March 1941, and in 1942 joined 
  1er Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West 
  Africa. Commissioned in early 1944, he fought in North 
  West Europe with 3e Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens 
  in 3rd Algerian Inf Div of Gen de Lattre’s French First 
  Army. He was that army’s first platoon commander to 
  enter Germany, at Scheibenhardt on 19 March 1945, and 
  was gravely wounded shortly afterwards. In 1951 Capt 
  Letestu joined the Legion’s 5 REI, and served in the Delta 
  before III/5 REI were flown into Na San in November 
  1952. Shortly after his successful defence of PA 8, Capt 
  Letestu was wounded for a third time.
  During the Algerian War (1954–62) he held various 
  posts before, promoted major in 1958, he joined HQ 
  3 REI in South Oran. Thereafter he held progressively 
  higher command and staff appointments before, in 
  1972, he was promoted brigadier-general as the first 
  head of the newly instituted Foreign Legion Group 
  (GLE). He retired in 1976. Despite his many decorations 
  and having held the Legion’s most senior command, he 
  would probably have regarded the peak of his career to 
  be his selection at the age of 80 to carry the Hand of 
  Capt Danjou in the annual Camerone Day ceremony at 
  Aubagne. General Letestu died in August 2006, aged 88.
  
  70
  was chaotic. Letestu had needed the paratroopers’ help, but he furiously 
  made Capt Guilleminot correct his first radio report that he had ‘retaken’ 
  11th Co’s strongpoint. A final attack at 0030hrs, no doubt to cover the VM 
  withdrawal, was also driven off. (One of the Legion company’s PIMs was 
  discovered loading and firing a 60mm mortar by himself after its crew were 
  wounded.) VM casualties were usually carried away, but here the attackers 
  left 64 corpses and five wounded. The attacking unit was identified as 
  Bn 322/Regt 88 from Div 308.
  After this unexpected overture both sides spent the next week 
  completing their preparations, and when the battle resumed on the night 
  of 30 November/1 December it took a more familiar form. GOMRN 
  had by then received all its artillery and its third paratroop battalion, and 
  Dramatized by this time 
  exposure, one measure that 
  greatly aided the strongpoint 
  garrisons at Na San was the 
  dropping of ‘luciole’ parachute 
  flares to light up the VM’s 
  night attacks. Each flare 
  burned for 4 minutes, and an 
  aircraft could carry up to 60 of 
  them, giving it a long period 
  of illumination over the target. 
  (Private collection, courtesy 
  Indo Éditions)
  
  71
  fire plans had been completed; local tree-trunks were used to improve the 
  overhead cover of many positions, and all strongpoints were well supplied 
  with ammunition. Giap’s Div 308 was drawn in around the north-eastern 
  face of the camp, Div 312 around the north-western, and the south-eastern 
  was entrusted to Div 316. No doubt every effort was made to reconnoitre the 
  defences, but the terrain denied Giap any useful vantage point until he could 
  capture one of the outlying hills.
  Under a full moon on the night of 30 November/1 December, Bn 165/
  Regt 141 from Div 312 struck PA 22bis about 1km out from the western 
  end of the airstrip. It was held by a fragile Thai company from BT 2, and 
  although supported by the CMLE mortars they only lasted about 20 minutes 
  before abandoning the hill; they were brave forest fighters, but quite unsuited 
  to holding trenches under bombardment. This was the first test of Gilles’ 
  defence plan: if the hill could not be retaken, the airfield would be vulnerable 
  to Giap’s recoilless weapons and mortars. Legion paratroopers from 2 BEP 
  were readied close to PA 4, but first Gilles ordered the mortar company to 
  saturate the lost strongpoint for a full 2½ hours. The 120mm rounds were 
  more powerful than 105mm howitzer shells, and their devastating effect was 
  revealed to the French by circling Douglas C-47 Dakotas dropping parachute 
  flares to illuminate the scene. Starting at 0600hrs, Lt Bertrand’s company 
  of 2 BEP reoccupied PA 22bis without difficulty, despite receiving 81mm 
  mortar fire on the approaches.
  That same night another attack fell on PA 24, about 500m outside 
  the north-eastern corner of the perimeter, which was held by 4th Co, 
  II/6 RTM. They were bombarded with mortars and RCLs at close range, 
  and after withstanding two mass assaults by Bn 79 from Regt 102/
  Div 308 looping around both flanks, the strongpoint was overrun by a 
  third charge at about 0300hrs. The counter-attack – by 3 BPC and two 
  companies of I/3 RTM – went in at dawn, but met stubborn resistance; it 
  Na San: a famous photo 
  by Jean Péraud, who 
  accompanied Lt Hovette’s 
  23rd Indochinese Parachute 
  Co of 3 BPC during that 
  battalion’s counter-attack 
  to recapture PA 24 on 
  1 December 1952. It took 
  3 BPC and part of 1/3 RTM 
  from dawn until 1600hrs 
  to drive VM Regt 102/
  Div 308 off the hill, but the 
  counter-attack’s success 
  vindicated one of the tactical 
  foundations of the ‘air-ground 
  base’ concept. (ullstein-bild 
  via Getty Images)
  
  72
  was 1600hrs, after several attempts with artillery and air support, before 
  the paratroopers recaptured the hill. They suffered 70 casualties, but the 
  outer perimeter was restored, and Giap was still denied overwatch of the 
  central positions.
  The Viet Minh kept up a harassing fire with their heavy mortars and RCLs 
  all day on 1 December, and from 0100hrs on the 2nd major assaults struck 
  both PA 21bis outside the south-western corner, and the long ‘lizard-shaped’ 
  ridge of PA 26 a full 2km out to the east.
  Strongpoint PA 21bis – where Lt Bonnet’s 100 légionnaires of 10th Co, 
  III/5 REI had only had since 21 November to clear a tall, wooded hill 
  and dig in – was attacked by three battalions from Div 312, which made 
  long approach marches down the west side of the outer ring (at least two 
  battalions from Regt 209 and one from Regt 141). Despite shelling of their 
  suspected avenue of approach, the VM worked their way close to the wire 
  on two flanks, and at 0130hrs their mortars and RCLs began firing on 
  the company’s command and heavy-weapons bunkers. Suicidal sappers 
  died to breach the wire; the first mass charge was thrown back only 20m 
  from the command post, and Lt Bonnet was among those killed, trying to 
  throw back a grenade. A machine-gun crew and a 57mm recoilless rifle crew 
  both carried their weapons out into the open for better fields of fire; the 
  fighting again came down to 30m range, and Lt Bachelier was also killed. 
  Led by Lt Blanquefort, and with the planned support from the artillery 
  and French Air Force, the company managed to hold out until 0400hrs; 
  the VM then grudgingly fell back, though harassing fire continued. At 
  around 0700hrs the battalion’s 9th Co came up in support, followed by 
  two paratroop companies which combed the surroundings. They found that 
  – very unusually – the Viet Minh had left their casualties and weapons on 
  the field: about 350 dead and 50 wounded, plus many rifles, 45 SMGs, 39 
  LMGs, eight machine guns and two mortars.
  The ‘lizard’ of PA 26 was a razor-back ridge extending about 500m on 
  a north-east/south-west axis, held by the whole III/3 REI (Maj Favreau – 
  like Col Gilles, a veteran who had already lost an eye in battle). They had 
  arrived exhausted from a long retreat, but the strength of this position raised 
  morale at once; the bare ridgetop dominated steep, open slopes on all sides. 
  The unit was soon solidly installed behind a continuous perimeter of wire 
  and mines covered by oblique lanes of fire from machine-gun bunkers. 
  Visible fake weapons positions were built and manned by daylight, to draw 
  VM attention away from the real ‘blockhouses’ occupied at night. The 
  entrenched company positions were held by 10th Co (Lt Tholozany) at 
  the north-east, by 9th Co (Lt Cantin) and 11th Co (Lt Fournier) along the 
  north and south flanks respectively, and by 12th Indochinese Co (Lt des 
  Rieux de la Villoubert) at the south-west end. The centre accommodated 
  the command post and other bunkers, the mortars, and a counter-attack 
  reserve platoon.
  Each company, led by one or two lieutenants and six sergeants, was 
  divided into four small platoons of two squads each, and communications 
  were ensured by burying all field telephone cables 80cm deep. They had 
  to be proof against 105mm shells, because Favreau’s fire plan included 
  plots for fires virtually on top of his own positions. He had the barbed 
  
  73
  wire attached to branches in free-standing 50m lengths, so that if struck 
  by mortar fire they would leap up and fall back in the same place. Finally, 
  Favreau had microphones (which he had bought on his own initiative in 
  Singapore, using regimental funds) placed outside the perimeter on the 
  likely approach tracks.
  The CO’s preparations all played their parts on the early morning of 
  2 December, when the VM attacked with the usual heavy and repeated 
  support from two companies of mortars and RCLs. On the northern 
  quadrants, a battalion of Regt 88 from Div 308 hit 10th Co and 9th Co, 
  and on the southern faces two battalions of Dang Van Viet’s Regt 174 
  from Div 316 hit first 12th Co, and then the southern parts of 9th Co 
  and 11th Co. (Frustratingly, Dang’s memoir ceases after October 1950.) In 
  all, four distinct waves of assault climbed the ridge: at 0120hrs, 0240hrs, 
  0320hrs and 0500hrs. The first three all achieved breaches in the wire before 
  being broken up by the defenders’ fire; air-dropped ‘luciole’ parachute flares 
  lit up the attackers, and the French artillery pounded their approaches 
  and assembly areas. There was never any danger of a break-in, and Legion 
  casualties amounted to no more than six killed and 20 wounded. Under 
  cover of the thick morning fog the VM carried away most of their casualties; 
  at least 260 killed, so perhaps up to 1,000 in all. Covered by their mortars 
  and RCLs, over the next few days Giap’s regular divisions withdrew: the 
  battle of Na San was over. A VM mortar crew captured by a patrol on 
  4 December confirmed the army’s hunger, and their great fear of the 
  Grumman F6F-5 Hellcat fighter-bombers.
  Photographed about a year 
  after the battle of Na San, 
  this group are reportedly 
  cadres of VM Regt 88 from 
  Div 308 – the regiment that 
  attacked Capt Letestu’s 
  company of III/5 REI in 
  strongpoint PA 8 on the night 
  of 23/24 November 1952 and 
  PA 26 in the early hours of 
  2 December. Note that some 
  still wear ‘sidecaps’ with their 
  pale-drab Chinese-supplied 
  uniforms. (SeM/UIG via Getty 
  Images)
  
  74
  PHU TONG HOA
  The major lessons of this action were both tactical and operational. First, 
  Legion infantry, who included many German and other World War II 
  veterans, proved formidable in stubborn defence and instinctive counter-
  attack, despite the handicap of long isolation in a one-company post 
  overlooked by higher ground. Second, despite an impressive concentration of 
  force and wide-ranging preparations, VM regional infantry lacked both the 
  skills and the heavy weapons to overcome légionnaires in pitched battle. The 
  third lesson, however, was that the French had no answer to VM dominance 
  of the road network in the Tonkinese highlands, so the quality of their soldiers 
  in tactical encounters was largely irrelevant.
  ‘SECOND DONG KHE’
  This action demonstrated that the fighting quality and junior leadership of the 
  Legion was still admirable, but that this still counted for little. In an operational 
  context that still favoured them the Viet Minh had improved their capabilities, 
  but the French had not. VM units were now stronger and better equipped than 
  in the past, had received basic tactical training, and for the first time enjoyed 
  effective artillery support. While still a regional regiment in all but name, 
  Regt 174 showed courage and dogged aggression over two nights in the face 
  of shocking casualties, and won a tactical victory (though it still took them too 
  long and cost them too dearly, due to inexperienced leadership).
  In the weeks that followed, Giap reacted to a confused situation much 
  more effectively than the French senior commanders, and inflicted an 
  Analysis
  OPPOSITE
  Despite the increasing 
  availability of support 
  weapons in 1951–54, the 
  central characteristic of 
  VM infantry tactics was a 
  willingness to accept the 
  high casualties that were 
  inevitable in massed frontal 
  attacks, which shocked French 
  observers. The French also 
  noted that VM units which 
  got into difficulties in battle 
  were abandoned to their fate 
  without any attempt to relieve 
  them. Such cold calculation 
  gave the Viet Minh a definite 
  advantage over Western 
  troops. These late-war 
  infantry, photographed in a 
  muddy assembly trench, wear 
  the typical cloth-covered 
  woven-fibre helmets, which 
  kept the sun or rain off but 
  gave no ballistic protection at 
  all. They appear to carry both 
  Chinese Type 50 and captured 
  French MAT49 SMGs, with 
  French rifles. (SeM/UIG via 
  Getty Images)
  
  75
  undeniable strategic defeat. 
  Chinese advice was crucial to 
  the planning of the ‘border 
  campaign’, and Chinese 
  weapons (though not, in 
  that context, their tactical 
  training) contributed to the 
  effectiveness of the units of 
  Div 308. Nevertheless, it was 
  Giap and his colonels who 
  had exploited unexpected 
  opportunities following the 
  slightly stumbling first move 
  at Dong Khe; and it was 
  his ordinary rank-and-file 
  – the bo doi, now a soldier 
  rather than a guerrilla – 
  who had persevered despite 
  exhaustion, hunger and 
  constant uncertainty, while 
  dispersed in harsh terrain 
  and weather. Operating 
  flexibly and aggressively, their 
  units had finally destroyed 
  major French forces. French 
  unreadiness and panic, at 
  levels far above a légionnaire’s 
  or a captain’s pay grades, had 
  then handed the VM the 
  consequent prizes, which 
  were enormous.
  NA SAN
  GOMRN’s victory brought Col Gilles his general’s stars, but he never doubted 
  how risky his position had been. On 24 November he had congratulated 
  Capt Letestu on having ‘saved Na San’, suggesting his awareness that his 
  incomplete defensive preparations could have been dismantled if a corner 
  had been knocked out of the perimeter. (He would later presciently warn the 
  commander at Dien Bien Phu of exactly this danger.)
  Giap makes no mention at all of the attack on PA 8, and glosses over the 
  failure of the subsequent assaults by arguing that ‘the troops were tired and 
  units disorganized after the long pursuit [of the French down to the Black 
  River] ... following glorious victories’. His divisions were certainly not at 
  their best by late November. In the Thai Highlands their logistics were under 
  strain; once up into the hill tracks beyond the Red River their supply lines 
  became tenuous, and their ammunition stocks had already been depleted. The 
  VM political machine’s lack of control over the civil population in the ‘High 
  
  76
  Region’ reduced not only the supply of rice and porters, but also of guides and 
  local intelligence-gatherers.
  Giap underestimated both GOMRN’s numbers and its morale, assuming 
  that all would be as tired as the units which he had pursued across country 
  to the Black River. The French occupation of the hills around the airstrip 
  also prevented his scouts from appreciating the depth of defence presented 
  by the inner perimeter, and his FOOs from directing his artillery. This was 
  anyway not strong; while capable of both direct (recoilless weapon) and 
  indirect (120mm mortar) fire, both its ammunition and its professional skills 
  were limited. Giap’s anti-aircraft units were also too weak to seriously deter 
  the A-26 Invaders and Hellcats, or to disrupt the daily airlifts upon which 
  GOMRN depended.
  The first attack on PA 8 on 23 November was launched without any 
  preparatory fires and seems to have been entirely opportunistic – perhaps 
  even ordered fairly low down the chain of command? If Regt 88’s gamble 
  had succeeded, and if there had been any comprehensive plan to exploit such 
  success, the heart of the camp might have been penetrated before the defence 
  was fully operational – but that second ‘if’ is a very big one.
  Once the defences and artillery plots were complete, the defensive plan 
  worked as intended – up to a point. The artillery, never seriously threatened 
  itself, was effective (on the night of 1/2 December alone the batteries and 
  CMLE expended 3,000 105mm shells, 600 120mm mortar bombs and 350 
  81mm rounds). The close-in paratroop reinforcement of PA 8 and the 
  counter-attack on PA 22bis were quickly successful, and that on PA 24 
  eventually, although the ability to recapture lost strongpoints even further 
  out was never tested. Tactically, when strongly armed and installed in well-
  planned defensive positions, the Legion infantry had covered themselves in 
  glory. They had laid the ghosts of Dong Khe, and could apparently look 
  forward with more confidence in their commanders.
  General Giap had once again demonstrated his lack of tactical 
  imagination, simply throwing his infantry into the meat-grinder – and they 
  had demonstrated, once again, their heroic willingness to charge into it. The 
  operational lessons for Giap included the fact that sustaining several divisions 
  far from their base areas for months on end demanded a logistic effort on an 
  entirely new scale. Crucially, he also needed more, heavier and better-served 
  artillery, and could only deploy it effectively if his forward observers had 
  uninterrupted views. Finally, in the face of the strengthened French Air Force, 
  anti-aircraft units armed only with machine guns were now insufficient.
  The French had been lucky in these handicaps faced by Giap, and above 
  all in the lie of the land. Without the defence-in-depth provided by Na San’s 
  continuous inner perimeter, surrounded by defensible hills within fairly easy 
  reach of a counter-attack reserve (and without uninterrupted airlifts), the ‘air-
  ground base’ would not have been sustainable. At Dien Bien Phu a year later 
  Giap would prove that he had learned his lessons, and that the Communist 
  Party, the General Staff and China had been willing and able to supply his 
  needs. The French C-in-C in 1953–54, Gen Navarre, recognized the risks of 
  Dien Bien Phu, but by the time he was fully informed of Giap’s new resources 
  and the VM’s unprecedented logistic achievements he had already thrown the 
  dice, and it was too late to withdraw.
  OPPOSITE
  French infantry and M24 
  Chaffee tanks during an 
  operation in the lowlands 
  in October 1953; the Legion 
  battalions had opportunities 
  to show themselves at their 
  best during such World 
  War II-style combined-arms 
  operations. This photo does 
  not in fact show elements 
  of a Groupe Mobile (GM), 
  which was an infantry 
  brigade with integral artillery, 
  armour and service units, 
  but of a smaller Groupement 
  Blindé or armoured battalion 
  group. This comprised an 
  HQ company, with an 81mm 
  mortar platoon; a tank 
  squadron (four troops each 
  with four M24 Chaffees, 
  plus one in the squadron 
  HQ); two or three truck-borne 
  infantry companies, each 
  with four rifle platoons plus 
  a support platoon with pairs 
  of .30-calibre machine guns 
  and 60mm mortars; and one 
  mechanized infantry company 
  in M3 halftracks. (ullstein-bild 
  via Getty Images)
  
  77
  UNIT ORGANIZATIONS
  Foreign Legion infantry units
  The basic infantry formation was a regiment, theoretically 
  of about 3,000 men – in British terms, a brigade. Its 
  designation was, e.g., 3e Régiment Étranger d’Infanterie 
  (3rd Foreign Infantry Regiment, abbreviated in this text as 
  3 REI). The standard organization was a large regimental 
  HQ and services company (CCR), and three rifle battalions 
  designated by Roman numerals, e.g. I/3 REI. Companies 
  bore Arabic numerals in sequence throughout the regiment: 
  I Bn = 1st–4th Cos, II Bn = 5th–8th Cos and III Bn = 
  9th–12th Cos.
  The regiment was a lieutenant-colonel’s command, and 
  the CCR comprised administrative, logistic, transport, 
  signals, intelligence and medical elements. The practical 
  links between regiment and battalion might be quite 
  tenuous. As ‘sector troops’ the battalions and their 
  companies were dispersed over long distances, but the 
  relationship remained intact through the regimental 
  commander doubling as the sector commander. From 
  1951, battalions serving within GMs or other operational 
  formations were dependent on the formation HQ in all 
  day-to-day matters.
  The battalion was the command of a major (chef de 
  bataillon). Standard battalion organization was an HQ 
  and services company (CCB) and four rifle companies; the 
  official strength of a CEFEO infantry battalion was 820 all 
  ranks, but in practice unreplaced casualties, sickness and 
  drafts detached for various reasons might reduce actual 
  ration strength on any given day to even as low as half 
  that figure. The battalion CCB was a miniature version of 
  the CCR, but also included a pioneer platoon and a mortar 
  platoon (four 81mm tubes – though only two might be 
  taken on mobile operations, to allow more ammunition 
  to be carried). Latterly, the pioneers received four 57mm 
  ‘recoilless rifles’, but both mortars and RCLs were often 
  devolved to rifle companies. When motorized within a GM 
  a battalion received an allocation of .50-calibre HMGs, 
  which they naturally tried to hang onto when they were 
  ‘dismounted’ (such opportunism was solidly within the 
  Legion tradition).
  A rifle company was normally about 120 strong but 
  might be reduced to only 90 (at every level, sub-units 
  often fell short of their establishments). Commanded 
  
  78
  officially by a captain but often by a first lieutenant, it 
  was equipped (from 1951) with a radio, and a jeep for the 
  company commander. The support platoon had pairs of 
  rifle-calibre machine guns and 60mm mortars; as was the 
  case at Na San (see above), in defensive positions these 
  could be augmented with extra and sometimes heavier 
  machine guns. There were supposed to be three officers 
  per company, but often there were only two, so one of 
  the three rifle platoons (sections) was routinely led by 
  a warrant officer (adjudant) or senior NCO. The platoon 
  might vary between 30 and 45 men, in a command element 
  and three squads (groupes) supposedly of ten riflemen 
  (fusiliers-voltigeurs) each plus an LMG team, led by a 
  corporal armed with an SMG. In some cases (as in PA 26 at 
  Na San) companies were organized in four platoons each 
  of two squads, for the sake of tactical flexibility.
  In 1951–53, Gen de Lattre’s ‘Vietnamization’ programme 
  saw CEFEO units form at least one Compagnie Indochinoise 
  per battalion. In the Legion the local recruits were at times 
  concentrated in complete battalions, e.g. IV/5 REI (later 
  the Vietnamese National Army’s Tieu Doan 75). However, 
  at Na San in November–December 1952 both III/3 REI and 
  III/5 REI had an integrated Vietnamese 12th Co, led by 
  French officers and senior NCOs.
  Viet Minh regular infantry units
  In May 1950, French intelligence reported standard 
  organization of a VM regiment (Trung Doan) as a command 
  and services unit, three infantry battalions and an artillery 
  ‘battalion’ (this was already overstating it; and from spring 
  1951 the regimental support element would be reduced to 
  a company with a few 81mm mortars and ‘SKZ’ bazookas 
  and recoilless guns). The typical battalion (Tieu Doan) then 
  reportedly had 710 men, in an HQ Co (140 men), three 
  rifle companies (sing., Dai Doi – each 170) and a support 
  platoon (60 men).
  By October 1950, battalion weapons additional to small 
  arms were listed as 27 LMGs (one per rifle squad), plus 
  in the support platoon six machine guns, eight 60mm and 
  two or three 81mm mortars, and three ‘bazookas’. At this 
  transitional date, all this prompts the question: ‘OK – but 
  which battalion are we discussing?’
  The exact strength and order-of-battle of Regt 174 
  at Dong Khe in September 1950 is unclear. Six weeks 
  previously, on 30 July, French intelligence had reported 
  that the ‘elite’ Bn 249 had 780 men, with 27 LMGs, six 
  SMGs, plus eight machine guns, six 60mm and two 81mm 
  mortars. The other two rifle battalions were identified on 
  that date as ‘255’ and ‘ex-251’. The CO’s account of the 
  battle has his three battalions numbered 249, 250 and 251, 
  but during the regiment’s advance to Lang Son in October 
  Dang Van Viet definitely mentions his Bns 249, 250, 251 
  and 255. Logically, we might suppose a reinforcement unit 
  to make up for the heavy loss at Dong Khe, in the absence 
  of individual replacements in the other battalions.
  The numbering of both battalions within a regiment 
  and companies within battalions might be at least partly 
  sequential, but bore no relation to the number of the 
  parent echelon. For instance, in mid-1950 Div 308 returned 
  from China with Regts 36, 88 and 102; Regt 36 was 
  composed of Bns 80, 84 and 89, and within Bn 84 the rifle 
  companies were numbered 41, 42 and 43. Similarly, within 
  the independent Regt 174, Bn 251 was composed of Cos 
  671, 673 and 674.
  The French report of July 1950 had listed Regt 174’s 
  organic Phao Binh ‘Artillery Bn’ 253 – which would soon 
  be stripped out to help form Heavy Div 351 – as having 
  three 75mm guns, two 65mm (perhaps old French M1906 
  mountain guns), and three ‘30mm’ (?). Its Anti-Aircraft 
  Bn 680 was reportedly more impressive, with ten .303in 
  Vickers MMGs and eight 12.7mm (.50-calibre) HMGs. That 
  report estimated the regiment’s total strength at 4,636 men, 
  but its actual combatants at only 2,327, thus reflecting the 
  importance of numerous service troops in units with few 
  radios and no motor vehicles. Even allowing for the relatively 
  fewer personnel in the artillery and anti-aircraft units, this 
  estimate, if accurate, suggests that the other two rifle 
  battalions may have been significantly weaker than Bn 249.
  In September 1953 the 2e Bureau reported standard 
  battalion strength prior to that date (it would soon fall 
  again) as 826 all ranks. The 96-man HQ Co had ten-
  man staff and political sections, and signals (22 men), 
  intelligence (ten) and engineer (40) platoons. The 160-man 
  support company had two machine-gun platoons (two 
  guns each), a mortar section (two 81mm) and a bazooka 
  section (two 60mm). The three rifle companies (each 190 
  men) each had a 33-man command platoon including 
  12-man mortar (two 60mm) and runner sections; and three 
  52-strong rifle platoons, each with a four-man command 
  section, a 12-man support squad (two LMGs) and three 12-
  man assault squads each with at least one SMG (probably 
  more), broken down into four three-man fire teams.
  
  79
  BIBLIOGRAPHY
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  Képi Blanc, No. 734: 70–71.
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  indochine54.free.fr
  On a typically vulnerable narrow dyke across paddy-fields, a 75mm M8 HMC leads two M3 halftracks – the same heavy vehicles as used by 
  the troop HQs of the RICM’s reconnaissance troops on RC 4. The frontier highway was not completely devoid of ‘soft going’, since in some 
  places (such as That Khe and Ban Nam) it traversed cultivated river valleys. (Howard Sochurek/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)
  
  80
  INDEX
  References to illustrations are shown in bold.
  AA bns/guns: (Fre)  24; (VM)  45, 55, 76
  AFVs (Fre)  9, 24, 27, 35, 35, 76, 77, 79
  air support (French Air Force)  6, 9, 13, 24, 34, 
  42, 46, 47, 52, 53, 54–55, 55, 62, 63, 63, 
  64, 65, 66, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76
  aircraft  9, 20: A-26  64, 76; AAC.1  34, 42, 
  45, 46, 55; C-47  63, 66, 71; Hellcat  73, 
  76; MS 500  34, 42, 54; P-63  47, 52, 
  54–55, 55; Spitfire  34, 42
  airfields/airstrips  9, 10, 34, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 
  53, 63, 65, 66, 69, 71, 76
  Algerian forces  44, 69: 23 BTA  7
  artillery forces (Fre): 69 RA  7, 38
  artillery forces (VM): bns/cos  18, 26, 45, 49, 
  52, 59
  artillery pieces/support (Fre)  7, 9, 13, 22, 24, 
  29, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 46, 47, 50, 52, 
  62, 63, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76
  artillery pieces/support (VM)  25, 26, 27, 36, 
  38, 46, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 59, 74, 76
  AT guns: (Fre)  50, 52, 53, 55; (VM)  26
  badges/insignia: (Fre)  40–41; (VM)  12, 40–41, 
  55, 56–57, 58
  carbines: (Fre)  22; (VM)  25, 62
  CEFEO  4, 8, 9, 19, 20, 30–31, 30, 33, 50, 54, 
  61, 62
  Colonial forces (Fre)  8, 18, 31, 36, 44, 66: 
  21 RIC  51
  Dan Cong porters  18, 18, 21, 28, 62, 65, 76
  Dang Van Viet, Gen  21, 25, 26, 60
  as regimental commander  12, 13, 18, 22, 
  32, 46, 48, 50, 52, 55, 60, 62
  attacks on Dong Khe  46, 47, 50, 52, 53, 
  54, 55, 59, 60
  failures/mistakes  46–47
  and road ambushes  22, 27, 60
  De Lattre, Gen  9, 19, 31, 61, 63, 64, 69
  Dien Bien Phu (1954)  13, 15, 64, 75, 76
  Foreign Legion
  calibre of  74, 76
  combat role/tactics  9, 17, 22, 23, 24, 77
  deployment to Vietnam  8
  discipline/esprit de corps  9, 17, 19
  ‘sector’ forces  8, 17, 19–20, 45
  size/strength  8
  training  17, 31
  Foreign Legion bns/cos/regts  8, 66, 76
  2 REI  16, 19, 22
  3 REI  6, 7, 7, 9, 22, 44, 49, 51, 58, 69
  I/3 REI  34, 36, 38, 49: Bn HQ  7, 38, 44, 
  51; 1st Co  34, 51; 2nd Co  34, 38, 43, 
  51; 3rd Co  34, 51; 4th Co  38, 51; 
  HQ Co  34
  II/3 REI  49, 62: Bn HQ  49, 51; 5th Co  
  22, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55; 6th Co  49, 
  50, 51, 53, 54; 7th Co  51, 54; 8th Co  
  22, 51, 54; HQ Co  50, 54
  III/3 REI  49, 51, 54, 62
  5 REI  69
  III/5 REI  10, 11, 66, 69, 72, 73: Bn HQ  
  69; 9th Co  72, 73; 10th Co  72, 73; 
  11th Co  10, 11, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 
  73; 12th (Indochinese) Co  72, 73
  GOMRN  66, 70–71, 76
  grenades: (Fre)  10, 10, 39, 40–41, 66, 69; 
  (VM)  14, 15, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 36, 53, 
  56–57, 58, 59, 69, 72
  Groupes Mobile (GMs)  9, 24, 63, 64, 76
  headgear: (Fre)  5, 9, 10, 16, 19, 40–41, 43, 43, 
  56–57, 58; (VM)  5, 12, 13, 14, 40–41, 55, 
  56–57, 58, 73, 75
  HMGs: (Fre)  22, 50, 52, 66, 67; (VM)  26
  Ho Chi Minh  6, 12, 34, 44, 48, 52, 59, 60
  Hoa Binh campaign  21, 29, 60, 64
  Indochinese forces  9, 23, 31, 61, 71, 72, 73
  LMGs: (Fre)  22, 23, 26, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40–41, 
  42, 43, 62, 66, 67, 68; (VM)  12, 12, 24, 25, 
  26, 26, 28, 29, 42, 53, 62, 72
  Lung Phai Pass  22, 23, 27, 34, 51
  machetes (VM)  15, 38, 39
  machine guns: (Fre)  22, 56–57, 58, 62, 66, 67, 
  72, 76; (VM)  26
  montagnards (Nung/Thai/Tho)  17, 33, 51, 54, 
  61, 64, 66
  Moroccan forces  35, 44, 50, 79: GTM  51, 54; 
  RACM  7, 24; RICM  7, 22, 34, 35, 44, 79; 
  I/3 RTM  71; II/6 RTM  71; 8 RTM  45, 46, 
  51; 1 TM  51; 3 TM  45, 51; 8 TM  45, 48, 
  49; 10 TM  45, 48; 11 TM  45, 51
  mortar cos/crews (Fre)  66, 70, 71, 76: CMLEs  
  69, 71, 76
  mortar cos/crews (VM)  73
  mortars/mortar fire: (Fre)  22, 36, 37, 38, 39, 
  42, 53, 54, 62, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 76; (VM)  
  25, 26, 26, 28, 38, 46, 52, 55, 58, 64, 66, 
  68, 71, 72, 73, 76
  paratroop drops (Fre)  6, 60, 61
  paratroop forces (Fre)  6, 48, 51, 54, 55, 63, 64, 
  65, 66, 69, 71, 76
  3 BCCP  48, 51, 62
  3 BPC  67, 71–72, 71: 5th Co  66, 67, 69
  1 BEP  51, 60, 62, 65
  2 BEP  71
  PIAT anti-tank weapon  26, 37, 39, 50, 53
  PIM labourers (French use)  19, 20, 66, 70
  pistols: (Fre)  11, 25; (VM)  55
  posts (Fre)  6, 8–9, 22, 23, 24, 27, 27, 28–29, 
  33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 39, 44, 47, 48, 49, 
  50, 51, 51, 60, 61, 64–65: ‘Ananas’/An Chau  
  51; Bac Kan  7, 34, 35, 38, 42, 44; Bac Ninh  
  7; Ban Be  51; Ban Cao  7, 36, 44; Ban Chu  
  51; Belair  7, 38; Bo Cung  7, 51; Cao Bang  
  7, 24, 34, 38, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 
  61; Chi Moi/Coc Long  7; Dinh Lap  7, 51; 
  Dong Dang  7, 34, 49, 51, 62; Dong Khe  7, 
  13, 22, 23, 27, 32, 46–47, 47, 48, 49, 49, 
  50, 51, 52–55, 53, 54, 55, 56–57, 58–62, 
  74–75, 76; Khuoi Saio  7; KM 41/KM 41 E  
  51; KM 41 W  27, 51; KM 45/Lang Giai  51; 
  Lang Son  7, 25–26, 44, 46, 48, 51, 54, 60, 
  62; Loc Binh/Lung Vai  7, 51; Na Cham  7, 
  44, 51, 54; Na Fac  7, 34, 44; Na Nam  7; 
  Na San  10, 10, 11, 14, 14, 15, 26, 29, 64, 
  65, 65, 66, 67, 68–73, 68, 70, 71, 73, 75–76; 
  Ngan Son  7, 38, 44; Nguyen Binh/Phu Lang 
  Thuong  7; Phu Tong Hoa  7, 16, 34, 35–36, 
  35, 37, 38–39, 39, 40–41, 42, 43–44, 74; 
  Pont Bascou/Song Ky Cong  51; Thai Moi  7; 
  That Khe  7, 23, 24, 29, 47, 48, 51, 54, 59, 
  60, 62, 79; Tien Yen  7; Vo Chang  7, 44
  recoilless guns/rifles/weapons: (Fre)  22, 23, 72; 
  (VM)  25, 26, 28, 52, 64, 67, 68, 69, 71, 
  72, 73, 76
  rifles: (Fre)  5, 10, 11, 22, 25, 26, 29, 40–41, 
  45, 45, 56–57, 58, 62, 75; (VM)  5, 12, 24, 
  25, 26, 40–41, 53, 56–57, 58, 72, 75
  routes coloniale (RCs)  6, 22–24, 24, 62, 66, 
  67, 74, 79, 79: RC 1  7, 51; RC 2  7; RC 3  
  6, 7, 34; RC 3bis  6, 7, 19, 34–35, 37, 42, 
  44; RC 4  6, 7, 12, 13, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 
  32, 34, 35, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 59, 60, 
  61, 62; RC 6  64; RC 7  60; RC 9  60; 
  RC 13  51; RC 37  51
  sappers: (Fre)  22; (VM)  28, 28, 29, 72
  satchel charges  28, 28, 29, 53, 56–57, 58
  ‘shock’ battalions (VM)  13, 38
  SMGs: (Fre)  22, 40–41, 53; (VM)  13, 14, 14, 
  15, 24, 25, 28, 29, 48, 53, 56–57, 58, 72, 75
  Thai forces/troops  66, 68, 69, 71
  uniforms/clothing: (Fre)  5, 9, 10, 11, 11, 16, 
  20, 40–41, 56–57, 58, 65; (VM)  5, 9, 12, 
  13, 14, 15, 15, 21, 40–41, 55, 56–57, 58, 73
  Viet Bac region  6, 7, 21, 44, 64
  Viet Minh
  bo doi  5, 13, 20, 75
  cadres  31, 32, 45, 55, 73
  Chinese assessment  48, 49, 50, 52, 59, 60
  civilian support  5, 6, 8, 12, 21, 21, 28
  combat role/tactics  4, 5–6, 8, 13, 18, 24, 
  26–29, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 44, 47, 
  53, 55, 56–57, 58, 68, 72, 74
  Du Kich village militia  12, 25
  elements/expansion of  6, 12–13
  food supplies  14, 21, 21, 60, 62, 65, 76
  recruitment/training  5, 17–18, 28, 31 74: in 
  China  13, 18, 28, 31, 44–45, 48
  Viet Minh forces
  bns  25, 27, 28, 32, 35, 48, 54, 59, 61, 72, 
  73: 11  52, 61; 23  13, 60; 61  38; 79  71; 
  84  29; 89  61; 154  61; 165  71; 246  49, 
  52; 249  12, 50, 51, 52, 53; 250  50, 51, 
  52; 251  50, 51, 52, 56–57, 58; 322  10, 
  67, 70; 374  60; 426  52
  cos  17–18, 26: 41  29; 315/316  50, 51; 
  671/673/674  50, 51; 924/925  50, 51
  divs  13, 18, 26, 45, 48, 64, 75, 76: 304  13, 
  18, 21; 308  13, 14, 15, 18, 21, 29, 45, 
  48–49, 52, 60, 61, 64, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 
  73, 75, 76; 312  13, 21, 45, 50, 52, 60, 
  64, 71, 72, 73; 316  73; 320  13; 325  13, 
  26; 351  26, 64
  regts  26, 45, 48, 74: 11  12, 60; 28  12, 25, 
  44, 60; 36  29, 48–49, 61; 38  49, 66, 73; 
  72  12, 34, 35, 36; 74  12, 34, 36, 38, 44; 
  88  10, 14, 15, 15, 67, 70, 73, 76; 98  13; 
  102  29, 49, 71, 72; 121  34, 35; 141  18, 
  21, 32, 34, 48, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56–57, 
  58, 60, 61, 62, 71, 72, 73, 74; 174  12, 
  13, 46, 48, 50, 51, 56–57, 58, 60; 176  
  13; 209  48, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 60, 61, 72
  Vietnamese People’s Army  6, 18, 31–32, 60
  Vietnamese supplétifs  4, 9, 49, 56–57, 58, 66: 
  CLSMs  44, 46, 51, 61, 61
  Vo Nguyen Giap, Gen
  actions of  6, 9, 13, 14, 18, 21, 25, 31, 35, 
  43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 48, 60, 61, 62, 63, 76
  attack on Dong Khe  47, 49, 50, 54, 55, 60, 
  74, 75
  road ambushes  13, 18, 33, 44, 59
  tactical failings/defeats  13, 26, 63, 75, 76
  Thai Highlands  64, 65, 66, 71, 72, 73
  Xam Pheo (1952), fighting at  28
  ZFNE  44, 49, 62
  ZOT  44, 54, 62
  
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  First published in Great Britain in 2018
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  Index by Rob Munro
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  Dedication
  To the late Légionnaire Eric Morgan
  2e REI, Indochine 1951–53
  Acknowledgements
  The author wishes to record his great gratitude to M Cyril and Mme 
  Ariane Bondroit, directors of Indo Éditions, Paris, and to Alexander 
  Zervoudakis in London, for their generous assistance with illustrations 
  for this book; and also to Benjamin Lai for his help in locating Chinese 
  research material.
  Author’s note
  All translations from French-language works are the author’s own.
  Conversions from metric:
  1cm = 0.39in
  1m = 3.28ft/1.09yd
  1km = 0.62 miles
  100g = 3.5oz
  1kg = 2.2lb
  Abbreviations
  Adj 
  adjudant (French warrant officer rank)
  AFV 
  armoured fighting vehicle
  BCCP 
   Bataillon Colonial de Commandos Parachutistes (Colonial 
  Commando Parachute Battalion)
  BEP 
   Bataillon Étranger de Parachutistes (Foreign (Legion) 
  Parachute Battalion)
  BM 
   Bataillon de Marche (task-organized battalion independent of 
  its parent regiment)
  Bn 
  battalion
  BPC 
   Bataillon de Parachutistes Coloniaux (Colonial Parachute 
  Battalion) (formerly BCCP)
  BT 
  Bataillon Thai (Vietnamese montagnards)
  BTA 
   Bataillon de Tirailleurs Algériens (Algerian Light Infantry Battalion)
  CEFEO 
   Corps Expéditionnaire Français d’Extrême-Orient (French 
  Far East Expeditionary Corps)
  CLSM 
   Compagnie Légère de Supplétifs Militaires (Light Military 
  Auxiliary Company) (Vietnamese)
  CMLE 
   Compagnie de Mortiers de la Légion Étrangère (Foreign 
  (Legion) Mortar Company)
  CO 
  commanding officer
  Co 
  company
  DBLE 
   Demi-Brigade de Légion Étrangère (Foreign Legion Half-
  Brigade; a regiment-sized formation)
  Div 
  division
  DKZ 
  Czech-made rifled recoilless gun
  FOO 
  Forward Observation Officer
  GOMRN  Groupement Opérationnel de la Moyenne Rivière Noire 
  (Operational Group Middle Black River)
  GTM 
  Groupe de Tabors Marocains (regiment-sized formation)
  HMC 
  howitzer motor carriage (self-propelled 75mm gun)
  HMG 
  heavy machine gun (.50-calibre/12.7mm)
  LMG 
  light machine gun
  NCO 
  non-commissioned officer (sergeant and above)
  PA 
  Point d’Appui (strongpoint)
  PIAT 
  Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank
  PIM 
  Interned Military Prisoner
  PLA 
  Chinese People’s Liberation Army
  RA 
  Régiment d’Artillerie
  RACM 
   Régiment d’Artillerie Coloniale du Maroc (Morocco Colonial 
  Artillery Regiment)
  RCC 
  Régiment de Chasseurs à Cheval (Light Cavalry Regiment)
  REC 
   Régiment Étranger de Cavalerie (Foreign (Legion) Cavalry 
  Regiment)
  Regt 
  regiment
  REI 
   Régiment Étranger d’Infanterie (Foreign (Legion) Infantry 
  Regiment)
  RG 
  Régiment du Génie (Engineers Regiment)
  RIC 
   Régiment d’Infanterie Coloniale (Colonial Infantry Regiment)
  RICM 
   Régiment d’Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc (Morocco 
  Colonial Infantry Regiment; mechanized)
  RIF 
   Régiment d’Infanterie de Forteresse (Fortress Infantry 
  Regiment; Maginot Line unit)
  RMLE 
   Régiment de Marche de la Légion Étrangère (Foreign 
  (Legion) Marching Regiment)
  RTM 
   Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains (Moroccan Light Infantry 
  Regiment)
  SKZ 
   VM-made smoothbore recoilless weapons, including ‘bazookas’
  SMG 
  submachine gun
  TM 
  Tabor Marocain (Moroccan light-infantry battalion)
  VM 
   Viet Minh (for simplicity, used here for both the Communist 
  political movement and its army)
  ZFNE 
  Zone Frontière Nord-Est (North-East Frontier Zone)
  ZOT 
  Zone Opérationnel du Tonkin (Tonkin Operational Zone)
  
SOURCE: textdata/thevault/Osprey System/Combat (CBT)/Osprey - CBT 036 - French Foreign Legionnaire vs Viet Minh Insurgent 1948-52.pdf