article: Earlier this week, the administration certified to Congress - as it must every 90 days - that Iran was abiding by the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the formal name given to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. But the US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, later underlined that his country's policy towards Iran was under full-scale review. And in a message that will be heard loud and clear in Tehran, he castigated Iran's "alarming and ongoing provocations" and described the country as "the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism". There was a broader warning, too. "An unchecked Iran," he said, "has the potential to travel the same path as North Korea". So is the Trump administration behaving inconsistently? Well, probably not. Certifying that Iran is upholding its end of the bargain does not preclude a fundamental US policy review - one that would be normal for any incoming administration, and, given the personnel surrounding US President Donald Trump, is likely to be far from sympathetic to Tehran. The Iran deal of course was famously characterised by then candidate Mr Trump as one of the worst deals ever negotiated. For now it is still there and for all we know it may have considerable life in it yet. The problem for US policy is to grapple with three aspects of Iran and its behaviour. Firstly, there is the nuclear issue, and whatever the controversy surrounding the nuclear deal, it does impose constraints on Tehran's nuclear programme in return for tangible economic benefits. Iran at the moment is not "unchecked", to use the term mentioned by Mr Tillerson. Many western experts back the deal even if they have little enthusiasm for it. Even senior security figures in Israel - who opposed the Obama administration's negotiation of the agreement - have tacitly accepted that it does provide a framework to manage the problem. Reports suggest that even the Saudis - also long-time opponents of the agreement - have counselled Mr Trump not to abandon it. Of course it will not last for ever. And one of the strongest arguments of the deal's critics has always been: What will happen 15 years after the implementation of the deal, when some of the key provisions restricting Iran's nuclear activities expire? One hope was that it would provide a platform for improved relations between Washington and Tehran. Well that has not proved to be the case. Tensions are rising in the Gulf; the wider chaos in the region which finds Washington and Tehran almost always on different sides has seen to that. Indeed Mr Tillerson's tough rhetoric may inevitably influence the ongoing presidential election campaign in Iran - and not in a positive way, at least as far as western interests are concerned. The hope that by the end of the JCPOA's term, Washington will be dealing with a different Tehran, seems as fanciful as ever. Beyond the nuclear issue and bilateral relations there is the thorniest problem of all, Iran's regional role. Iran is now a crucial player, from Syria to Lebanon;
summary: Once again rhetoric and reality in the Trump administration appear to be at odds with each other.