Sum1 wrote:Do you send the CO a facebook message when you need him to sign or review something?

No...but I don't send him a NAVADMIN either.

I think you are both missing the point, which is probably my fault. At the site here there is a process to draft, chop, sign, and approve awards -- 100% online. Email notifies you that you have correspondence to review. Chops and changes can be made online. Comments can be added to back up changes. PKI confirms the signature when approved. Meanwhile, the Navy continues to bury itself in blue folders.

If anyone on this site could be mistaken for a dinosaur, it is probably me. I grew up in the days of the Mod 40, banging away in the corner of the room printing messages as they came in. These were collated and filed. A six-section folder was used to create the daily read board. Out a sea, KLs were distributed in much the same way, hung up on a clipboard in SSES and initialed by Division leadership once read. How did we "automate" that process? We started sending them by email. Not effective.

Today, we have so many tools that we don't leverage. Tools that make us more effective, help get the word out, and encourage conversation. We need to embrace these tools as we move forward. The FLT TAC example is cute, and I have sent my fair share. But if we ever fight that way in an A2AD environment, we might as well throw in the towel. As far as NAVADMINs go, yes, they serve a purpose. Honestly, though, your example of the senior 1810 LCDR is troubling. As professionals, it is our job to be a part of the conversation, wherever it is occurring. Doctors read medical journals to keep up with their profession. They don't wait around for someone to send them a message. We are no different.

As for your Combatant Command instruction, I'll be sure to "like" it on FB.

I don't disagree with most of your points, but I watch day in and day out as people communicate ineffectively or in ways that don't achieve leadership's stated goals. I also love the fact that I feel more and more like a three star is within reach and not sitting in some ivory tower shielded by 100 O-6s and O-7s spoon-feeding their watered down agendas. But we all need to recognize that if there's a process for information dissemination and we buck that system, even if it's antiquated, without adequately socializing/solidifying the desired alternative then we're doing all of ourselves a disservice. Your KL via email example is great because it shows a paradigm shift that is easy to capture in policy and socialize with all the stakeholders. I'm sure if people were surprised by it, they weren't surprised for long because the KLs were now staring them in the face.

Now, say you decided that you were going to instead post all the KLs in some folder within the ship's LAN. You didn't tell everyone where they were, and just expected that people would notice that another folder was added to hierarchy. That could lead to confusion among the stakeholders, even if the new way gets the information out faster and more efficiently than making all the stakeholders physically walk to SSES and initial a paper.

I like what you mentioned about the awards process (wherever you are). That would have made my life way easier when I was at a big 4.

*edit*

As far as being part of the conversation, that was what I thought we were doing here. Then (there's a thread about it here) this site started getting less traffic, and a comment was made that the discussion had shifted to somewhere else. I recall asking where that "new" place was, but never really got a great answer. The HYPO blog is fine, but I've never been a fan of that format, so I don't often head there. The Information Warfare (now Cryptologic Warfare Officer, I'm guessing) discussion section of NKO was rarely updated. And when I read the Navy Live blog regarding our name change all the comments (at the time) were in broken English and obviously written by foreigners. The Facebook and Twitter changes are huge (and welcomed). I'm a big fan. But the Facebook page had something like 281 likes when I looked earlier today... there are a lot more CWOs than that.

COMEVIL wrote:

Sum1 wrote:Do you send the CO a facebook message when you need him to sign or review something?

No...but I don't send him a NAVADMIN either.

I think you are both missing the point, which is probably my fault. At the site here there is a process to draft, chop, sign, and approve awards -- 100% online. Email notifies you that you have correspondence to review. Chops and changes can be made online. Comments can be added to back up changes. PKI confirms the signature when approved. Meanwhile, the Navy continues to bury itself in blue folders.

If anyone on this site could be mistaken for a dinosaur, it is probably me. I grew up in the days of the Mod 40, banging away in the corner of the room printing messages as they came in. These were collated and filed. A six-section folder was used to create the daily read board. Out a sea, KLs were distributed in much the same way, hung up on a clipboard in SSES and initialed by Division leadership once read. How did we "automate" that process? We started sending them by email. Not effective.

Today, we have so many tools that we don't leverage. Tools that make us more effective, help get the word out, and encourage conversation. We need to embrace these tools as we move forward. The FLT TAC example is cute, and I have sent my fair share. But if we ever fight that way in an A2AD environment, we might as well throw in the towel. As far as NAVADMINs go, yes, they serve a purpose. Honestly, though, your example of the senior 1810 LCDR is troubling. As professionals, it is our job to be a part of the conversation, wherever it is occurring. Doctors read medical journals to keep up with their profession. They don't wait around for someone to send them a message. We are no different.

As for your Combatant Command instruction, I'll be sure to "like" it on FB.

Sum1 wrote:As far as being part of the conversation, that was what I thought we were doing here. Then (there's a thread about it here) this site started getting less traffic, and a comment was made that the discussion had shifted to somewhere else. I recall asking where that "new" place was, but never really got a great answer. The HYPO blog is fine, but I've never been a fan of that format, so I don't often head there. The Information Warfare (now Cryptologic Warfare Officer, I'm guessing) discussion section of NKO was rarely updated.

A team of us put together Station HYPO for this very reason. If you aren't happy with it, what solution are you working to implement?

Sum1 wrote:But the Facebook page had something like 281 likes when I looked earlier today... there are a lot more CWOs than that.

UNCLASSIFIEDROUTINER 101148Z MAY 16FM CNO WASHINGTON DCTO NAVADMININFO CNO WASHINGTON DCBTUNCLASNAVADMIN 106/16SUBJ/DESIGNATION OF THE CRYPTOLOGIC WARFARE COMMUNITY//MSGID/NAVADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N2N6/MAY//REF/A/MSG/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N2N6/021815ZFEB16//AMPN/NAVADMIN 023/16, INFORMATION DOMINANCE CORPS REDESIGNATEDINFORMATION WARFARE COMMUNITY//POC/WILSON/LTJG/OPNAV N2N6C1/-/TEL: (703) 604-6288/EMAIL: CHRISTOPHER.WILSON(AT)NAVY.MIL//RMKS/1. As discussed reference (a), officers with designators 181X, 681X, and 781X are designated as Cryptologic Warfare effective immediately.2. From the establishment of the Communications Security Group, the cryptologic community has continued to evolve to meet and defeat the threats it faces. The transition of the Information Dominance Corps to the Information Warfare Community in concert with the Chief of Naval Operations Design for Maritime Superiority has given Cryptologists another opportunity to formalize this evolution and define community identity. The Cryptologic Warfare designation honors the cryptologic heritage, recognizes the military effects these warfighters deliver, and aligns these officers along with Cyber Warfare Engineers, Cyber Warrant Officers, and Civilian personnel with their enlisted force.3. Released By Vice Admiral Ted N. Branch, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare, OPNAV N2N6.//BT#0001NNNNUNCLASSIFIED//

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The most important six inches on the battlefield is between your ears.

Just found an interesting article on CIMSEC lobbying to establish a connection(s) between Information Warfare structures/terms and more widely known Information Operations. Could this guy be on to something or just on something? http://cimsec.org/navy-information-warfare

yoshi wrote:Just found an interesting article on CIMSEC lobbying to establish a connection(s) between Information Warfare structures/terms and more widely known Information Operations. Could this guy be on to something or just on something? http://cimsec.org/navy-information-warfare

The article could be (unsurprisingly) summarized in one sentence:

"The application of the term 'Information Warfare' is not clearly defined, nor how 'Information Operations' applies to information superiority."

The author simply shows like 10 examples of how Information Warfare as a concept is nebulous and still set in jello. We've redefined who we are as a subset of information warfare (under the new construct of the IWC) at least two or three times in the last decade, so it's no wonder that legacy documents like JPs, DODIs, CJCSIs, NAVADMINs, NWPs, etc. would fall short in coherently communicating current Navy policy/doctrine.

I actually didn't see much real lobbying to connect IO and IW. In fact, all I saw was the identification of numerous problems without any clear recommendations on how to better align the (dare I say) overlapping responsibilities/missions of IW and IO. Simply stating "we need to define this stuff better" does little to actually redefine it in a way meaningful to policy makers and the warfighter developing doctrine.

Mmmmm - no. There IS value in reflecting on what he wrote especially, after: "In order to eliminate confusion and realize the potential contribution of Information Operations to naval warfare, the U.S. Navy needs to formally (1) define the IW mission, (2) specify IW functions to be accomplished by personnel, organizations, and systems, and (3) assign IW organizational responsibilities. The following are proposed definitions..."

And, here he demonstrates the need for the term IW and how it should be oriented:"The mission statement should be focused not on employment, but on the warfare task, purpose, action to be taken and the reason therefore. This translates to the need for the term “Information Warfare.” The following is offered as a statement of the mission of Naval Information Warfare: That portion of naval warfare in which operations are conducted to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the enemy’s human and automated decision making to gain warfighting advantages over the adversary, while protecting our own."

Sure it's different than how we have defined it, but that's not the point. The point is he is bridging the two terms to connect IW to the rest of the Navy/other warfare areas, something he again does later with an open ended question on N9 and N2/N6 relationship. The methodology behind the MFT he lays out is valuable in that it points to how any warfare area should know what it is supposed to be doing (define down through functions to identify tasks essential for the accomplishment or assigned or anticipated missions). I don't think his answers are necessarily correct, but his paradigm leads to inclusion of IW in the arenas of warfare in a practical way which makes sense to what is in existence. DCO afloat effort on CSGs, EW in Iraq, and several other successful examples followed that paradigm - because they connected to what is, not to what they wanted. I watched a VTC this morning during which a senior leader almost pleaded for his staff to get their widget to the right people and into the right process ("guys, you've got to get this stuff to the N3 at XXXXFLT. it's great to have a CAPT or Commodore in your back pocket, but you have to get this into operations"). Information Warfare is getting it into operations - not the ones we do by ourselves within our homogenous IW cylinder of excellence, but the ones we share with air, surface, mine, and other warfares. that's the author's point, I believe.

I completely agree with all of your points, but I disagree the author made any monumental contributions to bridge the gap. We already know we have problems defining the IW mission (we had issues defining what we did as IWOs in a meaningful and lasting way for years). I would also argue specifying functions and defining C2/organizational responsibilities is planning 101, whether you're talking about national strategy, a campaign plan, an OPORD, or something else.

I appreciate the dialogue he highlighted, but can we honestly say that any of us couldn't have written a similar document (albeit perhaps less eloquently)? These aren't new problems. I was hoping for new or insightful solutions and/or recommendations beyond the normal JP 5-0 / NWP stuff. I can also see that I'm coming across callously and less appreciative than I probably should have (I also noticed he quoted a blog that a member here runs!).

One thing I did appreciate is he highlighted the relative lack of emphasis on IO.