By economist John Kenneth Galbraith, former ambassador to India

The bombing of Germany, both by the British and ourselves [America], had far less effect than was thought. The German arms industry continued to expand its output until autumn 1944, despite the heaviest air attacks. Some of the best-publicised attacks, including those on ball-bearing plants, practically grounded the 8th Air Force for months. Its losses were that heavy. At the end of the war, the Germans had ball bearings for export again. Our attacks on their airplane plant were a failure. In the months after the spring raids of 1944, their production increased.

The reasons were threefold. First, the machine tools were relatively invulnerable. They'd be buried under rubble but could be dug out in a day or two. Second, it was possible to decentralise production: to move the machinery into schools and churches. It was reorganised in much less time than was imagined. The Germans discovered that it wasn't necessary for production to be in a single factory. They also discovered that it was possible to redesign a lot of equipment to reduce the use of ball bearings. Third, it was possible to reorganise what had been sporadic and less than diligent managements.

The most disappointing of the attacks was on the airplane plants. Production was taken away from Göring, who was expansively incompetent, and put in the Speer ministry, which was much better. This more than offset the damage done by the bombers.

There had been two broad strategies. The British bombed at night and went for the central cities, because that was all they could find. Naturally, working-class areas were the most damaged. The middle classes lived on the outskirts and were hardly touched. This was true of most cities – ours and theirs. It was the East End of London that was hardest hit by the Luftwaffe; or a working-class city such as Coventry. The same applied to German cities.

American strategy involved daylight raids; we aimed for the plants themselves. The problem was targeting. In a large number of cases, we couldn't hit them. There was a saying in 1945: we made a major onslaught on German agriculture.