article: The resignations of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, newly-appointed Prime Minister Khaled Bahah, and the entire cabinet were quickly followed by reports that the parliament had rejected their requests. Given Yemen's mercurial political playing field, another new configuration could be just around the corner. The tension from four days of fighting and negotiation between the rebels and Yemeni security forces seemed to have reached a resting point, with President Hadi and Houthi leaders reaching an agreement on Wednesday. That agreement essentially saw Mr Hadi capitulate to rebels' demands in exchange for a ceasefire, release of a kidnapped presidential adviser, and the withdrawal of rebel forces from some key positions in Sanaa. Yet a day later, the presidential adviser had not been released and rebels still surrounded the presidential palace and Mr Hadi's private residence. Judging from their mass resignation, Mr Hadi and his government decided that operating under the rebels' thumb was untenable and found little reason to believe the Houthis would ever fulfil their end of the bargain. Either they have given up entirely, or they are now playing their strongest card. The Zaidi Shia movement, whose traditional stronghold is the northern province of Saada, led massive anti-government rallies over the summer and then suddenly infiltrated the capital with its heavily-armed militia and tribal supporters, taking de-facto control Sanaa by mid-September. The government, political parties, and the Houthi movement signed the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) on 21 September, but it has largely gone unimplemented. Over the past year, Houthi leaders rightly concluded that they can use military might to change the political map and balance of power in their favour. The true extent of Houthi ambition is unclear; but the fact that they did not kick Mr Hadi out of the presidency or claim the premiership indicates they prefer to control from behind the scenes by placing their members in ministries and high-level government positions. This allows them to consolidate power, but without being saddled with ultimate responsibility. But the resignations of Mr Hadi and Mr Bahah now turn the table on their strategy. Sadly, the rebels' tactics affirm the power of the gun over the power of persuasion, and it marks a massive setback for the democratic transition process that began in 2011 with a youth-led uprising against longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a new government, and a successful National Dialogue Conference that produced agreement on the country's most pressing problems. The Houthis were included in the 10-month national dialogue process, and their representatives actually participated quite constructively in the working groups. But they were ultimately unhappy with the agreement of a six-state federal system they perceived would erode their power and autonomy. Since they did not win that fight politically, Houthi fighters set out to change the facts on the ground. They systematically pushed into new territory, aggressively picking fights with tribal militia, government forces, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militants, and established some degree of control in at least nine of Yemen's 22 provinces. The latest conflagration in Sanaa was prompted by the newly-drafted constitution,
summary: Less than 48 hours had passed after the latest agreement between the Houthi rebel movement and the Yemeni government, and the ground had shifted once again.